EDUCATION AND THE RELIEF-DEVELOPMENT TRANSITION IN POST-
CONFLICT COUNTRIES: THE (UN)SUSTAINABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

EDUCATION AND THE RELIEF-DEVELOPMENT TRANSITION IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: THE (UN)SUSTAINABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mary Anne Mendenhall

This dissertation explores the critical factors that affect the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development in post-conflict countries. Given the growing consensus within the international community about the role that education can play in humanitarian response and the long-term development perspective that is increasingly expected to accompany educational support provided in emergency and post-crisis contexts, this study seeks to develop a more holistic understanding of the concept of sustainability. Utilizing a vertical case study approach that calls for comparisons across multiple levels and organizations, this dissertation examines the efforts by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to sustain the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) in Angola, both during and after the civil conflict that affected the country for 27 years. These efforts, which were carried out at the national and local levels within the country, are compared and contrasted with the perspectives of educational experts working at the international level across a diverse range of international organizations (e.g. United
Nations, non-governmental organizations and donors). The findings from this study indicated that the following factors contributed to the sustainability of educational support, and these were consolidated in an effort to create a conceptual framework to guide future work in this field: integration into the system at the governmental or community levels, long-term strategic planning, adaptation to contextual factors, capacity building that complements service delivery, partnerships, coordination and predictable long-term funding. I argue that the sustainability of educational support will most likely entail the integration of certain elements related to the human, material and/or physical resources generated during the life of the program rather than the complete transfer of an intact program to the government or community. I also suggest that sustainability will become an explicit, rather than implicit, objective for international organizations as the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction continues to coalesce and greater efforts are made to sustain educational support through the relief-development transition. This dissertation offers a relevant case study for scholars and practitioners interested in the provision of educational support in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction, particularly in countries affected by and recovering from civil conflict.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Education is a right protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), but over 40 million children around the world are currently out of school and are denied an education as a result of civil conflict (Save the Children, 2007b). Traditionally, international organizations responding to humanitarian crises ignited by conflict addressed issues related directly to nutrition, healthcare and shelter thereby relegating education to the developmental sphere once a country stabilized. During the 1990s, however, many United Nations’ agencies and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) began to prioritize education as an essential component of humanitarian response due to the recognition that education can play a critical role in facilitating stability, disseminating life-saving messages, establishing a sense of normalcy and inspiring hope for the future. As a result, there is growing consensus across both humanitarian and development agencies that “education reconstruction begins at the earliest stages of a crisis...[and should be] undertaken concurrently with humanitarian relief” (World Bank, 2005, p. 32, emphasis added).

The consensus about the role of education has developed amidst the changing nature of conflicts from inter-state warring factions between two (or more) countries’ military branches to intra-state complex political emergencies that increasingly affect
civilian populations. Within this changing landscape, a “relief-development gap” has been identified as the time after which “…humanitarian agencies leave an area [once a] crisis has subsided but before incoming development agencies have established programmes” (Emmott, 2002, p. 2). When governments of the conflict-affected countries are unable or unwilling to assume responsibility for the delivery and continuity of education, the relief-development gap widens and threatens the sustainability of educational programs implemented by international organizations during the humanitarian phase of a crisis (Sinclair, 2002; Munslow and Brown, 1999).

**Purpose of the Study**

The agreement about the role that education plays in both humanitarian and developmental practices, coupled with the challenges presented during the transition from humanitarian relief to development, offer a rich context to answer the primary research question for this study: *What are the critical factors that affect the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development in post-conflict countries?* In order to develop a more holistic understanding of these critical factors, the line of inquiry used for this study encouraged participants to consider factors beyond those directly connected to financial resources. While financial resources are considered a critical factor and are included to some degree in this study, the fact that only four percent of total Official Development
Assistance (ODA) disbursed to conflict-affected and fragile states\(^1\) was used to support education suggests that international organizations develop creative strategies for overcoming monetary shortfalls (Save the Children, 2007a). In those instances in which the arrival of development agencies and the availability of related funding pools may be delayed, the development of creative strategies is especially necessary.

As such, this qualitative research study utilized a two-pronged and multi-level approach to identify and analyze the critical factors affecting the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development. The first part of the methodological approach for this study employed the use of an interview-based survey with educational practitioners working at the international level in a diverse range of organizations (e.g. United Nations, international non-governmental organizations, and donors) engaged with education in post-conflict environments. The identification and analysis of critical factors were sought at the global level for four reasons in particular: 1) to ensure that the perspectives of the primary organizational actors in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction were accounted for; 2) to explore the ways in which the critical factors identified by these individuals may have varied by type of organization (e.g. United Nations versus non-governmental organizations versus donor agencies); 3) to determine the degree to which sustainability was considered a priority for the educational work their organizations provided in conflict-affected countries; and 4) to create a global frame of reference with which to compare a narrower country case study as explained below.

\(^1\) Fragile states include “countries with poor governance as identified by a lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies; fragile states also often experience violent conflict” (Rose and Greeley, 2006, p. 1).
The second part of the methodological approach entailed the development of a case study of the Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) humanitarian work in Angola, both during and after the civil conflict that affected the country. For approximately 12 years, NRC implemented a non-formal education program—the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP)—which served as a bridge for out-of-school children to return to the formal system and provided an opportunity for inexperienced and unqualified teachers to acquire the needed competencies for the profession. In anticipation of its withdrawal from the country in 2007, NRC took steps to transfer responsibility for the program to other capable partners in an effort to sustain the TEP and the resources that had been developed throughout the life of the program. In addition to NRC personnel directly involved with the program, various stakeholders at the municipal, provincial and national levels participated in this study, including staff from other international organizations as well as the Ministry of Education. Through the use of semi-structured interviews, observations and document analysis, the involvement of these participants at the various levels provided the opportunity to create a comprehensive country perspective on the sustainability of an educational program in the transition from relief to development. The methodological approach used in this study provided the opportunity to make comparisons across levels (international, national, provincial and municipal); organizations; and to some extent different post-conflict contexts.

While the primary objective of this study was to identify and analyze the critical factors affecting the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations in post-conflict countries, the research and analysis processes also led to the creation of a conceptual framework for sustainability (presented in Chapter VII) that
can be used and built upon by practitioners and researchers interested in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction.

**Significance of the Study**

The significance of this study lies in its conceptual, methodological and practical contributions to the emerging field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction, and specifically to the dearth of literature on education in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. Conceptually, this project applies and further develops the under-developed concept of sustainability beyond its environmental foundation within this emerging field as well as within the broader field of education.

Sustainability was an appropriate and worthwhile concept for this study for several reasons. First, international organizations devote significant human, technical and financial resources as well as time in their efforts not only to provide educational opportunities that help to realize the right to education for those populations affected by crisis, but also to rebuild an educational system that is stronger and more equitable than the one that preceded it. Second, if the opportunities, knowledge and skills provided by educational support during a crisis are not recognized and leveraged in the transition to development, the lack of sustainability has the potential to create resentment among the population as well as exacerbate the underlying fragility of a nation and reignite conflict. Third, if international organizations are unable to implement their programs in such a way as to be sustainable, they run the risk of losing funding from donors over the long-term; a loss of funding would limit the educational assistance that could be provided to
populations affected by conflict. Moreover, the challenges presented by the relief-development transition, coupled with lost or interrupted opportunities for schooling, greatly frustrate efforts to achieve universal primary education by 2015 as outlined in the Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The research findings from this project will greatly complement the evaluations and rich but anecdotal evidence customarily produced by the international organizations working in this field.

Methodologically, this project provides an opportunity to make comparisons across a range of international organizations, levels (municipal, provincial, national and international) and post-conflict contexts. Practically, the analysis of international organizations’ policies and practices and the challenges they face to sustain their respective educational programs in the transition from humanitarian relief to development in post-conflict countries will provide illustrative examples (e.g. case study, good/bad practices and lessons learned). These can be used to inform decisions about policy and practice made by those individuals and organizations in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction, including UN agencies, international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), bi- and multi-lateral donors, and ministries of education.

**Overview of Chapters**

Chapter I introduced the overarching research question that guided this study—i.e., what are the critical factors that affect the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to
development? The remaining chapters and the ways in which they contributed to answering this question are presented here.

Chapter II reviews the relevant literature and situates this study in the fields of humanitarian relief and development. In so doing, the evolution of the relief-development gap is presented, followed by a closer look at the role that education plays in the humanitarian and development spheres. As the central tenet to this study, the review of the literature concludes with a discussion about sustainability, its underutilization within the field of education and initial attempts by some researchers to apply it to developmental contexts. Chapter III includes an overview of the qualitative methodological approach taken for this study and efforts to compare data across levels and organizations in order to generate a comprehensive understanding of what sustainability looks like in post-conflict contexts.

The data findings for this study have been divided into two chapters, Chapter IV and VI. The first, Chapter IV, draws upon the expertise of educational practitioners working across a range of different organizations at the international level to analyze the critical factors for sustainability that these individuals have identified in their work in conflict-affected countries. The intervening chapter, Chapter V, is presented in order to establish the context for the second data chapter, which includes the case study on the TEP in Angola. To establish this context, Chapter V provides background information about Angola, the civil conflict that ravaged the country for 27 years, the state of the country’s educational system and the non-formal education program implemented by NRC. The data from the case study of the TEP in Angola are presented in Chapter VI. The TEP provides an illustrative example for this type of research due to the longevity of
the program's implementation in Angola, and the efforts that the implementing organization, NRC, made to transfer the TEP to other capable partners as Angola moved towards development and the organization planned to withdraw from the country.

The critical factors affecting sustainability that are identified and analyzed in Chapters IV and VI contributed to the creation of a conceptual framework for sustainability that is presented in Chapter VII. The conceptual framework illuminates the core elements of sustainability as well as the ongoing, interdependent and shifting processes that accompany efforts to sustain educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development in conflict-affected countries. Finally, Chapter VIII proposes recommendations and directions for future research for the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction and the practitioners and researchers working in it.
Chapter II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the emergence of the "relief-development gap" and the ideological, institutional and financial differences that lie therein. This chapter then examines the role that education plays in developmental and humanitarian spheres. The final section introduces the idea of sustainability as an under-developed but useful construct for this study.

Relief-Development Transition

The concept of a "relief-development continuum," which implies a smooth linear transition between humanitarian relief and development assistance, surfaced within the traditional decision-making processes about reconstruction following inter-state wars and natural disasters in which a central government continued to function and assume responsibility for its citizens (Sinclair, 2002; Munslow and Brown, 1999). The changing nature of conflict that erupted in the post-Cold War era, which increasingly entailed violent clashes between groups, factions and political parties within a nation’s borders, began to challenge the assumptions inherent in a linear continuum. Hence, the concept of a "relief-development gap" emerged not only to account for the shifting dynamics of conflict, but also the failure of humanitarian and development agencies to adjust to the
new reality. As such, the “gap” referred to the uncoordinated time and space that existed as humanitarian agencies were withdrawing from a particular country but development agencies had yet to arrive (Emmott, 2002; Suveiu, 2006).

The use of the term “post-conflict” has been criticized by some for masking this gap in time and space as well as withdrawal of support and funds. According to Moore (2000), “the notion of “post-conflict” has emerged and taken flight within humanitarian and development discourse, as if by linguistic fiat a “sustainable” peace will ensue and the traditionally separate realms of western third world-aiding agencies can come together and reconstruct war-torn societies in their image” (2000, p. 11). This masking is particularly troubling as many “post-conflict” countries continue to experience significant levels of violence (Macrae, 1999).

Another metaphor, the “merry-go-round,” surfaced in the relief-development debate to account for the cyclical nature of conflict and the digressions that a country may experience in its struggle to stabilize; these digressions may entail country-wide unrest or isolated disruptions that affect smaller portions of the country and its citizens. The “merry-go-round” conceptualization also has been discredited due to its failure “to provide any understanding of how relief and development agencies should act or interact as the merry-go-round turned” (Smillie, 1998, p. xxiv). Other metaphors, such as the “conveyor belt” (Smillie, 1998, p. xiv), have enjoyed brief moments of recognition and use, but all have failed to capture the challenges that pervade the humanitarian relief and development fields or any efforts to link the two.

The message communicated by Hugo Slim (2000), a prolific writer in the humanitarian field, is that the endless search for metaphors, discussions and debates, and
conference proceedings devoted to the “relief-development gap” are simply pointless.

Slim states that:

For too long, using these terms has played into the hands of that dreadful tendency to dualism which dogs the Western mind and has led to the pernicious idea that humanitarianism and development are radically different moral pursuits. The ethic of the humanitarian has been presented unthinkingly as a sort of temporary, morally myopic project which limits itself to meeting urgent physical needs before hurriedly abdicating in favour of development workers and their much grander ethic of social empowerment and transformation....But the stereotype helps no one in the long run (2000, p. 22).

Although there is agreement throughout the literature that some of the historical distinctions between relief and development are misguided, many barriers and challenges that prevent bridging the wretched “relief-development gap” continue to be cited. These factors include, but are not limited to, a “chaotic multiplicity of needs” and competition for limited resources (Moore, 1999, p. 2); “poor coordination, cumbersome donor procedures and unstable governments” (Emmott, 2002, p. 1); and international humanitarian personnel “ill-equipped to deal with development” issues (Demusz, 1998, p. 241).

As the various metaphors describing this process over the years have fallen short, the conceptualization of this process as a “transition,” although a less catchy term, appears to be the most accurate and useful description. Despite failed efforts to apply the continuum to complex political emergencies, bridge the gap between relief and development, and ride the merry-go-round in a coordinated fashion, what is clear is that there is an “unrealized symbiosis” (Moore, 1999) that continues to hamper the transition from humanitarian relief to development.
The lack of symbiosis and the ideological, institutional and financial differences from which it stems will be described in more detail in the following sections. Education-specific examples will be limited due to the fact that the broader humanitarian community is just beginning to recognize education as a key sector within humanitarian response, and its inclusion has not yet infiltrated much of the academic literature. The challenges identified in the literature with regard to the ideological, institutional and financial differences that may hinder the transition from relief to development simultaneously represent the challenges that international organizations may face in their efforts to sustain educational support provided in post-conflict environments.

**Ideological Differences**

Within the humanitarian context, international relief organizations responding to emergencies are charged with the task of alleviating human suffering and restoring a sense of normalcy for communities affected by crisis. The provision of humanitarian relief is based upon the following ideological beliefs outlined in the *Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes*: humanity, which states that humanitarian assistance will be provided to anyone anywhere in the world; impartiality, which links humanitarian assistance with the needs of the population or individuals affected regardless of nationality, race or creed; neutrality, which guides humanitarian relief efforts in such a way as not to favor one side over the other; and independence, which isolates humanitarian assistance from any partisan or political action (Sphere Project, 2004). In
order to meet these objectives in situations of armed conflict, humanitarian efforts may circumvent the state apparatus, particularly when national capacity and infrastructure have been damaged as a result of the conflict. Conversely, international development agencies strive to work directly and collaboratively with national authorities to develop plans that will contribute to the nation’s long-term economic, political and social development. In contrast to the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence ascribed to within the humanitarian realm, agencies working in developmental contexts will seek to influence this process directly, if not often aggressively.

As stated above, the traditional humanitarian relief arena has developed around the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These principles were put into place to safeguard international organizations’ efforts to reach the most vulnerable populations in a supposedly apolitical way that would not be misinterpreted by the warring factions or rebel groups. Humanitarian action therefore is based on a “universal ethic founded on the conviction that all people have equal dignity by virtue of their membership in humanity” (Terry, 2002, p. 19).

In her book about the paradoxes of humanitarian action documented from her personal perspective as a humanitarian worker, Fiona Terry clearly outlines the core principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence subscribed to by humanitarian actors:

The “humanitarian imperative” declares that there is an obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed, and is predicated on the right to receive, and to offer, humanitarian aid. Impartiality implies that assistance is based solely on need, without any discrimination among recipients because of nationality, race, religion, or other factors. The principle of neutrality denotes a duty to refrain from taking part in hostilities or from undertaking any action that furthers the interests of one party to the conflict or compromises those of the other. Independence is
an indispensable condition to ensure that humanitarian action is exclusively concerned with the welfare of humanity and free of all political, religious, or other extraneous influences (Terry, 2002, p. 19).

Although these principles have been heralded as the cornerstone of humanitarian work, the basic premise of Terry’s book is that the separation of humanitarian efforts from the political stakes of a conflict is almost impossible to achieve. Antonio Donini, a senior researcher at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University with 26 years of work experience within the United Nations, concurs with Terry to some extent; however, he also advocates for a contraction and insulation of “humanitarian action from political agendas” (2007, p. 3). Donini feels strongly that humanitarian actors have overstepped their bounds and have become a polarizing force, particularly as a result of the West’s “global war on terror” (2007, p. 2). Within the context of Angola, Chaulia (2006), a noted author, lambastes UN agencies and international NGOs’ “flattering self-image” for the “anodyne” and “innocuous” characterization of humanitarianism that persists today. He states forcefully that ‘humanitarianism as the “official ideology of the West”...is incapable of stopping wars or promoting social justice’ (p. 2). Humanitarian efforts and accompanying aid have a political effect, he argues. In Angola, according to Chaulia, the “role of humanitarians as surrogate welfare providers who saved costs for the warring side” buttresses this point (2006, p. 4). Furthermore, he argues:

In eagerness to raise funds and offer services, the INGO sector in Angola tried to replace the state’s functions instead of complementing them. Therefore, humanitarianism “contributed to the fragmentation of the public sector” and state divestiture of its social responsibilities (Chaulia, 2006, p. 2).

Jonathan Moore explains this widening girth of humanitarianism by pointing to the international community’s efforts to bridge the relief-development gap through the
recognition and desire to tackle the underlying root causes of conflict rather than simply treating the symptoms. In this process, he states that ‘the international community began using the label “humanitarian” in a less restricted context…one encompassing development…’ (Moore, 1999, p. 1). As noted here, there are strong arguments and critiques to be made about the direction that humanitarian work should take. Whether the humanitarian arena contracts, expands or tries to strike a balance between more “purist” (Donini, 2007, p. 4) and politically motivated approaches, the debate will surely influence education’s relatively new placement within this arena; the effects of which will be mediated to some extent by the following institutional differences.

**Institutional Differences**

In institutional terms, it is not uncommon for international organizations to have mandates which articulate both humanitarian and developmental objectives, but many organizations tend to focus their work on one or the other (UNESCO, 2006). This inclination ultimately influences the ideological principles under which organizations operate, their degree of engagement with national authorities, points of entry into and exit out of a particular country as well as the scope, timing and duration of the organizations’ activities. Other key challenges that fall under the umbrella of institutional differences and are influenced by an organization’s mandate include the degree to which organizations coordinate with other organizations and form partnerships, and offer capacity building opportunities for both the local populations with which they are working as well as their own staff.
In writing about the transition from relief to development, Munslow and Brown (1999) argue that “much of the complexity in complex emergencies stems from complexes within institutions themselves” (p. 208). They believe these can lead to what they have identified as an “institutional impasse” (p. 207). While the institutional mandate will dictate whether an organization provides humanitarian relief, development assistance or some combination of the two, these distinctions influence an organization’s timing of entry into and exit out of a particular country. Institutional mandates also indicate which populations an organization will target (e.g. refugees, internally displaced persons²). Clearly defined mandates have the potential to facilitate collaboration with other agencies, provision of complementary programming, and reduction of duplication; however, an organization’s aspirations may change in response to a particular crisis, often sparked by the availability of funding, and lead to what is commonly referred to in the field as “mission creep.” International organizations in these contexts understand the importance of working with the state rather than circumventing it; however, certain organizations are held accountable for this type of engagement more so than others. The United Nations agencies, in particular, are mandated to work directly with the state whereas non-governmental organizations are more accountable to the “beneficiaries” or “recipients,” for lack of a better word, of their services. Depending upon the nature of a crisis or the nation’s degree of fragility, the ability to collaborate with the state may be significantly compromised.

² Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border” (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html).
In addition to collaborating with state structures, an important component of this discussion is the degree to which international organizations collaborate with populations and communities with regard to the services, resources or programming being provided. Again, most organizations recognize the importance of engaging affected populations early on; however, the ways in which community participation is approached and facilitated may differ greatly across organizations. Along these lines, the ways in which an organization provides opportunities for capacity building among the local population are also important to reflect upon in this discussion. Capacity building is one of the key buzzwords within development and humanitarian circles these days, but what organizations propose they will do and what they actually do on the ground often prove elusive (Sinclair, 2002; Kaplan, 2000). Capacity building of an organization’s own staff and personnel is another critical factor. While education has begun to figure more centrally in humanitarian response, the educational expertise and experience within an organization may be sorely lacking as well as the “surge capacity” (i.e. sheer number of staff) able to respond to a crisis situation, perform rapid assessments and begin planning education with long-term educational goals in mind.

Lastly, an organization’s predisposition to collaborate with other organizations, to form partnerships and coordinate educational programming efforts can play a significant role in the sustainability of programs. While partnership approaches are heralded as being more effective and efficient over the long-term and form a key part of the UN reform process currently underway, the mechanisms through which humanitarian relief and development activities are financially supported creates an environment in which international organizations maneuver and posture to capture the attention of donors,
thereby creating a competitive rather than collaborative environment (Sommers, 2004). The following section will illuminate these various financial mechanisms in more detail.

**Financial Differences**

The ideological and institutional differences are complicated further by the following financial aspects of the international aid community: the types of mechanisms that have been established for delivering humanitarian versus development aid, the range of donor agencies and their internal structures for allocating financial resources, the impetus for providing aid and the overall amount of aid available. In humanitarian emergencies resulting from armed conflict, aid is customarily allocated to United Nations agencies and INGOs working on the ground as alternatives to national authorities that may not be in a position to manage funds due to corruption, lack of capacity and damaged or nonexistent infrastructure. In developmental environments, monies are typically centralized through the state; however, in “fragile states” weakened by a lack of political will or capacity, alternative financing mechanisms that entail the diversion of funds through other entities (e.g. UN agencies and INGOs) or mechanisms may be employed. Whereas financial support for humanitarian relief is intended to be allocated unconditionally, development aid funneled through state structures may be contingent upon a donor’s political and economic terms. Conceivably, international organizations’ own lack of capacity and corrupt practices can exacerbate the challenges presented by the relief-development gap.

The challenges presented by the financial differences between the humanitarian relief and development fields encompass not only the competitive strategies that
international organizations exercise to attract funding, but also the condition of the state, the type and duration of a crisis, the internal structure of donor agencies, and the conditionalities that donors often attach to their funding as well as the overall amount of funding available. In the traditional developmental context in which state structures are functional, bi- and multi-lateral donors as well as private sector donors are able to transfer monies directly to the government. In a crisis scenario or a situation involving a weakened state, which for many cases is one and the same, alternative financing mechanisms are needed for the provision of basic services to the affected populations. In these situations donors allocate funds to international organizations, thereby circumventing a damaged, corrupt or failed state structure.

There are a variety of funding mechanisms within the humanitarian field, each with its own limitations. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) serves as the primary mechanism through which donors assess and coordinate their response to a humanitarian situation after reviewing appeals made by UN agencies, and more recently NGOs. Education is included in the CAP as a standard sector, but the problem with the CAP is that the funds committed to this process on average have only covered two-thirds of the total humanitarian appeals to date (Bird, Dolan and Nicolai, 2006). The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden continue to be the top three supporters of education in emergencies within the donor community, the latter two having actually included education as part of their humanitarian policies. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was recently revised in order to ensure more rapid response while “strengthening the United Nation’s capacity to respond to natural disasters and complex emergencies” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008, p. 1). Accordingly,
the fund is designed to: “promote early action and response to save lives”; “enhance response to time-crucial requirements based on demonstrable needs”; and “strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crisis” (OCHA, p. 1). The CERF was revised to support life-saving interventions in under-funded crises, but it is unclear whether or not education will be considered a “life-saving intervention” in forthcoming allocations. Other mechanisms, such as Multi-Donor Trust Funds and the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Fund, have been designed to pool funds from a range of donors and to distribute the funds through mechanisms that do not involve the state (e.g. “trust funds in West Bank and Gaza and East Timor each paid teachers for several years, as well as funding school reconstruction and other education system costs”) (Bird et al., 2006, p. 37).

While these alternatives have been useful, the overarching problem is one of insufficient funds to respond adequately to the educational needs of a country in crisis or recovering from conflict. This shortage of funds coupled with the unrealistic donor expectations about what can be accomplished within an insufficient timeline complicate matters further. Once the “CNN effect” subsides, which has proven useful for attracting funding in the early stages, and a conflict persists, it becomes more and more difficult to secure funding (Carvalho, 2003; Save the Children, 2006).

Donors’ internal structures can also present barriers to securing more funds for education-related activities even when heightened attention is focused upon a particular emergency. For example, the United States Agency for International Development’s Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is responsible for providing humanitarian assistance, does not have an education mandate, and thus it will neither
carry out nor fund education-related activities during humanitarian response. Instead, the education mandate within the United States government exists within the Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade (EGAT), which works in developing and transition countries, not in emergency situations. The scarcity of funding for education-related activities caused by this type of internal structure and policy inconsistency greatly limits the extent to which education in emergencies can be provided (Winthrop and Mendenhall, 2006, p. 3). The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) is structured similarly.

Finally, the overall amount of aid made available for education has been and will most likely continue to be problematic. According to financial analysis conducted by Save the Children (2007), only two percent of total global humanitarian contributions were allocated to the education sector. This nominal amount signifies that education is still considered a long-term development activity. According to the Education for All Fast-Track Initiative (EFA FTI) (2007), which was designed to provide funding for countries “on track” to meeting the Education for All and Millennium Development Goals, governments are expected to “invest at least six percent of their gross national product (GNP) in education” (2007a, p. 1). None of the conflict-affected fragile states for which there are available data are reaching this level of investment, including Angola. In terms of budget allocation, it has also been suggested that for a country to be successful in meeting these developmental goals, it needs to spend approximately 20 percent of its total budget on education (Bird et al., 2006); this is a level of investment that is rarely met in these contexts.
Although the challenges presented by a lack of funds for education and the inability to allocate funds in a way that simultaneously strengthens state structures are significant, the reality is that there will most likely never be adequate funds available to support the various needs of a country experiencing conflict, recovering from conflict or transitioning to development. The implications of the financial challenges described here cannot be underestimated, and the efforts of donors to better harmonize their aid activities should be applauded. However, it is important to incorporate what an aid-centric study might not include in order to establish a more holistic understanding of international organizations’ efforts to sustain educational support in the transition from relief to development.

The following sections will highlight the ideological differences inherent to the relief-development transition through a more focused discussion on the role of education in both development and humanitarian relief. Whereas the role of education appears to be more straightforward in the development field, at least in regard to the importance placed upon it, efforts to secure the role of education within the humanitarian field have proven to be a bit more contentious.

**Education’s Role in Development**

Education has played a central role in development and the evolution of its related theories for centuries. Whether a nation-state needed to modernize (Rostow, 1964), strengthen and expand its human capital (Sobel, 1982), reduce its dependence upon other nations (Cardoso, 1973), or become better connected to the world economic system
(Wallerstein, 1987), expanded educational opportunities and an educated citizenry were part and parcel of any plans to achieve these objectives. This is not to suggest that this is a simple process, as “development means improvement in a complex of linked natural, economic, social, cultural and political conditions” (Peet and Hartwick, 1999, p. 1). However, when certain developmental objectives were not achieved, the lack of educational opportunities or the substandard quality of educational offerings was often to blame. In its exuberance in regard to the potential of education, the development field has often considered education as a panacea for the ills plaguing “developing” and “underdeveloped” nations (Vavrus, 2003). There have long been claims that education would do the following:

Accelerate economic growth..., raise levels of living especially for the poor..., generate widespread and equal employment opportunities for all..., acculturate diverse ethnic or tribal groups..., [or] encourage “modern” attitudes have been challenged or outright disproved (Todoro, 1989, p. 87).

The argument for education’s potential to assuage societal problems continues to reign today. In a 2006 education report prepared by DATA (i.e. debt, AIDS, trade, Africa) as part of its advocacy efforts to encourage the G8 to keep its promises for funding to the African continent, the authors highlighted the returns that basic education can provide for health and economic growth, particularly with regard to child mortality, the spread of HIV/AIDS and income generation for women (DATA, 2006). Despite the fact that the provision of education and its potential benefits must be couched within a broader economic, political and social framework, education clearly continues to play a central role in the development field. This fact is reinforced further by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All (EFA) agenda, which
call for universal primary education by 2015 and are endorsed by the international community. Although education has figured centrally in development processes for centuries, this has not always been the case within the humanitarian realm.

**Education's Role in Humanitarian Relief**

Traditionally, humanitarian relief consisted of three pillars—food and water, shelter and healthcare—which were life-saving activities and funded by the international aid community. The provision of these services continue to be central to humanitarian relief, but two factors in particular have challenged the notion that education should be postponed until a country stabilizes: 1) the changing nature of conflict, and 2) the rights-based approach that has come to influence and shape most international organizations’ programming structures (Kagawa, 2005).

The changing nature of conflict is evident in that all of the 19 conflicts recorded as major armed conflicts in 2004 were classified as intra-state conflicts, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which maintains one of the most comprehensive databases on the subject (2005). The SIPRI Yearbook defines major conflicts as those causing over 1,000 battle-related deaths in any one year. Although inter-state conflicts have diminished, and globally the number of refugees has gone down to 8.4 million, the number of IDPs has increased. In 2005, there were 24 million people living in IDP camps or temporary situations within their own countries (Save the Children, 2006). The fact that refugees spend an average of 10 years in refugee camps and many IDPs are displaced for numerous years (U.S. Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants, 2007), ‘displacement for either group can hardly be termed “temporary”’ (Save the Children, 2006, p. 4). The estimate that 50 percent of countries return to conflict within five years also emphasizes the need to restore educational opportunities as quickly as possible (Collier, 2003). At this rate, entire generations of children are growing up lacking the literacy, numeracy and cognitive skills needed to take care of themselves, and their families and nations recovering from conflict will be unable to successfully rebuild without educated citizens to contribute to this process.

It is also important to point out that time and time again the populations and communities affected by conflict directly are also prioritizing and requesting support for education in their discussions with international organizations responding to the crisis (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004b). For example, local chiefs and community leaders in Afghanistan have negotiated with humanitarian relief staff to ensure that teachers were given priority status for food distribution so that they would not need to leave the community in search of alternative means for feeding themselves and their families (Anderson, Martone, Perlman Robinson, Rognerud and Sullivan-Owomoyela, 2006). As inspiring as these accounts and international organizations’ efforts have been to provide education as part of their humanitarian activities, it cannot divert attention from the fact that over 77 million children remain out of school (UNESCO, 2007c) and that over 40 million of this global number are living in conflict-affected and fragile states (Save the Children, 2007b). Efforts to alter this reality and provide universal primary education are firmly rooted in human rights declarations, the second factor that has led to the growing recognition of the important role that education plays in humanitarian response.
The right to education under any circumstances is protected in numerous human rights documents. These guiding frameworks include the following: Article 26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to education” (United Nations, 1948); the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons During Times of War states that “education [is] facilitated in all circumstances” for children under fifteen, including orphans and those children separated from their families as a result of war (UNHCR, 1949); Article 22 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that refugees shall be accorded "the same treatment as...nationals with respect to elementary education" and "treatment as favourable as possible...with respect to education other than elementary education..." (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1951); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child includes multiple articles related to the right to education, specifically that primary education should be made compulsory and free for all (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1989). The Education for All and Millennium Development Goals mentioned in the previous section are also based on these human rights frameworks and were established to facilitate access to and completion of quality education in both developmental and emergency contexts.³

³ The EFA goals include: 1) expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children; 2) ensuring...all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality; 3) ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes; 4) achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults; 5) eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality; 6) improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills (UNESCO, 2000).
Two more recent examples illustrate that education is being considered a critical sector within humanitarian response. First, the international education community was successful in its advocacy efforts to ensure that sufficient attention was given to education at the 2005 UN World Summit, which served as the high-level plenary meeting of the 60th session of the UN General Assembly. The final text in the outcome document was as follows: *We also reaffirm our commitment to ensure that children in armed conflicts receive timely and effective humanitarian assistance, including education, for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society* (United Nations General Assembly, 2005, paragraph 118, emphasis added). The high-level, albeit discursive, nature of this achievement helped to create a solid foundation upon which international organizations providing education services could continue their advocacy work.

The second example and major achievement involves the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s new cluster initiative. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) conducted and released the findings of an independent evaluation titled the Humanitarian Response Review in 2005 (United Nations, 2005). The purpose of the evaluation was to “assess the humanitarian response capacities of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors..., map the gaps, and make recommendations to address them” (UN, 2005 p. 8). The primary recommendation that arose from this evaluation proposed the formation of a “cluster” approach to fill gaps. This idea entailed harmonizing a cluster of agencies to respond within a particular sector (e.g. camp management, water and sanitation, health) and identifying a “lead agency” (which must be a UN agency given that this was a UN initiative) to serve as the “first responder” to a crisis as well as a “provider of last resort” if no other agency were able to
assume the necessary responsibilities (UN, 2005 p. 8). The basic premise behind the cluster approach was to fill gaps and to improve accountability and predictability in humanitarian response. The nine main gap areas for which clusters were to be formed as a result of the evaluation included the following: logistics; emergency shelter; camp coordination and management; health; nutrition; emergency telecommunications; water, hygiene and sanitation; early recovery; and protection.

Although the evaluators examined international agencies’ capacities to respond as early as the first four weeks of a crisis and up to 18 months thereafter, education was only given a cursory review. When the international education community pressed for a better explanation about the oversight, they were told that there were no gaps and that UNICEF assumed the de facto lead role in organizing other agencies on the ground. While UNICEF plays a central role in the delivery of education in emergency situations (without an official mandate to do so), the international education community felt strongly that there were critical gaps to be addressed and that the evaluation’s failure to examine education more thoroughly in the evaluation reinforced the fact that education had yet to be prioritized as a key sector within humanitarian response. As a result, the international education community began to advocate aggressively for the inclusion of education in the cluster process by documenting gaps and circulating and submitting petition letters to the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee. About 15 months after the initial release of the evaluation, these advocacy efforts paid off and the IASC approved the proposal to apply the cluster approach to the education sector. The international organizations involved in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction felt strongly that the creation of an education cluster would contribute
greatly to securing the life-saving and life-sustaining role that education can play in emergency situations as well as help to earmark additional funds to support these efforts.

Though the important role that education can play in humanitarian response is increasingly being recognized, supported and mainstreamed in practice, the usefulness of looking at the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations across the relief-development transition is explained in the following section.

**Sustainability**

Sustainability and sustainable development have been central tenets within the discussions about the environment in which development "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland, 1987, p. 1). Despite criticisms that the term “sustainable development” is vague and ambiguous (Kottak, 2004), the rhetoric of sustainable development has been applied across economic, political and social arenas. The extensive use of sustainability in these different realms, albeit with a predominant focus on the environment, has created a “diversity of views” about what sustainability is or should be (Chapman and Austin, 2006, p. 2). Amongst this diversity, some believe that:

[The] epithet of sustainability, as currently understood in the “Northern” public arena and by many development agencies, is too plastic—or too loaded—to be of any authentic or practical use (Petrucci, 2002, p. 103).

Within education, the concept of sustainability rarely has been applied beyond issues directly concerning the environment. UNESCO, for example, has established the UN
Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014), for which the overall goal is to:

Integrate the values inherent in sustainable development into all aspects of learning to encourage changes in behavior that allow for a more sustainable and just society for all (UNESCO, 2007b, p. 2).

These values entail “respect for others, including those of present and future generations, for difference and diversity, for the environment, for the resources of the planet we inhabit” (UNESCO, 2007a, p. 1).

Apart from the focus upon the environment, the concept of sustainability is intimately in discussions about educational reform and the need to scale up successful efforts. The majority of reforms involve change that is meant to be an ongoing and long-lasting endeavor (Healey and DeStefano, 1997; Elmore, 1996). When education reforms prove successful, scaling up and “expanding impact” often become the priority (Uvin, Jain and Brown, 2000, p. 1409). According to Glennan, Bodilly, Galegher and Kerr, editors of a research brief prepared on education reform, the scaling up process entails the following four characteristics:

- Spread: implementation of reform practices at additional sites or in additional groups within existing sites
- Depth: a significant improvement in classroom practice, enacted in deep and meaningful ways, that influences student performance
- Sustainability: policy and infrastructure systems in place to support continued, deep improvement in classroom practice over time
- Shift in ownership: transfer of knowledge and authority to sustain the reform to the site, allowing continuous improvement and further scale-up (2004, p. 2).

In this brief about scaling up, the editors highlight the “interactive,” “adaptive,” “iterative” and “nonlinear” nature of this process (p. 2) as well as the need to transfer ownership into an established infrastructure, characteristics which can be helpful in
thinking about the concept of sustainability of education programs in the relief-development transition in post-conflict countries.

Despite its limited application, the concept of sustainability is also implicit in developmental discourse and agendas. One example of its application to the education field stands out in the work being conducted by Grace Akukwe Nkansa, from the Academy for Educational Development, and David Chapman, from the University of Minnesota. They have developed a “synthesis model of sustainability” that consolidates perspectives about sustainability from the following: economic models, which focus primarily upon the long-term economic benefits and self-sufficiency of a project once external funding ends; socio-political models, which look at the transfer of knowledge and skills from project implementers to those who will oversee the activity over the long-term; ecological models, which entail the preservation of resources to ensure “survival of individuals and cultures” in the future; and finally, innovation-diffusion models, which highlight the importance of local ownership and acceptance (Chapman and Austin, 2006, p. 1).

The synthesis model (see Figure I below) “posits that the sustainability of project elements is affected by both management components and socio-cultural components” (Nkansa and Chapman, 2006, p. 1). Nkansa and Chapman provide additional explanations about these two components in the paragraph that follows:

Management components include the extent of planning that had occurred at the community level, the transparency of project operations to community members, the strength of local leadership, and participation, e.g., the extent to which community members were engaged in the project activities. Socio-cultural components include the extent of social cohesion within the community, the availability of community resources, the skill of the community in creating and sustaining collective motivation, and the extent that education was valued within the community. Management
components tend to be factors that can be influenced by external intervention (e.g., training, planning workshops, etc.) while socio-cultural components tend to be more durable, underlying characteristics of communities (Nkansa and Chapman, 2006, p. 1).

**Figure I:** Synthesis Model of Sustainability

(Source: Nkansa and Chapman, 2006, p. 513)

The synthesis model highlights several key components that need to be taken into consideration when discussing sustainability within the education sector; however, the model’s perspective is limited in that it only addresses the management and socio-cultural dimensions taking place at the community level. Its application within a development
setting of a “stable” country, in this case Ghana, may also be limited for a more complex discussion of sustainability in a post-conflict environment in which a country, such as Angola, experienced a protracted crisis and is undergoing the transition from relief to development.

Another application of sustainability has surfaced within the philanthropic field and is tangentially related to education. In an effort to respond to critiques that foundations fail to ensure the sustainability of the programs that they fund, Weiss, Coffman and Bohan-Baker (2002) proposed looking at the role that strategic planning and evaluation could play in supporting sustainability. In their research, they asked foundation representatives and grantees what they wanted to sustain. Their findings pointed to four main categories: 1) the projects and organizations themselves, especially if the latter had been newly created as part of the initiative; 2) the “ideas, beliefs, principles, or values that an initiative is based on or promotes” (p. 4); 3) the relationships that have been established among the various organizations that participated in the initiative; and 4) the outcomes that resulted from the initiative (e.g. codification of policy, long-term engagement of local stakeholders). To support their proposal, they draw upon theories of change, leverage and sustainability to articulate the ways in which sustainability should be considered a core element during the development of a strategy and throughout the evaluation of the project that emerges from the strategy. What is useful in their proposal is that they emphasize the need to look at sustainability from the very beginning as well as throughout the duration of a project. They also stress that ensuring sustainability is a process and that organizations implementing the project must periodically examine the ways in which the context in which they are operating is
changing and how the project should or should not be adapted accordingly. While foundations and grantees may want an entire project to be sustained in many cases, the perspective that ideas, beliefs and principles can also be sustained is equally useful. Despite their recognition that an entire project or simply an idea can be sustained, they state that the primary emphasis on sustainability is about the “ability of foundations and their grantees to secure the funding needed to continue” their work (Weiss et al., 2002, p. 5; emphasis in original). While they speak about the need to sustain the relationships with other stakeholders or organizations that are generated throughout the implementation of a project, they fail to recognize that these groups could be potential resources for long-term sustainability if the original implementor is unable to continue the project. These two stances, in particular, prevent a more holistic understanding of what sustainability entails.

The review of the literature presented in this chapter captured the complexity of the relief-development transition, the role of education in humanitarian relief and development as well as the limited use of the concept of sustainability within the education sector. The challenges that emerged from the ideological, institutional and financial differences between the humanitarian and developmental spheres informed the perspective that this study assumed given that these differences often times corresponded with the critical factors that affected international organizations’ efforts to sustain educational support provided in post-conflict countries. The growing recognition of education as a key sector within humanitarian response indicated that more attention needed to be given to the role that education can play across the relief-development transition. Finally, the application of the concept of sustainability within the education
sector, albeit limited, was reviewed and the useful elements of the concept for education in post-conflict environments were identified. The following chapter on the methodology used for this research endeavor explains the ways in which this study sought to develop a broader understanding of the critical factors affecting sustainability in the relief-development transition.
Chapter III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Qualitative methods emphasize processes and meanings (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998), and they were employed in this study in an effort to develop a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the sustainability of education programs facilitated by international organizations in the relief-development transition in post-conflict countries. To develop this understanding, I employed a qualitative "vertical case study" (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006) in order to collect and analyze data from various levels (i.e. international, national, provincial and municipal) and across a diverse array of organizations involved in providing education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. A "vertical case study," as described by Vavrus and Bartlett, calls for "simultaneous comparisons of similarities and differences, across multiple levels" (p. 99) as well as the "concomitant commitment to micro-level understanding and to macro-level analysis" (p. 96). This multi-level and cross-organizational comparison allows the researcher to "nest one form of data within another" (Creswell, 2003, p. 16) and leads to "a more balanced and comprehensive approach" (Bray and Thomas, 1995, p. 488) in identifying and analyzing the critical factors affecting sustainability. The following sections will describe the methodological approach used for each level, including site and
participant selection, data analysis techniques, role of the researcher and limitations of this study.

**International Level**

To create a global frame of reference at the macro level about the critical factors that affect sustainability within the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction, I utilized an interview-based survey to glean this information from a group of educational practitioners working in different types of international organizations active in this field. I used purposive sampling (Maxwell, 1996), also known as criterion-based sampling (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993), in the selection processes for the organizations and the organizational representatives. The purposive sampling strategy was justified in that these organizations, and particularly the individuals, possessed information and educational expertise that could not have been obtained through the use of randomized strategies (Maxwell, 1996). The NGOs were chosen due to the size of their education in emergencies’ portfolios in comparison to other organizations (e.g. type and range of educational programs, and number of countries in which the organization was involved).\(^4\) The United Nations’ agencies were selected if their humanitarian and/or developmental mandates included education as a significant sector or activity. The bi- and multi-lateral donors were selected contingent upon the level of financial support provided for education in emergencies and post-crisis

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\(^4\) The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) would have also been included with the other NGOs, but the organization’s participation in this study was prioritized for the case study component described below.
reconstruction work compared to others. Table I includes the list of organizations represented in this study as well as the type of mandate that typically guides their work.

**Table I: International-level Organizational Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization:</th>
<th>Humanitarian or Developmental Mandate:</th>
<th>Type of Organization:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for International Development (DfID) – United Kingdom</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td>Bi-lateral Donor Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Multi-lateral Donor Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The criteria that I used to select the individual participants from each of these organizations required that their professional positions reside within the education departments of their organizations and that, when possible, they assumed the greatest degree of responsibility in regards to their organizations education in emergencies and
post-crisis reconstruction portfolios. To ensure that a global perspective was gleaned, all 12 of the participants were based in the headquarters’ offices of their respective organizations.

I used an interview-based survey with this group of individuals in order to facilitate data collection from an extremely busy group of practitioners who travel extensively. The use of interviews allowed for richer, more detailed information to be collected as well as the opportunity to ask clarifying questions as needed. Every effort was made to account for the five aspects of interviewer behavior that need to be standardized when using this method—i.e. introducing the study, questioning participants, seeking clarification, recording responses and managing interpersonal relations (Fowler, 2002). During the data collection process, I introduced the study in the same way each time. The interview-based survey, which is included in Appendix A, was used for all participants and conducted by telephone. I served in the role of interviewer throughout all of the interviews, thereby ensuring that probing questions were asked in the same style and manner. Occasionally, I would make adjustments to the order of the questions if the respondent had seemingly jumped ahead in his or her thought process and began responding to questions that appeared later in the survey. Regardless, all survey questions were asked and were recorded by a digital recording device. Despite the fact that I also worked in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction and knew the majority of the participants to a certain degree, the participants understood that the nature of the inquiry was part of my doctoral research and no business-related work was conducted during the interview.
Data Analysis

Prior to data collection, I created a general list of categories that stemmed from a review of the literature as well as my professional experiences working in this field. However, inductive analysis described as "discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one’s data" (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p. 159; emphasis in original) guided the overall data analysis process. Data analysis for the interview-based survey continued during the transcription process, which I performed for all surveys, and entailed adding new categories and sub-categories to the initial list for each of the questions asked. A second and more thorough review of the categories led to the consolidation of the master list of categories into a smaller, more manageable set of the critical factors that appeared to affect the sustainability of education programs in the transition from relief to development. The excerpts or phrases from the survey responses that related to these categories or critical factors were highlighted and grouped accordingly. In addition to grouping the data in this way, the responses were also cross-referenced by type of organization in an effort to explore any similarities or differences that surfaced as a result of organizational affiliation. As such, the data collected at the international level provided a unique opportunity to compare and contrast the findings from the participants across different types of organizations and post-conflict contexts; the latter occurred when respondents were able to include country-specific examples to support their responses.
Country Level

To understand in-depth the critical factors that affect the sustainability of educational programs facilitated by international organizations in the transition from relief to development, the second part of this qualitative study entailed the development of a case within the larger vertical case study about one organization’s efforts to sustain its education program in post-conflict Angola. This method was the appropriate choice for this component of the study because, according to Merriam (1998), a case study “is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved” (p. 19). Yin (2003) concurs and highlights the ability of the case study approach to “illuminate a decision or set of decisions..., why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (p. 12, emphasis in original).

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), a humanitarian non-governmental organization, began working in Angola in 1995 in order to respond to the humanitarian and educational needs of Angolans as the county experienced a protracted crisis caused by armed conflict. The crux of NRC’s work in Angola was the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP), which was a non-formal education program designed with the long-term goal of “facilitating the entry or re-entry of children and adolescents into the formal education system [once possible]” and providing intensive training for teachers (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004, p. 3). The organization and the educational program selected for this case study were chosen due to the fact that NRC had implemented the TEP in Angola from 1995-2007 as part of their humanitarian activities and looked for other partners to sustain the TEP as the organization prepared to withdraw from the
country. The decision underscoring NRC’s withdrawal from Angola was attributed to the country’s transition from humanitarian relief to development.

Although the peace agreement that ended the 27-year armed conflict in Angola was signed in 2002, it was followed by humanitarian relief activities that were needed to respond to the massive movements and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The United Nations General Assembly officially declared in a meeting in July 2006 that Angola had transitioned from humanitarian relief to development after its assessment of the country’s relative stability since 2002. In conjunction with NRC’s work with the TEP, Angola presented a dynamic country in which to examine issues of sustainability more closely as the nation continued its transition from humanitarian relief to development (United Nations General Assembly, 2006).

When I learned about NRC’s work in Angola and the arrangements it was trying to make with other international organizations as it planned to withdraw from the country, I approached one of the education advisers working at NRC’s headquarters about plans for my doctoral research. After explaining the focus of my study on sustainability and why I thought the TEP would be a good fit, the education adviser showed interest in the topic and in helping me connect with her colleagues in the country office. We discussed the ways in which the project could be mutually beneficial—for the completion of my dissertation as well as the documentation of the TEP using the concept of sustainability—and plans came together very quickly for the field visit to Angola.
Translation Concerns

At this juncture, it is important to discuss the issue of language due to the fact that I was not fluent in Portuguese. Prior to arrival in Angola, efforts were made to identify and contract an English-Portuguese translator who would accompany me during the site visit and translate as needed. The various organizations participating in the study were all asked for assistance in this area given their needs at times to provide translation services for visitors to the country. Despite these efforts, I was informed that it was extremely difficult to find translators with fluency in English and that costs were prohibitive even for those translators whom they considered mediocre. As an alternative, staff members from the various international organizations participating in this study offered to assist with translation when needed. While this may not have been an ideal situation in terms of establishing a neutral environment in which interviewees would feel comfortable critiquing their own or other organizations, it proved to be the best alternative. Translators were never in a position in which they were translating for their superiors or vice versa. On the single occasion that I was able to identify and hire a professional translator recommended by UNICEF, it was clearly evident during the interview that the individual did not possess the requisite skills to translate an English-Portuguese exchange. Fortunately, my fluency in Spanish allowed me to comprehend a great deal during the interviews that took place during the field visit, to restate questions if I felt that they had not been translated or understood accurately and to ask clarifying questions when needed.
Field Visit to Angola

In March-April 2007 a three-week intensive field visit to Angola took place during which I collected data through semi-structured interviews and archival research; details about the documents reviewed during archival research will be explained in more detail later in this chapter. The field visit provided me with the opportunity to meet and interview staff members and education authorities with experience working with the TEP, the principle criterion used for participant sampling. It also provided the opportunity for me to interact with staff working with other international organizations in the region that may have engaged with NRC and the TEP at different times. In total, 30 individuals participated in the interview process during the field visit. Table II provides an overview of these participants, their positions and locations in Angola at the national, provincial and municipal levels. The table also includes an additional three individuals interviewed at the international level due to their organizational affiliations and experiences working with TEP. More details about these participants will be provided below.

Table II: Case Study Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization or Ministry Office</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>2 Staff Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 TEP Trainers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>4 Staff Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>1 Staff Member</td>
<td>Luanda, Angola (Capital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Children’s Fund</td>
<td>2 Staff Members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1 Education Official</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROVINCIAL LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBIS</td>
<td>2 Staff Members</td>
<td>Sumbe, Cuanza Sul, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>3 Staff Members</td>
<td>M’banza Congo, Zaire, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Department</td>
<td>2 Education Officials</td>
<td>Sumbe, Cuanza Sul, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Education</td>
<td>3 Education Officials</td>
<td>M’banza Congo, Zaire, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNICIPAL LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBIS</td>
<td>1 Staff Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEP</td>
<td>3 Supervisors</td>
<td>Quibala, Cuanza Sul, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Teacher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Department of Education</td>
<td>2 Education Officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>1 Staff Member</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBIS</td>
<td>1 Staff Member</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1 Education Specialist</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>33 Participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National level.** During the time spent in the capital of Luanda, I used a semi-structured interview format to interview staff working in the country offices of the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNICEF, Save the Children and Christian Children’s Fund. During the site visit, a senior staff member from NRC who was responsible for oversight of the TEP was available for an interview that was conducted in English. Three of the 12 national trainers for TEP were also in Luanda during the visit and participated in a group interview, with translation assistance provided by another NRC colleague. The Pedagogical Coordinator for TEP was traveling during the site visit to Angola but participated in an interview that I conducted via email at a later date. I enlisted the assistance of translators based in the United States to translate the interview questions and responses during this exchange.

UNICEF had been involved with the TEP since the beginning of its implementation in Angola and was considered an important component of this study. Over the years, UNICEF had established various agreements with NRC about the TEP and had signed a tripartite agreement with NRC and the Ministry of Education that would guide the work of these major partners involved in the education program. Therefore, UNICEF’s involvement with the TEP and the role they played as an intergovernmental
organization working directly with the central Ministry of Education merited inclusion in this study.

Individual interviews were conducted at UNICEF’s country office in Luanda with a senior staff member and three program officers, all housed within the education sector. All of these individuals had experience working with the TEP. In addition to inquiring about TEP specifically, I also posed questions about the state of education in Angola in order to develop a broader understanding of the realities and challenges facing the country from this organization’s perspective. UNICEF staff also made relevant education-related documents available for me to review and analyze.

I also conducted interviews with staff members working in other international organizations in Angola, namely Save the Children and Christian Children’s Fund. Both of these organizations had participated, albeit minimally, in the implementation of the TEP at different times and in different ways over the years. NRC’s interest in collaborating more closely with Save the Children as it sought partners to assume responsibility for the TEP prior to its withdrawal from Angola also highlighted the need to include Save the Children more centrally in this study. I conducted one interview in English with the education officer based in Save the Children’s Luanda office. This individual also accompanied me on the provincial visit to Zaire during which ongoing exchanges took place (additional details provided below).

I conducted two interviews with protection and education staff members working at the Christian Children’s Fund. These interviews, both of which were with Angolan nationals with long-standing service in this particular organization, illuminated more broadly the challenges that they had observed in the education system in Angola both
during and after the conflict. One interview was conducted in English and the other was conducted with the help of the professional translator mentioned above. The poor quality of the translation in this instance required me to intervene at times in Spanish in an attempt to better explain the question being asked. The inclusion of these international organizations, although relevant to the TEP, also allowed me to ascertain different organizational perspectives about the challenges of transitioning programs from humanitarian relief to development in post-conflict Angola.

On the last day of the field visit to Angola, I was able to meet and interview a senior ministry official responsible for basic education at the central Ministry of Education in Luanda. This individual served as the main point of contact for the various international organizations working on education programs in Angola and was familiar with the TEP and the history of the program in the country. In addition to her experiences with the TEP, the ministry official was able to discuss the challenges that the Angolan education system confronted as well as the creation of new educational policies that affected the TEP. This interview was conducted with translation assistance provided by a Save the Children staff member.

Provincial and municipal levels. Two provincial site visits took place during the trip to Angola, including one south of the capital to the province of Cuanza Sul and one north to the province of Zaire. Figure II indicates these locations as well as the capital of Luanda, in which the national-level interviews took place.
The provincial visit to Cuanza Sul was arranged for one primary reason. NRC had established a formal partnership with IBIS, a Danish development NGO, in preparation of NRC’s withdrawal from the country. As part of this partnership, IBIS had assumed responsibility for the TEP in the Cuanza Sul province since 2005. The visit provided the opportunity to meet and interview IBIS staff as well as TEP teachers, supervisors and several ministry officials engaged with the TEP program at the provincial and municipal levels. This trip consisted of a visit to Sumbe, the provincial capital of Cuanza Sul, and
Quibala, one of its municipalities; IBIS had offices in both of these localities. Again, the primary method of data collection for the provincial and municipal levels consisted of semi-structured interviews. IBIS staff assisted with translation of interviews with colleagues and education authorities. Numerous documents about IBIS' education work in the province were also collected.

The trip to Cuanza Sul entailed a three-day visit to the municipality of Quibala, during which I had the opportunity to interview three IBIS staff members, 3 TEP supervisors, 1 TEP teacher and two education officials. The TEP personnel and education officials shared their experiences with the TEP, both during the time when NRC was responsible and later when IBIS assumed responsibility for the program in 2005. During the time in Quibala, two school visits were arranged that provided the opportunity for me to observe, albeit briefly, the pedagogy and methodology used in TEP classrooms. Both of the TEP classrooms visited were housed within schools that were part of the formal education system, and in which formal education classes were simultaneously being offered.

Another day and a half was spent in Sumbe on the coast of the province, during which I had the opportunity to conduct an interview in English with the IBIS staff member responsible for the TEP and two senior-ranking education officials within the Provincial Department of Education. The interview with the education officials was conducted in Portuguese with translation assistance provided by an IBIS staff member.

Initially, this study set out to develop a case study about Save the Children's work in Angola in order to compare the findings with the case study developed about NRC and the TEP. As the field visit to Angola was planned with this intention, a second provincial
visit was scheduled to the province of Zaire in the north of the country, in which Save the Children was actively involved in the education sector. During the course of the field visit, it became apparent that the development of a second case would not be feasible. This decision stemmed from the fact that Save the Children’s education work consisted of multiple components that were thinly dispersed when compared to NRC’s concentrated focus on one comprehensive education program over a significant number of years. Save the Children had also experienced high turnover in terms of staff, and there were very few individuals who could draw upon an historical perspective in terms of the organization’s educational plans in the country. The staff members that were currently working were fairly new and still learning about the ways that the organization worked. There was also much less documentation available about their educational efforts compared to NRC.

Despite this realization early on, the site visit to Zaire was not a complete loss in terms of data collection due to its potential contributions to the case study about the TEP. Since Zaire had been one of the first provinces in which the TEP was implemented, the education officials from the Provincial Department of Education were familiar with the TEP and NRC’s work in the area and provided information about their experiences with this educational program. Similarly, some of the Save the Children staff had a certain familiarity with the program that they were able to share. For those that did not, valuable information collected about the state of the education system in Angola and Save the Children’s efforts to make adjustments to their educational portfolio as the country transitioned from relief to development proved fruitful.
International level. The international level was the final step in the development of the case study described above. Staff members from both the Norwegian Refugee Council and IBIS who were based within respective headquarters’ offices were interviewed. With regard to the Norwegian Refugee Council, I conducted a face-to-face interview with the education adviser who had been involved with the TEP since the very beginning and had played a central role in the decision to use the TEP in Angola 12 years earlier. The in-person meeting was made possible by an international education meeting that the education adviser and I attended in Washington DC. The education adviser from IBIS headquarters was also interviewed (by phone) given her involvement in establishing the partnership with NRC that involved IBIS assuming responsibility for the TEP in the province of Cuanza Sul in Angola. An independent education specialist who was familiar with the TEP and had worked extensively with several international organizations in Angola was also interviewed. Finally, another international education meeting provided the opportunity for me to interview two staff members from Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA, Action for Rural Development and Environment), and two staff members from the Instituto Politécnico de Viana do Castelo (IPVC). ADRA is a national NGO working in Angola and providing teacher training in rural areas of the country. IPVC is a Portuguese higher education institution working on teacher training in Angola in conjunction with ADRA and other organizations. The representatives from ADRA were both familiar with the TEP and the various international organizations working in the country and were able to offer their perspectives about some of the challenges that these organizations, as well the country itself, faced in implementing education programs. The representatives from IPVC were
also very familiar with the various educational activities taking place in Angola and were able to offer their personal and professional perspectives about the realities on the ground.

Archival Research

In addition to the interviews conducted at the country level in Angola and at the international level, I collected and reviewed numerous documents about the TEP and the various organizations involved with the program. The document collection and review process took place before, during and after the field visit to Angola and was greatly facilitated by the willingness of NRC staff to share public and private files. In the preparation for this study, it was clear that NRC had made a concerted effort to document the evolution of the program as well as secure financial support for two evaluations to be conducted on the TEP. Official documents about the various agreements between NRC, UNICEF, IBIS and the Ministry of Education were also shared. The availability of the vast majority of these documents in English greatly facilitated the review process and supplemented the data derived during the interviews. The analysis of these documents allowed me to more fully grasp the history of the TEP in Angola as well as the context in which several key decisions were made in its evolution, decisions that may have affected the program’s sustainability in the transition from humanitarian relief to development.

Data Analysis

I developed a preliminary list of general categories and sub-categories during the initial review of data (i.e. during transcription of interviews conducted in English, or
during an initial read of transcriptions translated from Portuguese to English by a translator. The second phase of the analysis process entailed fine-tuning the general categories into more defined groups and isolating key phrases or excerpts from the interviews that were relevant to those particular categories. In addition to the categorization process, these key phrases and excerpts were organized by type of respondent (e.g. NRC staff member, TEP teacher, or central Ministry official) in an effort to identify and analyze convergence or divergence in responses. Once the case study portion of this study (Chapter VI) had been written, I conducted a final review of the data collected from the interviews in order to assess what types of information had been left out and to incorporate any important points or responses that may have been neglected during the writing process. Finally, the findings that emerged from the interview-based survey conducted at the international level with educational practitioners were used to inform the analysis process of the case study and to illuminate, once again, areas of divergence or convergence.

**Internal and External Validity**

For years scholars have debated what types of data analysis and interpretation processes should be applied to qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998); nevertheless, researchers are expected to respond to some degree about the ways in which their research studies contemplate issues of internal and external validity, to name two contentious issues in particular. The ways in which I grappled with these issues are discussed below.
In terms of internal validity—i.e., “the correctness or credibility” of the data and analysis being presented (Maxwell, 1996, p. 87)—this study relied upon the triangulation of data from a variety of sources using different methods. Data source triangulation “is an effort to see if what we are observing and reporting carries the same meaning when found under different circumstances” (Stake, 1995, p. 113). Data sources for this study derived from the variety of organizational and individual participants that took part in this study, coupled with the review and analysis of historical and organizational documentation. The range and diversity of stakeholders and documents, both within case and across levels, contributed to my objective of developing a comprehensive understanding of what the sustainability of educational support looks like in the transition from relief to development. According to Maxwell, triangulation “reduces the risk that your conclusions will reflect only the systematic biases or limitations of a specific method” (1996, p. 75).

A final effort to ensure validity entailed the use of “member checking,” which provides participants with the opportunity to “review material for accuracy and palatability” (Stake, 1995, p. 115). This strategy was used primarily when upon review of an interview transcript or during the writing process I decided that the information collected from the participant needed additional clarification. In these specific instances, the segment of the transcription or written paragraphs in question were sent to the participant along with a request for clarification.

In regard to internal validity, a final word about the translation and transcription process is also needed in regard to the interviews that were conducted in Portuguese during the field visit to Angola. Upon my return, I contracted the services of translators.
to assist with the translation of the interviews from Portuguese to English in order to have a complete transcription for each participant. According to Marshall and Rossman (2006), “analysis [during the translation process] is happening whether or not it is acknowledged” as it “entails the construction of meaning” (p. 112). In an effort to diminish this type of interference in the analysis process, I took the following steps to assist the translator: one, I had a lengthy discussion with the primary translators in order to present the purpose of the study and provide relevant background information; two, I provided a list of names of organizations, acronyms and geographical locations that were mentioned during the interviews and with which the translators might be unfamiliar; and three, I met periodically with the primary translators to discuss any questions, concerns or confusion that had arisen during the translation process.

The external validity, or generalizability, of this study—an even more contested topic for qualitative researchers—can perhaps be made more relevant through the concept of transferability; that is, the degree to which the study may be useful for other settings (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). While the responsibility for assessing a study’s transferability tends to lie with the reader interested in applying the findings to another context (Marshall and Rossman, 2006), a few possibilities will be mentioned here. First, the organizations included in this study work across a range of different conflict-affected and post-conflict countries and draw upon the same organizational structures and decision-making processes to inform their humanitarian and developmental work. Amidst these organizations’ efforts to adapt their responses and activities to the realities on the ground, certain organizational policies, practices and strategies will remain constant. Similarly, international organizations may provide the same type of educational
support across different settings that apart from efforts to adapt to local realities will preserve many of the core components (e.g. NRC’s application of the TEP in Burundi). While single cases may not be as strong as multiple cases for assessing the generalizability or transferability to other settings, when the same program is being implemented in other countries the usefulness of the case is apparent, especially by those familiar with other cases (Stake, 1995). Although different conflict-affected and post-conflict countries consist of characteristics unique to those environments, there may be commonalities in the types of challenges that organizations face while working in these settings, a point made by the educational practitioners interviewed at the international level (see Chapter VI). The organizational lens that this study used to examine critical factors that affect sustainability also speaks to these possibilities (see Chapters IV and VI).

**Role of the Researcher**

In qualitative research it is important to discuss my role as the researcher and the social location that I occupied in this study, particularly during the field visit to Angola. The fact that I was a white woman traveling independently to Angola did not seem to phase the staff from the various international organizations with whom I met as they were accustomed to receiving international visitors from a range of backgrounds. This appeared to hold true for the various educational authorities with whom I met in the two different provinces in Angola as well. The most notable reactions came from the children that we visited during classroom observations or passed while driving down the roads.
The children did not vocalize their curiosity in the classroom environment per se, but they did repeatedly turn around to catch a glimpse of the white woman sitting in the back of the room. Although I understood the children’s reaction and curiosity, I also felt badly that my presence was causing such a disruption to already limited classroom instruction time. Upon departure from one school in which a pre-school class was being conducted outside under a tree, a group of 20-30 children encircled the car and began to sing a song that they had been practicing. The children that we passed when driving down the roads were much more vocal and always yelled out “mundele” or “kachindele,” the term for white person depending upon their tribal language; they would also try to run along side the vehicle. Whereas my study did not include interviewing children, these occurrences, while interesting and thought provoking, did not affect the data collection process in Angola.

If this research endeavor were affected in some way, it was most likely due to the dual role that I filled as a graduate student researcher on the one hand and an education practitioner on the other. During the data collection process for this study, I was employed as the Network Coordinator of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). Depending upon the participants’ awareness and understanding of INEE, different assumptions may have been made about my role and ability to assist them with their organizational efforts on the ground. On two occasions I was asked whether I was able to provide funding, and I had to explain that as an international network INEE was not in a position to provide financial support to its members. Most of

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5 INEE is a global, open network of non-governmental organizations, UN agencies, donors, practitioners, researchers and individuals from affected populations working together within a humanitarian and development framework to ensure the right to education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction (www.ineesite.org).
the participants appeared to regard me as a source of information and the majority of the questions that they directed to me entailed requests for technical advice about a particular education program or a challenge that the organization was facing. Depending upon the complexity of the request, I either reserved a little time at the end of the interview or over a meal to address their questions. When participants’ inquiries were more complex, I made arrangements to follow-up with more information and documentation that I could send upon my return home.

As far as the interviews with the educational experts at the international level were concerned, there did not appear to be any major obstacles regarding my social location. The majority of these individuals stated that they found the research topic to be interesting and were happy to participate. During the data analysis process for this set of interviews, I did on occasion come across information that perhaps reflected a tacit understanding that existed between the interviewee and me and found the need to clarify excerpts of the interview in an effort not to assume that I understood what had been said. These occurrences, however, were rare.

**Limitations of this Study**

While this study sought to develop a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors affecting sustainability by using well-planned data collection and analysis methods, certain limitations are inevitable. The first limitation of this study was the short duration of the site visit to Angola, which was constrained by professional obligations to my employer at the time, and the accelerated nature of the data collection process during
this trip. The short duration in Angola inevitably prevented me from developing a comprehensive understanding and appreciation of the local and national contexts in which the TEP was implemented. Despite this constraint, long road trips to the two different provinces with organizational staff coupled with communal meals during these visits provided me with additional opportunities for inquiry and conversation. Furthermore, I was able to conduct multiple follow-up interviews with NRC, IBIS, Save the Children and UNICEF staff either over the phone or via electronic communications over several months after the initial field visit. Although a longer stay would have permitted access to a greater number of TEP personnel, namely teachers and trainers, I was confident that the individuals that were able to participate in the study during the field visit represented the various voices and perspectives needed for this study.

Language is another limitation of this study in that I was not fluent in Portuguese and relied upon assistance provided by numerous individuals during the field visit to Angola and in the translation and transcription process that took place upon my return. Although my fluency in Spanish helped to overcome many of the challenges presented by language, the lack of fluency in Portuguese may have affected the type of information provided or my understanding of the information during interviews.

Finally, my role as both an insider and an outsider inevitably affected participants’ perceptions of the study and perhaps the type of information provided during the course of the interviews. While every effort was made to present the study as part of my doctoral study endeavors, the fact that I also assumed a professional position working for an international network directly involved in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction may have affected the study. Specifically, the
fact that I could be considered a member of the group of educational practitioners working at the headquarters' level could be perceived as problematic in that we shared assumptions, to some degree, about the positive role of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. Although all participants, including myself, were aware of the negative role that education also has the potential to play in conflict-affected countries, our involvement with INEE and support of the network’s advocacy agenda may have prevented a more critical analysis of shared assumptions that have been shaped by a predominantly Western perspective. On the contrary, the positive consequences related to my work with INEE most likely resulted in ease of access to key participants both in Angola and at the international level. The following chapters present the data generated by the methodological approach reviewed in this chapter.
Chapter IV

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL FACTORS FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

At worst, [from a lack of sustainability] you get empty hulls of [school] buildings, buildings that have fallen apart right after they have been rehabilitated because there is no ownership. You get frustrated teachers, officials, students and parents because of raised expectations. If [education] is not sustainable, the legitimacy of the state, which is usually pretty tenuous anyway, is undermined and things collapse, and that usually results in a return to conflict (Interview, World Bank, August 30, 2007).

This was the response given by one interviewee in this study when asked, "What are the long-term consequences if education programs in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts are unsustainable?" His emphasis on the damage exacted on physical structures, human resources and state systems portrayed in this response illustrates the critical role that education has the potential to play as a country transitions from relief to development. While education is only one sector among many that contributes to a country’s emergence from conflict and subsequent transition to development, a closer examination of the educational support provided by international organizations and the challenges they face in sustaining these efforts is warranted.

This chapter will present the challenges that, according to educational experts, affect the sustainability of education programs facilitated by international organizations in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries and ultimately the transition from
humanitarian relief to development. The challenges presented here were identified through an interview-based survey of a select group of 12 educational practitioners working at the headquarters' level of a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies and donor agencies, organizations and agencies that have established over time a significant presence in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. The focus of this chapter upon challenges emanated from the fact that the following three survey questions elicited more extensive and detailed explanations of the issue of sustainability and the relief-development transition than all of the other questions combined (see Appendix A for complete list of survey questions): 1) What are the primary challenges confronting international organizations in their efforts to sustain education programs in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries?; 2) Do the primary challenges change depending upon the country context? If so, how?; and 3) How do these primary challenges change depending upon the organization implementing the education program, if at all? Given this outcome, the chapter will be organized by the two primary types of challenges they identified: contextual and organizational.

Although many of the challenges identified are interrelated, they will be presented in two separate sections in order to facilitate closer examination and analysis. In the concluding section of the chapter, the critical factors affecting sustainability indicative to these challenges will be summarized. These critical factors will then be used as a frame of reference in the presentation and analysis of the case study in Chapter VI, and then combined with the findings from the case study to create an overarching conceptualization of sustainability for education programs in the relief-development transition.
Contextual Challenges

The challenges identified throughout this section relate to the unique contextual challenges that organizations may confront in their work in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. Although many of the contextual challenges may be considered universal as they routinely surface across a wide range of countries, their nuances and the ways in which organizations respond differentiate them greatly. The overarching contextual challenge from which many others stem relates to the legacy of conflict in a particular country. For the purposes of this section, the legacy of conflict will serve as an all-encompassing category for a discussion of the following: marginalization and exclusion; institutional, human, material and economic resource deficits; and volatility and insecurity.

Marginalization and Exclusion

The challenges presented by the marginalization and exclusion of certain groups in a conflict-affected or post-conflict country are numerous. In terms of sustainability, the primary challenge entails the need to integrate these groups and any educational support provided to them by international organizations into the system without marginalizing them further. The definition being used here for “system” was proposed by the World Bank representative in which he stated that a system is “a network of institutions and individuals working with agreed expectations, and norms, using agreed resources to produce broadly agreed results” (Interview, August 30, 2007). The system referred to by several interviewees below may be the formal governmental system
functioning in a particular country, the systems established at the community level, or a combination of the two. The World Bank representative reflected on this need for integration into the formal governmental system in the following excerpt:

There is also the post-conflict burden of conflict-affected populations—refugees, IDPs [internally displaced persons], orphans, child soldiers, unemployed and demobilized youth and so on—which is an added burden to the system. Governments are not good at dealing with these marginalized groups. The system tends to be oriented toward the needs of the majority. There is a real challenge for international organizations in supporting and ensuring that resources are provided for these marginalized groups, but also in getting their support to become integrated into the system. Otherwise, the support simply marginalizes them further (Interview, August 30, 2007).

A representative from DFID concurred and stressed the importance of reaching these marginalized groups through educational support:

If we are in a post-conflict situation...there can be quite different regional conditions and...really trying to ensure that there is equity so that you are not getting pockets of exclusion. Trying to the best of your ability...to ensure that those communities or those regions that have been excluded from education delivery are brought into that (Interview, September 17, 2007).

Similar to these “pockets of exclusion,” a representative from NORAD stressed the importance for NGOs and other international organizations not to exacerbate this problem and further undermine sustainability by creating “islands of happiness,” which he defined as:

A place where some people are very happy because they have been targeted by INGOs, but [whose improved circumstances] will eventually be very different from other people living in the next village because they are not being targeted by this organization (Interview, September 5, 2007).

He went on to say that “you have to integrate the project activities in the local setting [and] be very careful then not to create problems in local society” even if this means offering fewer services to the identified target group (Interview, September 5, 2007).
Without this integration either into the community or the larger governmental system, he stated that not only will the educational support not be sustainable, but that the special treatment of one group or community over another will lead to greater problems (Interview, September 5, 2007).

Related to the challenges presented in trying to provide, integrate and sustain the educational support provided to marginalized groups are the educational needs that these different groups might exhibit, and the influence of culture on these needs. The NORAD representative cited the “female issue” in Pakistan, for example, and the illiteracy rates among girls in different regions of the country that necessitated urgent attention (Interview, September 5, 2007). Similarly, a CARE representative discussed the importance of girls’ education in many African countries as “the conflict gets…compounded with the issue of violence against women” (Interview, September 10, 2007). International organizations may offer and prioritize educational support for certain target groups that are not recognized by the government as a priority and therefore can greatly affect the educational program’s integration into the system and its long-term sustainability. In these instances, international organizations will need to confront the challenge of providing the necessary educational support to marginalized groups on the one hand while simultaneously advocating for its importance with the government on the other.

Apart from the challenges inherent in working with government counterparts, the country context can also influence the types of partners with which international organizations engage in their work to reach marginalized and excluded groups. For example, the CARE representative stated that madrassas have “become a viable
alternative force for education” in the organization’s work in Afghanistan (Interview, September 10, 2007). The challenge for international organizations is to identify partners that will help facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups as well as to sustain the educational services provided by carrying the work forward.

The marginalization and exclusion of certain groups throughout the conflict as well as during relief and reconstruction efforts also can lead to what the World Bank representative called “eroded social capital,” or the disruption of social networks existing within a particular country (Interview, August 30, 2007). He highlighted the toll that this can take on a country’s civil society and the overall sustainability of the system:

Civil society is often in disarray, usually deeply divided by the legacy of the conflict be they sectarian, religious, tribal...whatever. There is a lack of trust in authorities, which makes any system difficult to sustain, because systems require explicit agreement around allocation of authority. If there is a lack of trust in authorities then it is part of the eroded social capital that presents the really serious challenge (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Apart from this negative form of social capital that affects the hierarchical relationships between authorities and average citizens, eroded social capital also can disrupt the “cooperative relationships [present] at the community level” as “people become polarized” (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Converse to the negative ramifications that may surface as a result of eroded social capital, the World Bank representative also identified the potential for a more positive effect from social capital that has been established in reaction to the crisis:

Sometimes communities become very mobilized and united, particularly at the community and local level, in their struggle against an authoritarian regime. You can get a form of social capital that is a benefit rather than a challenge, and the challenge then is to use that social capital in reconstruction rather than in resistance. Social capital of this kind is the relationships, networks [and] authority structures which is oriented to
resistance to authority of the center or the system rather than the reverse so the challenge then is turning that social capital to reconstruction rather than resistance (Interview, August 30, 2007).

He argued that when feasible, international organizations should strive to harness the positive social capital that exists within a country’s civil society in order to facilitate sustainability of the educational support being provided.

To overcome the challenges generated by the marginalization and exclusion of certain groups and to ensure the sustainability of educational support provided in the transition from relief to development, international organizations must take the necessary steps to integrate their educational efforts into the system at the appropriate levels. Unfortunately, this can be easier said than done depending upon the state of the system’s institutional, human, material and economic resources, another challenge that will be examined more closely in the next section.

**Resource Deficits**

The legacy of conflict wreaks havoc upon a country’s institutional, human, material and economic resources resulting in enormous deficits. Whereas “education provision is sustained by systems” (Interview, World Bank, August 30, 2007), the state of these various resources and their inherent connection to the system carry implications for international organizations and their efforts to sustain educational programs.

**Institutional resource deficits.** Institutional resources form the overarching framework for the system, and a deficit of capacity in this area can be detrimental for sustaining education programs in the relief-development transition. The World Bank representative described “institutional capacity” as “the strategies, policies, procedures,
regulations, communication systems, management systems, information systems and organizational development” in place either at the capital or the community level, or both. He also discussed the legacy of conflict and the determinants which can affect to what degree institutional capacity has been affected:

The institutional capacity of the country changes very significantly from one country to the next. In some cases it is really seriously degraded and in some it is not. It is also affected by the length of conflict. If it has been a 15-20 or even 40-year conflict, it is likely that the institutional capacity has been very seriously degraded. If it is a conflict that comes at the end of a long period of oppressive rule, there may be institutional capacity, but it is usually distorted. There are changes in the capacity of the “state,” and by “state” I don’t just mean the central authority, but the state structures of the country on which the education system depends. That varies from one country to another (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Related to the definition of institutional capacity described here, the CARE representative discussed the lack of capacity in this area and its effect on systemic processes:

Sometimes the conflict also destroys processes that have to do with administration, management, communications, policies, frameworks, appraisals, and job descriptions. Something that makes the system work is the administrative and management aspect of it. In the post-conflict scenario many things get done through NGOs or on an ad-hoc basis, so these processes are not there and it takes a while for these processes to be established and for the people in the country to get used to these processes again. There has been no bureaucracy. It has its ills, but it also has its positive points. The people because of the conflict years are not used to these kinds of processes [and] to move toward these processes takes time (Interview, September 10, 2007).

The state of institutional capacity may also vary within a country and affect governmental structures differently in the capital versus other locations. The NORAD representative discussed the realities of finding very weak governmental structures in the countryside of certain countries and cited Angola, Sudan and Somalia as specific examples (Interview, September 5, 2007). The state of institutional capacity across a country can greatly affect international organizations’ efforts to integrate their
educational support into the system. As noted above, it takes time for these resources, capacities and processes to be replenished.

The legacy of conflict and its effect on institutional resources and capacities also affect a government’s commitment to education. Although this commitment can be strengthened over time through effective advocacy undertaken by the international community, this contextual challenge was cited by several interviewees. The DFID representative discussed the importance of the government’s willingness to commit to “getting education services in an equitable fashion delivered” (Interview, September 17, 2007). Similarly, the USAID representative stated that:

The government’s commitment to the education system is key. Without that it’s difficult for us to do anything because of course with the government we have to have that relationship and the commitment by the government before we can go ahead and schedule interventions (Interview, September 6, 2007).

While educational support can be provided by many organizations, whether a commitment to education exists or not, the absence of any commitment by the government greatly hampers the recognition, integration and sustainability of educational programs in general and especially through the transition from relief to development.

An aggravating factor for instilling a commitment to education may take the form of corruption. The World Bank representative highlighted the challenges that corruption can present not only for the system, but also for education specifically:

Corruption often fostered by conflict is a major disability…. Corruption becomes institutionalized, especially during conflict, but during any economic crisis. Corruption becomes institutionalized even within the education system so that teachers can only sustain themselves by giving private lessons and demanding extra fees. Those practices are very corrosive to reconstruction of the system (Interview, August 30, 2007).
The deficits related to institutional resources and capacities entail significant ramifications for the sustainability of education programs in that a system that is struggling to re-establish itself will be faced by numerous competing priorities and perhaps be unable to give sufficient attention to the needs and demands of the education system. International organizations providing educational support will need to consider the ways in which their support can also contribute to the reconstruction of the system when and where possible.

**Human resource deficits.** The deficit of human resources presents an equally difficult challenge depending upon the country context and the legacy of conflict.

According to the World Bank representative:

Human resources also vary. Some countries had an educated population and a thriving education system before the conflict and so they have human resources that are educated and sometimes skilled. Likewise, some countries have an established bureaucracy with qualified and experienced professionals, with experienced teachers sometimes after a conflict. There are other situations, where those resources simply aren’t around—Afghanistan and Sudan—where the supply of teachers is not there and there aren’t enough people to manage the system (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Similarly, the CARE representative reflected on the impact that a long conflict can have on human resources:

[It] leaves a big gap in the human capacities to take on activities and carry them on. You really don’t have qualified human resources to make the institutions work and that becomes a major issue and a major drawback for moving toward sustainable institutional development. So you get sustainability only when the human resources are qualified, trained and prepared to take on that task (Interview, September 10, 2007).

The deficit in human resources presents several challenges for international organizations. When a cadre of trained educators does not exist, the organization will have to identify and train unqualified and often uneducated candidates to fulfill the roles
of teachers and other education personnel, and then run the risk of losing these individuals to higher paying jobs often available within their and other organizations. The pool of trained practitioners then needs to be integrated into the system, which can prove difficult given the economic resource implications of adding staff to the government’s payroll. The implications of the need for capacity building will be explored further in the next section on organizational challenges; but first, a closer look at the challenges presented by material resource deficits.

**Material resource deficits.** The legacy of conflict consists of many elements, and the damage exacted on material resources often forms part of this legacy. In regard to the education system, these material resources may include curriculum guides, textbooks, teacher training programs, enrollment and attendance records, teacher rosters and other statistical records. When there are no physical examples that capture what the education system consisted of prior to the conflict, the international organizations responding have an additional challenge in developing new and appropriate resources quickly. The CARE representative remarked upon the challenge that this presents, particularly in terms of time and ultimately sustainability:

> When you are talking of teacher training and curriculum development, [often] there is no evidence there of what happened in that country prior to the conflict. There’s nothing tangible that remains so you are beginning from scratch. To make that acceptable to the teachers and communities and the pupils takes a lot of time. That is a major impediment in that there is just no institutional memory, no hard evidence of what was there in that country (Interview, September 10, 2007).

The UNICEF representative also commented on the fact there is never a “core set of textbooks to be found” in conflict affected and low resourced countries, which can be problematic for both IDP and refugee contexts (Interview, October 3, 2007). This poses
a challenge for international organizations that are prepared to support the government in sustaining and revitalizing the pre-existing educational system. Last, but not least, the state of a country's economic resources, as discussed below, is also a notable challenge that can affect the sustainability of educational support.

**Economic Resource Deficits.** Within this discussion of resource deficits and varying contextual factors across countries, it is equally important to look at the economy. The World Bank representative captures this issue and its impact on sustainability concisely in the following paragraph:

A country's economic status, especially in regard to sustainability, is really critical. There are some conflict-affected countries that have significant resources—e.g. Angola, Iraq, Sudan, Timor Leste—that can be tapped into if the peace can be sustained and economic development restored. It makes it easier to make the case for sustainability. Iraq is a key case, but [other examples include] Sudan, Angola and Timor Leste. One of the things that enabled the Bank to take forward its [education] work in Timor Leste was the evidence that there was some basis for sustainability of the economy and therefore of the education system. There are others like Kosovo and Afghanistan where the economic prospects are not nearly so strong. Countries vary with regard to their resource base, and that has real implications for sustainability (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Paradoxically, those countries that have economic resources available are more likely to receive additional financial resources in support of education from the donor community. However, the countries that “really lack resources” must not be forgotten (Interview, NORAD, September 5, 2007).

Despite this recognition and understanding of the different economic realities across conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, the CIDA representative stated strongly that the government must assume some responsibility:

The governments in some of these countries think that if there is a conflict that support should only be coming through the international
organizations. I think the countries should also be contributing. For the sustainability of these programs they have to budget within the national budget. In most of these provincial and district budgets, education is [not a priority]. There’s no budget for education. They allocate resources for other things, but not education, and they think it’s still the responsibility of the central government and the external organizations. There is always a dependency syndrome there. Over time, the government should increase their allocation to education and we should be reducing our education contributions to these countries (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Although there was agreement about the government’s need to assume greater responsibility over time and incorporate education into the public expenditure budget, the CARE representative spoke of the need to recognize the government’s limitations with regard to the economy, particularly within the earlier phases of reconstruction:

The economy is in such bad shape that the government can’t take on all of the responsibilities of paying teachers and building schools. It’s like a chicken and egg so you don’t know where to begin. We can’t always blame the national government. The economy and everything is in shambles. [It’s about] just maintaining stability and security in the country because that’s the primary concern on everyone’s mind (Interview, CARE, September 10, 2007).

The challenge for international organizations is to provide funding for educational support in such a way that also engenders an understanding on behalf of the government that financial assistance is not endless and that they should be prepared to assume responsibility for education in the future. If the financial resources are not accounted for and allocated by the government over the long term then the sustainability of any educational program will be in jeopardy. As stated by the CARE representative in the final quotation above, the lack of stability and security in a country will also affect sustainability.
**Volatility and Insecurity**

Ongoing volatility and persistent insecurity in a conflict-affected or post-conflict country coupled with the looming possibility that there could be a recurrence of violence commanded the attention of a number of interviewees in this study. One interviewee pointed out that “the conflict never completely disappears...and something like a third of countries slip back into conflict in the first 10 years” (Interview, World Bank, August 30, 2007). Another spoke of a “real risk of recidivism” and the frustration that any relapse can cause:

You can go so far and suddenly everything starts breaking up again. The violence resumes and things can become very nasty again. This is very demoralizing for local populations but also for the donors and the other agencies. All the learning that’s been done can often be undone very quickly. So in some cases there is a continuation of real threat and risk, or the real possibility of recurrence of violence or of gross instability. These things are really major challenges of any expectations of long-lasting effect (Interview, UNESCO, October 30, 2007).

The unpredictability of these situations adds another layer of complexity to this challenge. As one interviewee put it, “it’s difficult to pre-judge when and where it’s going to happen again” (Interview, UNESCO, October 30, 2007). Sometimes the reverse is true and stability prevails despite enormous odds. In this case, the UNESCO representative referred to the situation in Liberia:

What is happening now in Liberia was unimaginable. I am not saying that Liberia is a test case or a beautiful case, but even the situation there today...it’s unimaginable given the situation five or six years ago. It wasn’t on the horizon at all (Interview, October 30, 2007).

Likewise, the UNICEF representative alluded to the unpredictable and volatile nature in many of these countries “which means that certain things that are perhaps possible one
year aren’t possible the next year and so it requires a lot of flexibility” (Interview, October 3, 2007).

These realities prompted several interviewees to comment on the issue of security in these various contexts and the ways in which it affects the sustainability of an organization’s educational support. The USAID representative cited the following example from Afghanistan and felt that the security level was the “most important determining factor”:

*Sustainability of course is limited by security and so each time in Afghanistan we wanted to do something [and] we wanted it to become more sustainable, you know getting the government to implement the beautiful policy paper that they had come up with, security issues come up and make us go backward* (Interview, September 6, 2007).

For USAID, the challenge is partly contextual and partly organizational. The USAID representative commented on the difficulties they have monitoring education programs, for example:

*Because of our very strict security rules it’s difficult for USAID staff to monitor the implementation of the programs that we are funding so we’ll have our partner organizations in the field and we don’t really know what they are doing because we cannot physically go see them* (Interview, September 6, 2007).

She observed that “journalists from the Washington Post will be able to see something before we will because we don’t have... good oversight” (Interview, September 6, 2007).

For the DFID representative, “security is one of the challenges [that is] especially important for sustainability” as is “ensuring that security conditions are in place so that [a] program can go forward and be maintained” (Interview, September 17, 2007). The bottom line, according to the CARE representative, is that:

*It takes a while for any post-conflict context to stabilize and get the systems established so that they can become functional and continue to be*
functional. It’s not an easy and quick fix. It could be months or years before these get established so sustainability needs to be seen in the context of how much time do these institutions take to get strengthened and function (Interview, September 10, 2007).

The contextual challenges presented in this section can greatly affect international organizations’ effectiveness in a conflict-affected or post-conflict country; and it also affects their abilities to sustain education programs in the transition from humanitarian relief to development. For sustainability, any support provided to the overall system appears almost, if not equally, important to the support provided to education. Within this support to the system, the need to engage in service delivery as well as capacity building activities was also apparent. The challenge that this poses as well as others specific to the international organizations working in this field will be addressed in the following section.

Organizational Challenges

This study aims to understand the challenges confronting international organizations in their efforts to sustain educational programs in the transition from relief to development, and the study targeted organizational representatives as its primary informants. Therefore, it is not surprising that the organizational challenges represent the vast majority identified by the interviewees. These challenges, however interrelated, are also diverse and cover a wide spectrum of issues involving: organizations’ ways of working in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction; organizational responses to the transition between humanitarian relief and development; vision and planning processes that organizations undertake, which includes additional
challenges presented by parallel systems, complementary systems and taking educational programs to scale; capacity building of governmental officials and community members; organizations' human resources and capacities; coordination among and between international organizations and governmental counterparts; and the financial realities inherent to humanitarian and development aid. The first section on the organizations' ways of working will provide a backdrop to the discussion of the other challenges.

**Ways of Working**

An organization applies operational approaches that derive from a combination of the following elements: 1) the type of organization (e.g. NGO vs. UN vs. donor); 2) the institutional mandate and whether it calls for engagement in the humanitarian sphere, development sphere, or both; 3) internal organizational structures in terms of the relationship between humanitarian and development divisions (if applicable); and finally, 4) the nature and phase of the conflict to which an organization is responding. All of these elements inevitably affect the relationship, or lack thereof, that an organization establishes with governmental actors and their respective Ministries of Education. While relationships with other stakeholders were cited, namely those with local communities and other international actors, the relationship with the government was deemed an important factor for sustainability by the interviewees in this study.

**Type of Organization.** Prior to delving into the organizational challenges, it is important to present the range of organizations and their general ways of working in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. A typology of the various organizations working in this field was offered by the World Bank representative
in which he reviewed the modes by which these organizations provide educational
support and the degree to which these modes link to government. His response, which
follows, was prompted by the wording “implemented by” in the following survey
question: “How would you define sustainability for education programs implemented by
international organizations in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries?”:

[“Implemented by”] means different things to different people. Some
projects are implemented totally by the agencies, some are done in
partnership with the agencies, and some are done through the government
by the agencies. Different modes of implementation have serious
implications for [the way one looks] at sustainability. The World Bank
works largely through governments which has its limitations. Generally
the UN, I suppose, works in partnership with governments but handles a
lot of the implementation itself. NGOs tend to work around governments
(Interview, August 30, 2007).

This general typology of organizations has been accepted over the years;
however, there are indications that many NGOs are making concerted efforts to work
more closely with governments, examples of which will be presented later in this section.
Nevertheless, if a partnership with the government is deemed critical for ensuring the
sustainability of certain kinds of educational support, then the ways in which different
organizations engage with governmental partners is an important factor. For some
organizations, such as the UN and donors, engagement with the government is a
mandatory requirement.

For UN organizations, “there is kind of a role from mandates as inter-
governmental organizations to support system reconstruction” and work directly with
governments (Interview, UNICEF, October 3, 2007). The UNESCO representative stated
that his organization “has [an] in-built position to work with governments” and that:
We like to think of ourselves as a friend of governments in the sense that we are a more honest broker than some other kinds of agencies handing out loans (Interview, October 30, 2007).

UNESCO’s mandate articulates a longer-term view and includes:

A kind of testament that we need to invest in planning, [put] systems back together on a stable basis, and [reorient] the education systems (Interview, UNESCO, October 30, 2007).

The World Bank representative discussed his organization’s way of working by means of “recipient execution,” which he described in the following passage:

By recipient execution I mean the people who receive the funds actually implement the program and the Bank monitors and ensures that the fiduciary aspects are handled responsibly and money is spent for the purposes for which it was intended. It’s a pretty heavy hand nonetheless, but it is supervision rather than implementation. It is execution by the recipient which is usually the government. The main challenge when you are working through recipient organizations is getting the government to streamline its system. It tends to want to reconstruct the old system, the one it knows and trusts, and is unwilling to or reluctant to modify and streamline it and that makes service delivery really slow. Working through the government it is quite hard to get the government to change; but it’s about the only way in the long run (Interview, August 30, 2007).

As indicated here, even when there is an established relationship with a government, challenges continue to arise.

The bilateral donor representative for DFID acknowledged the need for donor agencies always to engage with governments given the “political priority” of the collaboration between the two governments; however, when there is not a strong relationship, she stated that UN agencies would be most successful in navigating that terrain:

For the UN it’s almost easier to engage with the government. Think about Zimbabwe or Burma where donors won’t have strong relationships with government, but the UN agencies are still able to engage. That can be an advantage. They have the relationship with governments [and an] ability to work with them; well, maybe not through governments, but [they are]
able to have policy dialogue where [donor] governments might not be able to have that (Interview, September 17, 2007).

Several interviewees cited the additional challenges that NGOs face in their work with governments in this field and across changing terrains. From the World Bank perspective:

If it is an NGO execution, or execution by other agencies on behalf of the government, sometimes they’ll work in consultation with or partnership with government, and there are varying degrees of involvement of the government. Sometimes the problem is the reverse. The focus tends to be on working around the government rather than reforming it. The challenge there is to get the NGOs to work with the government so that they can build the capacity and have the government acknowledge what the NGOs are doing (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Whereas NGOs may make concerted efforts to work in collaboration with the government, the UNICEF representative identified a slightly different challenge in regard to the government’s perspective of NGOs and their overall purpose in a post-conflict environment:

NGOs often in post-conflict situations find themselves in a difficult spot because there is often [a push by] governments to do things themselves. And rather than having all kinds of organizations, particularly NGOs, doing things for them there is often high distrust of NGOs by governments and so NGOs in that transition often have to redefine what their role is. UN agencies too, but there is not so much a question of whether they are needed, whether they have a mandate, and whether they have a role...where NGOs come often under more scrutiny in these contexts (Interview, October 3, 2007).

The DFID representative shared her observation that the collaboration between NGOs and governments does not “always happen organically or naturally,” and that bilateral donors would do well to provide incentives to NGOs in order to encourage stronger engagement with governmental counterparts (Interview, September 17, 2007).
In a related line of discussion, the NGO representative from CARE spoke of the challenges that NGOs face in their work with governments in comparison to UN agencies:

UNICEF and UNESCO probably have more mandates for negotiating. They have more levers with which they can move and negotiate with the government. For other NGOs like CARE or Save the Children, [the degree to which] they are able to negotiate depends on the kind of resources and technical assistance that they bring to that country and context (Interview, September 10, 2007).

The NORAD representative addressed the differences and the challenges of working with both UN agencies and NGOs. For NGOs, he felt that despite a lack of resources it was easier because “they are more flexible and they can better adapt.” However:

When you cooperate with UNICEF you really have the possibility to use or take advantage of that organization’s big resources, but at the same time it might be difficult to get [things] done (Interview, September 5, 2007).

Clearly, each type of organization has its advantages and disadvantages that ultimately affect the sustainability of educational support. NGOs may work more nimbly and efficiently than other types of organizations, but the challenges they face asserting their legitimacy in the eyes of the government can affect the sustainability of their educational support. UN agencies may have better resources to draw upon as well as an obligation to collaborate with governmental partners, but bureaucratic hurdles both within these agencies as well as the governments with which they are working can impede sustainability. Donor agencies, which do not work as direct implementing agencies, must work through governments and mediate any political resistance that may emerge; such resistance can slow down progress and impede the sustainability of educational support. In addition to the type of organization and its relationships with
external partners, endogenous challenges related to organizational mandates and structures generate other challenges.

**Mandates and Internal Structures.** For all of these organizations, the ways in which their mandates position them in terms of the humanitarian and development spheres and subsequently their role with governments elicit a slightly different set of challenges. The representative from UNESCO addressed his concerns by stating that:

Many [organizations] define themselves in terms of emergency response, but do they define themselves in terms of development agencies? I think that’s a real issue on the part of some of them who go in [early] and brave the difficulties. Do they have the mission to really continue forwards? Do they have staff, resources, technical capacity to do that? I think that’s a real challenge for some of them because many of them don’t have sustained economic support unless they have a very good relationship with the parent donor country to actually offer that long-term engagement (Interview, October 30, 2007).

Therefore, organizations guided by a humanitarian mandate that want to sustain their educational support beyond the acute emergency phase\(^6\) must do one or both of the following: 1) secure appropriate funding, staffing and technical expertise for their organizations to be able to continue their work over a longer time period; and/or 2) establish partnerships with other international organizations or governmental counterparts in order to transfer the educational support provided prior to withdrawing from the country.

The NGO representative from Save the Children also addressed the tension that exists between the humanitarian and developmental organizations. However, she noted that organizations that rely upon a broader mandate also face internal challenges:

\(^6\) The acute emergency phase refers to the immediate onset of a crisis during which “children may be cut off from their existing schools and communities” (UNESCO, 2006, p. 21).
There are organizations that are purely emergency focused, and that differ from organizations that also have a developmental branch; but that can vary for [organizations] like Save the Children, CARE, and World Vision. The connection between those acute emergency and development branches varies so much between organizations that you can’t really rely upon [it] (Interview, October 2, 2007).

For these organizations that rely on clear mandates to work within both the humanitarian and development spheres and are structured to do so internally, challenges remain. Within the donor group, the representatives for both the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USAID cited challenges that stem from their own organizations’ internal structural divides between the humanitarian and development sectors. According to the representative for the Dutch Ministry:

One big challenge is to bridge the gap between humanitarian response and the transition to development. I can look at two divisions within the Ministry, one that takes care of humanitarian assistance and the other reconstruction and good governance in transition situations. They are in the same department mind you, but there is not a smooth collaboration between the two and the dynamics are quite different also. The humanitarian division can just react to any emergency through Flash Appeals and CAPs [the Consolidated Appeals Process] and they act on the waves of publicity while the other engaged in reconstruction has to act in a more difficult way. There’s not much interest by the media or public. The work is not very glamorous. It is quite difficult, difficult to find what agents to support in what way. It’s a completely different type of work (Interview, September 3, 2007).

The new Minister has observed that “these two divisions should relate better than they do” and there is hope that through the Ministry’s prioritization of fragile states that steps will be taken to remedy this challenge (Interview, September 3, 2007).

Similarly the USAID representative highlighted the challenges stemming from internal structures within her organization in which the Office of Transition Initiatives does not have a long-term mandate for education work, but the Office for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade—in which the education team is located—does not have
the ability to work in crisis situations. She also pointed out additional challenges for USAID in regard to political pressures from the United States government and the lack of continuous funding:

OTI [Office of Transition Initiatives] will do a fabulous job working with vocational skills for returned combatants for instance, but they have no capacity to take it to the second phase and try to integrate it with the Ministry of Education and host government. And that’s where the USAID Education should come in, but we are tied by restrictions by Congress to only work in formal education. It’s very hard for us to work in non-formal education; so a part of USAID will start a great program, with combatants let’s say, and literacy and education; but no one within USAID can really follow that and take it the second step toward more sustainability because of the funding restrictions. That’s a huge, huge, huge issue, because USAID has to do short-lived, short-term interventions that cannot be picked up by more sustainable education reform support type of work. That’s a huge issue for us in fragile states (Interview, September 6, 2007).

Even when steps are taken to ensure a smooth transition, a loss of funding can completely derail a project, as illustrated in the following example from USAID:

In Burundi...OTI had done a fantastic job with reaching combatants and girls and everything so we [the education staff] came in to do an assessment to see how we could continue the work that OTI had been doing in a more sustainable fashion...from relief to development. So we had a plan. It was great. We gave the mission guidance because they don’t have education capacity in the mission. We laid it all out, but then we didn’t get funding to do education in Burundi so we are back to square one. This is just an example of the difficulties that we have (Interview, USAID, September 6, 2007).

In the case of Burundi, there were not enough financial resources to cover all of the education-related projects proposed, and the decision was made to “capitalize on existing education programs rather than cut budgets to accommodate new countries” (Interview, USAID representative, February 8, 2008).

Regardless of whether an organizational mandate covers one particular phase or the entire spectrum of emergency and development work, the internal challenges that
these organizations face and their influence on the sustainability of educational support are multifaceted. For organizations with a narrower focus on the humanitarian phase, they need to secure the financial and human resources, internally or vis-à-vis external partners, to be able to continue their education work. For organizations with broader mandates encompassing the relief-development transition, they must overcome internal challenges that hinder different divisions from working effectively with one another. For organizations that focus predominantly on the development sphere, they face pressure to engage earlier with humanitarian actors in order to better plan the transfer of responsibility for educational support from one group to another—a point that will emerge later in this section. Finally, despite mandates that facilitate organizations’ work across the relief-development transition, the nature and phase of a particular conflict also affects sustainability.

**Nature and Phase of Conflict.** As stated above, the nature and phase of a conflict may also affect sustainability of education support by the degree of implementation an organization pursues as well as the way it works with governmental counterparts. The International Rescue Committee representative captured this point in the following depiction:

If you are working in an IDP setting vs. a refugee setting vs. a post-conflict setting, like Liberia and Sierra Leone, your approach will be completely different; and their definition of sustainability will have to differ. In a refugee setting, it’s direct implementation. In an IDP setting you might have a little more coordination or integration where people are actually going to government schools, or there is closer coordination with the government. Each country is different and they set their refugee policy differently. Some countries like Uganda promote a more integrated approach where they have not refugee camps, but settlements; and so people don’t get any food distribution, but they get access to land. Schools are not run by INGOs. The schools are government schools and directly under the authority of the government. Where you have a
situation like Ethiopia, or like Guinea, it’s a refugee camp and the
government wants international aid organizations to run all of the
activities and they give the international community a lot of autonomy. It
varies depending on the policy and the involvement of the government in
the refugee situation. [Also,] it will kind of depend on the stage. If you
are in a country like Sudan, Liberia or Sierra Leone where it’s very much
post-conflict or early recovery it’s all about the government. It’s all about
strengthening the government and institution-building, not about direct
implementation entirely. In Guinea, it was all about direct
implementation. In Sudan, or in Liberia, it might be both...a two-pronged
approach...direct implementation, but you are also very much building
capacities of the ministries that eventually have to take over those
activities (Interview, September 21, 2007).

A two-pronged approach allows international organizations to provide educational
support quickly and as part of their relief efforts while simultaneously building the
capacities of governments to assume greater responsibility for education. A two-pronged
approach serves several purposes. One, it provides needed services to the target
populations without delay. Two, it is provided in such a way that governments are well-
informed about these activities and have the opportunity to approve them. Three, it
creates a space for governmental officials to develop their educational expertise and
assume greater ownership of the activities being provided within the education sector.
And four, it provides a solid foundation upon which the government can sustain these
educational support efforts initially provided by international organizations.

The fact that an NGO representative offered this example demonstrates the ways
in which her organization as well as other NGOs are adapting their ways of working to
better engage with governments, a criticism that was highlighted above. The following
section will explain these changes in more detail.
Organizational Response to Change

The evolving field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction and the institutional responses to these changes makes it difficult to compartmentalize any of these organizations into rigid categories. Whereas NGOs have been criticized by UN and donor agencies for their lack of direct engagement with governments, there is evidence as seen in the example above, as well as recognition by other actors, that this is changing.

The UNICEF representative offered the following observation:

In these post-conflict contexts and regular development work, NGOs realize more and more that they have to work with governments and that there is a shift in many cases overall in how international NGOs operate. I don’t know enough about it, but that is kind of the sense I get when I hear [NGO] colleagues talking. I think the conscientious NGOs...have [a] vision. I spoke to another colleague at an NGO [that had] really worked outside government [about making] a conscious effort to change that...also for greater sustainability for what they were trying to do (Interview, October 3, 2007).

The UNESCO representative also acknowledged this change and went so far as to say that effective and robust educational responses by NGOs and other civil society organizations in recent years have resulted in UNESCO not needing to respond:

The interesting thing that is happening in recent years, generally throughout EFA, but it is also extremely important in relation to emergencies and post-conflict, is the increasing presence and weight of civil society organizations. A few years ago in the early 90s, they were not so much in education. If they were, they were doing very simple things...where increasingly over the years they are getting much more engaged in substantive aspects of educational work. They are becoming more genuinely partners. In some cases there is no need for UNESCO to intervene because there already is significant education work going on. I think that’s been an important change. I wouldn’t say that it characterizes all NGOs, but it characterizes some of the bigger ones, some of the major international ones (Interview, October 30, 2007).

Although the UNESCO representative referred specifically to education work, one can infer that he also may be referring to NGOs’ increasing collaboration with governmental
partners as part of his explanation for why UNESCO might not need to respond.

Conversely, other international organizations would like to see UNESCO engage earlier.

Given the efforts to facilitate a smoother transition from humanitarian relief to development work, organizations such as UNESCO are also feeling pressure to engage earlier than their traditional mandate and operational approach may have deemed necessary. The UNESCO representative alludes to this pressure, the challenges that it presents as well as the way his organization is trying to respond:

The pressure is felt differentially within UNESCO. For the UNESCO people on the ground the pressure is very, very high because they have to face people around the table who are saying: “where are you?”; “what are you doing?”; “when are you going to join us?”; “when are you doing to do something?”; and that must be very uncomfortable; and if you don’t have many resources that is even more uncomfortable. From the point of view of parts of UNESCO that are familiar with these situations, yeah, it’s frustrating because we want to be able to fill these gaps and be there; but our resources tend to be trapped within certain kinds of lines. As a member state organization with limited budget and with very sharp eyes upon how we do our spending and what we do, it’s actually not that easy to move money around to respond to a particular crisis. Other organizations have more of a facility, almost a mandate to be able to do that whereas UNESCO is a bit more rigid and that’s simply the way it is. Nevertheless we are looking at ways to get around that. It’s not as though we can have a sort of “fighting fund” so easily like some agencies do. That hasn’t been developed yet. At another level of the organization for many of the people in headquarters the emergencies are something they may vaguely read about in the paper, and it’s not always something they feel themselves engaged with; or even if they are educationists they don’t see that there may be an educational dimension that they have [to be concerned with]. There’s an education process to take place among UNESCO people too (Interview, UNESCO, October 30, 2007).

In fact, UNESCO is taking strides to establish a Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Unit at UNESCO headquarters in order to create a space to “problematize the importance of post-conflict and disaster response” and get it “on people’s agendas more strongly.”
UNESCO recognizes that it is “a legitimate area of work” to which they have something to contribute (Interview, October 30, 2007).

Clearly, the changes taking place in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction do not affect NGOs solely. The recognition across this group of international actors that steps need to be taken to improve the provision of educational support through either better engagement with the government or more effective coordination with other actors working in this field bodes well for the sustainability of education programs. Progress in this area will generate options for organizations looking for as well as needing assistance from others to sustain their educational support. In the meantime, however, many of these organizations continue to confront internal challenges related to the vision and planning of their educational support.

**Vision and Planning**

The processes that organizations facilitate to create their vision and plans for educational support in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries are inevitably multifaceted; however, the interviewees in this study identified a few select challenges that can be equated with the vision and planning process that include: the need for long-term planning, continuity of engagement, close collaboration with the government, integration of parallel and complementary structures into the system and the ability to scale up effective and successful programs.

The importance of establishing a long-term vision for education that encompasses the transition from relief to development was paramount for several interviewees. The
UNICEF representative noted its importance in tandem with the need for long-term funding and ongoing support from various arenas beyond the education sector:

One [challenge] for sustainability is...our own short-term vision and short-term funding cycles. Moving on to different priorities be they in different countries, or being redefined in organizations or [by] donors. I think many of the challenges are internal...not committing the resources, not having the long-term vision, the long-term engagement..., particularly in post-conflict countries. From some of the research it seems that there needs to be and not only in the social arena but also on the economic front, the diplomatic front, the security front and the legal front and so on that there needs to be quite consistent support to countries to ensure that they don’t slide back into conflict. What we see of course is that for internal political or institutional reasons the long-term commitment isn’t there so the big primary challenges for international organizations are internal (Interview, October 3, 2007).

A long-term vision and plan for education also was stressed strongly in regard to anticipating the needs associated with the post-conflict transition. For those organizations that might not have a clear vision in place, the UNESCO representative stated that the situation in and of itself often times will force international organizations to assume that planning role. According to the UNESCO representative:

There’s an objective need once you start looking beyond the immediate and into the short and medium term. You have to plan budgets, you have to plan your actions and strategies. If you are planning teacher education you must have some vision of the level of needs, what the priority areas are and so on. So they [international organizations] are pulled into these things almost by the situation itself and I think increasingly they find themselves the ones who have to think this through [because] in many places the cadres or the government aren’t very strong, are absent completely...so they are filling the gap if you like of a relatively weak state apparatus (Interview, October 30, 2007).

The CARE representative discussed the need for advanced, long-term planning that entails clear steps for how and when an organization will handover a particular project or program to the governmental authorities, including capacity building efforts and close coordination with the government throughout the process:
I think CARE is very conscious that we are not there forever, and that is not the role that we should be taking of being a service delivery agency. So the kinds of programs that we implement have a phase [during which] we want to turn it over to the government agency and have activated [plans] around goals [in which] building capacity of the government is one of the program activities. There is a phase in and phase out for us (Interview, September 10, 2007).

More and more deeper engagement with governmental counterparts is becoming the goal, if it were not already, of most organizations working in this field; however, this turnover to government can be easier said than done given the capacities of the government to assume responsibility in post-conflict settings. When asked how CARE prepares for this type of phased approach and handover, she stressed the need for advanced planning and a set of indicators that would signal when this turnover could take place:

When and how you handle things with government needs to be implemented in advance. You need to have indicators as to when the government is ready, and when the structures are ready, to now begin to do things on their own. It’s almost a tool that you need to have proper milestones as to when the government is ready and when the milestones are achieved and what is the kind of scaffolding that CARE would like to do by hand-holding them and supporting them until they are ready to take responsibility on their own. It’s part of the design that you have (Interview, September 10, 2007).

In addition to the importance that CARE placed on its collaboration with the government, she also talked about complementing this phased, top-down work at the governmental level with a bottom-up approach at the community level:

On the other side, in many African countries CARE has worked directly with the community trying to make sustainable structures within the community and this has largely been to do with the ECD [early childhood development] and education programs. Making community structures more sustainable, finding players (could be NGOs, religious or faith-based organizations), [and] working with them...to build optimum capacity for that unit to carry on the activities (Interview, September 10, 2007).
The NORAD representative also reflected on the importance of community involvement for sustainability:

To make the activities sustainable you have to involve the community. You should involve them by using their resources in terms of building, or involving them maybe in the recruitment of teachers (Interview, September 5, 2007).

The DFID representative shared these thoughts:

If you are talking about community-based programs where you are working with communities and civil society, for example, there is a natural collaboration between the implementing agency and the community, and it has good potential for sustainability because they are actually developing capacity of the community; and that is a key part of the program (Interview, September 17, 2007).

There is broad agreement that working with both groups—government and community—is imperative for effectively sustaining education programs in the relief-development transition. The stronger the sense of ownership of the educational support that can be instilled, the better the chances are for sustainability. While this sense of ownership can and should be garnered in the early phases of humanitarian relief, it becomes essential as the country begins to transition to reconstruction and development. This sense of ownership can be jeopardized, however, when educational support is provided vis-à-vis systems set up parallel to the government; this is a challenge for international organizations that will be discussed in the following section.

**Parallel Systems**

The vision and planning processes become more critical when organizations create and establish projects or programs that run in parallel to the governmental system. Amongst the interviewees in this study, there was consensus that education provided by
means of a parallel system not only was justifiable, but was obligatory if the government were incapable of providing that service. However, there was also consensus that parallel systems must be integrated into the official governmental system as quickly as possible.

The agreement that parallel systems are justifiable and defensible stemmed from several related explanations. First, parallel systems were justified in acute emergency situations more than any other type or phase of conflict given the life-saving potential of education that entails life skills and psychosocial support. Second, the provision of education in any form was considered one of several mitigating factors in the prevention of a return to conflict. Third, the inability of the government due to lack of commitment or capacity to provide education was provocation for international organizations to intercede. Fourth, given the right to education protected by multiple human rights conventions, several organizations commented on the obligation they have, particularly as UN agencies, to respond.

The donor representatives in this study stressed the importance of responding to educational needs when and if governments are not in a position to do so. The representative from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated unequivocally: "if you want to reach the uneducated people and the government structure is weak [and unwilling]...then other channels need to be found" (Interview, September 3, 2007). If the government "is willing, but only weak they can be supported," and UNICEF can assume a supporting role in that situation (Interview, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 3, 2007). The World Bank representative made an equally strong point by stating that:

Sometimes the government deliberately ignores the education sector and has no interest in sustaining it...that doesn’t mean that there is no need for
education. Sometimes it is just so incapacitated or so absorbed in other priorities that it doesn’t have the resources to focus on it. You can’t wait for the government to recover to restore service provision (Interview, August 30, 2007).

The UNICEF representative articulated the children’s perspective and stated that:

One would like all children to have access to an education; and if the government can’t provide that, it’s of course an issue. As UNICEF we would say as a matter of principle, “why should these children have to wait?” because children can’t wait for their education (Interview, October 3, 2007).

Referring to IDP situations specifically, the Save the Children representative stated that “it depends on the state and how much the state wants to be involved”:

If you look at Darfur, the government has kind of a cursory interest since you are getting sort of a parallel system there. In Iraq the government is there; but it doesn’t have the ability to reach out or have any real control, so you do get a parallel system going in little cantons (Interview, October 2, 2007).

In a refugee context it depends upon whether or not it is a camp-based or urban-based setting. It is the former in which a parallel system often times is inevitable, as noted by the UNHCR representative:

If they are camp-based, then the camps are usually very far from the local infrastructure, from the local villages and borders...because...of the security reasons and environmental reasons. The government [indicates] where you have to build the camp and [build it] in the bush so it’s not possible for the refugee camp to go and be involved in the local schools. We need to put up refugee schools in the camp, so often it’s a necessary parallel system (Interview, August 28, 2007).

In urban settings, refugee children are able to integrate more easily into the public schools due to physical proximity.

In addition to these differences between camp-based and urban-based refugee settings, the UNHCR representative pointed out that in certain cases refugees may
contribute to the establishment of parallel systems as they strive to maintain certain

cultural or linguistic practices:

In [Francophone] Guinea, the [Anglophone] Sierra Leoneans refused to
enroll their children in local schools because they wanted to maintain their
own language and own curricula. The refugees themselves set up parallel
systems, but these are not recognized and didn’t get recognized curricula.
They preferred that; although, we really tried to convince them to go to
recognized schools so that they could get recognized certificates and so
forth. It was this strong sense of nationality that was more important than
[attending] a recognized school (Interview, August 28, 2007).

In those instances when children’s education is not recognized or accredited, there

was still a sense that any education was good education. The UNICEF representative

alluded to this point in the following remarks:

If you do create parallel systems children get an education; but if it isn’t
recognized by anybody, then it serves the children perhaps intrinsically
because they have learned to read and write, [and] they have learned some
skills (Interview, October 3, 2007).

The Save the Children representative shared these thoughts and noted that the

sustainability of skills is also important:

Whatever skills you are able to provide to [refugees or IDPs] they will be
able to take forward within whatever system, and hopefully at some point
there will be some alignment. When you look at parallel systems in
refugee systems or returnee systems the refugees are ideally given skills
that they can take across the border. You deal with recognition and those
types of things so I think it’s looking at the sustainability of skills being
provided (Interview, Save the Children, October 2, 2007).

The representative from the International Rescue Committee made a similar observation
as she addressed the idea that you are not supposed to have anything sustainable in
refugee camps due to the overarching plan to encourage refugees to return to their home
countries. She stated that in refugee settings, there should be a “heavier emphasis on
skills building” and the transfer of these skills to the community, because it is thought
that skills are more easily sustained once refugees return or resettle (Interview, September 21, 2007).

Despite general agreement about the intrinsic value of any education, training or skills development provided to students or teachers by international organizations, several interviewees stressed the importance of recognizing and validating this acquisition of knowledge and the related challenges if these learning and training opportunities are somehow disconnected from the national system. Recognition and validation signify, for example, that a student’s previous educational preparation will be taken into consideration and that they will be placed in the appropriate grade if schooling continues or will be offered employment opportunities in accordance with their educational achievements. For teachers, whether their skills have been newly developed or recently upgraded, any previous training would be acknowledged accordingly in teacher recruitment and compensation decisions.

In regard to student learning, the UNESCO representative commented on this point:

One of the key things to me is that in emergency situations, if learning needs to take place then a) it needs to be of good quality if possible, but b) it needs to be valued and to give it value, it needs to count. One of the great problems that I saw when I was based in Nairobi was people running schools in Sudan coming out and saying can you validate what I am doing in my secondary school? “No, I can’t, I am not a validating agency.” This validation of knowledge, validation of learning experiences...having some kind of mechanism to help children build year on year, I think this is really, really important. There is nothing worse than spending months and months in a school completing a year and what you do has no bearing, no recognition, no value and cannot be traded (Interview, October 30, 2007).
In this example, the terms for validation and accreditation were not worked out in advance by the international organization running the school and urgent steps needed to be taken to connect with the education authorities responsible for this process.

The CARE representative spoke of the challenges that arise when NGOs assume responsibility for recruiting and training teachers, especially when they do so in such a way that is disconnected from the national authorities, which is often times necessary if there is no viable government with which to collaborate:

During the conflict, the teachers are away and the structures for monitoring their recruitment almost come to a grinding halt. NGOs begin to recruit their own teachers or manage the recruitment. When the conflict is over and the new government comes on board, there is a tussle that begins to happen between the NGOs, the community and the government and whomever is responsible for teacher training and accreditation. That becomes an issue that needs a lot of attention. You have to negotiate with the different stakeholders (Interview, September 10, 2007).

When there is a functional government in place, the NORAD representative stated that:

You always need to see the activities in relation to what the government is doing, and that’s very essential in terms of teacher training for example. Because if you do teacher training you always have to consider how to validate the training and so you have to integrate your training into the government system (Interview, September 5, 2007).

In summary:

If your output is human resources and skills the challenge is to make sure that they are valued, recognized and rewarded otherwise they are not sustainable. It’s not only in the system, but also the society and economy which needs to value them. Quite often people provide teacher training courses that the government doesn’t recognize, skills that the economy doesn’t require (Interview, World Bank, August 30, 2007).

Once a viable government is in place or becomes capable of assuming greater responsibilities, most organizations will want to transfer any human resources that they
have helped develop to the Ministry of Education in an effort to ensure teachers’
continued employment. If the Ministry of Education is unfamiliar with the teacher
training program that has been developed or disapproves of the methods used in the
program, major delays in the absorption of these individuals is likely. If large quantities
of teachers have been trained by international organizations, the state of the country’s
economy and corresponding education budget may not be sufficient to cover these
additional costs. On occasion when NGOs or UN agencies assume responsibility for
teacher compensation or the provision of incentives, it is rare that they are able to provide
funding for indefinite periods of time; therefore, any delays may have a dire effect on the
teachers and their livelihoods. Similarly, if communities have supplemented teachers’
salaries in an effort to prolong educational support for their children, they will be eager
for the government to assume this responsibility. Given these realities, the sustainability
of educational support provided to students and teachers comes into question.

Another explanation offered for the need to provide education outside the realm
of governmental control entailed the argument that the provision of education can help to
prevent a recurrence of conflict through its role as a stabilizing factor and its symbolism
as a peace dividend. The NGO representative from the International Rescue Committee
stated that this inclination affects the ways in which donors prioritize certain activities
and shape an organization’s educational interventions:

If it’s called a “fragile state” [the donors] aren’t going to give you money
to do the long-term institution-building and capacity building in the
ministry so that three years, four years, or five years down the line they
can provide basic services. They are going to give you money to directly
get things happening…and basic services re-established as quickly as
possible. In part because there is this fear that those countries could slip
back into conflict if people don’t see services returning or don’t have a
favorable image of the government (Interview, September 21, 2007).
Despite the agreement about the need to provide educational support and the merits of doing so, the interviewees addressed the necessity as well as the challenge of integrating parallel systems into the government structure. The World Bank representative depicted the challenges that arise when this does not happen:

You get orphan schools that are built and created by communities with support of NGOs, and the government doesn’t even recognize them as part of the system. When the NGOs or agencies go away the schools implode because there are no resources. They need to be integrated into the system (Interview, August 30, 2007).

Within the acute emergency phase, there was a sense that some type of engagement with the government was possible:

In the acute emergency phase it would be justified to have parallel systems, but even quite early on you can start to have some kind of engagement with local authorities...anywhere between eight weeks to six months...you can start working with authorities and getting them more engaged. We can probably start a lot earlier than we do (Interview, DFID, September 17, 2007).

According to the DFID representative, even if the government is weak and not able to deliver services, governmental authorities can be responsible for “oversight and management,” which is something that should be taken into consideration and accounted for in the planning process (Interview, September 17, 2007).

The World Bank representative agrees that integration into the governmental system is imperative, but also pointed out that this integration process can begin at the community level and work its way up:

There’s no doubt that in the early stages you may need to focus on service delivery not using the existing national system which may be incapacitated or antipathetic, but it has to be eventually aligned with the system, or otherwise it is unsustainable. You can’t get away from that sole fact.
And I think, especially in early reconstruction, parallel systems in a sense are so focus[ed] on service delivery at the community level which is important, but that doesn’t mean that even from the very beginning that you don’t start building links with the community, because the community is a system and communities have authorities, and networks and institutions, and policies, practices and procedures even if they are tacit rather than explicit (Interview, August 30, 2007).

If educational support is provided in such a way that is “untethered from the governmental system” (Interview, Save the Children, October 2, 2007) or the community and remains that way, then sustainability is highly unlikely. However, if a parallel system is established initially the situation can be remedied if steps are taken to integrate the educational support into the appropriate governmental or community systems as soon as possible. It is also possible to provide educational support in a more positive way albeit still parallel to the official governmental system.

**Complementary Systems**

Apart from the points provided about the justifiable nature of parallel systems and the need to integrate these systems within the government, there was also an acknowledgement of the positive side of parallel systems, or what several interviewees defined as “complementary.” This term was applied to describe systems that were in fact parallel to the official governmental system, but that were established in direct coordination with the government. Two very specific and detailed examples were offered of CARE’s and Save the Children’s educational programs, both by interviewees working for different organizations.

In the first example, the UNICEF representative illustrated the efforts that CARE made in Afghanistan to create a complementary system, the details of which follow here:
When there was a new government after the Taliban, [CARE] had this very good community-based education program called COPE [Community Organized Primary Education]. Under the Taliban they basically set up their community-based schools in communities where there weren’t any government schools and that was a very clear policy although at the time the government schools were only for boys. Even so they said let’s go to communities where there is demand, where there is no conflict with existing services. Then what happened when the Taliban left, they said let’s now look at which schools we could potentially handover as government schools if the government is willing and tried to work with different government [counterparts] to do that. Then they said where is our new niche now? If I remember correctly they defined their niche as even more remote communities where it would have been unlikely that the government would have any outreach for a long time to come. So, they did this very quickly and they established [the program] almost immediately with the district education authorities. They really thought through what the implications were of the new situation and they were really exemplary. I didn’t see that with other NGOs which took much longer to change (Interview, October 3, 2007).

This portrayal illustrates the way in which an NGO initially established a parallel system as part of its humanitarian relief operations, but strategically and effectively used the opportunity that the Taliban’s departure offered to connect with the new government and coordinate their educational plans in a complementary fashion. They were able to do this when other NGOs were still contemplating how they might change their educational support, if at all, as the country moved from the humanitarian relief to reconstruction.

In a similar illustration, the representative from the International Rescue Committee spoke about the need for parallel systems in certain country contexts and the ways in which they can be connected later in a positive way with government. She cited an example from Save the Children-United Kingdom and their work in remote, pastoralist areas in Ethiopia in which the government did not rely on a framework for non-formal education programs and did not prioritize formal education in remote areas due to the prohibitive costs of doing this type of work in sparsely populated areas. She
described Save the Children’s non-formal education work in great detail in the following excerpt:

[Save the Children UK] started with a small pilot of alternative basic education in the Somali region and documented its success and a couple ways of improving access to these pastoralist and rural populations that were traditionally excluded from education systems. Then they documented their learning achievement through their pass exam rate and they worked at a local level with the local district education office very intensely to work together to come up with the curriculum that’s sort of an accelerated version of the formal school curriculum. They set up criteria for at what point is [a] school ready to enter into the formal school system. They just started with a few centers and [over time] the national ministry of education [started] to draft a national policy based on that model for reaching agro-pastoralist and remote rural, particularly sparsely populated areas (Interview, September 21, 2007).

She went on to say that:

I think that is kind of an ideal INGO role, where we would have the ability to identify a gap and pilot something innovative, but work in a way with first the local district education office, eventually through that move it up to the regional and then eventually do enough presentations and advocacy with your government partners at the main, more national [level] (Interview, September 21, 2007).

Due to the effectiveness of this complementary program, a major donor got involved and “helped fund other districts to come up with their own strategy for this alternative basic education, using curriculum that was specific to their contexts” (Interview, September 21, 2007).

The challenge here is that it takes time to set up complementary systems, but they will be most successful in terms of integration into the system when the government is in a position to assume greater responsibility. The integration into the system proves critical for sustainability in these cases. The last example of Save the Children’s work in Ethiopia transitions nicely to a more detailed discussion of scaling up.
Scaling Up

Another objective for the sustainability of educational support is to bring the program to scale and implement it on a much broader basis throughout the country. Scaling up entails “working with and within government structures to influence policy and systems” (p. 45), expanding programmatic operations, advocating at national and international levels for support, strengthening organizations involved with the program, and transferring responsibility for the program to other national and local organizations that can sustain it (Edwards and Hulme, 1997, p. 44). Although only two interviewees referred to scaling up in depth, it is discussed quite extensively in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction, and is evident as more organizations set goals for larger scale programs that make an “impact” and have program objectives that assume sustainability (Gubbels and Koss, 2000). The impetus for scaling up programs, therefore, should be seen in light of the EFA and MDG goals and the desires and efforts by numerous organizations to help countries, including those affected by conflict, meet the objective of universal access to primary education by 2015.

While scaling up is an important goal for many organizations, the interviewees commented on the challenges that can frustrate these efforts. The UNICEF representative commented on the internal objectives that her organization has for scaling up programs as well as the challenges that her organization and the NGO community have in achieving this goal:

[In] our Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies we have a vision of scale...so therefore we have seen real growth in terms of how we design programs, what we appeal for in terms of funding, [and] the kinds of capacities we put into place. We are not there yet and then of course we are not implementing. There is a clear change, but what I see from most NGOs, unlike in other sectors such as water, [and in] conflict-
affected [contexts] in particular is that most NGOs are happiest implementing on a fairly small scale. The argument could be made that it’s a matter of resources and to me it’s not a matter of resources in the first place, it’s a matter of vision and objectives and strategies in the first place and translating that into financial resources and then trying to get those. What I see is that most NGOs by and large design things on a small scale because they think they are good at that and that they can manage. They are not thinking yet [of the long-term yet] (Interview, October 3, 2007).

The vision of scale called for in UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies (2004) reflects “a concern with the affected population as a whole, not [just] part of the population” (Interview, UNICEF, January 31, 2008). Therefore, the objective of going to scale in this example relates to the earlier section in the chapter that discussed the need to overcome the challenges equated with the marginalization and exclusion of certain groups, either caused by the conflict itself or by the ways in which international organizations extended educational support.

The Save the Children representative agrees with the UNICEF representative that NGOs lack the ability to “go to scale” and stressed the need to hone skills not only in technical assistance but also logistics:

One [challenge] that is just hitting us now is how to go to scale. Although we seek to provide educational services for all children we really don’t know how to do that to scale. It’s actually looking at technically how do you get there? I think we can in some situations. People talk about the technical capacities of this, but not the logistics: how do you hire people quickly?; how do you put the management structures in place quickly to be able to roll this out?; how do you set up a logistics training?; how do you set up regular monitoring?; and how much is it going to cost? If possible we can rely on governmental structures but sometimes they aren’t rolling out either (Interview, October 2, 2007).

One potential explanation for NGOs’ focus on smaller scale operations was offered by the CARE representative who spoke about the challenges related to going to scale while also maintaining quality:
Since you are in control of everything,...managing the whole program,...and doing the training on a small scale and a small canvas, the kind of quality that you establish is of a different kind and you are able to establish quality indicators and do quality work. But in post-conflict when the new players come on board including the national governments and the decentralized district officials, what becomes difficult is to maintain that quality because the government is eager to integrate successful lessons, very eager to form coalitions and think together to work out policies and programs. But the demand for education escalates so much in the post-conflict [phase] that the choice between giving access and maintaining quality slips and that becomes a major challenge for some of those organizations (Interview, September 10, 2007).

While taking education programs to scale may not always be feasible or desirable, the integration and expansion of a successful education program into the governmental system and across a country would bode well for the sustainability of that particular program, not to mention the children that benefit from broader access to educational opportunities. As the supposedly successful education program penetrates the system more deeply and presents itself to a wider range of education practitioners, its viability can be secured. For this to happen, international organizations must work very closely with one another as well as with their governmental counterparts, opportunities to secure viability that may arise in their efforts to conduct capacity building for education authorities and others.

**Capacity Building**

The best strategy for ensuring integration into the system is to work in collaboration with the government and to create capacity building opportunities that will help education authorities prepare to assume responsibility for education programs. Capacity building can be defined as the “enhancement of capabilities of people and
institutions to improve their competence and problem solving capacities in a sustainable manner” (UNESCO, 2005). Capacity building is both an opportunity and a challenge. In order to accomplish this objective, several interviewees in this study advocated a two-pronged approach that entails service delivery and capacity building; this combined approach ultimately contributes to the reconstruction of the system.

By engaging in a two-pronged approach that entails “close coordination and handover plan” international organizations can avoid making the government appear “incompetent or not able to do its job” (Interview, International Rescue Committee, September 21, 2007). The UNICEF representative agreed with this statement, but stated that she did not think that the “balance has been quite struck,” noting that “it’s also very hard to strike because you are dealing with low capacity in many cases” (Interview, October 3, 2007). Although many international organizations are prepared to engage in capacity building, the low capacities permeating governmental systems affected by conflict and other crises present a serious challenge.

Despite this challenge, there is support for beginning capacity building efforts quickly. During the humanitarian phase when the primary focus is on service delivery, the DFID representative stated that “Ministry officials need to be engaged..., trained and given the capacity to continue the program over the long term” (Interview, September 17, 2007). In the post-conflict transition “there still needs to be capacity building...so that the program can continue to be sustainable” (Interview, DFID, September 17, 2007). In the Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks, prepared by the United Nations
Development Group and World Bank (2007), the report states that building “capacity, accountability and credibility of the state in the eyes of the population” is critical (p. 15).

The interviewees in this study thought that all international organizations engaged in this work have a certain role to play in capacity building with the government. Whereas UNESCO has a specific mandate to engage in capacity development with governments, the UNESCO representative noted the comparative advantage of other organizations, particularly NGOs, also to assume this role:

In some cases I’d rather it be an NGO than an international agency which may then use that power to sell loans, for example, to a government. This is where the NGOs, in fact, may have a certain sort of marketing edge for this kind of service, because they are not pushing a particular product or a particular set of commitments that a government may have to live with for several years to come. It’s this honest broker role. It’s a very important thing that UNESCO can offer to governments, and [governments] tell us all the time that this is why they value us, this is what they want us to be and to become. But if we aren’t there on the ground, there is no question in my mind that the governments need some support in many circumstances. They don’t have expertise, they haven’t been able to groom it yet, and they also need honest advice (Interview, October 30, 2007).

In this discussion, the UNESCO representative also commented that a certain professional expertise would be required for NGOs or other international organizations planning to engage more actively in this type of work:

[You need a] very sound choice of persons who would fulfill that role. It’s not going to be someone that is a typical go-getter, someone in an NGO that gets things done perhaps in terms of the emergency response phase. It needs a more considered mind and more experienced perception of things, someone who can speak with gravitas with ministers and visiting dignitaries or representatives of other agencies. I would strongly suggest that if... NGOs are getting into [more capacity building with governments] that they have to invest in people who have [extensive] personal resources and experiences that they can draw from (Interview, October 30, 2007).
Apart from the type of staff required to conduct this work, the various forms that
capacity building efforts could take were also considered by the interviewees. The World
Bank representative suggested a possible approach that he called "arms-length technical
assistance," which he described as:

[The objective should be] putting the first responsibility for the
development of the strategies and the policies...in the hands of locals,
doing research] in the local language, and using local institutions.
Technical assistance then is in the form of peer review, review of terms of
reference, suggestions for how they might be improved or tightened, and
then review of findings and so forth. The consultants are then people who
are consulted by the government rather than people who consult the
government and then produce wisdom, which tends to be the form that
technical assistance takes usually. We "grow" consultants to go in and tell
the government what to do. If consultants are people whom the
government consults whether it needs information or shares a
development policy or staffing system or whatever...it helps to turn
around the relationship. The government is almost saying "don't call us,
we'll call you". If it is handled well I think it is really empowering and
helps to build institutional capacity in the country and real political
capacity. It's slower. The quality control [may not be] as tight, but I think
the trade offs in terms of ownership are well worth it (Interview, August
30, 2007).

In addition to the ownership that this approach may inculcate within the government, it
may be more practical for international organizations that are unable to establish a
physical presence in a particular country due to security concerns.

A more hands-on approach was suggested by the International Rescue Committee
representative, through which international organization staff would be assigned to work
in the central Ministry of Education or the local district education offices. The purpose of
these assignments would be to perform an advisory role that would help to build the
capacity of the Ministry. The challenge here is that "you don't want that person to take
the place of the government official so that when the person leaves everything they have
done [falls apart]" (Interview, International Rescue Committee, September 21, 2007).
She noted that the advantages and disadvantages of this approach need to documented and examined more closely, but that it has potential.

Another example was provided by the UNICEF representative in which her organization played a supportive role while the government in Cambodia, in this example, built capacity to assume more responsibilities. She explained:

What was also interesting in Cambodia for a long time was that they were using a sector wide approach; but the government didn’t have the capacity yet, so UNICEF on behalf of one donor government managed a multi-million dollar budget. It did go through the government; but it did not go directly to government, so there were some checks and balances and the government department did some financial reporting to UNICEF. So since there wasn’t yet the confidence to put money directly into the government [coffers] it was managed for quite a few years that way. [It is] quite an interesting example [of] getting resources to a country when the financial systems were not fully developed yet (Interview, October 3, 2007).

Whatever the approach might be, the Save the Children representative felt strongly that any “good coordination with the government…has to be very, very supportive and light.” Furthermore, “being able to lightly support the government to take on board and watch what is going on increases their input and connectedness to everything…which is vital” (Interview, Save the Children, October 2, 2007).

The importance of engaging in a two-pronged approach that involves service delivery and capacity building is abundantly clear. By building the capacities of the government and its related education authorities, particularly in those countries emerging from a protracted conflict, the probabilities that education programs will be more sustainable is also evident. The ability to engage in capacity building activities is directly related to the internal capacities of the international organizations and the availability and quality of their human resources to meet these needs. Even for those organizations that
have included capacity building among their primary activities by mandate or by choice, improvements need to be made to ensure more effective capacity building that will lead to sustainable education programs.

**Human Resources**

The quantitative lack of education staff and the qualitative deficiency of capacities needed to respond in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings were cited as endemic to the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. It must be noted that this field is still relatively new, with greater attention being focused on its activities in recent years. Nevertheless, this challenge affects an organization’s ability to plan effectively, work collaboratively with governments and other international organizations, and provide quality educational support.

The USAID representative discussed not only the challenge of identifying qualified educational experts, but also the difficulty in enticing those with experience to work in conflict-affected countries under difficult circumstances:

> The first challenge we have is to find staff…to find people to go. It’s easy to get a contract with an international organization, but it’s very hard to find good people. [In] Afghanistan we have had a Senior Education position that has been open and hasn’t been filled for two years. We have had a very hard time finding good people who want to go to these countries and [are] experienced (Interview, September 6, 2007).

The UNHCR representative referred to the specific challenges that her organization faces given the internal structures and policies in place that are not conducive to a stronger commitment to education:

> We have no education officers in the field. We work through different staff categories. In Lebanon we have community services doing
education. In Syria it’s a program officer doing education. In Jordan it’s a durable solutions officer that is doing education. Then they will only stay for two years and there will be another staff [member]...or education will be shifted to the program officers’ division [which has] been saturated. It’s a constant capacity building process that has to take place (Interview, UNHCR, August 28, 2007).

In conjunction with the lack of education personnel to fill these roles another challenge is the dearth in skills and capacities needed to perform effectively and in response to the changing nature of the field. Specifically, this refers to the lack of specialized knowledge needed to respond to the demands of working in these contexts as well as the skill sets necessary for staff working across the humanitarian-development transition.

The Save the Children representative discussed the need for greater technical capacity and stated that when there are practitioners available with this type of expertise they are not being engaged early enough:

People are far too general in terms of what they do. We don’t bring in technical people soon enough therefore we don’t offer something that is of enough quality to actually stay the course. The example being...say safe spaces’...what happens after that? If they turn into an ECD [early childhood development] or youth program that’s a fairly specific skill set and it requires some real understanding of community mobilization, how you set up community structures to sustain something when there are very little resources, etc. That’s a lot to ask. Equally, look at the lack of really solid curriculum people in the field. We are doing teacher training and I think we are passing an age where we can do the rudimentary teacher training that we have been doing; in the late 80s-early 90s when we were teaching people how to use lesson plans. I think we are getting a little bit farther than that now so when we are looking at a curriculum for teachers to develop psychosocial curriculum for teachers to use on something, or a

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7 “During an initial emergency response, humanitarian agencies and communities create Emergency Spaces for Children (ESC). These places are developed with communities to protect children during emergencies through structured learning, play, psychosocial support and access to basic services. ESCs are implemented under many different names such as ‘Child Friendly Spaces’, ‘Safe Spaces’ and ‘Child Centered Spaces’. All these programs have the same focus and activities, and are part of the larger humanitarian protection response. ESCs are not a collection of activities focused on a specific area but rather a community program to create a larger protective environment for children during emergencies” (INEE, 2007, p. 1).
curriculum on landmines, it needs to be fairly sophisticated and needs to be tailored to different age groups. Right now we are block shooting for say 6-12 year olds and we are mixing all of the other kids because we don’t have the expertise (Interview, October 2, 2007).

The Save the Children representative noted that practitioners have been doing the best they could over the years, but that the changing nature of the field and the increase in and expansion of educational interventions today necessitates greater technical capacity (Interview, October 2, 2007).

In accordance with these comments, the International Rescue Committee representative indicated that one of the biggest challenges in regard to capacities entailed those needed for practitioners working across the relief-development transition and the shift in approach that the transition signifies. She stated that although headquarters’ staff may have a general awareness of the skills and capacities needed to work in this shifting environment, it proves more difficult for field-level staff:

We have a really, really hard time making those transitions from relief to development and the skill set that staff [at the field level] have in post-conflict is fairly weak. We are much more of an agency that historically has gone into an emergency and directly implemented. I think at the theoretical level we are all at least aware, but it’s true in practice that making that transition is not easy (Interview, International Rescue Committee, September 21, 2007).

She provided the following example to underscore the difficulties for field staff:

It’s hard for staff... at one point they are in a relief situation and they enter a community and they are handing out everything and then suddenly they are supposed to transition to a more development perspective where they are asking the communities [to contribute]. At one point you are doing material distribution so people can start businesses and then suddenly you are trying to transition. We want to reduce dependency and start promoting self-reliance so we are asking them to maybe match our contribution. I think people are aware that [this transition] has to happen, but in practice entering into an emergency is just very hard to enter with a long-term perspective of “no, we are not going to build a school for you even though you have lost your entire family, [have] no belongings, no
access to land, and no livelihood.” In practice, everyone needs to know it has to happen, but for IRC from an acute to a chronic crisis trying to make that transition from materials distribution handout to now we want you to run this school, and then to when you return home you have to build your school. It’s rough (Interview, September 21, 2007).

She noted that her organization has not hired “people with post-conflict, capacity building, advisory skill sets in terms of institution-building” which is disconcerting as they see institution-building “lead[ing] to sustainability” (Interview, September 21, 2007). According to her, as a country continues to stabilize and move toward development, staff need to be capable of “engaging in high level advocacy and coordination,” and know how to “promote good governance and decentralization” (Interview, February 9, 2008). She also pointed out that in addition to these skills, a different attitude is needed on the part of staff working in these contexts, and that this change can sometimes be the most challenging. She stated that “often staff feel [as though] they have the expertise and ability to identify the solution and find it expedient to design and implement projects” rather than taking the time to the build the capacities of national colleagues to do the same (Interview, February 9, 2008).

The UNICEF representative agreed with this observation about skill sets and stated that:

We need education teams that reflect these various capacities to deal with the challenges...the big picture challenges: vision, working with donors, and then actually running and managing a program. We need different profiles. Some people can be trained, but we need people to come in with different backgrounds and experiences (Interview, October 3, 2007).

The challenge does not only exist for NGOs and UN agencies working in the humanitarian sphere, but also the larger development agencies. The World Bank representative stated that:
We need more people who understand public administration and education management. We need people who understand the system. There aren’t many people with a systems perspective in any of these development agencies which always surprises me. There are quite a lot of economists and there are quite a lot of teachers, but there are not so many people who understand how an education system is publicly administered. And I think that’s something that we require and I think that our institution should be working actively to recruit more people with a grasp of how systems function and how education functions within that system (Interview, August 30, 2007).

A lack of education staff and the weaknesses in their capacities directly affect an organization’s efforts to sustain educational support in the relief-development transition. This human resources challenge affects sustainability from the very beginning of an education program’s implementation in that the program may not be developed and facilitated as best as possible given staff members’ lack of expertise in education and understanding of what is required for the longer term. Efforts to connect with governmental or community counterparts may be thwarted if there are not enough education staff to assume these roles, or if staff members do not possess the necessary skills for cultivating these types of relationships. Over the years, many organizations have recognized this problem and have turned to other partners in order to fill these gaps through collaborative relationships. Although coordination among and between international organizations and other partners is considered a valuable activity, challenges abound.

**Coordination**

Challenges with coordination among and between international organizations were noted across the broad relief-development spectrum, but particular attention was
paid to the post-conflict phase during which new resources and new actors arrive.

Interviewees from UN and NGOs alike commented on the number of organizations entering post-conflict countries and the potential for this influx to frustrate Ministries of Education. The UNICEF representative stated that:

In terms of post-conflict countries there is...a tendency for new NGOs, new agencies and new donors to come in and establish themselves particularly when they see a lot of funding around, UN too. [There is] “flag planting” and so on and so forth vis-à-vis domestic constituencies (Interview, October 3, 2007).

The UNESCO representative noted the flow of funding, but also the political aspect behind this influx:

[In] post-conflict countries you often have a very different cast of characters you know like the development banks come in if it's high profile politically. Many donors establish again a presence in countries and they all want to be seen at least politically as providing funding to countries and so on so it's a whole different cast of characters (Interview, October 30, 2007).

Apart from the development banks and donors arriving on the scene, UN agencies and NGOs with a development focus are also jockeying for position in post-conflict countries.

A challenge related to the sheer number of organizations present is the toll it can take on struggling Ministries to interpret and assess the plans proposed by each organization. The CARE representative elaborated on why this can prove problematic for sustainability:

[Another] aspect that I think hampers moving toward sustainability is that in post-conflict there are too many players that come on board and each of these agencies has their own agenda, own way of working; it could be curriculum, it could be teacher training. With so many voices around, the host government or the host agency that is trying to put these systems together has difficulty in hearing all of the voices and making a coherent system out of it. Some educational agendas and initiatives get integrated
and sustained, but some others fall off entirely (Interview, CARE, September 10, 2007).

The UNICEF representative similarly acknowledged the challenge that ministries face in managing the competing agendas and proposals:

[I]n these post-conflict situations you have these weak ministries being overwhelmed by many different types of agents and organizations and they all think they know what to do and what is important. How do you manage all of that? (Interview, October 3, 2007)

The UNHCR representative stated that even when the Ministry of Education is able to assume the lead in coordinating a broad range of agencies, that additional challenges could arise. She also commented on the need for coordination to help streamline the types of programs that various organizations are engaged with given their tendencies to take different shapes and forms:

[In] the reintegration contexts and the local contexts, it should mainly be the Ministry of Education that should be the lead [in coordinating]. In South Sudan they have coordination groups which the Ministry of Education is leading, but if we take South Sudan the problem there is an imbalance of support in regard to geographical areas and an imbalance of support for different programs. There should be much stronger coordination to synchronize support. Many agencies support teacher training, but in some areas they could support a language course for two weeks, in another area they could support school management which is like three months, in another area they could support training for peace education which is like for three days. Everybody talks about teacher training support; but in reality it’s not a recognized form of teacher training, it’s mostly on life skills training and not really a recognized certificate. There should be a much stronger coordination mechanism and more detail on planning (Interview, UNHCR, August 28, 2007).

The UNESCO representative noted that even when the government possesses a strong political commitment to the education sector that their capacities in a post-conflict environment, coupled with a “fragile economic situation” may not allow them to make
the best decisions about the various educational plans being promoted. This may lead ultimately to shifting priorities in the future:

[Post-conflict] poses challenges as well in terms of coordinating agendas and not overloading new governments and wanting to go too fast and then after a few years being frustrated [with] priorities changing, then again letting go (Interview, UNESCO, October 30, 2007).

This feeling of Ministries being overwhelmed can be related not only to the number of new organizations present in a post-conflict country, but also the sheer number of organizations that make up the NGO community. Interviewees from CARE and UNICEF commented on the need for a collective voice within the NGO community and “no more one NGO negotiating for itself” (Interview, CARE, September 10, 2007; Interview, UNICEF, October 3, 2007).

Although a country’s transition to post-conflict may draw the attention of a range of actors as well as resources, the timing of the donor agencies’ arrival was noted as a related challenge. Similar to the pressure that UNESCO may be feeling to engage with conflict-affected countries, the donors also are being asked to enter the fray earlier:

At this point in time, the development organizations come in very late in the post-conflict area. …they should be there in the beginning and the negotiations should take place on higher, more global levels much earlier (Interview, UNHCR, August 28, 2007).

In order to overcome these coordination challenges, interviewees suggested a number of possibilities. First, it is important to engage in a capacity mapping process both at the country level as well as globally (Interview, NORAD, September 5, 2007). This would allow all of the organizations engaged in this field to better understand which organizations are doing what and where. A preliminary effort in this area was made in the development of the Global Survey on Education in Emergencies by the Women’s
Commission for Refugee Women and Children in 2004. The authors of the report stated that the study was:

an attempt to gather information on how many refugee, displaced and returnee children and youth have access to education and the nature of the education they receive (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004a, p. iii).

In the development of this project, a database was created that included a list of organizations providing education in emergencies around the world. Unfortunately, this project ended and the database has not been updated since the report’s release. A second capacity mapping effort currently is underway as part of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) cluster initiative, to which a cluster for education has recently been added. Capacity mapping is an ambitious and long-term project that would need to be carried out systematically for all organizations working in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries.

Second, it was suggested that these various organizations come together to review, coordinate and possibly alter institutional mandates in order to “provide a more timely, effective and predictable response” (Interview, UNICEF, October 3, 2007).

Third, organizations should commit to using a common framework for coordination and utilize existing tools such as the INEE Minimum Standards to assist them in their work (Interview, UNHCR, August 28, 2007). The UNICEF representative agreed with this

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8 “The Cluster Approach aims to ensure sufficient global capacity, predictable leadership, strengthened accountability and improved strategic field-level coordination and prioritization. The approach is designed around the concept of partnerships between UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international organisations and NGOs. Partners work together towards agreed common humanitarian objectives both at the global level (preparedness, standards, tools, stockpiles and capacity-building) and at the field level (assessment, planning, delivery and monitoring).” (Excerpt from IASC website: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/issc/)

9 The INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction were designed to be used as a “capacity-building and training tool [by humanitarian, development and
point and advocated for the use of “common standards” for educational support as an
“organizing principle” among a “diversity of providers”—UN, NGO, and government—that would create a space in which these various groups could reconcile different and potentially opposing ideologies, establish agreement, ensure “consistency of approaches,” minimize “duplication of effort,” and overall contribute to greater quality (Interview, October 3, 2007). She provided a positive example from Afghanistan during the Taliban era when UNICEF and other organizations could not work with the Taliban due to the fact that they were not recognized internationally as a legitimate government:

There were all these different organizations that were working on education and many different NGOs, local NGOs and community initiatives came up to set up schools, home-based schools, and community-based schools. We couldn’t meet the needs of all of the country but we needed to have a longer term vision and we had to have some consistency in our approaches in terms of what really matters, not secondary issues, e.g. if one organization gives five pencils and another gives three. It’s the more important things. [After some discussion], the Afghan educators said that what’s really important is that the same learning standards are met and so what we did in Afghanistan…UNICEF and Save the Children…was that we organized workshops for Afghan educators to come together to develop [these standards]. It’s not our role to develop these standards, it’s our role to facilitate a process and to provide a venue and a platform for Afghan educators to come together and for Afghan educators to work on these issues so we had a very good group of Afghan educators from all over Afghanistan, men and women. We had to do it in Pakistan because the Taliban wouldn’t allow it. People crossed borders under harrowing conditions to come to this workshop and we even managed to get some people from the [Taliban] government (Interview, October 3, 2007).

In this example, the use of common standards created a foundation upon which different international organizations could collaborate with each other as well as with national and local stakeholders, thereby greatly contributing to the sustainability of the governmental actors as well as local populations] to enhance the effectiveness and quality of their educational assistance. [They were also designed to] enhance accountability and predictability..., and improve coordination among partners.” (INEE, 2004, back cover).
educational program. Finally, there was recognition by some bilateral agencies that they have a role to play in facilitating broader, more effective collaboration among international organizations (Interview, NORAD, September 5, 2007; Interview, DFID, September 17, 2007).

The benefits related to stronger coordination among international organizations are numerous. In terms of the sustainability of educational programs in the relief-development transition specifically, stronger coordination would create more opportunities to build partnerships and harness the strengths that different organizations offer in the provision of education. The comparative advantages across different organizations would also provide opportunities for stronger engagement by national and local stakeholders, as certain organizations tend to work with different groups. For humanitarian organizations that need to depart as a country stabilizes, the ability to transfer education programs to other organizations with broader post-conflict and development mandates is essential; especially if the government is not prepared or able to assume this role. As stated above, the donors may be well positioned to provide the necessary incentives for stronger, more effective coordination among international organizations in that they have greater financial resources at their disposal.

**Finances**

Whereas this study seeks to explore the critical factors affecting the sustainability of education programs that look beyond the financial variable, the pervasive problem of funding cannot be ignored, particularly given its impact on the sustainability of educational projects and programs. The World Bank representative summarized the
problem related to the "unpredictability of external financing" succinctly by stating that "high promises [during] reconstruction" are contradicted by the "low delivery of funds," and that "bridging the gap between humanitarian and development reconstruction financing still presents a challenge" (Interview, August 30, 2007). Interviewees from other donor agencies as well as the UN agencies and NGOs all concurred with this point.

Whether funding is more readily available during the high profile humanitarian phase of a crisis or is being allocated for very specific activities per donors' often times ambitious conditions, implementing organizations may not have much influence on how the money is to be used. One of the NGO representatives expressed that an organization has little choice but to accept any funding offered, especially when confronted with the urgent needs presented by a crisis:

We don't have much of a choice. The need after a post-conflict situation is so great that you really just want to go ahead and do your work and implement the program. You take the money and move on. When these mega-programs come along and within three years the funds have dried up and you have to wrap up your program in six months, that then becomes a major issue, but there is no way an agency like CARE can raise the resources to continue the program (Interview, CARE, September 10, 2007).

When an organization does have more input, the amount and duration of funding, if known, affect what type of educational support an organization can provide:

I think the funding determines in a big way what you choose to do. For instance, any good education program needs long-term funding. Even if it's to finish one cycle of primary schooling you at least need 5-6 years. If you are really talking about doing that type of program and completely enabling children to complete their primary school, it requires 5-year funding in x [number of] provinces and x [number of] schools. The kind of funding you are talking about is a large denominator vs. where you are going to go with one manual on say life skills (Interview, CARE, September 10, 2007).
The unpredictable nature of external funding and resultant shift in priorities emerge for different reasons across the range of bilateral and multilateral donors. Explanations for these shifting priorities may include the development of new humanitarian and developmental crises, a change in political leadership, or the whims of certain Ministry officials. The USAID representative explained the ways in which her organization has tried to remedy the problem despite the fact that it poses other problems:

We end up having programs we call “accordion programs.” One year we’ll have $5M and the next year we’ll have $1M so we have to reduce and expand, and reduce and expand, and reduce and expand. That’s very difficult to manage. It’s difficult to make the host governments understand why we have to cut here and there, it’s difficult for implementing partners because they have put in place their programs and projects and all of a sudden they have to cut or suddenly expand. It puts our implementing partners and our host governments in very difficult positions. So the way we address this is that when we design a program we always, or often, have a core set of activities that we know will not be touched, and depending on the country it’s prioritized. If it’s teacher training and communities of schooling then one will be affected, but not the other. We’ll go back to the core and try not to affect the core set of activities that we know would be really damaging to the country, so that’s how we deal with it. We tend to design programs that can be scaled up or that can be reduced which is very difficult and makes it hard to do any long-term community participation because it’s all based on sustainability (Interview, USAID, September 6, 2007).

Clearly, the erratic and unpredictable nature of funding in these contexts can greatly affect the sustainability of education programs generally, as well as in the transition from relief to development specifically. Whereas the global donor community is making efforts to streamline financial assistance provided for humanitarian and development work, the amount of aid allocated for education is still a concern, especially as the debate continues about the role of education in the humanitarian phase of a crisis.

Part of the *Rewrite the Future* campaign created by the Save the Children Alliance calls on all donors to increase their allocations to education in conflict-affected
fragile states (CAFS). The financial analysis that Save the Children has conducted shows that not enough aid is being committed to basic education despite the agreement among donors that $9 billion of aid is needed each year to achieve the EFA goal of universal primary education; only $3 billion was allocated in 2005 for basic education. Furthermore, their analysis shows that even less money is being allocated to education in CAFS. Although donors claim that support to education in CAFS is “too risky,” donors are providing approximately 43 percent of aid in these countries to “government and civil society activities” compared to just 12 percent allocated to education (Save the Children, 2007a, p. 13). Save the Children’s campaign also calls for stronger support of the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (FTI), which was designed to facilitate the mobilization of funds for education, but “remains under-funded and plagued by low disbursements” (Save the Children, 2007a, p. 17). While the financial realities plaguing humanitarian and development work and their affect on the sustainability of education programs cannot be ignored, it is clear from the evidence provided in this chapter that there are numerous challenges aside from finances that can affect sustainability.

**Conclusion**

The challenges elucidated throughout this chapter by the educational experts working at the global level are numerous and often times interrelated. According to the data and analysis presented in this chapter sustainability entails a variety of critical factors that cover the gamut of physical materials, human resources, structures and systems. Depending upon the type of educational support being provided, some or all of
the following factors may be important to ensure sustainability. Per the findings in this chapter, sustainability of educational support:

- Strives to integrate educational support provided by international organizations into the system—i.e. the government level, community level or both—by transferring responsibility of the program to the appropriate stakeholders.

- Requires long-term planning by international organizations that promotes ownership by national and local stakeholders vis-à-vis top-down and bottom-up approaches. Long-term planning:
  - Necessitates that international organizations reconcile internal, structural challenges between their humanitarian and development divisions (if applicable) that prevent the organization from providing cohesive and coherent services.
  - Includes (when possible) strong linkages to national educational policies; entails advocacy in conjunction with plans to integrate educational support provided through parallel or complementary systems when support provided by international organizations falls outside national priorities; and direct communication about all related activities to the appropriate education authorities (particularly support provided to marginalized and excluded groups).
  - Entails (at times) taking programs to scale in order to reach a larger portion of the affected population and achieve deeper integration of the support into the education system.

- Requires that international organizations take a two-pronged approach that includes timely service delivery of educational support coupled with capacity building of national and local stakeholders that prepares them to bear greater responsibility of educational provision over the long-term. This two-pronged approach:
  - Requires an adequate number of human resources equipped with the appropriate technical capacities and skills to carry out the work, which refers to the human resources of international organizations as well as their national and local counterparts.

- Benefits from the establishment of partnerships among and between relevant and diverse organizations and national and local stakeholders; specifically, partnerships that leverage the comparative advantages that each group contributes and prepares one or more actors for the transfer and assumption of responsibility for the longer-term.
• Requires coordination of all relevant international, national and local stakeholders in an effort to harmonize support and avoid duplication of effort.

• Needs long-term and predictable financial assistance that initially is generated through a combination of external assistance and a country’s national and community resources with expenses ultimately being covered in the government’s national, district and local education budgets.

• Requires a stable and secure environment in which international organizations and its partners can establish a presence and remain involved over a sufficient period of time.

The integration of educational support into the system was considered a key factor, but the terms “integration” and “system” should be defined very broadly. In regard to “integration,” the process may be as complex as the complete and total integration of an educational program into a Ministry of Education, including all of its elements (e.g. material, physical, human and financial); or, it could include a simpler integration of one particular element of educational support (e.g. recognition and accreditation of teacher training provided by an international organization by national education authorities). Similarly, the “system” could refer to the formal education system and its related education authorities, or it could refer to the system in place at the community level in which students, parents and community members have been involved in and assumed ownership of the educational support provided (e.g. maintenance of newly constructed or rehabilitated school buildings). The concerted focus on integration into the system that was apparent throughout the survey responses may stem from the headquarters’ perspective that these educational experts have in common. As previously stated, these critical factors will be used as a frame of reference in the presentation and analysis of the case study presented in chapter VI, and will then be combined with the
case study findings to create an overarching conceptualization of sustainability for education programs in the relief-development transition.
Chapter V

SITUATING THE CASE:
ANGOLA, THE STATE OF EDUCATION &
THE TEACHER EMERGENCY PACKAGE (TEP)

Unless the [Angolan] government provides more funds to meet its responsibilities in the reintegration process, returnees and their fellow citizens will be caught in the emergency-to-development gap and see their standard of living deteriorate as international humanitarian assistance dries up (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 38).

Introduction

In order to establish the context for the development of the case study presented in Chapter VI, this chapter presents background information about Angola, the civil conflict that ravaged the country for 27 years, the state of the country’s educational system and the non-formal education program implemented by NRC. The chapter begins with a country overview of Angola and the civil conflict that ignited on the heels of gaining independence from the Portuguese in 1975. This section describes the nature of the conflict that ensued, the ways in which the warring parties exploited the country’s natural resources and the damage exacted on the people of Angola. The second section addresses the state of the Angolan educational system from colonial times to present day. The final section presents the evolution of the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) in the Angolan context as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the core components of this educational program.
Country Overview of Angola

In 1975, Angola gained independence from the Portuguese and ended 14 years of “anti-colonial warfare” waged against the Portuguese by the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) (International Crisis Group, 2003b, p. 1). Despite shared goals to overcome the Portuguese, these various groups never coalesced (Bethke and Braunschweig, 2003, p. 3). On the heels of independence, internal conflict—primarily between the government-backed MPLA, which was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba and led by José Eduardo dos Santos who became president in 1979, and rebel-led UNITA, which was backed by the United States and South Africa and led by Jonas Savimbi—ensued (International Crisis Group, 2003b, p. 2). The MPLA-UNITA conflict was exacerbated by “ethnic and racial diversity, geography, Cold War politics and outside designs on its natural resources” (International Crisis Group, 2003b, p. 2). Though scantly referred to in the literature, the ethnic and racial tensions between tribes apparently resulted from the Ovimbundu’s tribal affiliations with the UNITA rebels and both group’s geographical location and dominance in the central highlands versus the Kimbundu’s tribal affiliations with the government and geographical location in and around the capital of Luanda (Moorhouse and Cheng, 2005). This tension appears to have arisen as a result of colonialism as “the virulence of rivalry...was profoundly rational and economic and had no roots in ethnic history” since these groups experienced little interaction “except through the colonial nexus” (Birmingham, 2002, p. 140). According to Malaquias (2007), however, who
devoted considerable attention to the issues of national identity and ethnicity in his book *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post-Colonial Angola:*

What divided the nationalist groups was their inability to move beyond their national identity differences. Some elements of their identity, like ethnicity, predated colonialism while others like region and class were exaggerated, if not created, by the colonial regime (p. 169).

During fieldwork in Angola, several participants in this study commented that MPLA and UNITA had exaggerated ethnic divisions in order to generate civilian support for the conflict (Field notes, March 18, 2007), thereby "politicizing ethnicity" (Malaquias, 2007, p. 177).

Several attempts throughout the 1990s to negotiate cease-fire agreements and peace accords, as well as to carry out national elections, failed with the resumption of fighting between the MPLA and UNITA. In 1991, the Bicesse Accord created an environment in which democratic elections were carried out under the supervision of the UN. When the MPLA won a tight race in 1992, Jonas Savimbi called the process fraudulent and reignited the war, the next two years of which proved to be more violent than preceding years. Despite Savimbi's antics, he continued to receive support from the United States, although relations became strained in the final years. In 1994, another peace agreement in the form of the Lusaka Protocol was signed and brought relative peace until 1998 when UNITA aggrivated the situation once again (Bethke and Braunschweig, 2003, p. 3). These unsuccessful efforts to sustain peace can be attributed to the fact that the "[w]arring parties relied heavily on revenues from natural resource exploitation [from oil and diamonds] to not only fund their wars but also to build up massive personal fortunes, to the extent that economic motives...crowded out any initial
political motives” (Lwanda, 2003, p. 23). Both sides’ greed and exploitation of natural resources are explained in further detail below.

From 1997 on, UNITA grew weaker. This was a result of “the government’s pressure, the impact of sanctions [on diamonds which they used to finance their efforts, as well as fuel and arms] and the unrelenting harshness of life in the bush” (International Crisis Group, 2003a, p. 3). The rebel movement ultimately folded when government forces killed Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s leader, in February 2002. Although widespread fighting has not resumed since the 2002 cease fire signed after Savimbi’s death, the legacy of war in Angola, which left one million people dead, displaced over a third of the population, and riddled the country with landmines will take years to reconcile. Many of those individuals and communities directly affected by the conflict are still trying to relocate and resettle.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

A third of Angola’s population—4.1 million people—were officially recognized as displaced in 2003 (Carvalho, 2003).\(^\text{10}\) Approximately one half of these IDPs were children under 15 (Watchlist, 2002). The United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which were designed to respond to the specific needs of affected individuals and populations in these circumstances, were adopted by the Angolan government; however, accounts of “forced relocation of IDPs by the government” and other infractions have been widely reported (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002, p. 5). A

\(^{10}\) Population statistics vary across sources and because no census has been conducted in Angola since 1970, all estimates are speculative. The U.S. State Department suggests that the population is no less than 15.5 million (2007).
joint IDP assessment carried out by the UN and the Angolan government in 2005 found that approximately 91,000 people remained displaced. The majority of these IDPs have temporarily settled with families and friends in Cabinda,11 Huila, Cuando Cubango, Luanda and Moxico provinces, or in villages en route to their final destination. The obstacles to their return consist of non-existent infrastructure and basic services as well as inaccessibility to arable land due to the presence of mines in the areas they once called home. These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that a high proportion of the IDPs are “poor and food-insecure families” (Global IDP Project, 2005b, p. 1). The few who have remained in the IDP camps continue to suffer from poor health, lack of adequate water and sanitation facilities, and limited to non-existent educational offerings. The “non-recognition by the government of the IDP populations and camps as part of surrounding communities” paints a bleak picture of the realities of the remaining IDPs and explains, to some extent, the lack of a clear plan for the final stages of resettlement.

For the large number of IDPs who have resettled since 2002, the formal demobilization efforts which accompanied these processes have not included boys and girls under the age of 17 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). According to the Human Rights Watch Report, this is extremely disconcerting given that many of the child soldiers “carried out the same duties as adults during the conflict” and were forced to commit dreadful acts against others (2003). Although the number of children who fought with UNITA and MPLA have not been confirmed, unofficial estimates state that

11 The situation in Cabinda, “an oil-rich Angolan enclave situated on the coast between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo,” has remained tenuous since the 2002 ceasefire agreement. Although the government has been “successful in dispersing the rebels,” the civil population was gravely affected in the process through “summary executions, rape, torture, destruction of property and pillaging of villages, mainly by government forces.” There are currently 23,000 IDPs in this province who are either staying with friends/family or have set up their own temporary shelters (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 2).
approximately 7,000 child soldiers may have served between the two primary antagonists while other reports claim as many as 14,000 (Watchlist, 2002). Whether or not these children served as porters, cooks, spies, fighters or sexual slaves of soldiers, their experiences require culturally appropriate and ongoing emotional and psychosocial support. The country’s vast natural resources and simultaneous inability to assume responsibilities for its citizens is a tragic contradiction.

**Angola’s Natural Resources and Corruption**

Angola's natural resources were exploited during the armed conflict and the revenues from diamonds and oil, in particular, filled both the MPLA and UNITA coffers. A corrupt wartime economy, involving the national oil company known as SONANGOL, created a financial system into which money flowed but never appeared in the accounting records. According to Malaquias (2007), the oil revenues disappeared into a “Bermuda triangle” comprising...SONANGOL, the president’s office, and the central bank’ (p. 230). A study conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that during the last five years of the war (1997-2002) at least $4 billion simply disappeared (IMF, 2003).

This pervasive corruption continues today and is evident by the fact that approximately 17 percent of Angola’s budget is earmarked for unidentified “special use” (IRIN, 2006, p. 1). Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which surveys “perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts” ranks Angola 147th out of 179 countries with an overall score of 2.2 on
a 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) scale; Angola shares this ranking with Guinea-

Despite these deeply entrenched corruptive practices, Angola’s oil resources have
attracted the interest of investors in recent years as well as during the country’s most
intensive fighting. Despite the conflict and atrocities committed against the Angolan
population, the country’s Gross Domestic Product was significantly better than most
other African countries at the same time (Ferguson, 2006). This type of growth can be
attributed to off-shore oil production facilities that were insulated from the fighting and
destruction carried out within the country’s physical land borders. Today, China has
appeared on the scene as one of the most powerful investors and developers in the
country. China has invested heavily in Angola and since 2004 has granted the country
between $8 and $12 billion in loans for which credit was secured against future oil
production (LaFraniere, 2007). This arrangement tends to be the type that the IMF and
other donors do not support due to the risky nature of using future production to bankroll
current budgetary needs. China’s “doctrine of noninterference,” aid without
“conditionality,” and foreign policy that “respects African countries’ independent choice
of the road of development” allows it conveniently to defend its business relationships
with questionable recipient countries (Traub, 2006, p. 77). In fact, these arrangements
have allowed Angola to become “China’s second largest trade partner in Africa and, after
Saudi Arabia, is China’s second largest supplier of oil” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 237). These
growing investments, however, have not yet led to significantly improved conditions for
the average Angolan citizen as the majority of governmental officials are more
preoccupied with how to protect their financial gains without the convenience of a civil conflict to mask their activities.

Poverty

The contradictions between the country’s vast natural resources and its sheer poverty are stark. The latest United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), which draws upon data from 2005 and attempts to measure “average progress of a country in human development,” assigns Angola an HDI of 0.456 and ranks it 162nd out of 177 countries (2007). The HDI is calculated by compiling statistics on life expectancy, literacy and education, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. To place the data for Angola in context, Table III compares Angola with the highest and lowest ranked countries in terms of overall HDI as well as across the individual dimensions used to calculate the composite HDI.

Table III: Human Development Index 2005 and Related Dimensions (Angola vs. Highest/Lowest Country Rankings per category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI value</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (in years)</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older)</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st. Iceland (0.968)</td>
<td>1st. Japan (82.3 years)</td>
<td>1st. Georgia (100.0)</td>
<td>1st. Australia (113.0)</td>
<td>1st. Luxembourg (60,228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162nd. Angola (0.456)</td>
<td>174th. Angola (41.7 years)</td>
<td>109th. Angola (67.4)</td>
<td>170th. Angola (25.6)</td>
<td>128th. Angola (2,335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177th. Sierra Leone (0.336)</td>
<td>177th. Zambia (40.5 years)</td>
<td>139th. Burkina Faso (23.6)</td>
<td>172nd. Niger (22.7)</td>
<td>174th. Malawi (667)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007)
The 67.4 percent literacy rate for the total population can be disaggregated for literacy rates among men and women respectively: 82.9 percent and 54.2 percent (U.S. State Department, 2007). The education sector will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

UNDP calculates two other statistics in relation to the HDI, which include the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) and the Gender-related Development Index (GDI). The HPI-1 "focuses on the proportion of people below a threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as the human development index." The HPI-1 value for Angola, 40.3, ranks it 89th among 108 developing countries for which the index has been calculated. The GDI also uses the same dimensions as the HDI, but was constructed to capture inequalities in achievement between women and men. Angola’s GDI value, 0.439, should be compared with its HDI value of 0.456. Its GDI value is 98.4 percent of its HDI value which means that out of the 157 countries with both HDI and GDI values, 114 countries have a better ratio than Angola’s (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). These data are unable to provide a comprehensive analysis of the human development realities in Angola, but do provide a quantifiable illustration of the challenges facing the Angolan citizenry.

**Current Challenges**

According to Munslow, a political scholar who has written extensively about Angola:

The country has been trying to undergo three transitions simultaneously, that from war to peace, from single-party rule to multiparty democracy and from a command-based to a free-market economy (1999, p. 551).
Within the transition from war to peace, the primary challenge for Angola is the return and reintegration of ex-combatants and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Within the former UNITA group alone, 105,000 fighters with as many as six civilian dependents per individual need to be reintegrated (International Crisis Group, 2003b). In addition, there are still tens of thousands of recognized IDPs who must be resettled, a process which also entails extensive, ongoing and well coordinated de-mining efforts of the country’s roads and potentially livable areas. In this process, as well as throughout the war, Angola’s government has demonstrated very little concern about “whether individual aid agencies stay or leave and has yet to internalise the strategic importance of building support through the provision of basic human services” (International Crisis Group, 2003a, p. 11). Lack of attention to the ongoing needs of the IDP populations and the equitable provision of basic services to all Angolans has the potential to inflame dissension and plant the seeds for future conflict.

The transition from single-party rule to multiparty democracy will also prove difficult due to the extensive damage done to the political system by President Dos Santos and Savimbi’s “highly personalised form[s] of rule, “extreme forms of centralised government” (Munslow, 1999, p. 551) and patronage systems (International Crisis Group, 2003a). As the country prepares for elections in 2008, and Dos Santos’ renewed interest in running for a final term, it may prove difficult to overcome the “semifunctional oligarchy” which prevails in the country (Traub, 2006, p. 78).

Finally, the transition from a command-based economy hinged on socialist principles and co-opted by a corrupt government to a free-market economy will also prove elusive if Angola’s natural resources continue to be exploited and revenues
unaccounted for by those managing the country’s financial systems. Furthermore, “the agricultural populations in the areas that most strongly supported UNITA [i.e. in the central highlands] are the most seriously affected by economic policies that favour urban areas and [are] the most severely penalized by oil-induced distortions” (International Crisis Group, 2003b, p. 1). In regard to these populations, Angolans’ efforts to re-establish agricultural production are stymied by a general lack of infrastructure in the form of roads and bridges that prevent the transportation of agricultural goods and products to the central markets. The lack of infrastructure and the challenges that accompany it worsen the farther one moves away from the capital and peri-urban areas. The country’s oil production continues only to benefit a small population of governmental officials and elites; this reality is greatly facilitated by the fact that the oil reserves are not located across the country, but rather concentrated off-shore or in the isolated province of Cabinda. According to the International Crisis Group:

Although a renewed war is unlikely, a chronic humanitarian emergency is deepening among displaced populations and demobilised ex-combatants that could create the context for future instability and disaffection (2003b, p. 1).

Despite these enormous challenges and what could be considered a “low-grade humanitarian emergency,” the UN Secretary-General’s Report during the 61st session of the United Nations General Assembly which met in July 2006 stated that Angola has “definitively moved from an emergency and humanitarian assistance phase to a recovery, reconstruction and development phase” (United Nations General Assembly, 2007, p. 2). This statement was made based on the fact that “four years after the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement on 4 April 2002, the consolidation of the peace process is a reality” (p.
2). The next section will discuss the state of Angola's educational system and the ways in which the conflict affected and continue to affect the system's development.

State of Education

Adding to the complexity of the Angolan context is the fact that the country “never had a legitimate universally available education system” (Bethke and Braunschweig, 2003, p. 1). Prior to independence:

Educational facilities were largely limited to [Portuguese] immigrants and, in 1940, the colonial government declared the education of Africans to be “the exclusive responsibility of [Roman Catholic and Protestant] missionary personnel” (Collelo, 1991, p. 1).

Despite efforts by missionaries to develop an educational system for Africans beyond what the Portuguese rulers felt was adequate, “their effects on Angolan society were limited” due to the fact that “the missions were isolated from the mainstream of colonial activity” (Samuels, 1970, p. 127).

After independence in 1975, the nation was consumed by the civil conflict with UNITA and unable to focus attention upon already limited educational opportunities. Despite minimal efforts made by the MPLA to offer education in its controlled and often less affected areas or UNITA’s attempts to create its own curriculum and offer some schooling, the high percentages of children among the internally displaced populations and those recruited by both sides greatly hampered children’s educational opportunities (Bethke and Braunschweig, 2003, p. 3). Although UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, tried to establish a “state within a state, complete with a system of schools,” these efforts were more “propagandistic” than genuine (Collelo, 1991, p. 1). In the case of Angola, “it is
noteworthy that the rebel groups made limited attempts to ensure provision of education in the areas that fell under their control" (World Bank, 2005, p. 4); this fact highlights both groups' obsession with the financial benefits of controlling the country's natural resources (oil for the MPLA and diamonds for UNITA).

According to Watchlist (2002), as of 2002 less than half of Angola's children and youth had access to the country's education system and an estimated 30 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 14 were merely working to survive. A Multiple Indicator Survey conducted by UNICEF and the Angolan government in 2001 estimated that only "56 percent of children of primary school age [are] attending primary school" (Instituto Nacional da Estatística and UNICEF, 2003, p. 9). As this was the last survey of this type conducted in Angola and official enrollment and attendance rates in Angola continue to be difficult to collect, it is most probable that the situation is more dire than expected. The civil conflict's damage and destruction of approximately 4000 schools have also stymied efforts to rejuvenate the educational system upon the cease fire agreement in 2002 (Relief Web, 2004).

Angola is one of 191 countries that adopted the Millennium Declaration in 2000 and committed to achieve universal primary education by 2015. However, the country has many challenges to face in meeting this goal. Government spending on education is one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa with only 2.6 percent of Angola's GDP and 6.4 percent of total government expenditures allocated to education (United Nations Development Programme, 2007). Many teachers are semiliterate, under-prepared and underpaid. Government paid teachers "receive only about $175 a month—an amount that is even more modest than it sounds, because Angola has kept the dollar fixed at an
artificially low exchange rate...[which makes it difficult to] attract better-educated teachers" (Traub, 2006, p. 78). Obstacles presented by poor water and sanitation, opportunity costs for families associated with their children’s school attendance, overcrowded or multi-age classrooms, inexperienced teachers and an overall teacher shortage, inadequate learning materials, too few schools, and child labor prevent many children from attending and completing primary school (UNICEF, 2005). A former Head of Education at UNICEF in Angola, stated that “[n]o sector of society has more influence on other areas than education. It is key to the fulfillment of other human rights. It is at the heart of development” (UNICEF, 2003, p. 1).

The 2005 Millennium Goals Report Summary prepared by the Government of Angola and UNDP states that although great strides have been made to improve and expand access to primary education through school (re)construction and rehabilitation as well as the recruitment of some 30,000 new teachers, “qualitative deficiencies” abound (2005, p. 12). In the Angolan educational system, children typically enter the first level at age six. The reality, however, is that only 22 percent begin school at this age with the majority being older-aged children, and “at least one million primary school age children are out of school, the majority of them being girls” (UNICEF, 2008, p. 1). Worse yet are the dismal completion rates exacerbated by academic failure and drop out. Data for 2002 indicate that only 34 percent of children who started primary school actually completed this first cycle of education (Watchlist, 2002). Since that time, primary school completion rates have only slightly increased to 46 percent (World Bank, 2006). Although efforts have been made to rebuild and construct new schools, many children are trying to learn in temporary structures prepared by their families and communities
(Global IDP Project, 2005a). In response to these realities, the Millennium Goals Summary calls for decentralized management, enhanced supervision capacity, recruitment and training of teachers, a qualitative assessment system and stronger partnerships with national and international organizations as the steps needed to accelerate access and improve school completion by the 2015 target. The Angolan government will need to prioritize its investments in education if it wants to ensure development of this sector, but in the meantime the country continues to face enormous obstacles as it strives to repair the damages of war.

**Education Reform**

The Ministry of Education in Angola launched a reform of the general education system in 2004 in an effort to respond to the country’s major educational challenges, including: unequal access to education for learners; limited to non-existent educational infrastructures (e.g. classrooms and schools); insufficient quality and quantity of teaching personnel; insufficient supply of equipment and instructional materials; weak administrative and pedagogical management of teaching institutions, and the related devaluation of the teaching profession (Grilo, 2006). The implementation of the reform was envisioned as a long-term, phased implementation process that would reinforce the right to compulsory primary schooling, reduce drop out rates and construct and rehabilitate schools. Until 2001, primary schooling only consisted of first through fourth grades, but the Ministry extended the primary system to cover first through sixth grades (see Figure III below).
**Figure III:** Organigram of Angolan Education System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum Age for Admission</th>
<th>Years &amp; Grades</th>
<th>Post-Graduate Education</th>
<th>Graduate Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-28</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Academic Doctoral Degree (4-5 Years)</td>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree: 3 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>University Degree: 4-6 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-25</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Academic Master’s Degree (2-3 Years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Prof. Degree (duration varies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>SECONDARY EDUCATION (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Cycle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>SECONDARY EDUCATION (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Cycle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>PRIMARY EDUCATION (Compulsory; Includes Literacy Education for Adults)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: República de Angola, Ministerio da Educação, 2004)

Unfortunately, instruction in all six grades for primary education has not always been possible throughout the country due to the fact that there are not enough teachers to cover all of these grades, curricular materials have not been distributed to all schools, or a combination of the two (Field notes, March 19, 2007). The next section will look at one international organization’s efforts to ameliorate the numerous challenges facing the educational system in Angola.
**Teacher Emergency Package (TEP)**

The final section of this chapter will provide background details of the case of the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) by introducing the Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) experiences with the TEP in Angola, the ways in which the program has evolved over the past 12 years and the key policy and practical decisions made about TEP’s implementation over the years. Chapter VI will then provide a closer examination of the critical factors that affected and continue to affect the TEP’s sustainability in the transition from a humanitarian relief to development context in Angola.

**Introducing NRC**

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)—an “independent, humanitarian non-governmental organisation which provides assistance, protection and durable solutions to refugees and internally displaced persons worldwide”\(^{12}\)—worked in Angola from 1995 to 2007 in an effort to respond to the humanitarian and early reconstruction needs of the Angolan population caused by the 27-year civil war which ended in 2002. During its 12-year tenure, NRC’s humanitarian activities consisted of camp and transit center operations for refugees and IDPs, including the provision and reconstruction of shelter, latrines and water wells; food and supply distribution; training of health care workers; advocacy, information, counseling and legal assistance for returnees; and emergency education (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002). To guide its work in Angola, NRC established the following exit and phase out criteria:

\(^{12}\) Description provided on the NRC web page: [http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9160690](http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9160690)
• The target group no longer has a need for protection or the kind of assistance that NRC can offer, or these needs are looked after by other organizations;
• NRC lacks access to the refugees or internally displaced persons, or is unable to perform proper programme work;
• The safety situation for the relief workers is indefensible;
• The situation is deadlocked and NRC’s activities cannot materially contribute to change a permanent solution;
• It is not possible to obtain adequate financial, human or other necessary resources to continue the work (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2006, p. 2).

The ongoing humanitarian and educational needs of Angolans caused by the severity and extent of the conflict, coupled with the fact that there were no major impediments regarding NRC’s access to target populations and necessary resources, provided justification for the organization’s continued operations there.

**Origins of the TEP**

The crux of NRC’s education work in Angola during these twelve years was the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP), a non-formal initiative. It entailed a two-pronged objective of “facilitating the entry or re-entry of children and adolescents into the formal [primary] education system” and “providing teachers with intensive training [to] improve their competence” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004, p. 3). The TEP had been developed originally by UNESCO’s Programme for Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction (UNESCO PEER) based in Nairobi. UNESCO PEER developed the TEP for use in Somalia in the early 1990s amidst the country’s civil conflict; it was later applied to refugee populations in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Yemen. The original package developed by UNESCO PEER consisted of a kit of didactic materials and a methodology for teaching basic literacy and numeracy in the
mother tongue of the learners. Specifically, the package consisted of a box containing slates, chalk, erasers, exercise books and pencils for eighty students to be used in two shifts. The teacher’s bag that formed part of the kit contained blackboard paint, brush and a tape measure to enable teachers to create their own blackboard on a wall if necessary; white and colored chalk; pens, pencils, pencil sharpeners and felt markers; ten "scrabble sets" so that teachers could create language and number games for the children; three cloth charts including letters, numbers and multiplication tables; an attendance book; a notebook; and the Teacher Guide, which outlined the pedagogical methods and the content of lessons to develop literacy and numeracy. Teachers were given one-off training of these materials, tools and pedagogy by UNESCO staff. The recruitment of teachers varied significantly by context. The program was used either to “encourage interactive teaching methods” when experienced teachers could be found within the refugee populations, or to train newly recruited teachers when needed (Interview, UNESCO, February 5, 2008). The kit was intended to cover grades one to four and was designed for a six-month period that would phase into a formal textbook-based curriculum.\textsuperscript{13} Given the extended period of time that most refugees spend in camp settings, the original TEP program focused on transitioning to a formal education curriculum in the camp versus physically transferring students and teachers into a formal education system.\textsuperscript{14} UNESCO PEER’s TEP, described as a “school-in-a-box”, was

\textsuperscript{13} Description of UNESCO PEER’s Teacher Emergency Package taken from the UNESCO website: http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13446&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

\textsuperscript{14} According to the World Refugee Survey for 2007, the average length of time that refugees spend in refugee camps is approximately 10 years (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants).
intended as a rapid educational response program during the humanitarian phase of a crisis.

**Adaptation of TEP for the Angolan Context**

In 1995 an education specialist from NRC's headquarters, invited by UNICEF to provide guidance on the development of a rapid educational response program for Angola, conducted a feasibility study on the adaptation of the TEP to the Angolan context. Until that point, UNICEF’s educational response had consisted primarily of the distribution of didactic materials. Upon conclusion of the feasibility study in 1995, UNICEF and NRC decided that NRC would become the lead agency in adapting the TEP to the Angolan context. This decision was supported by the fact that NRC was able to secure funding for the program from the Norwegian government, and that the TEP could serve as the main component of NRC’s education work in Uige province. ¹⁵

To begin the adaptation process, an NRC staff member collaborated with a trainer from UNESCO PEER, staff members from the Angolan Ministry of Education (MOE), curriculum specialists from a local teacher training institute and education colleagues from the UNICEF office in Angola (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998). Once this group decided that the TEP should be adapted for Angola, numerous meetings and drafting sessions were held over an eight-month period. In the preliminary adaptation process, the team of individuals mentioned above preserved the child-centered and participatory methodologies that were central to the original UNESCO PEER program.

¹⁵ At this time, NRC had been asked by UNHCR to provide educational support in Uige province as large numbers of refugees living in the Democratic Republic of Congo were expected to return to this area.
Other departures were made both early on and throughout NRC’s involvement with the TEP in Angola. A cursory overview of these fundamental changes will be provided here as each will be explored more completely later in the chapter. First, at the Angolan Ministry of Education’s request the six-month non-formal education program was extended to align with the formal education sector’s nine-month academic calendar. Second, the one-off teacher training sessions were extended initially to two weeks and later to a modular, in-service format spanning seven weeks in order to respond to the needs of under- and unqualified teachers. Third, a supervisory component was added in an effort to complement the teacher training modules and to provide ongoing in-service support to teachers. Fourth, the target age group for the program was changed in 2002 from 10-13 years old to 12-17 years old in order not to hinder younger children’s direct access to the formal system and to accommodate the enormous backlogs of adolescents and youth who had been out school. Fifth, the kit was devised for 50 children (reduced from 80) and two teachers (rather than two shifts); the teacher-student ratio was set for 1:25 and then increased slightly to 1:30 in the later years. Sixth, additional topics of relevance to the Angolan context were incorporated into the curriculum such as cultural, civic, health and environmental themes (e.g. landmine awareness) as well as physical education. Seventh, traditional Angolan stories and texts were collected to supplement different subject areas. In addition to these fundamental modifications, the adaptation of the TEP also included the following: development of hard copy manuals for trainers and teachers, utilization of pre- and post-training testing, provision of certificates of recognition for the teachers, advocacy efforts by NRC staff in local communities about the importance of schooling, participation by NRC in school (re)construction, production
and procurement locally of school furniture, and advocacy to increase the recruitment and retention of female teachers (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998).

Once the initial adaptation process had concluded, NRC, in collaboration with educators from the Ministry, prepared a presentation about the TEP for UN agencies and other NGOs working in the region in an effort to promote the program as well as recruit additional implementation partners. As part of the implementation of the TEP, a seminar was held in Uige province (one of the most war-affected provinces in the north and the pilot site chosen for the TEP) in order to prepare local education authorities as well as teachers for its implementation. Initial efforts to invite participants from both UNITA and MPLA apparently failed, but were later successful and ultimately led to the TEP’s use in geographical areas controlled by both groups (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998).

As the TEP was being rolled out across different provinces, one of the main challenges was finding qualified teachers. Although the target group for TEP was to be “trained but out-of-work teachers,” it was not always possible to find enough previously trained teachers in the target villages identified for TEP (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998). The Angolan education authorities tried to assist teacher recruitment efforts by requiring unemployed teachers “to serve a period away from home,” but this proved difficult, especially for female teachers (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998, p. 6). As a result, the majority of the teachers recruited were untrained and at the most had completed six to eight years of schooling. Female teachers were accepted with even fewer years of completed schooling. In later years, recruitment of teachers continued to be a challenge as there simply was a dearth of trained teachers in the country. NRC also wanted to avoid drawing teachers away from the formal education system and
subsequently depleting the Ministry of its human resources. Regardless of their educational backgrounds, all participants had to pass a pre-test to be accepted into the training and a post-test to be able to work as a TEP teacher; both tests were created and administered by NRC. It is unclear what the post-test consisted of, but the primary focus of the pre-test entailed the assessment of literacy skills in Portuguese and math (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2000).

The availability of prepared and literate teachers also proved to be a challenge in identifying TEP trainers and supervisors. NRC essentially used the introductory teacher training courses of the TEP program to identify the best-qualified participants and invited them to become trainers or supervisors. Over time the local education authorities became more involved in the selection process as they had more extensive experiences working with these individuals and were able to assess individual strengths more easily.

NRC’s capacity-building efforts relied upon a “train the trainers” approach which continued to be the primary method throughout the implementation phases of the TEP. These efforts in the early years entailed establishing training teams and resource centers in the province in which TEP was being implemented. Due to the continuing conflict in 1998-99 and after much destruction of the TEP training centers and materials in Uige province, the training teams were forced to use the capital, Luanda, as their hub of operations and would travel, security conditions permitting, to the provinces to conduct trainings. Over time multiple cadres of trainers were created at the national, provincial and municipal levels.

As NRC initiated its closing activities at the end of 2007, the final report documented that since TEP’s inception, 212,545 children participated in the one-year
bridging program, 3188 teachers and 525 trainers were trained, 211 new schools were constructed and the program had been implemented in 12 out of 18 provinces (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2007). The timeline below highlights the major accomplishments associated with the TEP’s development over the past 12 years.

**Figure IV: Timeline of TEP’s Development (1995-2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>NRC, Ministry of Education and UNICEF adapt TEP for Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>TEP approved by Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEP implemented in Uige province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>TEP Teacher Training Center opened in Uige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEP implemented in Huambo, Benguela, Malange and Luanda provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>TEP implemented in Bié, Zaire and Mexico provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National team of TEP trainers formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Pedagogical Coordinator recruited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEP implemented in Bengo, Huila and Cuanza Sul provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher training program upgraded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisory courses initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Tripartite agreement between NRC, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of TEP conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>In-service training initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Education assistants established to accompany supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seven-week, in-service teacher training course established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial trainers trained in Cuanza Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>National trainers administer courses in Malanje province for trainers, supervisors and teachers in formal education system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partnership between NRC and IBIS established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEP implemented in Cuando Cubango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisor’s manual created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Schools built in Bié and Huambo provinces in partnership UNICEF and WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEP program revised to span 35 weeks and include environmental studies and human rights modules (in accordance with national education reform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflexive supervision introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Training of trainers course initiated in Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation conducted on TEP graduates in Angola and Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National TEP trainers participated in education reform training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Policy change established permitting TEP graduates to enter 2nd and 3rd grades directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation conducted of TEP in Cuanza Sul province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1100 teachers trained in education reform changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NRC ceases operations in Angola</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2007)
Figure V below illustrates the scope of the TEP program across 12 of the 18 provinces and Table II indicates the duration of TEP in each province.

**Figure V: Map of TEP Sites in Angola**  
(note: * = provinces in which TEP was implemented)
Table IV: Duration of TEP in 12 of 18 Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Duration of TEP:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>1998-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>1998-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huíla</td>
<td>1999-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>1999-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuanza Sul</td>
<td>2000-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuando Cubango</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>2000-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moçico</td>
<td>1999-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uíge</td>
<td>1996-2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Partnerships**

From the very beginning, NRC worked in collaboration with the Angolan Ministry of Education and UNICEF. The nature of these relationships and the challenges that accompanied them are important for understanding the context of the TEP. NRC was the designated lead agency for the TEP; but UNICEF also was actively involved in the early years in its implementation, although not always in cooperation with NRC. According to a report on the history of the TEP in Angola, NRC was at times frustrated with UNICEF and had the impression that “UNICEF wanted to run their own race” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998). This was evident when UNICEF planned training courses with NRC’s trainers without discussing it with NRC in advance (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998). Some of this independence stemmed from the fact that UNICEF, in the early years, counted on more provincial offices located throughout the country from which they were able to launch TEP-related activities, such as identifying and training trainers and teachers. After the first two years of TEP’s implementation in
Angola, the Norwegian government—the main donor for the TEP—requested that UNICEF and NRC collaborate more formally. The two organizations signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 1998 in an effort to coordinate TEP-related tasks and responsibilities (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998). The MOU explained that NRC would be responsible for all training involving the teachers, trainers and supervisors while UNICEF would be responsible for the implementation of the program. These implementation responsibilities consisted of: collaboration with provincial and municipal education authorities regarding selection of teachers and supervisors and integration of TEP students and teachers into the formal education system, distribution of TEP kits and materials for school construction, and at times transportation for TEP supervisors (Johannessen, 2000).

In 2000, a tripartite agreement was signed between NRC, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education in order to strengthen further the collaboration in regard to the TEP; however, the language of the agreement was loosely constructed and cited as a weakness in an evaluation of the TEP carried out in 2000. According to the evaluator, the tripartite agreement “describes a division of responsibilities between the parties, but lacks details on the areas and modes of cooperation” as well as the “the hierarchy between the parties” (Johannessen, 2000, p. 5).

Although NRC and UNICEF had initiated the TEP, the overall goal in terms of sustainability was for the government gradually to assume responsibility for this program. The details for how and when the government would assume these responsibilities were never accounted for clearly in the agreement. In later years, UNICEF began to disengage from its involvement in the TEP, apparently as a result of a de-prioritization of TEP
within the organization’s education portfolio coupled with the fact that they began closing many of their provincial offices throughout the country (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). Despite the formal agreements, challenges among these parties continued and will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

In anticipation of its withdrawal from Angola, NRC also established a formal partnership with IBIS, an “independent Danish development organization”,\(^{16}\) in order to ensure the viability and sustainability of TEP in the country’s transition to development. IBIS began collaborating with NRC in 2003 in order to learn more about the TEP, and in 2005 IBIS assumed sole responsibility for the TEP in the province of Cuanza Sul as part of the transitional process. The decision for IBIS to focus on one province stemmed from IBIS’s inclination “to ensure coverage and depth in a well defined geographical area” as well as “develop synergy” between the two organizations and their ways of implementing the TEP (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). As the tripartite agreement between NRC, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education was already in place, IBIS was considered a “subcontract partner under NRC” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004).

NRC and IBIS established this partnership, a new approach for both organizations, with the objective of “increasing the effectiveness of their assistance and securing more long-term results of their interventions” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). According to a draft of the memorandum of understanding between IBIS and NRC:

IBIS wishes to increase its competence and capacity in emergency interventions in the field of education, so as to become a more effective link between crisis and development.

NRC as a short and medium term actor in conflict situations needs partners that can cooperate in emergency education, overlap in the exit

\(^{16}\) Description provided on the IBIS web page: [http://www.ibis.dk/uk/](http://www.ibis.dk/uk/)
phase and secure continuation of activities and experiences with a more long-term perspective (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004).

Both organizations were interested in leveraging their experiences and partnership in Angola in order to apply them to other conflict-affected countries in the future.

Although the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and IBIS were the principle partners throughout NRC’s work on the TEP in Angola, there were other organizations that contributed to the TEP’s implementation through the years by contributing to professional development and training of TEP personnel, reconstruction of schools, transportation needs, monitoring and evaluation and even small incentives for TEP teachers. Briefly, these included: Norwegian People’s Aid, an international NGO based in Norway; Christian Children’s Fund, an international child protection NGO; FMC-Kongsberg International AG, an Angolan private corporation; International Child Development Program (ICDP), an international NGO based in Norway; INTERSOS, an international, humanitarian NGO based in Italy; World Food Programme; Save the Children (including branches from Norway, Denmark and Sweden), an international humanitarian and development NGO; and Verbo Divino, a local NGO (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2007). The principle donors of the TEP included the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)\(^\text{17}\); the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO); and Statoil, a Norwegian petroleum company.

Due to generous and ongoing support from the Norwegian government, NRC and IBIS were able to carry out two formal evaluations of the TEP, including their

\(^{17}\) NORAD is a directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORAD’s primary functions are to advise the aid administration, provide funding for Norwegian and international development NGOs, and carry out quality assurance and evaluation of Norway’s development co-operation activities (http://www.norad.no/).
partnership. A final assessment is also currently underway in 2008. Further discussion of these organizational partnerships as well as the challenges that accompanied them will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

At this juncture, NRC has ceased its official operations in Angola. TEP activities were phased out at the end of 2006, and all TEP classrooms and schools were incorporated into the formal education system. A small staff remains in Luanda to oversee closing procedures, and negotiations are underway with the Ministry to ensure that all teachers, trainers and supervisors have been transferred into the formal system.

IBIS has also discontinued its work with TEP in 2007, but continues its work in Cuanza Sul with the Provincial Department of Education on a new education program designed to reach out-of-school youth and adults. Evidently, provinces interested in continuing with the TEP have been told by the central Ministry that they are not allowed to do so and that they must focus on the new program (Interview, NRC representative, February 18, 2008). Although the elaboration of the new program is proving frustrating for international organizations working in Angola, it provides the most likely opportunity for certain elements of the TEP to be sustained. The specifics of this national education program are described below.

**The TEP and Angola’s Educational Reform**

As mentioned above, an educational reform process overseen by the Ministry of Education has been underway in Angola for the last few years, the major component of which entailed the extension of the compulsory primary education system from four
grades to six. In addition to this change, the Ministry has recently announced a new literacy and accelerated learning program—*Alfabetização e Aprendizagem Escolar*—for overage students who have missed out on formal schooling (*República de Angola*, 2005). The accelerated learning program, or ALP, which is the component most relevant to this study, consists of six years of schooling compressed into three with the opportunity to transfer to secondary school (grade seven) upon successful completion of the program cycle. The program presents the opportunity for older students to complete a full cycle of primary education. Although the program has been designed for adolescents and youth over 15 years old, students younger than 15 may participate in the first module of the program and then transfer into the appropriate grade within the primary school system.

In the development process for the ALP component, the experiences from the TEP and the expertise from NRC’s staff have been sought. The Pedagogical Coordinator, in particular, has contributed extensively to this process and collaborated regularly with the Ministry of Education. Interestingly, a staff member from IBIS who attended one of the planning sessions in Luanda noted that all of the materials distributed by the Ministry to the participants during the meeting were merely a repackaging of the TEP materials that the Pedagogical Coordinator had supplied during the developmental stages. Whether this was a sign that the Ministry was badly prepared or simply needed to take the credit was unclear (Interview, March 21, 2007). As mentioned above, NRC is also negotiating with the Ministry of Education about the probable absorption of the TEP teachers, trainers and supervisors into the ALP program.

Despite this use of the TEP materials, experiences and human resources, not all of NRC’s suggestions have been taken into consideration. The main source of contention
with this new program entailed the number of hours dedicated to classroom instruction. The ALP calls for 12 hours of instruction per week compared to the 25-30 set forth in the TEP. This has caused much concern not only for NRC, but also UNICEF, both of which acknowledge the contradiction of trying to launch an accelerated program that condenses six years into three with fewer hours of instruction. NRC and UNICEF have expressed their concerns with the Ministry and have tried to advocate for a review of this issue, but the central Ministry has responded by stating that the reduction in hours stems from the lack of available classroom space to accommodate the target number of adolescents and youth they hope to reach with this program—approximately 100,000 students per year. The Ministry has stated that as school construction progresses in the future and more classrooms become available, modifications to the number of hours will be made.

Since the new ALP was announced, the Ministry has made additional modifications. The first module, which encompasses first and second grades, has been scaled back to 10 hours per week over three months and is essentially a literacy program. Despite various international organizations’ objections, it has proved very difficult for them to discuss this issue with the Ministry. As elections have been planned for 2008, this new program has become very political and the Ministry’s interest in reaching a large number of people appears to be trumping the need for quality education (Interview, IBIS representative, February 13, 2008).

Regardless of these issues, the Ministry of Education has called upon support from the various actors and organizations working in Angola to assist with the

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18 The number of hours of instruction for general education courses within the formal education sector total 20 hours per week.
implementation of this program as it does not have enough personnel or resources to manage independently. The Ministry has asked all potential partners, especially NGOs and churches, to submit proposals outlining the ways in which they can help carry out this program. While a diverse range of partnerships will facilitate implementation of the ALP across a wider landscape, the quality assurance issue is a major concern for NRC, UNICEF and others.

Considering the concerns by the international community about Angola’s lack of attention and prioritization for this age group, this new initiative has been welcomed, especially since the Ministry of Education is at the helm (Interview, UNICEF representative, March 30, 2007). Although it is not completely clear how and when the new program will be rolled out, there appear to be legitimate opportunities for NRC to incorporate certain aspects of the TEP and for other organizations, such as IBIS, to contribute to this process. Chapter VI will address the sustainability issue more directly, but first it is important to understand and examine in more detail the teacher training and bridging components that form the core of the TEP program.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of the Teacher Training Program**

Perhaps the program’s name itself, Teacher Emergency Package, is indicative of the fact that the teacher training and related activities were the strongest component of the TEP and received the most attention over the course of the 12 years. The data collected about the teaching and training methodologies, the supervisory aspect of the program and
the overall recognition by education authorities of the program’s strengths and contributions will be discussed here as well as the challenges that arose along the way.

The teaching methodology promoted in the TEP was based upon a child-centered, participatory approach that ran counter to the traditional teacher-centered methodology used in Angola’s formal education system. One TEP trainer described the method by stating that “in the TEP we have a set of participatory methodologies and activities in which the student participates, learns by doing and the teacher just facilitates the understanding of the subject” (Group interview, March 23, 2007). Field observations of a writing lesson during which the students were learning about the letter “p” captured the essence of this method:

After an introduction of the letter “p” by the teacher the students were asked to write the letter on their slates with chalk and hold them up in the air to show the teacher. One female student is invited to the front of the class to show her fellow students the letter on her slate. The teacher helps her trace the big letter “p” written on the blackboard on the front wall because the tail of her “p” is too short and doesn’t exactly look like a “p”. While some children laugh, the teacher gently places his hand on the student’s shoulder and helped the student trace the letter on the blackboard. The teacher then asks all of the students to write a big “p” in the air with their chalk (Field notes, March 19, 2007).

Although classroom observations were limited due to the focus of this project on the organizational level, the strength and effectiveness of the teaching methodology were cited in all of the interviews conducted. One IBIS staff member from headquarters, however, did have a slightly different perspective about the participatory nature of the teaching methodology:

The thing that [the Angolan Ministry of Education has] found most interesting and valuable in TEP has been the teacher training...that the teachers have been able to use [what] some would call participatory methodologies. I have a tendency to call it activity-based methodologies because I think there is a way to go for it to be participatory. But they are
certainly activity-based methodologies and the way I differentiate it is that to me the children are still not asking questions, they are still not exploring a lot of things, but they are actively involved in the learning situation…no doubt about that. So I think there is a way to go to call it a true participatory methodology and I totally acknowledge that you cannot go further with inexperienced teachers with so little training (Interview, November 19, 2007).

The ability to grasp and master a new methodology inevitably takes time. Both the TEP supervisors as well as a provincial Ministry official from the province of Zaire commented on teachers’ initial reluctance or resistance to this new methodology during the training sessions. One of the TEP supervisors stated that:

We work in a terrain that is very traditional since many of the teachers come from the formal schools, so changing the teaching methodologies was a challenge. In the beginning it was very difficult, only later they understood how helpful it was for improving the learning process (Interview, March 23, 2007).

This provincial Ministry official who had also been trained as a TEP supervisor stated that “most of them [the teachers] had no familiarity with the methods of TEP” and that they “were not capable of grasping what was being taught by the TEP” (Interview, March 26, 2007). These participants as well as several others credited the training methodology and supervision used with the teachers as the main factors for overcoming this initial resistance or lack of understanding of the teaching methodology.

As indicated earlier, the TEP training program for the teachers evolved over time from on-the-spot to two weeks and finally to a seven-week in-service format that interspersed training sessions over the course of the academic year. This modular in-service format allowed the teachers to practice what they had learned during one module in the classroom with an opportunity to reflect and ask clarifying questions during the
next training session. This practical approach was applauded by several participants and is captured in the following excerpts:

Another thing about the training, not only the length, is the kind of really practical approach or method of training. The way the training has been done, it's not to teach about, for example, a particular methodology and tell them what methods there are and so on, but about trying to do a model lesson, practicing them together, trying to ask the trainer what do they have problems with, then trying to see how could you do that. They work in groups. One teacher is giving the lesson and the others are observing, so they also learn to analyze what is good, what is not good, and they will discuss it. Very down to the kind of basics, on a very basic level, because these teachers don't have strong academic skills in terms of Portuiguese. They don't know how to write themselves so they need that [additional assistance] (Interview, IBIS Staff member, March 21, 2007).

Similarly:

The teachers started accepting how important it is to consider this particularity of getting to know how to identify what they did during the class and what they did not do during the class. In sum, they started acquiring a reflexivity with which they were correcting their own classes. This is the valuable thing the TEP has brought to the teachers who were involved in the process (Interview, Provincial Ministry official, March 26, 2007).

One TEP teacher who had 15 years of experience in the formal education sector stated that:

After the training with the TEP, now I enter the classroom and have no difficulties. I feel I'm really ready to teach and instruct the children because now I'm aware of the methodology (Interview, March 19, 2007).

In addition to the training approach utilized in the TEP, the supervisory component that was incorporated in 2000 further complemented the training exercises by providing ongoing support for TEP teachers. Typically, supervisors were trained and assigned to a particular province; they strove to visit each TEP teacher twice per month. The supervisors are "responsible for supporting and helping the teachers, ...collecting statistical data in the field, [and] submitting monthly reports" to the Provincial
Departments of Education (Johannessen, 2000). In the beginning there was some hesitation about these visits due to teachers interpreting them more as an inspection than supervision. One TEP trainer commented that in the beginning:

The teachers were very afraid of the inspections and often when they saw us, even if they didn’t have to go over an easier topic they did, and this fact undermined these teachers’ previous plans for the classes. They were afraid of teaching new contents when there were inspectors who might find a mistake (Interview, March 26, 2007).

Over time, the teachers stopped seeing these visits as inspections and “more as a possibility for development” and “sort of continuous training” (Interview, NRC Angola staff member, March 23, 2007). One TEP trainer commented on the development of the supervisory component:

Nowadays, with the intensive supervision, this help is given before the teacher goes to the classroom. We invite the teacher to develop a plan that includes the week in which he or she will teach, the subject that will be taught, etc. We lead these helping activities in a participatory manner and after such help the teacher is invited to go to the classroom. At this point he or she does not feel it is so difficult because of the continuous training (Group interview, TEP Trainer, March 23, 2007).

Another TEP trainer, also a supervisor, who participated in the group interview described another possible approach to supervision:

In the training activities, we have to help the teachers to understand and to elucidate their doubts and difficulties. But when we attend a class with a teacher and the kids we have to help the teachers in planning the classes, giving directions about both the contents and the methodologies. We sit together with the teachers and praise them for the positive points of their job, but at the same time we expose the negative points and give guidance so that they can do their best next time. And if the time allows, we get the chalk and teach the kids so that the teacher remains seated to see how that subject could be better taught. This is another way of helping (Group interview, TEP trainer, March 23, 2007).

The handful of teachers who participated in this study commented positively about the ongoing training and supervisory support that they were offered.
The main challenges associated with the supervisory component entailed the difficulties that some supervisors experienced in reaching teachers assigned to more remote areas within the provinces as roads and transportation continued to be impediments to accessing the various locations in which TEP was being implemented. Supervisors made diligent efforts to reach these teachers either by walking or taking advantage of the bicycles that NRC and its partners provided; but it was not always possible, especially during the rainy season (Group interview, TEP Trainer, March 23, 2007). Likewise, the challenges that the teachers faced by being isolated and alone in remote areas without easy access to supervisors and other support services also proved problematic and worrisome to NRC (Interview, Education specialist, November 7, 2007).

Despite these challenges, the various individuals and staff members involved with the TEP took several steps to ensure that support services were available along the way and at different levels. In addition to the trainers and the supervisors who were on hand to assist the teachers, a Pedagogical Coordinator position was created within NRC’s country office to assist with the overall management of the program and to serve as a technical resource person for the trainers and supervisors.

The compensation of teachers in particular deserves attention given the highly contested nature of this issue in any conflict scenario. Although the government should be ultimately responsible for compensating teachers, the realities in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries are that this is often not possible and that some type of support will be needed to retain teachers and other education personnel. Guidance in regard to this critical issue recommends that international organizations providing teacher compensation do the following: offer compensation that is comparable with
governmental pay scales in order to facilitate transfer of responsibility to the government in the future; harmonize the provision of salaries or incentives with other international actors in order to avoid competition and inflation in compensation that the government will neither be able to support nor maintain in the future; and consider the long-term impact of their actions (UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2006).

In the case of Angola, NRC initially decided to compensate the teachers during the one-year TEP program which entailed approximately one-half of the salary of a formal education teacher in the Angolan system. NRC’s decision to compensate the teachers was based on the following objectives: to improve retention of teachers; to reduce loss of an organizational investment in training courses; to provide some level of relief for teachers; and to apply equitable policies when other national staff working with NRC or other NGOs were being paid for their services (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998). Despite NRC’s noble efforts to carefully compensate teachers with the limited resources they had, there was evidence of individuals entering the program for the sole reason of collecting a salary; an occurrence that is unfortunately quite common in these settings (UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2006). There was occasional evidence of local education officials being bribed to nominate certain individuals to participate in the program (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998).

Fortunately, these incidences were few and far between. Gradually, the Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for compensating the teachers, which was a major accomplishment for NRC and the TEP. The assumption of this responsibility by the

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19 The actual amount of money that this entailed at the time could not be confirmed. Today, formal education teachers earn approximately $180 US dollars per month (Field notes, March 18, 2007). In the early stages, the World Food Programme also provided food support to TEP teachers as an additional incentive.
Ministry of Education inevitably helped garner additional support for and recognition of the program and would bode well for the absorption of TEP teachers back into the formal education once NRC began to close down its operations in Angola. All of the trainers as well as the Pedagogical Coordinator were paid by NRC, while some of the supervisors received support from both NRC and the Ministry of Education when and if they performed multiple roles at the provincial level (e.g. including both the duties of TEP supervisor and school inspector for formal education system).

Additional details about the teacher training program will be provided in Chapter VI, but all in all this component of the TEP proved to be quite successful throughout TEP’s implementation in Angola. The bridging program for students, however, proved to be more problematic.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of Bridging Program for Students**

As previously mentioned, the TEP had a two-pronged objective; it not only trained teachers, but it also served as a bridging program that granted children who missed out on or never benefited from schooling the opportunity to re-enter or enter the formal education system. Through the data collection, analysis and document review processes for this study, it became clear that the subordinate component of the TEP was the bridging program for students. The main reasons for this subordinate position stemmed from a shifting policy regarding in which geographical areas the TEP would be implemented, the decision to change the target age group from 10-13 to 12-17 years old,
and the inability to track the students and measure their academic progress once they had completed the TEP and entered the formal education system.

In order to complement the formal education system rather than compete with or overshadow it, NRC prioritized the implementation of the TEP in remote and rural areas that had no schools. When the primary objective of TEP was to serve as a bridge into the formal system the inability of the government to provide formal schools in these areas in a timely fashion proved problematic. In certain instances, NRC agreed to train the teachers to provide a second year of the TEP under the condition that the local communities would assume responsibility for covering teachers’ salaries or providing an incentive. The dilemma generated by this situation was short-lived in the early years as a resurgence of fighting interrupted NRC’s efforts in these particular areas. Nevertheless, NRC recognized the longer-term implications of trying to implement a bridging program in remote areas lacking formal schools (Interview, NRC headquarters’ staff member, April 15, 2007). Even in areas that did have public schools available, the formal education system may have consisted only of the first and second grades. Therefore, if a student had been successful in the TEP and exhibited competencies at the end of the program that would have merited a transfer into the third grade, there were no formal classrooms at that level to accommodate the student (Interview, IBIS staff member, March 21, 2007). The extent of this problem was unclear, but these realities led NRC to shift its policy and only implement the TEP in communities that had schools available or within walking distance for the students.

Ironically, the reverse of this situation became true in the later years as a result of the recognition of the TEP’s success both for the students and the teachers involved with
the program. A staff member from IBIS headquarters captured the dilemma in the following excerpt:

There were some parents saying why should we put our children in the normal school if they can go to TEP and then jump to class three or whatever. And teachers…why should they still teach in the formal school if they can go to TEP and only have 30 children in the classroom, get some supervision, in-service [training] and a bicycle and so on and so forth (Interview, November 19, 2007).

In the later years, as more and more TEP teachers were being incorporated onto the government payroll, the temptation among teachers working in the formal education system to work with TEP was understandable.

As a result, IBIS decided in recent years to focus its attention on the most remote and rural areas within the Cuanza Sul province in which no educational facilities existed. This policy change was initiated in order to alleviate the drain on the formal education system caused by teachers abandoning their classrooms and students already enrolled in the formal system transferring into the TEP. This change was made despite the recognized need for broader implementation of the program due to the high number of young people who remained out of school in the province and the problems that students in the remote areas inevitably would face once they had completed the TEP year and had no formal schools into which to transfer. To combat the latter, IBIS urged the local education authorities to provide teachers and schools in these remote areas, an effort they hope will come to fruition by the time the students need to make the transition into the formal system. These examples illuminate the complexity of the challenges that can develop when a program is set up in a parallel, albeit complementary, fashion to the formal education system.
Another challenge associated with the student component of the TEP was the decision to change the target age range for students. During the initial years of the TEP the program was geared for younger children without any schooling; but in 2002 NRC staff in Angola, in consultation with UNICEF and the Ministry of Education, decided to target older students 12-17 years of age. This change was made “to avoid [enrolling] the youngest children who were really supposed to be in the normal school” (Interview, NRC headquarters’ staff member, April 15, 2007). Other interviewees throughout this study commented on the lack of a youth policy within the Ministry of Education in Angola, which may have also influenced this decision to alter the target age group in order to accommodate the backlog of older children who had missed out on schooling and for whom no other viable alternatives were available. Several participants questioned the appropriateness of the TEP for this age group given the overall objective of creating an entrée into the primary school level of the formal education system. According to the NRC staff member at headquarters, even if the students had been successful in leveraging the TEP to enter the upper grades, “I don’t think there are many fifteen or seventeen-year-olds who are going to go through that” (Interview, April 15, 2007).20 A qualitative study conducted by the Christian Children’s Fund about perceptions of education in Angola discovered that older children and adolescents who had missed out on schooling were hesitant to return to the classroom and felt that they were too old to go school (Robson, 2006). Because there was not a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system in place to trace TEP graduates once they transitioned to the formal education

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20 TEP students were only prepared to enter 1st, 2nd or 3rd grade of the formal education system upon completion of the program.
system, NRC and its partners did not have sufficient data to assess the progress of these students.

There was consensus across several interviewees in this study that this age group needed a different program more tailored to their needs that would involve literacy and numeracy, but also skills training. On the contrary, however, with such a high demand for education and the lack of alternatives those individuals responsible for coordinating the TEP found it impossible to turn away the older students when they started showing up at the doors of the TEP classrooms (Interview, IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007). After the policy change, 10 and 11 year old students were still allowed to join TEP if there were not enough students in the 12-17 target group or enough schools in the area in which they could enroll (Johannessen, 2006).

The desire to provide learning opportunities to children, adolescents and youth covering a wide age range created challenges with regard to mixed-age classrooms despite the quality control mechanisms put into place regarding teacher-student ratios that were initially 1:25 and then increased slightly to 1:30. The predominant strategy in mixed-age classrooms was to assign students to work in groups that were organized by age. A TEP supervisor in Quibala illustrated the point of this strategy:

We can’t place a child with an older one, so that the latter doesn’t bully the former. We group children who are close in age in a single group and we place those with median age in another group so they can work freely (Interview, March 19, 2007).

Apart from this logical strategy, the TEP teachers and supervisors were not able to identify any other strategies for confronting this challenge, but they did point out that mixed-age classes also permeated the formal system due to the high percentage of students who repeated grades. Interviewees commented that the formal education
teachers did not use group work as a strategy as it did not form part of the teaching methodology traditionally used in the formal system. Although the age range was adjusted to accommodate older students, there were no significant changes made to pedagogy and content of the TEP by NRC and its partners.\textsuperscript{21} In fact, the TEP was considered applicable for a wide age range, including adults (Norwegian Refugee Council, 1998).

The greater challenge associated with the bridging program entailed the difficulties from the very beginning of tracking students’ progress once they completed the TEP and entered the formal education system. These difficulties stemmed primarily from three factors: resistance as well as a weak administrative system within the Ministry of Education, the mobility of students and their families and the drop out rates of students in general. The resistance within the Ministry of Education, including the provinces and municipalities in which the TEP was implemented, stemmed from the Ministry wanting to avoid the perception that TEP graduates were getting any “special treatment” once enrolled in the formal system (Johannessen, 2005, p. 14). According to an evaluation conducted on TEP students, “this attitude…was related to the political situation in Angola where unity and reconciliation [were] core components” (Johannessen, 2005, p. 14). TEP graduates were to be considered no different than any other student in the formal system. Although the Ministry has recognized the sizeable investment made in the TEP over the years and is aware of the final evaluation to be carried out in 2008, this attitude coupled with the Ministry’s inability to assume greater administrative

\textsuperscript{21} Although one reference was found in the evaluation report of former TEP students that stated that the “TEP curriculum has been updated to allow TEP students to qualify for entrance in grade 4,” there are no specifics about what this process entailed other than the inclusion of an “integrated sciences” module to align more closely with the national education reform (Johannessen, 2005, p. 13).
responsibility in this area have made it impossible for the Ministry at its various levels to commit to any type of systematic tracking process.

Whereas the primary objective of the TEP was to “facilitate and prepare over-aged children and youth for entering or re-entering the formal system,” NRC’s work was finished once the students had completed the TEP and were transferred (Interview, NRC representative, February 10, 2008). NRC and IBIS did initiate a few attempts to track TEP graduates once they entered the formal system, but these efforts did not happen until 2005 and 2006, almost 10 years after the initial launch of the TEP in Angola. Although the statistics of students throughout their tenure with the TEP were very thorough, including information about drop out rates and which grade they qualified for within the formal system, the statistics regarding their transition to the formal education system were either non-existent or inaccurate given the education authorities’ resistance or inability to participate in the tracking process (Johannessen, 2005). During a group interview, TEP supervisors in Luanda discussed the difficulties of evaluating students’ progress without support from the local education authorities. As one stated:

[I]t is very difficult to find the students who attended the TEP...because they are all spread out...so it is necessary to walk all around, to pass by each school and by each classroom to see if we can find any of those first students and check at what level they are. It’s not an easy thing. It is a challenge that demands patience, courage and contact with the directors of each school and with the students themselves (Group interview, TEP supervisor, March 23, 2007).

An additional challenge related to this issue is that students were able to decide which school they would attend. While this freedom of choice was beneficial for the students and their families, it added another level of complexity in tracking their enrollment and progress within the formal education system (Johannessen, 2005).
Even at this late stage and only upon request by NRC has there been an informal agreement with the Provincial Department of Education in Cuanza Sul to facilitate the tracking process by placing an asterisk next to the names of the students who participated in TEP and who are now on the formal system’s enrollment and attendance rosters (Interview, NRC headquarters’ staff member, April 15, 2007). Cuanza Sul was chosen due to IBIS’ continued presence in the province and their ability to maintain communication with the provincial and municipal education authorities. Whether or not the Provincial Department of Education has followed through with this request is unknown, but the researchers contracted to conduct the 2008 evaluation of the TEP will follow-up in the near future (Interview, NRC representative, February 10, 2008).

If a monitoring and evaluation system, however rudimentary, had been implemented effectively, efforts to identify and track TEP graduates in many cases would have been challenged by the mobility of students and their families as well as the drop out rates that were and continue to be endemic to the Angolan education system. The mobility factor has been fairly steady over the years due to the extensiveness of internal displacement caused by the war and families’ efforts to move back to their communities of origin as different parts of the country opened up and became accessible following reconstruction efforts. In recent years, families’ mobility can also be attributed to their efforts to find more secure employment opportunities or as a result of parental separation (Johannessen, 2005).

Student drop out posed another challenge to efforts to track students after their enrollment in TEP. The lack of data from the education authorities made it impossible to determine when TEP graduates dropped out and why, thereby making any analysis
speculative at best. Although an education adviser working with IBIS in Cuanza Sul stated that TEP graduates dropped out less frequently than non-TEP students once in the formal system, there were no quantifiable data available to support this statement (Interview, Wednesday, March 21, 2007). Regardless, the attrition rates and nonexistence of well formulated statistics added another level of complexity to any efforts to track students.

The reality of these challenges, however, did not justify the fact that more emphasis was not placed upon the establishment of a systematic and continuous tracking system, especially considering the longevity and expansiveness of the TEP in Angola. Given the objectives of this program to create an entrée to the formal education system vis-à-vis the use of child-centered pedagogy, it was important to understand the impact of this program on students’ learning and success rates in the formal system. Throughout the interviews conducted, the education staff, TEP supervisors and Ministry staff echoed these concerns and expressed their frustration with the lack of data available on TEP graduates. They felt that it was a missed opportunity to understand the impact of the TEP on students’ overall academic achievement and formal schooling completion rates. The recommendations generated through the informal evaluations that were conducted of TEP graduates stated that the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating TEP students’ progress in the formal education system ultimately fell to NRC and that they should be responsible, financially and administratively, for overseeing this process (Johannssen, 2005; Antoni, 2006).

Despite these fundamental challenges, the TEP teachers and supervisors interviewed in Quibala, Cuanza Sul made positive comments about the TEP’s approach
and offered examples of its impact on student learning. One TEP teacher, a former teacher within the formal system, remarked that students in the TEP classroom learned faster and had a better understanding of the learning process. One of the TEP supervisors provided the following example:

A child is in regular school for three years and is unable to read anything. With the TEP, a child who completes a year is already able to write letters, read some documents and make some interpretations. So, in my opinion, I think the TEP is good, it’s a good methodology and helps a lot in children’s growth and development. (Interview, March 19, 2007).

Although the focus of this study was not on students’ academic achievements per se, it is clear that this type of limited, anecdotal evidence is insufficient for comprehensive evaluation or impact assessment purposes. There was some optimism that a more systematic effort could be put into place, particularly in Cuanza Sul where IBIS would continue to work and would be able to maintain relations with the municipal and provincial departments of education over the coming years after NRC’s withdrawal. The strengths and weaknesses of the TEP described here will provide the background for examining the question of sustainability of this program in Chapter VI.
Chapter VI

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL FACTORS FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

This study set out to identify the critical factors that affect the sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development in post-conflict countries. To help analyze questions of sustainability, this chapter will present a case study, situated within the larger vertical case study for this project, of the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) that was implemented in Angola from 1995-2007 by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and other partner organizations. The TEP provides a rich example for this type of analysis due to the longevity of the program's implementation in Angola, which spanned the acute emergency and post-conflict phases; and the efforts that NRC made to transfer the TEP to other capable partners, including the government and IBIS, as the country moved towards development and the organization planned to withdraw from the country. Specifically, this chapter will encompass the critical factors related to the following: the responsiveness of the program to the Angolan context; the relationships between NRC and the Ministry of Education as well as other international organizations; the role of civil society and local communities; and finally, the coordination across all actors and organizations engaged with this program. This chapter will conclude by exploring what
sustainability looks like for a program such as the TEP, which aspects are being transferred or leveraged in the transition to development as well as what steps could have been taken to ensure a more effective transition.

The analytical lens used to examine evidence of sustainability for the TEP in the Angolan context was informed by the literature on sustainability presented in Chapter II, albeit limited, and the findings that emerged from the survey of educational experts in Chapter IV. Drawing upon these two resources enabled the examination of sustainability to encompass a wide spectrum of possibilities that included the complete transfer of an intact educational program to the Ministry of Education on the one hand, or the ways in which the ideas and principles framing an educational program infiltrated the system and informed educational policy on the other. This approach was taken in an effort not to rule out any possibilities or underestimate more discrete evidence of sustainability.

**Responsiveness of TEP to Needs of Angola**

From the beginning, NRC took the necessary steps to adapt the TEP to the Angolan context by collaborating with the Angolan Ministry of Education, a local teacher training institute and UNICEF in the modification and translation processes. From that point onward, they made considerable additions and adjustments over the years to accommodate the evolving needs of the country, particularly with respect to the capacity building of teachers and other education personnel in Angola. Although it ultimately proved problematic, the decision to change the target age group was a well-intentioned effort to respond to the country’s needs and the lack of educational alternatives for the
nation’s youth. In addition to developing the teacher training more fully, adding a supervisory component and accommodating youth more centrally, the program also responded to changes brought about in the Ministry’s education reform. As a result, the TEP curriculum and training sessions were revised to incorporate the topics prioritized in the reform including human rights, HIV/AIDS awareness and integrated sciences. Moreover, NRC included national, provincial and municipal education authorities in the decision-making process throughout TEP’s implementation in Angola. This continued responsiveness and inclusion was valued by various individuals associated with the program. According to one interviewee:

The whole organic process that has taken place in TEP…it’s like TEP has become an approach, an approach where the local people have developed it and have been able to change it, depending on what they see in the field. The education advisor, the trainers of NRC go to the field, they work with the supervisor, they go back, they plan, and they make the systems around that. That’s one of the really strong parts (Interview, IBIS staff member, March 21, 2007).

Similarly, another interviewee commented on NRC’s predisposition to learn from its experiences with the TEP and make changes as necessary:

They have learned from their experience…it’s not the same program today that it was 10 years ago…it would have been totally a mistake to use a basic program over the years…I think that is an advantage…it means that they have learned from experience…I think that is good (Interview, Education specialist, Wednesday, November 7, 2007).

One of the education authorities from the municipal Ministry of Education in Quibala, Cuanza Sul commented positively that the TEP had been successful due to the “ground up approach” and the “practical management” exercised by NRC over the years. He also felt strongly that the simple fact that the program had not been “derailed” was a testament to its strength as he had seen many other initiatives come and go over the years.
in Angola (Interview, March 19, 2007). Despite these positive observations of the TEP, challenges did arise over the years, primarily in regard to the change in the age range for the student target group and the appropriateness of TEP in the later years once the country began to transition to development.

As discussed in Chapter V, NRC adjusted the target age group from 10-13 to 12-17 years old in accordance with the Ministry of Education’s request; however, at certain times the usefulness of the program for this age group began to be questioned by education practitioners familiar with the program. An IBIS headquarters’ staff member stated the following:

I must say it’s also a question of whether TEP fulfills the needs of 12-year-old or 14-year-old children because they go to TEP and then to grades two or three because they haven’t had what they needed for entering [higher grades] concerning environmental education, life skills or whatever it is. A lot of things were needed for them to be able to enter higher grades that [was] not part of the curriculum of TEP so you know they couldn’t go further than grade three and it is difficult for a 14-year-old to enter grade three [or lower] and for the other children in the class (Interview, November 19, 2007).

In response to this concern, the TEP curriculum was updated in recent years to include environmental sciences, human rights and HIV/AIDS awareness as mandated by the Ministry’s education reform, thereby creating the opportunity for TEP graduates who performed well academically to transfer into the fourth grade. Prior to this change, there also was an opportunity for TEP graduates to take a test administered by the Ministry to determine whether or not they could be placed into the fourth grade. Table V captures the number and percentage of students who placed into the formal education system upon completion of the TEP.
Table V: Overview of TEP Graduates’ Placement into the Formal Education System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Students Enrolled in TEP MF F</th>
<th>Students Evaluated End of TEP MF F</th>
<th>Eligibility for Formal Education System 1st Grade MF F 2nd Grade MF F 3rd/4th Grades MF F</th>
<th>Eligibility by Percentage 1st 2nd 3rd/4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1425 916</td>
<td>1375 880</td>
<td>575 360 448 357 352 143</td>
<td>41.8 32.6 25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5375 3893</td>
<td>4879 2987</td>
<td>2872 1221 1087 768 920 998</td>
<td>58.9 22.3 18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7858 4680</td>
<td>5101 2980</td>
<td>2080 1108 1734 1036 1287 836</td>
<td>40.8 34.0 25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>19088 12555</td>
<td>15453 10377</td>
<td>7313 4977 5176 3261 2964 2139</td>
<td>47.3 33.5 19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20125 9382</td>
<td>12284 5513</td>
<td>5122 2298 4042 1835 3120 1380</td>
<td>41.7 32.9 25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17953 7851</td>
<td>12232 5423</td>
<td>4645 2216 4097 1855 3490 1352</td>
<td>38.0 33.5 28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>20171 8932</td>
<td>12659 5663</td>
<td>4415 2228 4292 1842 3952 1593</td>
<td>34.9 33.9 31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15147 6973</td>
<td>11860 5490</td>
<td>3625 1716 4043 1953 4292 1821</td>
<td>30.3 33.8 35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>23264 11137</td>
<td>17121 8008</td>
<td>5138 2512 5846 2883 6137 2613</td>
<td>30.0 34.1 35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>29274 14439</td>
<td>21097 9968</td>
<td>6483 3124 7322 3475 7292 3369</td>
<td>30.7 34.7 34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28124 12542</td>
<td>23013 11013</td>
<td>0 0 13324 6717 9771 4296</td>
<td>0.0 57.5 42.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Norwegian Refugee Council, 2007, p. 15)

In the early years (1996-2002) when the target age range for students was 10-13 years old, more students were qualifying for the first grade. Although more students were qualifying for the higher grades (second, third and fourth) from 2002-2006 once the age range had been changed to 12-17 year olds, the distribution of students across all the grades was comparable. The decision agreed to by NRC and the Ministry in 2006 to place TEP graduates automatically in second grade or higher is evident in that no students were placed in the first grade that year. Unfortunately, the data collected neither reflect the ages of the students for each class nor separate third grade from fourth grade making it difficult to determine how many older students placed into the lower versus the higher grades. The lack of data on the students once they transferred to the formal system renders it impossible to determine the degree to which their placement may have affected their decisions to continue schooling, especially if older students placed into the lower grades.

Despite reform-based curricular adjustments and the opportunity to take a placement test, an IBIS staff member expressed concern about the program’s overall
appropriateness at this juncture. She felt that the Ministry’s endorsement of the program did not necessarily signify that it continued to be relevant:

Of course TEP is good, but I mean, it could be much better. Let’s not get stuck on the status quo. You know, it’s still a package which is very prescribed and which is needed, but after you teach us something we can start to reflect and then you can start to learn more and so on. So there’s a need to move forward from that and that’s not often seen by ministry people, for example. And that’s the challenge (Interview, March 21, 2007).

The perspective that this interviewee took, likely informed by her position working within a development-oriented NGO, speaks to the need to transform a program such as TEP into something different as the country stabilizes and the capacities exist to oversee a revision process.

The UNICEF representative in Luanda agreed with this perspective and spoke of a potential time limit for a program like TEP, as well as the need for the Ministry to play a more central role in the execution and oversight of the education sector:

The TEP was an appropriate and timely programme during the emergency and post-emergency period, with a good curriculum and especially a good training and supervisory mechanism thanks to NRC’s capacity. It was well accepted by the provincial education authorities, although overall still seen as something parallel and additional to the Ministry’s mandate. The Ministry regards the TEP as insufficient to meet the demand for “second chance education,” especially for catering to older adolescents. At the same time, the government is acutely aware of the need to deliver education to out-of-school youth. [The Ministry] has really driven and puts high priority on its own [new] Literacy and Accelerated Learning Programme. We are aware that there will be some compromises on quality, compared to an intensive NGO-run programme like TEP, but are convinced that we need to work within the Ministry’s programme (Interview, November 22, 2007).

This discussion about the responsiveness of the TEP to the Angolan context in this section, as well as in Chapter V, highlights the ways in which NRC made significant efforts to adapt the program to the needs of the country’s educational system throughout
the program's implementation in Angola. NRC's work with the Ministry, with support from its partners, to extend the length of the program to cover an academic year, to adjust policies regarding which geographical areas and which age groups would benefit from the program, to incorporate content areas entailed in the education reform, and to offer continuous capacity building opportunities for teachers and other education personnel demonstrated the organization's overall disposition to ensure the program's ongoing relevance. This discussion also highlights the challenges that arise as a country moves through the transition from relief to development and the need for the Ministry of Education to assume greater responsibility of the education sector.

The efforts and related challenges discussed here also correspond with several of the critical factors for sustainability identified by the educational experts in Chapter IV. One, while trying to establish TEP as complementary to the formal system, there were difficulties identifying the appropriate geographical areas for its implementation, which signaled the dangers alluded to earlier of further marginalizing target groups given that in the more remote areas students would not have a formal school into which to transfer. Two, TEP's promotion of a child-centered teaching methodology ran counter to the country's teacher-focused methodology and created mild resistance initially among some teachers during the training (Johannessen, 2000), an issue highlighted by interviewees in this study. Three, NRC's efforts to build capacity among teachers and other education personnel assuaged the legacy of conflict by filling the human resource deficit created by armed conflict. Four, in recent years the Ministry of Education exerted its independence in the development of the new ALP, which may have affected NRC's strategies to incorporate the TEP into the system. The need for the government to assume greater
responsibility over time requires closer examination of the nature of the relationships between NRC and the Ministry of Education throughout the implementation of the TEP in Angola.

**Relationship and Collaboration with the Ministry of Education**

Throughout the course of NRC’s tenure in Angola and given the magnitude of the TEP program, the organization understood the need to cultivate strong relationships with the Ministry of Education at the central, provincial and municipal government levels; especially if the overarching goal was for the government to assume responsibility for the TEP in its entirety. The relationships and modes of collaboration with the Ministry, as well as other international organizations working in Angola, manifested in different ways, at different levels and at different times. Although these relationships were interlinked in many ways as one had the potential to facilitate or hamper the other, they will be treated separately in the analysis of findings with regard to the opportunities and challenges that accompanied them.

In regard to the relationship with the Ministry of Education, the TEP trainers, supervisors and teachers acknowledged that there were strong and positive interactions with education authorities. They also recognized that they had a role to play in cultivating these relationships. The three TEP trainers that participated in the group interview in Luanda commented on the cooperative relationship that they had with the Ministry, and one supervisor clearly explained the way in which they communicated and collaborated:
We are in Luanda and here we work directly with the Ministry of Education. In the provinces, the Ministry of Education is represented by provincial delegations. We can work at the provincial level either as a coordinator or a trainer and the same can happen at the municipal level or even at the teacher level. But we don’t carry out any activity without letting the Ministry of Education know (Interview, March 23, 2007).

Due to the longevity of the TEP in Angola, in many cases education authorities were found at the provincial and municipal levels who began as teachers or supervisors and had participated in the TEP training thereby bringing their understanding of and training in the program to their work within the provincial and municipal departments of education. As one IBIS staff member pointed out, the result is that “it’s very easy to see [the TEP] as a government program” (Interview, March 21, 2007). This also was evident in that several individuals interviewed at the provincial level for this study performed dual roles in the formal education system and the TEP and made comments that spoke to the cross-fertilization that occurred. This knowledge, understanding and support for the TEP that seeped into the provincial and municipal departments of education as well as the formal system can be considered one aspect of sustainability.

The opportunities for developing these supportive relationships and instilling a stronger commitment were most successful at the provincial and municipal levels. The exposure of the local education authorities to the TEP provided these individuals with multiple opportunities to observe and learn about the program’s methodology, which led to requests by Provincial Departments of Education for assistance to train teachers and supervisors from the formal education system. The staff member from NRC headquarters stated that at one point:

The Ministry discovered that the children in TEP were in many cases performing better than the same-aged children who had been in school regularly...[and they] sort of discovered that there must be a reason for
this. And the differences were the methodology and the attitude of the teachers, etc. Then NRC was asked to train all first and second grade teachers in two provinces (Interview, April 15, 2007).

In response to this request, NRC used a “cascade training model” to train 52 provincial trainers who, in turn, conducted trainings for 1800 formal education teachers in the provinces of Malanje and Cuanza Sul. In addition to the teachers, 200 formal education supervisors were also trained during this time.

IBIS, which assumed responsibility for the TEP in Cuanza Sul province in 2005, had also been asked in recent years to provide training for both formal education teachers and supervisors (Interview, IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007). As a result, NRC staff felt that:

The provincial education authorities have obviously understood the participatory methodology and the importance of follow-up and supervision, and they appreciate the capacity that has been built in their areas (Interview, NRC headquarters’ staff member, April 15, 2007).

In addition to the education authorities, formal education teachers also became interested in the TEP methodology and noticed the change in teaching as well as the TEP graduates’ ability to read and write in the second and third grades (Interview, TEP Teacher, March 20, 2007). One of the TEP Supervisors stated that in her experiences working in other provinces that teachers from the formal education system were seeking out TEP supervisors working in the area when they had questions about pedagogy or experienced other difficulties in the classroom (Interview, March 23, 2007). Many of the trainers working for NRC at the national level served in a dual role as provincial supervisors for the formal education system and in this capacity had the opportunity to share the TEP methodology as well as conduct trainings for provincial and municipal staff (Interview, TEP Supervisor, March 23, 2007).
The TEP training proved to be such a success that the education authorities immediately recruited teachers upon completion of their TEP training in some instances. Unfortunately, this “abrupt absorption of teachers trained in the TEP into the regular schools prevented [NRC from] reaching the goals foreseen in the project” (Interview, NRC staff member, October 15, 2007). Nonetheless, it was also a clear indication of TEP’s success to the extent that a vice-director of a school in Quibala, Cuanza Sul that accommodated formal education and TEP classes stated that he would like to see the TEP teaching methodology included in all grades and subjects of the formal education system (Interview, March 20, 2007). This widespread recognition of the TEP methodology and the education authorities’ growing interest in and requests for training constitute evidence of sustainability.

The continuous interactions that the TEP trainers, supervisors and teachers had with the provincial and municipal Ministries of Education played a key role in the cultivation and maintenance of these relationships. The education authorities working at these levels also seemed to grasp the relevance of the TEP for the children and adolescents living in their communities, although they were unable to commit to tracking the TEP graduates in the formal system. While there seemed to be strong recognition of the TEP’s contributions to the Angolan education system, the degree to which this support existed at the central Ministry level was less clear.

The explanations offered about the lack of support for TEP specifically and for education generally highlighted systemic as well as organizational challenges. At the systemic level, three explanations were proposed: an overall lack of prioritization of education and its importance in the country; an historic lack of attention to the needs of
youth (although a new education policy has been formulated recently); and the confusion caused by a governmental system which claims to be decentralized but in many ways is not.

With regard to the overall lack of prioritization about education, an education specialist who has worked extensively in the country for a range of organizations expressed her frustration in the following excerpt:

Overall plans for education in the country have been very vague and unclear. In 2003 when they had to write the Education for All [country report], do you know what [the Ministry of Education] did? They hired a consultant to do that, an external person. I mean you can’t do things like that. You need to have a person who really understands what Angola wants and needs from the inside. That plan is really so bad. For me that was demonstrating how little emphasis they put on education. It’s very incoherent. Maybe some ideas are good, but it’s not a good plan. It is absolutely useless. That has been the problem (Interview, November 7, 2007).

A senior education adviser at UNICEF in Angola also expressed her concern that although an EFA plan had been compiled for Angola, it had not been finalized, approved or budgeted and that the education sector truly lacked a mid-term strategy (Interview, March 30, 2007). A staff member from Save the Children, also an Angolan national, spoke about the lack of commitment and accountability on behalf of the government with respect to education:

I think there is a need from the government to have more commitment in taking up in full its responsibilities. I don’t think people have been doing what they were supposed to in terms of all of these sectors. The World Bank has said that if Angola is to achieve the MDGs then it has to increase its budget for education by 20 percent. What we have noticed is that it decreases. Soon after the war [education] was 7-8 percent of the total budget but as time is going on it is decreasing instead of increasing so I don’t think that we can address all the needs in the education sector. The central government needs accountability. Sometimes the funds are allocated but they are not used the way they were meant to be (Interview, March 29, 2007).
The lack of importance placed upon education is complicated further by the weak human resources capacity within the central Ministry of Education. This weakness stemmed primarily from a quantifiable lack of staff (Interview, NRC staff member, March 23, 2007) as the primary contact within the Ministry with whom staff from international organizations met was incredibly overstretched; this factor hindered more effective collaboration at times, according to several NGO staff members.

The lack of importance or commitment given to education, coupled with a limited number of education staff within the Ministry, is a huge challenge for the sustainability of education programs provided by international organizations. As mentioned in Chapter IV, international organizations’ efforts were deemed most effective and sustainable when education programs aligned with national priorities and policies. When this is not the case, efforts to sustain educational support may prove difficult. When there is a moderate amount of support, but a lack of capacity and resources within the Ministry of Education, a certain degree of dependency on the international organizations is likely and often difficult to counteract.

In regard to the lack of attention given to youth in Angola, the TEP has been the primary program responding to this group’s needs. As mentioned earlier, this has been problematic in that the TEP was intended for a younger group, 10-13 years old. Although accommodations within the TEP have been made for this older group (12-17 years), the suitability of TEP has been questioned and most individuals involved with the program felt that a more tailored program that combined academic and vocational components should have been provided for this group. One interviewee stated that the young people are a very important group in Angola, but the Ministry has “not agreed
[about a policy] and has not looked at this group as important enough” (Interview, Education specialist, November 7, 2007).

As mentioned in Chapter V, the Ministry of Education recently has developed an accelerated learning program (ALP) that targets youth 12-20 years old. According to a representative from the central Ministry of Education, the TEP will figure centrally in the new ALP. She stated that the Ministry of Education plans:

To incorporate the teachers and supervisors who have worked up to now with TEP. We have already had two meetings with those responsible for TEP so that we could include these people within the Ministry of Education. They were all already teachers in the Ministry of Education and almost all are associated with education, so the transition is very smooth. There are no problems regarding the staff, which will be absorbed, because their experience is very positive according to our perspective. In regard to the materials, the materials were already produced with the support of the Ministry of Education. The TEP experience is also being absorbed and the TEP staff have already participated, since last year, in the [ALP] and contribute by improving the utilization of materials and in all other mechanisms of implementation of the strategy to recover delays in schooling. So their experience will be completely absorbed both in terms of human resources and material resources (Central Government Ministry of Education Official, April 2, 2007).

While the launch of this program and the Ministry’s plans to incorporate TEP’s human resources and materials sound extremely promising and constitute evidence of sustainability, it is unclear how quickly the new program will be implemented in the country. The fact that core components of the education reform that was initiated in 2002 (i.e. didactic and administrative materials) have yet to reach significant portions of the country (Field notes, March 20, 2007) does not engender a lot of confidence that the ALP will be implemented any more smoothly. Whereas the new ALP was announced officially in March 2007, negotiations between the Ministry and NRC continue with regard to the incorporation of human resources and materials. In the time that it takes for
the final elements of this program to come together and for the ALP to be implemented comprehensively throughout the country, it is likely that another generation of youth will be left without educational or equivalent practical training opportunities. Considering that more than 50 percent of Angola’s population is younger than 30, the implications of delayed or lost schooling are enormous (Grilo, 2006). While Angola may be ready for a more comprehensive ALP that builds upon the TEP, the ongoing implementation of the TEP may be justified in this interim period. Despite the provincial and municipal education authorities’ interest in continuing the TEP, they have been told by the central Ministry that they must focus solely upon the new ALP program. As such, the nature of the decentralization process in Angola warrants closer attention.

The challenges presented by a system that claims to be decentralized but is not are problematic in regard to support for education and the TEP. During interviews with provincial and municipal Ministry staff, no one was really able to explain the ways in which the system was decentralized and it was evident that the decision-making process still resided predominately in the capital of Luanda. One senior Ministry official from the Provincial Department of Education in Sumbe, Cuanza Sul felt that the system was decentralized, but then made contradictory statements to this fact:

The [central] Ministry has a role to orient and to make decisions. Based on this, they send information about new decisions and policies. The provincial government acts as the implementor of these actions (Interview, March 21, 2007).

If decentralization signifies the devolution of decision-making to the provinces, then the Angolan government clearly has not met this requirement (Carnoy, 2000).

Another staff member from the municipal Ministry of Education in Quibala, Cuanza Sul stated that his office did not have much influence on policy- or priority-
setting at the central level and felt that it would be a “slow process” until the system was actually decentralized (Interview, March 19, 2007). Another indication of the extent to which the system remains centralized is that, according to a school supervisor in the northern province of Zaire:

The quotas disbursed to the province come from Luanda, so they are the ones who establish the number of students to be enrolled in the first, second and third grades (Interview, March 27, 2007).

An education adviser from UNICEF agreed that the system had a long way to go before it became decentralized, but also highlighted the discrepancies and challenges with parts of the system in which a decentralized system had been established:

What is strange is that under decentralization the directors for the different ministries [do not report] to their head offices [in the capital]. They are accountable to the province and the provincial governor which I guess is in line with decentralization, but it’s still quite awkward in terms of the national ministries whether it is health or education to be able to give some directives. I mean they do, but it’s not quite clear how this works. It all means that the provincial governors are very powerful, but again they are political appointments (Interview, March 30, 2007).

This statement speaks to the challenges presented by the decentralization process as well as the corruption that continues to plague the system. A staff member from Christian Children’s Fund, another INGO working in Angola, concurred:

The political system and every other system are very top-down...the teachers the way they teach, the inspectors the way they work...very top-down...they just replicate what they see in the political system (Interview, April 2, 2007).

Simply put, “it is not clear enough who is responsible for what” (Education specialist, Interview, November 7, 2007).

The issue of decentralization and its impact on the TEP are extremely complex in this context. The provincial and municipal departments of education evidently enjoyed a
significant degree of autonomy regarding the implementation of the TEP over the years, which resulted in strong recognition and support for the program. Regarding the ALP, however, the provincial and municipal education authorities had limited to no input into its development at the central level (Interview, Senior provincial ministry official, March 21, 2007). It will be interesting to see if the provincial and municipal departments of education decide to utilize the TEP in their respective areas when and if there are delays in the launch, roll out and implementation of the new ALP.

The explanations offered in regard to the organizational challenges inherent to the lack of support for the TEP at the central level entailed the perception of NRC as an "emergency" organization, the assumptions inherent to that perception, and the capacities of an organization like NRC, or IBIS, to facilitate an expansive program such as TEP. The perception of NRC as an "emergency" organization and the assumptions that any activities they oversee will be short in duration and that the organization will exit quickly and perhaps unexpectedly from the country in which they are working did not seem to carry much weight in the Angolan context considering that NRC worked actively since 1995 and initiated a comprehensive education program during its tenure. Nevertheless, the assumption that a humanitarian organization like NRC would abruptly cease its activities and withdraw from the country may have, according to a couple of the interviewees in this study, contributed to the central Ministry of Education's reluctance to support the TEP more extensively. The observations that NRC and later IBIS were too small to be able to adequately coordinate such an extensive program encompassed both valid and invalid points. The explanation was invalid in that NRC had not attempted to undertake the implementation and management of the TEP as a lone organization, but
rather it strove to establish strong partnerships with both the Ministry of Education and other national and international organizations. The validity of the explanation stemmed from the fact that there were challenges along the way in fortifying some of these partnerships inevitably resulting in weaknesses that may have compromised the quality and effectiveness of the program. As NRC assumed greater responsibility for the TEP, particularly as UNICEF disengaged, they may not have had the capacity to cover all the needs (e.g. smoother transition of TEP graduates into formal education system, monitoring and evaluation of TEP graduates’ progress in the formal education system).

The explanations regarding organizational challenges that carried the most merit involved those related to staffing, in terms of turnover and skill sets. Staff turnover was the most pervasive and affects the array of international organizations working in conflict-affected contexts due to the demanding nature of the work. Regardless, it was a serious challenge that needed to be better addressed, according to several interviewees, particularly if more trusting and stable relationships were to be cultivated with education authorities at the central level. As one interviewee put it:

The problem...is that there hasn’t been a continuity with the people working there [in the capital] with this program on the NRC side. They have been changing all the time and all these educational coordinators have different ideas. Being head of office at NRC in Angola there are many other things that you have to pay attention to so maybe they aren’t paying enough attention to this program (Interview, Education specialist, November 7, 2007).

In addition to not being able to maintain continuous contact and communication with the central Ministry of Education, the skill sets of staff in regard to Portuguese language fluency and cultural knowledge as well as the savvy required to interact effectively with education authorities were also offered as potential challenges.
According to one interviewee who had interacted with the various NRC expatriate staff in Luanda over the years, their proficiency in Portuguese was insufficient if the NRC representatives wanted to be able to advocate and negotiate effectively with education authorities (Interview, Education specialist, November 7, 2007). Interviewees also suggested that NRC staff needed a better understanding of the culture in the Ministry of Education in order to establish a presence, build relationships and navigate an inherently complex environment.

Upon examination of the opportunities and challenges that surfaced over the course of the TEP in Angola, it seems as though the program would have benefited from a more concerted effort by NRC at the provincial level to help local education authorities communicate more effectively their recognition, praise and need for the TEP to the central level and for NRC’s staff based in Luanda to have taken additional steps to garner support for the program within the central Ministry of Education. While this did occur at different times and to varying degrees depending on the leadership in place within the country office, it was clear that the relationship at the central level required ongoing nurturing and cultivation. Although the achievement of getting the teachers onto the government payroll is hugely significant and perhaps a sufficient accomplishment for this type of program, a stronger relationship at the central level may have facilitated clearer communications across the various Ministerial levels and perhaps stronger buy-in on the importance of tracking the TEP graduates in the formal system, especially since the provincial directorates of education took their cues from the central level when it came to these types of decisions. While the Ministry of Education played and should play a vital
role in the collaboration and coordination of these types of projects, the influence of other international organizations should not be underestimated.

**Relationships and Collaboration with International Organizations**

Throughout the development of TEP, NRC attempted to establish partnerships with a variety of organizations working in Angola. While several organizations, as indicated in Chapter V, contributed to the TEP over the years, three in particular—UNICEF, IBIS and Save the Children—require more extensive analysis in this study. UNICEF’s involvement with TEP is important to the discussion of sustainability for two primary reasons: one, the organization plays an extremely influential role with the Ministry of Education, a role that has the potential to create as well as limit opportunities for other international organizations; and two, the organization typically will have a longer-term presence than other international organizations, particularly those with humanitarian mandates, in a country like Angola. The second organization, IBIS, merits closer examination given the unique partnership that NRC and IBIS established with regard to sustaining the TEP in the transition to development. Finally, it is important to include Save the Children in this discussion due to NRC’s efforts to engage them more centrally in TEP’s implementation over the years as well as their apparent plans to collaborate on the new ALP being launched in the country.

The relationship between NRC and UNICEF was tenuous from the very beginning of TEP’s inception in Angola and problematic given the brokering and coordination role that UNICEF was positioned to play between the central Ministry of
Education and the international organizations working in the country. Although UNICEF remained involved to varying degrees with the implementation of the TEP over the years, numerous obstacles surfaced that proved frustrating to NRC and others collaborating on the TEP.

Whereas NGOs tend to act quickly and nimbly in the coordination and management of their activities, UN agencies in general tend to become bogged down by their own bureaucracies. In the case of the UNICEF office in Luanda, this inherent bureaucracy created delays for the procurement and distribution of didactic materials needed for the kit and the allocation of funds to partners involved in the implementation of the program (e.g. financial resources provided for teachers’ accommodations and meals during TEP training sessions). In 2000 a tripartite agreement between NRC, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education was signed about the management of the TEP, but as indicated in Chapter V it did not include sufficient details about the roles and responsibilities to be assumed by each party. One IBIS staff member commented that even as late as 2006 materials (e.g. slates and other didactic materials) were still delayed in reaching the province of Cuanza Sul. Although it was not written clearly in the agreement there was an expectation that UNICEF was responsible for delivering these materials as they had done in previous years (Interview, March 21, 2007).

Apart from the administrative delays that accompanied the collaboration between NRC and UNICEF, NRC staff were concerned about the ways in which UNICEF kept NRC in or out of the loop with regard to key information. In the early years, TEP coordinators were often times not allowed to attend meetings and were not given updated information about the outcomes of decisions that might have affected the implementation
of the TEP (Interview, NRC headquarters’ staff member, April 15, 2007). While personality issues between and among staff members explained some of these exclusionary practices, the problem apparently continued and affected not only NRC but other NGOs working in Angola (Interview, NRC staff member, March 23, 2007).

In addition to any interpersonal issues, there was a sense that these challenges not only led to avoidable delays, but they also interfered with the provision of educational support. One NRC staff member felt strongly that the various administrative delays over the years had often “lower[ed] the intervention capacity of NRC and [created] some obstacles in the realization of capacity building courses for the teachers” (Interview, October 15, 2007). These challenges of collaborating with UNICEF prompted NRC to assume more and more responsibilities over the years, especially given the enormity of their investment in this program (Interview, NRC headquarters’ staff member, April 15, 2007). Unfortunately, this inadvertently may have led to UNICEF becoming under-informed about TEP. Considering UNICEF’s influential partnership with the central Ministry of Education, this fact may have affected negatively the relationship between NRC and the Ministry of Education. As TEP became a lower priority for UNICEF and figured less centrally in their discussions with the Ministry, the Ministry’s attention perhaps was being directed elsewhere.

Similar to NRC, weak staff capacities and rampant turnover played a role within UNICEF and affected their ability to support the TEP adequately and collaborate with NRC effectively. Despite the presence of some high quality staff who were considered visionaries, staff turnover and the inability of those who followed to engage at a deeper, more technical level with the TEP appeared to be particularly problematic in Angola:
When it comes UNICEF...some of the people have very good ideas...[but don’t] stay long enough. Generally I think UNICEF in terms of the cooperation with NRC has been involved in the more technical part of the TEP program like distributing things, books or whatever. They haven’t been so involved in the education part, specifically teacher training and what happens in the classroom. The learning process...that has not been there. I don’t think they have the capacity to do it, although some of the people have been good they haven’t really been [involved] in that part. I think that UNICEF is not very thorough the way they work...too superficial, lack of capacity. They work much better in other countries, but in Angola I don’t think it has been very good. The cooperation between the two has had their problems in Angola, because UNICEF was supposed to be responsible for some portions that they did not do and things like that. NRC had to advance money. They had to help them out. They have a different bureaucracy. These things created a lot of problems, but still this is how it is...if you want to cooperate you always find these problems (Education specialist, November 7, 2007).

There also was agreement among interviewees that UNICEF may have lacked the vision as well as interest for this type of project. The following excerpt spoke to the feelings among staff that their efforts to connect with UNICEF were often fruitless:

You got some other people from UNICEF who politely listen to you and then say yes we’ll see and you knew not so much would happen. That was the kind of feeling that we got...you know that they were busy doing [other things] and they didn’t have the [human] resources to carry it through (Interview, IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007).

When one interviewee was pressed further about why the relationship with UNICEF was so tenuous, she had a difficult time identifying a justifiable reason:

We have asked ourselves, NRC and us, at some of these meetings why it was so difficult. I mean they are sitting next to the government; they are so close to the Angolan government, or were at least, so we couldn’t see why they could not [advocate for the TEP more]. I don’t know really. They also took some credit [for the TEP] because they supplied us with material and saw it also as part of their work and it was an agreement between the government, NRC and UNICEF in the beginning to make TEP of course (Interview, IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007).
During the interview with a senior education adviser at UNICEF who was fairly new to UNICEF's office in Angola, she offered an observation that NRC did not have a strong linkage with the central Ministry of Education. This she noticed as she was familiarizing herself with the Ministry of Education’s new education policy for youth:

I don’t know why NRC has been outside totally in the last year or so of this ALP development program. The [Ministry] didn’t look at...the TEP to learn from this experience and how to scale it up. It seems to have been a parallel process going in to the ALP (Interview, April 2, 2007).

Her comments that the TEP had not been considered in the development of the ALP program were not accurate as NRC staff members as well as an education official from the central Ministry commented that the experiences from the TEP had been shared in the development of this new education policy; however, the perception that NRC was “outside totally” illuminated the degree to which UNICEF was uninformed about NRC’s current activities with the TEP. To aggravate the situation further, the post that this senior education adviser filled for less than a year is vacant once again, which means that it may be even more difficult for the new appointee to get up to speed on NRC’s contributions in the region as the organization withdraws from the country.

Although the bureaucracy of UNICEF and the challenges that accompany it permeate different country contexts, the NRC staff with experiences working in other countries and in collaboration with UNICEF noted that the relationship with this UN agency in Angola had proven more problematic in comparison to other contexts. As NRC planned to withdraw from the country, the organization needed UNICEF to be well informed about its activities and the ways in which the TEP had and might continue to feed into the new ALP, particularly with regard to leveraging the vast human and material resources that NRC had created over the years. Although IBIS continues to be
an active and supportive partner, the organization is based in Cuanza Sul with little to no interaction with the central Ministry of Education in Luanda. Regardless of the organization’s geographical location, the formal partnership that NRC established with IBIS warrants a closer examination.

In anticipation of NRC’s withdrawal from Angola, the education staff in headquarters explored the possibilities of partnering with another organization that would remain in the country for a longer period of time and be able to assume responsibility for the TEP, at least in one province. IBIS, a development-oriented NGO, was equally interested in exploring what a partnership of this nature would entail. IBIS respected NRC and their reputation for doing quality education work in emergencies and was interested in learning from and benefiting from their experiences. The two organizations agreed that IBIS would assume responsibility for the TEP in the province of Cuanza Sul in 2005 for two reasons: one, IBIS had already begun working with a school governance program in the area; and two, Cuanza Sul boasted the largest group of TEP teachers (Interview, IBIS staff member, March 21, 2007). The start date and the focus on one province also would allow IBIS time to become acquainted with this new program and seek support from NRC when necessary as NRC planned to remain in the country for at least three to four more years.

These types of partnerships are extremely rare in conflict-affected countries making the partnership truly groundbreaking. The perspective of IBIS headquarters about the potential of this partnership speaks to the opportunity that this type of collaboration would provide:

The IBIS staff decided that instead of what we have been planning [for Angola]...why don’t we find out what would be relevant to do and where
we would be able to make some change concerning education. We realized that NRC had been working seriously with TEP and that we agreed upon the concept and found it very interesting and a very new way to support out-of-school children. So we found it interesting to collaborate with an emergency or humanitarian organization as we consider ourselves mainly a development organization. We found that we could complement one another. We found it very interesting that we might stay after they leave and be able to kind of keep up the good things from the TEP and put them into a development situation (IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007).

An IBIS staff member in Angola stated that the main objective of the partnership “would be sustaining experiences and resources from a successful emergency education program in the development stage” (Interview, March 21, 2007).

Despite the good will of both organizations to establish this partnership, some challenges inevitably surfaced along the way. The challenges that accompanied this type of partnership consisted of the following: a lack of clarity at the beginning about IBIS’ objectives, how much the program might or could change, how this unique partnership would be communicated to NRC and IBIS staff in Angola and how challenges or conflicts of interest that arose would be mediated between the two organizations.

In regard to the lack of clarity, several education practitioners associated both with IBIS and NRC commented that IBIS did not have a clear sense internally of what it wanted to accomplish with the TEP and that the specifics of the agreement were vague. Some of the confusion most likely stemmed from both organizations’ lack of familiarity and experience developing these types of partnerships between two organizations with different mandates, one being humanitarian and the other developmental. An IBIS staff member alluded to the need to reconcile mandates in the following statement:

One organization was entering the country while the other organization was about to leave the country. And of course that needs to be very carefully thought about. An organization entering is coming with a lot of
ideas and so on, and maybe full of energy, and the other also has energy, but I mean it's a different kind. They have routines and they have ways of doing things, and so there was some conflict in ways of looking at how you work, how you do things and so on. Not like conflict, but some conflicting ideas about the kind of issues about what is the program still needing and how often and so on. Another thing which is linked to that is the whole thing about how an NGO that works in development usually is working and functioning, what kind of logistical set up they have, what kind of support they have for their project, and how much time do they spend. You know, aspects of monitoring and evaluation...how is that different? Usually you might spend much more time on that [in a development organization], or at least looking at it or trying, you know, in emergency it's different. So organizations that are used to emergencies and organizations used to working in development are quite different. I don't know that many but I can imagine (March 21, 2007).

Another colleague associated with the partnership planning echoed the need to reconcile mandates while also pointing out that perhaps the partnership was too ambitious about what could be accomplished:

I mean education is one of many activities of NRC. It's emergency education and IBIS is a totally different organization and they plan things differently. Not to say that one is better than the other, but they are different by nature. I think that is one thing. It has to be the first thing to look at. How can we join forces even though we have these different organizations? What do we really want to do? What is possible to do and how does it fit into our policy? We need to be very clear about that and also to be open to change along the way...and to learn from your experiences. But maybe you have to be less ambitious and more realistic in what you can do from the beginning. Better to expand gradually than to start out with a very unrealistic vision of what you can do (November 7, 2007).

The decision to establish the partnership between these two organizations and transfer responsibilities for TEP in Cuanza Sul was made at the headquarters' level of both organizations, which coupled with the challenges described above proved frustrating and confusing at times to country office staff:

It was of course difficult for some of the NRC staff in Angola to understand what was happening. [It] also perhaps was hard for our staff to realize that it was difficult for NRC staff to hand over their baby so to
speak, but as the director for NRC in Angola said at that time, it is better to have someone to hand your baby over to than to just leave it (Interview, IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007).

Another staff member from IBIS felt strongly that the two organizations should have better anticipated the needs of both organizations at country level for ongoing supervision and assistance:

You need to take it very seriously that it will probably need support at different levels and at times you will need to have people coming in and really discussing issues about how you can make it function in order to not have situations where either one or the other is feeling that they have to change (IBIS staff member, March 21, 2007).

A staff member at NRC headquarters did realize at one point that her NRC colleagues were in a sense guarding the TEP as she indicated here:

I also became aware at one stage that our coordinator, the program managers…were holding on to the TEP too much. In a way they were trying to protect it because they had worked out quality and standards, and things were supposed to be done in one type of way. [We made an effort to communicate that] the TEP is not ours to keep. It belongs to the ministry. It belongs to other organizations who can implement. Please make it possible for them to use it (Interview, April 15, 2007).

Unfortunately, she did not feel that this message penetrated effectively and this protective tendency ultimately caused some challenges for facilitating the partnership with IBIS as well as establishing partnerships with other actors in the country.

Conversely, a staff member from IBIS stated that there was initial reluctance among her colleagues within IBIS to endorse another organization’s program (Interview, March 21, 2007). Eventually, IBIS overcame this reluctance, however natural it may have been to have that reaction. She also noted that there had been a “general recognition that things have to change” as many organizations working in Angola had taken an
independent approach and worked in a very disconnected fashion from other organizations in the region (Interview, March 21, 2007).

All in all, both organizations made a concerted effort to resolve these challenges and it was clear from interactions with TEP teachers and trainers and local education authorities in Cuanza Sul that they were satisfied and confident in IBIS’ leadership and coordination of the TEP in this province (Field notes, March 20, 2007). Unfortunately, IBIS now faces a financial challenge that could affect the duration of its operations in Angola.

IBIS relies on core funding support from the bilateral donor agency DANIDA (Danish International Development Assistance) in Denmark. However, as Angola’s GNP continues to increase, DANIDA will be forced to cut its funding for IBIS under the criteria the donor agency has set forth. As the GNP strengthens, regardless of whether the general Angolan population benefits or not, it becomes more and more difficult for IBIS to justify remaining in an expensive and corrupt country that has the ability to leverage its extensive natural resources. IBIS has already been forced to close its operations in South Africa and Zambia due to improvements in those economies, which means that the country office in Angola is slowly losing its network of support from other country and regional offices (Interview, IBIS Staff member, March 21, 2007). Although IBIS plans to remain in Angola until 2011, its continued presence in the country has become uncertain. In fact, IBIS’ involvement with TEP lessened even before NRC had completely withdrawn from the country. IBIS stopped implementing the TEP in 2006.
when humanitarian funding from DANIDA ended, although it was prepared to facilitate the “idea of sustaining experiences and resources from the TEP within the components of the new [ALP] program” (Interview, IBIS Staff member, February 29, 2008). The reason behind the decision to cease implementation of the TEP in Cuanza Sul, as alluded to earlier in this chapter, stemmed from the “need to revisit and further develop the TEP curriculum and methods” to be more relevant for the changing context in Angola (Interview, IBIS Staff member, February 29, 2008). A name change for the program was also suggested given that the use of “emergency” in Teacher Emergency Package was no longer appropriate.

Despite these past and present challenges, there were many positive aspects of this collaboration and recognition of what the partnership provided for both organizations. For IBIS:

Without NRC it would have been very difficult for us to start. The sharing of their knowledge and the possibility of putting our adviser into their organization in Angola the first year and a half or two years and supporting them in implementing TEP and therefore being able to (introduce) ourselves in Cuanza Sul has been extremely valuable for us as an organization (Interview, IBIS headquarters’ staff member, November 19, 2007).

Prior to the development of the Ministry’s ALP program, NRC was able to put plans in place to transfer responsibilities for the TEP to a competent development organization that would remain in the country beyond NRC’s withdrawal in 2007 and further contribute to meeting the educational needs of Angola’s young people. Due to the success of this partnership as well as the critical role it has to play in the transition to development, NRC and IBIS have continued this type of partnership in other conflict-

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22 Since 2007 IBIS has received funding support from its Thematic Education Programme Budget to which DANIDA and other funders contribute (e.g. private foundations in Denmark, UNICEF). This pool of funding is more development-oriented.
affected countries. The ongoing collaboration will certainly benefit from the lessons learned while working on the TEP in Angola.

Other partners collaborated at different intervals with NRC on the TEP, but their contributions were not as substantive as UNICEF’s and IBIS’ involvement. The only other major INGO that was discussed at length with interviewees in this study was Save the Children, and it was because of their lack of substantial engagement with the TEP despite NRC’s efforts to invite them to participate more integrally. Also, the inclusion of Save the Children in this analysis is necessary due to the fact that the organization recently has been in discussion with NRC about the incorporation of some elements of the TEP into the ALP.

In the early years, there were several Save the Children country offices working in Angola. Save the Children is considered an alliance of 29 member organizations, but individual country offices tend to work separately, especially in the early phases of a conflict. As a result, Save the Children United States was engaged in school construction in a southern province while the country offices from Denmark, Norway and Sweden worked together, as they were smaller in size, on child protection in the north. Save the Children United Kingdom was also present doing school construction and teacher training. Save the Children’s mandate also called for them to work with and through local organizations rather than other INGO partners in order to develop capacity at the community level. In the initial period of TEP’s implementation, Save the Children’s mandate prevented them from establishing a comprehensive partnership with NRC and engaging with a program of TEP’s scale.\(^{23}\) In later years and as a result of the confusion

\(^{23}\) On a smaller scale, Save the Children did assist with data collection about TEP schools and its students and provided monetary incentives for teachers.
caused by the multitude of Save the Children offices established in the country, the Save the Children Alliance took steps to establish a “unified presence” which was a consolidation of staff and resources (Interview, Save the Children education adviser, March 29, 2007). A staff member from Save the Children who joined the team during this process stated that “we are starting basically all over again” because it required “a change of actors who needed time to learn more about Save the Children” (Interview, Save the Children education adviser, March 29, 2007). This individual also recognized that this process and its duration may have hampered Save the Children’s engagement with other actors and programs that would have been worth exploring. A staff member from NRC’s Country Office concurred and stated that:

It was a little unfortunate that Save the Children decided on doing the organizational change into an alliance. The timing was not good for the TEP program (Interview, March 23, 2007).

Amidst the unification process of Save the Children’s offices in Angola, the organization also embarked upon their Rewrite the Future campaign, which was a global campaign for the alliance about ensuring the right to education for all children affected by and living in conflict-affected fragile states. Although the focus of the campaign was in alignment with what NRC was striving to do with the TEP in Angola, the organizational process that Save the Children’s country office in Angola needed to complete in order to prepare their country plan may have prevented their establishing partnerships that would have contributed to the achievement of the goals outlined in this global campaign. The timing of both the unified presence effort and the Rewrite the Future launch took place at the same time that NRC was planning for its withdrawal from the country and looking for
other competent international organizations that could assume responsibility for the program.

The frustration that these obstacles created was evident when speaking with NRC and TEP staff. Another education specialist who had worked with NRC as well as Save the Children in Angola over the years also expressed her discouragement at this outcome and felt that in addition to the organizational processes that hampered the establishment of a stronger partnership was the desire of Save the Children to make its own mark. She stated that Save the Children, not unlike many other organizations, “want to have their own agenda...to be the best, to do new things” and that this approach superseded cooperating with other organizations (Interview, November 7, 2007).

Since fieldwork for this study was conducted, it appears as though Save the Children is now entering into a partnership with the Ministry of Education in order to collaborate on the accelerated learning program (ALP) that has been launched. Save the Children’s work is expected to take place in three provinces (Uige, Zaire and Cuanza Sul). According to an IBIS staff member, IBIS and Save the Children have agreed in theory to collaborate on the implementation of the ALP in Cuanza Sul and will continue discussions about what this collaboration will entail. Although the timing did not work out well and proved frustrating for NRC in its final years, it appears as though there is still an opportunity for Save the Children to build upon the solid work conducted by NRC and IBIS to sustain TEP resources through the development phase in Angola.

There are several parallels in relation to the critical factors for sustainability identified in this section and those identified by the educational experts in Chapter IV. First, certain challenges emerge in partnership arrangements between different types of
international organizations (e.g. UN vs. NGO, humanitarian vs. development), and steps need to be taken to overcome these challenges in order to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of any educational support provided. Second, the organizations engaged with TEP all experienced internal challenges related to the number and capacities of staff to perform the diverse range of activities needed to facilitate the sustainability of a program as expansive as TEP. Third, despite an agreement to cooperate with NRC on the implementation of the TEP over a certain period of time, the launch of a new education policy by the Ministry of Education and IBIS’ concern about the relevance of TEP to the current educational system have curtailed IBIS’ efforts.

**Community and Civil Society Engagement**

The role of the community and civil society in Angola was not a central focus of this study, but since it arose tangentially in the interviews it merits inclusion as a critical factor for sustainability. Civil society in Angola was incredibly weak as a result of the long-lasting civil conflict, and most interviewees from international organizations as well as the Ministry of Education commented that there were very few social organizations or movements, apart from churches, to connect with in regard to educational responses. A central Ministry of Education official commented that as a result of war “many people were quiet and not able to speak their minds” and that there was no basis for “that kind of participation in the public life of the country” (Interview, April 2, 2007). Moving forward, however, she recognized that “we have to have a civil society” and people have “to realize they have a role to play” (Interview, April 2, 2007). According to Nordstrom
(1997), an anthropologist who has conducted extensive field studies in Angola, “to speak politically is deemed to be a statement for or against one side, one military, one ideology, one action over another” (p. 231). Although new opportunities were beginning to transpire, many Angolans still expressed their fears about openly criticizing the Angolan government and spoke in hushed voices if a conversation turned too political (Field notes, March 18, 2007).

These sentiments of fear and disengagement permeated the country and greatly affected the degree to which parents and guardians participated at the community level and collaborated with the international organizations working to provide educational opportunities. NRC attempted throughout the implementation of the TEP to work with community members in order to garner stronger participation, but it appeared to have been difficult and perhaps even waned as the TEP expanded and NRC needed to concentrate on more administrative priorities. An IBIS staff member observed that:

In the beginning, I think it must have had a strong focus on the community side when [NRC was] in Uige and Zaire. But then when they went a little bit all over [to other provinces] I think that maybe they forgot it a little bit (Interview, March 21, 2007).

Whether it proved to be challenging or became secondary to other priorities was unclear, but there was a feeling that stronger engagement with the community would have contributed to higher student retention and achievement as stated here:

It could have helped a lot, maybe, for making sure that children continue afterwards, or that they don’t drop out. When they go from one area to another because of the war it could have helped...if the parents and the communities would be more linked (Interview, IBIS staff member, March 21, 2007).

IBIS has attempted to cultivate broader community participation in their work in the Cuanza Sul province which has been recognized by the central Ministry of Education
as a valuable contribution that they would like to extend to other provinces (Interview, Central Ministry official, April 2, 2007). These community participation initiatives included a participatory school governance program and parent and guardian committees which created solid linkages between the schools and the community. While these types of programs may be more realistic due to the relative stability in the country since the peace treaty was signed in 2002, other simpler community mobilization efforts were needed throughout the implementation of the TEP; particularly as they related to building support for students transferring from the TEP to the formal education system.

As noted in Chapter IV, community engagement was considered a critical factor for sustainability that should be cultivated simultaneously with an international organization’s efforts to collaborate with the government. In a country emerging from 27 years of armed conflict, community mobilization with an aim to garner support for the importance of education for children and youth becomes even more critical. The opportunities and challenges related to the ways in which an international organization can coordinate this top-down process with the government and bottom-up process with the community, as well as with other international organizations working in the region, will be explored in the following section.

**Coordination Across All Actors and Organizations**

The strengths and weaknesses of the relationships that NRC had vis-à-vis the TEP with the Ministry of Education, other international organizations, civil society and local communities exemplified the critical need for coordination and begged the following
questions: Who is responsible for coordinating this range of actors and organizations? What does coordination consist of? When does coordination begin? Within the field of education in emergencies, there is an implicit agreement that the government should perform this role and be supported by the international community as it takes strides to build capacity in this area. The reality is that in many cases, especially during an acute or chronic crisis, the Ministry of Education or relevant governmental entity is not prepared to do so. This fact, coupled with the modus operandi of humanitarian NGOs to move quickly, at times sidestepping the government, often leads to an uncoordinated response that may last longer than it should. Failed or inadequate coordination has the potential to cause more harm than good, particularly when programs like the TEP ultimately necessitate recognition and validation by the government of learning and teaching successes and development of credentials or the transfer of learners and teachers into the formal system.

NRC and the TEP have worked successfully with the Ministry to incorporate the TEP teachers onto the government’s payroll as well as back into the formal system as NRC planned to conclude its activities; however, the recognition and validation of the teaching skills acquired by the teachers through their participation in the TEP teacher training program was another story. The primary concern among the TEP trainers, supervisors and teachers who participated in this study was this issue. As one TEP Trainer articulated during the group interview:

Wages depend upon the category, the academic level of each teacher. We have teachers in the TEP with the highest academic level, but most of them are at the 8th grade level. Since the government is the one who pays the wages for the TEP, it is paid on the same basis of the teachers of basic education, even though [TEP teachers have had additional training] (Interview, March 23, 2007).
Although these concerns were noted by NRC staff at both country and headquarters’ levels, they were still grappling in the closing months of NRC’s operations to determine the best way to assist these teachers and trainers in garnering this recognition or supplementing their training with the necessary formal academic preparation. In terms of sustainability, it could be argued that the skills acquired by the teachers will be transferable to the formal education system and thereby sustainable; however, if teachers do not feel adequately compensated it could lead to their attrition from the teaching corps ultimately affecting sustainability.

A separate but related challenge emerged in the range of teacher training programs being offered in Angola. During an interview with a senior administrator for the Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA, Action for Rural Development and Environment), a national NGO working in Angola and providing teacher training in rural areas of the country, he relayed the confusion that teachers with whom he had come into contact had expressed to him about having been approached by several organizations to participate in teacher training programs, including the TEP. He recounted that many teachers had been approached by two, three and often four different organizations to participate in teacher training workshops, and that they did not know which methodology to follow or which was legitimate. The decision for choosing one over the other most often boiled down to whether or not a salary or other monetary incentive were being offered (Interview, July 9, 2007). Another colleague from ADRA stated that Angola had become an “archipelago of teacher training programs” (Interview, July 9, 2007). A staff member from NRC in Angola supported this point and stated that:
Everyone has their idea what a good teacher is and what should be included, and that is of course a weakness. I think that is the fate of humanitarian action. What the problem at the moment is, of course, is that Angola has seen very low capacity on the Ministry level, so they have difficulties in defining what should be teacher training, and what should be the diploma for a teacher (Interview, March 23, 2007).

A representative from the central Ministry of Education commented that this may have been the case, but that things were changing:

[The] administration of the system until 2002 functioned more or less like islands. So the partnerships were more or less selected in accordance with what was happening. And each province, by their own initiative, managed and supervised their partners in all activities, including teacher training. But since 2002 we have tried to reach consensus. The National Leadership Directorate for the Training of Personnel is the organ of the Ministry of Education in charge of supervision; therefore, it monitors the management of all training actions. All partners that want to work with teacher training present their programs to this Directorate which coordinates training activities, because it is the only body that has the competency to certify training programs (Interview, April 2, 2007).

The Ministry official went on to say that:

It is exactly because we foresee that many of the organizations are already leaving that we want the experiences and all of the programs to be approved by the Ministry of Education. And every time there is an action, we want it to involve the Ministry of Education personnel, exactly so that they can assume these practices and so they can afterwards organize [them]. This is the way we can ensure sustainability. This is happening now with the TEP program, which will soon start to disappear. It was a good experience and since the Ministry was already involved, the international people are leaving, but the experience and learning that remained and were transmitted to the Angolan people are what we are going to continue to work with through the process. So nothing that was done up to now will be lost with time (Interview, April 2, 2007).

Until the Ministry is prepared to assume responsibility for coordination, it has often been suggested that UNICEF or another UN body undertake the honest broker role due to the nexus they provide between the international organizations and the government. In fact, UNICEF was repeatedly asked to play a more active role in Angola.
Despite the gains made by the Ministry of Education to create its own capacity in this area (Interview, UNICEF senior education adviser, March 30, 2007). Nonetheless, this never seemed to have happened effectively and the international non-governmental organizations felt excluded as UNICEF engaged in a "privatized planning process" with the Ministry, which essentially shut out international organizations (Interview, NRC staff member, March 23, 2007). The more logical response to the question of who should be responsible for coordination is that every organization has a role to play although the Ministry should eventually assume overall coordination responsibilities when possible. The NGO actors should organize themselves in order to communicate their respective strategies in a harmonized voice, make adjustments when needed and avoid duplication of services or coverage areas where possible. According to a staff member from the Instituto Politécnico de Viana do Castelo (IPVC), a Portuguese higher education institution working on teacher training in Angola in conjunction with ADRA and other organizations, coordination meetings should not be "information meetings" where all the organizations use the platform to promote their activities, but should truly focus upon coordination and a genuine assessment of the comparative advantages that each organization offers (Interview, July 9, 2007). The bilateral donor agencies also have an influential role to play in the coordination process in the criteria they set forth for funding for a particular country or project, a recommendation proposed in Chapter IV as well. More emphasis by the donor agencies would help alleviate the cut-throat competition that arises among agencies in both high profile countries and those for which funding is starting to dwindle. As another representative from IPVC stated, "we all have to navigate the same river" (Interview, July 9, 2007).
Conclusion

The education adviser working at NRC headquarters, who had been involved with the TEP since the initial feasibility study in 1995, stated that the sustainability of TEP in Angola "would be necessary if the government sees it as necessary, as something that's viable, something that is still needed" (Interview, April 15, 2007). What is clear from this case study is that certain elements of a program like TEP are more sustainable than others, and that these elements can change as the Ministry of Education assumes greater responsibility for the education sector. In the case of Angola, the Ministry's decision to develop a much needed accelerated learning program changed the landscape to the extent that it became less about NRC transferring an intact program to the government, as stated in the original goals for TEP, and more about transferring certain elements into the system, namely the human and material resources.

Despite the challenges that NRC faced in its implementation of the TEP, particularly those related to the bridging component for the students, the recognition by education authorities of the positive contributions that NRC made to building the capacity of Angolan teachers, supervisors and trainers augured well for their integration into the governmental system. This integration entailed the inclusion of the majority of TEP teachers onto the governmental payroll during TEP's implementation as well as the future incorporation of TEP teachers, supervisors and trainers into the ALP (currently under negotiation). It also included the utilization of TEP material resources on curriculum, pedagogy and training in the development of the ALP. Finally, the exposure to TEP that education authorities at the municipal and provincial levels received and the knowledge and understanding of the program and its methods that these individuals developed and
used to inform their work should not be discounted. The role of partnerships was and continues to be an important factor for the sustainability of TEP given that IBIS and, most likely, Save the Children, will become engaged actively in the coordination and implementation of the ALP, including the continued integration of TEP human and material resources.

As NRC withdraws from Angola, the benefit of hindsight indicates that perhaps a few additional steps could have been taken to ensure the sustainability of the program, although the ALP appears to be supplanting the TEP. According to the education adviser at NRC headquarters, “the one mistake may be that [the TEP] has not been extended to other organizations” (Interview, April 15, 2007). NRC made several efforts to establish and fortify collaborative relationships with other international organizations throughout TEP’s implementation, some more successful than others, but in retrospect there were probably new opportunities for collaboration after the peace treaty had been signed in 2002 and other organizations began to initiate work in Angola (Interview, Education adviser from NRC headquarters, April 15, 2007). The broader organizational buy-in that would have resulted from new partnerships being formed would have contributed to the sustainability of TEP in that the program’s reach would have been that much wider, thereby benefiting a larger number of teachers, supervisors, trainers, students and communities.

While the TEP enjoyed broad-based support within the provincial and municipal departments of education, more consistent communication with the Ministry of Education at the central level could have been helpful, especially in regard to clarifying any mixed messages that may have been coming from UNICEF due to staff turnover and changing
educational priorities that this particular UN agency repeatedly experienced. A more assertive effort to communicate with UNICEF, despite the resistance that was felt by NRC staff when they did make these efforts, may have also been helpful in resolving some of the communication problems that appeared to originate with UNICEF. The inclusion of additional organizational partners may have also been helpful for advocating the need for and importance of the program at the central ministry level.

As noted in this chapter, the most difficult aspect of sustainability to analyze is that related to the TEP students in that the data about the long-term effects of their participation in TEP are inexistent. At minimum, it is hoped that the literacy and numeracy skills that these students acquired during the TEP will retain some degree of intrinsic value throughout the course of these individuals’ lives, especially if no other academic training is sought. A short-term accelerated learning program that serves as a bridge to the formal education system, but does not entail the completion of a full cycle of primary education seems to be problematic for the students’ continued academic progress, first and foremost, as well for efforts to achieve the EFA goal of universal primary education.

Despite the challenges that NRC did its best to remedy, the ways in which the organization implemented the TEP in a parallel, but complementary manner in Angola and the subsequent integration of the core components of TEP (i.e. human and material resources) into the Ministry of Education provided an illustrative example of what sustainability looks like in a country transitioning from protracted conflict to development. The evidence of sustainability presented here, coupled with the data findings generated among the educational experts working at the international level in
Chapter IV, contributed to the development of a conceptual framework for sustainability presented in the following chapter.
Chapter VII

CONCEPTUALIZING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT TRANSITION

The role of education has always been central to traditional development work, and it is increasingly becoming a core component of humanitarian response in countries affected by crisis. The inherent long-term nature of education and the agreement that “education reconstruction begins at the earliest stages of a crisis” (World Bank, 2005, p. 30), implies that a certain degree of sustainability will accompany educational support provided in these relief and development contexts. The majority of participants in this study agreed that sustainability was an implicit priority for their efforts to provide educational support to countries affected by conflict, even though it may not have been clearly articulated as a goal within their respective organizations; they also cited examples that indicated when sustainability may not be an immediate objective (e.g. acute emergency response phase).

Although participants considered sustainability an implicit rather than an explicit goal, there are several organizational as well as global initiatives currently underway that will most likely accentuate its importance in the near future. In terms of organizational initiatives, UNICEF recently released an education in emergencies tool kit for its staff that states:

An emergency education programme should have a long-term development perspective and not merely be a series of stop-gap measures. Simple initial steps should be designed to contribute to the ultimate rebuilding of the education system (UNICEF, 2006, p. 6).
Similarly, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) recently established a new Program Framework, which is meant to guide the organization's sectoral work from emergencies through reconstruction. The common goal of the Program Framework is "durable solutions," which calls for a foundation to be laid that will generate "lasting peace, stability and development" (IRC, 2007, p. 10). At the global level, the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) launched an initiative—the Cluster Approach—to strengthen humanitarian response. The Cluster Approach was designed to enhance predictability, accountability and quality of humanitarian response, but also seeks to "promote strategies that enable strong linkages between humanitarian and development actions" (IASC, 2006, p. 8). Finally, the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (FTI) has developed a Progressive Framework to be used by governments and development partners to support education in fragile states. The framework includes "balancing short-term service delivery with longer-term reconstruction [and] institution-building" as one of its core principles (Education for All Fast-Track Initiative, 2007b, p. 1). The sustainability of education programs provided by international organizations is undeniably a core element of all of these initiatives.

The paucity of literature on sustainability in education and the growing emphasis of its importance at the organizational and global levels necessitate a more holistic understanding of this concept. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to create a conceptual framework of sustainability by consolidating the findings generated from the survey of educational experts at the global level (Chapter IV) with the findings from the case study of TEP in Angola (Chapter VI). John Paul Lederach's (1997) efforts to
establish a conceptual framework for peacebuilding articulate the utility of a framework and its relevance for this study. He states:

Conceptually, I understand a framework as providing the general parameters, the boundary outline that helps create meaning and focus; concepts are the more specific ideas and analytical elements that make up the framework. In other words, a framework helps situate things within a context and provides lenses through which we can look at them. Perhaps most important, a framework provides categories in which we can raise questions and think about specific action (p. 22).

The conceptualization presented below in Figure VI illuminates the core elements of sustainability, but also the ongoing, interdependent and shifting processes that accompany efforts to sustain educational support provided by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development in conflict-affected countries. The conceptualization and its related elements should not be interpreted as hierarchical, sequential or prescriptive. Additional details about each element follow in text.
Figure VI: Framework for Sustainability of Educational Support in Relief-Development Transition

Sustainability is Integration into the System

There was broad agreement across the educational experts surveyed in Chapter IV and the educational practitioners working with TEP in Angola in Chapter VI that integration into the system—at the governmental or community level—was the overarching goal for an education program to be sustainable in conflict-affected countries. As stated earlier, this integration process could entail the transfer of an entire educational program or only one element into the existing system. The system could represent the governmental level, the community level, or a combination of the two.
Depending upon the scope of the educational program, participants in this study advocated a top-down and bottom-up approach that would cultivate a sense of ownership of the educational support being provided. This combined macro- and micro-level strategy would help establish a wide network of support for the program in the country. In the case that the government continues to be plagued by corruption or incapacitated for other reasons, the focus on the community level will become more important. However, international organizations should strive to establish linkages with governmental counterparts when possible in an effort to help rectify these internal weaknesses.

If the entire educational program were not transferred into the system at its various levels, different elements of the program including human, material and physical resources could be. In the case study of TEP it appeared as though the transfer of the human resources generated throughout NRC’s work in Angola (i.e. teachers, supervisors and trainers) into the system was the most practical and logical step given NRC’s contribution to building needed capacity in these areas and the Ministry’s new education policy on accelerated learning. In this example, the capacities and experiences that these individuals developed with TEP can be shared with others and will help increase the quality of educational instruction, supervision and training. The material resources produced for TEP had already been integrated into the system in the sense that the Ministry of Education used them as a model for the development of the new education policy. Other physical resources (e.g. schools and classrooms) had also been integrated into the system throughout TEP’s implementation, as plans for their construction or rehabilitation were coordinated with local education authorities. NRC’s work in this area
prevented any of these structures from becoming abandoned or disowned, a concern expressed by the educational experts in Chapter IV.

In addition to the integration of the various types of resources, the sustainability of the knowledge that local education authorities and others produced as a result of their exposure to TEP over the years should be not be underestimated. The exposure of these individuals to new ideas about teaching pedagogy and methodology evidently seeped into the system, as indicated by periodic requests for NRC and TEP personnel to train formal education staff. Formal education teachers who sought advice from TEP teachers and supervisors also contributed to the transfer of knowledge into the educational system.

The objective of integrating educational support into the system became a high priority for those educational programs implemented by international organizations in parallel to the formal system. Even when these parallel systems were established in a complementary way and in collaboration with education authorities, the need to maintain communication with education authorities and determine the timing for the handover of these programs was critical. The long-term perspective inherent to this final point leads to the next critical element for sustainability.

**Sustainability is Long-term Strategic Planning**

While all the participants in this study agreed that educational services should be delivered as quickly as possible given their life-saving potential in acute and chronic crises, there was also agreement that international organizations providing educational
support should take a long-term perspective in their planning processes. According to Isaacs (2002):

Practitioners and researchers familiar with refugee and humanitarian programs recognize the limits to delivering sustainable long-term educational programs if they are not linked to more grounded development planning and programming (p. 2).

Despite this recognition, however, organizations continue to face challenges setting up long-term planning and programming processes. In this study, several participants noted that this was an internal challenge for their respective organizations. The UNICEF representative working at the international level stated that her and other organizations’ “short-term vision” was to blame as well as “short-term funding cycles.” She felt that the challenges associated with short-term funding cycles could be overcome if a longer-term planning perspective were taken initially that accounted for budgetary requirements over the long-term. She and other participants also acknowledged the importance of taking a multi- and cross-sectoral approach that does not isolate planning for the education sector from other sectors (e.g. economic, health, and security).

As pointed out by the UNESCO representative, it may be incumbent upon international organizations to assume a longer-term perspective even when they had not planned to, especially when a recovering or nascent government is unable to think strategically about the future due to lack of staff and capacity within the Ministry of Education. In the example of the TEP, the Angolan government had not yet considered the educational needs for out-of-school children or youth despite the ongoing conflict in the country. It was not until a peace treaty had been signed in 2002 that the government began to think more strategically about the needs of those individuals who had missed out on schooling and the ways in which they could build upon the TEP experience.
A long-term perspective would enable international organizations to think more clearly about the country's short-, medium- and long-term educational needs as well as the best way to respond and adapt their programs to the country context. The assessment of needs would include service delivery as well as capacity building for education authorities and other education personnel (e.g. teachers, supervisors and school directors).

This approach would allow organizations to think strategically about the most appropriate ways to establish collaborative relationships with the government, communities and other organizations working in the region; to ensure linkages with national education policies (when possible); to communicate their plans to appropriate stakeholders; to plan for the transfer of parallel and/or complementary programs into the system; to consider the possibilities of bringing educational support to scale (if desired); and to secure adequate funding for the initiation and duration of the program. In the example offered about Save the Children's education work with pastoralist and rural populations in Ethiopia in Chapter IV, the organization was able to identify a niche area that the government was not in a position to prioritize and to establish a collaborative relationship with the district education office. Over time, the educational program was brought to scale at the regional and national levels and eventually incorporated into national educational policy. In the case of the TEP in Angola, a similar process occurred in regard to identifying a niche area, garnering support from education authorities (in this instance at the national level first and then at the provincial levels) and expanding the program to numerous provinces. In essence, an educational policy for accelerated learning was created based upon the TEP in that the government was finally able to prioritize the needs of out-of-school adolescents and youth; however, not all of the
components of the TEP were absorbed in the process (e.g. number of hours of instruction, curricular content). Even when complementary programs, such as the TEP, are facilitated in coordination with the government, it does not automatically guarantee the complete absorption of the program and its various components into the educational system. While the Angolan government appeared to appreciate the efforts made by NRC with the TEP and recognized the various resources that could be leveraged, the Ministry of Education was also trying to exert its independence to some degree in establishing an educational policy for accelerated learning.

Finally, a long-term perspective would also help international organizations with dual humanitarian and developmental mandates to mitigate any internal challenges that may arise as a result of the ways in which these different divisions were structured. The challenge presented by disconnected internal structures was most pervasive within the bilateral donor agencies and has clearly affected decisions about the most effective ways to provide financial support to countries affected by and recovering from conflict. Although there is growing recognition of the role that education can play during the humanitarian phase of a crisis, this understanding has not yet prompted donor agencies (namely USAID and DFID) to make adjustments to include education as a core response sector within their humanitarian policies. If continuity of engagement and continued presence on the ground contribute directly to sustainability, a long-term perspective that bridges the humanitarian and development transition is essential for helping international organizations to establish plans that will not require withdrawing prematurely. When external factors beyond the control of the organization interfere with these plans, efforts
to build capacity, establish partnerships and coordinate with other stakeholders will be imperative.

**Sustainability is Capacity Building**

The capacities of national and local stakeholders are critical for ensuring sustainability of educational support provided by international organizations; and these organizations should strive to complement their service delivery efforts with capacity building activities at the necessary levels of the system (i.e. governmental, community). In conflict-affected countries transitioning from humanitarian relief to development, these efforts become even more critical as they contribute to filling the human resource gaps created by the conflict, not to mention reconstructing and strengthening the system in its entirety. In Angola the teaching corps had been decimated by the ongoing conflict in the country and formally trained teachers working with the Ministry of Education rarely had more than an eighth grade education. The TEP contributed to recruiting teachers as well as improving teaching skills for both new and veteran teachers, not to mention the capacity building opportunities established for supervisors and teacher trainers.

Capacity building is important for cultivating a sense of ownership and facilitating the transfer of educational support into the system. Capacity building may also be the only component of educational support that is sustainable as it leads to the acquisition of skills, which for certain individuals in certain contexts (e.g. refugees in camp settings) may be all they can take with them upon return or resettlement. The participants in this study from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Save the
Children both emphasized the sustainability of skills that refugees, in particular, can take with them across the border. The IRC participant also discussed her organization’s interest in conducting follow-up studies in order to evaluate the degree to which returnees are using their educational leadership and management skills, which were developed in collaboration with the NGO in the camp, to rebuild the educational system in the returnee’s home country. With the shortage of quality teachers in Angola, individuals who participated in the TEP teacher training program were considered well-trained resources by the Ministry of Education that should be incorporated into the formal education system.

Even when governmental authorities are unable to assume complete responsibility for the education sector, international organizations should identify specific activities for which these individuals can be responsible. As suggested in Chapter IV, education authorities’ contributions to general oversight of an educational program, while initially more symbolic than operational, can set the stage for the assumption of greater responsibility in the future. The UNICEF participant, in particular, cited an example from Cambodia in which UNICEF was primarily responsible for managing the budget provided by bilateral agencies. In this instance, the government played a role in financial reporting and accountability until they were able to assume greater responsibility for the budgeting process. When international organizations have higher levels of trust and confidence in the country in question more assertive approaches were recommended. Several NGO participants proposed that a staff member be placed within the Ministry of Education in order to serve in an advisory role while the World Bank representative recommended a slightly less involved approach for providing technical assistance. This
approach entailed keeping external consultants on stand-by for consultation by the
education authorities rather than having them enter a country and assume responsibility
for the development of an educational policy, for example. These types of arrangements
will help to create the appropriate environment for collaboration between international
organizations and education authorities in which the government is able to exercise and
expand its leadership role over time. To accomplish this objective, however, staff from
the international organizations will have to strike that delicate balance of providing
support without overstepping their bounds and assuming responsibilities that should be
carried out by education authorities.

The need for capacity building does not only apply to national and local
stakeholders. It also applies to the international organizations working in these contexts.
As one of the most problematic internal challenges cited in Chapters IV and VI, the need
for international organizations to invest in the development of their own educational
practitioners is paramount. If international organizations are unable to commit the
necessary human resources, in quantity and quality, to respond to the educational needs
of a conflict-affected country, the effectiveness and sustainability of their educational
support will be greatly undermined. While the field of education in emergencies and
post-crisis reconstruction is still a relatively young field, its steady growth over recent
years indicates that more staff is needed to work in the range of organizations active in
this area. As these organizations expand their mandates and operational frameworks to
cover the humanitarian-development spectrum more amply, new skills will be needed for
these individuals to work through the transition period. These skills include not only
being able to provide educational support in the early phases, but building capacity of
national and local stakeholders to do so themselves. For the collaboration required with education authorities, several participants pointed to the need for staff to possess special skills and personal characteristics that would allow them to effectively interact with officials at the various levels of the Ministry of Education. The UNESCO representative, for example, spoke of the “gravitas” that a staff member working in this environment would need as well as extensive personal and professional experiences upon which the staff member could draw. Other participants highlighted the need for staff to have strong language skills and cultural knowledge (of the country as well as the Ministry) that would better position them to play a facilitative and supportive role with education authorities. The lack of these skills was identified in the case of the TEP as being a possible impediment to a stronger relationship between NRC staff and education authorities at the central Ministry of Education in Angola.

In the transition phase, staff will need skills in establishing partnerships and negotiating with a diverse array of stakeholders, facilitating coordination internally and externally, promoting good governance and decentralization practices, and engaging in high-level advocacy with governments and donors. In addition to these more administrative and managerial skills and capacities, participants also discussed the need for refined technical expertise in regard to education (e.g. curriculum reform and teacher training). As the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction continues to evolve, it is also becoming more specialized in the sense that international organizations need to develop expertise across a broad spectrum of education-related issues, including specific needs of different age groups (i.e. early childhood and youth) and different types of educational programming (i.e. safe spaces, psychosocial support
and livelihoods). Even if greater investments in capacity building can be garnered, the importance of partnerships for responding effectively to a crisis and complementing one another’s strengths, weaknesses and areas of technical expertise remains crucial.

**Sustainability is Partnerships**

Partnerships in these contexts include an array of possibilities. First and foremost, international organizations should determine the most effective ways to collaborate with national and local stakeholders. The various partnerships that can be established with education authorities and community members, for example, will generate stronger ownership, broader buy-in and overall sustainability for the educational support being provided.

Partnerships between different international organizations are also extremely important in terms of complementing one another’s programmatic or operational strengths and weaknesses, leveraging limited financial resources and ensuring continuity of engagement through the transition to development. Partnerships are particularly important when one or many of the organizations active in the region have narrower humanitarian mandates and will need to withdraw from the country prior to or during the transition phase. The need to partner with other international, or national, organizations prior to their departure becomes critical, particularly if the government is not prepared to assume complete responsibility for the educational support being provided due to a lack of capacity or resources. Similarly, the development organizations need to engage with
humanitarian organizations earlier in order to create opportunities to build upon work previously carried out in the region.

Although more and more organizations are prioritizing strong collaborations with Ministries of Education and education authorities as part of their educational support, certain organizations, such as the UN for example, are able to leverage these relationships differently given the honest broker role that they may be expected to play. In these instances, it behooves international NGOs to establish partnerships with UN agencies in order to benefit from these relationships, especially when their base of operations is in the field and farther from the capital in which the central government and UN offices will reside. Conversely, it is in the best interests of UN agencies to partner with NGOs that have the ability to work more quickly in providing educational support.

Given the varieties of partnerships that can be established in order to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of educational support provided, it is important for international organizations to assess at regular intervals which organizations might be potential partners. As indicated in Chapter VI, NRC recognized in hindsight that there may have been additional organizations with which to partner upon the signing of the peace treaty and the arrival of new actors in Angola. The discussion about the partnership that NRC established with IBIS in regard to the TEP also highlighted the need for these types of relationships and the staff involved to be nurtured in an ongoing and systematic way. NRC and IBIS staff working in Angola exhibited some reluctance to engage in the partnership in the beginning. This reluctance stemmed from NRC’s reticence to handover the TEP to IBIS and IBIS’ reticence to endorse another organization’s program. Once the merits and the objectives of this partnership were
better explained to staff working on the ground the collaboration was able to move forward. As NRC began its closing activities in the final months of its operation in Angola, interactions between NRC and IBIS appeared limited. NRC, for example, did not know why IBIS had decided to decrease its involvement with TEP in the province in which it had been working and suggested that I might have a better idea. While it is understandable that NRC had other priorities as it closed its operations, it is unfortunate that more attention was not paid to the partnership towards the end of NRC’s involvement in Angola. The need to nurture and support organizational partnerships was also evident in the relationship between NRC and UNICEF and their collaboration on the TEP. In this situation, high turnover of staff at UNICEF led to interruptions in communication between the two organizations that resulted in a lack of understanding for new TEP and misinformation being passed to the Ministry of Education in the capital. Unfortunately, NRC’s partnerships with both IBIS and UNICEF weakened over time.

**Sustainability is Coordination**

Whether partnerships are established or not, the need for coordination between and among all actors should always be a priority. When the government is not in a position to assume responsibility for coordinating the wide range of actors and stakeholders present in its country, the international organizations should take it upon themselves to do so in a harmonized fashion. In order to create a sense of equity, international organizations could develop a mutually agreed upon format for meetings or other suitable forum and share leadership responsibilities on a rotating basis in order to
ensure that each type of organization has the opportunity to contribute to the management process while simultaneously developing their coordination skills. When the government is in a position to oversee this process, the sheer number of organizations working in a region can prove overwhelming for a fledgling Ministry. Efforts by international organizations to reduce this burden would be a significant contribution. Although there are organizations within the international community that are mandated to assume coordination responsibilities (e.g. UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), there are limits to their reach across the various response sectors (e.g. water and sanitation, health, education) as well as the transition to development.

Coordination is imperative to streamline educational support, reduce unnecessary duplication, and devise the most effective educational response possible by leveraging the varying resources and capacities of the range of organizations responding in a particular country. The problem raised in Chapter VI in which teachers in Angola were subjected to international organizations’ different and contradictory teacher training programs is a strong indication that coordination is needed to establish a common approach and to ensure quality. The UNHCR participant also cited a similar problem in Sudan in which various international organizations were offering different types of teacher training opportunities, most of which focused mainly on life skills and would not be accredited by the education authorities. She also spoke of the imbalance of educational support being provided for different programs (e.g. teacher training) in different regions of the country. In the Sudanese context, a lack of coordination was leading to too many organizations concentrating on the same type of work in the same geographical areas.
To overcome this type of duplication, participants in this study recommended that international organizations take advantage of existing tools and standards to guide and better plan their educational work. The cluster approach established by the UN IASC was also referred to as a mechanism for remedying coordination challenges. For this new initiative to be effective, however, the lead organizations for the education sector will have to remove their agency hats and represent the collectivity of the organizations working to provide education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction.

As the country moves from humanitarian relief to development, coordination between the different types of organizations working in these spheres is equally important in order to ensure a smooth transition, transfer of responsibility (if needed) and sustainability of educational support provided thus far. Although several of the development-oriented organizations in this study (i.e. UNESCO and the World Bank) recognized the need to engage earlier with humanitarian actors, these organizations’ lack of involvement in the earlier phases of a crisis continues to be problematic. While it may be unrealistic and unnecessary for the development organizations to establish a strong presence on the ground during the acute crisis and early recovery phases, there should be opportunities for these organizations to participate in early discussions and planning exercises about the needs of the educational system over the longer-term. Development organizations and donor agencies’ involvement is critical for facilitating the transition and handover of educational support and securing adequate financial assistance.
**Sustainability is Predictable Long-term Funding**

The financial challenges confronting international organizations working in this field were intentionally subordinated in this study in order to better understand the other challenges inherent to sustaining educational support. Nonetheless, the availability or lack of financial resources inevitably affect the sustainability of educational support in these contexts; and this element needs to be included as part of the conceptual framework. While the availability of financial support remains an external factor that few organizations have direct control over, the need for predictable long-term funding is a critical factor that has the ability to affect all of the other elements listed above. Despite broad recognition by bi- and multi-lateral donors that financing mechanisms need to be improved, it will take time for these issues to be resolved. It will also continue to prove challenging to international organizations for national governments to allocate the appropriate level of funding to the education sector. Other sectors tend to be prioritized even when the government does recognize that it is responsible for financing the education sector.

**Sustainability is Adaptation to Contextual Factors**

In addition to these six core elements of the conceptual framework of sustainability, the contextual factors identified in Chapters IV and VI merit inclusion given the ways in which they can affect sustainability, although they are external to international organizations’ loci of control. These included the challenges presented by the legacy of conflict, which encompassed the marginalization and exclusion of certain
groups; the institutional, human, material and physical deficits; and the volatility and insecurity that often plagues a conflict-affected country even once a peace agreement has been established.

In the case study of the TEP, the challenges presented by marginalization and exclusion fluctuated over time. Throughout the country, large percentages of adolescents and youth had missed out on schooling as a result of the chronic armed conflict and were excluded from the formal education system. In these contexts, the government tends to focus primarily on formal education and those school-aged children who can take advantage of the opportunities being provided. In order not to compete with the efforts made by the provincial and municipal departments of education to provide schooling opportunities, NRC initially established the non-formal TEP in more remote and rural areas that were lacking schools. Given the objective of the TEP as a bridging program into the formal education system and the slow rate at which schools were being constructed or rebuilt in the areas in which TEP was being implemented, NRC had to change its plans and offer TEP in areas that had existing schools. In recent years in the Cuanza Sul province in which IBIS had assumed responsibility for the TEP, the organization found that the TEP was drawing resources away from the formal education system as a result of its success. Teachers, who would remain on the government payroll if they worked for TEP, preferred to teach in TEP classrooms given the manageable teacher-student ratio and additional supervisory and training support offered. Likewise, parents preferred for their children to participate in the TEP as it would accelerate their schooling. As a result, IBIS made a change to offer the TEP in remote and rural areas in the province once again in order to avoid detracting from the formal education sector.
While the educational experts who participated in this study spoke about the need to avoid creating “islands of happiness” in which certain segments of the population were benefiting more than others from support provided by the international community, it is difficult to avoid creating these imbalances completely. Even though NRC was very cautious about compensating teachers and made every effort for the Ministry of Education to assume this responsibility, the provision of supervisory support, transportation assistance (e.g. bicycles for teachers, trainers and supervisors) and the teacher-student ratio attracted attention from external observers and set the TEP apart from that which was occurring in the formal education system. These “benefits” associated with TEP were put into place in order to maintain the quality and continuance of the TEP, but inevitably were perceived as something more given the dire conditions of the educational system in Angola.

Despite this inevitability, the TEP contributed enormously to filling the institutional, human, material and physical deficits created by the conflict. In terms of developing institutional capacity, the training and capacity building opportunities provided through the TEP for trainers and supervisors made a significant contribution to building expertise in the educational system, particularly as formal education authorities recognized the strengths of the program and requested assistance training teaching personnel within the formal system. In addition to the supervisors and trainers, the deficits related to human resources were greatly filled by the sheer number of teachers trained over the years, not to mention the skills and knowledge developed by the students who participated in the TEP. Material and physical deficits were alleviated through the development of teaching, training and learning materials as well as the reconstruction of
school buildings and classrooms that NRC facilitated in collaboration with education authorities and local communities. The involvement of education authorities at central, provincial and municipal levels also allowed the Ministry and respective departments of education to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the community, which in some ways also contributes to rebuilding institutional capacity of the educational system and establishing a commitment to education.

In regard to the volatility and insecurity that may continue to pervade a country recovering from conflict, the participants in this study discussed their inability to predict when and where this might occur. In the case that staff members from international organizations have to withdraw due to concerns with personal security, the participant from Save the Children spoke of the importance of community involvement. Depending upon the severity or longevity of the renewed crisis, community members would be able to sustain an educational program until the crisis had subsided as long as it had not been severe enough to force the local population to flee. Unfortunately, this is one of the most uncontrollable factors that cannot be easily anticipated and requires that international organizations work with a significant amount of flexibility that will allow them to adapt to contextual changes as they arise.

**Conclusion**

The conceptual framework of sustainability presented here draws upon the expertise of educational practitioners working at both global and country levels in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. The use of a vertical
case study to frame this research project facilitated an understanding of the critical factors affecting sustainability across multiple levels (e.g. international, national, provincial and municipal). The study’s methodology intentionally assumed an organizational perspective in conceptualizing sustainability, which may have limited the inclusion of additional elements (e.g. the role of community groups). Nevertheless, this conceptual framework of sustainability can be used to guide the work of practitioners and organizations providing educational support in conflict-affected countries. As more organizations make efforts to provide educational support through the transition from humanitarian relief to development, this framework can inform their planning processes. Given the recognition that the transition period spans increasingly longer periods of time (Interview, DFID representative, September 17, 2007), the sustainability of educational support and the critical factors that affect it will become more pressing. The next and final chapter proposes specific recommendations for each of the key concepts of the framework presented here.
Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

The qualitative case study upon which this dissertation is based sought to identify and examine the critical factors that affect the sustainability of education programs facilitated by international organizations in the transition from humanitarian relief to development. The importance of this study's main findings is accentuated by one of its secondary findings; that is, sustainability will most likely become an explicit, rather than implicit, objective for international organizations as the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction continues to coalesce and greater efforts are made to sustain educational support through the relief-development transition. As a result, more attention will need to be paid by these organizations, if not already the case, to the key concepts that make up the conceptual framework of sustainability presented in Chapter VII.

Based upon the individual concepts inherent in the conceptual framework of sustainability that emerged from this study, this final chapter will propose recommendations for the various stakeholders working in this field; review the contributions to academic and programmatic spheres; and discuss directions for future research.
Recommendations

Integration into the System

In the findings related to the integration of educational support provided by international organizations, both the government and the community were emphasized as key components of the system. Whereas the government ultimately has the responsibility to provide education for its citizens and is expected to do so as the country transitions to development after conflict has subsided, the recommendations proposed here will focus on the government.

In order to ensure the sustainability of educational programs, international organizations need to transfer responsibility to the relevant levels of the Ministry of Education gradually and throughout the duration of the program. International organizations cannot afford to wait until they plan to withdraw from a country or decide to take a new direction with their education work to initiate this process. International organizations, particularly NGOs that often must assume responsibility for direct implementation during an acute or protracted crisis, need to play a facilitative role as the country stabilizes and the government is prepared to assume greater responsibility. This change in roles should lead to greater ownership of the education program on behalf of education authorities. International organizations’ efforts to build capacity within their own organizations as well as the Ministry will help to reinforce this transition and facilitate greater assumption of responsibility.

In these efforts, international organizations need to examine different ways of offering technical assistance in order to determine which method might be most effective,
recognizing that this could change depending upon the context. Some of the participants in this study suggested placing a staff member directly in the Ministry to act as an “advisor,” while another suggested a more distant approach that would entail “arms-length technical assistance” through which governments would consult external resources rather than have external consultants thrust upon them. More information and research are needed about these and other possible approaches, and international organizations should develop and experiment with different options. Furthermore, donors should support these efforts and provide funding that ensures that the type of technical assistance provided lasts long enough to be helpful as well as evaluated by those involved.

Related to transferring responsibility and cultivating ownership of educational support by education authorities, international organizations need to assess the ways in which this happens at the various levels in the Ministry of Education. What we saw in the case of the TEP in Angola is that NRC’s efforts were very successful at the municipal and provincial levels, but that challenges abounded at the central level. In a system that has not truly embraced the process of decentralization, efforts at the municipal and provincial levels become increasingly irrelevant if the central Ministry does not share the same views. Recognizing that the strategies used to communicate and generate buy-in at the central level can be problematic for international organizations that perhaps have established operations outside of the capital, the establishment of partnerships becomes even more important. This is one area, in particular, in which relationships with UNICEF and other organizations that have a mandate to engage directly with governments need to be maintained, strengthened and leveraged by those organizations working at a distance.
UNICEF, in particular, should also be prepared to assume this role and represent the needs and efforts of NGOs fairly and accurately.

**Long-term Strategic Planning**

The recommendations proposed above should be accounted for during the planning process that international organizations undertake. This process should consider sustainability as a key component and contemplate what sustainability looks like for the type of educational support being provided (e.g. transfer of responsibility for an intact program, integration of human resources into system, etc.). Planning should adequately account for the time needed to provide educational support as well as the gradual transfer of responsibility to capable stakeholders in order to secure necessary financial resources. It should also consider who these stakeholders might be and what type of capacity building might be needed to facilitate the transfer or integration process. Conversely, partnerships with organizations through which different strengths can be leveraged should be explored early on and throughout the duration of the program. As noted in the TEP example, NRC felt that they had missed an opportunity to develop a broader partnership base once the peace treaty in 2002 had been signed and new actors arrived in Angola. Along these lines, guidelines should be included that help an international organization and its partners assess progress as well as make adjustments to the program in order to better meet the objective of sustainability. To do this thoroughly, all organizations (i.e. NGOs, UN and donors alike) should revise their planning documents to account for sustainability more centrally.
Although the overall objective is to transfer responsibility to the Ministry of Education or another competent partner, an organization’s planning process should also account for its own staff needs in terms of time in the field. One of the main challenges that was cited by numerous participants in this study was high staff turnover and the interruptions and discontinuities in programming that staff who only stayed for short periods of time generated. While due attention must be paid to the extremely difficult environments in which many humanitarian and development staff work, international organizations should continue to explore the ways in which more adequate staff care combined with other incentives might alleviate the challenges presented by high turnover.

**Capacity Building**

In the findings derived from both the educational practitioners working at the global level and those involved with the implementation of the TEP in Angola, it was abundantly clear that the range of organizations active in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction must invest in ongoing capacity building for the various target populations (e.g. educational authorities, school administrators and community leaders) they are working with as well as their own education personnel. The findings of this study emphasized the importance of coupling service delivery with capacity building in order to reverse the legacy of conflict by building up a country’s human resources. UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning recently launched a *Guidebook for Planning Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction*, which includes a chapter on capacity building and is equally relevant for this discussion about sustainability. To begin the process of capacity building, it states, educational
planners must acknowledge that “capacity already exists” and that the first step should entail assessing and evaluating the “human, operational and institutional capacity” in order to identify the “most urgent challenges facing the education system” (UNESCO 2006, p. 31). International organizations working in this arena need to consider the various ways that capacity building can be offered, starting with a realistic plan that gradually develops to include the individuals in the government or the community that most need it.

As the field continues to grow and the role that education can play is given more credence, these organizations and their personnel will be asked to assume greater responsibilities. To respond to this need and demand, international organizations must prioritize professional development opportunities sooner rather than later. While the international organizations may be concerned about the costs related to capacity building, they should consider different strategies, such as combining their efforts with other organizations in order to offset expenses associated with preparing a series of workshops. Organizations should also consider how they might utilize pre-existing resources to develop their own internal, ongoing capacity building efforts. For example, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) has developed numerous resources as well as training materials—primarily based upon the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction—that can be used by these organizations to develop internal organizational capacity. Other organizations have equally relevant resources that can be adapted as needed for internal trainings. In addition to thinking creatively about meeting these needs, international organizations should seek donor assistance to support these efforts. If a group of
organizations were to come together to request financial assistance, as a separate group or under the auspices of INEE, donors might respond more favorably.

The findings in this study stress the urgency of developing capacities and skills required to develop systems, collaborate with Ministries of Education, conduct high-level advocacy, and understand the implications of a country’s transition from relief to development upon any educational support being provided. In reference to the latter, the findings in Chapter IV indicate that staff members at the country level also need to be supported as they make the transition from a relief to a development context due to the effect that it has on the ways in which they engage with beneficiaries and other stakeholders. For the various organizations working in this field, capacity building may be the most urgent recommendation as the capabilities and skills of staff directly contribute to improvements being made in all of the other areas (i.e. integration into the system, long-term planning, partnerships, coordination and fundraising).

**Partnerships and Coordination**

The need for developing partnerships and coordination mechanisms has been recognized by all organizations, but for various reasons continues to be an elusive goal that very few organizations seem able to attain effectively. Part of this appears to stem from individuals’ inability to remove their “organizational hats” and think about the greater needs of those for whom educational support is being provided. In this instance, incentives need to be provided either by senior management or by donors. Some of the donor participants in this study, in fact, acknowledged that they had a role to play in providing these incentives vis-à-vis financial assistance. Therefore, donors should make
the development of partnerships and the need for coordination explicit requirements within their requests for proposals. Depending upon the type of educational support being provided, international organizations should identify potential partnerships at various levels (e.g. international, national, and local) and across different stakeholders (e.g. international organizations, national organizations, Ministries of Education, and community groups to name a few). While coordination across organizations is central to the IASC’s cluster initiative mentioned above, the challenge remains in devising strategies to coordinate organizations and educational support through the transition from humanitarian relief to development as some organizations depart and others arrive on the scene.

**Long-term Predictable Funding**

Efforts are underway to identify alternative funding mechanisms that take into account the long-term educational needs in countries affected by conflict (e.g. Fast Track Initiative), but advocacy efforts must continue to help this process advance. While it proves very difficult for an individual organization to assume this responsibility, a group of organizations working together to make this plea may prove more successful and appear less risky. Again, INEE has a real contribution to make in this area as they are positioned to represent the diversity and collectivity of organizations working in the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction. These organizations’ efforts may also help donors who face their own “use it or lose it” dilemma each budget cycle’ (Dichter in Fisher, 1993, p. ix) make the case internally for longer, more predictable
funding streams. Efforts must be made to eradicate the irresponsibility of starting and stopping educational support prematurely.

**Adaptation to Contextual Factors**

In theory, the international organizations working in this field understand the importance of adapting educational support to the needs of the country in which they have established operations. In practice, this is less clear due to a lack of information about the processes international organizations actually undertake to adapt their programs to different country contexts. In an effort to understand the process that NRC facilitated in adapting a program initially used in Somalia for the Angolan context, I requested documentation about what this process entailed. The availability of this type of documentation was extremely limited and mostly came from unofficial field notes that an NRC staff member had kept that documented how many meetings were held and with which Angolan counterparts in the Ministry or teacher training institute. Other than translating the materials into Portuguese and trying to collect stories about Angola to supplement the curriculum, there were no specifics about what this process entailed. It is understandable that international organizations may not be able to document every aspect of an educational program’s development, but it would greatly benefit organizations working in this field to document and share their good practices and lessons learned in regard to the adaptation process when and where possible. Although the adaptation process and related experiences may be quite unique from one country to another, the process and the types of decisions made would be informative for organizations working in other conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts.
In addition to documenting what happens in the initial stages, it was clear in this study that the adaptation process continues and that international organizations need to be prepared to make adjustments to their programs as the context in which they are working changes. Although documentation about the initial adaptation process was limited for NRC's work with the TEP in Angola, the changes that the organization made over the years in regard to stronger linkages with the country's educational reform, for example, were better documented. International organizations should account for the need to take stock and assess changes in context as part of its long-term planning process.

In regard to the accelerated learning program (ALP) that NRC established vis-à-vis the TEP in Angola and the uncertainties of the program's impact on the learners' continued academic progress after transfer into the formal system, perhaps an ALP that encompassed a complete cycle of primary education would have been more suitable. A programmatic shift of this nature is not simple and would require even stronger collaboration with the Ministry of Education to ensure accreditation of the learning credentials upon completion of the program, not to mention a commitment by the international organization to provide the required institutional, human and financial resources needed to oversee at least a full cycle of the program. However, the benefits for the learners could be enhanced while maintaining the benefits offered to the teachers participating in the program. There is limited documentation about the effectiveness of accelerated learning programs facilitated in conflict-affected and post-conflict environments, but what does exist indicates that longer-term ALPs (i.e. programs that entail several years include a full cycle) are more successful than short-term ALPs (i.e. programs that last no more than one year and serve as a bridge to the formal education
system) in terms of student retention and academic progress (Dennis and Fentiman, 2007; Nicholson, 2007).

These recommendations are not meant to diminish the diligent efforts that the various international organizations are making in this field, but they do hope to stimulate discussion about additional strategies that could be undertaken “to find more explicit points of contact and coordination to maximize each [organization’s] contribution” to the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction (Lederach, 1997, p. 99).

**Contributions of This Study and Directions for Future Research**

This qualitative research study makes a scholarly contribution to the academic literature emerging from the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction, and complements the rich, but anecdotal evidence produced by the various organizations working in this field. The use and development of the conceptual framework of sustainability in this study are unique in the limited application of this concept in the field of education in general.

As noted in the review of the literature in Chapter II, the concept of sustainability rarely has been applied beyond issues concerning sustainable development and the environment. In its most robust application to the education field, Nkansa and Chapman (2006) developed a synthesis model of sustainability that looked specifically at the management and socio-cultural components taking place at the community level. While their model highlights the importance of planning, transparency, resources, leadership
and participation, it neither addresses the needs of the educational system writ large nor the challenges presented by working in a conflict-affected or post-conflict context.

In relation to the use of the concept of sustainability in the philanthropic field, the four main categories that were developed to guide foundations’ strategic planning and evaluation practices are relevant for this study. These four categories, which entailed what foundations wanted to sustain, included the following: 1) the projects and organizations themselves, especially if the latter had been newly created as part of the initiative; 2) the “ideas, beliefs, principles, or values that an initiative is based on or promotes” (p. 4); 3) the relationships that have been established among the various organizations that participated in the initiative; and 4) the outcomes that resulted from the initiative (e.g. codification of policy, long-term engagement of local stakeholders) (Weiss et al., 2002). As far as the TEP was concerned, certain elements of the program were sustained in that human, material and physical resources had been integrated into the formal education system for use within the new accelerated learning program, not to mention the overarching principles of helping out-of-school adolescents and youth recuperate years of lost schooling as a result of the conflict in Angola. Weiss et al. (2002) also noted the importance of assessing contextual changes over time and the need to make adjustments. Despite the usefulness of the four categories mentioned above, the importance of securing funding to sustain any programs initially supported by foundations trumped these other objectives. While funding is a critical element in any type of project or program, it should not overshadow other factors. While the compensation and later incorporation of the TEP teachers into the formal education system obviously required their inclusion within the Ministry of Education’s budget,
there were examples that certain aspects of the program that did not bear any costs were sustainable. For example, the exposure of formal education teachers, supervisors and education authorities to the TEP program vis-à-vis training courses and related meetings signaled that the approaches used in the teaching and learning methodologies were seeping into the system in different ways.

Finally, the findings in this study that the sustainability of educational support and its related concepts are an ongoing, interdependent and shifting process relate to the use of the concept in discussions about education reform. This reference, which addresses the process of scaling up successful education reforms as a key aspect of sustainability, states that the process is "interactive," "adaptive," "iterative" and "nonlinear" (Glennan et al., 2004, p 2). As such, the framework is a living construct that can be built upon through additional research. Despite the limitations of a single case study, the lessons learned that were generated through NRC's implementation of the TEP in Angola coupled with the insights of educational practitioners working at the global level provide illustrative examples that can be used to inform the education work being conducted in this field.

The findings of this study also point to several directions for future research. In terms of sustainability, the organizational perspective taken for this study signifies the need to examine the critical factors affecting this process from other perspectives. The ways in which sustainability is understood by the communities directly involved with the educational support being provided would be particularly important as would the experiences of education authorities. Inevitably, other critical factors can be identified.
that contribute to the ongoing development of the conceptual framework presented in this study.

Although the educational practitioners who participated in this study at the global level alluded to a range of contexts in their responses about the critical factors affecting sustainability, a more structured focus on refugee populations versus IDP populations versus returnees would illuminate the ways in which these critical factors change given the group that international organizations have targeted for their educational support. Similarly, the application of the conceptual framework across different types of educational programs or in different post-conflict contexts may also uncover other critical factors important for consideration and inclusion in this discussion. Depending upon the target group or country context, future studies may require a longitudinal approach that looks at change over time. As interest and research initiatives develop about the ways in which education may mitigate fragility and facilitate stability in conflict-affected and other settings, the concept of sustainability should be considered a central tenet for these types of studies.

Apart from the issue of sustainability, the findings from the case study about NRC’s work with the TEP in Angola also point to the need for additional research about the most effective programs for children and youth who missed out on schooling as a result of conflict. There has been much discussion within the field about the particular needs of youth, but efforts to research and provide more appropriate support services to this group continue to be inadequate. The challenges that NRC faced in monitoring and evaluating the TEP graduates once they entered the formal education system also identify the need to understand these students’ experiences and the impact of bridging or
accelerated learning programs on their overall educational attainment and subsequent employment opportunities. While it often times proves difficult for international organizations to secure and allocate adequate resources for monitoring and evaluation, mutually beneficial opportunities for them to partner with the various universities and research institutes that have started developing academic programs and concentrations in education in emergencies should be explored. By providing opportunities to graduate students and scholars working in this area, the organizations benefit from receiving assistance in the research and evaluation process while the students and scholars gain experience working on the ground.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that more has to be done to ensure access to and completion of quality education for the more than 40 million children who remain out of school because they reside in conflict-affected and fragile states. The efforts being undertaken by the range of international organizations working in this field, often times with extremely limited resources, must be applauded. However, these organizations and others need to continue to advocate for the resources, monetary and beyond, that they need to better respond to the needs of these children and to sustain the educational support being provided. As stated in the introduction of this study, if the opportunities, knowledge and skills provided by educational support during a crisis are not recognized and leveraged in the transition to development, this lack of sustainability has the potential to create resentment among the population as well as exacerbate the underlying fragility of a nation and
reignite conflict. If the international community is truly dedicated to achieving the Education for All and Millennium Development Goals by 2015, more must be done. The needs of adolescents and youth that have been denied an education as a result of civil conflict cannot be forgotten in the process.
REFERENCES


book


APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW-BASED SURVEY (INTERNATIONAL LEVEL)

1. How would you define “sustainability” for education programs implemented by international organizations in conflict-affected/post-conflict countries? What are the key components/critical factors?

2. From your perspective, what are the primary challenges confronting international organizations in their efforts to sustain education programs in conflict-affected/post-conflict countries?

3. Do the primary challenges change depending upon the country context? If so, how?

4. How do these primary challenges change depending upon the organization implementing the education program, if at all? [Please provide an example]

5. How do these primary challenges change depending upon the type of education program being implemented (e.g. teacher training, accelerated learning, life skills, etc.)? [Please provide an example]

6. How is sustainability affected when international organizations set up parallel structures to the government/Ministry of Education? [Please provide an example]
   a. When are parallel structures necessary?
   b. When can they be avoided?

7. Is sustainability important? Why exactly?

8. Is sustainability a top priority for your organization? If so, why?

9. How does your organization measure and/or evaluate the sustainability of educational programs?

10. What do you and your organization need/require to be able to better respond to these challenges (e.g. resources, tools, training)?

11. Which policies/practices with regard to sustainability have you found to be most promising internal or external to your organization? [Please provide an example]

12. If education programs in these contexts are unsustainable, what are the short-term vs. long-term consequences?