THE ROLE OF THE EDUCATION CLUSTER IN MONITORING, REPORTING AND RESPONDING TO ATTACKS ON EDUCATION

MAPPING OF PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES

A looted tent with Education in Emergencies supplies in Bentiu, South Sudan

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1. Executive Summary

The Education Cluster operates in a diverse range of contexts throughout the world, including evolving and full-scale armed conflict, protracted crises and situations exhibiting patterns of attacks on education. Since 2011 in particular, Education Cluster coordination teams and their cluster members in country have been ‘learning on their feet’ in an ongoing process of defining the role of the Education Cluster in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education and developing the partnerships and processes to help support their involvement in this area. This report aims to capture a range of perspectives on the Education Cluster’s role at the global and national levels, and to map the current Education Cluster practices in monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education, including the main challenges and lessons learned.

Inputs for this mapping were collected via a survey which yielded 61 individual responses, 31 key informant interviews with global, regional and country level stakeholders, review of more than 50 field level resources, and additional email correspondence. In total, more than 80 practitioners, specialists and advocates from the education, child protection and rights-related fields contributed their perspectives and shared their experiences. The mapping covers 22 countries, of which 13 have an active Education Cluster and eight have Education in Emergencies Working Groups. All 14 countries in which the UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) is currently established are represented in the mapping, as well as two former MRM countries.

The following overarching perspectives emerged from the mapping:

**Education Cluster has a key role to play in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, though the role(s) needs to be clearly defined:** Participants unanimously converged in their agreement that the Education Cluster, at the global and national levels, has a vital role to play in monitoring and reporting attacks on education while also supporting partners, most critically the Ministry of Education (MoE), in preparing for and responding to such contingency with guidance, tools and capacity building. The timing of this mapping coincides with several other initiatives of global partners in relation to attacks on education and was welcomed as an important contribution to global efforts. However, much of the engagement to date has been informal and the need to more clearly define the Education Cluster’s role was widely called for, including in relation to the areas of convergence with the work of other stakeholders.

**Education Clusters are engaging in most countries:** Education Cluster or Working Group staff in 16 of the 22 country contexts included in the mapping reported that the Education Cluster is engaging with one or more types of attacks on education. Numerous concrete steps and good practices are evident in the field level efforts to strengthen the Cluster’s role in this area.

**Comparative strengths of the Education Cluster:** The Education Cluster’s established field presence and extensive outreach in countries affected by attacks on education, its close partnership with the Ministries responsible for education, and its operational mandate and partners’ response capacity were highlighted as among the comparative strengths of the Education Cluster that support its role in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education. The Education Cluster often acts as a natural ‘hub’ in country for education networks to report information related to attacks on education, and is well-positioned to influence and support responsive actions at the local levels.

**Education Clusters monitoring and reporting is distinct from, but positively contributes to, MRM monitoring and reporting on attacks on schools:** In eight of the 14 countries where the MRM Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) exists, Education Clusters contribute to the CTFMR’s monitoring and reporting on ‘attacks on schools’. Close coordination between the Education Cluster and the CTFMR extends information collection and responsive capacity, while also being necessary to avoid overlapping or duplication of efforts and resources (such as repetition of interviews or multiple requests...
for information to the same actors). Informants emphasised that it is important not to conflate the Education Cluster’s own monitoring and reporting with that of the CTFMR. The Education Cluster may adopt monitoring and reporting indicators that reflect the Cluster-specific objective of supporting children’s access to safe learning environments, while still aiming for a minimum level of comparability with MRM data requirements. Potential sensitivities around MRM monitoring and reporting may influence the Education Cluster to maintain a certain distance from the CTFMR. Finally, the prominent role of the Ministry of Education in the Education Cluster distinguishes it from the CTFMR composition which does not include government as a party to conflict in order to clearly preserve the CTFMR’s independence and neutrality.

**Shared responsibility of the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Coordination Group:** The Education Cluster and Child Protection Coordination Groups should maximise resources, synergise efforts and complement areas of expertise in relation to attacks on education. While the Education Cluster may play a stronger role in school-level monitoring and reporting, the Child Protection Coordination Group’s expertise in monitoring and responding to attacks against individuals (e.g. through case management systems) may enable it to play a stronger role regarding attacks against individuals. The potential for more systematic ‘triggering’ of joint or coordinated response to attacks on education, including on psycho-social support, should also be actively explored.

**Security and operational challenges:** The security-related risks associated with monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education are a primary concern for Education Clusters across many countries. The sensitivity and complexity of the related issues require a profound understanding not only of the consequences of the attacks, but also the causes. In many contexts the access to affected communities, survivors and to the perpetrators themselves are severely restricted, financial and human resources are limited, and the Education Cluster is confronted by many competing priorities.

**Coordination across the humanitarian and the development fields:** Given the short-term and long-term impacts of attacks on education, and the importance of supporting sustainable systems for monitoring, reporting and response, a broader approach that spans the humanitarian and development spectrum is essential for planning and implementation.

### Key findings

#### Types of attacks

- The Education Cluster **focuses on attacks resulting in physical damage to school infrastructure and the military use of school**. Monitoring of these two types of attack is seen as more objective and observable, and there is relatively little work on the less ‘visible’ attacks against individuals (students, education personnel) as well as threats to schools or personnel.

- The Education Cluster **currently lacks definitional clarity** in relation to the Cluster’s monitoring, reporting and response to ‘attacks on education’, which can render it more difficult to identify areas of convergence and complementarity with other actors.

#### Collaboration and Partnerships

- The collaboration between the Education Cluster and the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting is **highly variable** across contexts - ranging from very strong to non-existent – and is generally informal. The most common form of collaboration by the Education Cluster to the CTFMR is through non-standardised “alerts”, and by the CTFMR to the Education Cluster through advocacy support. Participation by the Education Cluster in CTFMR meetings occurs in only four countries and feedback from the CTFMR to the Education Cluster is sometimes weak.

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### Key findings

**Collaboration and Partnerships:**
- There is a lack of formalised, country level coordination mechanisms between the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Coordination Group which reflect their comparative advantages in relation to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.
- The Ministry of Education in most countries is an active asset to the Education Cluster’s role in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, particularly through the sharing of information and mobilisation of outreach networks.

**Monitoring and Reporting**
- Education Cluster monitoring currently relies on members’ voluntary efforts and their own program monitoring structures. This is resource-efficient but presents challenges for standardisation, timeliness and verification.
- The Education Cluster in some countries is measuring the longer-term impact of attacks on education such as student attendance rates and teacher retention. More can be done to extend this work to other locations as well as to understand short and medium-term impacts.

**Response**
- Response to attacks on education is generally ad hoc and a comprehensive, coordinated response system for attacks on education is in place in only one country. The most common response “trigger”, used in seven countries, is the initiation of negotiations by relevant actors with military and armed groups to vacate schools being used for military purposes.
- Education Clusters in the majority of countries are not monitoring the effectiveness of different types of response in reducing or preventing attacks on education and mitigating their impact.

**Challenges**
- Security is the main challenge to the Education Cluster in relation to monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, including issues related to access, political sensitivities, and perceptions of impartiality and neutrality.
- Less than one third of Education Cluster coordination staff and members have received training related to attacks on education, and training of the Education Cluster was the most relevant new guidance or process required for monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, as cited by Education Cluster respondents and MRM respondents.
- There is limited planning and capacity building for the strengthening of and transition to national and local systems for monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

To the Global Education Cluster:

**Standardised parameters of engagement**

- Include, as part of the Education Clusters’ global role in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, the responsibility for developing risk-informed, context-sensitive strategies at the national level for collecting, analysing and utilising information on patterns and trends of attacks on education, sharing relevant information with the CTFMR (in countries where it exists), and coordinating with the Child Protection Coordination Group and other appropriate stakeholders for complementarity of actions (including the potential for Education Cluster to focus on school-level monitoring and Child Protection to focus on attacks against individuals). Incorporate this responsibility in all Cluster coordination staff’s Terms of Reference.

- Develop a list of standard terms and indicators related to attacks on education and military use of schools to be used by the Education Cluster, contextualised as appropriate, and ensuring a minimum level of interoperability with MRM terminology and data requirements. Convene and support key stakeholders to develop or adapt the current definitions and indicators of attacks on education, as needed.

**Collaboration and Partnerships**

- Initiate and support a consultative process to agree, at the global level, the roles and responsibilities of the Education Cluster, the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and the Child Protection Working Group in relation to attacks on education, and develop joint guidance for country teams. Such guidance should, inter alia, outline institutional mandates, promote organisational collaboration, distinguish between the MRM and broader monitoring and reporting on attacks on education, and recommend the development of country-level agreements and communication protocols (including a feedback mechanism to Clusters), and highlight the benefits of the Education Cluster’s participation in the CTFMR technical working group.

- The Education Cluster’s role can and should contribute to the MRM as a means of supporting accountability and higher level actions and political advocacy, alongside its own Cluster monitoring and reporting of attacks on education. The Cluster can and should work to harmonize existing monitoring data fields with MRM data fields to encourage interoperability of attacks information at the field and global level. Wherever possible, the Education Cluster should consider, as a minimum level of engagement, the communication of informal alerts to the CTFMR. As a good practice, joint advocacy with the CTFMR should be encouraged where relevant in order to broaden outreach of messages in-country.

**Reporting**

- Enhance reporting by the Global Education Cluster on the scale and impact of attacks on education, including through the collection and collation of a minimum set of standardised indicators which include the measurement of short and longer-term educational impact, and as a support to awareness raising efforts by global advocacy partners. Consider the possibility of country ‘report cards’ for priority countries with recognised high levels of attacks.

**Security and Ethical Considerations**

- Reinforce the Education Cluster’s adherence to ethical standards, humanitarian principles and risk mitigation in monitoring and reporting, such as the necessity of informed consent, confidentiality and risk assessments, including through clear guidance to national clusters in the Practical Guide and periodic training.
Include attacks on education, an introduction to the MRM and an in-country security briefing on the context as a standard component of the induction of Education Cluster coordination staff.

**Capacity, Resources and Knowledge Management**

- Invest in capacity, skills and knowledge of Coordination teams related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education, including through the development of a Practical Guide and training package (including modules for use in existing training packages, during Cluster meetings and events) for Education Cluster coordination teams with elements on relevant standards and legal framework; coordination structures, partners and the link with the MRM; definitions and types of attacks; monitoring principles, security measures, confidentiality and ethical safeguards; standard tools available; and planning and monitoring the Cluster’s activities and results. Support an ongoing exchange with the Child Protection Working Group, Protection Cluster, MRM actors and other relevant global partners, regarding the potential for joint capacity building initiatives.

- Develop and disseminate global standardised Education Cluster data collection tools (e.g. monitoring forms and associated guidance), information management products (e.g. databases, information sharing protocols), and templates for reporting and advocacy, that allow for contextual adaptation and contribute to the systematisation of country-level practices. Such tools should draw upon the MRM experience, methodologies and best practices, as relevant.

- Establish a global online resource bank to share field-level monitoring, reporting and response resources, such as guidelines, case studies, issue and best practice briefs, incident reporting formats, codes of conduct, information-sharing protocols, databases, advocacy briefs, reporting templates and training modules. Include field-level reference materials collected through this mapping as part of the Education Cluster Toolkit which will be accessible on the Global Education Cluster’s website.

- Continue and enhance the surge (RRT) support to national Education Clusters in relation to attacks on education, particularly for capacity building on related Cluster guidance and standard tools, and the convening of country-level stakeholders to support the development of coordination and information exchange protocols.

To the National Education Clusters:

**Strategic Engagement**

- Facilitate, wherever the context allows, a strategic discussion amongst Cluster members to determine the level of Education Cluster engagement in monitoring and reporting on attacks on education, including initial and periodic risk assessments, and analysis of stakeholders and relative capacities, and ensure that the security of staff and communities, humanitarian neutrality, and enhancing programme quality are prioritised.

**Collaboration and Partnerships**

- Support the development of country-level agreements such as two-way information sharing protocols and formalised response coordination frameworks with the Child Protection Coordination Group and the CTFMR.

- Invite the CTFMR to participate periodically in the Education Cluster meetings to support understanding and exchange on issues related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on schools/education.

- Maintain and encourage the mutual participation of Education Cluster and Child Protection Coordination Group representatives in each other’s meetings to strengthen coordinated planning and action related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.
• Work closely with Child Protection and Protection Coordination groups to ensure that attacks against individuals, including sexual violence against children to and from school, and abductions and recruitment of children in school, are being monitored and reported, and referred to appropriate response mechanisms such as inter-sectoral referral pathways or community-based mechanisms so that survivors may seek available help.

Monitoring and Reporting

• Consider how to incorporate MRM data fields into the Education Cluster’s own monitoring and reporting of attacks on education in order to support comparability of data.

• Consider the development of Cluster-specific standards or procedures to ensure a minimum level of verification for cluster monitoring and reporting on attacks on education. This could include a requirement for a Cluster member to visit the site of the incident or interview a witness in order to cross check the reported information. Education Cluster ‘verification’ should be distinguished from MRM verification, and would require coordination with the CTFMR in order to avoid overlapping/duplication of efforts and resources (e.g. repetition of interviews, multiple requests for information from the same actors).

Preparedness and Response

• Building on positive practices in multiple countries, maintain and enhance country level joint advocacy (with CTFMR and other relevant stakeholders) triggered by the military use of schools, including negotiations through well-positioned interlocutors with military and armed groups to vacate schools.

• Systematise other types of trigger response, in coordination with relevant actors, including psycho-social support for students, teachers and communities affected by attacks.

• Continue to advocate for and support programs that empower children and communities, advancing accountability and preparedness. Support children’s clubs and strengthen Parent Teacher Associations in the establishment of early warning systems, localized contingency plans and feedback mechanisms.

• Improve the monitoring of preparedness and response effectiveness, including through the identification of measurable indicators to be used as a baseline and to monitor the response in the short and long-term. Provide options for response monitoring indicators in the Practical Guide for Education Clusters.

• Advocate for and support both short and longer-term strategies that build capacities of government, civil society organisations and community structures for sustainable monitoring, reporting and response systems and risk-informed contingency planning. In locations where Clusters are not active or have been deactivated, this preparedness initiative should be built into Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) programming.

Capacity and Transition

• Build capacity of Cluster members in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, particularly regarding security and confidentiality measures. This should also include arranging for the CTFMR team to carry out periodic, contextualized trainings to the Education Cluster on the MRM mandate and operational structure, and the specific methodologies, definitions and standards used by the CTFMR for monitoring and reporting of attacks on schools

• Explore ways of bridging humanitarian and development approaches in order to strengthen national and local monitoring, reporting and response systems, including through working groups linked to conflict - disaster risk reduction and safe school networks.
To global MRM actors and the global Child Protection Working Group:

- Participate in and support a consultative process to agree at the global level the roles and responsibilities of the Education Cluster, the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and the Child Protection Working Group in relation to attacks on education, and develop joint guidance for country teams.

To CTFMRs:

- Initiate the development of country-level agreements with the Education Cluster such as two-way information sharing protocols with a built-in feedback mechanism.

- Include the Education Cluster as a participant in the CTFMR Technical Working group.

- Continue to provide orientation or training related to attacks on schools to Education Cluster members and government counterparts and participate in Education Cluster meetings on an as-needed basis to support understanding and exchange on issues related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.

- Support government in contingency planning related to attacks on schools in partnership with the Education Cluster.

To national Child Protection Coordination Groups:

- Support the formalisation of country level agreements with the Education Cluster on two-way information protocols, joint response coordination frameworks and systematisation of response triggers (e.g. psycho-social).

- Maintain and encourage the mutual participation of Education Cluster and Child Protection Coordination Group representatives in each other’s meetings to support coordinated planning and action related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.
2. Introduction

2.1. Background

Attacks on education, including military use of schools, are a major challenge to education provision in conflict-affected countries. There is growing recognition and evidence that these threats to education are more wide-spread than previously understood. The report “Education under Attack 2014” found significant patterns of attack in 30 countries over a 5-year period, and isolated incidents in another 40 countries\(^1\). A report on military use of schools “Lessons in War 2015” found that in the majority of countries with armed conflicts, including at least 26 countries in the past decade, government armed forces and non-state armed groups have used schools and other education institutions for military purposes\(^2\).

In recent years, Education Clusters and Education in Emergencies Working Groups have been increasingly engaged in monitoring attacks on education and military use of schools, as a basis for advocacy, prevention and response. This is consistent with the cluster mandate of ensuring a timely and effective education in emergency response, and its aim to ensure safe learning environments for conflict-affected children and youth. The Global Education Cluster (GEC) in partnership with UNICEF Education section has therefore identified the priority need to provide technical support and capacity building of education in emergencies coordination staff in this fast evolving field.

As a first step, the GEC and the UNICEF Programme Division’s Education Section’s Education in Emergencies Hub commissioned a consultancy from November 2015 to March 2016 to advance outcomes against the GEC 2015-2016 work plan and UNICEF’s 2014-2017 Strategic Plan, including:

i. Mapping of existing practices by Education Clusters in contexts with prevalent patterns of attacks on schools, and capturing the field and global perspectives of key actors regarding the role of Education Clusters in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, and


Particular focus in the mapping was directed to collaborative arrangements between the Education Cluster and key stakeholders - notably the Country Task Forces on Monitoring and Reporting and Child Protection Sub Clusters/Coordination Groups\(^3\); tools and resources currently utilised to support field-level monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education; gaps and challenges; and promising practices and lessons learned. Some of the findings and recommendations from the mapping will be carried into and further elaborated in the practical guide for Education Cluster coordination teams, which will include more specific detail relevant to field-level Education Cluster coordination structures and processes.

2.2. Methodology

A Management Committee comprising the GEC Coordinator, UNICEF Education in Emergencies Specialists, two members of the GEC Rapid Response Team (RRT) and the Global Child Protection Working Group Coordinator, was formed to support and oversee the mapping framework and report. A broader ‘informal’ reference group was invited to the webinar on 26 January 2016 in which the key findings of the mapping were shared, and to review and comment on the draft report.

A desk review of guidance material and resources relevant to monitoring, reporting and/or responding to attacks on education, including key Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) documents and selected

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\(^1\) Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (‘GCPEA’), *Education under Attack 2014*, 2014.


\(^3\) Throughout the report, the term ‘Child Protection Coordination Group’ is used, and is inclusive of country level Child Protection Sub Clusters, Working Groups and other similar fora.
resources dealing more broadly with education in emergencies, child protection and human rights monitoring, informed the development of the consultation framework.

Tailored, online surveys were designed for Education Cluster Coordination teams, Child Protection Coordination Group teams and MRM teams (MRM specialists or focal points from UNICEF and Child Protection Advisors from UN Missions). The Management Committee contributed significantly to the content of the survey, and the MRM team in UNICEF Headquarters as well as the Child Protection section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) were consulted on the content of the survey for in-country MRM focal points. The surveys for Education and Child Protection were sent out to in-country staff in November/December 2015, with survey participants selected based on their current or previous Education Cluster coordination positions in countries in which the MRM is operational and/or categorised as ‘heavily affected’ by attacks on education\(^4\). The MRM surveys were sent out by UNICEF and DPKO to relevant country staff in January 2016.

The survey yielded 60 respondents, or a return of about 60 percent: 38 responded from Education Clusters or Education in Emergency Working Groups, 14 from Child Protection Coordination Groups, and nine from MRM teams (four from DPKO and five from UNICEF). Forty one (41) percent of the Education and Child Protection respondents were Coordinators, 20 percent were Co-ordinators, 22 percent were Information Management Officers and 17 percent were from cluster support or other\(^5\). A total of 21 countries were represented in the survey responses: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Mali, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

In addition to the survey, key informant interviews were conducted at the global, regional and field levels. Global key informants were first and foremost selected as (expert) representatives of key stakeholder groups, and based on their recognised expertise in education in emergencies, child protection in emergencies, attacks on education related advocacy or technical fields. Field level key informants were selected for follow-up interviews based on an analysis of their survey responses which provided particularly relevant information related to good practices, gaps and lessons learned. A total of 37 key informants were interviewed by skype or telephone through 31 interviews: 14 interviews with agency and organisational headquarters, 3 interviews with regional offices, and 14 interviews with current in-country or former coordination staff from 13 countries\(^6\). Email inputs were also received from a number of in-country Education, Child Protection and MRM staff who were not available for the survey or interview.

Survey respondents and key informants were requested to share field level resources related to attacks on education that had been developed and/or used by Education Clusters or partners, where they existed. More than fifty resources were reviewed, including reports addressing attacks on education, advocacy briefs or statements, standard forms and templates used in monitoring and reporting, coordination documents, written protocols, strategies, planning documents, Terms of Reference for Working Groups on Attacks on Education, and training tools.

In total, the perspectives of around 80 individuals and experiences from 22 country contexts contributed to the mapping. Of the countries represented, all 14 countries with a current MRM in country were included, together with two former MRM countries (see Annex 1 for a full list of mapping countries, cluster status, response statistics and field-level resources). Where information from survey respondents is referenced in this report, it is reported as ‘respondents’, while ‘informants’ refers to information provided during key informant interviews. Percentages presented always represent the percentage of survey

\(^5\) Some of the ‘other’ Child Protection respondents were UNICEF Child Protection staff / MRM focal points who are ‘double-hatting’ for cluster coordination.
\(^6\) CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine.
respondents. Given the political sensitivities and potential security risks, quotations (presented in italics) are not directly attributed to individuals or countries.

There are limitations to the mapping data and coverage. Education and Child Protection coordination staff do not represent the same set of countries (although there is overlap across 10 countries), and MRM respondents represented a smaller set of eight countries. Comparison between ‘Education’, ‘Child Protection’ and ‘MRM’ data is therefore broadly indicative only. Respondents and interviewees included current and former personnel, who were in place in the countries during different time periods. Their experience and perspectives on the Education Cluster’s role in the same country may therefore differ significantly. Country comparisons are presented only where it is possible to identify a consistent or recurrent practice for those countries. Given tight timelines and the focus on Education Cluster Coordination staff, the mapping did not allow interviews of additional in-country stakeholders such as government representatives, community actors and individual cluster members. Field visits were not included within the scope of the study.

2.3. Key definitions and acronyms

| **Advocacy** | The deliberate process, based on demonstrated evidence, to directly and indirectly influence decision makers, stakeholders and relevant audiences to support and implement actions that contribute to the fulfilment of children’s and women’s rights. Advocacy to address attacks on education may include, in practice, a broad range of activities from global level awareness-raising and campaigns, to the mobilisation of local level interlocutors to speak out on behalf of a specific issue. |
| **Attacks on Education** | Any intentional threat or use of force – carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious, or criminal reasons – against students (of all ages), educators (school teachers, academics, other education personnel, members of teacher unions, and education aid workers), and education institutions (any site used for the purposes of education, including all levels of education and non-formal education facilities). This includes attacks directed at students and educators at education institutions, or while going to or from an education institution or elsewhere because of their status as students or educators; attacks on pro-education activists because of their activism; and attacks on education personnel, such as administrators and maintenance workers, and education aid workers. |
| **Attacks on schools** | One of the six grave violations against children in armed conflict situations identified by the UN Security Council. ‘Attacks on schools’ is an umbrella term in respect of both indiscriminate and direct attacks against schools that are civilian objects, resulting in their compromised functioning, partial damage or total destruction, as well as against related protected persons (teachers, students and other education personnel). Such incidents include: physical attacks, looting, pillaging and wanton destruction. In the case of related protected persons, such incidents include: killing, injuring, abduction, and use as human shields. Since 2011, attacks on schools (and hospitals) are a trigger for listing of parties to conflict in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict. |

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7 Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria. These countries were all represented by multiple Education survey respondents as well.
9 See Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, [http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-attack-education](http://www.protectingeducation.org/what-attack-education)
There is no universally agreed definition of an armed non-state actor. For the purposes of this mapping, the term is used to indicate organized armed entities that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside effective State control, and lack legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties. ‘Armed groups’ is used interchangeably in the report.

Children

Persons under the age of 18 years.

Child Protection

The prevention of, and response to, abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence against children.

CTFMR

Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting. The CTFMR is a UN-led structure established in countries to implement the MRM, including collecting, verifying, analysing and reporting information on the six grave violations and developing and supporting the implementation of Action Plans of parties to conflict.

DPKO

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. There are currently eight UN missions (five peacekeeping missions administered by DPKO, and three special political missions administered by the UN Department of Political Affairs) with dedicated Child Protection Advisors whose role includes monitoring, reporting and verifying the six grave violations, co-chairing the CTFMRs and supporting implementation of MRM Action Plans.

GCPEA

Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack: a global level inter-agency coalition undertaking research, advocacy, normative and technical work. A key GCPEA initiative was the development of “Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict” finalized in December 2014.

GEC

Global Education Cluster: an open formal forum for coordination and collaboration on education in emergencies. At the global level, work is focused on providing operational support to country clusters, building response capacity and developing and implementing standards and policies.

Grave Violations

The six grave violations monitored and reported by the MRM: recruitment and use of children; killing and maiming of children; abduction of children; rape and other forms of sexual violence against children; attacks on schools and hospitals; and denial of humanitarian access. Once established in a country following the listing of one or more parties to conflict in the annexes of the Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation of children in armed conflict, the MRM monitors and reports on all six grave violations and all parties to that conflict (whether listed or not).

Listing

Process of adding a party to conflict to the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report on Children and Armed Conflict. The decision is made by the Secretary-General on the basis of UN-verified information indicating that a party to a conflict has committed at least one of the ‘trigger violations’ (as a pattern or recurrence). Listing leads to the establishment of the MRM in the country where the listed party operates. All but one of the grave violations (denial of humanitarian access) are triggers for listing.

Military Use

Refers to a wide range of activities in which armed forces or armed groups use the physical space of a school in support of the military effort, whether temporarily or for a protracted period of time. Includes, but is not limited to, the use of schools as military barracks, weapons and ammunition storage, command centres, defensive positioning, observation

13 There are two additional missions (Cote d’Ivoire and Haiti) with child protection officers who undertake broader child protection activities and are not MRM related.
14 See GEC website, http://educationcluster.net/who-we-are/
posts, firing positions, interrogation and detention centres, training facilities, and recruiting grounds.\(^{15}\)

### Monitoring
The process of data collection, verification, documentation and information management. Monitoring of attacks on education may include incident-level monitoring (detailing a specific event), as well as the longer-term consequences and impacts of trends and patterns of attacks, and it encompasses ‘impersonal’ attacks (against structures and property) as well as attacks against individuals.

### MRM
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism. Established by Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) to provide the UN Security Council with timely and reliable information on the six grave violations against children in armed conflict.

### OSRSG-CAAC
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (‘SRSG’) for Children and Armed Conflict serves as the leading UN advocate for the protection and well-being of children affected by armed conflict. The OSRSG-CAAC provides technical support and guidance to the CTFMRs and receives inputs to develop the OSRSG-CAAC’s advocacy at global, regional and field level as well as to draft the Secretary-General’s annual report to the Security Council in which the Secretary-General names parties to conflict who commit grave violations against children that are triggers for listing. The SRSG is also mandated to engage in dialogue with listed Governments and armed groups to develop Action Plans aimed at halting and preventing violations against children. The SRSG also reports annually to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. Other CAAC resources are also developed by the OSRSG-CAAC in partnership with UNICEF and DPKO.\(^ {16}\)

### Reporting
The CTFMR provides reporting inputs to the UN Secretary-General’s annual report and country-specific reports on Children and Armed Conflict, and ‘global horizontal notes’ which are quarterly confidential notes shared with the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. Separate to the MRM, the Education Cluster may prepare their own public or private reports or provide inputs to external reports related to attacks on education.

### Responding
Actions informed by the gathering and analysis of information on attacks on education which aim to address the needs of affected children; enhance the education and protection situation of children; end, reduce and prevent further attacks; and/or enhance accountability.

### RRT
Rapid Response Team: a team of education in emergencies coordination professionals managed by the Global Education Cluster who are available for short-term surge deployment to support Education Clusters and working groups in country in strengthening coordination.

### Schools
All learning sites and recognisable education facilities, as determined by the local context, including both formal and informal, secular and religious, providing early childhood, primary and secondary education, as well as vocational training to children. Includes all school-related spaces, structures, infrastructure and grounds attached to them.\(^ {17}\)

### Threat of attacks
Include the plausible, explicit declaration of a plan, intention, or determination to inflict harm, whether physical or psychological, related to the seeking or provision of education.\(^ {18}\)

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\(^{15}\) Guidance Note on SCR 1998, op cit.  
\(^{17}\) Guidance Note SCR 1998, op cit.  
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
3. Decision to Engage and Types of Attacks

3.1. Decision to Engage

The INEE Minimum Standards for Education are the authoritative standards framework for the Education Cluster’s work, and provide a clear mandate for the Education Cluster to engage in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education. However there is no specific standard defining the scope of the Education Cluster’s engagement, nor a consistent trigger for when the Cluster will become involved. The mapping suggests that country level engagement has to date often been prompted by a sudden escalation in conflict, or the rapid availability of information related to attacks on education.

Both factors were present, for example, in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, which is the earliest example of Education Cluster involvement in monitoring and reporting attacks on education that emerged from the mapping. In that situation, the Education Cluster included a question in their Back to School Assessment following a period of post-election violence, which asked about dangerous objects or damage to school infrastructure. The data revealed that there had been significant attacks, and as a result the Education Cluster conducted another assessment (developing a simple questionnaire and database) of almost 10,000 schools. Working very closely with education officials and teachers, the Education Cluster collected detailed information on military use of schools, schools looted, destroyed or damaged, schools closed due to threats and the presence of UXOs (unexploded ordnance) in schools.

Education Coordination informants acknowledged that much of the Cluster’s strategic thinking around engagement has to date been unwritten, and examples of broad consultation on Education Cluster engagement or documented monitoring, reporting and response strategies are relatively few. Only 26 percent of Education survey respondents indicated that the cluster’s engagement had emerged through a strategic discussion and planning within the Cluster. Another 26 percent reported that it had evolved spontaneously, while 21 percent did not know. The remainder reported that the engagement was decided by the Cluster Coordinator, the UNICEF Representative, or through informal or minimal agreement with Cluster members.

In several contexts of intensive or rapidly escalating armed conflict, Education coordination staff reported that the cluster members had made a particularly strong call for cluster engagement. Often the personal initiative and previous experience of the Education Cluster coordination staff or Rapid Response Team members in working on attacks on education appears to have been a key factor in a higher level of cluster engagement. In some contexts where attacks on education were too sensitive to be discussed in the Education Cluster, Cluster Coordination staff have individually supported monitoring and reporting efforts.

Multiple informants stressed the importance of national Education Clusters clearly identifying ‘why’ they are engaged in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education and how it contributes to the broader Education Cluster objective of enhancing children’s access to a safe and protective learning environment before they initiate activities. A related process of assessing the Cluster’s existing capacities and resource needs, carrying out a thorough risk assessment and stakeholder analysis, and identifying areas of potential synergy with partners should also take place at this initial planning stage. This will allow the Cluster to match objectives with the ability and willingness of its partners to engage in such activities.

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19 Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery (reprint, 2012). See in particular Access and learning environment standard 2, guidance notes 4 and 7, pp 63-65. See also Analysis standard 1 – 4 Assessment, Response Strategies, Monitoring, and Evaluation; Community participation standard 1 and 2; and Education Policy standard 1 and 2.
3.2. Types of attacks with which the Education Cluster engages

The survey asked Education Cluster and Child Protection coordination staff to indicate the different types of attacks that occur in their context and their perspective on whether the respective clusters are engaged in the issue, evidenced for example through the highlighting of these issues in their cluster’s situation analysis and reporting, planning or strategic documents, or advocacy efforts.

The findings showed that the Education Clusters are engaging in most countries: Education Cluster or Working Group staff in 16 of the 22 country contexts reported that the Education Cluster is engaging with one or more types of attacks on education. There is not yet however a standardised definition for what constitutes an ‘attack on education’ for the purpose of the Education Cluster’s own monitoring, reporting and response. In a number of country contexts the Education Cluster has made reference to the MRM definition of ‘attacks on schools’ in relation to the types of attacks the Cluster monitors, however the Education Cluster has generally focused on the effect of the attack on the functioning of individual schools, with much less attention to identifying the perpetrator or confirming the school’s civilian status (elements of the MRM definition) and/or determining the intentional nature of the attack (a key element of the GCPEA definition of attacks on education).

In some contexts the types of conflict-related or security-related impediments considered of interest to the Education Cluster may not clearly fit within either definition of ‘attacks’. Additionally, Education Cluster standard terminology (e.g. learners, classrooms) have not yet been incorporated into the Education Cluster’s monitoring and reporting on attacks on education.

The Education Cluster has engaged to a greater degree on two types of attacks - physical attacks on school buildings and infrastructure and the military use of schools - compared with other types of attacks such as attacks against individuals (education personnel and/or students) or threats to schools and personnel. There are generally operational and security-related reasons for the Education Cluster’s focus on certain type of attacks in a particular context20, and it is therefore important that the Education Cluster signals its areas of coverage as well as the gaps in order to facilitate coordination and complementarity with other actors to provide the necessary support and assistance to all individuals and groups at risk.

Physical attacks on infrastructure: Eighty-seven percent of Education respondents, across 17 (out of 20)21 countries, indicated that physical attacks on school facilities is occurring in their context and 67 percent indicated cluster engagement in relation to this type of attack. During interviews, Education Cluster staff explained that engagement in these type of attacks is relatively easier and less sensitive as the physical effects of the attacks (destruction or damage to school infrastructure) could be objectively observed, and it was not necessary to identify the perpetrator to make a report and response. Education Cluster monitoring does not generally aim to determine if the attack was targeted or indiscriminate, but focuses on the resulting physical damage to infrastructure and equipment. In some contexts the issue of unexploded ordnance (UXOs) has also been closely monitored (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia).

Military use of schools: Ninety percent of Education respondents, across 19 (out of 20) countries, indicated the military use of schools in their context and 54 percent of Education respondents indicated cluster engagement in this area. This was also the type of attack most often identified by Child Protection respondents (57%) in relation to the engagement of the Child Protection Coordination Group. The use of schools as military barracks, operational bases, or detention facilities by parties to the conflict is often highly visible and its immediate impact on the disruption of school is relatively easily measured. A number of informants from Education, Child Protection and Protection suggested that military use of schools is a

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20 The survey responses also identified most often that physical attacks and military use of schools were happening in the country contexts, however this may be due to their relatively higher ‘visibility’ in comparison with other types of attacks.

21 Myanmar was the only one of the 21 countries included in the mapping that was not represented by Education respondents and/or interviewees.
particularly promising area of inter-sectoral and inter-agency collaboration as different partners may be comparatively better placed as interlocutors with military forces and groups.

**Threats:** While 64 percent of respondents in 15 countries identified threats to schools or educational personnel as an issue in their context, only 23 percent felt the Education Cluster was engaging with this type of attack. Challenges to engaging with this specific type of attack included the ‘fluid’ and usually invisible nature of threats and the difficulty of determining a causal link between the threat and the person’s educational status.

**Attacks on students and education personnel:** Attacks against teachers and educational personnel were reported by Education coordination staff in 16 out of 20 countries, and against students in school and on the way to or from school in 15 countries. Attacks against students and education personnel outside of the school was often seen as part of a general environment of insecurity and limited movement (see below) which is relatively difficult to monitor or respond to. While 33 percent of Education respondents indicated Cluster engagement in relation to attacks on students, and 38 percent indicated engagement in relation to attacks against teachers, the examples of specific Cluster actions in relation to these categories were limited. In Mali, Cluster reports include such attacks against students and education personnel under the reporting of “allegations”.

Survey responses from child protection indicate that Child Protection Coordination Groups are engaged in all types of attacks, with an involvement most often indicated in relation to military use of schools (57%). The survey results suggest a fairly low level of engagement by the Child Protection Coordination Groups in relation to attacks against teachers (29%) and students (21%), as well as recruitment of children carried out in schools (29%)\(^2\).

Other actions with an impact on children’s access to education which emerged from ‘other’ responses and interviews but were not included amongst the survey options, were:

**Limits on Movement, Association or Access:** The impact of a general environment of insecurity and limitations imposed on children’s mobility and access to schools (e.g. families restricting their movement, or security checkpoints limiting movement) was highlighted in a number of contexts. The only clear example of monitoring, reporting and responding in this area was in Palestine which specifically addresses the impact of security checkpoints.

**Ideological or Political interference:** The use of ideological or political materials, lessons, or trainings in schools was noted in several contexts. In one context for example, the issue of ‘militarisation’ of children in schools (‘patriotic’ lessons encouraging children to participate in armed activity) was raised as an issue that does not easily fit within the definitions of military use of schools or recruitment of use of children and was challenging to address. In another context, armed groups had forced the replacement of curriculum materials with different language and content.

**Occupation of schools by internally displaced person (IDPs)** – while clearly not an attack on education – was often included by Education Cluster staff within the same monitoring and advocacy activities. Several informants noted that advocacy on the issue of IDP occupation is less sensitive and can help open up a broader dialogue on the use of schools for non-educational purposes (e.g. Syria). Informants stressed that use of schools by IDPs can severely damage or destroy infrastructure, as well as prevent the school functioning and impede children’s access to schools.

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\(^2\) See Annex 2 for full survey responses from Education and Child Protection in relation to engagement in different types of attacks. Possible reasons for the lower level of engagement are covered under section 4.2 on collaboration with the Child Protection Coordination Group and section 6 on challenges.
Recommendations

To Global Education Cluster:

- Include, as part of the Education Clusters’ global role in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, the responsibility for developing context-specific strategies at the national level for collecting, analysing and utilising information on patterns and trends of attacks on education.

- Develop a list of standard terms and indicators related to attacks on education and military use of schools to be used by the Education Cluster, and contextualised as appropriate as well as with a minimum level of comparability with MRM data requirements. Create guidelines to convene and support key stakeholders to develop or adapt the current definitions and indicators of attacks on education, as needed.

To national Education Clusters:

- Facilitate, wherever the context allows, a strategic discussion amongst Cluster members to determine the level of Education Cluster engagement in monitoring and reporting on attacks on education, including identifying the context-specific role and responsibility of the Cluster as a whole, context-specific roles and responsibilities of individuals within the cluster, an analysis of stakeholders and relative capacities and who is best positioned to address each of the types of attacks.
4. Partnerships and Collaboration

4.1. Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting

The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism is currently established in 14 countries, of which nine have an Education Cluster and the other five have Education in Emergencies Working Groups.²³ The Country Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) is established in those countries to implement the MRM, including collecting, verifying, analysing and reporting information on the six grave violations and developing and supporting the implementation of action plans of parties to conflict.

The CTFMR is co-chaired by the UNICEF Representative and the highest UN authority in the country (either the Special Representative of the Secretary-General - ‘SRSG’, or the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator). CTFMR members include all relevant UN entities, represented at the most senior level, and other members of the human rights and child protection community operating in-country may also be invited, as appropriate.²⁴ The participation of NGOs in the MRM is recognised as an issue of high sensitivity given the risks that it poses for NGO personnel and programmes.²⁵ At the technical working level, UNICEF Child Protection co-chairs the Working Group and – in countries where there is a UN Mission – the Child Protection Advisor from the mission is the other co-chair.

The diagram above indicates the potential linkage points (represented by yellow boxes or yellow text) between the Education Cluster and the CTFMR structure. As UNICEF co-chairs the CTFMR, it is understood that it can represent the interests of the Education Cluster (and the Child Protection Sub Cluster) in its position as Cluster lead agency and facilitate information sharing for the purpose of monitoring, reporting and response. Some informants in the mapping noted the high level support of the UNICEF Representative in their country on issues related to attacks on education. In some countries the Education Cluster NGO members may also be present in the CTFMR or technical working group membership. Governments are not part of the CTFMR, as MRM monitoring and reporting needs to be necessarily an independent and neutral activity.²⁶

²³ See Annex 1 for a complete list of MRM countries and the status of the Education Cluster or Working Group in those countries.
²⁴ See MRM Field Manual, op cit., p.4, for the description of the CTFMR and its membership.
²⁶ Ibid.
In eight of the 14 MRM countries the Education Cluster is reportedly making a regular contribution to the CTFMR’s work on attacks on schools either through the sharing of all related Cluster data and/or providing alerts. In four of those eight countries Education Cluster coordination is also participating in CTFMR meetings. Multiple informants at global and field level expressed the view that the Education Cluster can and should contribute to the work of the CTFMR as a means of supporting accountability and higher level reporting and response to attacks on education. A number of informants also noted the potential for CTFMR information and actions in country to support the work of the Education Cluster, and one global informant pointed out the opportunity for the MRM to ‘give back’ to the Education Cluster through advocacy by the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict and reporting to the Security Council and other UN bodies.

The most common type of engagement by the Education Cluster with the CTFMR was reported by Education Respondents as providing “alerts” to the CTFMR (31%, reported in five MRM countries), followed by providing all data (26%, reported in five MRM countries). “Alerts” are a simple communication (verbally or written) to flag that an incident has occurred but generally do not use a standardised reporting format or provide detailed information. Several informants noted that there is relatively little operational and security-related ‘cost’ to the Education Cluster of providing an alert to the CTFMR when it has received information on attacks on education.

Eleven percent of Education respondents reported that the Education Cluster is participating in CTFMR meetings; fifteen percent of Education respondents indicated ‘don’t know’ and eleven percent reported ‘none’. Some Education respondents reported that they did not know if a CTFMR existed (including in countries where the CTFMR is established).

Where ‘other’ forms of engagement was indicated, it was often because the engagement was seen as informal, or was channelled through the Child Protection Coordination Group or UNICEF Child Protection section or (less often) UNICEF Education section. Some country staff highlighted that they had provided briefings to the CTFMR on the Education Cluster’s own work in relation to monitoring and reporting on attacks on education.

The majority of MRM respondents reporting on countries where there is an active Education Cluster indicated that the Education Cluster was sharing data (56%) or providing alerts (22%), while those with Education Working Groups in their countries noted that there was no sharing of information from the Education Working Group. There was not always agreement between the responses from the Education Cluster and the responses from MRM staff as to whether the Education Cluster was participating in CTFMR meetings, an outcome which is possibly influenced by the lack of formal agreement regarding the Education Cluster’s role.

In some contexts, collaboration between the Education Cluster and the CTFMR may happen more in one part of the country than another. This was noted in the Philippines where no engagement was reported at

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27 In the other six countries, the collaboration was either none, unknown, or ad hoc through UNICEF sections.
28 The tools and processes utilised by the Education Cluster for these purposes is considered under ‘Reporting’ in section 6.2 below. The chart showing all responses is included in Annex 2.
the national level, while at the provincial level of Mindanao the Education Cluster Coordinator and Child Protection Coordinator were reported to participate actively in the CTFMR technical working group. This participation of Clusters in sub-national task forces, where they exist, was identified as a good practice in Palestine due to the potential to form strong relationships with communities and local interlocutors for stronger monitoring, reporting, and advocacy. In Syria, prior to the introduction of the Whole of Syria architecture, and linked to political and security considerations, the Southern Turkey cross-border cluster reported having very little engagement with the CTFMR which they understood to be operating out of Damascus.

The mapping identified four country contexts in which the Education Cluster – usually the Coordinator – is participating in CTFMR meetings: DRC, CAR, Mali, and the Philippines (at the sub national level only). The status of the Education Cluster in these countries is not a formal member, and Coordinators are generally participating in the CTFMR Technical Working Group meetings. The exception was DRC where the Education Cluster Coordinator also reported participating in higher level, ‘principal’ CTFMR meetings. Invitations to become a member of the CTFMR may be extended to entities that ‘must be neutral, impartial and independent from all parties to the conflict and governments are not part of the CTFMR. As the Ministry of Education is generally part of, and often leads/co-leads the Education Cluster, it is therefore extremely unlikely that the Education Cluster would be invited as a formal member of the CTFMR.

Ensuring the participation of Cluster Coordinators or representatives in CTFMR meetings was recognised as a good practice in the OSRSG CAAC/UNICEF’s 2011 MRM Study. This view was echoed by Education informants with experience of CTFMR participation who reported that the Education Cluster’s inputs were valued and well-reflected in the CTFMR reporting and strategic use of collected information. Several global informants also noted the benefits of Education Cluster participation and linkage points with the CTFMR, particularly regarding the potential for coordinated response and advocacy. One MRM informant, noting the high level of collaboration between the Education Cluster and the CTFMR, observed:

… the Education Cluster really supported increasing the monitoring, refining definitions and putting the advocacy on attacks on schools on the agenda of all other coordination groups.

More than half of the MRM respondents indicated that it was their ‘expectation’ that the Education Cluster participates in CTFMR meetings, and several included such participation amongst their recommendations for improved collaboration between the CTFMR and the Education Cluster. These responses did not suggest whether the participation should be regular or on a needs basis. In some contexts where the Education Cluster has reported not being invited to CTFMR meetings, there was a sense of frustration that the potential for the Education Cluster’s contributions to the MRM were not realised.

In Palestine, where there is a Working Group on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict rather than an official CTFMR, the Education Cluster is a formal member of the Working Group. Palestine is also the only context in which a written document outlining the role of the Education Cluster (and the Child Protection Sub Cluster) in the CTFMR was identified in the mapping. This ‘Joint Coordination Framework’ was highlighted by both Education Cluster and Child Protection Sub Cluster staff as a good practice which brings together the key actors in joint planning and shared responsibilities, particularly around response.

Another good practice identified was the establishment of regular communication channels with MRM focal points in UNICEF (South Sudan) and/or the Peacekeeping Mission (CAR) to support cooperative arrangements for regular information exchange and linkages between monitoring and response. It was

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29 MRM Guidelines, op cit., p 11.
noted that Education Cluster Coordinators may not always have time to actively participate in the CTFMR and these interpersonal channels can be both resource efficient and effective.

The most common **engagement by the CTFMR with the Education Cluster** reported by Education respondents was supporting advocacy on issues related to attacks on schools, which was reported in 10 of the 14 MRM countries and by 32% of respondents. Informants most often cited examples of UNICEF or DPKO CTFMR members advocating with military or armed groups to vacate schools. One field Education informant also emphasised the importance of CTFMR reporting for global level advocacy: “The MRM provides precious data for evidence-based reporting and advocacy without which we would not be credible, particularly on the international scene”. This was followed by sharing information (24%, in six MRM countries).

MRM respondents also most often indicated advocacy support as the type of CTFMR support for the Education Cluster (56%), followed by sharing information with the Education Cluster (44%)³¹. A relatively small number of Education respondents (14%, in four MRM countries) indicated that the CTFMR had provided training to the Education Cluster on attacks on schools, while 22 percent said there was no engagement and 16 percent didn’t know. While 44 percent of MRM respondents said they had provided orientation or training for the Education Cluster, only 33 percent reported that they had participated in an Education Cluster meeting. “Never invited, it’s something we need to strengthen”, reported one MRM staff.

The assumption expressed by many Education informants that the country-level **Child-Protection Coordination Group has a closer engagement with the CTFMR** than the Education Cluster was – to some degree – supported by the Child Protection responses³². For example, 57 percent of Child Protection respondents reported ‘sharing all data’ with the CTFMR (compared with 31% of Education) and 64 percent of Child Protection respondents reported that the CTFMR was ‘sharing information’ as well as providing ‘advocacy support’ (compared with 24% and 32% respectively of Education respondents) and 29% reported receiving CTFMR training (compared with 14% Education). However, the participation of Child Protection in CTFMR meetings was the same (4 countries) and there were no examples of agreements between CTFMR and Child Protection (other than the joint framework in Palestine mentioned above which also includes the Education Cluster).

MRM responses in the eight countries which they represented did not suggest a significantly higher level of engagement by the Child Protection Working Group or the Protection Cluster in the CTFMR in comparison with the Education Cluster’s engagement. In one country, Mali, the Education Cluster is participating actively in the CTFMR while the Protection and Child Protection coordination groups were reportedly not present.

The fact that a UNICEF Child Protection staff generally co-chairs the CTFMR technical working groups (usually together with the DPKO Child Protection Advisor wherever there is a UN mission, and sometimes with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights - 'OHCHR'), is likely an influencing factor in the

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³¹ See Annex 2 for the full survey responses of MRM respondents regarding collaboration with the Education Cluster.
³² See chart in Annex 2 for full responses of Child Protection respondents regarding collaboration with the CTFMR.
relatively closer link between the Child Protection Coordination Group and the CTFMR. In some countries the UNICEF MRM focal point is also double-hatting as the Child Protection Coordination Group Coordinator, and so performs both roles. Moreover, the Child Protection Coordination Group is generally considering all six grave violations, inclusive of attacks on schools, so the scope of potential collaboration on issues is also greater.

Informants in multiple contexts emphasised the importance of Cluster members receiving feedback on information and reports they have provided to the CTFMR. Several Education Coordination staff noted that they were not told what happens with the Education Cluster information, including whether Cluster reported incidents have been verified. MRM respondents were asked about the process for dealing with alerts and reports received by the Education Cluster, to which respondents in three countries answered ‘sometimes provide feedback’ and in three countries they reported that CTFMR ‘provides feedback’. In two countries verification visits were ‘sometimes coordinated’ with the Education Cluster. It was noted by one MRM respondent that verification findings by the CTFMR were ‘not always shared in an open or timely way’.

One Education informant shared as a lesson learned a simple tool that had been developed and effectively used in Sri Lanka for the purpose of systematic feedback on incident verification. Other informants stressed that a Cluster Coordinator should request certain information from the CTFMR to support the Cluster’s decision to engage with the MRM, including: “what is the capacity of the CTFMR to verify reported incidents?”, “How will verification be done?”, “What will happen if reports are verified?”, and “How will we know the outcome?”.

Education informants noted that the MRM – with its strict requirement of UN-verified incidents and often limited staff and geographical reach – may miss out on a large section of available information. Improved coordination between the CTFMR and the Education Cluster can enhance the sharing of information, however it is likely there will remain a gap between what is gathered by Education Cluster members and what can actually be verified and used by the MRM. Several MRM informants suggested that a better understanding of the objectives of the MRM and the related institutional mandates of stakeholders can help address this concern. As one informant noted,

> The MRM guidance is relevant – some principles, some modalities, and some of the same definitions – but the Education Cluster needs to look at a different framework for its monitoring and reporting work – not at the MRM.

Several informants pointed out that the Education Cluster (and other clusters) may be in a better position than the MRM to track bigger picture trends, particularly longer term impact.

Multiple informants at global and field level suggested that the Global Education Cluster and the MRM focal points at global level (OSRSG, UNICEF MRM, DPKO) should agree on joint guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of the CTFMR and Education Cluster as this would facilitate more systematic collaboration at the field level and remove some of the ‘burden’ from field Coordinators to negotiate this relationship. The tendency for collaboration to be at the personal rather than the institutional level was frequently mentioned throughout the mapping, allowing for breaks in collaboration due to staff turnover. As this MRM respondent reported:

> The previous Education Cluster Information Manager was very good at contacting UNICEF [MRM] with updates and new developments. This was relationship based and not formalised. She has since left and it is unclear whether this partnership will continue.

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33 In the other two countries the MRM respondents had reported that they were not receiving reports from the Education Working groups in country.
The current discussion between DPKO, UNICEF and the global Child Protection Working Group to develop a paper that demarcates respective roles and responsibilities in relation to child protection coordination could serve as a useful reference for the Education Cluster.

4.2. Child Protection Coordination Groups

The Child Protection Working Group has included ‘child protection monitoring’ as one of the minimum standards for ensuring a quality child protection response in humanitarian action, and a number of other child protection minimum standards link with and contribute to the monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education. At the country-level, Child Protection Coordination Groups typically cover all six grave violations in their work, including attacks on schools.

The importance of the collaboration between Education Clusters and Child Protection Coordination Groups in relation to attacks on education was consistently highlighted throughout the mapping consultations. Current collaboration on attacks on education at the country-level was almost always described as ‘informal’ and multiple informants suggested this should be strengthened or formalised. MRM respondents in four countries described the collaboration and information sharing between the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Coordination Group in relation to attacks on education as ‘medium’, while in one country it was described as ‘good’, in another country ‘very good’ and in one other country ‘none’.

The only relevant collaboration document which was identified through the mapping in relation to attacks on education was the Coordination Guidance Framework used in Palestine. The development of this kind of joint framework between the Education Cluster and Child Protection Sub-Cluster was highlighted as a good practice by both Education and Child Protection staff. As one informant reported:

This acted as a strategic work plan, and then clusters had their own work plans. Every operation should consider this – it doesn’t have to be formalized, but it should be approached cross-sectorally in order to bring synergy.

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34 A draft concept paper has been developed by DPKO.

35 Minimum Standards for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action, Child Protection Working Group (2012), standard 6 (Objective and timely information on Child Protection concerns is collected in an ethical manner and systematically triggers or informs prevention or response activities). See also standard 7 (dangers and injuries), standard 9 (sexual violence), standard 10 (psychosocial distress and mental disorders), and standard 11 (children associated with armed forces or armed groups).
The importance of strong inter-personal collaboration with the UNICEF Child Protection MRM focal point was repeatedly stressed by country-level Education Coordinators. Several informants highlighted the importance of UNICEF Child Protection, Education and Health program sections strengthening their internal collaboration in relation to attacks on education, as a means of supporting inter-sectoral as well as inter-cluster collaboration. Several respondents suggested having a joint taskforce which would include Education, Child Protection and other relevant actors. In this respect, the joint framework from Palestine can offer an instructive example to other countries wishing to formalise their collaboration. In another example, UNICEF Child Protection and Education sections (with double hatting cluster coordination staff) in Pakistan formed a taskforce on Attacks on Education with membership foreseen to include UNICEF Health and Security sections36.

Both groups recognise the need for more formalisation and strengthened collaboration, emphasising the relative strengths and comparative advantages of the two groups and the potential to learn from and complement each other. Education coordination staff felt that that Child Protection Coordination Groups have relatively greater expertise in identifying and addressing protection needs of individuals, including through their experience in case management systems and Child Protection community-based committees. The Child Protection Coordination Group’s link with human rights organisations and the judicial system can also further accountability measures.

Child Protection informants highlighted the Education Cluster’s strengths as its partnership and extensive outreach through Ministry of Education and education service providers, as well as the possibility that education may be seen as more ‘neutral’ than protection and therefore has a better chance to move the issue of attacks on education forward. As Child Protection covers all six grave violations, it was pointed out by Child Protection informants that they have relatively less resources available to address attacks on education specifically.

The potential for one coordination group to take a ‘formal’ lead on monitoring attacks on education has been suggested in some fora37, but this did not emerge as a clear recommendation in the mapping consultations. Where it was suggested (by one MRM respondent, one Education informant and one Child Protection informant), it was proposed that the Education Cluster should take the lead. In Ukraine, it was reported that UNICEF had designated the Child Protection Coordination Group as the lead on monitoring attacks on education and following up, while the Education Cluster would support collecting and collating information. Reports from both Education and Child Protection indicated that there was a lack of clarity on the ‘ownership’ of data as well as who was leading on ‘response’.

The favoured approach that emerged from the mapping was one of ‘shared responsibility’, with a strong emphasis on the need to clarify respective roles and responsibilities in each context, taking into account the relative capacities and priorities of the two clusters/coordination groups. Several informants pointed out that the Child Protection may take a stronger role in a context where – for example – attacks on education are linked with other violations such as recruitment in school or sexual violence. One other informant observed:

> Sometimes the Education Cluster has better resources than the Child Protection Working Group and can bring more attention to the issue. The Education Cluster can act as a big motor for monitoring and response.

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36 Terms of Reference for the Working Group are draft only and not endorsed.

37 See Feasibility Study for Improved Global Monitoring of Attacks on Education, Education Above All and Child Protection in Crisis, Oct 2011. Some education experts/practitioners stated that the UN education cluster should formally take the lead on monitoring attacks on education, at least at the primary and secondary levels, while other expert-practitioners thought the UN protection cluster (and specifically the Child Protection Working Group) might be a better lead, as many of its members are familiar with the MRM and other forms of child rights monitoring.
A number of field level informants recommended that Education and Child Protection at the global level formalise their collaboration in relation to attacks on education to help streamline and facilitate the field level collaboration. The wish to ‘move forward together’ in relation to protecting children from attacks on education was echoed at the global and field level.

4.3. Ministry of Education

In line with their general obligations under international human rights law, including the right to education, States are ultimately responsible for protecting children in their territory and should, in principle, have a pivotal role in the monitoring, reporting, response and accountability related to attacks on education. The Ministry of Education (MoE), present throughout a country, and with systems and networks for collecting education information, should be in the best position to monitor and track attacks on public schools and have contingency plans to implement in the event that an attack occurs. The MoE was generally recognised in the mapping as an asset to monitoring and reporting on education.

In some conflict contexts however, the Ministry may not have a nation-wide network due to constrained access to teachers and education officials in certain non-government controlled areas (this may be the result of wilful political decisions to not pay civil servants or due to blockages levied by opposition groups). The government or its affiliates may also be implicated in attacks on education and their presence may undermine or call into question the neutrality, objectivity and effectiveness of Cluster monitoring and reporting efforts. Several MRM respondents raised concerns about bringing MRM-related work into cluster meetings where the government, as a party to the conflict, has a prominent and often leading seat at the table.

Most education field staff and a number of global actors felt it was important to have the Ministry present for discussions on attacks on education and viewed it as consistent with the Cluster’s inclusive engagement and advocacy roles, while recognising that such a decision must be subject to the political sensitivities and a careful risk assessment of the context. Informants noted the difficulty for individual Education Coordinators, particularly those who are new to the context or relatively inexperienced, to make this assessment and the importance of support from the Global Education Cluster and from UNICEF in country or at the regional level in this regard.

The main roles of the Ministry of Education in relation to the Cluster’s engagement on monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education which were identified through the mapping are outlined below:

**a. Actively monitoring and/or sharing data related to attacks on education** - Sharing data was the Ministry role most often cited - in 47 percent of Education survey responses - while 40 percent of Education responses indicated that the Ministry is actively engaged in cluster monitoring, either through non-trained or trained staff. In some countries the Ministry of Education has actively supported cluster assessments related to attacks on education. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire the Education Cluster’s assessment was able to cover almost 10,000 schools, “a feat that was only made possible because the Cluster used the Ministry of Education and its excellent communication channels”.

It was noted by informants in several countries that data reported by governmental agents needs to be approached carefully and preferably verified by independent sources to ensure the Cluster’s monitoring and reporting is not biased, or perceived as biased. Even in situations where political interests may not be obvious, the possibility of data being used for another agenda (e.g. to maximise financial aid in certain geographical areas) should be considered.

**b. Neutral** – In some contexts the Ministry has been described as aware of the Education Cluster activities in relation to monitoring and reporting, but not actively supporting, nor resisting them. Some interviewed Education Cluster coordination staff with the experience of working with outwardly ‘neutral’ Ministries felt
that the Ministry was in fact appreciative of the Cluster’s capacity and engagement in this area as the Ministry was unwilling or unable to actively play this role.

c. Responsive – Thirty-one percent of Education survey responses indicated that the Ministry of Education was supporting response activities related to attacks on education. In a number of contexts it was also noted that local level Education officials were much more likely to engage with monitoring and response. In Mali, local education authorities were reported to regularly provide information regarding school closures, school occupation, attendance information and information on exam centres in unsafe areas to the Education Cluster in order to advocate with the Ministry, UN Peacekeeping Mission and other partners for protection of the areas. Responsive actions by local level education officials to negotiate with military to vacate occupied schools were reported in a number of contexts (Ukraine, CAR, Côte d’Ivoire).

d. Resistant – Only three Education respondents (in two countries) reported that the Ministry was ‘resistant’ to cluster monitoring or sharing information related to attacks in their context, due to the extreme political sensitivity of the issue. Even in such highly politicised contexts, there may still be ways to advocate with the Ministry of Education. One informant shared a lesson learned from such a challenging context, where part of the role of the Coordinator was working with the Ministry of Education in order that the Ministry began to acknowledge the conflict’s negative impact on the education system. The Coordinator spent a lot of time supporting the Cluster’s introduction of an alternative education system whereby children would receive education materials that could be used at home. When this system was subsequently taken up by the Ministry of Education it represented a ‘breakthrough’ for the Cluster.

While some ministries may lack the political will to monitor and report on attacks on education, others may be constrained in their abilities to collect, manage, analyse or report information. This may be due to the impact of the conflict on the Ministry’s financial, material and human resources or, to institutional challenges such as staff turnover and underfunded systems. Already, thirty-nine percent of Education survey respondents indicated that the Cluster is strengthening the Ministry’s capacity in monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education and the Ministry of Education are routinely part of Cluster supported training on Education in Emergencies or INEE standards (including on monitoring and assessment). Specific training for Ministry of Education officials on monitoring and reporting on attacks on education were cited only in CAR, Palestine and at the sub-national level in DRC and Philippines.

4.4. Communities

Communities were identified as a significant resource for monitoring and reporting on attacks on education. Thirty-seven percent of Education survey respondents indicated that community members were reporting attacks to the Education Cluster and 23 percent reported that community members (non-trained) were involved in monitoring. Only 11 percent of survey respondents indicated that the Cluster had a mechanism in place for providing feeding back to communities on monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education, and this was implemented on an ad hoc basis through the individual cluster members’ own processes.

Only six percent of respondents indicated that trained community members were monitoring and reporting attacks on education, and survey and interview responses suggest that the Education Cluster has not to date engaged significantly in the training of community structures in this area. Informants at the global and national level noted the ethical concerns of ensuring security and confidentiality in community-level monitoring, and the difficulty of ‘giving back’ to the community in situations where monitoring may not lead to timely follow-up or response.

Only in one country context was it reported that communities themselves were leading the response, although country-level informants noted the importance of extending their support to the development of community-based protection strategies and responses. In Somalia, the Education Cluster cited the initiative taken by local community mechanisms for the successful evacuation of military occupied schools. In some
cases the Education Cluster’s regional focal point mobilised community and religious leaders and community education committees who then advocate with the military.

4.5. Other Groups and Actors

The majority (53%) of survey responses reported that the Education Cluster collaborated with other groups or actors in country, most notably the Protection Cluster (particularly for legal matters, such as school demolitions in Palestine or school certificate for displaced students), mine action (Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire), UN Peacekeeping Missions (DRC, CAR), Gender-Based Violence Sub-Cluster (CAR), and OSCE (Ukraine). This collaboration was mostly informal and on an ‘as needed’ basis. In DRC, the Education Cluster at sub-national level reported a good practice of sending Education Cluster ‘ambassadors’ to different cluster meetings in order to share information and to be informed on issues related to attacks on education. The Child Protection Coordination Group respondents reported their collaboration with the Protection Cluster, Gender-Based Violence Sub-Cluster, and National Human Rights Commissions on issues related to attacks on schools and education.

Forty one per cent of respondents indicated that there was a working group or forum in country that was working on attacks on educations. This included countries where there was no official CTFMR, but also in addition to the CTFMR in some countries. Such working groups include:

- Working Group on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict (Palestine)
- Safe Schools consortia and Schools as Zones of Peace networks (Nepal, Philippines, Pakistan)
- Attacks on Education Taskforce with Education and Child Protection Clusters, together with UNICEF section staff (Pakistan)
- Attacks on Education Taskforce within the Education Cluster (Somalia, Gaza)

A good practice reported by informants in Mali, Somalia and Palestine was the taskforce formed during and after the GCPEA workshop in October 2015, comprising representatives from the Education Cluster, Child Protection Coordination Group, UN mission (Mali), UNICEF MRM and national Ministries. An MRM informant in Mali reported that this had played a significant role in strengthening cooperation on education matters. In Somalia, the delegation included the Ministry of Defence, and a tangible outcome of the action plan developed during and after the workshop was the signing of a Declaration by the Ministries of Education and Defence for the non-use of schools for military purposes.

Some informants noted the potential for closer links with health actors in contexts where attacks on schools and on hospitals are taking place, and given that attacks on schools and hospitals are joined together within one grave violation of the MRM. This collaboration appears – to date – relatively unexplored, and the possibilities for joint training and guidance, shared operational resources, and coordinated monitoring and reporting could be considered.

In relation to civilian-military engagement, the most common channel for the Education Cluster is UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination (22% of Education survey respondents), while two respondents indicated engagement with UN Peacekeepers and via the CTFMR. Advocacy by the OCHA Civil Military Coordination Unit to negotiate for forces to vacate schools was particularly highlighted as a good practice in CAR. In one country, engagement was reported as happening via the UNICEF Country Representative who then advocated with military and government. No survey response indicated any direct Cluster engagement with government security forces or armed non-state actors, however several Cluster Coordinators did report during interview their experience of meeting with local armed groups to discuss issues around attacks on education. Several informants noted the value of security information from NGO and UNICEF  

38 In several additional countries the “Working Group” for attacks on education was identified as the (regular) Protection Cluster or Child Protection Coordination Group.
security staff and the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) which includes information on attacks on education.

The collaboration – both actual and potential – between the Education Cluster and Child Protection Advisors (‘CPAs’) of UN peacekeeping or political missions was emphasised by a number of informants. CPAs are often found in countries with an MRM (see Annex 1), where they generally co-chair the technical meetings and their role includes documentation of violations, advocacy to the host government on remedial actions, dialogue with armed forces and armed groups, and training of the military and civilian components of the UN mission. The issue of military use of schools was cited as a good opportunity for working together as the peacekeeping mission often has more contact with armed groups.

Recommendations

To the Global Education Cluster:

- Initiate and support a consultative process to agree at the global level the roles and responsibilities of the Education Cluster, the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and the Child Protection Working Group in relation to attacks on education, and develop joint guidance for country teams. Such guidance should, inter alia, outline institutional mandates, promote organisational collaboration, distinguish between the MRM and Cluster monitoring and reporting, recommend the development of country-level agreements and communication protocols, and highlight the benefits of the Education Cluster’s participation in the CTFMR technical working group. The guidance should also include considerations for how to contextualize the agreed upon global levels roles and responsibilities of the cluster for Education Cluster and other stakeholders at the national level.

- The Education Cluster’s role can and should contribute to the MRM as a means of supporting accountability and higher level actions and political advocacy, alongside its own Cluster monitoring and reporting of attacks on education. Include suggestions for harmonisation of Cluster monitoring data fields with MRM data fields in the Practical Guide for Education Clusters. Wherever possible, the Education Cluster should consider, as a minimum level of engagement, the communication of informal alerts to the CTFMR. As a good practice, joint advocacy with the CTFMR should be encouraged where relevant in order to broaden outreach of messages in-country. Processes for monitoring and reporting if and how the Education Cluster is contributing to the MRM should be considered by the Education Cluster at the country-level.

To global MRM actors and the global Child Protection Working Group:

- Support a consultative process to agree at the global level the roles and responsibilities of the Education Cluster, the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and the Child Protection Working Group in relation to attacks on education, and develop joint guidance for contextualizing globally agreed-upon roles and responsibilities for country teams.

To national Education Clusters, CTFMR and Child Protection Coordination Groups:

- Support the development of country-level agreements such as three-way information sharing protocols and formalised response coordination frameworks between the Education Cluster, the Child Protection Coordination Group and the CTFMR.

- Invite the CTFMR to participate periodically in Education Cluster meetings to support understanding and exchange on issues related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.
• Maintain and encourage the mutual participation of Education Cluster and Child Protection Coordination Group representatives in each other’s meetings to strengthen coordinated preparedness planning, capacity building, response planning and action related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education.

• Work closely with Child Protection and Protection Coordination groups to ensure that attacks against individuals, including sexual violence against children to and from school, and abductions and recruitment of children in school, are considered in contingency plans and are being monitored and reported, and referred to appropriate response mechanisms such as inter-sectoral referral pathways or community-based mechanisms so that survivors may seek available help.

The mapping found that in those countries where monitoring, reporting and response activities are included in the Education Cluster work plan, they are often broadly formulated under general Education in Emergencies programs and contribute to objectives such as ‘access to safe and protective learning environment in affected areas’, without specific reference to ‘attacks on education’. This is often necessary in order to maintain a low-profile approach, but can make it difficult to measure the specific contribution and resource requirements of monitoring, reporting and response activities.

Each sub-section below considers Education Cluster practices in relation to monitoring, reporting and response, including reference to documentation, guidance and tools available. Specific examples of good practices, and practices to avoid (where relevant), are extracted at the end of each sub-section. Practices from other actors, notably Child Protection and the CTFMR, are included where they provide examples of complementarity or potential applicability for the Education Cluster.

5.1. Monitoring

The majority of Education respondents (75%) reported some level of Education Cluster monitoring on attacks on education, with 50 percent of all respondents using tools for monitoring and reporting, and 25 percent not using any tools. Of those using tools, it was most common to use Education Cluster developed tools. In some countries, ‘a combination of Education Cluster and MRM tools’ are reportedly being used whereby an MRM standard form (typically the incident reporting form) is adapted for the use of the Education Cluster.

Respondents and interviewees generally described developing fairly simple tools, with a view to incorporating some data fields from the MRM tools related to attacks on schools. The most frequently used tool is a single excel sheet, which is generally not accompanied by written definitions or guidance. Most often the IMO and/or Coordinator developed the tool/s, while in one context (Northern Syria) an Education Cluster member developed a monitoring and reporting form that was subsequently adopted, with some modification, for use by the Education Cluster.

Education Cluster monitoring currently relies on the voluntary efforts of its members, with Cluster members receiving information about attacks on education through their own regular, programmatic structures. This approach has the advantage of being resource efficient, low profile and not placing additional ‘burdens’ on the work of the Cluster members, however Cluster Coordination staff reported that there can be challenges of standardisation of information and timeliness.

The possibility of including attacks on education monitoring indicators in other standard Cluster monitoring such as 4Ws was proposed. In some countries (e.g. CAR, DRC) a standardised cluster ‘incident reporting format’ – based on the MRM form - is used, while in other countries members use their own formats to report incidents to the Cluster Coordination team who then enter the information into the Cluster tool or database of affected schools. This is generally an excel spreadsheet, although in Ukraine an Access database was used. In several contexts, it was emphasised that cluster members do not use paper forms while collecting information due to the sensitivities and security risks, and would communicate the information through telephone to the Information Management Officer or Coordinator for further documentation.

At a minimum, the Education Cluster database/excel sheet (e.g Somalia, Syria, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC) generally records information on the school (name, location, level, type, number of girl/boy students, number of classrooms, number of teachers), nature of attack (date, type, description), impact of attack (physical damage, duration of school closure, and sometimes information on casualties, presence of UXOs),
and the source/contact person. In Mali, the Education Cluster maintains a database of schools which tracks those that are open, closed or occupied, and/or verified in MRM (uploaded on an online file repository), and in Palestine, the ‘Vulnerable Schools List’ is used by the Education Cluster to record schools that have been subject to attacks, or are located in insecure areas. The more detailed databases (e.g. CAR, South Sudan) include more information about occupation (date of occupation/departure of military or IDPs, name of forces/group in occupation), more detail on the impact (number of days closed, how many classrooms affected, furniture/equipment damaged or looted, how many students/teachers/personnel affected or displaced), more specific and comprehensive coding of the type of attack, whether the incident is an ‘attack on school’ as per MRM definition, and whether the report has been verified.

The tools reviewed in the mapping exercise are largely designed to capture information about the impact on school structures, and there is limited information on attacks against individuals or the impact on individuals. Information on response actions recommended or taken are also not included. The most common source of information for Education Cluster monitoring is the Department of Education or education personnel, and key informants noted that interviews of individual victims of attacks are rarely or never conducted. One informant reported that in the situation that a child victim is identified, she or he would be referred to the Child Protection Coordination Group for interview and follow-up, however the mapping did not identify examples of referral tools for such individual cases.

Monitoring by the Education Cluster does not often include information on perpetrators – except in situations of military use, where the military or armed groups are often identifiable – nor the specific motives behind attacks. Some Education Cluster coordination staff stressed that the complexity and risks of gaining information on motives and perpetrators, and determining whether the attack is linked to the act of providing education, has discouraged monitoring and reporting of attacks against education personnel. The limited information on motivations and perpetrators can also have implications for response programming (considered under section 5.3 below).

The mapping did not identify a specific example of a Cluster strategy, guidelines or operational procedures for monitoring, reporting and/or responding to attacks on education (several interviewees reported that they had developed monitoring guidelines, but that they had been lost during the end of assignment). In CAR, a one page note (publically available on the country Education Cluster web page) was developed in late 2014 which introduces the MRM, outlines the role of Cluster members (including how to collect and communicate information) and the role of Cluster coordination, and describes how the information will be used. In the Ukraine, the Child Protection Sub Cluster has developed standard operating procedures (SoPs) for monitoring military use of schools but these were not yet being used by the Child Protection or Education Clusters and were not available for sharing.

Some discussion of safety and ethical safeguards have reportedly accompanied the introduction of monitoring tools to Education Cluster members in several contexts, however this has not yet been clearly documented in a Code of Conduct for Education Cluster members. A Code of Conduct for organisations engaged in child rights monitoring in Pakistan could provide a reference template in this area. Security and ethical concerns related to monitoring are considered further under section 6.1 below.

An issue repeatedly raised by country level education informants was verification. In general, Education Cluster Coordination staff rely on the Cluster member or government official who has provided the information and there is no cluster mechanism for ‘verifying’ member reports. In some contexts the Coordination staff may be able to use desk-level corroboration or triangulation from other sources, or physically visit the site of a reported incident, however this is entirely subject to capacity and priorities. In Palestine, two Education Cluster individual members (the Ministry and Save the Children) took the lead on collecting data on attacks on education, and UNICEF would use that list plus other sources to verify incident by incident. In a context with a high number of incidents, a geographically vast territory, and/or restricted
or insecure access to areas where attacks occur, validation by cluster coordination staff is not always feasible.

Moreover, reports communicated by the Education Cluster to the CTFMR may also not be verified – for similar reasons of limited capacity and access. Gaps in feedback mechanisms can also result in the Education Cluster not knowing whether reports have been verified by the CTFMR or not. Several informants (Education and MRM) suggested that selected Education Cluster members could be trained by the CTFMR to be part of an inter-sectoral, inter-agency verification team. One MRM respondent, who reported that the inclusion of the Education Cluster in reporting and verification had recently been recommended in the CTFMR principal meeting, noted: “They are a valuable resource that should be used to verify “despite” the fact that they are not UN staff.”

The importance of distinguishing between MRM verification (which has very specific criteria) and other standards of verification, has been highlighted in Iraq. The Child Protection Working Group issued a memorandum instructing partner organisations not to include the indicator “# child rights violations verified” in their project sheets for the Humanitarian Response Plan 2016, as this is an indicator that should only come from the centralized MRM database managed by UNICEF. Partners who wanted to add a component of MRM in their project sheet were advised to use “# of trained staff who monitor, report and refer cases to appropriate services when necessary” as this reflects the required element in MRM of training of staff to monitor and report in a safe manner as well as underlining the importance of responses and referrals when needed.

MRM informants emphasised the value of the Education Cluster monitoring and analysis of the longer-term impact of attacks on education - for example, the impact of schools being closed on the level of education attainment, the number of school days lost, the change in student and teacher attendance rates before and after the attack - as an important complement to the MRM incident-specific monitoring modalities. It was suggested that in this way the advocacy impact can be multiplied and can also be used to generate funding for response. One method of collecting this type of information is through Education Cluster assessments which incorporate questions on attacks on education. Such assessments have been carried out by Education Clusters in several countries (see side-bar).

These assessments can provide a snapshot of the situation during a determinate time period and location, which may be useful for quickly raising awareness of the extent of the problem, or including attacks on education with other education questions which are less sensitive, or as a means of encouraging buy-in from a broad range of actors on the issue. They do not take the place of ongoing monitoring as they do not allow for ongoing tracking and analysis of patterns and trends of attacks, and they are not usually agile enough to enable immediate response. MRM respondents in five countries indicated that it was their expectation that Education Clusters ‘conduct assessments and research on attacks on schools/education’, but it was only reported as happening in one country.

**EDUCATION CLUSTER ASSESSMENTS**

**Côte d’Ivoire:** Back to School assessment (2011), highlighted the country-wide impact of violence on school closures and enrolments.

**CAR:** Three State of Education impact assessments (2013, 2014, and 2015) looked at the prevalence and types of attacks on schools during the period 2012-2015, school re-openings, and changes in enrolment compared with the pre-emergency period.

**Palestine:** Needs Assessment of education facilities (pre-school, primary, secondary and tertiary) conducted after the 2014 war in Gaza by the Education Cluster in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, UNDP, UNESCO and Save the Children.
5.2. Reporting

Currently the most common form of Education Cluster reporting on attacks on education – and in many countries the only form of reporting – is reporting to the CTFMR, either through alerts on attacks or full data sharing. This information, where verified, is in turn incorporated into the CTFMR reporting to the OSRSG-CAAC through MRM reports that are shared with the Security Council. Reports are communicated by the Education Cluster through standardised incident reporting forms, or through emails or phone. Sharing of Education Cluster data is typically done through the periodic sharing (e.g. once a month, or once a quarter) of updated databases or tables of schools affected by attacks on education. The information-sharing model used in CAR is represented below. The Education Cluster sent monthly updates to the CTFMR as well as to multiple other recipients including UNICEF (country and regional offices), Humanitarian Coordination, Protection Cluster, OCHA, UN Panel of Experts on CAR, MINUSCA Child Protection and OCHA Civil/Military Coordination.

### Monitoring Good Practices:

- Utilise cluster members’ existing program and monitoring structures to collect and report information (multiple countries)
- Systematically include questions on attacks on education in any education assessment (Côte d’Ivoire)
- Partner with a broad range of actors in assessments to cover different levels of education affected by attacks on education (e.g. early learning, primary and secondary, and tertiary) (Palestine)
- Develop a Code of Conduct for Cluster members involved in monitoring (Pakistan Child Protection)
- Choose monitoring indicators that draw a link between the Education Cluster’s objectives (such as children accessing a safe learning environment) and the impediments caused by attacks on education, as a way of making monitoring more meaningful and Cluster specific (Protection Cluster)
- Sit together with CTFMR or MRM focal points to see how Education Cluster monitoring tools can incorporate CTFMR required data through common indicators or data fields (South Sudan, Palestine)
- Where the situation allows, develop a simple document which outlines what the MRM is and the role of the Cluster Coordination and Cluster members in contributing to monitoring and reporting attacks on schools (CAR)
While it is anticipated in this flow chart that verification is done prior to the submission of reports to the CTFMR, the mapping suggested that reports were generally sent first to the CTFMR and verification (if done) happened sometime after that. The mechanism for information exchange between the Education Cluster and the CTFMR could therefore be strengthened by including the feedback loops from the CTFMR to the Education Cluster, and from the Education Cluster back to communities, on the verification of reports and whether the information was used for advocacy or follow-up action, together with appropriate and agreed timeframes.

In a few countries, the Education Cluster has produced its own Cluster reports on attacks on education. In CAR and Mali, the Education Clusters make regular bulletins and flash reports on attacks on education, as well as regularly updated tables, publically available (with sources of information removed) through its own reporting mechanisms such as the OCHA hosted Cluster web page or an online file repository (Mali). Mali has also developed an innovative collaboration with OCHA to produce web-based ‘heat maps’ to show trends of attacks on education throughout the country. In Côte d’Ivoire and CAR, the Education Clusters produced assessment reports which showed trends over time in relation to schools reopening and the percentage of children who had returned to reopened schools. In Turkey (for North Syria), a six-page briefing note Schools under Attack in Syria: A monitoring report on the impact of attacks on Syrian schools by the Southern Turkey Education Cluster (Syria response) was produced in 2015.

Informants highlighted that any Education Cluster reporting should be thoroughly risk-informed, should carefully distinguish between verified and ‘unverified’ or ‘credible’ information, and should have clear, agreed objectives and a target audience. It was also noted during interviews that the Education Cluster’s decision to report in country needs to be balanced against the possibility of negatively impacting the humanitarian access of its members.

Sometimes individual cluster members have more autonomy than the Cluster collectively and may be better positioned to produce their own organisational reports on attacks on education – for example: UNICEF Education under Fire: How Conflict in the Middle East is Depriving Children of their Schooling (2015) and Save the Children Education under Attack in Syria (2015). The Cluster’s information has also served as an important reference in international NGO reports such as Watchlist’s report Vulnerable Students, Unsafe Schools: Attacks and Military Use of Schools in the Central African Republic. In Palestine and Iraq, UNICEF produces a bulletin on trends and patterns in grave violations, including attacks on schools.

In contexts where the issue of attacks on education is highly sensitive, it can be frustrating for the Education Cluster not to be able to publically use the information they have available on attacks on schools. Informants shared examples of providing information to the UNICEF Representative, or via the Representative to UNICEF regional offices or Headquarters, which has then been utilised in regional or global statements and news releases. Sharing information with other appropriate networks, such as through the Child Protection Coordination Group or Protection Cluster’s human rights partners may be another option.

The potential for the Global Education Cluster to support more systematic global reporting on trends and patterns was proposed by multiple field and global level informants. It was recognised that this would require some investment of resources (particularly information management) at the global level, and that the GEC may be better positioned to ‘support from behind’ rather than be the ‘voice’ of such advocacy. Country level clusters (where capacity allows, or in prioritised countries) could report periodically on a minimum number of indicators to be compiled by the GEC and used for global updates, country ‘report cards’, resource mobilisation efforts, and as a resource for advocacy partners such as GCPEA. Such indicators could include data that a number of Education Clusters have already demonstrated the capacity to regularly collect, such as the number of military occupied schools, the number of students out of school, and the longer-term impacts such as the number of school days lost due to military use and the impact on
student and teacher retention. Information more targeted at donors such as the average cost of rehabilitating a damaged school in different countries could also be collected.

Education Cluster contributions to other UN reporting, such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child through its periodic review of country compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol on Children and Armed Conflict, the UN Human Rights Council through the universal periodic review process, or the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, appears unexplored to date. One global actor suggested this could be an important contribution by the Global Education Cluster to increasing the awareness of the impact on attacks on education.

### Reporting Good Practices:

- Look for partners who can provide technical support or a platform for Education Cluster reporting (Mali)
- Consider carefully whether Education Cluster reporting may jeopardise humanitarian access or raise concerns of bias, particularly in contexts where reporting on all parties is not feasible (Syria)
- Where cluster reporting in country is not appropriate, look for other ways to share information such as through individual members of the Education Cluster or the Child Protection / Protection coordination groups, including at the global level (multiple countries)
- Be clear about the strategic objective and target audience of Cluster reports (multiple countries)

5.3. Response

The essential link between monitoring and reporting on attacks on education, and an effective response, was emphasised repeatedly by respondents and informants across country contexts and agencies. This linkage is also expressly articulated within the purpose of the MRM. The mapping revealed however that there are a number of challenges confronting Education Cluster in relation to responding to attacks on education, and significant gaps in the responsive mechanisms available.

The highest number of Education respondents (44%, in 10 countries) categorised their Cluster response as ‘cluster members responding, but to a limited degree’, while 29 percent in four countries reported ‘no current cluster response’. Only nine percent of respondents, in three countries, indicated that a ‘formal response mechanism’ was in place. The only example of a comprehensive and documented response mechanism identified was the Joint Response

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39 The purpose of the MRM, as articulated in the Secretary-General’s Report on CAAC in 2005, “is to provide for the systematic gathering of objective, specific and reliable information on grave violations committed against children in situations of armed conflict, leading to well-informed, concerted and effective responses to ensure compliance with international and local children and armed conflict protection norms.”
Framework in Palestine whereby each predetermined type of attack triggers a predetermined type of response by a predetermined actor. Proposed emergency child protection/education response (see side diagram) is organized around five categories of intervention: advocacy (intersecting with all categories); material support (including protective presence/transport); legal aid; academic learning/teaching; and psycho-social support. The response is coordinated via the inter-cluster forum.

In CAR, the CTFMR has developed draft SOPs for response (including at the individual, community, and advocacy levels), but it does not (yet) identify specific actors for the responses.

Other examples of individual ‘standard’ Cluster responses exist, although the final outcome is not necessarily known to the Cluster or successful. Some of the responses triggered by monitoring and reporting that were reported were:

- The initiation of advocacy by the Education Cluster for the evacuation of schools used by military forces or armed groups stood out as the most common ‘trigger’ response to attacks on education (CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Mali, Philippines, Somalia, and the Ukraine)
- In Côte d’Ivoire, the identification of UXOs or explosives in schools was immediately reported by the Education Cluster to the mine action group for disposal
- In Palestine, monitoring and reporting of threats of attack on education or security measures triggered an SMS alert to teachers and parents to avoid certain areas or to close schools.
- In Sudan, reports of damaged and destroyed schools are regularly shared with cluster partners for possible rehabilitation action
- In Palestine, a school demolition triggers an assessment and inter-sectoral response including material, educational legal and psychosocial assistance.

In those countries where some level of response was indicated, it was most often found to be part of the general Education in Emergency response (e.g. the establishment of temporary learning centres or the provision of psychosocial support in conflict affected areas, where attacks on education may also be happening) rather than specifically responding to an attack or a pattern of attacks. While the level of response varied significantly across contexts, dependent in particular on funding, member capacity, and security/access, the most common form of response reported by both the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Coordination Group was advocacy (65% of Education respondents in 14 out of 20 countries, and 75% of Child Protection), followed by psychosocial support (59% of Education respondents in 12 countries, and 58% by Child Protection) and prevention (53% by Education in 14 countries, and 50% by Child Protection)40.

Apart from interventions and negotiations to address the military use of schools, advocacy interventions reported were not systematic and the mapping found only one example of an Education Cluster advocacy strategy specifically addressing attacks on education (Palestine, addressing school demolitions). In CAR, a

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A gap observed from the mapping was the lack of response monitoring to measure the effectiveness of responses on reducing attacks on education or mitigating its impacts. The inclusion of response and outcome columns in Education Cluster databases, and related follow-up, could be a first step in capturing this information. Documentation and analysis of the longer-term impact of response on trends on attacks, for example the change in military behaviour or the community’s feeling of security, could also be considered. This monitoring of response effectiveness is also a powerful tool in encouraging and justifying monitoring and reporting investments by cluster members. As one informant recounted,

*If the Education Cluster was responsible for monitoring, reporting and responding, it would help the partners feel like they were doing tangible work. When OSCE (who received reports of military occupation from the Education Cluster) reported back that parents came to a school and used all of their*
personal ties to remove a battalion from the school, the education cluster members applauded in the meeting because they saw how they can coordinate and really make a difference.

In addition to immediate response, the Education Cluster can also link monitoring with more long-term, system building actions. A promising practice from Pakistan is the development by Education Cluster members of a ‘School Safety Framework’, endorsed by government, and Cluster support to the Ministry of Education to include safety of schools in its action plans. The incorporation of school safety issues in broader DRR and resilience frameworks have also proven effective in several contexts (Pakistan, Nepal) in ensuring buy-in and leadership from government partners, and support from development actors.

Several informants highlighted the important contribution that Education Cluster monitoring, reporting and response can make in supporting accountability. One avenue is the Education Cluster’s engagement with the MRM which has as a core objective fostering the accountability and compliance of parties to conflict with international child protection standards and norm, as well as designing concerted strategies to end and prevent the violations, including through advocacy and programmatic response. Programs to remedy the harm inflicted on children and communities by attacks on education, and actions that prevent similar violations from taking place in the future, are critical for accountability⁴¹, and have been carried out by the Education Cluster in Sri Lanka, Somalia, and elsewhere to support the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups into educational opportunities. An effective collaboration and information sharing between the Education Cluster and the Child Protection and Protection groups, who are more likely to work with national judicial actors and processes, human rights institutions, and national security forces, can also indirectly support accountability.

### Response Good Practices:

- Bring together inter-cluster and inter-sectoral stakeholders with counterpart ministries to develop action plans to protect and prevent attacks on education (Somalia, South Sudan, Mali)
- Build relationships with interlocutors at the local level who have strong leverage with perpetrators to stop and prevent military use of schools (Philippines, Ukraine, Somalia)
- Collaborate with actors with established access to military and armed groups for advocacy to address the military use of schools (multiple countries)
- Use an agreed approach and common tools and/or messages in advocacy efforts (CAR, Ukraine)
- Work together with ministries and development partners to develop long-term comprehensive frameworks to support preparedness and prevention of future attacks, including under the umbrella of disaster risk reduction and resilience (e.g. Nepal, Pakistan)
- Build concrete linkages between monitoring and response to attacks on education as a way to facilitate the overall collaboration between stakeholders in monitoring, reporting and response (multiple countries)

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Recommendations

To the Global Education Cluster:

- Enhance reporting by the Global Education Cluster on the scale and impact of attacks on education, including through the collection and collation of a minimum set of standardised indicators which include the measurement of longer-term impact, and as a support to awareness raising efforts by global advocacy partners. Consider the possibility of country ‘report cards’ for priority countries with recognised high levels of attacks.

To the national Education Clusters:

- Consider how to incorporate MRM data fields into the Education Cluster’s own monitoring and reporting of attacks on education to support comparability of data.

- Consider the development of Cluster-specific standards or procedures to ensure a minimum level of verification for cluster monitoring and reporting on attacks on education. This could include a requirement for a Cluster member to visit the site of the incident or interview a witness in order to cross check the reported information. Education Cluster ‘verification’ should be distinguished from MRM verification, and would require coordination with the CTFMR in order to avoid overlapping/duplication of efforts and resources (e.g. repetition of interviews, multiple requests for information from the same actors).

- Building on positive practices in multiple countries, maintain and enhance country level joint advocacy (with CTFMR and other relevant stakeholders) triggered by the military use of schools, including negotiations through well-positioned interlocutors with military and armed groups to vacate schools.

- Systematise other types of trigger response, in coordination with other actors, including psycho-social support for students, teachers and communities affected by attacks.

- Continue to support programs that empower children and communities and advance accountability, such as support to children’s clubs and strengthening of Parent Teacher Associations; local-level contingency planning; establishment of early warning and response mechanisms; and ability to conduct local-level, context-sensitive real-time monitoring.

- Improve the monitoring of response effectiveness, including through the identification of measurable indicators. Provide options for response monitoring indicators in the Practical Guide for Education Clusters.

- Advocate for and support both short and longer-term strategies that build capacities of government, civil society organisations and community structures for sustainable monitoring, reporting and response systems and support risk-informed contingency planning.

To national Child Protection Coordination Groups and CTFMRs

- Support the development of coordination response frameworks and the systematisation of trigger responses to attacks.
6. Challenges and Gaps

Security was most often signalled by Education respondents (65%) as a main challenge to monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, followed by lack of member capacity (46%), operational resources (40%), and gaps in collaboration with the CTFMR (40%). The main challenges reported by the three groups of respondents were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Challenges</th>
<th>Education respondents</th>
<th>CP respondents</th>
<th>MRM respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of cluster members’ capacity (relevant knowledge, skills)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of operational resources (time, funds)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaps in collaboration with CTFMR</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of standardised tools</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Coordination team members’ capacity (relevant knowledge, skills)</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of education cluster is not clear</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaps in collaboration between Education Cluster and Child Protection Sub Cluster</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Child Protection respondents most often flagged operational resources (92%) and some Child Protection staff pointed out that as the Child Protection Coordination Group generally covers all six grave violations, the resources available for attacks on schools/education are particularly limited. This was followed by security (75%) and then gaps in collaboration with the CTFMR (42%). A higher percentage of Child Protection respondents (33%) reported that gaps in the collaboration between the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Coordination Group was a main challenge, compared with Education respondents (23%).

MRM respondents most often cited gaps in collaboration with the CTFMR (88%) as a main challenge, followed by security and lack of Education Cluster member capacity (63%).

6.1 Security and confidentiality

Within the category of ‘security challenges’, Education informants highlighted a range of related issues in their contexts. These included:

- Security-related access restrictions to areas affected by attacks on education
- Sensitivity around monitoring and reporting of conflict related violations in general, and particularly when the government or its affiliates are implicated in violations
- Risks to agencies and staff of collecting sensitive information
- Safety and ethical concerns for the sources of information and the victims of attacks, including: not placing sources and victims at increased risk, protection of confidentiality, informed consent for onward reporting and verification processes
- A lack of capacity amongst member staff in monitoring skills, including risk assessment and mitigation, and a lack of capacity of the Cluster coordination staff to oversee members’ respect for security and ethical safeguards
- Challenges for new coordination staff, particularly if not from that context, to quickly and comprehensively assess the political sensitivities and security-related risks

In relation to managing security and confidentiality, the most common measure employed by Education Clusters was reported to be the use of **information management protocols** (32%, in six countries) followed
by training of data collectors. Many Education informants stressed the cluster practice of removing the source from all onward reporting to the CTFMR or other agencies. In several contexts, cluster members did not use paper forms to monitor and report due to sensitivities and security concerns. Only one example of a written Education Cluster information protocol was identified, which was developed by the Education Cluster in Turkey / Northern Syria to cover all types of Education Cluster information (not specific to attacks on education). In CAR, the CTFMR has developed in late 2015 a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which provides guidance on information sharing procedures between the Technical Working Group members (which includes the Education Cluster).

It is notable that the use of information management protocols, as well as other measures for managing security and confidentiality issues, were indicated only in a minority of responses and countries. Training of cluster members who collect data on attacks on education was reported by 29 percent of respondents, in seven out of 20 countries. This training typically accompanied the introduction of a Cluster monitoring tool and was reported to include some basic security and ethical safeguards, however the mapping did not identify written training material or guidelines specifically developed for the Education Cluster. CTFMR training modules covering safety and ethical concerns were available from DRC, where some training of Cluster members by the CTFMR had been conducted.

The use of informed consent was low, reported by only 18 percent of respondents in just four countries. The inclusion of a specific question on whether informed consent has been given during monitoring is included in the incident reporting form utilised by the Education Cluster in Mali, but was not otherwise included in the reviewed tools. No Education Cluster Code of Conduct for members involved in monitoring was identified, however an example from Pakistan used by child rights monitoring organisations (which was, in turn, based on the Code of Conduct developed in Nepal for agencies involved in MRM reporting) could act as a reference. Coordination regarding verification with the CTFMR, for example in order to raise any particular concerns regarding source identification, was reported by 21 percent of respondents in five countries.

The use of security assessments by the Education Cluster was a particularly notable gap, with only nine percent, in three out of 20 countries, reporting the use of security assessments for monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education. Cluster coordination teams reported that they generally left such security assessments to individual partners. The importance of coordination staff receiving security briefings in country was highlighted during a number of field interviews, as was the value of security related information to monitoring attacks on education.

6.2. Capacity, resources and processes

The lack of capacity of Education Cluster coordination staff and cluster members was a challenge reported by 31 percent and 46 percent of respondents respectively. Twenty-eight percent of Education respondents reported that Education Cluster Coordination staff had received some training on attacks on education, however this was often reported within broader training courses such as the Education in Emergency (modules on human rights and international humanitarian law and access), Education Cluster Core Skills training and INEE Conflict-Sensitive Education. More specific orientations and briefings on the MRM and attacks on schools were reported to have been conducted by in-country CTFMR or UNICEF MRM staff, as well as regional UNICEF staff, and respondents also noted the GCPEA workshop in October 2015.

Regarding Education Cluster members, 33 percent of respondents indicated that some training had been received. These trainings were most often delivered by UNICEF MRM staff in country, over a few hours or a half day, and covered an introduction to the MRM as well as explaining how cluster members can report attacks on schools. Several respondents noted that additional training for Cluster members in reporting

42 See question 24 chart in Annex 2 for full response details.
would be useful in order to improve the quality and standardisation of reported information, as well as in monitoring skills. In Mali, the Child Protection Sub Cluster provided a training on MRM and members of the Education Cluster who were also members of the CP Sub Cluster participated in the training. In a number of contexts the Education Cluster had provided a training on when and how to use monitoring forms or communicate information to the Education Cluster.

Similar to the Education Cluster responses, just 31 percent of Child Protection staff reported that coordination staff had received training related to monitoring and reporting on grave violations, including attacks on schools. The Child Protection trainings received were primarily MRM orientations and trainings by CTFMR and UNICEF MRM staff. In a pattern also similar to the Education Cluster, slightly more respondents (35%) indicated that Child Protection Coordination Group members had received trainings. The Child Protection trainings referred to were were 2 or 3 days long, reflecting the wider subject scope (all grave violations, including attacks on schools).

For both groups, the higher number of responses reporting training of cluster members is likely due to the turnover of cluster coordination staff in-country. For instance, new coordination staff may have missed earlier orientations provided by the CTFMR. A number of informants stressed that all new coordination staff should receive some orientations in this subject, and that a more intensive training of coordination staff would also enable the roll-out or refresher trainings to cluster members. It is most typical for CTFMR to provide basic introductions and orientations on the MRM and attacks on schools, and MRM informants noted that Clusters generally should not expect lengthier trainings due to limited CTFMR resources.

Asked to indicate the most relevant new guidance, tools or processes needed in relation to monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, the highest response by Education staff by a significant margin was ‘training in monitoring, reporting and response’, with 69 percent of respondents choosing this. Other options frequently selected by Education respondents were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer choices</th>
<th>Education responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training in monitoring, reporting and response</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-stakeholder processes to determine consensus on guidance/tools/training/reporting structures</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global cluster database and analysis tools</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global cluster data collection forms</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global cluster reporting and advocacy templates</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalised minimum standards on attacks on education</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global cluster monitoring, reporting and response guidance</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal agreements/MoUs with CTFMRs</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training was also the most common response amongst MRM respondents by a large margin (88% selected), followed by multi-stakeholder processes, formal MoUs/agreements with the Education Cluster and global Education Cluster guidance (all 63%). The most often selected suggestion by Child Protection respondents were ‘multi-stakeholder processes’ and ‘formalised minimum standards’ (both selected by 45%).

The development and delivery of a specific training package for the Education Cluster in Education Cluster tools, guidance, monitoring skills, and security and ethical considerations, would be expected to be supported by the Global Education Cluster engaging experts for the relevant areas or a partner doing it on behalf of the Cluster. Several informants from Education and Protection highlighted the potential for joint capacity building in which the Education, Child Protection and Protection Clusters could maximise resources and facilitate knowledge exchange and lessons learned. Some Education informants proposed the utilisation of RRT or surge missions as a more ‘neutral’ approach to convening stakeholder processes in country.
The importance of **information management capacity** within the Education Cluster in order to support monitoring and reporting on attacks on education was repeatedly stressed. Multiple Coordinators pointed out that they did not have a Cluster Information Management Officer and that this was an impediment to expanding and systematising their collection, management and analysis of information. Several informants suggested to have information management tasks related to attacks on education included as a standard responsibility in the Cluster IMO Terms of Reference and recognised as a time investment.

It was observable that capacity in the area of monitoring and reporting attacks on education often followed individuals who had moved between country contexts affected by attacks on education and brought their experience of using tools and processes with them. Opportunities to strengthen this **knowledge management** and exchange should be actively explored, including through the newly established Helpdesk or focal points within the RRT team.

Many Education Coordination staff reported that they had not used some of the **global tools** available. Of the tools listed, the Safe Schools declaration was most often rated as ‘very useful’, followed by the MRM Guidelines and the GCPEA Guidelines on Military Occupation and Use of Schools and Universities. Although the Guidance Note on Security Council Resolution 1998 was overall not as often used, it was frequently rated as ‘very useful’ in those contexts where the Education Cluster had a particularly high level of engagement in monitoring and reporting attacks on schools. Child Protection staff responses indicated a higher use of MRM tools than the Education respondents⁴³.

Multiple informants stressed that ‘heavy’ new guidance was not needed and that Cluster coordination staff do not have time to read through detailed case studies, handbooks, or text-heavy materials. What is needed is support to point them in the right direction (“to know where to look”) and to operationalise some of the more theoretical concepts. One informant noted that education actors know the issues, but don’t have all the ‘language’ which can be particularly important in advocacy.

### 6.3. Coordination and transition

As discussed in section 4 above, collaboration between the Education Cluster and other stakeholders is occurring at different levels across different contexts. Some of the challenges highlighted in the mapping which impact on coordination effectiveness include:

- insufficient capacity and/or operational resources of one of more stakeholders
- misunderstandings or lack of familiarity of institutional mandates
- lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities
- absence of formalised coordination frameworks, secure information-sharing protocols and feedback mechanisms
- lack of consistency and compatibility between inter-sectoral and inter-agency data collection and management tools
- weak linkages between monitoring and reporting on one side, and response on the other

More broadly, in some contexts certain coordination gaps in relation to monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education were attributed to **weak links between the humanitarian and development structures in country**. While the cluster’s humanitarian approach emphasizes preparedness and rapid response and relies heavily on direct service provision, the development approach is characterized by long-term planning and an emphasis on local ownership and capacity development. Moreover, there is generally no one ‘forum’ that brings together the stakeholders relevant to monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education. In the absence of formalised organisational linkages, coordination often depends on individual relationships, and a reliance on UNICEF’s organisational position (represented in yellow in the diagram below) across the three relevant coordination areas: development,

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⁴³ See Annex 2 for the chart with full responses of both Child Protection and Education in relation to the listed resources.
humanitarian and the CTFMR. Even within UNICEF however, the coordination linkages between the staff representing UNICEF in these fora is generally not well-defined in relation to attacks on education.

Government is represented by green blocks, noting that the diagram is highly simplified and in no way inclusive of the actors involved in development and humanitarian coordination. The strong role played by the Ministry of Education in most Education Clusters (46 percent of responses indicated that the Ministry of Education is the lead or co-lead of the Education Cluster) helps to bridge the humanitarian and development approaches. However, often the human, material and financial constraints faced by government partners to monitor, report and respond present a significant blockage to the potential transition to a nationally owned mechanism. While 39 percent indicated that capacity building to the Ministry was taking place, this was typically in the context of general Education in Emergency training or MRM familiarisation of cluster members. Training of Ministry officials in monitoring and reporting specifically on attacks on education was reported in Palestine and DRC (at the sub-national level).

The question of what kind of transitional mechanism should replace an MRM once it withdraws from a country, or in those contexts where no MRM and/or no cluster exists requires further investigation. Amongst MRM respondents, it was reported in four countries that there was ‘no plan’ for the period following the deactivation of the MRM, while in two countries it was reported that the government would take over and in one country that the Education Cluster would take over. In Nepal, the CTFMR ‘reconfigured’ itself in the post-conflict context and sought to bring State actors into the activities of the taskforce. In Pakistan, in-country efforts to establish child rights monitoring and reporting have included capacity building and technical support to the Human Rights Commission and the provincial Child Rights Commission. Amongst the countries included in the mapping, no specific Cluster plans for transition were found.

A number of respondents and informants highlighted the current gaps in countries where attacks on education are taking place against a backdrop of political instability or protracted insecurity, but clusters...
are not activated and the MRM (established only in contexts of armed conflict) does not exist (e.g. Kenya, Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi). As one respondent noted,

One of the difficulties at the coordination level is that it is a slow onset crisis with gradual deterioration. There is no cluster so liaising with sectors and disseminating information is left to personal initiative and commitment.

There is a need therefore to utilise existing education coordination mechanisms and to integrate the issue of attacks on education into developmental education programming. In some contexts this has been supported through the establishment of ‘safe schools’ initiatives (e.g. Nigeria) and school safety’ networks that bring together humanitarian and development partner members (e.g. Pakistan). Additional suggestions from the consultations were to adapt guidance and capacity building tools to support education professionals in situations where there is no cluster, and to actively increase support to community structures to take a lead role in monitoring, reporting and response.

Recommendations:

To the Global Education Cluster

- Reinforce the Education Cluster’s adherence to ethical standards, humanitarian principles and risk mitigation in monitoring and reporting, such as the necessity of informed consent, confidentiality and risk assessments, including through clear guidance to national clusters in the Practical Guide and periodic training.

- Include attacks on education, an introduction to the MRM and an in-country security briefing on the context as a standard component of the induction of Education Cluster coordination staff; advocate to the Ministries and development partners to include similar information as part of their induction processes for newly appointed Ministry officials or development staff, respectively.

- Invest in capacity, skills and knowledge of Coordination teams related to monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education, including through the development of a Practical Guide and a training package for Education Cluster coordination teams with modules on relevant standards and legal framework; coordination structures, partners and the link with the MRM; definitions and types of attacks; monitoring principles, security measures, ethical safeguards; standard tools available; and planning and monitoring the Cluster’s activities and results. Support an ongoing exchange with the Child Protection Working Group, Protection Cluster, MRM actors and other relevant global partners, regarding the potential for joint capacity building initiatives.

- Develop and disseminate global standardised Education Cluster tools, for data collection (e.g. monitoring forms and associated guidance), information management (e.g. databases, information sharing protocols), and templates for reporting and advocacy, that allow for context adaptation and contribute to the systematisation of country-level practices. Such tools should draw upon the MRM experience, methodologies and best practices, as relevant.

- Establish a global online resource bank to share field-level monitoring, reporting and response resources, such as guidelines, incident reporting formats, codes of conducts, information-sharing protocols, databases, advocacy briefs, reporting templates and training modules. Include field-level reference materials collected through this mapping as part of the Education Cluster Toolkit which will be accessible on the Global Education Cluster’s website.

- Continue and enhance the surge (RRT) support to national Education Clusters in relation to attacks on education, particularly for capacity building on related Cluster guidance and standard tools, and the convening of country-level stakeholders to support the development of coordination and information exchange protocols.
To national Education Clusters:

- **Build capacity of Cluster members** in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education, particularly regarding security and confidentiality measures. This should also include arranging for the CTFMR team to carry out periodic, contextualized trainings to the Education Cluster on the MRM mandate and operational structure, and the specific methodologies, definitions and standards used by the CTFMR for monitoring and reporting of attacks on schools.

- Explore ways of bridging humanitarian and development approaches in order to **strengthen national and local monitoring, reporting and response systems**, including through working groups linked to conflict - disaster risk reduction and safe schools networks. Develop or adapt contingency plans which are risk-informed and that consider attacks on education in the plan.
7. Conclusion

This mapping found a number of promising practices and common perspectives regarding the Education Cluster’s role in monitoring, reporting and responding to attacks on education. Everyone involved in the mapping acknowledged that there is an important role for the Education Cluster in relation to monitoring, reporting and/or responding to attacks on education and the positive contributions already being made by national Education Clusters was highlighted in a range of countries. Nearly all informants also stressed the primary importance of context specificity, and particularly risk assessment, in determining the extent to which national Education Clusters should engage in this area of work, and how the engagement should look.

The Education Cluster’s involvement in this area dates back only to 2011, and documentation and examples of systematic practice are still relatively sparse. Moreover, a process of strategic decision making, linked to clearly identified and measurable Cluster objectives, and incorporating a process of in-country stakeholder analysis and consultation, is generally absent to date. It is clear from this mapping review that the Education Cluster’s monitoring, reporting and response to attacks on education must be designed with reference to existing mechanisms and programs. In recognising the shared, inter-sectoral responsibilities of monitoring, reporting and response, and the comparative advantages of different actors, the roles and responsibilities of the Education Cluster and other key stakeholders need to be better defined and supported in country.

The frontline actors are the Education Cluster members who collect data, whether through their regular programmes or more targeted monitoring on attacks on education. The Education Cluster has a responsibility to equip these members with the knowledge and tools necessary to collect data in a way that respects the safety of sources, communities and children, individual victims and witnesses, as well as of the monitoring staff and their colleagues. Cluster members, in turn, have a responsibility to ensure safety and ethical considerations are safeguarded.

In those countries where the MRM is in place, it is an opportunity as well as a responsibility of the Education Cluster to share the information it receives on attacks on education with the CTFMR. The development of two-way information sharing protocols that confirm the CTFMR’s role in feeding back to the Cluster on the verification and use of the information would further enhance the Education Cluster’s potential to strengthen its monitoring and reporting standards as well as provide its own feedback to affected communities.

Keeping in mind the ultimate goal of informing and strengthening the operational response to the needs of children affected by attacks on education, the importance of enhancing response coordination frameworks is paramount. The responsibilities of the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Coordination Group to work together to maximise their resources, synergise efforts and complement areas of expertise is highly relevant in the area of attacks on education. The collaboration between the two coordination groups, together with the CTFMR, should be formalised and promoted at the global level in order to facilitate institutional partnerships at the national level.

Investment to further develop capacity, skills, knowledge and tools is required, and the Global Education Cluster has a critical role to play in supporting this investment. This includes human resources support, standardised resources and training, and an accessible forum for field-level knowledge sharing.
### Annex 1: List of Countries included in the Mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MRM established</th>
<th>Country where at least one party to conflict is listed for attacks on schools or hospitals</th>
<th>Cluster status</th>
<th>UN Mission presence</th>
<th>Edu Cluster engagement with CTFMR</th>
<th>Survey response</th>
<th>KI Interviews</th>
<th>Resources available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Afghanistan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>None, but sometimes shared data through Education section</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Central African Republic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Active cluster</td>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Participates</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Colombia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>Alerts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Active cluster</td>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Participates</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Iraq</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Alerts</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Nigeria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Active Working Group</td>
<td>Just established</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Philippines</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>Participates (sub-national)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mali</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Participates</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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45 These tools were identified and reviewed during the mapping, but does not necessarily represent the most the most current or complete list of resources used in the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Active Cluster</th>
<th>PKO</th>
<th>Alerts</th>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>Contact through</th>
<th>Education Cluster:</th>
<th>Pending:</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Working Groups</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education Cluster: Basic excel sheet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pending: Education Cluster Taskforce on Attacks on Education ToR.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Active cluster</td>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Shares data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education Cluster: Excel sheet database, general education advocacy brief (inclusive of attacks on education);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pending: Info sheet on the MRM and role of the Education Cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Alerts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Working Group (Syria) (Russia for Northern Syria),</td>
<td>Contact through UNICEF CP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Education Cluster: (Syria/cross-border): Incident monitoring form, Briefing Note on the impact of attacks on education (6 page), info-sharing protocol (general, not specific to attacks on education).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Syria: basic excel sheet UNICEF: Advocacy letter on use of schools by IDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Former</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
<td>CPA (non MRM)</td>
<td>Shared all data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assessment reports, database and questionnaire (all 2011). Resources in French, except reports also in English.</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Israel and the State of Palestine</td>
<td>WG on Grave Violations</td>
<td>Active Cluster (OPT)</td>
<td>Participates</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Education Cluster: Joint response framework (with Child Protection Sub-Cluster), School vulnerability list, assessment questionnaire (Gaza), CAP Project Sheet on capacity building of ministries (Save the Children) Protection Cluster: Strategic Response Plan (2015), including MRR to grave violations UNICEF: CAC Bulletin on grave violations</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Country of concern (SG’s report)</td>
<td>Active Cluster (sub-national)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(2 people) Education and CP clusters: Taskforce on Attacks on Schools and Hospitals ToR (draft); Ministry: School Safety plan of Action Other: Code of Conduct for organisations monitoring and reporting child rights violations Pending: ToR for Working Group on Safe Schools</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Former</td>
<td>Schools as Zones of Peace Consortium</td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CTFMR: Concept note for the reconfiguration of the CTFMR into broader, post-conflict child rights taskforce</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active Cluster</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CP Sub-Cluster: SoPs on monitoring military use of schools (not available yet for sharing)</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
<td>Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Congo- Brazzaville</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Incident reporting form with verification feedback section.</td>
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</table>
Annex 2: Selected Survey Responses

Responses from Education Cluster Coordination Staff

Q3 In your context, which of the following types of attacks on education are happening and, of those that are happening, which are the Education Cluster engaging with?

Answered: 39  Skipped: 3

Q21 What type of activities are carried out by your Education Cluster members in responding to attacks on education?

Answered: 34  Skipped: 8
Q24 Does the Education Cluster use any of the following measures to manage confidentiality and security issues related to attacks on education?

Answered: 34  Skipped: 8

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Q34 Rate the following global materials related to attacks on education in terms of their usefulness to the work of the Education Cluster

Answered: 30  Skipped: 12
Responses from Child Protection Cluster Coordination Groups

Q3 In your context, which of the following types of attacks on education are happening and, of those that are happening, which are the Child Protection Coordination Group engaging with?

Answered: 14 Skipped: 6

Q5 What is the level of engagement of the Child Protection Coordination Group with the CTFMR?

Answered: 14 Skipped: 6
Q6 How does the CTFMR engage with the Child Protection Coordination Group?

![Bar chart showing engagement methods and their percentages.]

Q16 How do the Education Cluster and the CP Coordination Group collaborate in relation to monitoring, reporting and/or response to attacks on schools/education?

![Bar chart showing collaboration methods and their percentages.]

Answered: 14  Skipped: 6
Q20 What type of activities are carried out by Child protection Coordination Group members in response to attacks on schools/education?

Answered: 12  Skipped: 8

Q26 Rate the following global materials related to attacks on schools/education in terms of their usefulness to the work of the Child Protection Coordination Group

Answered: 11  Skipped: 9
Responses from MRM respondents:

Q3 What is the level of engagement of the Education Cluster (or Education Working Group) with the CTFMR?

Answered: 9  Skipped: 1

Q5 How does the CTFMR engage with the Education Cluster?

Answered: 9  Skipped: 1
Q15 What is the process for dealing with alerts / reports on attacks on schools shared by the Education Cluster with the CTFMR?

Answered: 8  Skipped: 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit / Interview all reports</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit / Interview some reports</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating all visits</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating some visits</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide feedback on verification</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes provide feedback</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
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