Donors’ engagement
Supporting education in fragile and conflict-affected states

The book

Education is a key factor in restoring normalcy and hope and in providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection in emergency situations. However, few donors have humanitarian policies that explicitly include education from the onset of a humanitarian response.

This book gives an overview of the policies, strategies and financial commitments of the 23 influential Western donors that constitute the OECD in relation to education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Three donors, including the European Commission, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, together with two international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) – the International Rescue Committee and Save the Children UK – were interviewed to draw out lessons learned and emerging good practice. A field visit to Liberia obtained a more detailed country perspective.

Recommendations are presented for deeper engagement by external stakeholders (donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs). Suggestions are also made to advise governments in fragile and conflict-affected states how to create an enabling environment for external stakeholders to support service delivery.

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Laura Brannelly, Susy Ndaruhutse and Carole Rigaud
Acknowledgements

The case study information for this research depended strongly on the contributions and willingness to be interviewed of a variety of donor agencies, international non-governmental organizations and government officials at both headquarters and country level. The authors are therefore very grateful for the time taken by four of the five organizations that were studied in-depth for this research (the European Commission, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Rescue Committee and Save the Children UK) and which completed telephone interviews and headquarters and country-level questionnaires. In addition, the authors appreciate the time given by all the individuals and organizational/government representatives who were interviewed in Liberia as part of the country case study that was undertaken there. All those that we have liaised with are mentioned by name in Appendix 1.

This research project has been managed across two agencies, involving different staff members and changes to staffing. We are very grateful to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP-UNESCO) and CfBT Education Trust for the role that they have played in enabling this research partnership to run smoothly despite changes in personnel. At IIEP, Chris Talbot, Cynthia Cohen, Lyndsay Bird, Leonora MacEwen and Sandra Baxter kept a watchful eye on the project, providing constructive and helpful feedback. Within CfBT Education Trust, Carol Flach paid close attention to the progress of the research. The support of these individuals is very much appreciated.

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Foreword to the series

UNESCO is increasingly being requested to provide an educational response in emergency and reconstruction settings. The organization is in the process of developing expertise in this field in order to be able to provide prompt and relevant assistance. It will offer guidance, practical tools and specific training for education policy-makers, officials and planners.

The fifth of the 11 objectives adopted by the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children in emergencies. The Dakar Framework for Action (World Education Forum, 2000) calls for national Education for All plans to include provision for education in emergency situations. Governments, particularly education ministries, have an important role to play in an area that has often been dominated by the actions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies.

The field of educational planning in emergencies and reconstruction is still young. It must be developed through further documentation and analysis. Accumulated institutional memories and knowledge in governments, agencies and NGOs on education in emergencies are in danger of being lost due to the dispersion of documents and to high staff turnover in both national and international contexts. Most of the expertise is currently in the heads of practitioners and needs to be collected while memories are fresh. Diverse experiences of educational reconstruction must be more thoroughly documented and analysed before they disappear from memory.

This task includes the publication in this series of country-specific analyses of the planning and management of education in emergencies and reconstruction. They concern efforts currently being made to restore and transform education systems in countries and territories as diverse as Pakistan, Burundi, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Rwanda. This series has been initiated and sponsored by IIEP, in close collaboration with colleagues in other UNESCO offices.

The objectives of the case studies are:

• to contribute to the process of developing knowledge in the field of education in emergencies and reconstruction;
• to provide focused input for IIEP training programmes for government officials and others in education in emergencies and reconstruction;
• to identify and collect documentation on the management of education in various countries;
• to capture some of the undocumented experiences of practitioners;
• to analyse the responses in different situations to education provision in times of crisis;
• to increase the dissemination of information and analysis on education in emergencies and reconstruction.

IIEP’s larger programme on education in emergencies and reconstruction embraces not only these case studies, but also a series of global, thematic and policy-related studies. In addition, IIEP has published the Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction for ministry of education officials and the agencies assisting them, and is developing training materials for a similar audience. Through this programme, IIEP will make a modest but significant contribution to the field of education in emergencies and reconstruction. Its hope is to enrich the quality of the planning processes applied.

Mark Bray
Director, IIEP
Foreword by CfBT Education Trust

The educational needs of children affected by conflict, emergencies and fragility have become an area of increasing attention. The Dakar Framework for Action stresses the importance of meeting “… the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict” (World Education Forum, 2000: 9). But achieving the Millennium Development Goals and Education For All goals is being seriously impeded by continuing conflict and persistent fragility.

CfBT Education Trust recognizes that studying the provision of education during periods of conflict, emergencies, fragility and reconstruction is an emerging field. While our understanding of how best to provide education in these challenging situations has grown, we nevertheless believe that there remains a need for more research that is both rigorous and more widely disseminated. The research partnership between CfBT Education Trust and IIEP-UNESCO was established to address this need. The partnership has helped to improve our understanding of the specific interventions and of the strategies and methodologies that can be deployed to improve access to, and the provision of, a quality education for those currently denied it.

CfBT Education Trust has long sought to find ways of overcoming the barriers to education for the most disadvantaged children, wherever they are in the world. A key underlying aim of our research and operational work is to improve education opportunities for learners and to enhance the quality of their learning. This research partnership with IIEP has allowed us to combine our practical experience working in the fields of education and emergencies with rigorous research. I hope that the fruits of this research partnership will encourage further collaboration among researchers, practitioners and policy-makers. I hope also that it will foster an increasing adoption of evidence-based policy-making and practice, with a revitalized interest in using practice-based research to plan and deliver education services in situations of conflict, reconstruction and social and political instability.

The research produced as a part of CfBT and IIEP’s partnership is a component of CfBT’s broader Evidence for Education research.
programme. This programme was established with the aim of investing in a coherent body of practice-based development and research that can be shown over time to have a positive impact on education policy and practice both in the UK and worldwide. It is our ambition that through this research partnership with IIEP we are able to contribute to this vital field of education provision and so help improve the opportunities for millions of children whose ability to contribute to the future of their communities would otherwise be jeopardized.

John Harwood  
Chairman, CfBT Education Trust
Contents

Acknowledgements 5
Foreword to the series 7
Foreword by CfBT Education Trust 9
List of abbreviations 13
List of tables 18
List of figures 19
List of boxes 20
Glossary 21
Executive summary 23

Chapter 1 Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states 25
  1.1 Keeping and delivering on the promises of achieving Education for All by 2015 25
  1.2 Research methodology 26
  1.3 Definition of fragile and conflict-affected states 28
  1.4 Donors’ growing recognition of education in emergencies, fragile and conflict-affected states and their recent statements of support 32
  1.5 Non-DAC donors’ growing interest in education in fragile and conflict-affected states 41
  1.6 Principal reasons for donors’ engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states 43
  1.7 Principal reasons for donors’ non-engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states 46
  1.8 Principal reasons for donors’ engagement in prioritizing education in fragile and conflict-affected states 48
  1.9 Principal reasons for donors’ non-engagement in prioritizing education in fragile and conflict-affected states 50
  1.10 Summary 52

Chapter 2 Donors’ financial commitment to education 55
  2.1 Introduction 55
  2.2 Development aid 55
  2.3 Humanitarian aid 68
  2.4 FTI funding flows to fragile and conflict-affected states 72
  2.5 Foundation funding 75
  2.6 Predictability of funding 75
  2.7 Summary 78

Chapter 3 Channels for the financing of education 83
  3.1 Introduction 83
  3.2 Different aid modalities 83
  3.3 DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations 84
  3.4 Which aid modalities work best in which categories of fragile states? 89
  3.5 Summary 107
| Chapter 4 | Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education | 109 |
| 4.1 | Introduction | 109 |
| 4.2 | The European Commission | 109 |
| 4.3 | The Netherlands | 126 |
| 4.4 | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) | 139 |
| 4.5 | Emerging issues for the EC, the Netherlands and Sida | 149 |
| Chapter 5 | Policies, strategies and practices of two INGOs in relation to financing education | 153 |
| 5.1 | Introduction | 153 |
| 5.2 | The International Rescue Committee | 153 |
| 5.3 | Save the Children UK | 169 |
| 5.4 | Emerging issues for the International Rescue Committee and Save the Children UK | 183 |
| Chapter 6 | Policies, strategies and practices of the government, donors and INGOs in relation to financing education in Liberia | 187 |
| 6.1 | Introduction | 187 |
| 6.2 | Background to fragility | 187 |
| 6.3 | Government policy and strategy | 188 |
| 6.4 | Donors’ policies, strategies and engagement | 190 |
| 6.5 | Education sector strategy | 193 |
| 6.6 | Financial mechanisms used by donors | 195 |
| 6.7 | Coordination | 200 |
| 6.8 | Emerging issues | 203 |
| Chapter 7 | Common findings, emerging good practice and lessons learned in relation to financing education | 207 |
| 7.1 | Introduction | 207 |
| 7.2 | Common findings | 207 |
| 7.3 | Emerging good practice and lessons learned | 208 |
| 7.4 | Application of the DAC Principles of good international engagement | 219 |
| 7.5 | Donor engagement versus long-term exit strategies | 220 |
| 7.6 | Summary | 221 |
| Chapter 8 | Recommendations and conclusion | 223 |
| 8.1 | Introduction | 223 |
| 8.2 | Recommendations | 223 |
| 8.3 | Conclusion | 232 |
| Bibliography | 235 |
| Appendix 1 | 253 |
### List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Alliance Cooperation in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Accelerated Learning Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEDP</td>
<td>Basic Education Development Project (Yemen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFS</td>
<td>Conflict-affected fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE</td>
<td>Community-based education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Education Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Catalytic Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGECCD</td>
<td>Consultative Group on Early Childhood and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSA</td>
<td>Child Rights Situation Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Programme (EC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO/OO</td>
<td>Education Division within the Netherlands MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDE</td>
<td>District Directorate of Education (Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>DEC</td>
<td>Disasters Emergencies Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESO</td>
<td>Department for Democracy and Social Development (Sida)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG AIDCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for Aid Co-ordination (EC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of abbreviations

DG DEV  Directorate General for Development (EC)
DG ECHO  Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (EC)
DMH/HH  Humanitarian Aid Division within the Netherlands
MFA  
DPF  Development Partners Forum (Eritrea)
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSS  Direct Support to Schools (Mozambique)
EC  European Commission
ECHO  EC Humanitarian Aid Office
EDF  European Development Fund
EFA  Education for All
EFA-FTI  EFA Fast Track Initiative
EFPS  Education Pooled Fund
EMIS  Educational Management Information System
EPDF  Education Programme Development Fund
EPP  Emergency Preparedness Plan
ESDP  Education Sector Development Programme (EC Eritrea)
ESOP  Emergency Standard Operating Procedures
ETF  Education Transition Fund
EU  European Union
FAWE  Forum for African Women Educationalists
FSG  Fragile States Group (OECD)
FSTT  Fragile States Task Team (EFA-FTI)
GBV  Gender-based violence
GCE  Global Campaign for Education
GDP  Gross domestic product
GEMAP  Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (Liberia)
GFATM  Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GIRA  Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GMR  Global Monitoring Report
GOSS  Government of Southern Sudan
HCS  Humanitarian Coordination Section
HIC  Humanitarian Information Centre
IASC  Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDA  International Development Association
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IIEP</td>
<td>International Institute for Educational Planning (UNESCO)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD-DAC)</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>INEE WGEF</td>
<td>INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPAD</td>
<td>Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRS</td>
<td>Interim poverty reduction strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBAR</td>
<td>Joint Budget and Aid Review (Ethiopia)</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Joint Initiative (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Strategy Paper (EC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German development bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low-income country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LICUS</td>
<td>Low-income country under stress (World Bank)</td>
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<td>LMIC</td>
<td>Lower middle-income country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPERP</td>
<td>Liberian Primary Education Recovery Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRDC</td>
<td>Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<td>LTTP</td>
<td>Liberia Teacher Training Program</td>
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<td>MDEF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Education Fund (EC Myanmar)</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDTF-SS</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Middle-income country</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture (Mozambique)</td>
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<td>MOEYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of understanding</td>
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<td>MSG</td>
<td>Monitoring and steering group (Liberia)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-state actors</td>
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<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand’s International Aid and Development Agency</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PACE-A</td>
<td>Partnership for Advancing Community-based Education in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAU</td>
<td>Programme administrative unit</td>
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<td>PBS</td>
<td>Protection of Basic Services (Ethiopia)</td>
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<td>PDR</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Republic (Lao)</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project management unit</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty reduction strategy</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent-teacher association</td>
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<td>RFTF</td>
<td>Results Focused Transitional Framework (Liberia)</td>
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<td>RIMCO</td>
<td>RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>SEK</td>
<td>Swedish kroner</td>
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<td>SEKA</td>
<td>Department for Cooperation with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance (Sida)</td>
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<td>SFD</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development (Yemen)</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>School management committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Secretariat of Education (Southern Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector-wide approach</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
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<td>UIS</td>
<td>UNESCO Institute of Statistics</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>UN Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of tables

Table 1.1 DAC categorization of fragile states 30
Table 2.1 Response to consolidated and flash appeals, by sector, 2008 70
Table 2.2 Summary of donor activities 80
Table 3.1 DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations 85
Table 3.2 Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in deteriorating environments 91
Table 3.3 Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in arrested development environments 93
Table 3.4 Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in post-conflict transition situations 98
Table 3.5 Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in early recovery situations
Table 6.1 Donor funding in Liberia, 2004-2006 191
Table 7.1 Summary of lessons learned from case studies 209
Table 7.2 Summary of the application of lessons learned and emerging good practice for different DAC categories of fragile states 216
List of figures

Figure 1.1  Rationale for donors’ engagement 53
Figure 2.1  Bilateral ODA and aid to education, 1999-2007 59
Figure 2.2  Donors’ allocation of ODA and education ODA, average 2005-2007 61
Figure 2.3  Donors’ aid allocations by recipient group 63
Figure 2.4  Comparison of aid to basic education per primary school-aged child received by states and the proportion of children out of school 64
Figure 2.5  Donors’ commitments to education in fragile and conflict-affected states, average 2005-2007 65
Figure 2.6  Comparison of donors’ proportional and volume commitments 66
Figure 2.7  Proportion of humanitarian funds provided to the education sector by donor (average 2004-2007) 69
Figure 2.8  Proportion of humanitarian funds allocated to education 70
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Box 1</td>
<td>The OECD-DAC members</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 2</td>
<td>Classification of fragile and conflict-affected states</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 3</td>
<td>The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Education Cluster</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 4</td>
<td>The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 5</td>
<td>The Monterrey Consensus and the Paris Declaration</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 6</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Joint Initiative</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 7</td>
<td>Somalia Basic Education Programme (Somaliland and Puntland)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 8</td>
<td>Southern Sudan MDTF</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 9</td>
<td>Afghanistan MDTF</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 10</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Accelerated Learning Programme (NGO-managed)</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 11</td>
<td>Mozambique Direct Support to Schools Programme (World Bank)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 12</td>
<td>Yemen Social Fund for Development</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 13</td>
<td>Ethiopia basic services grant</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 14</td>
<td>The EC’s education programmes in Eritrea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Somalia</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 15</td>
<td>The Dutch education programmes in Yemen</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 16</td>
<td>Sida’s education programmes in Afghanistan, the DRC and Timor-Leste</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 17</td>
<td>The IRC’s education programmes in Afghanistan, the CAR and the DRC</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 18</td>
<td>Save the Children’s education programme in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 19</td>
<td>Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP)</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 20</td>
<td>Liberia’s 2007 application for funding from the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 21</td>
<td>Summary of recommendations</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

An aid darling is a country that receives a disproportionately higher amount of aid than would seem appropriate relative to its poverty and governance levels.

An aid orphan is a country that receives significantly less aid than would have been predicted based on its poverty and governance levels, and is thus aided by a relatively small number of donors.

Alignment is where donors follow partner country policies, strategies, priorities and public financial management and administrative systems as a guide for their own interventions, with the objective of building capacity and ownership.

Budget support is aid financing provided directly to the government either generally or to a specific sector such as education, to assist funding an agreed national or sector policy and plan. It includes recurrent and capital costs and can be used in any way as long as the national or sector plan remains on track. The fund is managed by the government (either the ministry of finance or the relevant sector ministry) and the finances provided are blended with domestic resources, thus passing through government financial systems and accounted for using government reporting and auditing systems.

A donor orphan (in relation the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund) is a country with four or fewer bilateral donors each giving over US$1 million to the education sector.

Aid is fungible when a government can choose how to use it provided that certain progress indicators are met at a national or sectoral level; it is not guaranteed or earmarked as additional funds for a specific sector.

Harmonization refers to common arrangements between different donors, which leads to the adoption of a set of rationalized procedures and to greater openness and information-sharing regarding aid interventions in a given country or sector within a country.

Long-route accountability refers to the relationship between citizens and their elected government. As part of their role as elected representatives, the state is accountable to its citizens to ensure delivery of services as
outlined in their policies, whilst citizens voice their demands and needs to the government.

A **multi-donor trust fund (MDTF)** is an aid funding mechanism usually managed by the World Bank or the UN where several donors (and the national government if it is able) pool their funding for capital and/or recurrent costs in support of national reconstruction in a post-conflict or post-crisis setting. It is usually shadow aligned with government systems with the aim of handing over management in the longer term, when capacity allows, to the recipient government.

**Partial alignment** is where donors work in a way that is compatible with some aspects of government systems (for example, by working with the systems operating at decentralized levels rather than at the national level) but that is not fully aligned. Usually, partial alignment is followed where there are legitimacy or capacity issues at the national level that are not such an issue at the local level.

**Pooled funding** is a situation where two or more development partners (bilateral, multilateral, NGO, private sector or other) provide funding that is pooled and managed together, whether through a project, programme, trust fund or budget support.

**Project support** is time-bound aid financing to support specific capital investment or pilot approach (for example, the building of 15 primary schools over three years or a two-year project developing an alternative approach to teaching children with disabilities). Funds can be used only to support the criteria outlined in the project document. The project is managed by the donor or NGO through a separate project management unit. Financial reporting takes place according to the donor’s or NGO’s own regulations and requirements.

**Shadow alignment** is where donors work in a way that is compatible with government systems and the longer-term transfer to using government systems, even if they are not working directly through government systems.

**Short-route accountability** refers to the relationship between citizens and service providers. This is a more direct route than the political long-route accountability, with citizens as clients and consumers of services holding the providers directly accountable for the level and quality of services provided.
Executive summary

Millions of children are denied the right to education across the world and although it is estimated that over half of the world’s out-of-school children (40 million) live in fragile and conflict-affected states, these countries receive a disproportionately low amount of education aid (Save the Children, 2009). The ultimate responsibility for ensuring access to education for all lies with governments, but for many countries, especially the poorest, progress also depends heavily on support from the international community, especially donors. In 2000, donors committed themselves to making “new, concrete financial commitments” and providing “increased development assistance and debt relief for education” to help countries achieve Education for All (EFA).1 Nearly ten years later, the question is whether donors have increased their political and financial commitments to education in the poorest countries, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states. An analysis of donor’s funding portfolios, suggests that further prioritization should take place to ensure that their support is aligned with educational needs.

This research set out to examine the changing nature of donors’ engagement in supporting education in fragile and conflict-affected states. It outlines lessons learned and emerging good practice. A detailed examination was undertaken of the policies and practices of three main donors – the European Commission (EC), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) – and two leading international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) – the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Save the Children UK. In addition, a field visit to Liberia was carried out to obtain a more detailed country perspective, and to map the research findings.

The research findings highlight the increased recognition of the importance of education in fragile and conflict-affected states within the international community. The authors point to the role key champions such as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) have played in successfully advocating significant policy and financial commitments to education in such situations. However, the volume of

Executive summary

development funding received by fragile or conflict-affected states does not appear to correlate with the comparative needs for basic education and support required to meet the EFA goals. In terms of humanitarian aid, education remains one of the least-funded sectors.

The book explores appropriate mechanisms for channelling funds to the four different Development Assistance Committee (DAC) categories of fragile states, providing examples and analysing how modalities relate to the DAC principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations (OECD, 2007b). It further suggests the most appropriate funding modalities according to the DAC categories for fragile states. Whilst the donors interviewed typically prefer using budget support or pooled funding to gain greater harmonization and alignment with government priorities, in practice they experience delays and other difficulties in using such mechanisms or feel that other modalities may be more appropriate.

Finally, the authors identify emerging issues and lessons learned for donors, NGOs and education stakeholders to consider in supporting education in fragile and conflict-affected states. It is important for state building to encompass the widest meaning of the term (government and civil society) and even in deteriorating or arrested development contexts, work in close collaboration with local, regional or central governments by working through non-state actors as implementing partners. Furthermore, coordination and harmonization are made easier where governments are open to working with a range of stakeholders and have a clear education plan and strategy in place. Supporting an education sector policy and plan, where possible, encourages ownership and relevance. In addition, INGOs and donors can play a key role in providing services to groups whom the government finds challenging to reach, thus avoiding pockets of exclusion. Finally, long-term engagement is important; with the shifts towards reconstruction, funding gaps could emerge risking a discontinuity of the progress already made.

Based on emerging issues and lessons learnt the research offers recommendations, linked to the DAC Principles, for external stakeholders seeking to strengthen their engagement in education in fragile and conflict-affected states, and for governments to provide an enabling environment for stakeholders to engage more deeply.
Chapter 1

Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

1.1 Keeping and delivering on the promises of achieving Education for All by 2015

In April 2000, ten years after the declaration of Education for All (EFA) pronounced in Jomtien in 1990, 164 governments, together with partner organizations from around the world, committed themselves at the Dakar World Education Forum to achieving EFA. They adopted the *Dakar Framework for Action* (UNESCO, 2000) focusing on the achievement of six key educational goals and aiming to meet the learning needs of children, youth and adults by 2015. In September that year, 189 member states of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Millennium Declaration and agreed to work towards the reduction of poverty by 2015. This commitment produced the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The EFA goals are complementary to the MDGs and contribute in particular to MDG2 and MDG3, which are directly concerned with education: respectively, to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE) and to empower women and promote equality between women and men by 2015. Since 2000, this international commitment to education has been reinforced at many global meetings and conferences.

The Dakar World Education Forum recognized children’s rights during emergencies and explicitly acknowledged that armed conflicts constitute a key barrier to the achievement of EFA. The *Dakar Framework for Action* specifically mentions the need to “meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict” (UNESCO, 2000: 19). Millions of children are denied the right to education in countries affected by emergencies, conflict or aspects of

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2. The sixth edition of the *EFA Global Monitoring Report* assessed the extent to which these commitments were being met (UNESCO, 2007).
fragility and instability, and which often receive limited education aid. Despite a drop in the number of out-of-school children\(^3\) by 28 million between 2000 and 2006, there are still 75 million children not in school (UNESCO, 2008). Out-of-school children living in conflict-affected countries make up over half of these out-of-school children globally – 40 million, according to the latest figures (Save the Children, 2009). Many of these countries are therefore at risk of not achieving UPE by 2015. According to UNESCO (2007: 181), 58 countries are not on track to achieve UPE by 2015 if current trends continue and of these, 11 are considered to be fragile states. Within this group of 58 countries, 45 (seven of them fragile) are not anticipated to achieve UPE by 2025, unless there is an acceleration in positive trends or a reversal of negative trends.

The ultimate responsibility for ensuring access for all children lies with governments, but for many countries, especially the poorest, progress also relies heavily on support from the international community, especially donors. In 2000, donors committed themselves to ensuring that no country taking the goal of EFA seriously shall lack the resources to accomplish this (UNESCO, 2000). A decade later, has there been a ‘Dakar effect’?\(^4\) Have donors fulfilled their promises? Have they increased their political and financial priority given to education in the poorest countries, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states? Can their current engagement help achieve the huge challenge of getting the 40 million out-of-school children living in fragile and conflict-affected states into school by 2015?

1.2 Research methodology

This research gives an overview of the policies, strategies and financial commitments of the 23 influential Western donors that constitute the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in relation to education

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3. A child is considered to be out of school if he or she is of primary school age and not enrolled in either primary or secondary school (UIS, 2007).

4. As explained by UNESCO (2007: 154), “the Dakar meeting in 2000 was essentially initiated by donors and international organizations as a way of reinvigorating the movement towards universal primary education and the other aspects of basic education that had developed at Jomtien in 1990 but had slowed during the following decade. Among other objectives, the Dakar meeting was intended to galvanize donors into giving increased financial support”.

26
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states. The OECD is considered as one of the main forums to discuss assistance to less developed countries. It provides the majority of aid and, unlike the majority of non-DAC donors, reports aid activities for education to the DAC Secretariat. Box 1 provides information on the 23 OECD-DAC members.

**Box 1 The OECD-DAC members**

Twenty-two countries and the Commission of the European Communities (plus eight observer states) make up the DAC, including nations from North America, Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific. The 22 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA).

We begin with a literature review related to multilateral and bilateral donors’ engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, including donors’ recent policy and strategy declarations on education. We then present an overview of the current provision of and trends in donor funding to education in these states.

In order to learn from some of the main donors that provide educational assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key policy-makers and practitioners. Three leading donors (the European Commission (EC), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)) and two leading international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Save the Children UK) were interviewed to draw out similarities, differences, lessons learned and emerging good practice. This can be built upon by others to create an evidence base for deeper engagement. These interviews also sought to gain a fuller picture of whether the rhetoric of deeper engagement is actually taking place on the ground. This was achieved through interviews with both international agency staff based at headquarters and those who are leading in-country programmes for education in fragile and conflict-affected states. A

5. Sida’s education officials did not respond to our request for more information on country programmes so the analysis presented in Chapter 4 is more limited than what has already been presented for the EC and the Netherlands, thus it has been difficult to comment on whether the policy rhetoric is actually followed on the ground.
Donors’ engagement

mixture of methods was used, including telephone interviews and written questionnaires, supplemented by an analysis of official policy and strategy documents.

In addition to the interviews of international agency staff at headquarters and country level, a field visit was undertaken to Liberia to conduct more in-depth interviews with those leading in-country programmes for education, staff in the national Ministry of Education (MOE) and non-state providers of education. The aim of these interviews was to obtain a more detailed picture of the reality in relation to donor engagement in the education sector within a particular country. These also sought perspectives of a variety of actors in order to triangulate the research findings, and present a broad perspective of actual practice. We chose Liberia partly due to the challenges the country is facing in reaching the MDGs, and partly because it has recently become a popular location for donor activity and has emerged from a situation of civil war to one of greater stability.

1.3 Definition of fragile and conflict-affected states

There is no one common definition of fragility, and different agencies and communities focus on various aspects of fragility. Several bilateral donors, including the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), focus on the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness across four main areas – security, politics, economics and society (USAID, 2005a: 4; Moreno Torres and Anderson, 2004: 7) – while others may focus specifically on one or more of these aspects rather than all four.

Agencies and communities are using evolving terms in relation to fragility. The most common include:

- weak, failing, failed or collapsed states (used by security and international relations communities);
- failing states, failed states and recovering states (USAID, 2005a);
- conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS) (Save the Children, 2007b);
- low-income countries under stress (LICUS) or poor performers (used by the World Bank until 2007);
- fragile and conflict-affected countries (presently used by the World Bank);
- difficult environments (OECD-DAC; DFID, 2005).
The World Bank defines fragility based on its Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIAs). Countries are defined as fragile if they fall within the lowest two categories (out of five) in relation to performance plus a separate group of unranked countries. Save the Children’s definition of CAFS focuses on those countries that have low CPIA scores and are affected by conflict as indicated by the Project Ploughshares list and the failed states index, but includes five lower middle-income countries (LMICs) – Angola, Colombia, Congo, Iraq and Sri Lanka. The European Commission (EC) tends to avoid the term ‘fragile states’ as aspects of fragility can concern regions, states, parts of states or communities. Not surprisingly, there are more general objections to the term ‘fragile state’ being used to label countries as this can be counter-productive and countries could become stigmatized. The antonymic term of resilience is often used to shift the focus away from the negative connotations of weakness or fragility towards the more progressive ideas of strengthening capacity (OECD, 2008a).

The terms fragility and resilience should be used as dynamic concepts recognizing the fluidity of different contexts and multiple contributing factors, including economic development, conflict, natural resources and climate change, natural disasters, the global economic climate, international systems and other external shocks. Yet the emphasis of definitions used by donors, international organizations and academics still contains a central element concerning the willingness and capacity of the state and its institutions to operate effectively in the interests of its citizens. As such, while definitions of fragility and the factors contributing to it may be broadening, throughout this book we use the following functional definition of fragility: where a state is unable and/or unwilling to provide basic services for its population.

The OECD-DAC distinguishes between four different categories of fragile states (OECD, 2008b). In order to ensure consistency with international commitments and frameworks for engaging with fragile and conflict-affected states, the authors frame the discussion in this book within this context and have summarized the DAC categories, giving examples, in Table 1.1.

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Table 1.1  DAC categorization of fragile states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Deteriorating</td>
<td>Conflict or risk of conflict; weakening capacity and/or weakening will</td>
<td>Zimbabwe, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Arrested development</td>
<td>Varied capacity; lack of will; state not using its capacity for pro-poor development</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Post-conflict transition</td>
<td>Risk of conflict; low capacity; low or high will</td>
<td>Afghanistan, South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Early recovery</td>
<td>Possibility of being post-conflict; low capacity; high will</td>
<td>Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Rwanda, Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on OECD, 2008b with examples given by authors.

While the DAC framework assumes that states can be categorized into one of the four options, it is clear that fragility is not a static condition, and that countries transition in and out of different categories of fragility. Fragility thus includes states affected by conflict and humanitarian disasters, as well as those that have low effectiveness or lack legitimacy. In addition, in stable countries situated in regions that are fragile and in countries that are not generally considered fragile but that have pockets of fragility within them, fragility may have a knock-on effect as refugees, rebel groups or humanitarian crises spread over borders or into wider areas of the country.

Box 2 outlines the main classification of fragile and conflict-affected states according to four key indices and defines which countries are included under each index. It then describes the classification adopted within this study.
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

Box 2  Classification of fragile and conflict-affected states

Definitions of fragility vary according to the donor and organization, as discussed above, which affects the countries they therefore classify as fragile, as shown below. The 17 country names that are italicized appear in all four organizations’ country lists.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Colombia, the Republic of the Congo, the Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, the Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Liberia, Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, the Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Liberia, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Vanuatu, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen and Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to reflect the nuances of each of these categorizations and the definitions behind them, a list of fragile and conflict-affected states was
created for this research, taking into consideration the different approaches taken. This list was compiled by comparing the countries that appear in different classifications of fragile and conflict-affected states. To be included on the list of countries used for data analysis in this book, the countries had to meet at least three of the following criteria:

1. appear as ‘critical’ on the Fund for Peace Fragile State Index* between 2006 and 2008;
2. appear in the bottom quartile of the Brookings Institute Index of State Weakness;**
3. receive an average IDA Resource Allocation Index score of 3.5 or below in 2007;***
4. be listed as having an armed conflict or recently ended conflict in the 2007 and/or 2008 Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report.****

Subsequently, this publication has considered the following 28 states to be fragile and conflict-affected: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. This includes all 17 countries appearing in the above four donor and organization classifications and provides a breadth of countries affected by fragility and conflict, with contexts from deterioration and arrested development to post-conflict reconstruction and early recovery.

* www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php
** www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx
*** http://go.worldbank.org/S2THW11X60
**** www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePageRev.htm


1.4 Donors’ growing recognition of education in emergencies, fragile and conflict-affected states and their recent statements of support

*The recognition of education as a right in emergencies and humanitarian contexts*

Enshrined in human rights instruments (such as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the UN Millennium Declaration, and the Dakar Framework for Action), the right of education in emergencies is now increasingly recognized in both the policies and frameworks of several major donors, such as Canada (CIDA, 2006: 23), Norway (Norwegian MOFA, 2003: 1)
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

and Sweden (Sida, 2001: 2). Education is also increasingly perceived as a key factor in restoring normalcy and hope, a necessity that can be both life sustaining and life saving, providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection. Its role in the promotion of peace and human development is also acknowledged (INEE, 2007). Yet only a few OECD-DAC donors have humanitarian policies that explicitly include education from day one of a humanitarian response or that refer to education as part of their humanitarian policy. These donors include Canada (CIDA, 2007: 42), Denmark (DANIDA, 2002: 13), Japan (Government of Japan, 2005: 16), Norway (Norwegian MOFA, 2003: 11) and Sweden (Sida, 2002c).

Other donors, such as the EC Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), one of the main actors providing humanitarian assistance in emergencies, have no specific mention of education in their humanitarian policies but are currently reviewing them. According to an EC official, ECHO, the mandate of which is to save lives, had not considered education as life-saving until very recently (personal communication, June 2007). Education, however, does seem to be forming a component of the EC’s humanitarian response. The EC is also aware of the gap between emergency and development and seems to be working on how better to bridge the ‘early recovery’ gap and link relief and development (DFID, 2007b). This gap between emergency and development responses is both organizational and conceptual, with agencies identifying very different needs to be met in these two different contexts (lifesaving, basic needs versus longer-term stability and economic growth) and therefore adjusting their responses and subsequent organizational structure accordingly to best meet them. However, in practice, just as there is a spectrum of different humanitarian crises and development contexts, so there is a broad continuum of transitional progress between the two. This progress may not always be linear and requires a coordinated approach to help address basic needs while also equipping individuals, organizations and the state to meet these needs themselves.

The Netherlands does not have a specific reference to education in its humanitarian policy, but refers to it in its website. In contrast, many

7. For more details on the potentially protective element of education in emergencies, see Nicolai and Triplehorn (2003: 10) and IIEP-UNESCO (2006).
Donors’ engagement

donors still do not consider education as a lifesaving sector and have not recognized education as part of all humanitarian responses. However, some have included education activities in their humanitarian response in the field. Switzerland mentions, for example, school reconstruction along with the rebuilding of other social infrastructure. The USA refers to activities that include education responses, such as Safe Spaces and Youth Centres, and links education activities to other sectors (water, sanitation and hygiene, HIV and AIDS, and so on). Greater consistency is needed between donor policy and practice, with humanitarian aid policies recognizing the importance of education and the work already being undertaken. Box 3 provides information on the recently created UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Education Cluster for co-ordinating humanitarian aid.

Recognition of the importance of education in fragile and conflict-affected states

The field of education in fragile and conflict-affected states is relatively new. Some donors have been pioneers in this field, however, addressing the issue since the beginning of the twenty-first century and integrating it in their policies. These include the governments of Norway, Sweden and Canada. In 1999, Canada developed an operational framework on education and peace building, of which the “primary purpose [was] to provoke a broader discussion especially in regions of conflict, on the positive or negative roles of education in war and peace situations” (CIDA, 1999: 1). Two years later, Sweden published a reference paper entitled Education in situations of emergency, conflict and post-conflict, which stressed the “right to education for all children” (Sida, 2002b: 2). It described Sida’s views and support for education in countries in situations of emergency, conflict and post-conflict. In 2003, Norway developed its strategy paper Education – Job number 1. One of its guiding principles was already to “support efforts to ensure that education is provided in emergencies and from day one in post-war rehabilitation situations” (Norwegian MOFA, 2003: 2). It also recognized wars and disasters as the main barriers to reaching EFA and stressed the need to include education in its humanitarian response: “Children are a particularly vulnerable group when countries are affected by war and other disasters. When Norway provides humanitarian assistance in such situations, education will be a major priority” (Norwegian MOFA, 2003: 11). As stressed by Rognerud (2005: 51), this approach has often been considered as “exemplary, amongst both advocates and practitioners in the field”.

Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

A number of major donor countries have of late been developing or reviewing their strategies on education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Many donors, for example in Australia (AusAID, 2005a; 2007: 25), Canada (CIDA, 2005: 13), Denmark (DANIDA, 2007b: 29 and 31),

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**Box 3 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Education Cluster**

The UN Cluster system was introduced in 2005 to improve the predictability, timeliness and effectiveness of the response to humanitarian crises.* While not initially included as a global cluster, Education Clusters were formed in several cluster roll-out countries. The Cluster Approach was notably activated at the time of the Pakistan earthquake of October 2005** to ensure communication and coordination among the various partners (Kirk, 2008; Haiplik, 2007).*** As highlighted by Kirk (2008: 209): “although education was not formally accepted as an IASC Cluster at the time of the Pakistan earthquake, an Education Cluster nonetheless was successfully formed and operated.”

Recognizing the value of including education in the Cluster system, the IASC – the primary mechanism for the inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, consisting of representatives from key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners – endorsed the creation of the Education Cluster in December 2006. Co-led by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Save the Children Alliance, this new Cluster is expected to increase and fully legitimize the role education can play in an emergency response, plus ensure a coordinated response and attract adequate funding. Key objectives for the Cluster at a global level are as follows: (i) to map gaps and capacities at the global and country levels to improve preparedness and response; (ii) to establish core capacity at the global level and develop coordination capacity and mechanisms for improved response; (iii) to strengthen the capacity and preparedness of government authorities and humanitarian personnel; and (iv) to develop and test needs assessment toolkits, and document and evaluate education responses.

* [www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/Cluster/default.asp?mainbodyID=5&publish=0](www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/Cluster/default.asp?mainbodyID=5&publish=0)
** On 8 October 2005, an earthquake of a magnitude of 7.6 on the Richter scale struck the northern areas of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. The two administrative areas of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) were particularly affected – around 18,000 students and teachers died and two thirds of schools in the affected areas were destroyed.
*** As stressed by Haiplik (2007: 40), “the overall aims of the field-level clusters were: to ensure coordination of emergency education programmes and activities among the partners engaged in the emergency education response; to facilitate effective sharing of information and data among education cluster partners and across other sector clusters; and to facilitate the exchange of ideas, data, guidelines and solutions to outstanding issues”.

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Germany (BMZ, 2007), Ireland (Irish Aid, 2006: 12), Portugal (IPAD, 2006: 30), UK (DFID, 2005) and the USA (USAID, 2005b), have mentioned education in fragile states or difficult environments within their development policy or policy papers, indicating that education and fragility is becoming an emerging priority for some donors. Spain, for example, mentions in its education strategy that: “with particular attention to countries that are conflict-prone, in conflict or in post-conflict situations, and to the most vulnerable groups, noteworthy are education activities for peace building, the training of teachers and sociocultural mediators, and reinforcing the activity of public higher education institutions” (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 2005a: 6). In its three-year development cooperation programme for 2006-2008, Austria also stresses: “in all the above interventions great attention is paid to the question of children in armed conflicts” (Austrian Federal MOFA, 2006: 36).

In 2006, USAID developed an assessment tool in order to identify the links between education and fragility (USAID, 2006). On 22 June 2006, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) sponsored the ‘Policy roundtable on education in emergencies, fragile states and reconstruction: addressing challenges and exploring alternatives’, which took place at UNICEF headquarters in New York. This roundtable focused on three objectives: (i) to contribute to policy dialogue that will effectively connect and leverage the various education initiatives being carried out in the domains of humanitarian assistance, development, gender equality, fragile states and child protection; (ii) to identify alternative financing mechanisms; and (iii) to examine the ways in which the INEE Minimum Standards can be used by donors and other stakeholders to support their work in education (CIDA and INEE, 2006). Recently, an increasing number of papers on the delivery of education in fragile and conflict-affected states and its effectiveness have appeared, including a DFID Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments working paper on Aid instruments in fragile states (Leader and Colenso, 2005); the OECD-DAC commissioned report on education in fragile states, Education in fragile states: capturing lessons and identifying good practice (Rose and Greeley, 2006), a Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) commissioned paper on Donors and the ‘fragile states’ agenda (Cammock, McLeod, Rocha Menocal and Christiansen, 2006); and a briefing paper entitled Education aid in fragile states: delivering it effectively (Berry, 2007).
This interest, as well as the fact that international mechanisms such as the EFA Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) and agreements like the *Paris Declaration* (2005) are less relevant for these states (Colenso and Buckland, 2006), has led to the establishment of a variety of working groups and initiatives focusing on education and fragility. These groups have been established in order to tackle a number of difficulties that these states confront, including issues related to resources and aid effectiveness principles. As far as resources are concerned, as underlined by UNICEF: “the situation is worse for post crisis transition and for fragile states, where the urgency of saving lives is no longer compelling and yet the situation is much too unstable for conventional resources to be invested through standard channels for external assistance” (UNICEF, 2007: 2).

There are currently two groups working on education and fragile states: the EFA-FTI Fragile States Task Team (EFA-FTI FSTT), and the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility (WGEF). These groups overlap in membership and in order to ensure that duplication of work is avoided, the key members of these initiatives agreed to maintain strong links with each other.

The EFA-FTI was launched in 2002 by the World Bank and other development partners as a global partnership between developing countries and donors to help low-income countries (LICs) achieve free UPE by 2015 and to mobilize funds for education. Three years later, the EFA-FTI FSTT, led by DFID, was created. This group includes representatives from donor agencies, multilateral agencies, humanitarian agencies, civil society and the FTI Secretariat. It was established to consider whether and how the FTI should increase its support for education in fragile states. Since its meeting in Cairo in November 2006, the FSTT’s mandate has been: (i) to explore the provision of interim support to fragile states to help get them on track for the FTI endorsement process; (ii) to develop and endorse a “progressive framework for education”: a roadmap to get fragile countries on track for FTI endorsement; and (iii) to continue making linkages between humanitarian and development assistance. The *Progressive Framework* was developed for support to education in fragile states in 2006 (FTI Secretariat, 2007a) and is due to be piloted in a few countries. Additionally, a request was made at the Tokyo 2008 Steering Committee meeting to explore appropriate financing mechanisms to support fragile states. Discussions have proposed the creation of an ‘interim status’ for fragile states and access to an Education Transition Fund (ETF) as countries progress towards full endorsement (FTI Secretariat,
The ETF (built upon a pooled fund by the Netherlands in 2007 for education in conflict-affected countries and described below) would continue to be managed by UNICEF, but would be integrated into the FTI structure. The ETF will aim to support investment in education provision and in doing so, also contribute towards the enhancement of the quality of education delivery and strengthen the education system and its role in improving stability and reducing fragility (FTI Secretariat, 2008e).

Established in February 2008, the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility (WGEF) is made up of practitioners, policy-makers and researchers engaged in advocacy, research and policy development in the education sector in fragile states. The Working Group’s goals are: (i) to strengthen consensus on what works to mitigate state fragility through education while ensuring equitable access for all; (ii) to support the development of effective quality education programmes in fragile states; and (iii) to promote the development of alternative mechanisms to support education in fragile states in the transition from humanitarian to development assistance. It is also envisaged that once the FTI FSTT completes its work, it will discuss its future and possibly fold into the INEE WGEF.

The OECD-DAC has now integrated its approach to fragile states and conflict into a new International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).10 This brings together, in one forum, the work undertaken by the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group (FSG) and the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation. INCAF also works alongside the OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, but whilst the focus of INCAF is on fragile and conflict-affected countries, its remit goes beyond aid management to include the broader issues of governance, security, peace building and capacity.

The preceding OECD-DAC FSG had two important achievements. In May 2006, it published the aforementioned report Education in fragile states: capturing lessons and identifying good practice (Rose and Greeley, 2006). This study examines how development assistance in the four DAC categories of fragile states can enhance access to quality basic education, mitigating the risks of fragility and increasing the effectiveness of future aid. The OECD-DAC FSG also recommended the

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10. www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_41840710_1_1_1_1,00.html
development of principles for supporting donor engagement in fragile states in *Principles for good international engagement in fragile states* (OECD, 2007b). Drafted in 2005 and endorsed at the 2007 OECD-DAC High Level Meeting, these ten principles aim to complement and inform the commitments set out in the 2005 *Paris Declaration*.

**Recent political and financial statements of support for education in fragile and conflict-affected states**

In recognition of the urgency to support education in fragile and conflict-affected states, a certain number of donor governments have also made very strong political and financial commitments. Over the past year, nearly US$600 million in new international assistance was committed by the UK and the Netherlands governments to support education-in-crisis programmes. In December 2006, the Netherlands pledged US$201 million over four years (2006/2010) to UNICEF to provide children in countries affected by conflict with education. This contribution, the single largest sum that UNICEF has ever received, aims to provide 25 million children and young people in 40 countries with a better education and a more promising future. It has also formed the basis of the Education Transition Fund, to be incorporated into the FTI structure, and proved instrumental in prompting other donors to action, as mentioned above. A few months later, in April 2007, the UK announced its ‘Education beyond borders’ package (DFID, 2007a). This package will include a £20 million grant to UNICEF over the next four to five years, to deliver education in emergency, conflict and post-crisis countries. This is in addition to UK support to education in conflict and post-conflict countries, including financial support to Nepal (£60 million to 2015), Burundi (£6 million over three years), Sierra Leone (£9 million over four years) and Somalia (£9 million over three years) (DFID, 2007a). As highlighted by Hilary Benn, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development (5 April 2007): “to meet our collective aim of getting every child into primary education by 2015, and our commitment to provide greater support to fragile and conflict-affected states, this new initiative will provide a vital boost of funds, support and expertise to bring education to those made most vulnerable by conflict” (DFID, 2007a). In May 2007, a new EFA Act was introduced to the US Congress. If passed, this initiative would provide US$4 billion for

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Donors’ engagement

education over the next five years, with a focus on out-of-school children and education in emergencies and conflict-affected countries.12

During the political and technical sessions of the world’s first ever global donors’ conference for education, hosted in Brussels in May 2007,13 major speakers, including Gordon Brown (the UK Prime Minister), Louis Michel (the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid) and Richard Manning (the then OECD-DAC Chair), addressed the need to increase education support for countries affected by conflict and mentioned conflict or fragile states as a major impediment to EFA. The UK and Netherlands re-announced their financial contribution for education in fragile and conflict-affected states. The EC announced new funding of €1.7 billion for education from its new programming cycle (the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) – 2008/2013) and from the EC budget, some of which will go to conflict countries.14 The World Bank also extended its support for post-conflict countries and announced its investment of US$1.5 billion in education in the poorest countries during 2007, which will continue into 2008 in Education Plans in the 68 poorest countries (EC, 2007d).

The Accra Agenda for Action reinforced the messages of the Paris Declaration and commitments to aid effectiveness in fragile contexts (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008). It included a paragraph on adapting aid policies so that they are more appropriate to fragile situations in which there is weak ownership or capacity. The paragraph included the following commitments: Donors committed to conducting joint assessments of governance and capacity to identify the root causes of fragility. Following on from this, donors and developing countries committed to agree on realistic objectives to tackle these causes of fragility and conflict. They also agreed to support partner governments’ efforts by responding to demands

12. www.results.org/website/article.asp?id=2751
13. Hosted in Brussels by the EC and co-organized by the UK government and the World Bank, this event aimed to generate renewed high-level political commitment to finance basic education in an urgent and long-term predictable way in order to accelerate progress towards the education MDG. In addition to the EC, the UK and the World Bank, the event was attended by over 200 people, including ministers and other representatives from the OECD, the Middle East and developing countries, and high-level representatives of the private sector, international organizations, foundations and civil society organizations (EC, 2007d).
14. This will include €80 million for basic education under its thematic programme ‘Investing in People’, of which €22 million will support the EFA Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI).
for capacity development and developing phased interim approaches that help strengthen local institutions. When providing aid, donors committed to using flexible, but responsive, long-term funding modalities, including the use of pooled funding where appropriate. They also agreed to use funding modalities to support stabilization and governance processes, and to bridge humanitarian and longer-term development transitions. Lastly, donors and developing countries committed to monitoring the implementation of the DAC principles for good international engagement in fragile states and the Paris Declaration, and sharing results as part of this process. The following Doha Declaration on Financing for Development emphasized that “special and sustained attention is needed to support post-conflict countries in their rebuilding and development efforts” (UN, 2008: 7).

1.5 Non-DAC donors’ growing interest in education in fragile and conflict-affected states

Despite the fact that the focus of this research is on OECD-DAC donors, it is worth mentioning that ‘non-DAC’ donors are becoming increasingly involved in education and, for some, in education in emergencies. Although they are often described as ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ donors, Manning (2006) prefers to refer to them as ‘non-DAC’ or ‘re-emerging’ donors. These donors do not, however, constitute a homogeneous group and include states (mainly those in the Gulf, in Asia, the accession states to the European Union (EU), South Africa and countries in Latin America), private foundations and corporations.

States in the Gulf are particularly active. At a consultative group meeting for the Republic of Yemen, organized in London on 15-16 November 2006, the Islamic Development Bank and the Gulf Cooperation Council pledged US$109 million for education and vocational training in Yemen. The governments of Bahrain and Qatar, as well as the Saudi Fund, also affirmed their commitment to education at the donors’ conference for education that took place in Brussels on 2 May 2007. They outlined their increasing aid to the sector and their

15. According to Harmer and Cotterrell (2005: 7-8): “[t]he central European states (...) were aid-givers during the communist period. The Gulf States too have a history of development financing and support to Arab and Muslim populations. Asian countries have for many years been responding to natural disasters within their borders and in the region, and have provided development and economic aid to their neighbours and further afield”.

International Institute for Educational Planning www.iiep.unesco.org
willingness to share their experiences in basic education with other countries (EC, 2007c). China has recently re-emerged as a potential source of external finance, notably for African countries. However, as stressed by UNESCO (2007: 162): “the focus of the US$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund is on natural resources, infrastructure, large-scale agriculture, manufacturing and industrial parks. Few, if any, of the funds are likely to be directed to basic education”. Some of these donors have been engaged in humanitarian response for many years. However, only three (the Czech Republic, the Republic of Korea and Turkey) report giving aid to education (UNESCO, 2007). They also account for a small share of official humanitarian assistance and tend to focus on a few specific locations, such as Afghanistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005).

Other donors outside of the traditional DAC group include the private sector and foundations. In September 2006, the NoVo Foundation awarded US$15 million over six years to support the IRC’s work with children and youth in West Africa, with a focus on Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. This donation, announced at the annual meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative, intends to provide on-the-ground services (teacher training, school construction, vocational training, and so on) that will lay the foundation for sustainable education in West Africa. At the World Economic Forum on the Middle East, held at the Dead Sea in Jordan on 18-20 May 2007, the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, launched an Arab development foundation with an endowment of US$10 billion to raise education standards in the Middle East. Based in the United Arab Emirates, the Sheikh Mohammed Foundation will initially finance the education of some 100 applicants from the 22 member countries of the Arab League in pursuing their Master’s degrees at selected leading universities (Black, 2007; Kerr, 2007; Al Najami, 2007). At the donors’ conference for education on 2 May 2007, the Soros Foundation promised, conditional to other donors’ commitment (that is, trying to leverage other donors into action), an investment of €3.7 million in support of Liberia’s education plans (Soros, 2007). The Gates and Hewlett Foundations have also committed

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16. Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen.
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

US$60 million over three years for programmes aimed at improving learning achievements in LICs (EC, 2007c).

A group of private sector representatives (Cisco Systems, Intel, Microsoft and AMD) also announced that they would work through the World Economic Forum’s Partnership for Education in support of country education plans (EC, 2007c; World Economic Forum, 2007). The increasing role of public-private partnerships was also highlighted in 2006 when the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) launched the ‘ninemillion’ campaign,17 which intended to raise US$220 million by 2010 to allow nine million refugees and vulnerable children to have access to education, sport and technology by 2010. The initial focus of ‘ninemillion’ is on uprooted children from Darfur, Iraq and Colombia. This campaign brings together UNHCR and private sector partners, such as Nike, Microsoft, Manpower, the advertising group WPP (Wire & Plastic Products) and GSMA (Global System for Mobile communications Association), an association of mobile phone operators and equipment suppliers (UNHCR, 2007).

Another education grant was announced at the Clinton Global Initiative summit in September 2007 as part of the Clinton Initiative’s Education Partnership for children in conflict, co-chaired by Gene Sperling, an economist and advocate for education for children affected by conflict. Under a US$30 million grant from the William J. Clinton Foundation to UNICEF, 150,000 children in conflict areas, especially Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, will benefit from a distance-learning project.18 UNICEF is working with Microsoft, the IRC and computer maker Hewlett Packard on this project.

1.6 Principal reasons for donors’ engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states

Debiel, Klingebiel, Mehler and Schneckener (2005: 3) outline four main ways that donors may operate in relation to engaging in fragile and conflict-affected states:

1. non-engagement and conscious passivity;
2. exerting influence and pressure through assistance and support programmes;
3. the threat and use of coercive measures;

17. www.ninemillion.org
18. www.unicef.org/malaysia/media_7387.html
4. the short-term assumption of government functions via protectorates or quasi-protectorates.

There are various reasons why donors may choose to operate in one or more of these ways in different fragile and conflict-affected states. The principal reasons are outlined below.

**Historical ties, security concerns and links to regional stability**

For many donors, aid giving reflects wider historical, political and ideological interests, as seen during the Cold War. Today, donors such as France and Italy still give priority to former colonies, as seen with France’s priority solidarity zone and Italy’s support to the Horn of Africa. Donors also tend to support countries with which they share an official language – France for Francophone countries, the UK for Anglophone countries, and so on. Aid is used as an instrument of foreign policy. Rognerud (2005: 61) describes the case for Norway: “to Norway, a country with just 4.5 million inhabitants, the ‘aid business’ is not just big business, it is in fact a pillar of national identity and one of the country’s most powerful foreign policy tools”. Other donors, such as Australia and New Zealand, allocate the bulk of their assistance to their neighbours and to regional stability. New Zealand gives priority to 11 Pacific countries, while Australia’s aid assistance programme focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. Austria and Greece privilege the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Moldova). Security factors are therefore important and have become even more influential after the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 and the ‘war on terror’.19 This concern for regional or national stability explains donors’ selective assistance as well as their focus on specific crises, including the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, Iraq and Timor-Leste. As indicated on the website of Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID): “Australia gives aid to other countries because it improves our regional security”.20

**Humanitarian concerns**

Donors’ engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states can also be explained by solidarity and humanity. This is, for example, underlined

Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

on the website of the Italian MOFA: “Development cooperation comes from the need to grant the respect of human dignity”.21 This is also stressed by Harmer and Cotterell (2005: 14):

[…] a sense of solidarity with human suffering has always been a strong driver of international humanitarian assistance. ... A greater understanding of the diversity of official giving reinforces the argument that humanitarianism is, and has always been, a universal pursuit, neither entirely dominated by Western states, nor necessarily biased exclusively towards Western interests.

As a result, in fragile states facing a humanitarian crisis, many donors engage or intervene out of a sense of moral obligation to alleviate suffering. Some give significant quantities of money or in-kind aid (such as food aid) both bilaterally, through multilateral channels (predominantly taking the route of UN organizations, particularly UNHCR for refugee issues and the World Food Programme (WFP) for mass feeding programmes) or through NGOs (both local and international), though the latter tends to be of a smaller nature.

Capacity development to minimize the risk of deterioration

There has been growing concern among many donors and their governments about the need to engage in state building and institution strengthening in fragile and conflict-affected states. This is to ensure longer-term stability and development and to avoid slippage into increasing fragility or back into conflict for those states. This is one of the reasons frequently cited by some politicians for maintaining troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. An Overseas Development Institute (ODI) blog entry commenting on the World Bank’s conference in Addis Ababa in July 2007 on ‘Engaging with fragile states: challenges and opportunities’ stated:

Above all, the conference served to highlight the fact that state building has now become one of the leading priorities of the international community (in fragile states and beyond), and that a focus on MDGs is simply not enough to address complex development challenges (ODI blog entry by Alina Rocha Menocal, 31 July 2007).22

21. www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdges/inglese/intro.html
1.7 Principal reasons for donors’ non-engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states

Despite these potential ‘pull’ factors, there is also a plethora of reasons why donors are not engaging deeply in fragile and conflict-affected states. Many of them are well documented in the literature and the key ones are mentioned below.

**Governance concerns**

Political considerations – notably, distrust of unstable or corrupt governments, or governments that violate the principles of human rights, rule of law and democracy – can explain donors’ hesitation to engage in fragile and conflict-affected states. Some donors may also have difficulty funding quasi-state actors in disputed territories that are not yet or may never become states. Recent examples include Kosovo, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Somaliland and Southern Sudan. Donors also have a responsibility to their taxpayers to ensure that aid is spent effectively, and several donors are required to undertake a fiduciary risk assessment (for example DFID and the World Bank) to outline what level of risk there is in providing funding. Thus for both political and fiduciary reasons, donors want to avoid being seen as supporting states that violate human rights, practise overt corruption or that might use aid to finance conflict. The EC tries, for example, to ensure that its funds are used in accordance with the principles enshrined in the treaties of the EU and that they are not diverted for belligerent purposes (Commission of the European Communities, 1999).

**Administrative and security difficulties of managing in-country programmes**

For donors that have a devolved approach to the management of country programmes, the practical difficulties of managing and running an in-country programme in the midst of a conflict zone is a major hindrance when the physical safety of staff cannot be guaranteed. In this context, the principal choice concerning engagement is between (i) supporting non-state actors on the ground through either humanitarian aid or project funding, and (ii) disengaging from supporting these countries. In the former option, humanitarian funding can be quite significant in size, but generally covers emergency interventions such as food aid or support to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It can also include support to pilot programmes with which NGOs are
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

involved, but these tend to be small in size and few NGOs have the financial or managerial capacity to manage in-country programmes of over US$1 million per annum. Therefore, this kind of engagement by donors remains insignificant in size.

*Lack of coherence between ‘humanitarian’ responses and longer-term ‘developmental’ responses*

Low levels of engagement can be explained in part by discontinuous funding modalities between the emergency and development phases. Despite recent initiatives on how to bridge the dichotomy between relief and development, “the relief-development gap still defines and dictates the way in which education in emergencies is funded, organized and delivered” (Rognerud, 2005: 32). The concept of ‘transition’ is difficult to define and the “mechanisms for transition to development aid remain weak” (DFID, 2007b: 11), despite this being raised as an issue by donor institutions themselves. Both short-term and long-term funding cycles are needed: supporting states during conflicts often takes the main priority, yet there is also a need to support longer-term national capacity development and reconstruction.23 “While the need for rapid, short-term interventions would be unavoidable in emergencies and conflict situations, it is nevertheless “important to promote long-term strategic planning and analysis from a sectoral and rights perspective” (Sida, 2001: 2).

*Lack of predictability of funding*

The seventh indicator of progress in the *Paris Declaration* concerns making aid more predictable, yet aid to fragile and conflict-affected states remains typically unpredictable. This is because it is often difficult to foresee which countries will face situations of conflict and emergencies. Donors tend to commit funding in programmes of one to three years (Ndaruhutse and Brannelly, 2006) and if a crisis occurs that needs additional funding, it is difficult to secure new funding for this outside of humanitarian aid. Donors’ hesitation and fiduciary concerns, as well as discontinuous funding modalities between emergency and development phases, also explain the lack of predictable and adequate funding in different sectors. Short-term and piecemeal donor funding, as well as the

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23. “Education in emergency situations has frequently been viewed as a short-term response that is a stop-gap measure until normalcy can be restored: a relief effort. This concept must be challenged (...). Any emergency education programme must be a development programme and not merely a stop-gap measure” (Pigozzi, 1999: 3).
fact that donors do not always align their assistance with the priorities and objectives of the country’s national plans (where these exist), make it difficult for the government or ministries to plan ahead. DFID has recognized that enhanced donor use of long-term financing mechanisms in fragile and conflict-affected states will help ensure governments have predictable funding plus enable greater stabilization and the long-term recovery of a country (DFID, 2007b).

Trust gaps

Sperling (2006: 5) defines ‘trust gaps’ as “the specific weaknesses in fragile states that prevent donors from having the confidence to provide additional education resources in fragile states”. Some of these trust gaps are linked to the illegitimacy or perceived motivation of the government, while others are linked to its financial and management capacity. Sperling outlines six specific trust gaps related to:

1. the recipient government’s capacity to manage and disburse funds;
2. the ability of the central government to prevent fraud and abuse;
3. the possible diversion of funds by the government to finance war;
4. inequitable use of funding across regions or groups;
5. the possible use of education aid to teach hate or perpetuate oppression;
6. the perceived basic motives of government.

Sperling argues that once trust gaps have been identified, donors need to look for a way to close these gaps and build confidence in providing additional resources in a way that is least disempowering of the state.

1.8 Principal reasons for donors’ engagement in prioritizing education in fragile and conflict-affected states

Several factors have contributed to donors’ growing recognition of the role of education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Its critical and necessary role has been promoted by various conferences, reports and organizations. Machel (1996) played a major role in her report The impact of armed conflict on children as she strongly emphasized the need for education and the protection of children affected by conflict.
**Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states**

*The right to education as reinforced by the EFA and MDG agendas*

Given that fragile and conflict-affected states face high numbers of out-of-school children and low levels of aid, addressing education in these difficult environments has been recognized as an absolute necessity for achieving EFA. As the mid-point to achieving the EFA and MDG targets passed in 2007, the number of countries seriously off track to achieving these goals has become more apparent. The presence of conflict or instability does not supercede children’s rights to education, and it is increasingly recognized that efforts need to be made to ensure that children living in these situations are not left behind. This has been due in large part to the lobbying of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and its member agencies to governments and donors for promoting quality education in emergencies and in countries affected by conflict and fragility (see Box 4).

**Box 4  The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)**

The INEE has contributed to increased awareness on the part of donors of the needs of all children including those affected by conflict and fragility. This open network of over 2,700 individual and organizational members has been advocating strongly to governments and donors for quality education in emergencies. Its establishment in 2000 and the development of the *INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction* have given great impetus to collaboration, standard-setting and sharing of experience and information among agencies and governments engaged in post-conflict, post-disaster work in the education sector.

* Referred to from here on as the Minimum Standards.

As an example of this increasing focus on education in these contexts, the International Save the Children Alliance launched its *Rewrite the Future* campaign in 2006. This focused on the action required to provide education to the estimated 40 million children missing from school due to war and conflict. This campaign and the advocacy work of other organizations including INEE has helped bring global attention to support for education for millions of children throughout the world. IIEP-UNESCO has contributed to the filling of some of the research gaps in this relatively new field and has produced guidance on conflict- and disaster-affected ministries of education, including its *Guidebook for*
planning education in emergencies and reconstruction (IIEP-UNESCO, 2006) and several case studies that have begun to influence policy-making and practice in ministries and among NGOs, UN agencies and donor governments (Talbot and Andreoli, 2007). The 2008 report of Vernor Muñoz, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, which will focus on education in emergency situations, should maintain the focus on this global challenge.

**Governance and security concerns**

As discussed above, some donors have sought proactively to address their foreign policy concerns by working with future generations and addressing issues through the education system. As the ‘political-security-development’ agenda has become more influential following the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, education in fragile and conflict-affected states has begun to attract considerable attention. Education interventions help address the core routes of instability by helping to reduce poverty and inequalities (Save the Children, 2008a and 2008c). Targeted education programmes also provide opportunities to address issues such as conflict resolution, tolerance and peace building. Education and improved national literacy is linked to the development of bottom-up governance.

**Child protection and psychosocial care**

Living through periods of intense conflict or trauma deeply affects a child’s emotional and social development. Education can provide a mechanism for addressing the psychosocial effects of conflict or natural disasters, providing support and a neutral environment in which to move forward from these experiences (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003). Education is often seen as the starting point for a return to normality. This has been particularly important for the demobilization and rehabilitation of child soldiers, and preventing the initial recruitment or re-recruitment of child soldiers (Save the Children, 2008c). In addition, education provides a forum for communicating life-saving messages, such as landmine safety.

1.9 Principal reasons for donors’ non-engagement in prioritizing education in fragile and conflict-affected states

Despite these factors and the rhetoric of the importance of the role of education in fragile and conflict-affected states, actual engagement has very often been low for the following principal reasons.
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

Competing demands from other important sectors of the economy

The lack of funding for education during and after a crisis can be explained in part by the numerous demands that arise in each sector of the economy during and after a war (Ndaruhutse, 2004). A country in war or in reconstruction faces many urgent needs (demobilization, economic and social infrastructure, healthcare, and so on), with education as one sector among many that are seen as the most important, urgent and crucial to fund. Donors also have limited evidence as to the impact of their education interventions in difficult situations (OECD, 2005b).

Incoherence of donor priorities versus national priorities

The education support provided by donors is often determined according to what they consider to be both visible and their organizational priority. This can happen through the earmarking of funds (as happens through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), for instance), which is often focused on basic education, and within this sub-sector on capital investments. It can also happen through stop-gap activities, such as the physical rehabilitation or construction of schools and the supply of education kits. Some donors, such as the governments of Austria, France and Germany, focus specifically on technical or higher education. A key question is whether the initiatives that donors fund in fragile and conflict-affected states, such as school feeding programmes or education kits, are the most appropriate (Penson and Tomlinson, 2009) or cost effective. Certain sub-sectors of education are often neglected and a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) is rarely pursued. Post-basic education, which usually needs more time to rebuild, tends to be overlooked. The lack of secondary and higher education, as well as non-formal opportunities and vocational training, creates tension and frustration. Young adults who have missed schooling opportunities during wars, as well as child soldiers and returning refugees, need to have prospects. The role that secondary education can play in reconstruction and stability should not be underestimated. Post-basic education can prevent the recruitment of child soldiers and accelerate their rehabilitation (Rose and Greeley, 2006).

Lack of confidence in the absorptive or administrative capacity of ministries of education

The institutional and absorptive capacity of governments affected by wars and crises are limited. Education has a symbolic value and
is often seen as a state prerogative. Donors can at times be reluctant to bypass the role of the state by funding education through NGOs or emergency agencies, which can be perceived as further undermining the legitimacy and rebuilding of an already weak state (OECD, 2005b). If they follow this route, and for fiduciary reasons do not have confidence in a government, the only option is to disengage.

**Bias towards supporting ‘good performers’**

Donors’ hesitation and reluctance to invest in fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly in arrested development environments, explain why they often tend to use selectivity criteria and support ‘good performers’. The current criteria for the EFA-FTI make it difficult for fragile and conflict-affected states to become eligible for funding. It is expected, however, that the FTI policy framework will change to be able to support fragile and conflict-affected states, with the introduction of an Education Transition Fund. According to Sperling, ‘good performance’ needs to be reviewed and redefined in order to encourage donors to support countries not considered ‘good’ performers (DFID, 2007b: 4). The challenges and risks associated with financing education in emergencies and reconstruction also explain donors’ enhanced control mechanisms, such as payment in instalments, periodic evaluations of the use of the funds, and so on).

1.10 Summary

*Figure 1.1* summarizes the rationale for the levels of donor engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, and then more specifically within education.

This chapter has shown that among certain donors, concern for the slow or negative progress of many fragile and conflict-affected states in moving towards the EFA targets and MDGs has caused some alarm and has prompted these donors to announce new aid commitments for the funding of education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Education is beginning to be recognized as having an important role not only in the longer-term development of these countries, but also during the emergency or humanitarian phase and this is highlighted by the creation of the Education Cluster.

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24. “Arrested development: donors are typically unwilling to deal with the state directly” (OECD, 2005b: 6).
Increased attention and support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states

**Figure 1.1 Rationale for donors’ engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal reasons in favour of engagement</th>
<th>Principal reasons inhibiting engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Historical ties, security concerns and links to regional stability</td>
<td>• Governance concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Humanitarian concerns</td>
<td>• Administrative and security difficulties of managing in-country programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity development to minimize the risks of deterioration</td>
<td>• Lack of coherence between ‘humanitarian’ response and longer-term ‘developmental’ response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of predictability of funding</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Trust gaps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Engagement in education in fragile and conflict-affected states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal reasons in favour of engagement</th>
<th>Principal reasons inhibiting engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EFA and MDG agendas reinforcing human rights to education</td>
<td>• Competing demands from other important sectors of the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political/security/governance concerns, with education as an instrument to promote peace, stability and social cohesion</td>
<td>• Incoherence of donor priorities versus national priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Child protection and psychosocial care</td>
<td>• Lack of confidence in absorptive or administrative capacity of Ministries of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bias towards supporting ‘good performers’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advocacy attempts by organizations, such as the Save the Children Alliance in their *Rewrite the future* campaign, have succeeded in putting on the agenda the low prioritization and levels of education aid flows to emergencies and fragile and conflict-affected states and raising the profile of these countries. Even some non-DAC donors and private philanthropists have begun to recognize the importance of supporting education in these contexts.
Chapter 2

Donors’ financial commitment to education

2.1 Introduction

In the first chapter of this book we have seen how donors are beginning to respond to the needs of fragile and conflict-affected states struggling to achieve the EFA and MDGs, and how the policy framework for engaging with these states has developed over recent years. This chapter explores in more detail the actual aid flows in these contexts, analysing some of the recent trends in aid allocation and exploring whether the rhetoric of deeper engagement has actually led to increased funding flows for education in fragile and conflict-affected states over the past few years.

2.2 Development aid

Commitments to fragile and conflict-affected states

In the past decade, the aid sector has seen an increase in the number of donors, in particular in the number of private foundations providing funding. The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) estimates that there are now close to 300 different channels of aid working through over 230 international organizations, funds and programmes, including at least 56 bilateral donors providing official development assistance (ODA) (IDA, 2007). The IDA (2007) also reports that the average number of donors per country rose from about 12 in the 1960s to about 33 in the 2001-2005 period. While this may be the trend globally, this pattern is not always reflected in fragile and conflict-affected states. UNESCO (2007: Table 4.11) finds that between 2003 and 2005 the 68 LICs\(^{25}\) had 14 or fewer major donors supporting their education sectors. The report classed over half of these 68 states as fragile. None of the fragile states\(^{26}\) had more than 11 major donors working in their education sector, and the majority of these states had just two donors. While the number of donors providing aid has increased, the size of activities funded has actually decreased (that is, smaller volume of aid per project). This is particularly true of states with a poor

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25. As defined by the World Bank.
26. As defined by OECD-DAC.
governance record, where donors demonstrate a preference for funding smaller projects (IDA, 2007).

The proliferation of aid channels and the fragmentation of ODA has had a number of consequences for the sector. Firstly, it raises questions as to the coordination and harmonization of activities between donors and agencies, with the potential for overlapping initiatives, misalignment of objectives and activities, and gaps in provision. With an often growing number of actors (usually NGOs and non-state actors rather than donors), fragile and conflict-affected states can also struggle to sufficiently ‘own’ or coordinate their activities and initiatives. Without fostering a sense of ownership among recipient governments, the sustainability of initiatives is placed in doubt. Administrative costs have also risen, both for donors and recipients (Sundberg and Gelb, 2006; Curto, 2007). This has obvious implications for the capacity of recipient governments and also raises questions about the effectiveness of aid, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states that have reduced capacity.

For precisely these reasons the international community has made several steps towards greater coordination and harmonization of aid activities, as seen in the Monterrey Consensus and Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (see Box 5).

International accords on aid effectiveness have also encouraged a move towards budget support being provided to recipient governments, either for general use or earmarked for a particular sector. The IDA (2007) reports that general budget and sector programme support rose from 8 per cent of ODA commitments in 2001 to 20 per cent by 2004. Not all donors have embraced this shift towards budget support, but it is growing in popularity both in general terms and more specifically for the education and health sectors. It is a common mechanism for commitments, particularly in the Scandinavian states and the UK. Budget support allows for greater state ownership and prioritization of funds, but it has obvious limitations for fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly in the deterioration and arrested development stages. This is due to their reduced capacity to absorb and manage budget support, and the unwillingness of donors to commit unearmarked funds to states with poor governance records and which represent higher fiduciary risks. It can, however, be a useful tool to rebuild countries’ capacities to develop and implement policy. Celasun and Walliser (2006) argue that the risks to donors of providing support during times of poor governance are actually offset by the potential gains from the more rapid increase in capacity levels
resulting from continuous donor engagement. They do accept, however, that a donor’s willingness to take this risk is affected by the recipient government’s track record and some evidence of commitment towards improving capacity and governance. This is why signals such as sector planning can be key in attracting funding and also endorsement from multi-donor initiatives such as pooled funding and the FTI, as discussed below. These issues are also explored in more detail in Chapter 3.

Box 5  The Monterrey Consensus and the Paris Declaration

The Monterrey Consensus

The Monterrey Consensus on financing for development (UN, 2003), agreed in March 2002, lays out a framework of mutual accountability whereby developing countries accept responsibility for their own development while developed countries commit to supporting developing countries in doing this and accounting for their support. Thus while aid is an important tool, it should be used to support development efforts already being made within developing countries, and should complement rather than replace domestic resources. The Monterrey Consensus reinforced agreements by bilateral donors to raise ODA to 0.7 per cent of gross national income with between 0.15 per cent and 0.20 per cent specifically targeting Less Developed Countries (LDCs) (FTI Secretariat, 2006: 9).

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

The Paris Declaration was agreed by more than 60 aid donors (bilateral, multilateral and civil society) and aid recipient countries at a High Level Forum in March 2005. It sets out a statement of resolve and partnership commitments regarding the five pivotal issues to ensure aid effectiveness: (i) ownership, (ii) alignment, (iii) harmonization, (iv) managing for results, and (v) mutual accountability. The Paris Declaration also includes indicators with which to measure progress in these four areas.

Donors work in different ways in relating to engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, and targeting ODA to address challenges in achieving the MDGs and EFA goals. Levin and Dollar’s (2005) study on aid volumes and volatility in difficult partnership countries noted how some donors such as the World Bank (IDA) and the governments of Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands and Norway, are better at taking into account poverty prevalence and governance levels when allocating their aid. Other donors such as the USA and French governments seem to be more influenced by other factors, such as security concerns or historical ties. Some studies have found that multilaterals tend to be more responsive to recipients’ needs than bilaterals, presumably due to
diminished foreign policy or historical concerns (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000).

Levin and Dollar (2005) found that difficult partnership countries received on average 58 per cent less bilateral aid and 34 per cent less multilateral aid than would be expected given their population, level of poverty and institutional performance. McGillivray (2006) also argues that fragile states are ‘under-aided’ in that they receive less aid per capita than predictions taking into consideration their poverty, population and governance levels (as assessed by their CPIA scores) would justify. Within the group of countries Levin and Dollar examined they found considerable variation, with some countries receiving far more aid than predicted. They noted that this trend became more distinguishable after the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, indicating that foreign policy and security concerns predominate in decisions regarding aid allocations in fragile and conflict-affected states. Levin and Dollar also found that you could split difficult partnership countries, like other developing countries, into two main groups: (i) aid darlings, which receive a disproportionately higher amount of aid than their poverty and governance levels would predict, such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone; and (ii) aid orphans, which receive significantly less aid than would have been predicted and are aided by a relatively smaller number of donors. The majority of the latter were in Africa and included Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sudan. Levin and Dollar (2005) also noted that donors have a tendency to give a higher proportion of their aid to smaller, better-managed countries in the post-conflict and reconstruction stages.

The OECD (2006) further classifies three different groups of fragile states according to the funding they receive. These include: (i) marginalized countries that receive less aid than would be predicted by their need, policy and institutional quality (for example, Burundi, the DRC, Guinea, Nigeria, Uzbekistan and Yemen); (ii) countries with low or declining levels of aid but relatively weaker policy and institutional systems (for example, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe); and (iii) countries with relatively high or increasing levels of aid (for example, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan). These distinct groupings of recipient countries imply that several factors in addition to educational need are affecting donors’ decisions on aid allocation, as outlined in Chapter 1.
Commitments to education

In the years following the adoption of the Dakar Framework, total ODA commitments to education rose rapidly, reaching US$10.9 billion in 2004, a 65 per cent increase in real terms since 2000 (FTI Secretariat, 2008e: 22). Following a fall in commitments during 2005, they then rose again, reaching US$11.3 billion in 2006. Despite the return of a positive trend there has been a slowdown in the rate of increase since 2005 when compared to the start of the millennium.

Commitments to basic education have increased at an even more rapid rate, rising by 83 per cent from US$2.8 billion in 2000 to US$5.1 billion in 2006, again with a dip in commitment levels in 2005 to US$3.7 billion (FTI Secretariat, 2008e: 22). However, disbursements between 2002 and 2006 increased by only 70 per cent from US$2.1 billion to US$3.5 billion (FTI Secretariat, 2008e: 22). Trends in commitment levels from bilateral donors to education and basic education are shown in Figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1 Bilateral ODA and aid to education, 1999–2007

Source: OECD-DAC CRS database.

27. Note that the growing preference for budget support (whether earmarked for a specific sector or for general use) has complicated the accuracy with which the total amount of aid allocated to education and to basic education can be calculated. The figures used in the data analysis of this chapter have been adjusted accordingly. Education ODA includes 20 per cent of general budget support and basic education ODA includes 10 per cent of general budget support plus one half of unspecified education aid. Unless otherwise stated, amounts are given in constant 2006 US$. 

International Institute for Educational Planning  www.iiep.unesco.org
A recent study by Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher (2006) analysed donors’ funding allocations to different sectors to identify whether or not they were aligned to support the achievement of the MDGs. They found that donors not only differed in their level of generosity but also in the extent to which their aid is responsive to poverty levels, sectorally aligned and focused on achieving the MDGs. They found that some MDGs, such as combating HIV and AIDS, have received far more attention from donors whilst others, notably the achievement of UPE, have not seen a comparable shift in aid allocations to support their achievement. McGillivray (2006) and Sundberg and Gelb (2006) also highlight how donors are not always motivated by poverty reduction when allocating funding. Save the Children (2007b and 2008b) in their Last in Line, Last in School reports calls upon donors to ensure that their funding allocation is equitable and responsive to needs. Evidence presented in these reports of donors’ recent aid allocations highlights the level of underfunding of education in states affected by conflict.

Our analysis of the aid portfolios of the OECD-DAC donors in the new millennium has revealed the following:

1. **Volume of aid flows to education**: By far the most generous donor to education, in terms of volume, is the French Government, which allocated nearly US$1.8 billion on average between 2005 and 2007. The majority of this aid was devoted to post-secondary education, with just under 10 per cent allocated to basic education. Other donors providing volumes of aid to education include the EC and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, the UK and the USA (see Figure 2.2).

2. **Proportion of overall aid to education**: the donor giving the largest proportion of its ODA to education is the Portuguese Government, on average allocating over a quarter (28.5 per cent) of its aid budget to the education sector between 2005 and 2007. The Portuguese Government is closely followed by the governments of France, New Zealand, Greece and the Netherlands, all of which committed on average between 14 and 20 per cent of their aid budget to education. The average level of donor commitment was just 8.25 per cent, but some donors that contribute significant amounts of ODA in terms of volume are committing aid to education well below this average figure. For example, Japan committed an average of 5.9 per cent of ODA and the USA just 2.9 per cent.
3. **Proportion of overall aid to basic education:** Globally, the EC and the governments of Germany, Japan and the USA are the largest donors of sector allocable aid, but none of these committed more than 4 per cent of their sector allocable aid to basic education between 2005 and 2007. The 2008 *Education For All Global Monitoring Report* estimates that if all those donors that currently allocate less than 10 per cent of their overall aid to basic education began to allocate 10 per cent, and if those that currently allocate more than this maintained their levels of allocation, bilateral aid to basic education would grow by 15 per cent annually and reach US$8.6 billion by 2010 (UNESCO, 2007: 188).

4. **Proportion of education aid to basic education:** this varies, with a small cluster of donors distinctly prioritising basic education and committing at least half of their education aid to basic education (Canada, Ireland, Norway, the UK and the USA), another group committing between a third and half of their education ODA, and then a small group committing 20 per cent or less to basic education, including Greece and France, which on average committed less than 10 per cent of education ODA to basic education between 2005 and 2007. This last group of donors tends to prioritize tertiary education instead, with secondary education receiving proportionally fewer funds overall.

**Figure 2.2 Donors’ allocation of ODA and education ODA, average 2005-2007**

*Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System database.*
Overall, the analysis highlights a need for increased prioritization of education within aid budgets, and within this a focus needs to be given to basic education.

**Commitments to education in fragile and conflict-affected states**

The funding received by fragile and conflict-affected states does not always reflect their needs in terms of meeting the MDGs or EFA goals (Save the Children, 2007b and 2008b; UNESCO, 2007). Rather than donors aligning funding according to the needs of states to meet these goals, trends in donor funding would suggest that a number of other factors are influencing donors’ funding decisions.\(^{28}\) Only 4.5 per cent of ODA to fragile and conflict-affected states is spent on education (equivalent to US$1.8 billion), in comparison to 10 per cent in other LICs (equivalent to US$3.2 billion) (OECD-DAC CRS database).\(^{29}\) Figure 2.3 compares all donors’ allocations to fragile and conflict-affected states to other LICs and other middle-income countries (MICS). While nearly one third of ODA between 2005 and 2007 was committed to fragile and conflict-affected states, the same group of countries received less than one fifth of commitments to education. Instead, MICs seem to receive a disproportionate level of overall education ODA.

UNESCO (2007: 189) identifies six countries with a significantly high proportion of out-of-school children but which receive a disproportionately low amount of aid to basic education per primary school-aged child. These include the Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan. All of these are affected by conflict. These countries are also identified as being at ‘serious risk’ of not achieving UPE by 2015 or there is insufficient data to make projections. This converse relationship between donors’ engagement and needs can be further demonstrated by comparing the aid to basic education per primary school-aged child with the proportion of children who are out of school, as seen in Figure 2.4.

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\(^{28}\) The following data analysis applies the authors’ own list of fragile and conflict-affected states, as defined in Box 4 of Chapter 1. This list includes the following 28 countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

\(^{29}\) Figures are averages for 2005-2007, in constant 2006 US$. 

Donors’ financial commitment to education

Figure 2.3 Donors’ aid allocations by recipient group

In this analysis the countries identified as fragile and conflict-affected states were removed from the list of low- and middle-income countries so that data was not double-counted, hence the expressions “other LICs” and “other MICs”.

Source: OECD-DAC CRS database.

Both trend lines show the expected relationship with aid to basic education per child increasing as the proportion of children out of school increases. The trend line for fragile and conflict-affected states is considerably lower, with primary school-aged children receiving approximately US$40 less than children in other LICs, despite the fact that more than half of the world’s out-of-school children live in conflict-affected and fragile states (Save the Children, 2008d). In 2004, the trend was actually reversed for fragile and conflict-affected states with the amount of aid received per school-aged child decreasing as the proportion of children out of school increases. This was due in part to large levels of aid in 2004 to Iraq, Nepal and Yemen, of which the out-of-school populations were comparatively low when compared with other fragile and conflict-affected countries. This negative trend is not only counterintuitive but also demonstrates the failure of donors to respond to the educational needs of children without access to education and to efforts to reach the EFA goals.
Figure 2.4  Comparison of aid to basic education per primary school-aged child received by states and the proportion of children out of school

![Graph showing comparison of aid to basic education per primary school-aged child received by states and the proportion of children out of school.]

(1) The following fragile and conflict-affected states are not included due to insufficient data: Afghanistan, Angola, the CAR, Congo, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Uganda.

(2) The following other LICs are not included due to insufficient data: Bhutan, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Uzbekistan.

Source: Authors’ own calculations using data from UNESCO, 2007: Aid Table 4 and Statistical Table 5.

UNESCO (2007: 189) notes that in some conflict-affected countries the trend in aid allocation has actually deteriorated. In the CAR, Guinea and Haiti, aid per school-aged child decreased between 1999-2000 and 2004-2005, and has decreased significantly in the Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea and Rwanda. This could potentially be associated with declining teaching and learning quality for those children attending school, which is a worrying trend for countries focused on reconstruction and recovery.

Analysis of DAC donor commitments

DAC donors committed an average of US$1.8 billion per year to education in fragile and conflict-affected states between 2005 and 2007, of which US$1.14 billion (62 per cent) was committed to basic education. In terms of volume, the USA, UK, France and Germany are the top four...
donors providing education aid to fragile and conflict-affected states, with combined annual commitments averaging over US$600 million between 2005 and 2007. *Figure 2.5* provides an overview of the volume of aid going to education and basic education in fragile and conflict-affected states, also indicating the percentage of aid committed to education for these states.

*Figure 2.5  Donors’ commitments to education in fragile and conflict-affected states, average 2005-2007*

An error in reporting meant that large proportions of the Netherlands’ ODA commitments were reported as unallocated. This has been rectified for 2007, but is yet to be revised in earlier report submissions. As a result the average figures for 2005-2007 show just 7 per cent of education ODA and 6 per cent of basic education ODA being committed to fragile and conflict-affected states. But in 2007 these figures were 12 per cent and 25 per cent respectively.

*Source: OECD-DAC CRS database.*

An analysis of commitments of education and basic education ODA according to fragility and recipient income group finds that Portugal provides the highest proportion of its basic education funding for fragile and conflict-affected states, committing a huge average of 82.5 per cent of basic education ODA and 38 per cent of overall education ODA to fragile and conflict-affected states (OECD-DAC CRS database) between 2005 and 2007. Greece, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden committed between 35 and 55 per cent of basic education aid to fragile and conflict-affected states. This was followed by the UK, Ireland, the USA, Italy and Luxembourg, all of which committed between one quarter and one third of basic education aid, above the donor average of 23 per cent. However,
a large number of donors are allocating substantial amounts to other MICs, with nearly half of DAC donors (Austria, Australia, France, Spain, Japan, Luxembourg, the USA, Italy, Greece and Germany) committing at least one third of their basic education ODA to other MICs.

To gain an accurate picture of financial commitments and engagement, the proportion of aid committed to fragile and conflict-affected states needs to be considered alongside the overall size of donors’ aid budgets and their commitment to education. *Figure 2.6* tries to capture this by plotting overall commitments of aid against the proportion committed to education, with the ‘bubble’ scatter plots representing the proportion of education ODA committed to fragile and conflict-affected states.

*Figure 2.6  Comparison of donors’ proportional and volume commitments*

This enables us to see more clearly that while some donors, such as Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and Portugal, have comparatively small aid budgets in terms of volume, they are still committing reasonable proportions within their education budgets to fragile and conflict-affected states. In comparison, some of the large donors, such as the USA, Japan, Germany and France, could be committing more to education in fragile
and conflict-affected states and, in some instances, education in general. For example, while the USA contributes just under one third of education and basic education funding to fragile and conflict-affected countries – which is above average for DAC donors and represents significant funding in terms of volume – education appears to be under-prioritized in relation to the USA’s overall assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states, receiving just 2.4 per cent of funds. Likewise, some smaller donors, such as New Zealand, Australia and Austria, which may be committing reasonable amounts to education, could perhaps re-evaluate the proportion allocated to fragile and conflict-affected states.

When comparing the aid allocations and policies of these countries, some inconsistencies between the political rhetoric and financial commitments of donors emerge (see Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher, 2006). It should be noted that theses inconsistencies may be exaggerated due to unallocated funding, the delay in ODA data becoming available and the lead time needed for policy to be implemented in budgets.

However, there are clearly some examples of policy and financial commitments being aligned, including countries such as Norway and Denmark, which have published specific policy documents emphasizing education as a human right during conflict and the important role it has in stabilizing fragile and conflict-affected states and in conflict prevention. These political commitments have been reflected in the comparatively high proportion of funds allocated to fragile and conflict-affected states as part of ODA directed towards the education sector. While the development of policy within this area has often been accompanied by large financial commitments, we are only just beginning to see the product of such developments being reported in the actual disbursement of funds.

In contrast, other states such as Portugal, Belgium and Ireland, which have committed comparatively higher proportions of funding to fragile and conflict-affected states, do not appear to have the same established political commitment to education in these same countries; only Belgium mentions fragile and conflict-affected states within the education aspects of its international cooperation.

For other donors, such as Austria, Switzerland and Spain, which are less engaged in the emerging policy dialogue on education in fragile

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30. Over half of the Netherlands’ ODA to education between 2004 and 2006 was unallocated.
and conflict-affected states, funding commitments to education in these contexts is still weak.

2.3 Humanitarian aid

Donors should extend the boundaries of emergency funding to include support for education which should be accepted as a priority component of humanitarian assistance (Machel, 1996: 49).

Humanitarian aid in 2007 totalled over US$7.5 billion in current prices (OCHA, 2007a), but donors remain hesitant about funding educational activities, and of the humanitarian aid total in 2007, just 1.9 per cent (US$146 million) was earmarked for the education sector. This was slightly above the average proportion of total humanitarian aid received by the education sector between 2004 and 2007, during which education received 1.6 per cent of total humanitarian aid.31

Variation among donors is stark, however. When a breakdown of humanitarian funding (via the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)) is examined, the proportion devoted to education between 2004 and 2007 varies from over 4 per cent (by Denmark and Australia) to no education sector-specific funding from Greece, Luxembourg or Portugal (see Figure 2.7).32 When considered as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), however, Sweden appears as the most generous funder of education as part of emergency aid, contributing 0.035 per cent of GDP, followed closely by Norway at 0.03 per cent (OCHA, 2007b).

The presence of non-DAC donors contributing to education in emergencies is noticeable, as discussed in Chapter 1, with the private sector providing a relatively high proportion and high volume of funds (OCHA, 2007a). Between 2000 and 2005, the share of private sector

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31. Note that a large proportion of funds is being used for multi-sector purposes, or for activities in which the sector has not yet been specified. Such funds may include those used for initiatives with educational aspects, such as Safe Space or Child-Friendly Space initiatives.

32. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data primarily covers contributions for countries that are the subject of appeals and which have been reported to the FTS either by the donor or by the recipient agency. There is a possibility of under-reporting of data by donors or the recipient agencies.
Donors’ financial commitment to education

contributions rose from 13.3 per cent to 24.4 per cent of total humanitarian funding (Altinger and Tortella, 2007).³³

Figure 2.7 Proportion of humanitarian funds provided to the education sector by donor (average 2004-2007)

Source: OCHA, 2007a.

Over recent years, the proportion of humanitarian aid allocated to education has shown positive trends, with funding of nearly US$235 million provided in 2008, which was over double that provided in 2007 (see Figure 2.8). Save the Children (2008c) attributes this improvement to coherent international advocacy on education in

³³ Private funding refers to individuals and organizations, including charitable trusts and foundations. Funds raised in the aftermath of the December 2005 tsunami have not been disaggregated from this data set.
emergencies and an improved understanding of the needs and importance of education in emergencies, which has helped ensure the inclusion of education within appeals. For example, high profile emergencies in 2008, such as the cyclone in Myanmar and the earthquake in China, included education as a key response. These processes have been supported by the creation of the IASC Education Cluster to coordinate emergency education responses.

**Figure 2.8 Proportion of humanitarian funds allocated to education**

A breakdown of responses to consolidated appeals processes (CAP) and flash appeals by sector reveals that education received just under half of the required funding in 2008 (see percentage figures in Table 2.1).

In 2006, OCHA (2007b) reported that of the five most under-funded sectors in 2006 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), four of these (mine action, shelter, agriculture and health) received the greatest proportion of funding going to non-appeal projects – that is, those beyond the CAP (OCHA, 2007b). In other words, with the exception of education, the other least-funded sectors all received significant funding (amounts are not specified) beyond the CAP, with donors providing funds to other implementing organizations and activities outside of the appeal activities. As highlighted by Webley (2007: 17), Head of Education at Save the Children UK, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – set up by the UN General Assembly in 2005 to improve the speed and effectiveness of the humanitarian response in rapid onset emergencies with high levels of unmet need – “focuses on life-saving criteria and remains cautious of funding education”. Hopefully, the signs of positive
change in funding discussed above are indicators of changing attitudes and improved prioritization of education responses in emergencies. The improvement in education’s met funding requirements is indicative of the importance of the IASC Education Cluster in mobilizing both attention and resources for educational needs in emergency responses.

Table 2.1  Response to consolidated and flash appeals, by sector, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Funding (US$)</th>
<th>Proportion of funding requirements met (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>2,600,058,404</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sector</td>
<td>240,718,663</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and support services</td>
<td>308,847,595</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>157,406,874</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
<td>249,838,869</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>161,930,723</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and non-food items</td>
<td>166,849,623</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>415,341,994</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>212,415,852</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td>216,413,619</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine action</td>
<td>16,047,402</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and security of staff and operations</td>
<td>345,310</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector not yet specified*</td>
<td>332,645,551</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funding includes both financial commitments and in-kind contributions. Source: OCHA FTS database (http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/pageloader.aspx)

* This ‘sector’ includes any unearmarked funds provided to implementing agencies whose final use by project or sector has not yet been reported.

Donors’ prioritization of education is in stark contrast with that of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who, after food and shelter have been provided, frequently list education as their first priority (Muñoz, 2008; Sinclair, 2002). This suggests that donors are not responding effectively to demands in emergency situations and are either assuming how best to prioritize services in such situations or placing their own priorities above those of the intended beneficiaries. Sommers (1999) goes further to suggest that donors actually resist supporting education during emergencies, for the very reason that education is seen as more of a developmental activity rather than as life saving and there is a fear of developing infrastructure that may attract IDPs or refugees.34

34. See Lexow (2002: 29) for Angolan example.
There is also the problem that most projects funded under the CAP are short term, lasting less than one year, and donors are reluctant to support projects that are not short term during emergencies (Lexow, 2002).

2.4 FTI funding flows to fragile and conflict-affected states

The FTI currently has two main funding channels\textsuperscript{35} to provide education assistance to developing countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states: (i) the Catalytic Fund (CF) (established in 2003 and then expanded in 2006) to provide additional funding for endorsed education sector plans, and (ii) the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) (established in 2004), which provides funding for those countries that do not meet the endorsement criteria and need support and capacity building in developing a credible education sector plan. In addition, it is hoped that the presence of an endorsed education sector plan will result in in-country donors contributing additional resources. Many fragile and conflict-affected states are unable to meet the FTI eligibility criteria and thus have not been endorsed, making them eligible only for EPDF financing. Realizing that the existing FTI architecture was not appropriate for fragile and conflict-affected states, a proposal was put forward to the FTI Steering Committee at its Tokyo meeting in April 2008, outlining recommendations for a new aid approach. These recommendations included the creation of an ‘interim status’ for fragile states to allow them to access FTI finances and support while working towards full endorsement. It was agreed at the Oslo 2008 FTI meeting that this financing would take place through an Education Transition Fund (ETF). The aims of this are to (i) invest in the provision of education; (ii) strengthen education systems; (iii) increase education’s contribution to reducing country fragility; and (iv) enhance the quality of all education provision. The ETF will apply a similar approach to that established by the Netherlands MOFA and UNICEF, whereby funds are pooled for management by UNICEF headquarters and field staff.\textsuperscript{36} The hope is that UNICEF’s presence in the education sector in most fragile states will enable the quick and responsive disbursement of funds to enable the ETF to address urgent needs, while also providing a foundation for stabilization of the sector and further domestic and external support.

\textsuperscript{35} Discussions are currently underway regarding the creation of a ‘transition fund’ for fragile states, with the FTI working in partnership with UNICEF. At the time of publication these details had not been finalized.

\textsuperscript{36} At the time of writing the precise operational processes were still being finalized by UNICEF and the FTI.
As UNICEF adopts this new role, lessons need to be applied from the management of other multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) and UNICEF’s own experience in managing pooled funding in Myanmar (see Box 14 in Chapter 4) and in Liberia (see Chapter 6).

**The Catalytic Fund (CF): funding flows, performance and relation to fragile and conflict-affected states**

The performance of the Catalytic Fund (CF) from early 2007 to early 2008 was mixed. Donors’ performance in making firm commitments from pledges increased from 44 per cent to 82 per cent, and disbursements to recipient countries through signed grant agreements improved from 64 per cent to 85 per cent. What compromised these positive results, however, was the considerable delays in the World Bank’s performance in turning allocation decisions into new grant agreements, with performance dropping from 54 per cent to 30 per cent (FTI Secretariat, 2008c: 2). In addition disbursement of funds have been delayed by World Bank trust management procedures introduced in June 2008 (FTI Secretariat, 2008e). The FTI’s annual report noted a disappointing average of 242 days between grant allocation and signature of the grant agreement, then a further 70 days before the first disbursement was made. In Sierra Leone, the first stage of this process has taken over 541 days (FTI Secretariat, 2008e: 28).

Twenty-seven countries received a total funding of over US$1 billion from the CF by early 2008, with the Fund having total pledges of US$1.3 billion since 2003 (US$320 million of this was pledged during the period 2008 to 2010) (FTI Secretariat, 2008c: 2). Of these countries, only four are fragile or conflict-affected states (Ethiopia, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Yemen) while others such as Cambodia, Rwanda and Mozambique have been so in the past. Given the increasing demands on the CF, and the short-term commitments of most donor pledges, “an urgent replenishment of the CF is required, as well as agreement on a future replenishment mechanism in order to provide for longer-term predictability” (FTI Secretariat, 2008c: 3).

Pooled funding from the CF is being provided in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia, and investment funding in Cambodia (FTI

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37. Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste and Yemen.
Secretariat, 2008a: 6-7). Experience has shown that where budget support or pooled funding is used for the disbursement of CF finances, disbursement performance has been higher than when project instruments have been used (FTI Secretariat, 2008c: 5).

The CAR, Haiti and Lao DR were endorsed in 2008 and 2009, with up to 20 more countries scheduled for endorsement in 2009 (including Chad, DRC, Eritrea and Papua New Guinea). There are 12 other eligible countries that are not yet scheduled for endorsement, the majority of which are fragile and conflict-affected states (FTI Secretariat, 2008c: 9, 15).

The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF): funding flows, performance and relation to fragile and conflict-affected states

The EPDF is a much smaller fund than the CF and was set up later than the CF, in 2004. By the end of October 2007, it had allocated US$32.2 million, including US$7.5 million of bridge funding approved in September 2007. Of the non-bridge funding, by late 2007 contracts had been signed for 87 per cent of the total available funds and 60 per cent of these funds had actually been disbursed (FTI Secretariat, 2007c: 2). Of the 48 countries that had received EPDF financing, 26 of them had received less than US$150,000 (FTI Secretariat, 2008d: 12). Forty-one per cent of EPDF recipient countries are fragile states receiving 28 per cent of the overall country-specific funding allocation (there is also significant funding allocated on a regional basis across six regions). The sub-Saharan region, which received 60 per cent of EPDF funding between 2005 and 2008, contains 50 per cent of out-of-school children and 62 per cent of the fragile states (FTI Secretariat, 2008d: 14). However, given that the actual volume of aid channelled through the EPDF is small and that over 50 per cent of countries have received less than US$150,000, this represents a truly insignificant volume of aid channelled to fragile states through the EPDF.

The FTI progressive framework

Since 2005, there have been discussions around how the FTI can be relevant and applicable for fragile and conflict-affected states, especially

38. However, the CAR was turned down for catalytic funding in Tokyo as the proposal was seen to be overly ambitious, given capacity levels and the size of the funding request in comparison with national financing. Instead, EPDF funding was recommended to strengthen the proposal.
those that are far from reaching the endorsement criteria. While the EPDF has played a small role in building capacity and assisting some of these countries to develop initial plans, it has been a much smaller fund with fewer resources spread across a much larger group of countries than the CF.

At the EPDF Committee Meeting in 2007, the FTI Secretariat presented the Progressive Framework as a tool to assist fragile states in the development of an FTI interim strategy that could be endorsed and used to attract interim financing to address educational needs and strengthen institutions (FTI Secretariat, 2007a). The Progressive Framework provides a useful dialogue process for partners in fragile states opting for ETF funding and a tool for assessing their position according to a number of continuums. Indicators contained within the framework enable countries to establish a base line from which they can measure progress while developing an interim strategy or a comprehensive sector plan. The ETF is being developed alongside the Progressive Framework to ensure that they are mutually supportive.

2.5 Foundation funding

Foundations have tended to work in niche areas not covered by typical donor support. The increasing involvement of foundations in international development has made it more difficult to coordinate activities and to determine how much funding is provided for a specific sector. This is partly because foundations have a tendency to work with civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector and to bypass the government. This can lead to a duplication of efforts and can potentially undermine harmonization, especially with regard to smaller and medium-sized foundations that focus resources on smaller, regional projects (Marten and Witte, 2008). This is not always the case, however. In Liberia, for example, the Soros Foundation has contributed to the Education Pool Fund, managed by UNICEF (see Chapter 6).

2.6 Predictability of funding

At Dakar, donors and funding agencies were called on to provide not only more aid but to make the provision of this aid more robust, predictable and longer term, and to support sector-wide reforms and programmes. This commitment was then reinforced by donors in the Monterrey Consensus and the Paris Declaration. The OECD-DAC, in its guidelines for harmonizing donor practices, defines aid as predictable
if “partner countries can be confident about the amount and timing of aid disbursements” (OECD, 2005a: 22). Yet as a group, fragile states are not only under-supported financially, but those aid flows they do receive are on average twice as volatile as aid flows to other LICs (even when factors such as conflict and performance changes are taken into consideration) (Levin and Dollar, 2005).\(^\text{39}\) Levin and Dollar also found that donors can be fickle with their funding allocations, with aid to fragile states being committed and disbursed in spurts. For example, in one year a particular country may receive substantial aid flows, while the next year the donors may move on to another country. While there may be valid reasons for aid flows to be slightly more disrupted to states affected by conflict than that to other LICs, the current evidence suggests that aid flows are disproportionately volatile. This is especially problematic considering that fragile and conflict-affected states are in greater need of longer-term, more reliable support to develop their capacity and facilitate achievement of the MDGs.

The impact of unpredictable aid flows is likely to be more problematic and acute for fragile and conflict-affected states as volatile aid flows provide an additional source of instability and can exacerbate existing problems in macroeconomic planning. For states that are heavily reliant on aid, unpredictable and volatile disbursements can undermine short- and medium-term budget planning processes and sector programmes by forcing spending cuts and adjustments during budget execution. In addition to the direct impact of necessary spending adjustments, this can also endanger the credibility and value of future planning processes and confidence in the government, potentially contributing to a state’s fragility. Continuity and reliability of funding is a particular issue for the education sector, where recurrent costs such as teachers’ salaries form a substantial component of the budget and where governments need confidence in financial flows in order to expand education systems to address educational needs and challenges. This is particularly crucial in post-conflict settings with new governments in place and limited capacity or systems to collect taxes and low or non-existent bank reserves, such as in Rwanda in 1994.

In recent years, there have been a number of key empirical studies examining the predictability of aid for various countries (Bulir and

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\(^{39}\) Volatility is calculated by comparing the standard deviation of aid/capita received by a country with the mean amount of aid/capita received by the country.
Donors’ financial commitment to education

Hamann, 2003, 2005; Odedokun, 2003). Evidence from these studies indicates that when aid is volatile, procyclical\(^{40}\) and unpredictable it is less effective than it should be and often has a negative impact on economic growth. Bulir and Hamann (2003) find that commitments made to developing states consistently exceed the disbursements received and that these disbursements cannot be predicted reliably using commitment values alone. Figures on the level of funds not disbursed vary from up to a third (Curto, 2007) to a fifth not arriving within the expected year (Celasun and Walliser, 2006), and an estimated 9 per cent of commitments being lost on average, although there are large differences across countries (Celasun and Walliser, 2006). Bulir and Hamann’s (2005) update to their 2003 report in 2005 concludes that volatility and predictability of funding have actually worsened in recent years despite efforts to harmonize aid.

Donors cite unmet policy conditions as the most common reason for unpredictability and delays in disbursements, followed by administrative problems on the donor side and recipient government delays in meeting the processing conditions (Celasun and Walliser, 2006). When considering only bilateral donors and the EC, the most common factor in delays was administrative and political problems on the donor side (Celasun and Walliser, 2006). Given the commitment of donors to aid effectiveness and to assisting states in achieving the MDGs and EFA goals, they need to evaluate how the choice of aid modalities and administrative processes support effective, timely and predictable disbursements of aid.

Rose and Greeley (2006) also note patterns of donor engagement during and after conflicts, with initial peaks during the provision of humanitarian support, followed by disengagement during the early recovery period. Rose and Greeley also state, however, that this early recovery period can be the most effective time for donors to engage with and support governments demonstrating the political will to improve their capacity. In fragile and conflict-affected states, donors tend to prefer to use technical assistance (TA) and off-budget assistance via NGOs and CSOs where state capacity is low or to avoid corruption. But by bypassing the state, donors can miss opportunities to help build capacity and transparency in government systems. To address this, it is also possible for donors to insist that NGOs and other local implementing partners

\(^{40}\) Positively related to the state of donors’ economies – that is, during times of growth, aid commitments will increase but when growth slows or economies enter into recessions, aid commitments will decrease.
build state capacity by making it an integral part of project design. For example, in Somalia all EC education interventions in rural areas include community education committees as a pre-condition of funding in order to safeguard their sustainability and encourage community participation.

As states move towards reconstruction and recovery, donors may also have different criteria for financing priorities when the funding allocation switches from humanitarian aid to development assistance, thus disrupting the continuity and predictability of funding. As states emerge from conflict and are able to focus on developing capacity and infrastructure, they can find themselves in a situation where it is difficult to obtain financial support from donors until they have satisfied new criteria, including sufficient demonstration of the political will to reform and the development of appropriate governance structures.

Donors may be understandably tentative about providing funding to states with lower capacity, a poor governance record and weak public expenditure management systems. Rather than using these reasons to avoid providing funding, donors should more readily accept the challenge of helping states to develop their absorptive capacity, providing assistance with financial management such as planning, procurement, public accounting and budget execution.

While it is understandable that during stages of arrested development donors may be unable to engage effectively with governments of fragile and conflict-affected states, as states move into early recovery and reconstruction the emphasis should also shift to supporting the development of a long-term stable government that is capable of effectively managing aid flows and ensuring education provision is supported by all relevant financiers (government, donors, INGOs, other NSAs and foundations). This issue, including details of mechanisms to achieve this, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

2.7 Summary

Table 2.2 provides an overview of donor activities related to the funding of education in fragile and conflict-affected states. It summarizes the main findings highlighted in this chapter in relation to each of the 23 DAC donors regarding humanitarian aid for education, contributions to the EFA-FTI, the proportion of aid going to education and more specifically to basic education, the proportion of education aid going to CAFS and other LICs, and the top three recipients of education aid.
Overall, the data analysis revealed that there are positive trends in increasing education ODA and improving support to education in fragile and conflict-affected states. This progress needs to be encouraged and maintained by all donors in order to continue to support the development of the education sector within these countries. While overall trends may be positive, there is a need for greater consistency in the allocation of education aid to fragile and conflict-affected states and greater prioritization according to educational needs. This is particularly true for donors already engaging with such states but not prioritizing education in their country strategies. In addition, some donors appear to prioritize disproportionately the provision of education ODA to MICs, often at the expense of fragile and lower-income countries. Proportional allocation of aid across education levels should be assessed and, where appropriate, financial support to basic and secondary education needs to be increased. Similar positive trends can be seen within humanitarian aid, with commitments to support education responses in emergencies increasing in volume and subsequently meeting a greater proportion of funding requirements. These positive trends have emerged in conjunction with increased dialogue among donors regarding aid effectiveness when engaging with fragile and conflict-affected states, with greater exploration of appropriate funding modalities. However, progress still needs to be made to ensure improved predictability in funding.
| Donor      | Education included in humanitarian policy | Humanitarian aid to education (%) | Financial contributions to EFA-FTI $^{[3]}$ | Volume of ODA to education (Average 2005–2007) | Proportion of aid to education greater than 10 per cent | Proportion of education aid going to basic education | Proportion of education aid (%) going to Fragile and conflict-affected states | Top 3 recipients of education aid $^{[6]}$ |
|------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Australia  | X                                         | > 2                              | X**                                           | 203.388                                       | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 3                                               | 28 Indonesia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea      |
| Austria    | X                                         | < 1                              | X                                             | 111.45                                        | X                                                   | X                                                | 3                                               | 11 Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia        |
| Belgium    | X                                         | 1-2                              | ✓ *                                           | 165.59                                        | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 27                                              | 22 DRC, Rwanda, Vietnam                          |
| Canada     | ✓                                         | 1-2                              | ✓ ✓                                           | 269.11                                        | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 21                                              | 56 Mali, Mozambique, Bangladesh                  |
| Denmark    | ✓                                         | > 2                              | ✓ **                                          | 79.70                                         | X                                                   | ✓                                                | 25                                              | 54 Benin, Nepal, Bolivia                         |
| EC         | X                                         | < 1 $^{[3]}$                      | ✓ ✓ **                                        | 869.07                                        | X                                                   | ✓                                                | 13                                              | 27 Tunisia, Turkey, India                        |
| Finland    | X                                         | < 1                              | X                                             | 46.58                                         | X                                                   | ✓                                                | 15                                              | 61 Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia                  |
| France     | X                                         | < 1                              | ✓ **                                          | 1,134.20                                      | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 9                                               | 27 Morocco, Algeria, China                       |
| Germany    | X                                         | 1-2                              | X *                                           | 1,047.29                                      | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 9                                               | 20 China, Cameroon, Turkey                       |
| Greece     | X                                         | < 1                              | X                                             | 39.30                                         | ✓                                                   | X                                                | 19                                              | 5 Albania, Afghanistan, Turkey                   |
| Ireland    | X                                         | > 2                              | ✓ ✓ **                                        | 74.69                                         | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 31                                              | 44 Uganda, Mozambique, Zambia                   |
| Italy      | X                                         | > 2                              | ✓ ✓ *                                         | 58.22                                         | X                                                   | ✓                                                | 18                                              | 10 Somalia, Ethiopia, India                      |
| Japan      | ✓                                         | > 2                              | ✓ *                                           | 811.04                                        | X                                                   | ✓                                                | 8                                               | 24 China, Vietnam, Indonesia                     |
| Luxembourg | X                                         | < 1                              | ✓ **                                         | 28.40                                         | ✓                                                   | X                                                | 10                                              | 45 Senegal, Cape Verde, El Salvador              |
| Netherlands| X                                         | > 2                              | ✓ ✓ **                                        | 861.454                                       | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 7                                               | 31 Indonesia, Mozambique, Bangladesh             |
| New Zealand| X                                         | < 1                              | X                                             | 62.18                                         | ✓                                                   | ✓                                                | 3                                               | 57 Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga                 |
| Donor       | Education included in humanitarian policy | Humanitarian aid to education (%) | Financial contributions to EFA-FTI<sup>3</sup> < US$10 million = ✓ < US$10 million = ✓ > US$10 million = ✓ | Volume of ODA to education (Average 2005–2007) US$ millions, 2006 | Proportion of aid to education greater than 10 per cent ✓ ✓ = ✓ ✓ > 1/4 ✓ = ✓ > 1/2 ✓ ✓ | Proportion of education aid going to basic education ✓ ✓ < 1/4 ✓ > 1/4 ✓ > 1/2 ✓ ✓ | Proportion of education aid (%) going to Fragile and conflict-affected states | Top 3 recipients of education aid<sup>4</sup> |
|-------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Norway      | ✓                                        | 239.30                           | ✓                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | ✓                                             | 16 29                                   |
| Portugal    | X < 1                                    | 65.76                            | ✓                                             | X                                               | X                                               | 38 20                                   |
| Spain       | X 1-2                                    | 260.14                           | ✓                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | 6 20                                   |
| Sweden      | ✓ > 2                                    | 128.44                           | X                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | 25 47                                   |
| Switzerland | X 1-2                                    | 49.42                            | X                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | 6 36                                   |
| UK          | X 1-2                                    | 694.29                           | X                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | 27 49                                   |
| US          | X < 1                                    | 727.15                           | X                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | 30 23                                   |
| World Bank  | – < 1                                    | ✓                                | ✓                                             | ✓                                               | ✓                                               | 33 56                                   |

1. All ODA figures refer to 2005-2007 averages, except for humanitarian aid which is a 2004-2007 average.
2. The figure for ECHO is also less than 1 per cent.
4. Fragile states are italicized with the definition being inclusive of all countries included in Box 2 in Chapter 1.

Source: Data analysis for Save the Children, 2008b; OCHA database, OECD-DAC database, FTI Secretariat, 2007b.
Chapter 3

Channels for the financing of education

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the main options for providing aid financing to education in fragile states and which ones are most appropriate in the context of the four DAC categories of fragile states. This is undertaken using the framework of the 2007 DAC principles for good engagement in fragile states. Case studies are cited as examples of good practice and for lessons to be learned to ensure better practice in future interventions.

The financing modalities focus specifically on multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), budget support and projects. Pooled funding and sector-wide approaches (SWAs) in each of these modalities is discussed, as are the implications of each option for fiduciary risk, education service delivery and the building of sustainable, long-term education systems.

The chapter concludes by suggesting which approaches might be most effective in different contexts of fragility, recognizing that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that will work in every context, but that more concerted effort will be needed by donors to explore different financing options if the MDGs for education are to be met in fragile and conflict-affected states by 2015.

3.2 Different aid modalities

There is a range of mechanisms by which donors can provide funding to fragile and conflict-affected states. Funds can be provided bilaterally (individually) or pooled so that many donors are providing coordinated funding for a given set of activities. Funds can be managed by the recipient government, UN agencies, the donor or an NGO (international or national); and funds can be disbursed through government systems (fully or partially aligned), systems that are separate to but a reflection of government systems (shadow aligned), or parallel systems that are totally separate to government and not aligned with government systems.

There are three main modalities in which funds flow to partner countries – projects, budget support and multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs). A project is usually a time-bound assignment to support specific capital
investment or pilot approaches, for example the building of 15 primary schools over three years or a two-year project developing an alternative approach to teaching children with disabilities. Funds can be used only to support the criteria outlined in the project document. The project is managed by the donor or NGO either directly or in conjunction with the government through a separate project management unit (PMU). Financial reporting takes place according to the donor’s or NGO’s own regulations and requirements. In contrast, budget support is provided directly to the government, generally or to a specific sector such as education, to assist the funding of an agreed national or sector policy and plan. Budget support includes recurrent and capital costs. It can be used in any way as long as the national or sector plan remains on track. The fund is managed by the government (either the ministry of finance or the relevant sector ministry) and the finances provided are blended with domestic resources, thus passing through government financial systems and accounted for using government reporting and auditing systems. A multi-donor trust fund is a hybrid approach where pooled funding is provided by multiple donors to support capital, recurrent or both types of costs in a way that is aligned as far as possible with government systems, but is usually managed by the World Bank or a UN agency rather than the recipient country.

3.3 DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations

In 2007, in recognition of the fact that many fragile and conflict-affected states remain seriously off track of being able to achieve the MDGs and that donors have a critical role to play in partnering with these countries if the MDGs are to be met, the DAC drew up a list of ten Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations (OECD, 2007b). These principles are designed to complement the Paris Declaration and they are a work in progress that will be reviewed and updated in future as deemed appropriate. The key implications for engagement are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1  DAC principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Principle</th>
<th>Summary and implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Take context as the starting point</td>
<td>Engagement with fragile states needs to recognize the causes of fragility and the resulting implications for institutional capacity and willingness for change. The Principles recommend that international actors “mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blue-print approaches” (OECD, 2007b: 1). There has been consensus among some donors that MDTFs are the preferred approach in fragile states, particularly in those countries that fall into the post-conflict and early recovery categories. But even in these categories, there are varying degrees of capacity and will, which still result in the need for donors to be flexible in their approaches (Foster, 2007). For example, in Nepal, DFID is providing different types of assistance to support capacity development at the community, school and policy-making levels including grants, sector support and support for non-state providers. This means that it has not “placed all its eggs in one basket” and has the flexibility to change the mix if circumstances change (Berry, Duncan and Armon, 2004: 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Do no harm</td>
<td>The aim of this principle is to ensure that donors, through their interventions, do not worsen corruption, abuse or division. This requires donors to base their aid programmes on well-informed conflict and governance analysis, and to make considered decisions to suspend or continue aid programmes in situations of governance concerns. This is particularly important in cases where donors are providing budget support as sudden changes in disbursement can have a significant negative impact on service delivery and stability, yet continuing to support countries with a worsening human rights or corruption record will not be seen as good practice by taxpayers back home. In this context, providing aid in a portfolio approach, as DFID has done in Nepal, enables a donor to redistribute its portfolio without having the dramatic negative impact of suddenly cutting off aid.</td>
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### DAC Principle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Summary and implications</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Focus on state building as the central objective</td>
<td>This DAC principle adopts a holistic definition of the state that recognizes that “civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery” (OECD, 2007b: 1). However, the reality on the ground does not always live up to this principle; with the concept of state building often being narrowly interpreted by some donors to mean the capacity building of central and local government to the exclusion of working cohesively with civil society. The review of MDTFs in Sudan found that “civil society has been left out of many processes” (Hasle and Borchgrevink, 2007: 38). (See Box 8 and Box 9 for more detailed case studies on MDTFs, and Chapter 5 for case studies on Save the Children and the International Rescue Committee).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Prioritize prevention</td>
<td>This principle prompts donors to focus on financing activities that have the potential to prevent the situation in fragile and conflict-affected states from worsening and lower the risk of future conflicts and crises. This requires donors to evaluate and try to address the root causes of fragility and to intervene in contexts that are high risk for future conflict and instability before these situations spiral out of control. Within education, key issues related to prevention include addressing curriculum content and access policies that might aggravate fragility where they favour certain groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives</td>
<td>Sector specialists can have a tendency to see their sector as being the most important and urgent to finance. Sometimes this leads to a myopia where they do not see interlinkages with the overall poverty reduction agenda of other sectors, especially the political and security sectors. This therefore requires trade-offs and potentially significant amounts of aid to be spent in the short to medium term on peace-keeping and building the overall capacity of government to manage national development. This will inevitably leave fewer resources for social sector spending, including education, with potentially large expenditures on the military and police. To prevent myopic thinking, donors need to have a joined-up economy-wide approach that involves working with policy-makers and other stakeholders responsible for the economy, security, politics and service delivery to ensure coherence in the provision of humanitarian and development aid in a way that leads to progress rather than stagnation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## DAC Principle Summary and implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Principle</th>
<th>Summary and implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Promote non-discrimination</td>
<td>Where discrimination (social exclusion, human rights discrimination and gender imbalances) is not tackled, this can lead to further fragility. Building inclusive societies where rights are respected thus forms an important part of sustainable development strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts</td>
<td>Wherever possible, donors should avoid building completely parallel systems that are unlikely to be transferable to government in the medium to long term. However, ODI (2004: 49) recognizes that alignment is not always possible and in these cases recommends that the second best option is for donors to harmonize in preparation for future alignment if the context improves and permits this. In the case of low will at the national level, partial or shadow alignment may be realistic alternatives. Partial alignment can take place at the sector or regional level if full alignment with central government is not possible but capacity and will exist at these other levels. If there are serious concerns about capacity and the will of the government to act in the interest of development for the population at large, then systems of shadow alignment can be pursued. This implies that donors work in a way that is compatible with government systems and the longer-term transfer to using government systems, even if they are not working directly through these systems (ODI, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors</td>
<td>While it is important to focus on coordination due to the obvious benefits to both donors and recipient countries, it is critical not to let the coordination goal be pursued to the point of delaying the task of service delivery. For example, Brophy (2007: 1) notes that since the peace agreements of 2005, the MOE in Southern Sudan has established at least nine coordinating committees and working groups which are attended by ministry officials, donors and NGOs. He argues that large amounts of time and energy are spent focusing on the coordination effort at the expense of service delivery, which has received lower priority with funds being slow to disburse. However, it should be pointed out that putting in place coordination mechanisms does take time particularly in the early stages and while it may lead to less availability of resources (both person-hours and finances) to focus on service delivery in the short term, if it is done successfully it should result in more efficient and effective service delivery in the long term.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DAC Principle 9: Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance

There is always a desire to act quickly in countries that are fragile to ensure that service delivery can continue to take place. However, there is often a strong humanitarian response (which may not include education) that quickly fades when the country begins to stabilize. This can leave a gap between humanitarian assistance and development aid, which can result in a lack of service provision and sometimes reverses the progress that humanitarian aid has achieved. Even in developmental terms, given the number of countries that are affected in some way by fragility there is always a new country to engage in, which means donors can be quick to reduce aid to a country that has stabilized and increase it to other countries. This often results in support being scaled back quickly and not provided for a long enough period to ensure capacity for long-term developmental progress and lasting impact within the education sector. Also, it is rare for countries to follow a continuum out of crisis and be on a constant road of improvement without setbacks. If and when these setbacks do occur, donors can be quick to suspend or delay aid, which further destabilizes progress, which this principle is seeking to avoid.

### DAC Principle 10: Avoid pockets of exclusion

This principle applies to countries as well as regions, sectors or specific groups within countries. There is a need for donors to avoid creating donor ‘orphans’ and donor ‘darlings’, especially when in donor orphan countries there are often no obvious reasons (political or financial) that pose a barrier to engagement. It is not possible for every donor to support every country requiring aid, particularly when a donor’s modus operandi is to have an in-country office for every programme they are engaged in. However, one solution that reduces the need for excess management and donor personnel is for donors to fund as silent partners (Sida did this, for example, by providing silent partnership funding through DFID to fund the education sector in Rwanda in 2000) or under delegated assistance strategies or leadership arrangements. Donors need to consider Principles 9 and 10 in tandem, prioritizing aid commitments according to need to avoid pockets of exclusion, but then once these commitments have been made, remaining engaged to ensure success. Donors’ political rationale for providing aid based largely on historical links and present strategic policy objectives, however, means that changes in recipients of development assistance are slow to take place.
3.4 Which aid modalities work best in which categories of fragile states?

Of the ten DAC Principles, this research will take Principle 1 as the basis and will then focus on six others (Principles 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10) that are of particular relevance for donors providing education aid to fragile states. Using DAC Principle 1 as a basis for engagement, it is clear that not every aid modality will be appropriate for every category of fragile state. This next section takes each category in turn and explores the most suitable aid modalities. In some cases there may be a range of modalities, all of which have the potential to be quite effective, whilst in other cases, some are definitely more likely to be effective than others. In all environments, donors and NGOs will gain by coordinating their efforts and pooling funds to reduce transactions costs. Where more can be done in adhering to other DAC Principles, this should also be pursued.

Rose and Greeley (2006: 29-30) suggest that there is very little concrete, documented information available on NGO interventions that support service delivery and build accountability (directly and indirectly by empowering civil society) in education in either arrested development contexts or deteriorating environments. This means that our knowledge base on what works and what does not work effectively in these environments is very limited in comparison to the information that exists on the post-conflict transition and early recovery contexts.

Deteriorating environments

In deteriorating environments, it is often very difficult to engage fully with governments that may be experiencing weakening capacity, will and legitimacy in continuing to provide services. In these contexts, some donors have disengaged, others have turned to providing humanitarian assistance and still others have taken the short-route accountability approach. Under the latter approach, funds are often channelled directly to NGOs for service delivery, thus making them accountable (in theory, even though it does not always take place in practice) to communities for service delivery and bypassing the state.

Following the humanitarian route does not always guarantee the inclusion of education, as this sector is a relative newcomer to

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41. With short-route accountability, citizens as consumers of services hold the service providers directly accountable for the services provided. See glossary for full definition.
the humanitarian field. It also requires coordination between the ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ departments of donor agencies. These can often have competing mandates within the same organization but co-ordination is essential to ensure a sustainable approach when the context improves and longer-term development aid that is likely to require a bigger educational component is needed.

In following the short-route accountability approach, there can be a tendency for NGOs to try out innovative approaches or pilots. However, this can result in them not having a longer-term strategy for eventually working more closely with government structures for poverty reduction. It may lead to a fragmented approach even though it results in service delivery and enables children to attend school in the short term (Rose and Greeley, 2006: 14). Thus it is important that the design and implementation of any pilot project, innovative approach or continuation of service delivery is compatible, as far as possible, with the longer-term objective of state building and transferral to government as the main service provider.

The main options in deteriorating environments are to fund NGOs and communities directly or to support the local government if possible. Ideally, this will be through pooled funding as there is a high administrative cost of managing many projects (for example, Sida was working with 45 NGOs in Zimbabwe in 2005 (Fenton, 2007: 19)), but this will require NGOs to have the capacity to manage significant sums of money. In addition, any approach would ideally need to cover both recurrent and capital costs, even if implemented through a programme or project mode. While funding may then bypass government channels, and thus limit this side of state building, it does not necessarily mean that dialogue with the government cannot continue. If key stakeholders from local government, communities and civil society are actively involved in the process, state building may continue to take place and ownership may be built, but this is likely to be bottom up rather than top down. Additionally, this will ensure service delivery can continue to take place even when the state is deteriorating. The following case study of a joined-up pooled fund managed by a group of INGOs in Zimbabwe shows that such an approach is possible.
Table 3.2 Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in deteriorating environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Principle</th>
<th>Interpretation and application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Do no harm</td>
<td>If governments suddenly deteriorate where budget support is being provided, then it is important that donors think quickly but deeply about how to respond to minimize the damage of cutting back aid (see illustration from Ethiopia in Box 15). However, in most cases, deterioration does not happen suddenly or in a sustained way, thus donors have some time to provide a considered response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Focus on state building as the central objective</td>
<td>Direct state building with national governments may be difficult, thus working with local governments, communities and service providers is likely to be the second best option until national government will and intent begin to change. This does not mean severing relations with the national government, but it will require a consideration of how state building at this level can continue without the donor supporting bad governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Align with local priorities</td>
<td>Full alignment is unlikely to be possible, so shadow or partial alignment is most likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors</td>
<td>Coordination is highly desirable particularly given limited resources, a multitude of NGOs and civil society groups through which funding can be channelled, and difficulty in accessing certain parts of the country due to instability. Coordination is very possible in this environment but does require a consolidated effort on the part of donors and service providers. Where humanitarian aid is significant for education, the Education Cluster should play an important role in coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance</td>
<td>Some donors may already be engaged but wondering what to do given the deteriorating context. In this case, it will be important for them to continue to engage but to channel funds through different routes if this addresses governance concerns. Others may not be engaged at all, but could start engaging through the humanitarian approach, ensuring that this is a joined-up approach that could lead to more sustained inputs in future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Avoid pockets of exclusion</td>
<td>It tends to be deteriorating countries and unstable regions within other countries that become marginalized and excluded. When donors choose not to work with a government for fiduciary and governance reasons, this exclusion should not prevent them from engaging in a wider context in the country in order to ensure ongoing service delivery.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Box 6 Zimbabwe Joint Initiative

In 2005, seven INGOs (Africare, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam GB, Practical Action Southern Africa, Save the Children UK and Mercy Corps) developed an integrated programme – the Joint Initiative (JI) – to address the needs of highly vulnerable groups in six urban areas of Zimbabwe. Supported by donor funds, the JI partners developed a multi-sectoral programme (including education) and negotiated among themselves budget, governance and contractual agreements that would also be acceptable to donors and local partners. This led to an 18-month contract worth US$5 million. Five donors (DFID, Sida, CIDA, AusAid and the Norwegian government) agreed to pool their funds with no earmarking, to adopt Sida’s procurement regulations, and to direct funds to Mercy Corps for onward distribution. USAID was unable to pool funds for legal reasons so they paid funds separately to Mercy Corps to cover project management costs.

A full project evaluation report is not currently available, but feedback from NGOs and donors involved has been largely positive. Although the time spent setting up the consortium and agreeing modalities was lengthy, the resultant model could more easily be replicated in the future.


Arrested development

In the arrested development category of fragile states, donors and many agencies find it extremely difficult to work directly with the government and at times, difficult even to engage as the government’s legitimacy and control of the country can be questionable. The issues for donor engagement are likely to be similar to but maybe even more pronounced than those in deteriorating environments. Fiduciary risk is very high and the increased security risk means that the operating costs of donors and INGOs in these contexts are significantly higher than in other countries, resulting in fewer agencies on the ground. Most donors in this context will channel funding through UN agencies and NGOs that are on the ground, as in deteriorating environments. Implementing agencies are likely to experience difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff in these challenging working environments, making it difficult to build and maintain local capacity. In addition, projects are likely to be focused on particular target groups or locations, with activities concentrated according to need and risk. This poses additional challenges for coordination, the scaling up of activities and consistency in education provision, and results in the additional benefits of economies of scale being lost.
Table 3.3  Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in arrested development environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Principle</th>
<th>Interpretation and application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2  Do no harm</td>
<td>In these contexts, the ‘arrested development’ state is likely to have existed for some time or started out as ‘deteriorating’. Donors are unlikely to do much harm by starting and stopping aid flows, as these are probably small-scale interventions related to project activities that are unlikely to cover project costs and do not flow through government channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Focus on state building as the central objective</td>
<td>Direct state building with the national government is likely to be impossible, though it might in some contexts be possible to work with the local government. The alternative option will be to work through the UN or NGOs with communities and service providers. This may be the only option until the context changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Align with local priorities</td>
<td>Shadow alignment may be possible if supporting through UN structures. Partial alignment is possible if there is the option of working with the local government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors</td>
<td>Given the constraints on nearly all other DAC Principles, this may be the only principle that can be adhered to fully. It is highly necessary given limited resources, great need, and the desire to ensure that if and when the context improves, donors and service providers are working well together and coordinating and harmonizing their efforts wherever possible. This will require a consolidated effort on the part of donors and service providers as it may be very difficult to find out who is working in these contexts, where they are working, and which activities they are funding. Where humanitarian aid is significant for education, the Education Cluster should play an important role in coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance</td>
<td>Given that few donors are likely to be present directly in-country and their funding is likely to flow through NGOs and UN organizations, the issue of engagement is transferred to these bodies. For organizations that are already on the ground, the situation may be so precarious that donors may be unable to stay engaged long term if the situation does not improve due to ongoing security concerns, government interference and the possibility that the government can declare an organization unwanted. All of this has the strong potential to undermine staying engaged long enough to build sustainable systems. For donors that are not already engaged at some level, acting fast will require working with existing organizations on the ground, coordinating with donors already operating and funding activities in these environments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Avoid pockets of exclusion

This principle may be very difficult to adhere to in a country where the government has tight control of where NGOs and the UN can operate. There can also be underlying political reasons, such as a lack of strategic interest, hidden under an umbrella excuse of ‘governance concerns’ and which may lead to more donor orphans. It is not clear how this can be addressed. It can also be difficult when the scale of needs is too challenging to address comprehensively in the short term and the logistics of accessing certain parts of the country (for example in the DRC) proves challenging.

The main option in environments of arrested development will be to fund NGOs or UN organizations to ensure service delivery. Ideally, this will be in a coordinated way through pooled funding. If the NGO subcontracting route is chosen, this requires NGOs to have the capacity to manage significant sums of money. Spending and managing such sums may not always be possible within short timescales and in highly variable and unpredictable working environments. This can limit the scale of activities and place an administrative burden on NGOs. As in deteriorating environments, any approach ideally needs to cover both recurrent and capital costs. This has happened in Somalia, where EC funding is channelled via INGOs that are managing both the financial and technical inputs of projects due to the limited capacity of state actors.

### Box 7 Somalia Basic Education Programme (Somaliland and Puntland)

In Somalia, Save the Children UK has been working closely with regional education authorities to strengthen their capacity and provide a basis for further state building whenever a formal national government is formed. This includes not only working directly with state actors at a regional level to develop and coordinate education activities, but also extensive work at the community level with head teachers, teachers, students and parents to help encourage state accountability and legitimacy, and form a foundation for state-managed programmes. This approach has been more successful in the Togdheer region of Somaliland, where there is a draft education plan in place and government structures are more established, than in the Hiran region, where coordination efforts have been limited by ongoing conflict.
Whilst Rose and Greeley (2006) argue that there are questions about the sustainability of such interventions, particularly given that in Somaliland similar approaches have been followed for nearly a decade without the government taking greater control, this is not necessarily due to a lack of effort, but more to do with a lack of ownership of the role of government in the international development agenda within Somaliland that goes beyond what an NGO can deliver.

Source: Rose and Greeley, 2006.

Post-conflict transition

In countries that fall into the post-conflict transition category, there are various options for donor engagement. Several MDTFs have been supported, as well as sustainable projects. Some reasons why donors may be keen to support MDTFs in post-crisis situations include the following: (i) aligning assistance with national objectives; (ii) harmonizing and co-ordinating with other donors; (iii) increased influence on national and sectoral policy and strategy; (iv) the limited capacity of bilaterals in the country due to security concerns and constrained resources, thus making them unwilling or unable to post new or additional personnel in the country; (v) the transferral of risks and responsibilities from the bilateral donor to the MDTF administrator; (vi) the avoidance of direct bilateral engagement with the national government if there are still governance issues; and (vii) a collective bargaining tool for governments to be held to account for service delivery where a system is put in place for the MDTF to match recurrent funding based on a specified ratio.

MDTFs have been popular and are often cited as the ‘preferred mechanism’ with donors in post-conflict transition situations as they manage the problem of high fiduciary risk; they reduce transaction costs for governments and other implementing agencies as they act as a channel for pooled funding from several donors; they are broadly in line with the DAC Principles, and they go further than most other mechanisms in addressing the issues of coordination, harmonization and alignment, as outlined in the Paris Declaration. They can support a variety of different aid instruments, including budget support and projects. This has led the team commissioned by the World Bank and Norwegian MFA reviewing post-crisis trust funds to conclude that “MDTFs represent best-practice post-crisis funding mechanism” and “MDTFs are by far the most important coordination, harmonization and alignment vehicle in place” (Scanteam, 2007: 12).
### Table 3.4 Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in post-conflict transition situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Principle</th>
<th>Interpretation and application</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Do no harm</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Focus on state building as the central objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Align with local priorities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td><strong>Avoid pockets of exclusion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that MDTFs have strong potential for sustainability given that they are shadow or fully aligned is a further advantage and enables
Channels for the financing of education

longer-term state building to take place. In practice, however, MDTFs are usually a small share of total aid, with some donors continuing to provide aid through separate projects or via NGOs and some countries having significant internal revenues that are managed directly by the government rather than passing through the MDTF. This dilutes the potential beneficial effects of MDTFs, placing additional pressure on the recipient government and questioning the long-term sustainability of the MDTF if a parallel government system for managing and disbursing funds is already in place. Also, some donors earmark funding provided for the MDTF, reducing its flexibility.

Most of the existing MDTFs are managed by the World Bank, with a few being managed by the UN. Scanteam (2007: 13) found that the Bank-managed MDTFs have “systematically supported the involvement of non-state actors in policy development, project implementation ... but subject to government acceptance”. UN-managed MDTFs are not able to fund NGOs directly but instead funds have to pass through a UN executing agency, which then contracts out services to the NGO as an implementing partner. In these situations and others where donors channel funding through UN agencies, the UN charges significant overhead costs, which reduces the overall funding available for project implementation – in some cases, quite significantly. In addition, where procurement needs to take place, this then has to be done through UN procurement systems, which are often bureaucratic and cause delays, reflecting badly on the NGO (Fenton, 2007a: 19).

One of the main criticisms of MDTFs from a civil society perspective is that they are very much focused on building government capacity, and funds are not often made available to civil society groups and NGOs with which to fund more community-based initiatives or support the provision of services. This raises the question about how to build state capacity in places where the government is wary about NGO involvement and does not approve or accept that MDTF funds can be used and managed by NGOs.

Where MDTFs are project-based in their funding and do not provide funds for recurrent costs, they represent a de facto coordinated development budget. While this may be good for coordinating donors, there is also an urgent need for recurrent funding. Thus it will be important to ensure that MDTFs have the flexibility to provide the right balance of development or capital costs and recurrent costs.
Box 8 and Box 9 highlight the case studies of two MDTFs that have a significant educational component.

**Box 8 Southern Sudan MDTF**

The MDTF for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) was established with the aim of rebuilding the southern states of Sudan and providing support to the new Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The fund is managed in Juba by the World Bank. The MDTF-SS funds projects and capital costs with the expectation that the GOSS will match MDTF-SS funds on a 2:1 ratio from oil revenues, to fund recurrent and other costs. There is presently a debate over whether this ratio should be reduced in light of GOSS’s difficulty in matching funding to date.

Stakeholders had high expectations for the MDTF-SS, viewing it as it was intended as a coordination mechanism to leverage and pool external funding, with significant proportions of funding still using the UN and NGO systems. As a result, there is considerable frustration, with concern that it is slow and bureaucratic in disbursing funds. The reasons for these delays are multifaceted, but paramount is low capacity within the GOSS. Delays in appointing key personnel, coupled with little understanding or experience of international norms and requirements (due to low levels of donor engagement in the two decades prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement), left the GOSS in a very weak position and overwhelmed by the influx of donor finances and the demands of returning populations (Sommers, 2005). The GOSS received insufficient capacity building support and found it difficult and time consuming to understand the systems and procedures. Additional impediments have been the weakness of the MDTF-SS secretariat, with managers based outside of Sudan making occasional visits; that World Bank procedures have not been adjusted to reflect the reality on the ground (for example, the lack of local firms that could meet the tendering requirements); and the lack of access for NGOs to MDTF-SS finances (Scanteam, 2007: 99-103).

Whilst the MDTF-SS has worked well in coordinating donors that are providing financing through it, it has not been very successful in providing broader donor coordination around non-MDTF-SS resources, though this may well be changing as part of the Budget Sector Planning Process 2007-2009.

*Sources:* Foster, 2007; Scanteam, 2007; Sommers, 2005; World Bank, 2006b; and World Bank, 2007.
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) has been operational since March 2002 and is managed by the World Bank. There are three components to the ARTF: (i) the Recurrent Window (funding for wages, operations and maintenance in the recurrent budget, excluding the security services); (ii) the Investment Window (funding for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRA) National Priority Programmes, as contained in the National Development Framework); and (iii) the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (funding for the internal security sector – police and prisons), which is managed by the UN Development Program (UNDP). Through these three components the ARTF covers approximately one third of GIRA’s annual budget deficit. A total of 24 donors provide funding to the ARTF with five of them (the UK, the USA, the EC, the Netherlands and Canada) providing nearly 80 per cent of the total funds. No earmarking of funds is permitted, though donors can express a preference for use of funds if a funding gap exists, but this preference cannot exceed 50 per cent of a donor’s annual contribution. Despite this large group of donors supporting the ARTF, significant aid still flows outside the budget, both from the top five ARTF donors and from others (Foster, 2007).

The majority of ARTF funds (around 75-80 per cent) is allocated through the Recurrent Window to the state budget to be spent according to agreed fiduciary standards but using GIRA’s public financial management systems. The Recurrent Window was established quickly and efficiently, and has helped build the capacity of GIRA in public financial management. There has been a significant increase in the number of teachers to deal with the rapid increase in enrolment, which jumped from 2.8 million in 2002 to nearly 6 million in 2005. The majority of these teachers are paid through the Recurrent Window and while salaries are low (only around US$45 per month in 2005) payments are now much more regular due to the ARTF.

The ARTF Investment Window plays a minor role, with total expenditures of around US$100 million annually compared to overall donor-financed project funding of approximately US$3 billion annually. There has been no funding for education in the ARTF Investment Window.

NGOs played an important role in service delivery under the Taliban regime as donors were channelling significant resources through them, but their role has decreased as the public sector has been rebuilt. The World Bank has played a role in enabling NGOs to access ARTF funding in rural development programmes, resulting in greater participation by NGOs in the ARTF than in the other Trust Funds. However, NGOs do not have any formal voice on policy, strategy and decision-making and no seats on government-donor committees.
The ARTF experienced some problems with disbursement in the first year of its operations due to limited field staff based in Kabul but this was subsequently resolved. The Scanteam evaluation concluded that the ARTF Recurrent Window has been effective in harmonizing and aligning donor support with GIRA’s priorities and coordinating rural development, but given that so much donor money flows outside the ARTF, particularly in relation to the Investment Window, it is limited in contributing to further harmonization.

Despite these limitations, the ARTF is currently the only existing mechanism for coordination and its management committee includes the four major multilateral actors, thus contributing to more effective and co-ordinated national policy dialogue.

Sources: DANIDA, 2005; Foster, 2007; Scanteam, 2005 and 2007.

As these two case studies have outlined, there have been significant challenges regarding these MDTFs. However, it is hard to say whether they are unique to the MDTFs or part of the challenges of the wider environment in which the MDTFs are working, and therefore challenges also for other aid modalities and channels. The Scanteam review (2007) recommends that an analysis is undertaken of how well activities funded through MDTFs have performed in comparison to similar activities financed through other channels, in order to see the real benefits or challenges of the MDTFs.

According to the DAC Principles, it is preferable for donors to support NGOs via government systems. This means supporting them through MDTFs or budget support, thereby enabling governments to be in charge of subcontracting NGOs to deliver services where the state does not have full capacity. This means that aid will be on-budget. This approach of contracting out has not worked well under some MDTFs and thus the main alternative is projects or programmes with a limited time span. While there is an inbuilt bias against projects by many donors due to the fact that they do not tend to be supporting the discourse of the Paris Declaration, they can be effective if well designed and intentioned. A successful approach is outlined in the example of Southern Sudan in Box 10.
**Early recovery**

This is probably the easiest category of DAC fragile states within which to provide aid and to apply the DAC Principles, and hence there are many more examples and possibilities of aid modalities to use that have emerged in different contexts. In early recovery countries, there is a strong likelihood that donors will have a long-term commitment to harmonize and fully align their aid and, wherever possible, to use government systems and build government capacity. As in all other categories, pooling funding will ensure more efficient use of aid and will reduce transaction costs. It is critical in these contexts that as humanitarian donors scale back their aid to focus on pressing priorities elsewhere, and new development donors come on board, there are effective and consistent approaches between the ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ departments, both within and between organizations to ensure continuity and the effective use of aid resources.

In early recovery settings, projects are not perceived as sustainable in the longer term. Budget support or pooled funding around common sector plans in support of a SWAp for achieving the EFA agenda are preferred for their benefits of coordination, harmonization, alignment and efficiency. Budget support is only suitable in early recovery settings where there is a strong commitment to development, even if there is still...
low capacity. Aid given via direct budget support is fungible\textsuperscript{42} so there is no guarantee that education will receive additional funds (although targets can be set). Much will depend on the negotiating power of the MOE with the ministry of finance. In contrast, aid given via sector budget support is additional and may be a preferred option.

Three of the main challenges of budget support are (i) predictability, (ii) sustainability, and (iii) weak financial systems in the recipient country. Aid to fragile and conflict-affected states is twice as volatile as aid to other LICs (Levin and Dollar, 2005). These countries may be highly dependent on budget support to help finance significant recurrent costs, as they may have a very low tax base and low capacity to raise domestic revenue. If there are delays or interruptions in the disbursement of this aid, this will have a major and immediate impact on service delivery. For example, there will be delays in paying teachers’ salaries, which often constitute over 90 per cent of the recurrent education budget. Such delays have occurred in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda in recent years. Secondly, regarding sustainability, donors are usually able to make a firm two to three year commitment of aid. Yet budget support is likely to be needed at significant levels in the medium to long term, especially for low-income fragile and conflict-affected states with no natural resources. Where financial systems are weak, it has been argued that budget support can help to strengthen them, but this does mean that along the way there will be funds that are not properly accounted for or are even embezzled, as is shown in the example from Mozambique in \textit{Box 11}.

\textbf{Table 3.5 \hspace{1cm} Interpretation and application of DAC Principles in early recovery situations}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Principle</th>
<th>Interpretation and application</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 \hspace{1cm} Do no harm</td>
<td>Given that aid in these contexts is highly likely to be provided through pooled programme funding including budget support, which contributes to recurrent costs, any interruption in aid flows can have a detrimental impact on service delivery. Donors will need to ensure any changes in aid flows due to governance concerns are carefully considered.</td>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{42} Aid is fungible when a government can choose how to use it, provided that certain progress indicators are met at a national or sectoral level; it is not guaranteed or earmarked as additional funds for a specific sector.
### DAC Principle | Interpretation and application
--- | ---
3 | Focus on state building as the central objective. Direct state building with national and local government takes place through pooled funding and budget support but civil society can be marginalized in these approaches.
7 | Align with local priorities. Full alignment will generally take place through budget support as national systems will be used and strengthened. Where funding is pooled but managed separately from government funds due to fiduciary concerns, shadow alignment usually takes place. This needs to be designed in such a way that it is consistent with the transition to full alignment as capacity is strengthened, rather than ending up being a parallel system (as has happened in Yemen – see Box 12).
8 | Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors. Where donors can pool their funding through budget support at the general or sector level, this will ensure that coordination can take place, and the government will not have to meet separately for policy dialogue and reporting to individual donors. Even where funding is pooled but managed by a donor, this can take place.
9 | Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. In settings where the tax base is low, there is a high dependence on subsistence agriculture and there are few natural resources, donors will need to be engaged with budget support for the long term to ensure results that are sustainable. In other contexts where there is less agricultural dependence and more natural resources that can provide substantial revenues, donors may be able to scale back their assistance over the medium term, but it will be important to do this in a phased and sustainable manner. Where funding is pooled but not given directly as budget support, as financial capacity is strengthened the pooled fund could be transferred to the government to manage. The major challenge will be to ensure that budget support is provided predictably and sustainably without sudden cuts.
10 | Avoid pockets of exclusion. It will be important that governments are held to account through the policy dialogue that accompanies pooled funding and budget support to ensure that marginalized groups and regions do not remain marginalized in terms of aid allocation and service delivery.

One of the key questions in fragile states categorized as ‘early recovery’ is how long after a conflict or crisis these countries remain in a stage of early recovery until they are no longer fragile states. Clearly, there is not a hard and fast number of years for each country. Even when
countries have made significant progress, they may still remain fragile but not easily fit into any of the four DAC categories. Countries like Rwanda and Uganda seem to have moved beyond the early recovery stage in terms of developmental progress, yet they still face issues of fragility (Uganda in the north of the country and Rwanda being surrounded by other fragile countries, including Burundi and the DRC). Given the lack of clarity on which countries to include and which are beyond this category, the examples below include a mix of countries, some of which may no longer be considered in early recovery but were at the time of the interventions outlined.

**Box 11 Mozambique Direct Support to Schools Programme (World Bank)**

The Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), with financial support from the World Bank, designed and started the Direct Support to Schools (DSS) programme in March 2003. This programme allocates block grants to primary schools on the basis of student enrolment and the number of classes per school to assist them in improving quality in basic education. Each school received between US$200 and US$4,500. In addition, a sum of money was allocated to the District Directorate of Education (DDE) to cover administrative costs.

The MOEC transfers a school’s allocation to the DDE bank account. The DDE is then responsible for informing schools of the availability of funds. Schools were given the responsibility to decide how to spend those funds according to MOEC guidelines on eligible expenditures and to ensure that the necessary financial controls are followed.

One of the key successes of the programme is that there has been strong leadership and ownership by the MOEC, which has invested significant time and energy into the implementation of the programme and the training of government officials. However, challenges have included (i) a lack of control and organization in programme implementation; (ii) mismanagement of funds; (iii) weak community involvement in decision-making; (iv) weak or non-existent financial management skills of head teachers and school staff; (v) duplication of expenditure already covered by the state budget; (vi) excessive use of funds for food and transport; (vii) ignorance of or lack of adherence to MOEC guidelines; and (viii) delays in the purchase of items. These factors have lead to significant variation in the impact of the DSS programme across districts.

*Sources: Blasie’Ayako, 2006; Muzima, 2006; Rose and Greeley, 2006.*
Box 12 Yemen Social Fund for Development

The Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD) is a donor-led and managed pooled fund created in 1997. Its aim is to improve access to basic social services for low-income groups, with a focus on empowering local communities and councils to lead their own development. SFD funding is allocated to each of the governorates and districts using a pro-poor funding allocation and has been particularly successful in reaching remote, rural areas. In 2005, the SFD funded approximately 950 projects with an estimated cost of US$87.2 million; over half of this funding was allocated to education.

The main challenge for the SFD is how to move from a project to a programme approach, and to try to eliminate the earmarking of funds by donors and the practice of donors to add underspends from elsewhere at the end of the financial year to the SFD since it is viewed as being ‘safe’. This has made it difficult to fully align the SFD with government priorities. In addition, the SFD needs to support more state building rather than operating a parallel system to the country’s poverty reduction strategy (PRS) and national strategy for education, the Basic Education Development Strategy, which is partly funded with the support of donors. The main questions seem to be whether the SFD should continue to focus on infrastructure (construction and equipment) or whether it should have a wider role in capacity building and service delivery, and how to scale-up successful initiatives that have emerged through the programme.

The SFD has supported NGOs and specifically facilitated the establishment of an NGO legal framework that is well respected. There are now around 5,000 NGOs registered with the government, the majority based around service delivery and some unlikely to be sustainable. A major challenge is how to enable NGOs to focus on empowerment rather than exclusively on welfare so that they can play a greater role in building state capacity.

Sources: ESA Consultores Internacional/Environmental Resources Management, 2007; and Jennings, 2006.

Box 13 Ethiopia basic services grant

Prior to late 2005, several donors were providing ongoing aid funding via budget support to implement Ethiopia’s poverty reduction strategy. However, as a result of governance concerns following the May 2005 elections, donors providing budget support suspended their aid. There was much criticism concerning the impact this would have on service delivery. Consequently, donors developed the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) grant as an alternative to budget support that would be used to support basic services (primary and secondary education, health, agriculture,
water and sanitation) by increasing the overall volume of block transfers at the regional and woreda (district) levels. (This effectively transferred budget support down one level of the decentralized system.) To ensure that PBS funds are used for their intended purposes, more rigorous expenditure monitoring and evaluation tools have been developed.

The PBS is earmarked budget support covering recurrent and development costs totalling US$822.4 million over a two-year period, provided by a group of donors including the World Bank, DFID, the EC, CIDA, the AfDB and Irish Aid. It comprises four components: (i) support for delivering basic services in education, health, water and sanitation, and agricultural support; (ii) support for achieving the health MDGs (specifically focusing on malaria); (iii) support for financial transparency and accountability and strengthening of the government’s capacity; and (iv) support for social accountability. The first three components are being implemented through the government’s existing decentralized public financial management system.

A PBS Special Account has been created as a holding account for all sources of PBS funding. Once conditions have been met, World Bank and AfDB funding flows directly into this account, while EC and DFID funding flows through a specially created MDTF managed by the World Bank into the PBS account. The Government of Ethiopia draws funds from the PBS account into a fungible Consolidated Fund Account, from which funds will be transferred to the Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development at the regional level, based on an agreed PBS formula for each region, for transferral to the woreda level. Progress is monitored by a quarterly Joint Budget and Aid Review (JBAR) and the disbursement of further tranches depends on satisfactory reporting at the JBAR. The third component of the PBS will help to support and strengthen the government’s capacity to ensure the JBAR monitoring requirements are met.

The programme has not yet been evaluated, but if future reviews show that it has had a positive impact and ensured service delivery can continue, then this type of intervention may well be appropriate to use in decentralized or federalized fragile states in the early recovery or slightly deteriorating categories.

*Sources:* African Development Fund, 2006; World Bank, 2006a.
3.5 Summary

This chapter has presented and discussed the DAC Principles and, using the DAC typology for fragile states, outlined which range of aid modalities are likely to be most effective in different contexts of fragility, building strongly on the foundation of DAC Principle 1.

While the evidence is limited, the chapter has outlined good practice in the contexts of arrested development and deteriorating environments, but showed that in these cases, engagement through NGOs and UN agencies is likely to be the most effective approach, given that fully engaging with the government is probably going to be difficult. In these contexts, the DAC Principles can only be applied in a limited way due to the constraints of government capacity, legitimacy and will, with the main focus being on Principle 8 (donor coordination) and Principle 2 (do no harm).

In post-conflict transition settings, MDTFs have been an important tool but have focused on top-down systems, at times doing harm by being bureaucratic and slow to deliver services. In addition, MDTFs provide a limited role for NGOs and civil society partnerships, thus limiting the full meaning of state building. There are some successful examples of programme approaches where funding is managed by NGOs that work closely with the government through partial- or shadow-aligned systems. This shows that the DAC Principles can be applied in different ways and that the success or failure of them is not necessarily dependent on the approach but more on the design and implementation of the specific intervention.

In early recovery contexts, there is a wider range of possibilities and the likelihood of greater coherence with the DAC Principles. However, it is in these contexts that NSAs are most sidelined. Yet in these countries, while there may be significant government capacity and will, there may not be sufficient implementation capacity for the government to be the sole provider of services. Thus NSAs can complement the government in providing services. They often have a good track record of doing this in the areas of non-formal education, ALPs and services for hard-to-reach and marginalized groups. Therefore, it is important that NSAs are not excluded.

The chapter has reiterated that in all contexts of fragility, pooling funding wherever possible reduces transaction costs and increases
coordination and harmonization. Where it is not possible to use government systems as a channel for funding, a lead donor, UN agency or NGO can be appointed to manage the funds according to agreed financial procedures, thus lowering the risk of corruption or financial mismanagement. However, pooled funding that does not pass through government systems cannot replace national or sectoral budgets in the long term, so it is a transitional solution that, if shadow aligned, is likely to be more sustainable.
Chapter 4

Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education

4.1 Introduction

When donors focus on funding programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states, there is often an overriding security, political and poverty reduction agenda coupled with the need to manage fiduciary risk. This accompanies the DAC Principles and the Paris Declaration, both of which focus on working to strengthen government systems and capacity for long-route accountability, and on harmonization and coordination. While these are important elements, the focus can be a top-down one as well as structural instead of intervening at the service delivery level to ensure an effective impact on beneficiaries.

This chapter outlines the policies and in-country practices of educational engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states by three international donors (the EC, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida). For each donor, we also summarize some lessons learned and emerging good practice in funding the education sector in a range of contexts of fragility.

4.2 The European Commission

Policy and strategy

Within the European Commission (EC), the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) works on development policy formulation at the global and sectoral levels. The implementation of programmes funded by EC development assistance rests with the Directorate General for Aid Co-ordination (DG AIDCO), while the Directorate General for EC Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) is the service of the EC that is responsible for the provision of humanitarian aid.

43. Accountability of the state to its citizens as part of their role as elected representatives to provide (directly or indirectly) services on their citizen’s behalf. See glossary for fuller definition.
The EC’s approach to engaging in countries that have some degree of fragility is predominantly guided by four recent internal documents:

- *The European Consensus on Development* (EC, 2005)
- *EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy* (EC, 2007a)
- *Towards an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace* (EC, 2007b)

In addition to these, the EC is guided by key international frameworks such as the DAC Principles and the Paris Declaration. In 2009, the European Council requested the EC to present an implementation plan on an EU response to situations of fragility. This is to be based on experience in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen, and will address the EU and member countries’ political engagement and coordination, and coherence in response and aid effectiveness.44

The EC’s immediate focus in situations of fragility is to deliver basic services through collaboration with UN agencies and civil society, with the longer-term aim being to build “legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions and an active and organized civil society” (2005: 27). In the longer term, its main framework for addressing fragility is through Country Strategy Programmes (CSPs), which are prepared jointly with partner governments (EC, 2007b: 7). The EC also emphasizes the need for complementarity among EU donors and other partners, as well as comprehensive and coordinated engagement through a ‘whole of government’ approach. The initial response strategies address the immediate needs of the population, even if strategic responses need to focus on the longer term. In order for this to be effective, it is critical to understand how fragility affects the different groups in a society, in particular women and vulnerable groups such as children, youth, the disabled and minorities, in order to address their needs appropriately.

The CSPs are based upon such needs assessments and provide a structure for coordinated, strategic intervention. But given the complexity and rapid changes in fragile contexts, a CSP can take time to develop, particularly if working in partnership with a government that may have limited capacity or willingness to engage. This can create tension between

the desire for rapid intervention and one that is based on an appropriate understanding of the context. There is also a risk that interventions become fragmented during the transition from basic service delivery as part of the humanitarian response towards longer-term development engagement. For example, in Myanmar the EC began moving in 2004 from providing humanitarian assistance towards development assistance, but the CSP was not established until 2007. In the interim period before the CSP, interventions were financed from multiple budget lines based on ad hoc assessments. While interventions in such transitional circumstances may have addressed needs appropriately, the development of a CSP or similar interim framework is vital in facilitating coherent and effective engagement. In Myanmar, the CSP for 2007-2013 now works alongside humanitarian support provided through DG ECHO, ensuring complementarity between projects and programmes, where possible.

CSPs define the strategic programming of the EC’s aid allocation for developing countries. One of the key principles in the CSP approach is the concentration of activities and financial assistance on two sectors where the EC has a comparative advantage, with the aim of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of EC cooperation. This has been seen in Pakistan, where the EC has been working since the mid-1970s, but only began working within the education sector in the late 1990s. This was in part related to changes in the education approach, in particular the development of a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), which aligned with the EC’s interests and expertise. In contrast, in Somalia the decision was taken to continue supporting the education sector, given previous positive evaluations of education programmes.

The aforementioned policy and strategy documents apply directly to education and the EC’s development response. In the case of the EC’s humanitarian response, a programme is based on the country context and jointly identified needs, which may or may not include education. However, there has been a growing realization within the EC of the importance of educational activities in emergency and crisis situations and a feeling that the EC must be ready to intervene in the sector when it appears that no other actor (national or local authorities, or long-term aid providers) has the means or possibility of intervening. For this reason, DG ECHO has included education in emergencies as one of the three strands within the action framework of its 2007-2008 operational strategy, under the Children’s sectoral theme. It should be noted, however, that support
of these types of activities is contingent on a thorough needs assessment and prioritization.

The EC is a member and strong supporter of the FTI partnership and has recognized the importance of addressing the problems faced by fragile and conflict-affected states under this forum. Between 2004 and 2008 it committed over US$92 million to the Catalytic Fund and pledged a further US$25 million in 2009 (FTI Secretariat, 2007b). Seeing that a large proportion of out-of-school children are living in fragile and conflict-affected states and that these countries are therefore often the ones most off track to meet the MDGs, the EC acknowledges the critical need to work in such networks to enhance the effectiveness of its response at the country level.

Coordination

Recovery and reconstruction in the aftermath of a disaster is a major challenge, which requires structural and development action beyond immediate emergency aid. Thus it is important to ensure that humanitarian, development and other relevant aid instruments work better together, in particular in situations of fragility and where communities are seeking to recover from the effects of crisis (EC, 2008: 9).

Since the early 1990s, DG ECHO has reiterated its commitment to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The EC (2008: 3) states that “EU humanitarian aid ... should take long-term development objectives into account where possible, and is closely linked to development cooperation ...” Coordination takes place at the headquarters level with the Directorate General for Aid Coordination (DG AIDCO) and the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) to facilitate this from Brussels. At the country level the DG ECHO co-ordinates directly with the EC Delegation to ensure complementarity of interventions and to avoid duplication. DG ECHO will also be consulted during the development of CSPs and programme design, as has taken place in Myanmar.

The EC has found that developing an articulated LRRD aid strategy for fragile and conflict-affected states requires a considerable investment of time and effort from the early design of interventions to their eventual implementation. As noted above, during this development period an interim strategy is needed to ensure that transitional programmes assist the progression towards the LRRD strategy. The resultant strategy is
dependent upon information exchange and a policy platform from which development partners can initiate coordination. This, however, presumes the existence of an appropriate policy framework or sector plan and the ability to foster such dialogue among stakeholders, which in practice may be difficult in fragile settings. In addition there are also several key challenges to coordination: (i) the division of responsibility between many different aid services complicates coordination; (ii) slow and cumbersome procedures for the transition from relief to development assistance can delay the phasing out of humanitarian aid; (iii) the rigidity of the development planning agenda limits flexibility and rapidity in adapting development aid in an evolving situation; (iv) there is a need to better integrate governance, institutional development and security into the donors’ and governments’ strategic frameworks; and (v) there are limitations to date with funding mechanisms such as trust funds, which have not always been able to support the implementation of reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes as quickly as expected, even though they do contribute in principle to increased donor co-ordination and coherence.

The EC has found that one of the key aspects of the proper design of LRRD programmes in post-conflict situations is a joint analysis and response, covering humanitarian and development assistance, in three steps: situation analysis, needs assessment and consolidation of response. At each stage, all relevant stakeholders, including donors, implementing organizations, the local population and partner countries, should try and develop, through appropriate coordination mechanisms, a consensus on the causes, the diagnostics, the requirements and the response, before moving to the next step. In recognition of this, the EC believes that it is critical to involve civil society and other stakeholders in the development of its implementation plan on an EU response to situations of fragility.45

At the country level, DG ECHO participates in the broader co-ordination mechanisms used by the humanitarian community as well as those supported by the donor community. This can include the UN OCHA-led inter-agency coordination through the IASC Education Cluster, EC Member States coordination and structures provided by the government, as well as other coordination structures (EC, 2008: 2, 3 and 8).

Regarding development assistance, EC Delegations are active in different coordination forums at both the macro level and sector level. Their exact involvement and structures vary from country to country. For example, in Somaliland, sector coordination happens at two levels. In Nairobi, it takes place under the umbrella of the Somali Support Secretariat and the associated Education Sector Committee, which is financed by the UN and development partners (including the EC). Participation is voluntary and decisions are not binding but remain informative. In-country, there are the same mechanisms but under the direction of the respective MOEs in Somaliland and Puntland. In central-south Somalia, no coordination mechanisms exist due to the lack of any government structures or control. Wherever possible, the EC participates in and encourages joint review missions and pooled funding approaches to develop opportunities for alignment. For example, in Myanmar, the EC contributes to the Multi-Donor Education Fund managed by UNICEF, which also receives funds from DFID, DANIDA and NORAD. The conditions on fund release have been agreed jointly by the donors and UNICEF, but it did take time to streamline the expectations, rules and regulation of the contributing donors, which is now contained in a Statement of Cooperation that outlines guiding principles designed to ensure optimal cooperation and collaboration among the donors and UNICEF.

Educational activities

DG ECHO’s interventions are based on needs assessments. Those most in need are identified in two ways: (i) by assessing the needs of potential beneficiaries in the field; and (ii) by making a comparative analysis of countries using national indicators to identify those countries that are home to people within the priority beneficiary groups of DG ECHO assistance. This means that education may or may not receive priority in a given fragile state depending on the other humanitarian needs of the country. The EC also fully supports the cluster approach (EC, 2008: 8). Some examples of humanitarian assistance programmes in education supported by DG ECHO include the following:

46. Throughout this book, we refer to Myanmar by its name as recognized by the UN, but the EC refers to the country as Burma/Myanmar. In May 2008, cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar with devastating effect. The following case study is based on the donor context prior to May 2008 and does not discuss the change in donor access or the humanitarian response to the disaster.
• In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, DG ECHO is funding psychosocial support programmes through schools.
• In the Côte d’Ivoire, DG ECHO has supported recreational and educational activities in schools in order to make both the children and the community aware of the risks of enlistment. The focus has been on technical and vocational skills such as carpentry, building, fashion and hairdressing.
• As part of its disaster preparedness programmes in Asia and Latin America, DG ECHO is financing specific educational activities aimed at making teachers and/or pupils aware of how to prepare for and prevent natural disasters, notably with simulation exercises.
• DG ECHO has supported education in various refugee camps, for example in Tanzania, by constructing or refurbishing classrooms, supplying teaching materials and furniture, making and distributing school uniforms and by training teachers.
• After the tsunami in South-East Asia, DG ECHO financed educational activities in Aceh, including psychosocial and protection aspects.

DG ECHO prioritizes basic education and vocational skills as well as landmine safety, psychosocial care, safe spaces and recreational activities. It targets vulnerable children including refugees and IDPs, child soldiers, girls and those affected by conflict. Given the effects of fragility on school attendance and the large number of children who have had their schooling disrupted due to fragility, DG ECHO programmes can involve both primary school-aged children as well as adolescents, so that programmes are open and accessible to all vulnerable children.

The EC has active development assistance programmes in education in 27 countries considered to be affected by fragility.\(^{47}\) Priority is given to the funding of basic education (EC, 2005: 28) ideally through budget support, but funding is also given to other sub-sectors, such as vocational training, adult literacy and teacher training. Increasingly, there is a strong focus on system building and institutional development, including public financial management, education management information systems (EMIS) and education planning at the central and decentralized levels. A common mechanism for this is through the provision of long-term and short-term technical assistance (TA). In Eritrea, TA was provided

\(^{47}\) Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tonga, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.
to support the MOE according to its identified needs. This support was quite heavily concentrated on supporting the Project Management Unit responsible for managing the donor’s pooled fund in line with EC procedures, rather than on supporting broader policy dialogue. In retrospect, this may not have been the most cost-effective and appropriate use of TA. This also highlights the implications that the choice of funding modality can have on other areas of donor support and engagement.

Box 14 gives an overview of four of the EC’s education programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states.

**Box 14 The EC’s education programmes in Eritrea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Somalia**

The EC Delegation opened its office in Eritrea in 1995 but it has only been supporting education since 2006 through a four-year project worth €53 million. This intervention intends to support Eritrea’s Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP), focusing on improving the quality of basic education, the development of institutional capacity, the construction of primary schools and supporting learning structures. The construction component of the project is implemented through a single donor Trust Fund with the World Bank. For the non-construction project components, funds are disbursed via EC programme estimates through the ESDP Project Management Unit (PMU) set up by the MOE to manage the donor-funded projects implementing the ESDP (currently that is the World Bank, the AfDB and the EC). NSAs are limited in both number and capacity, and there is no structured system of dialogue between them and the government. Most INGOs have left the country, as they were not granted registration under the 2005 NGO Proclamation. During 2007, the Development Partners Forum (DPF) was re-established in Eritrea, spearheaded by UNDP and the World Bank. At present, the DPF consists of four technical coordination groups including one on social sectors and one on infrastructure. So far, the government has not participated in the DPF. During 2008, it was hoped that the government would become fully involved and that the technical co-ordination groups would provide feedback to the planning mechanisms of donors to maximize the complementarity of donor activities. The 10th EDF CSP does not foresee education as a focal sector of intervention according to Government priorities, so the EC will be disengaging from supporting education at the end of the current project.
Until 2004, the EU Common Position on Myanmar permitted only humanitarian assistance and EC assistance operations were limited and implemented through DG ECHO’s budget. Since 2007, the EC has taken a more strategic approach to increase the effectiveness of its assistance and has developed the first EC Myanmar CSP (2007-2013), which is based on a detailed needs assessment and focuses on the health and education sectors. The EC contributes to the Multi-Donor Education Fund (MDEF), operating between 2007 and 2009 with a total budget of €28.09 million (€17.08 million from the EC, DFID, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD); and €11.01 million from UNICEF). The MDEF focuses on basic education in the formal sector (recurrent and development costs) and is managed by UNICEF, since only UNICEF and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the MOE to work directly with government schools. Due to the EU Common Position on Myanmar, support can be provided only at the civilian administration level and below. Thus donor funds support educational activities at the decentralized levels while UNICEF’s own funds support some key activities at the central level. EC funds have been used to develop the capacity of UNICEF field staff, to establish robust monitoring and evaluation systems, and to build the capacity of UNICEF to absorb the significantly increased resources that are flowing through the MDEF. The EC has encouraged national NSAs to submit proposals for education interventions; however, only a few proposals have been submitted so far. Under the MDEF, UNICEF has set up four main meetings to coordinate donors, NGOs and government departments working in the education sector, taking place at regular intervals depending on need. Despite this, progress on policy dialogue has been slow and meetings with the ministers at the MOE have been limited.

The EC has been working in Pakistan since 1976 but has worked only in the education sector over the past decade. Its focus is on primary education, vocational and technical education (recurrent and development costs). The EC has recently supported three education programmes:

1. the Northern Pakistan Education Programme (2003-2008), with a total funding of €20.8 million (€19.3 million from the EC and €1.5 million a beneficiary contribution by the Aga Khan Foundation, Pakistan);
2. the Institute for Educational Development (2001-2007), with a total funding of €22.6 million (€9.9 million from the EC and €12.7 million a beneficiary contribution by the Aga Khan Foundation, Pakistan); and
3. the Sindh Education Plan Support Programme (2001-2006), with a total funding of €39 million.
EC funding is managed and disbursed by the EC, the Aga Khan Foundation and by the government (in the case of sector budget support). Approximately 30 per cent of EC funding for education is through the provision of direct project grants to NGOs while 70 per cent is through the government as sector budget support. The EC is a member of the education donor group and shares information about its programmes with all its development partners. In addition, the EC has co-financed multi-donor projects in education in the past and is currently engaged in the overall sector reform programme in two provinces. Under its NGO projects, the EC has chosen to engage in specific regions of Pakistan based upon their high levels of poverty and illiteracy. The emphasis is on the empowerment of communities to take on the project after its completion. The EC is also engaged with the government at the provincial level on sector reform programmes because constitutionally, education is a provincial responsibility. The intention is for a sustained annual increase in the education sector budget and overall governance of the programme, supported by the provision of TA.

The EC has been supporting the education sector in Somalia since the early 1990s, with a focus on basic education, teacher training and vocational or life skills training for disadvantaged youth. In March 2008, the EC had a portfolio of 13 projects in the education sector in Somalia, totalling over €29 million with 50 per cent of this targeted at basic education. Some of these were operating across all three zones of Somalia, while others operated only in one or two zones (Somaliland and/or Puntland). Each of these projects had a budget of between €0.5 and €3.8 million and nearly all of the funds were channelled through INGOs, as there is no recognized government and the EC found that pooled funding under UN or World Bank management is often extremely cost-intensive and not effective in delivering services. However, if there is an improvement in fragility, there is the potential for a switch to full sector support, including budget support, in order to reduce transactions costs and have greater effectiveness for the aid given. The EC follows a dual approach of increasing access through supporting service delivery as well as capacity building at all levels of the system (central, regional, district and local). All education interventions in rural areas have a community education committee (a pre-condition for funding), which is critical to safeguard their sustainability and cost-effectiveness as it encourages community participation in construction activities and an element of cost sharing. NSAs have been involved at all stages of the project cycle, from identification to programming and implementation. They are also involved in regular dialogue regarding policy. All implementing partners report regularly to NSAs through the education sector committees chaired by the government (except in central-south Somalia).

Source: interviews undertaken with country offices.
Financial mechanisms

Development assistance can be provided through different modalities that can be complementary (project aid, sector programme support, sector and general budget support, humanitarian aid and assistance in crisis prevention, support to and via the civil society, approximation of norms, standards and legislation, and so on) according to what will work best in each country (EC, 2005: 19).

DG ECHO funds are disbursed through the implementing organizations, including INGOs, UN agencies and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and the International Organization for Migration. The EC has a formal partnership agreement with these organizations. It also supports the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (EC, 2008: 8).

For development assistance, the EC uses a variety of instruments to disburse funds to fragile and conflict-affected states, ranging from budget support (Sierra Leone, Rwanda and the Comoros), pooled funding (Ethiopia and Mozambique), MDTFs (Southern Sudan), project and funding through UN agencies and NGOs (Haiti, Somalia and Myanmar) and TA (Liberia). There is a stated preference “where conditions allow” for budget support as the preferred modality since “it will enable recipient countries to cope with growing operating budgets, promote harmonization and alignment on national policies, contribute to lower transaction costs and encourage results-based approaches” (EC, 2005: 32). This has been demonstrated in Cambodia where the EC and the Asian Development Bank have acted as the forerunners to other development partners in providing sector budget support. However, in practice the provision of budget support can be problematic as has been the case in Eritrea where, at the time of the EC formulation mission for the education programme, the Education Sector Development Plan was still being finalized and lacked a budget framework and adequate performance and monitoring systems. This meant that the EC support could not be set up as a Sector Policy Support Programme (budget support) with project support being the only possible financing mechanism under EC procedures. Despite this, the project is linked to the sector framework and is broadly consistent with Eritrean education policy and strategy.
Donors’ engagement

There is a commitment for the EC to “improve its capacity to deliver budget support, keeping into account its specific risks and expected benefits in fragile situations. Coordination with the WB [World Bank], the IMF and the AfDB [the African Development Bank] will be reinforced” (EC, 2007b: 13). However, the EC recognizes that to date, no ideal instrument or set of instruments can effectively ensure that education is fully supported in situations of fragility. In Pakistan, this has led to a mixed approach with approximately 30 per cent of EC funding for education being provided through direct project grants to NGOs while 70 per cent is through the government as sector budget support. The EC Delegation in Pakistan has found that funding via NGOs is efficient, particularly when providing project assistance through those NGOs that are service providers, but that this has a limited impact upon overall sector development. By comparison, funding managed by the EC Delegation is effective but is time consuming for the Delegation. Sector budget support is a more recent development and independent evaluations are yet to be published, so it is difficult to evaluate its impact. However, this has not been an easy process in Pakistan, partly due to the difficulty of long-term planning because of the fragile context and religious conflicts, which affect the provision of education services. The Delegation ensures some sustainability and predictability of budget support through flexible tranche release, but this is not always easy.

In Somalia, the EC has found that using INGOs as the implementing partners has been more cost effective than using UN agencies that have higher administrative costs. However, transaction costs are still high, so there is an aim to establish a pooled fund linked to capacity development and application of a SWAp.

Wherever possible, it is the EC’s preference to align support to government systems. For example, while pooled funding in Eritrea is managed by a Project Management Unit (PMU), this has been set up by the MOE to manage all donor-funded projects supporting the implementation of the Education Sector Development Plan. The PMU applies some EC procedures, which has resulted in delays in project implementation as local capacity has been developed, supported by technical assistance. This has meant, however, that EC support has often been concentrated at the project management level rather than more strategic policy engagement and has inevitably taken place, at least in the short term, at the expense of service delivery.
The EC recognizes that each of the aid instruments has strengths and limitations and that using a reasonable mix of approaches to ensure the best coverage of support is often a good approach. Some mechanisms may be better suited to making progress with short-term service delivery needs for communities (for example, through the UN and NGOs), while mechanisms for longer-term system building are perhaps more complex. Others may be better suited to shadow alignment in cases where the EC is unable to work directly with a government (for example, the UNICEF-managed pooled fund in Myanmar).

The use of budget support in fragile and conflict-affected states has been a fairly recent and limited development, so systematic lessons have not yet been drawn from this, at least for the education sector. Nonetheless, it is expected that this form of support can best facilitate the re-establishment of government systems for the financing and planning of service delivery. There are similar expectations of pooled mechanisms, though again it is too early to draw concrete evidence of this, and the Southern Sudan MDTF has not been quick to deliver education services, with its main activities for education starting only recently, some three years after the peace agreement.

The EC believes that coordination with other donors is essential, particularly in contexts of fragility where the situation on the ground may be changing quite rapidly. The EC has predicted that it will be responsible for 80 per cent of the international donor community’s scheduled scaling up of aid (EC, 2007a: 5). Thus, it recognizes its leadership role in co-ordinating with other donors through dialogue, joint programming and pooled funding, with a particular preference for budget support where appropriate, to make this a reality. In Somalia, the EC plays a lead role in the coordination of the education sector; in Ethiopia the EC was actively involved in the design of the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) grant (see Box 15). When there has been a need to consider an alternative to general budget support in other countries, such as Southern Sudan, the EC has been involved in joint missions to ensure coordinated and responsive approaches with other donors. In most countries, the EC is actively involved in coordination forums at the political and technical levels, especially with its own Member States.

At the global level, the EC is a donor to the EFA-FTI and it has committed funds to the FTI CF for disbursement to a number of fragile and conflict-affected states. However, the EC recognizes that this is not a
Donors’ engagement

comprehensive instrument and has been actively seeking additional fit-for-purpose mechanisms to address these particular situations. From 2009, it is also envisaged that the EC will contribute to the newly established Education Transition Fund managed by UNICEF. This has been influenced by the recognition of a need to develop further more appropriate ways of working to support education in fragile situations. The EC sees this programme as complementary to the broader efforts under the FTI.

The EC desires to ensure long term, predictable aid to education and to provide continuity in both humanitarian aid and longer-term development assistance. The 10th European Development Fund (EDF) has a six-year funding programme, an increase of one year compared to previous EDFs. The EC strives to design programmes that span this time frame to provide continuity and predictability, but in practise projects are likely to be shorter than this, thus undermining longer-term continuity. In relation to humanitarian aid, the EC welcomes the introduction of the UN CERF and supports the aim of strengthening the predictability and flexibility of humanitarian funding through both bilateral and multilateral channels (EC, 2008: 8).

Service delivery and capacity development

In fragile situations, the EC recognizes the competing demands of immediate service delivery and longer-term capacity building (EC, 2008: 9; EC 2007b: 9). EC initial response strategies address the immediate needs of the population, and strategic responses needed to focus on the longer term. The EC supports broader service delivery and multi-sectoral approaches through NGOs using demand-driven approaches (for example, in Sudan through a rehabilitation and reconstruction programme) and also through the UN (in the Côte d’Ivoire). EC experience shows the need to work at different levels (national, local and community) and over time strengthen the links between them for service delivery and capacity development. However, this is not an easy balance to strike, as evidenced by the aforementioned EC programme in Eritrea.

DG ECHO does not provide direct support to governments and intervenes exclusively through its implementing partners (including UN agencies and INGOs, which may in turn engage in collaboration with government agencies, as appropriate). For development assistance, the EC can and does use a mix of aid instruments that enables it to work
both through governments and NSAs. In situations that have deteriorated so much that long-term development cooperation is no longer possible or desirable, the EU tends to apply a mix of political and diplomatic action, in combination with a certain level of development cooperation and crisis management tools.

The EC also recognizes that the use of external TA is important in such situations but needs to be managed properly and coordinated by all development partners in order to optimize capacity-building aspects. In addition, the EC is committed to strengthening the capacity of those most likely to respond to humanitarian crises to ensure better use of humanitarian aid (EC, 2008: 9). While this is positive rhetoric, the cost of hiring TA who are willing to work in fragile and conflict-affected states is very high. Thus it is critical that the EC makes wise decisions about how to use TAs to provide appropriate and practical capacity building for local stakeholders that involves a real transfer of skills rather than an external expert coming in to ‘do the job’ for long periods at exorbitant costs.

Engagement, disengagement and risk management strategies

The EC makes decisions on engagement in any country based on partner government requests or, in cases where it is not possible to work through the government, through agreements with UN agencies or NGOs. The decision to support programmes in education is a culmination of dialogue between the partner governments, other EU Member States, multilateral donors and civil society. The key factors affecting the decision would include consideration of the European Consensus on Development (EC, 2005), the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Cooperation (EC, 2007a), the Paris Declaration principles and the EC’s assessment of its added value to the sector. Interventions in a given sector are based on the principle of complementarity (EC, 2007a), which has five aspects to it:

• in-country complementarity: not too many donors focusing on one sector;
• cross-country complementarity: avoiding aid darlings and aid orphans;
• cross-sector complementarity: recognizing comparative advantage in a sector;
• vertical complementarity: working at the national and regional levels;
Donors’ engagement

• cross-modalities and instruments complementarity: using a mix of aid instruments.

In relation to cross-country complementarity, the EC has stated the commitment of Member States “to dedicate part of their aid budget to ‘under-funded’ countries. These are often ‘fragile states’ whose stabilization has a positive spill-over effect for the wider region” (EC, 2007a: 11). The EC has also affirmed its commitment to supporting forgotten crises or those where the humanitarian response is inadequate (EC, 2008: 4).

There may be situations where the EC decides to disengage from a given sector due to an abundance of donors already funding that sector and greater needs identified in other sectors (that is, in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy (EC, 2007a). The EC’s engagement in a given sector could also be affected by appropriate measures decided, for example, following a violation of essential elements in a partnership agreement. Yet even in those cases, the EC tries to remain engaged in country situations. This can be reflected, in particular for the education sector but also for social sectors and human rights promotion, in the supporting of initiatives with NSAs, when direct cooperation with central governments is no longer possible.

The EC’s rationale for engaging in the education sector is largely dependent on the context. Feedback from EC officials emphasized a desire to mitigate governance concerns and recognition that education can play a critical role in terms of state building, prevention and reduction of fragility. Also underlined was the right to education and other basic services. In states affected by fragility, EC policy highlights the importance of restoring the contract between a government and its citizens, and building the legitimacy of the government. The re-establishment of education services can also be a point of entry for broader donor engagement in improving service delivery and governance, and basic service provision can contribute to change through building on community initiatives.

In order to support these aims of engagement, the emphasis of the approach needs to be on ownership, with the EC working through government processes as soon as possible. This is evidenced by the phased introduction of budget support in Yemen. In contrast, in Somalia there has been a tendency at times for implementing partners (mostly INGOs) to try to lead the show rather than working together to build a system that is cost-effective and sustainable. This underlines the importance of donors
Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education

need to be wary of the potentially detrimental effect of highly visible and well-branded projects that are seen to be distinct from government initiatives.

Dealing effectively with fragility requires taking deliberately calculated risks that have to be weighed against the potential cost of non-action. Supporting partner countries’ efforts to prevent fragility, to address its root causes and to tackle its consequences is integrated in EU partnerships. As part of the CSP, each country programme, including those in fragile and conflict-affected states, involves the carrying out of a risk assessment. The EC Delegation is then able to assess any changes in fragility and decide the most appropriate course of action to maintain relations with the country.

**Effectiveness of response in fragile and conflict-affected states**

The effectiveness of the EC response to engaging in education programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states depends on the context. As of 2008, there had been no evaluations of the effectiveness of EC education programmes in fragile situations. This indicates a clear need for the EC to learn more systematically from country operations, especially given the emphasis that it is placing upon effective engagement in situations of fragility and education as a component of this. Having a robust evidence base and framework from which to evaluate effectiveness is thus integral to monitoring and improving future interventions. The EC, along with other donors, recognizes the need to improve the effectiveness of its response in fragile situations, both generally and for education, including finding ways to be more flexible with the procedures followed. In fragile contexts, the need for improved harmonization is even more critical. In some cases there are sector plans and strategies in place that can facilitate better dialogue and complementarity among donors. An example of good practice has been in Myanmar, where the EC working together with other donors through the MDEF has given the donor group more clout to negotiate with UNICEF and the MOE, and has provided a good modality for donor coordination and harmonization in the context of a government-owned strategy. A similar approach has been followed by the EC in the health sector in Myanmar.

However, in the absence of a sound analysis and strategy development, which is often the norm in many fragile contexts, the focus

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48. This statement was made by the EC during interviews with EC officials at headquarters.
of efforts has been on putting the basics in place (be that construction of facilities, teacher training, and so on). This has certainly helped to make progress towards the MDGs and EFA goals, though clearly not rapidly enough and more could be done to ensure that viable systems are in place. The EC recognizes the need for more comprehensive and coherent approaches, applying the principles of SWAps and improved aid effectiveness to its education where possible.

4.3 The Netherlands

Policy and strategy

The latest policy note on Dutch development cooperation for the period 2007-2011, entitled *Our common concern: investing in development in a changing world*, outlines four main areas of policy focus. One of these is fragile and conflict-affected states, with a particular emphasis on “promoting peace, stability, sustainable security and development in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the African Great Lakes region, the Middle East and the Western Balkans” (Netherlands MFA, 2007b: 26).

The Netherlands has a development cooperation relationship with 36 partner countries and countries in conflict or post-conflict situations. Under Dutch cooperation policy, the focus is on assisting countries to meet the MDGs and three broad country profiles are included: (i) LICs where fragility is not a particular problem and it is possible to work with government structures (profile: accelerated achievement of the MDGs); (ii) countries that are fragile and face major poverty or inequality (profile: security and development); and (iii) prospective MICs where fragility is not a problem (profile: broad-based relationship). Under the second profile, the countries and territories included for bilateral support are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Guatemala, Kosovo, Pakistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Sudan. Currently, the Netherlands is also supporting Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eritrea and Sri Lanka (humanitarian support) but support in these three countries is to be phased out over the next four years (Netherlands MFA, 2007b: 37-39).

The Netherlands believes strongly that security and development policy need to be developed and implemented side-by-side in fragile and conflict-affected states. Based on this conviction, the Dutch Government has made a significant contribution to the UN CAP and through this has assisted in developing conflict policy frameworks for
Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia, Angola and the Great Lakes region. There is recognition that partnerships in fragile and conflict-affected states cannot always be based on the government-to-government level, and that initiatives supported through private sector and civil society/NGO partnerships can also be effective. Within fragile and conflict-affected states and regions, the focus of interventions will be on conflict prevention and management, reconstruction and promoting stability.49

In terms of humanitarian aid, Dutch policy focuses on two forms of aid: the first provides support to countries affected by protracted wars or crises and the second on acute emergencies including disasters, attacks and sudden outbreaks of conflict. Humanitarian aid is provided under the direction of the Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH) in response to an official request from the countries affected for assistance by the international community and is for the alleviation of the suffering of the most vulnerable. Education is included as a focal sector for humanitarian aid.50

Dutch humanitarian aid is usually channelled through international partners such as UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and NGOs.51 The standard duration of humanitarian aid projects is 12 months, but proposals for funding can have a duration of two years in situations of protracted crises for those countries listed in the annex to the Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules (Netherlands MFA, 2008b), which is published annually. The Dutch Government favours the scaling-up of project size, with the minimum project budget ideally being at least several thousand Euros.

Education is at the centre of Dutch development policy, with the core focus on achieving the education MDGs and the EFA agenda through SWAps, and the formal primary education sector being the key priority. However, there is also increasing support for other sub-sectors that have been neglected, such as early childhood development, non-formal education, vocational training, programmes to reach marginalized groups, adult education and literacy.52 The Dutch Government has made

Donors’ engagement

a commitment to ensure that from 2007, 15 per cent of its ODA will be dedicated to education (Netherlands MFA, 2007a: 1).

There is recognition by the Netherlands that fragile and conflict-affected states face special challenges in reaching the MDGs and that education and schooling have an important role to play in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. This recognition spurred the Netherlands between 2006 and 2010 to provide US$201 million (€166 million) to an innovative Dutch-UNICEF programme to support education in countries in crisis, with the aim of providing better quality education for 25 million children in 40 countries (Netherlands MFA, 2007a: 2). In addition to this, the Dutch Government is providing €9.9 million between 2007 and 2010 in support of Dutch Save the Children for its programme for education in crisis situations and HIV and AIDS, and is in dialogue with FTI partners to explore appropriate financing options through the FTI for financing education in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The Netherlands MFA supports education in fragile and conflict-affected states via five main approaches:

1. the Dutch-UNICEF programme;
2. embassies (bilateral programmes);
3. through multi-lateral mechanisms, including MDTFs in Afghanistan and Sudan, and as an active donor engaging with the EFA-FTI in its focus on fragile states;
4. Dutch NGOs;
5. humanitarian assistance from DMH/HH (of which education is a minor part).

In addition, the Education and Development Division (DCO/OO) has been strongly involved in the FTI, being a member of the temporary EFA-FTI Fragile States Task Team and the OECD-DAC fragile states work stream on education. Recently, DCO/OO became an active member of the new INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility, though it does not currently contribute financially to INEE. The main reasons for involvement in this working group are: (i) to be kept informed on recent developments in education in fragile states; (ii) to further international collaboration in and coordination of the provision of

53. As an innovative model of funding, this programme has since been developed into the FTI Education Transition Fund, which is described in more detail later in this chapter.

Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education

education interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states; and (iii) to interlink and facilitate a more effective international aid architecture for the provision of funding to fragile and conflict-affected states.

Coordination

The Dutch Government has recognized the weak links in existence in making the transition from the humanitarian relief phase to the development phase, and it seeks to push for a “stronger support role for the UN and coordination through more efficient use of joint donor funds” to help bridge the two responses (Netherlands MFA, 2007b: 14). The original Dutch-UNICEF funding mechanism was established to be managed by UNICEF as it was recognized that the organization typically has a strong and consistent on-the-ground presence in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and as such is in a good position to bridge the gap between the two responses. In addition, an underlying aspiration of the fund was that other donors would contribute to make this a pooled funding mechanism through which donor interventions could be co-ordinated.

For bilateral responses, within the Netherlands MFA two different divisions are involved in the provision of humanitarian (DMH/HH) and development aid (DCO/OO). There is no formal coordination mechanism between the two divisions, although coordination does take place informally. However, the existing informality runs the risk that coordination between the humanitarian and development responses for education activities is not always as effective as it could be. There are only three countries affected by fragility that receive direct bilateral development assistance for education (Pakistan, Uganda and Yemen) and each one has an education adviser. In emergency situations, humanitarian assistance can contain an education component through DMH/HH without the consent of the DCO/OO. DCO/OO gives advice on request from an embassy or another division within the Netherlands MFA if it relates to education.

At the country level, wherever possible the education expert based at the embassy supports the education sector and participates in the sector dialogue with the MOE and other donors. There is usually a lead donor for this process and the Netherlands has taken this role in some countries. For example, in Yemen, coordination with the Government of Yemen, the MOE and development partners (the UN, World Bank and bilateral donors) is achieved formally through a signed Partnership Declaration and a joint annual review of education. In addition, there are monthly
plenary meetings with the education partnership and quarterly strategic meetings between development partners and the MOE. The Netherlands was nominated as the education donor coordinator for 2007/2008 and works in delegated cooperation with DFID. There are also twice-yearly joint supervision and support missions to review progress of the BEDP, SFD and Annual Plans in the education sector.

In the FTI framework, DCO/OO strongly promotes country donor group coordination, which is supported where relevant by the Dutch embassy in country. However, in most fragile and conflict-affected states there is no such expert as most of the Netherlands funding is provided via UNICEF or NGOs. Consequently, while the Netherlands strongly advocates for coordination, in practise this is operationalized by the UN agencies and NGOs that the Netherlands support. The principles of coordination are therefore enshrined within the Memoranda of Understanding. For example, under the Dutch-UNICEF programme, it has been agreed that UNICEF will play a role in actively seeking to coordinate its interventions with other in-country donors, with the assumption that if other donors provide co-funding and it becomes well connected to the FTI, this could result in greater coordination and a role for the local donor group in liaison with its respective headquarters in advising on appropriate steps towards FTI endorsement. In Southern Sudan, where the majority of Dutch aid is provided multilaterally, the Joint Donor Team represents the Netherlands but it has no education expertise, so DCO/OO participates in the annual joint donor education missions. This weakens the ability of the Joint Donor Team to provide advice and to monitor and evaluate country-level operations in an effective way, except in the once-a-year joint donor education missions.

Partnership is a core strategy in the provision of Dutch foreign aid. The Netherlands is aware that it cannot do everything bilaterally, but needs to provide multilateral assistance as well as partnering with the private sector, the business world, civil society groups and governments, in order to reach the MDGs. For the Netherlands, the use of implementing partners as part of their development cooperation strategy has several implications. It allows them to be more responsive, channeling funds through the most appropriate mechanism and to partners with a comparative advantage in particular areas and countries. However,  

it does also mean that Dutch commitments to the *Paris Declaration* and the *DAC Principles* have to be enacted through the partnerships. This requires the careful selection of partners that share the same core values. It also means that it can be hard to distill the effectiveness of Dutch assistance from the partners’ broader operations and activities and thus measure its impact.

*Educational activities*

The Humanitarian Aid Division within the Netherlands MFA (DMH/HH) is in charge of the Dutch humanitarian aid budget. Examples of sponsored programmes in which children are an important target group are health, water and sanitation, landmine safety, psychosocial care and school feeding. DMH/HH supports activities that include relief as well as rehabilitation in support of people affected by a humanitarian crisis, with a special focus on the most vulnerable, including women and children. The Netherlands strives towards the provision of gender-balanced humanitarian aid. Dutch support via UNICEF for education in crisis situations includes both humanitarian and development aid, and consequently there will be limited additional support for education through the humanitarian aid budget (Netherlands MFA, 2008b: 7).

While the Netherlands provides substantial support for education in emergencies and fragile and conflict-affected contexts, it does not include education within its humanitarian policy. A commitment to education during crises, conflict and natural disasters is made on the Netherlands MFA’s website, but unfortunately was not formalized in its 2008 Humanitarian Policy (Netherlands MFA, 2008b). This is a clear weakness and every effort should be made to include education in the next revision of its humanitarian policy to ensure the inclusion of an education response during emergencies.

The principal reasons for the Netherlands to support education are its formative role for young people as well as the opportunity to show a ‘quick impact’ in an area that is highly visible and prioritized by parents, local communities and governments. Basic education is the main priority, but since 2007, the Netherlands has shifted its focus to the education sector as a whole with a strong focus, where necessary, on girls’ education. Specific interventions in technical and vocational

education and training and early childhood development have also been identified as being important.

In 2008, the Dutch-UNICEF programme provided education assistance in 18 fragile states or situations of crisis. The funds provided through this programme are channelled multilaterally through UNICEF with no earmarking from the Netherlands nor involvement in country selection. Within fragile and conflict-affected states, core priorities for funding generally rest with the implementing agency. As mentioned above, this demonstrates significant levels of trust on behalf of the Netherlands MFA, but also places the decision-making responsibilities away from political concerns and into the hands of country-level education representatives.

One of the main aims of this joint Dutch-UNICEF programme is to “help prepare the ground for FTI-endorsement of these countries at a later stage” (Netherlands MFA, unpublished: 3). These aims have been realized with the programme’s development into the FTI Education Transition Fund, the specific purpose of which is to support the education sector in countries during their transitional phase before endorsement for Catalytic Funding. It is an innovative mechanism and there is strong hope in the Netherlands that through this partnership “a set of evidence-based policies, operational strategies and financing mechanisms is developed as the most appropriate for external support to these countries” (Netherlands MFA, unpublished: 5).

Box 15 summarizes the Dutch education programmes in Yemen.

**Box 15 The Dutch education programmes in Yemen**

The Netherlands has been working in Yemen for the past 30 years, focusing on three key sectors: health, water and education. During the 1990s, the Netherlands developed criteria for limiting the number of countries in which it was operating based on need (high levels of poverty) and willingness to work on areas such as good governance. As Yemen fulfilled these criteria, it remained one of the countries supported by the Dutch Government. Education has become an increasing priority since 2000, with a focus predominantly on basic education. As of mid-2008, there were six Dutch projects operating in Yemen:

1. the Basic Education Development Project (BEDP) (2004-2009), with total funding of €24 million jointly financed by the World Bank, DFID,
the Government of Germany (KfW) and the Netherlands MFA through a pooled fund;
2. the Trust Fund for TA (to support the BEDP) (2007-2009). This is a pooled fund with DFID, which supports BEDP implementation, the preparation of secondary education project and the preparation of a World Bank vocational training project;
3. the Social Fund for Development (SFD) (2004-2008), with total funding of €12.5 million until 2006, then US$10 million pooled funding for 2007-2008. The funds were mostly for investment in school building, but also for some innovative pilot programmes including literacy, school libraries and school mapping;
4. the Girls’ Secondary Education Project (2008-2014), with total funding of €10 million (co-financed by the World Bank, DFID, KfW and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit). The project focuses on the quality and efficiency of secondary education with a particular emphasis on girls’ education;
5. the Netherlands programme for strengthening the institutional capacity of post-secondary education and training and the Netherlands Fellowship Programme, with total funding of €16.4 million over a 3- to 4-year period supporting 13 projects in higher education;
6. the education component of the Child Development Project and Improving Education Effectiveness (2001-2008), with total funding of €10 million, with a US$1.24 million extension to include the remote Socotra Island for a period of two years (2007-2008), implemented by UNICEF.

The Netherlands uses a variety of modalities for its support of the education sector, including pooled funding through the BEDP, direct funding to UNICEF, programme support for the education component of the SFD and a small amount of funding via an INGO to support a project benefiting the Yemeni Women’s Union. Generally, the Netherlands support does not cover recurrent costs (except for training). Through pooled funding with the World Bank, DFID and KfW, the BEDP is initiating support for an innovative programme for conditional cash transfers to girls and mothers to promote female enrolment and retention in schools. In addition, a capitation grant scheme for selected schools has been set up. Also, UNICEF and the BEDP partners fund a three-year programme to contract and pay salaries for female teachers in remote and rural areas, with the agreement that after these teachers are qualified they will be absorbed in the formal government system. The BEDP is managed and implemented by the MOE with the support of a Programme Administrative Unit (PAU) and the BEDP management team, on which all BEDP financiers are represented. The SFD works in a similar way. Pooled funding is disbursed through the PAU with funds managed by the World Bank, based on a jointly approved annual work plan with the MOE.

Source: Interview undertaken with country office
Financial mechanisms

In 2007, the Dutch basic education programme received around €700 million, equivalent to 15 per cent of Dutch ODA (Netherlands MFA, 2007a: 1). Bilateral support accounted for 74 per cent of this budget and provided education support bilaterally to 15 countries, as well as support through silent partnerships and the FTI CF. A further 14 per cent of the basic education ODA was provided through multilateral channels, including contributions to UNICEF, the International Labour Office and IIEP-UNESCO. It was also provided through direct support through Dutch embassies for education programmes to improve the quality of education and support direct interventions in early childhood development, child labour, HIV and AIDS and education, and education in post-conflict situations and emergencies. The final 12 per cent of the basic education ODA in 2007 was channelled through NSAs, including Dutch NGOs, INGOs and CSOs.

The Dutch Government has a policy of using a range of modalities, intervention levels and partners (the government, the private sector, CSOs and international partners) depending on the capacity and legitimacy of the government of the country it is supporting. This is clearly demonstrated in Yemen, where funds are disbursed through a pooled fund, bilaterally to the MOE’s Basic Education Development Project, and also via UNICEF and NGOs. Dutch FTI funds pass through the specific FTI-assessed financial mechanisms and the Netherlands is advocating to make a greater volume of funds more easily available for fragile states through the FTI. The Netherlands has always been a strong supporter of the FTI, involved as it was in its establishment and co-chairing in its first year of operation, in addition to engagement in a number of working groups. The Netherlands also committed US$475 million to the Catalytic Fund between 2004 and 2008.

The bulk of Dutch funding for education in fragile and conflict-affected states is not disbursed bilaterally, but instead the Netherlands tries to use multilateral mechanisms in situations where they seem to provide the greatest benefits for the country with no added burden because of a specific donor’s reporting and accounting desires.

57. Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia.
In Afghanistan and Sudan, most funding is distributed via the MDTFs or pooled funds. In some fragile and conflict-affected states, projects are being implemented by NGOs receiving Dutch funding on the basis of their own multi-annual strategic plans (including education in crisis situations) and in others, funds are given to an NGO to implement a Dutch programme, such as is taking place in Sudan. Funds for NGOs may be granted directly from the Netherlands MFA or from Dutch embassies. Adopting a mixed approach and providing support via multilateral and bilateral mechanisms and NSAs means that the Netherlands is not trying to follow a one-size-fits-all approach to education financing. Instead, it recognizes the different contexts and situations and seeks to use the most appropriate financial mechanisms to support education in each context (Netherlands MFA, 2007b). Working with a core group of partners, such as UNICEF, and providing financing multilaterally, the Netherlands is able to reduce transaction costs and funnel assistance according to need even if there is no official in-country Netherlands MFA presence. However, in the case of aid channeled via UNICEF, given that this aid is fungible it will be difficult to measure the direct impact and effectiveness of Dutch funding.

From experience, the Netherlands has found that MDTFs have generally been bureaucratic and slow to disburse funds. The Netherlands is seeking to improve the effectiveness of MDTFs though this process is in turn lengthy. In Yemen, the management of the pooled education fund is decentralized, with disbursements made according to a pre-approved four-year strategic plan, which has helped make funding more predictable. The Netherlands perceives that NGOs can often act more quickly and efficiently for discrete projects or regions, but that their impact is not always as effective with regard to countrywide coverage and the longer-term objectives of country ownership. Inevitably, a compromise needs to be made between speed of delivery, transaction costs, ownership and the scale and scope of programmes. DCO/OO is currently engaged in a pilot with Dutch NGOs and their local partners to collaborate more intensively among themselves and with other local government stakeholders. This pilot will be implemented in Southern Sudan, Afghanistan and Colombia.

The planning and budgeting cycle of embassies and the Education Division at headquarters is four years, in which annual adjustments can be made, which provides some funding predictability for recipient countries. Embassies have the main say in deciding country-level priorities within
the multi-annual planning cycle. Longer-term (beyond four years) donor commitments both for the Netherlands and other donors are rare and no promises are made by the Netherlands about future, longer-term aid since this is dependent on whether there is a political change in the Netherlands, which sets new and different priorities. However, the Dutch target of 15 per cent of ODA going to education has set a precedent. From 2008, however, expenditure for post-basic education has also been included in the 15 per cent, which up until now has been earmarked for basic education. There is a danger that this could sideline the Dutch prioritization of basic education and thus the Netherlands should be encouraged to maintain its exemplary levels of funding for basic and post-basic education, despite the inclusion of the latter within the 15 per cent of ODA for education. Dutch core funding support to programmes like the UNICEF one is very likely to be maintained on a high level even if there are political changes in the Netherlands.

**Service delivery**

In general, Dutch education support is focused on capacity building in the MOE but can also include community-level capacity strengthening. Under the Dutch UNICEF programme, the intention is to provide financing to assist directly in quality education service delivery for 25 million children as well as to build the capacity of education systems in recipient countries, wherever possible.59

Within Africa, 50 per cent of the Dutch basic education budget will be spent on education sector plans, including the training of key staff as well as more direct service delivery interventions. In addition, support for regional organizations and programmes that seek to build capacity and strengthen institutions will also be provided.60

Development cooperation is about using opportunities, about learning from past performance – good or bad – and working with others to enhance the effectiveness of aid. New coalitions can be forged with the private sector, civil society and innovative funds for knowledge, growth and development (Netherlands MFA, 2007b: 6).

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The Netherlands is committed to working with governments and NSAs (Dutch and international NGOs and the private sector), recognizing that “much of the actual development work on the ground is done not by governments but by NGOs”.61 This is particularly the case in situations where there is no effective government (such as in Somalia) or where the government is not promoting good governance. The Netherlands believes that one of the advantages of working with NSAs is that they often work closely with local partners that are cognizant of the needs of the local community, which is likely to lead to more effective use of aid. To this end, the NGO financing channel accounts for approximately one quarter of the total development budget.62 As already mentioned, the Netherlands MFA committed a total of €9.9 million between 2007 and 2010 to one Netherlands NGO for its education programme in crisis situations and its campaign against HIV and AIDS (Netherlands MFA, 2007a: 3). While this approach encourages responsive programming with a focus on service delivery, it only reinforces short route accountability mechanisms. The Netherlands, other donors and the implementing NGOs operating on its behalf should be encouraged to explore ways in which the foundations can be laid for the re-establishment of long-route accountability mechanisms. This may be through working with local government officials or even local community structures where the state is absent.

There is no clear mechanism in place under Dutch development policy to continue service delivery in the context of deterioration. However, while there is recognition that there should be more continuity in the process from humanitarian aid to reconstruction and development (as stated above), this is still to be operationalized into a strategy. The ETF programme explicitly recognizes the need for continuity since UNICEF can use funds in emergencies, crisis and post-crisis transition situations.

**Engagement, disengagement and risk management strategies**

Engagement in emergency and conflict situations is based upon need with attention paid to specific ‘crisis zones’ monitored by the MFA (Netherlands MFA, 2008b). As stated above, while education is not a stated priority sector in humanitarian responses, it is often supported if


identified as a priority in needs assessments or appeals. Reconstruction and development aid is given to a specific set of priority countries according to three profiles, as already outlined. A general principle in engaging with new countries is to ensure that Dutch aid is not spread too thin, to allow aid allocations to have sufficient impact. The Netherlands devolves decision-making to long-standing partners such as UNICEF, which includes decisions regarding country allocations.

Political change or a political decision to stop aid are likely to be the principal reasons for disengagement. A recent example of this is Pakistan, where bilateral cooperation was interrupted leading up to the 2008 elections and then resumed again after the elections had taken place.

The Netherlands MFA does not have any risk management strategies in place. The absence of formal strategies is perhaps related to the concentration of delegated implementation to partners, which shifts the responsibility for safety in operations away from the Netherlands MFA. While the MFA may not wish to impose requirements on its partners, minimum risk management and security procedures should ideally be in place to protect those operating on its behalf.

Effectiveness of response in fragile and conflict-affected states

Given that the Netherlands MFA (Education Division or embassy) is seldom the direct implementing agency, the effectiveness of its response in fragile and conflict-affected states depends on the partner. Thus the impact of Dutch aid within education sectors can be difficult to extract. Funds provided via UNICEF, for example, are fungible so it is difficult to evaluate areas supported using Dutch funds from standard UNICEF interventions. Having said this, MFA officials consulted believed that Dutch-supported education interventions were effective, based upon information received from their partners, and in the case of Yemen, based upon an independent evaluation of the Basic Education Development Programme. This concluded that the Netherlands has made considerable progress along with other donors in pooling funds, aid harmonization and alignment. Lessons learned from this evaluation and more broadly from the Dutch educational response in Yemen include: (i) the need to apply SWAp principles in planning, implementation and evaluation; (ii) the importance of having a decentralized and flexible approach; (iii) the critical place of donor harmonization and alignment and having this formalized through a partnership declaration; (iv) getting the basics
right; (v) coordinating closely with other Dutch thematic advisers (for example, on politics, public financial management and decentralization); and (vi) that gender mainstreaming and a focus on interventions that specifically target girls is a key to success.

In terms of the Dutch-UNICEF strategy, this is still at an early stage of implementation so no significant monitoring and evaluation has yet taken place. Despite this, the impression is that this initiative is quite successful, with UNICEF’s position and experience being particularly pertinent for successful intervention. There is also a process of cultural change within UNICEF, which is leading to greater collaboration and partnership as opposed to working as an individual organization. This is also reflected in part by UNICEF’s new role as the cluster co-leader (with Save the Children) for the IASC Education Cluster.

4.4 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Policy and strategy

The government bill entitled Policy on Global Development, adopted by the Swedish Parliament in December 2003, guides Sida’s overall approach to development cooperation. The aim of this policy is “to contribute to an environment supportive of poor people’s own efforts to improve their quality of life”.63 Sida follows the principles in the Paris Declaration in its provision of aid and the overall Swedish budget for development cooperation is set at 1 per cent of gross national income (Sida, 2006: 1).

During 2007, in line with the Paris Declaration, Sida rationalized its aid policy to better target its aid interventions to a smaller selection of countries where it has a comparative advantage. This has meant a reduction in the number of countries with which Sweden conducts bilateral development cooperation, from 125 to around 30 (Swedish MFA, 2007: 2). This rationalization has been based on four criteria: (i) to focus on countries that are most in need in relation to poverty; (ii) to look at which countries’ own development policy environment (issues surrounding good governance) are more likely to lead to the increased effectiveness of aid; (iii) to focus on countries that are pursuing democracy and respect human rights; and (iv) to focus where Swedish aid has added value in a particular country (Swedish MFA, 2007: 4-5). As a result, this

63. www.sida.se/?d=258&a=3808&language=en_US
will mean that Sweden focuses predominantly on contributing to poverty reduction in Africa, on peace and security, democracy and human rights and reform in Eastern Europe. This is shown in the country categories below:

1. The **12 countries** with which Sweden will conduct long-term development cooperation to *focus on poverty reduction* include Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

2. The **12 countries** in conflict and/or post-conflict situations with which Sweden will conduct development cooperation with a *focus on peace and security* include Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Guatemala, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste and the West Bank and Gaza.

3. The **nine states** in Eastern Europe with which Sweden will conduct reform cooperation to *facilitate EU integration and strengthen poverty reduction* include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Fragile and conflict-affected states are recognized as an important group of countries for Sida to support under the second category, with the understanding that the systems and structures in place in these countries are often much weaker and the approach outlined above not altogether appropriate. Thus, Sida channels funds multilaterally through the UN in humanitarian crises and, since 2005, has been using “a spectrum of aid forms” (Sida, 2006: 8), each one chosen according to its likely maximum impact on improving the lives of the poor. Sida does not, however, have a separate policy on its support to fragile and conflict-affected states. A sensible next step as Sida focuses more resources towards fragile and conflict-affected states would be to develop a framework for how this ‘spectrum’ can operate in these challenging circumstances.

Sida’s overall development cooperation is based strongly on the goals and framework outlined in a partner country’s poverty reduction strategy (PRS), with an increasing focus on the provision of budget support and SWAp arrangements that use financial and reporting systems that are aligned with the partner country, plus a move away from the funding of discrete projects. Where appropriate, Sida is to provide support to develop and strengthen the capacity of the partner country to implement and monitor the PRS (Sida, 2005: 39). While this may be appropriate for the first and third of these country categories, Sida will
need to modify its approach to support countries affected by fragility, where the policy and financial frameworks may be less developed.

In recent years, the Swedish Government has focused increasingly on the relationship between relief and development due to the number of fragile and conflict-affected countries with which Sida is engaged (OECD, 2005c). Operationally, responsibilities are transferred from Sida’s humanitarian division to regional departments. However, financial support during this transition phase has become less flexible due to changes in what can be financed through the development cooperation budget, the budget for humanitarian assistance and the conflict management budget (OECD, 2005c). The consequences of this for continuity of interventions need to be considered to avoid gaps in service provision.

Sweden’s approach to humanitarian assistance is outlined in *The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy* (Sida, 2004) and is provided as a needs-based response in situations of conflict or natural disasters, based on the principles of good humanitarian donorship. Humanitarian assistance can take place in countries where Sida has a bilateral programme (where humanitarian assistance is provided in addition to the planned country programme) and in countries where Sida has no bilateral programme (where humanitarian assistance is generally provided through annual or consolidated appeals by multilateral or NGO channels, often through UN agencies and the International Red Cross).64

Sida’s Education Division within the Department for Democracy and Social Development (DESO) is responsible in partnership with field offices for Sida’s education development aid. For each partner country, the main programme and approach to support is outlined in the three-year country or regional plan. Sida’s main priority in the education sector, as outlined in the *Policy for Sida’s development cooperation in the education sector*, is to support the implementation of the EFA agenda according to a country’s national education plan (Sida, 2001: 25). Even in emergency or conflict situations, Sida believes that if providing short-term, rapid interventions, it is “important to promote long-term strategic planning and analysis from a sectoral and rights perspective” (Sida, 2002b: 2), which is more likely to facilitate the overall reconstruction process in these contexts.

64. www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=608&language=en_US
Sida has developed a specific policy on *Education in situations of emergency, conflict and post-conflict* (Sida, 2002b), which recognizes that the approach outlined above may be challenging in some countries, particularly those in protracted crises, due to the lack of a legitimate government. In these contexts, Sida would consider providing assistance through Swedish, international or local NGOs to strengthen the capacity of the education sector (often via the UN CAP); supporting international networks that advocate for education; supporting UN and other multilateral agencies to provide long-term sectoral support to education; and promoting and supporting research in the education sector (Sida, 2002b: 3). The primary responsibility for these interventions is with the Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management within the Department for Cooperation with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance (SEKA) at the headquarters level. Education is mentioned specifically as a potential sector for consideration in Sida’s humanitarian policy.65

In 2002, to support their humanitarian response Sida produced *Guidelines for humanitarian assistance in the education sector* (Sida, 2002c). This includes recognition that direct support (support to service delivery) and indirect support (for example, feeding programmes in schools) for education is needed but that this should be provided with a long-term development perspective. The specific focus of education interventions should be primary education, but interventions in secondary, vocational and adult education will also be considered (Sida, 2002c: 4-5).

**Coordination**

Sida emphasizes the sustainability of humanitarian assistance and that “a humanitarian education programme should have a long-term development perspective” (Sida, 2002c: 6) that is developed and implemented as far as possible with the involvement of the local authorities, underlining Sida’s belief in the importance of coordination between humanitarian and development responses. Where Sida is likely to be engaged in longer-term development after an emergency response (which is particularly the case in fragile and conflict-affected states), responsibilities for the education programme need to be transferred gradually from SEKA to DESO under the coordination of the relevant regional department.66

Most of the Sida field offices have been granted extended (full) delegation based on the country plan. Effectively, this means that the field office is fully responsible for the coordination and implementation of the country plan and does not have to delegate any decision-making back to the headquarters level. This allows field offices to respond according to locally identified needs and to coordinate more closely with other development partner country programmes. It also decreases transaction costs and in so doing, improves the timeliness of responses. However, it is expected that where necessary and appropriate, the field offices will consult the headquarters and other field offices for relevant advice and expertise. The field office is required to ensure that Swedish policies and regulations are borne in mind for all interventions, and at least one formal consultation between the headquarters and the field office is required during the initial preparation phase of a new programme of support (Sida, 2005a: 33).

We, the donors, will coordinate ourselves better and adapt to the partner country’s system of reporting and planning. Government officials must be able to concentrate on developing their own country and not have to devote time to thousands of donor-run projects with different priorities and reporting requirements (Sida, 2006: 6).

An OECD-DAC peer review of Sida’s development cooperation notes Sida’s efforts to align its practice with local government procedures. It states that Sida has explored a number of different forms of alignment to work with government procedures, and suggested that Sida actively monitors the effectiveness of these arrangements for the benefit of other DAC donors (OECD, 2005c). Sida rates highly the importance of information sharing and coordination with both partner country governments and other donors (Sida, 2001: 68). The organization also believes strongly in the value of harmonizing its capacity development interventions with those of other donors (Sida, 2001: 18) based on the Paris Declaration.

**Educational activities**

As well as providing humanitarian assistance that at times includes an education component in a selection of countries according to need, Sida has significant active education development assistance programmes in three main fragile and conflict-affected states: Afghanistan, the DRC and Timor-Leste, which are described briefly in *Box 16.*

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67. [Link to more information](www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=710&a=4993&language=en_US)
Box 16  Sida’s education programmes in Afghanistan, the DRC and Timor-Leste

Afghanistan is one of the largest recipients of Swedish development co-operation.\(^{(a)}\) Sweden started providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in 1982 and more recently began providing development assistance. In 2008, Sweden provided SEK145 million (US$23 million) for education, nearly 32 per cent of the total annual value of its country programme, and the second largest sectoral input after human rights and democratic governance.\(^{(b)}\) Aid is channelled via the UN and Swedish and international NGOs. Sida is providing funding to the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, which has since 1984 been working in rural areas of Afghanistan providing basic education, and is also providing funding for projects implemented through UNICEF and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee.\(^{(c)}\)

Sida started providing humanitarian assistance to the DRC in 1994, during the Rwandan genocide.\(^{(d)}\) The vast majority (nearly 66 per cent) of Swedish support to the DRC in 2008 was via humanitarian assistance. This level is likely to continue for some time in order to promote peace and ease the return of refugees. The education sector received SEK27.9 million (US$4.5 million) or 8 per cent of the total funding for the country programme.\(^{(e)}\) UN OCHA and UNDP are coordinating funding for 330 projects across a multitude of sectors, to which Sweden is contributing. A major education programme providing training for 5,000 teachers and education packages for nearly a quarter of a million children has been supported with Swedish funding via UNICEF. In addition, Swedish funding to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is providing schooling for refugee children in eastern DRC.\(^{(f)}\)

Sweden began providing humanitarian assistance to Timor-Leste in 1997 and since 2002 has been providing development cooperation.\(^{(g)}\) Education is the second largest sector of Swedish cooperation after human rights and democratic governance. In 2008, education programmes received SEK15 million (US$2.4 million), or 45 per cent of the overall country

\(^{(a)}\) Sida’s education officials did not respond to our request for more information on country programmes, hence the analysis and critique of the effectiveness of Sida’s in-country education programmes is more limited than what has been already presented for the EC and the Netherlands and it has been more difficult to comment on whether the policy rhetoric is actually followed on the ground.
\(^{(b)}\) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=245&a=855&language=en_US
\(^{(c)}\) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=245&a=853&language=en_US
\(^{(d)}\) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=1346&language=en_US
\(^{(e)}\) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=1346&a=24802&language=en_US
\(^{(f)}\) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=1346&a=24666&language=en_US
\(^{(g)}\) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=271&language=en_US
Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education

Financial mechanisms

Sida’s preference is for budget support or sector programme support in support of the partner country’s PRS. Thus a large proportion of its education aid is provided bilaterally from government to government in the form of pooled funding through the state budget. However, there is recognition that in some special cases, the implementation partner could be a non-state actor even though the main cooperation agreement would be signed between the two governments (Sida, 2005a: 24). Thus Sida will consider funding via NGOs and other routes that lead to innovation, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states, as seen in Afghanistan and the DRC (Sida, 2001: 16).

Sida also channels some of its funds through multilateral agencies (the EC, UN agencies and the World Bank) and other funds through silent partnerships, though ideally through a SWAp (Sida, 2001: 17). Sweden is one of the main funders of UNICEF, providing around 10 per cent of UNICEF’s annual budget. Subsequently, there is significant potential for Sida to become a key supporter of the Education Transition Fund (ETF) and begin channelling a proportion of this funding specifically to fragile and conflict-affected states. Sida also provides support in certain contexts via Swedish institutions (for example, for research cooperation or contract-financed technical cooperation) or NGOs that might in turn rely on local organizations or civil society groups on the ground to implement activities (Sida, 2005a: 22, 26). The variety of approaches used by Sida in channelling its funds enables the organization to tailor its funding according to specific contexts, including fragile and conflict-affected states. Similar to the Netherlands, Sida makes use of the comparative

(h) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=271&a=907&language=en_US
(i) www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=271&a=906&language=en_US
advantage of its partners to channel funds, particularly in environments in which it may have a limited country presence and potentially no education specialist. With this flexibility comes a responsibility first and foremost to use the most appropriate mechanism according to local needs and capacity but then also to remain engaged long enough for projects to have an impact.

Given that Sida uses a range of aid modalities, by default it has to liaise closely with governments, multilaterals and NGOs, with dialogue happening at both the headquarters and country level. It is important for Sida to maintain this focus on working with a coordinated approach through SWAps where possible, to minimize potential fragmentation resulting from partnership working and in order to support government ownership. Sida has adopted Strategy Framework Papers for the co-ordination of a coherent approach in its funding to UN agencies (Sida, 2005a: 62). These stipulate regular communication, coordination and harmonization of inputs with other donors, funding agencies and the partner country.

With Sida’s approach to supporting a national PRS in a partner country and, wherever possible, providing programme support at the general or sector level that uses public financial management systems, it is seeking to strengthen the capacity of partner countries to manage and absorb larger amounts of funding. Sida has specifically outlined its intention to “increase the share of programme-based support [...] whenever conditions allow”, supporting capacity strengthening as appropriate (Sida, 2005a: 40). The organization believes that this creates an enabling environment for the scaling-up of aid. Fragile and conflict-affected states require this support and capacity development, but Sida may find that transitional approaches are needed to foster suitable conditions for programme-based support.

The Swedish Parliament makes the ultimate decision on resource allocation for development cooperation. This is undertaken on an annual basis, but does allow the Parliament to make additional longer-term commitments on a regional basis. Sida then has some flexibility in allocating at the sub-regional or country level. This permits a degree of continuity and flexibility in responding to specific partner country needs and allows for a longer-term approach to cooperation with partner countries. Sida is responsible for approximately 60 per cent of Sweden’s overall development cooperation budget, with the MFA handling
Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education

multilateral transfers to the EC, UN agencies, the World Bank and others (Sida, 2005a: 27). Formal coordination between the MFA and Sida needs to be maintained in order to ensure coherence in response, planning and strategic decisions regarding education interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states, so that these remain cohesive.

Service delivery and capacity development

Sida’s main focus in its in-country programmes is on supporting the implementation of national education sector plans through a SWAp (Sida, 2001: 12), outlining its core focus on service delivery. However, this is to be coupled with capacity building as a key priority (Sida, 2002a: 15; 2001: 15). Sida’s policy for capacity development (Sida, 2000), as well as some of its other main policy documents, refers to the important priority that the Swedish Government gives to the area of capacity strengthening in partner countries. It is through this approach that Sweden seeks to build the long-term “sustainability of institutions and organizations including national systems of education, training and research” (Sida, 2000: 10). Sida is also committed to working in partnership with others to improve its effectiveness in building capacity in partner countries. Sida’s focus on capacity building is at all levels of the system, from state to local and including civil society (Sida, 2002a: 47).

Sida supports the development of the State, private sector and civil society, so that these in turn can give poor people the opportunity to gain power, safeguard their livelihoods and increase their choices. That is our goal at every stage of our work: at the strategic level, when planning and deciding on a contribution and when following up the results (Sida, 2006: 5).

Sida’s support, as already mentioned, is primarily on working with the national government in a partner country. However, support can be channelled via NGOs or private sector groups (Sida, 2005a: 17), which is often an important channel in fragile and conflict-affected states. Support to NGOs is mainly channelled through Swedish NGOs via SEKA, which has responsibility for providing and coordinating funding through Swedish NGOs (Sida, 2001: 19). Sida’s policy paper Sida’s support to civil society (Sida, 2007a), outlines how this support to CSOs can take four main forms:
1. direct support to a CSO as an implementing agency;
2. direct support to a CSO to build its capacity as a democratic actor in civil society;
3. direct support to a CSO or network of CSOs to strengthen the role of civil society in providing opportunities for engaging the local population;
4. indirect support to CSOs in the creation of an enabling social environment to develop the appropriate structures for civil society, to influence and advocate with government for the rights and needs of the local population (Sida, 2007a: 8).

In working with NSAs, including CSOs, the aim of Swedish support is to strengthen the capacity of civil society without undermining the legitimacy of the state. This is of particular importance under the first form of support where a CSO is an implementing agency (Sida, 2007a: 8).

One of the challenges of providing support through predominantly Swedish NGOs is that there may be other local NGOs and INGOs that have greater comparative advantage or more efficient and effective operations in different fragile states, so it will be important for Sida not to show partiality to Swedish NGOs but rather ensure that aid is untied and allocated on the basis of competitive tendering.

*Engagement, disengagement and risk management strategies*

Sida strongly follows the EC principle of complementarity and is already limiting its interventions to a maximum of three sectors in any partner country as well as providing general support for the PRS. Where Sida has a comparative advantage and there is obvious need, the organization may seek to intervene in a given sector such as education. Where it does not, it may provide general programme support or it may give via multilateral support or a silent partnership (Sida, 2006: 10).

Following the principle of complementarity and the focus on a maximum of three sectors as well as increasing budget support, Sida may choose to disengage from supporting education in a given partner country due to other more urgent priorities within the country, the comparative advantage of other donors in providing support to the education sector, or through using delegated cooperation (silent partnerships) (Sida, 2006: 10). In addition, which is particularly applicable to fragile and conflict-affected states, Sida may disengage because of a lack of shared
Policies, strategies and practices of three donors in relation to financing education

4.5 Emerging issues for the EC, the Netherlands and Sida

All of the donors have outlined the importance of providing assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states in one or more of their overall or more specialist development policy or strategy documents. However, while Sida includes a focus on nine fragile and conflict-affected countries in its overall development strategy, stating the need to provide this support through a spectrum of aid modalities, it does not have a separate policy outlining how in practice it will provide this support to such countries. This is an urgent need given that Sida states its desire to support a PRS or sector plan that may not be existent in many contexts of fragility. While this is a weakness, Sida has developed a specific policy on the provision of education in such contexts. In contrast, the commitment of the Netherlands in providing significant support to the education sector in fragile and conflict-affected states is unquestionable, yet this is not mentioned in its 2008 Humanitarian Policy, showing an oversight by policymakers. For the EC, the desire is to prepare a CSP based on a comprehensive needs assessment to guide all interventions, yet this can take time to develop, which can create tension between the desire to intervene quickly to ensure service delivery but at the same time, do so in a way that is appropriate to the local context.

For the three donors, governance and security concerns dominate decisions to engage in fragile and conflict-affected states. This is displayed in the policies and approaches adopted, which emphasize the importance of developing institutions, working with civil society and addressing inequality. An underlying aim in engagement is the desire to improve the resilience of institutions and mitigate fragility; in practice, donors can grapple with how to go about this, while also acting quickly to address basic short-term delivery needs. For example, all donors noted a preference for the use of budget support or pooled funding in order to gain greater harmonization and alignment with government priorities, but in practice had experienced delays and other difficulties in using such mechanisms, or felt that other modalities were more appropriate in some fragile circumstances. In addition, the EC highlighted that integrating broader initiatives to promote good governance and strengthen institutions can be difficult in the short term. The diverse approaches described within the case studies emphasize the first DAC Principle that context is vital in
achieving this, with combinations of funding modalities common within countries and complementary projects.

Decision-making is often devolved to the country level to ensure engagement is responsive and appropriate, to reduce transaction costs, and to improve the timeliness of responses, but this also needs to be supported by sufficient flexibility in planning processes and procedures, and the effective division of responsibilities.

All three donors were involved in country-level coordination mechanisms including, where they exist, joint review processes. They were often contributing to pooled funds, therefore needing de facto to coordinate with other donors. The Netherlands, due to the channeling of much of its financial assistance via UNICEF, has delegated in-country coordination to UNICEF. However, in the case of Yemen, where the Netherlands has a bilateral programme, the Dutch education adviser led the donor coordination group from 2007 to 2008.

In humanitarian contexts or in the immediate post-conflict stages, it is common for funding to be channeled through NGOs or UN agencies, particularly UNICEF, whereas the longer-term aim for the three donors was greater harmonization and alignment with country priorities. Each of the donors expressed a desire to provide greater continuity between the provision of humanitarian and longer-term development aid. However, in the case of the Netherlands, there is a risk that the informal coordination mechanisms between the humanitarian and development departments of the MFA are not as effective as a more formal way of operating; while for Sweden, the split between the MFA and Sida of responsibility for aid funding will require ongoing formal coordination to ensure coherence in planning and decision-making.

Donors were conscious that resources should be allocated according to country and sectoral need, coordinating with other donors to maximize coverage, but also so as not to spread resources too thinly. All donors emphasized the importance of identifying their comparative advantage and concentrating their development assistance on the sectors in which they felt their efforts and finances could be put to good use most fruitfully. This demonstrates good donorship in so far as aid is put to best use from each donor’s perspective, but this needs to be married with effective co-ordination with other stakeholders to ensure that there is consensus on donors’ comparative advantage and coordination between sectors to ensure some are not neglected.
Important to all donors was the need to engage civil society and work to build states at the most appropriate level. To strengthen structures and capacity, the link between these levels was also a priority for donors, in order to improve the legitimacy of institutions and governance structures. In many cases, this involved working with NSAs, though in the case of Sida, one of the weaknesses of this approach is the fact that most of the aid channeled via NSAs passed through Swedish NGOs that may not have comparative advantage or operational presence in all fragile states. The experience of the Netherlands was that NSAs can often act more rapidly and efficiently in specific geographical areas or for small projects, but that they are not always effective in building ownership and being able to scale up nationally. Thus, when working directly with NSAs, donors will need to ensure that long-route accountability mechanisms are also being pursued in the longer term. In the instances where donors are working more directly with government stakeholders, one of the challenges remains how to use TA in an appropriate and effective manner to ensure skills are being transferred to local stakeholders and at an appropriate cost.

While there is a clear commitment both in policy and financial terms by all three donors to supporting education in fragile and conflict-affected states, given that this approach has been more formally adopted only over the past few years, there is a lack of documented evidence in the public domain of the effectiveness or impact of such support. Such evidence does exist in some cases in grey literature in the country offices of the donors (for example, the independent evaluation of the Dutch educational response in Yemen), but not having this information in the public domain means that it is very difficult to comment on how effective the policies and funding of donors is in such contexts and what lessons have been learned that could be applied in similar contexts. In the case of the EC, the fact that in 2008 there had been no completed evaluations of the impact of EC education programmes in such contexts underlines the urgency to ensure systems are in place to document lessons learned and good practice, to assist in more effective programming in the future.
Chapter 5

Policies, strategies and practices of two INGOs in relation to financing education

5.1 Introduction

The priority of INGOs as they focus on funding programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states is usually on service delivery, and while there is a desire among some to build state capacity and work alongside governments, the overarching aim is to ensure there is an impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries, often from a grassroots or bottom-up approach, irrespective of whether this means bypassing state structures. In this view, short-route accountability that holds service providers accountable to communities for service delivery and bypasses the state is preferable to long-route accountability that holds governments to account when they may not be able or willing to deliver services.

Chapter 5 outlines the policies and in-country practices of education engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states by two INGOs (the IRC and Save the Children UK). For both these INGOs, we also summarize some lessons learned and emerging good practice in funding the education sector in a range of contexts of fragility.

5.2 The International Rescue Committee

Policy and strategy

Founded in 1933, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is a humanitarian organization working in fragile and conflict-affected states to provide emergency relief, the rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons, post-conflict redevelopment, protection of human rights and advocacy for populations affected by conflict, oppression and displacement. The IRC provides support in emergency relief, post-conflict development and resettlement contexts.

The IRC currently works in over 25 countries that can be considered to be affected by fragility. In 2006, the IRC developed its Program Framework to guide its interventions. Prompted by research and data on the changing nature of conflicts (protracted, cyclical, and...
so on), one of the key elements of the Framework is addressing the root causes of conflict in the IRC’s programme design and implementation to ensure that programmes are conflict-sensitive and appropriate for fragile contexts. To this end, the IRC seeks to assist the development of capacity and civil society to provide a foundation for socio-economic development and reconstruction. Consequently, key pillars of its operating strategy for post-conflict development work are good governance and community-based approaches.

The IRC’s first education programmes emerged in the early 1980s in response to demands from refugee populations the organization was working with. Early programmes involved the provision of schooling for Cambodian refugees in Thailand and Afghan refugees in Pakistani refugee camps. Education and child protection has since become one of the IRC’s foundational programme areas, with country programmes requiring justification if its interventions do not contain an educational element. Programmes now cover a spectrum of activities from formal learning (at the primary and secondary levels), early childhood care and development, alternative learning programmes (ALPs), psychosocial care and child protection, human rights and peace education, and vocational and skills-based education and training for adults, including literacy and numeracy. The nature of a country’s education programme is highly dependent on the context, as discussed in more detail below.

There are two main driving factors behind the IRC’s education strategy. Firstly, a rights-based approach, which emphasizes access to education and every child’s right to learn. Secondly, education in fragile and post-conflict settings has a fundamental role in facilitating child protection and psychosocial care, namely: (i) providing children and young people with stability and structure; (ii) helping individuals cope with the effects of trauma; and (iii) providing them with knowledge and skills for their future. Consequently, the focus of the IRC’s education programmes is to increase access to learning opportunities for out-of-school populations and in contexts where schools are not available (for example, displaced populations or areas affected by conflict, where school systems have been disrupted).

Coordination

Due to the IRC’s focus on fragile and conflict-affected states for all of its operations, the organization has not developed the typical divisions between the humanitarian and development elements of its work. Within each country, the IRC generally has a country director and a sector specialist. These posts are then supported by education advisors and corporate teams based within headquarters.

At the country level, the IRC works through a number of consortia, which work to expand and coordinate response programmes. For example, the IRC works in a consortium in Afghanistan with CARE, the Aga Khan Foundation and Catholic Relief Services. Each NGO works in specified provinces, using an agreed approach and standardized training modules and processes. The project is managed by a central management unit, which holds regular meetings with the education managers from all of the partners, to coordinate activities and collaborate on issues as they arise.

It is common practice for the IRC to work in consortia or with local implementation partners in this way. This enables successful interventions to be scaled up and provides increased capacity in terms of service delivery. In addition, partners bring additional (local) knowledge and specialist skill sets, which can embellish programme design and delivery. Working in consortia has also helped amplify the voice of the IRC when working with government authorities and donors. The PACE-A project in Afghanistan initiated a Community-Based Education (CBE) forum to provide a coordination mechanism for all stakeholders working in the field of CBE (beyond the PACE-A partner organizations). Membership includes NGO and UN representatives and the MOE CBE adviser. Meeting monthly, the focus is on ensuring that operations are aligned with the MOE policy guidelines on CBE and MOE national strategy. The forum also provides an opportunity to maintain ongoing communication among actors and to share information and lessons learned. The successes of the forum have led to the MOE establishing its own CBE coordination meeting, which works alongside the CBE forum, with overlapping membership and agendas. While forum members are committed to reinforcing the MOE’s leadership in the development of and strategy for CBE, there is a need to consider how effective it is to maintain the two fora and how they could develop to fulfil the needs of both the NGO community and the MOE, while developing the latter’s capacity. Despite this challenge, the consortium has strengthened its
Donors’ engagement

voice when advocating with the MOE for community-based schools to be recognized formally, and for the project to work with the MOE on development of their Community-Based Education (CBE) policy. One of the lessons learned from the IRC’s involvement in the CBE forum is that in order to maintain stakeholders’ participation, the focus of co-ordination mechanisms needs to be action oriented with clear outcomes so that participants can see clearly the value of their contribution. This has been evidenced by the growing membership of the forum which has been achieved through strong facilitation, by an emphasis on aligning activities with MOE CBE policy, and by remaining relevant through the promotion of new initiatives, such as the work to contextualize the INEE Minimum Standards.

At the country level, it is the responsibility of the sector specialists to liaise and coordinate with the relevant authorities and partners, primarily through attendance at regular coordination meetings. For example, in the CAR, cluster systems are in operation to facilitate coordination between stakeholders, with education teams attending the education and protection cluster meetings. Meetings are held on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. However, group objectives are often not adhered to or not well defined. The IRC also holds regular bilateral meetings with UN agencies, the MOE and other in-country NGOs. Given the weaknesses of the UN cluster system in country, bilateral co-ordination mechanisms and communication channels have been critical. In the DRC, all of the IRC’s educational activities are undertaken in collaboration with the provincial government through the MOE. Cluster systems are in operation to facilitate coordination between stakeholders, with education teams often attending the education and protection cluster meetings organized by UNICEF in Goma. These take place monthly or bi-monthly. Some IRC projects also have a specific aim of building the capacity of government counterparts, in which instance there is very close liaison and consultation. In Afghanistan, this extended to the secondment of IRC staff to the central and provincial MOE offices.

The IRC has also led policy discussions between policy-makers, government actors, local leaders and the international community to prompt discussion on issues such as accreditation and certification mechanisms for refugee teachers and students. For example, in West Africa, work has taken place with the Liberian, Guinean and Sierra Leonean governments, the West African Examinations Council and other
stakeholders to ensure that teachers trained while they were refugees would be recognized for this by their government on repatriation.  

The IRC has close links with the INEE and contributes to its strategic planning through representation on its Steering Group along with CARE, the Christian Children’s Fund, the International Save the Children Alliance, the NRC, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Bank. It is also a member of the Working Groups for Minimum Standards, and Education and Fragility; and has led INEE initiatives such as teacher compensation in fragile environments. The IRC is an active member of INEE task teams addressing issues such as teacher training and gender. It is also on the Advisory Committee of the IASC Education Cluster and has participated in country-level implementation of the Cluster system, particularly in Pakistan and Uganda, via monthly coordination meetings.

The IRC staff members recognize considerable organizational benefits from their involvement with international networks such as the INEE and working in partnerships. For example, the organization’s involvement with the INEE Minimum Standards process coincided with an internally recognized need to develop an education monitoring and evaluation framework. A decision was then made to develop that framework via investment in the inter-agency process so that the final product was aligned with the Minimum Standards. Staff also felt that having a mechanism, such as the INEE, through which to share information, approaches and technical materials also enables them to remain up to date. In addition, it provides a forum for IRC to disseminate information on its activities and raise its profile when leading in certain areas.

Educational activities

In 2008, the IRC had active education programmes in 27 countries. The nature and scale of education programmes in each of these countries was subject to an initial country assessment and an ongoing situational analysis of countries in which the IRC has been operational for extended periods of time. The IRC’s ability to plan and deliver programmes

70. For more information on this issue see Certification counts: recognizing the learning attainments of displaced and refugee students (Kirk, 2009)
71. Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burundi, the CAR, Chad, Colombia, the Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Nepal, Northern Caucasus, Pakistan, Palestine, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur and Southern Sudan), Syria, Tanzania, Thailand and Uganda.
according to these needs is then heavily dependent upon available funding streams. This can be a time-consuming process requiring awareness-raising with donors to influence their spending decisions by drawing attention to specific needs in order to attract funding (Penson and Tomlinson, 2009).

The IRC education programmes typically include formal schooling (at the primary and secondary levels); vocational education; accelerated learning; alternative delivery, such as community-based schools; basic skills education (literacy and numeracy) for out-of-school children and youth; adult education; the provision of safe spaces for recreation, sports and cultural activities with in-school and out-of-school children and youth; health education and landmine awareness outreach education; and peace education and conflict resolution with youth leaders and peer support groups.

The emphasis in educational programmes between the two education strategy driving factors (education access and learning outcomes versus protection and psychosocial care) is highly dependent upon the particular country context (relief, reconstruction or resettlement) and the needs of the population the IRC is working with. The focus of the IRC’s acute emergency response is on children and youth, and addressing their immediate needs via the provision of safe spaces, the delivery of critical life-saving messages such as landmine awareness, and child protection. As soon as is operationally possible and appropriate, the IRC tries to transition to formal learning. The inclusion of adult education components normally follows as the programme shifts towards chronic crisis or post-conflict response.

While the focus and objectives of education interventions may shift over time in a changing context and with changing needs, the dual aims of learning and protection should be seen as mutually supportive rather than incongruous. In order to design and deliver education programmes effectively in these fluid contexts, the objectives and balance between aims need to be clear to all stakeholders, with a re-evaluation over time if a shift of focus takes place (Penson and Tomlinson, 2009).

The IRC has three models of operation to be used in different contexts and stages of programme development, and to help establish operations and then scale up:

1. **Direct support** involves the IRC working directly to deliver education or educational support through direct support to a
school, or the provision of safe spaces or recreational activities in situations of conflict or refugee camps. This approach is best suited to small-scale, localized interventions that are typically short term and aim to address specific needs. While addressing immediate needs and providing a platform for further work, such projects have limited reach, both geographically within a country and in terms of target groups. In order to have broader coverage and address the longer-term development needs of beneficiaries, programmes need to develop beyond this stage into the following two models.

2. **Middle support** involves the IRC working as an intermediary and facilitator of education delivery but still at a relatively local level – for example, working with parent-teacher associations (PTAs) to support a school. By working through school-level management structures and communities, the IRC hopes to achieve a broader reach in terms of project beneficiaries. Such strategies also have the advantage of building local capacity and strengthening accountability for education. Engagement at the community level in this way requires careful management of community expectations and long-term commitment in order to develop trust and ensure that sustainable mechanisms are established, which can flourish independently after the IRC’s intervention (Brannelly and Sullivan-Owomoyela, 2009).

3. **District/national support** sees the IRC working at the institutional and organizational levels to improve the capacity of local education systems, for example by supporting district education offices to provide effective support to PTAs to enable them to support schools. The aims are to rebuild and strengthen education systems to support refugee and IDP returns and to help secure successful reintegration, and also to lay the foundations for the IRC’s eventual exit strategy.

In the latter two models, the IRC’s programme emphasis is on capacity building, training and the mobilization of communities, teachers, administrators and MOEs at all levels. This requires close work with local partners and government systems to support their redevelopment. An element of this work that requires planning and coordination from the initial education response is ensuring that training and learning undertaken by returning teachers and students is recognized and that their skills are transferable upon reintegration.72

72. For more information on this issue see *Certification counts: recognizing the learning attainments of displaced and refugee students* (Kirk, 2009)
For this strategy to be undertaken as a progressive model working from level one to three, this requires an enormous long-term commitment from the IRC when initially engaging in a country. Such commitment has been evident in Afghanistan, where the IRC has been engaged in education for nearly three decades. This commitment, however, is dependent on the IRC sourcing funds for activities. In addition, funding is bound to have an influence on the nature and scale of the education interventions that the IRC can deliver. Further analysis as to how this model has operated in practice to scale up activities both in scope and geographical coverage, and in particular the influences of funding streams and the transition between phases, would be invaluable to inform the IRC’s operations as well as that of other NGOs and donor programmes. Information on this how this progression has taken place in practice often exists in grey literature or within an individual’s own experiences. For example, IRC staff in Afghanistan highlighted how training materials and methodologies used as part of their Healing Classroom Initiative were shared with the Partnership for Advancing Community Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A) consortium to develop its teacher orientation training.

Box 17 provides an overview of the IRC’s education programmes in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

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<th>Box 17</th>
<th>The IRC’s education programmes in Afghanistan, the CAR and the DRC</th>
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<td>The IRC has been working with Afghans since 1980, when it began providing emergency relief (including education and vocational training) to refugees in Pakistan. The IRC continued to support returnees in Afghanistan, providing access to basic services, including basic and vocational education. During the Taliban regime, when girls were banned from attending public schools, the IRC began providing clandestine education for girls. With the fall of the Taliban this initiative has been developed into a community-based schooling programme. The programme includes the mobilization of communities to engage with education, the establishment and training of school management committees (SMCs), teacher training, material provision and ongoing dialogue with the MOE for the eventual handover of the schools to the government. In 2008, the IRC had three education programmes in Afghanistan:</td>
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73. Although it is not assumed to work in a purely linear fashion, and in fact most country programmes operated at more than one level.
the Partnership for Advancing Community Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A) (2006-2011), with total funding of US$6 million, funded by USAID and managed by a partnership of four INGOs led by CARE, with the Aga Khan Foundation, Catholic Relief Services and the IRC;

2. the Community-Based Inclusive Education for Children with Sensory Disabilities (2007-2009), with total funding of US$500,000 from Europe Aid, plus an additional US$22,000 from a local partner, the National Association of the Blind;

3. the Integrated Support to the Government of Afghanistan’s Land Distribution Program for Returning Refugees, which includes an education component (2007-2008) and with total funding of US$100,000 from the Stichting Vluchtleiding (a Dutch NGO).

The IRC undertook an initial needs assessment in the Central African Republic (CAR) in late 2006, which found that schools in the conflict-affected areas had been closed for 6 to 12 months, with teachers having fled and the majority of children displaced with their families in the bush. The IRC’s initial emergency response focused on health and environmental health work, which was then extended to gender-based violence (GBV) programmes. Its education and child protection programme started in October 2007. This was seen as an opportunity not only to re-open schools, but also to provide the prospect of child protection work and psychosocial care (via the IRC’s Healing Classrooms initiative). In 2008, the IRC had three principal education programmes in the CAR:

1. an Integrated Emergency Intervention for Displaced and Conflict-Affected Communities in the CAR (2007-2008), with total funding of US$253,980, of which US$72,108 is dedicated to education, with funding from UNICEF;

2. the Education and Operational Gap Coverage project (six months, 2007-2008), with total funding of US$200,000 of which US$91,217 is dedicated to education, with funding from the UNDP Emergency Response Fund;

3. the CAR Safe Schools Initiative (eight months, 2007-2008), with total funding of US$64,730, funded by the Wellspring Foundation.

Given that the CAR was still in the emergency/relief phase when the IRC started interventions, the IRC’s funding has tended to be provided via UN agencies and private foundations. For one project, funding was received from the CERF, via UNDP. Programmes were generally short term, having a total funding cycle of 12 months or less. Programmes in the CAR have taken an integrated approach working with health, operations, environmental health and protection as well as education, with set proportions of the project budget dedicated to education activities. As such, the budget and activities are coordinated between teams.
The IRC has been working in the eastern DRC since 1996, originally working with Rwandan refugees who had spilled over into the DRC during and after the genocide, and local communities affected by civil war. In 1999, the IRC also started operations in the west in response to Angolan refugees fleeing to the DRC. Work in the North Kivu province began in late September 2007 in response to renewed military clashes and the resulting displacement in the region. Education interventions focus on teacher training, literacy and psychosocial care (via sports and recreation) and target primary school-aged children, youth and primary school teachers. In 2008, the IRC managed one small humanitarian education programme in the DRC, funded jointly by the Wellspring Advisors (US$30,000) and Marie de la Soudière Crisis Fund (US$20,000). Initial funding for the humanitarian education response was sought from two private foundations. The IRC is hoping to expand the scale and duration of the project by seeking further funding opportunities from UN agencies (in this instance, UNICEF) as the impact of the initial project becomes known and as peace talks continue. An initial emergency assessment was undertaken in the DRC with UN agencies and INGOs working in the region to identify the range and scope of their activities and available resources. Following this, a more detailed needs assessment took place within one particular territory identified as the area in which the IRC’s operations could be most beneficial. This needs analysis included consultations with other education and child protection agencies working locally, teachers, health workers, IDPs, religious leaders, elders and nearly 100 children and youth. It was based on this analysis that education opportunities were identified as a primary need.

Source: Personal correspondence with IRC staff representatives in country offices.

Financial mechanisms

The IRC’s funding is received from a broad range of private sources in addition to development cooperation. Private donations (from individuals and organizations) and foundation funding, from generalist and education or child-centred foundations, form a large component of the revenue. In 2006, the IRC received a US$15 million pledge (its biggest ever private donation) from the NoVo Foundation to support the LEGACY education initiative in West Africa. NoVo’s executive director, Bob Dandrew, highlighted that “the key to successful rebuilding of war-torn societies is the development of solid education systems” (IRC, 2007: 15). The IRC country programmes outlined in Box 17 indicate a prominence of private funding sources for education in the initial emergency response phases.
Funding is also received from UN agencies (notably, UNHCR and UNICEF), the EC and bilateral aid. As the IRC is a US-based organization, the US Government is predominant in providing bilateral finances, not only from USAID, but also from other US Government departments. Other regular contributors to the IRC’s education programmes include the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and Stichting Vluchteling, the Netherlands Refugee Foundation. The organization also has limited core funding from reserves, from which a proportion is available for the education sector.

The dependence the IRC faces on external revenue streams is the reality faced by all NGOs, and this affects the nature and scope of the education programmes delivered. To address this, the IRC has diversified its sources of finance and has also used innovative marketing techniques to raise awareness of the issues of education in fragile settings. For example, the organization took the opportunity to work with the production team for the recent film version of Khaled Hosseini’s novel The Kite Runner, and created an action and awareness campaign around the film. Through the campaign, the IRC raised funds for its education programmes in Afghanistan that helped enrol over 11,000 students in schools and train over 1,000 teachers (IRC, 2007: 17).

The IRC’s level of private funding has allowed it a degree of flexibility in its education response, rather than applying for specific programme funding in line with donor strategies. The IRC also works with refugees within the USA, which helps familiarize US-based foundations with the organization. Advocacy is a key component of the IRC’s work with awareness raising of education needs taking place with donors to attract funding and in-programme design and development.

As one of the IRC’s foundational programming areas is education, country programmes have to justify if they are not going to include educational activities as part of their operations. But, as with all NGOs, attracting funding to support activities is challenging and it relies on continuous fund-raising efforts, with the majority of funding lasting for less than two years. It is the larger national-level development interventions such as the Partnership for Advancing CBE in Afghanistan (PACE-A) and the Liberia Teacher Training Program (LTTP) that tend to attract more substantial multi-year funding, particularly from bilateral

74. Including the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, the US Displaced Children and Orphans’ Fund and the US Department of Labor.
Donors' engagement

donors. The latter tend to be funded via UN agencies or foundations. It is common for some of the smaller, foundation-funded programmes to be funded jointly. Some education projects are funded as components of broader child protection or social development or reintegration projects.

Where the IRC works with local implementing or partner organizations, either as part of a consortium to build local capacity or to extend access to areas in which they are unable to deliver projects directly (due to safety concerns, for instance), funds are distributed to partners for use, with regular reporting on budgets to the in-country finance officer.

Service delivery and capacity development

A guiding principle of the IRC’s Program Framework is capacity building as a means to strengthen institutions within the countries where the organization works, thus creating durable solutions. This can be seen in the three main models of the IRC’s education response, which will be detailed later. The latter two in particular, working beyond direct delivery, maintain a focus on capacity building, training and the mobilization of stakeholders, from teachers to administrators, government staff and school communities. Operationally, this has included the rebuilding of infrastructure, the review and revision of national curricula and training programmes, and the creation of bridging programmes that enable integration back into formal systems, such as psychosocial support and accelerated learning.

The IRC’s focus on capacity building in Afghanistan is at all levels. Under PACE-A, communities have received training and support in management and monitoring of their community’s education activities. The IRC has also seconded staff to the central MOE and to each province of operation to provide specific support to CBE activities. The seconded Provincial Liaison Officers have MOE staff counterparts, and their job is to institutionalize the responsibility and ownership of CBE activities at the ministry level, as well as to coordinate CBE providers.

Work also takes place with MOEs to assist in the re-establishment of national systems and the training of ministry personnel. This has been seen in Afghanistan, where consultation with the MOE on training materials developed for school administrators and trainers in Pakistani refugee camps led to opportunities for these materials to be adopted by the MOE, and for the IRC to deliver training on administration and teacher support to ministry personnel. In contrast, in the CAR,
the IRC’s programme is in an area beyond the operational capacity of the MOE. Nevertheless, the IRC has been working with the MOE and the local ‘Inspection académique’ so that the MOE can return to its role incrementally within the region as the situation stabilizes and the capacity of the MOE develops. For example, from 2008 the Inspection académique has been supported by the IRC to begin school visits.

A large focus of the IRC’s work is building the capacity of communities to develop ownership of issues, including taking responsibility for education. This has typically been done through work with PTAs and other mechanisms for school oversight and management. In addition to improving ownership it is hoped that working with community structures will improve accountability structures. In the DRC, the IRC’s capacity development is focused on teachers and local stakeholders and there is close collaboration between the IRC and the regional MOE regarding the planning and implementation of activities. When engaging with communities and fostering their support for initiatives, it is essential to keep in the forefront of activities clear objectives regarding long-term outcomes and to openly share and discuss these with the communities (Brannelly and Sullivan-Owomoyela, 2009). This is essential for keeping expectations (that of communities towards NGOs and vice versa) realistic, and to ensure that engagement is embedded with community structures and is sustainable. A focus should be maintained on building capacity for more than just the delivery of the project.

The balance between work with NSAs and governments depends on the country context and the level of fragility. In emergency and chronic crisis environments, work with NSAs is common, especially in remote areas where the government’s reach is limited. By comparison, in situations in which the government is capable and willing to be heavily involved, work will take place in conjunction with its plans – for example, the IRC’s work in Ethiopia and Syria.

In Afghanistan, the IRC made the decision not to support teacher costs, but instead to work with local communities to encourage them to provide direct support. As free primary education has been offered in government schools, some rural communities have resented the fact that they are struggling to fund their children’s education while more wealthy households in urban areas have access to free schooling. Despite these challenges, the IRC sees its decision not to pay teacher salaries as
a strength of the programme. It emphasizes the long-term sustainability of projects by encouraging communities to lead the process of education within the community rather than expecting to be ‘paid for participation’. This is vital, particularly in fragile contexts where the prolonged engagement of external actors cannot be guaranteed. By maintaining this policy in Afghanistan, the IRC has been able to successfully lobby the MOE to include CBE teachers on the MOE payroll.

The IRC also made the decision not to support teacher costs in the CAR, but instead to work with local communities to encourage them to provide support to the volunteer teachers. Thus, compensation is funded via households committing a small fee (typically US$1 per month per family). In contrast to Afghanistan, this has led to some difficulties in ensuring reliable and sufficient compensation, especially where the income of displaced families fluctuates greatly and is highly dependent on the stability of the region.

**Engagement, disengagement and risk management strategies**

The IRC’s Board of Directors makes decisions regarding entry into new countries. This will usually be in response to the onset of a crisis. Decisions are also informed by an indicator list of ‘countries to watch’, which enables appropriate preparation. The organization’s focus is on responding to situations of displacement, prompted by political instability and conflict rather than natural emergencies. But if the IRC is in the country and a natural disaster occurs, it will respond as appropriate, as seen in Pakistan after the 2006 earthquake and in Indonesia following the 2005 tsunami.

The average length of the IRC’s stay in a country is 10 years, although in situations of prolonged crisis its presence extends well beyond this. The IRC’s educational involvement coincides with the duration of the organization’s in-country presence, and planning for programmes is conceived in terms of multi-year commitments.

Risk management strategies underpin all of the IRC’s operational work and are embedded within standard procedures, from logistics to security to procurement. As a humanitarian organization, these are foundational to the IRC’s way of working. Security is key when working in these contexts and all of the IRC’s programmes have comprehensive security and risk management systems. If, due to insecurity, the IRC needs to pull out of a context or temporarily scale down projects, the
organization will often leave key staff (if it is safe to do so) to maintain some level of continuity. The IRC also undertakes a considerable amount of distance monitoring and works with local communities so that services are not entirely halted or disrupted if the organization has to withdraw due to security concerns. In the CAR, the IRC worked with local communities on multiple projects, including health, sanitation, child protection and education. Building these relationships over time improved the security and ease of operations for the IRC staff (for example, villagers helped ensure safe passage between villages). In this instance, the IRC also felt secure in initiating dialogue with the rebel factions active in the region, which enabled schools to re-open as the IRC was able to request that rebel activities moved away from schools, that arms were kept off school property and that the use of any school structures as bases was abandoned. In addition, the IRC has considered a different delivery model as a temporary measure if the situation deteriorates.

Unfortunately, community relationships do not always lead to such guarantees of staff security. In 2008, four members of IRC staff were killed during an ambush while travelling in marked aid agency vehicles in Afghanistan, despite rigorous security procedures, including daily security assessments for staff travel. Immediately after this tragedy, the IRC suspended all operations in Afghanistan to allow staff time to grieve and to undertake a full security assessment. Work was resumed incrementally two months later, with increased security measures.75 Working in such circumstances is never risk free and security concerns have to take precedence for NGOs to protect their staff. In addition to affecting the delivery of services, this has an impact on the recruitment and retention of staff. The latter can mean that NGOs find it difficult to develop capacity consistently within local offices as staff move on.

The IRC’s disengagement would primarily be part of a broader country exit strategy in response to diminished need, or where sufficient internal capacity to deliver services has been developed. The emphasis of the organization is on working in consultation with government structures to prioritize continuity of service delivery and access to education, even in challenging circumstances. For example, the IRC retained an operational presence in Afghanistan throughout the Taliban’s time in power. If, however, circumstances became politically inoperable,

it would disengage. A secondary reason why the IRC may disengage is a lack of funding.

**Effectiveness of response in fragile and conflict-affected states**

The impact and effectiveness of the IRC’s interventions is dependent on the type of intervention (UPE, quality and youth, for instance) and the availability of funding. Programme evaluations are often internal and not publicly available, making it difficult in this study to assess objectively the impact of interventions.

One of the IRC’s key education interventions is the Healing Classrooms Initiative. The focus is on supporting teachers in creating supportive learning environments for children that also help them move forward from the traumatic experiences of conflict or natural disasters. The initiative focuses on teacher motivation and well-being as a fundamental element in enabling effective teaching and learning. The approach was developed following a literature review and lessons learned from evaluations of other child-friendly approaches. The tools were originally developed and piloted in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, and then applied in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake in 2005. The toolkit itself was published in late 2006 for further field testing and is yet to be evaluated independently (IRC, 2006).

In 2002, there was an internal evaluation of the IRC’s education programme in Liberia where, between 1998 and 2001, the IRC supported the repatriation and reintegration of returning Liberian refugees. This involved support for more than 42,000 students in 159 schools across three districts. Between 1999 and 2001, high school pass rates in the IRC-supported schools increased from 9.5 per cent to 69.8 per cent, which was higher than the national average. The evaluation also found improved teacher preparation and motivation, linked to the IRC-provided teacher training, a mentoring programme and teacher resource centres. In addition, the IRC’s advocacy with schools and the government was found to have had a positive effect on increasing the number of female teachers (IRC, 2002).

The evaluation concluded with the following recommendations, which could be applied to Liberia and to other IRC programmes to improve the effectiveness of planning and delivery:

- More time needs to be allocated to ensuring that basic systems are put in place to get schools functioning.
• Working at multiple levels of support in Liberia (direct, middle and national support) facilitated more rapid change. For example, the IRC trained regional education officers on the importance of teacher/student ratios and supported the Liberian MOE to address schools for teacher reallocation.

• The training of PTAs should focus initially on school management and child protection issues to build PTA leadership capacity, rather than supporting income-generating projects. In Liberia, the IRC initially supported the latter to help PTAs meet teacher salary needs and other school costs, but it found the impact to be limited due to the lack of management and planning skills within the PTAs.

An always-challenging decision is how to approach the issues of teacher compensation and support. The IRC has adopted different policies on this issue according to the context. During its initial work in Liberia, incentives were paid to teachers along with the provision of training. In this conflict situation, the evaluation of the IRC’s work between 1998 and 2001 saw this policy as a key element in stabilizing the education system by providing a liveable wage, improving morale and motivating teachers and school administrators not to leave the profession (IRC, 2002). It also helped prevent school closures and teacher strikes. More recently, however, the IRC has moved away from providing compensation, as seen in Afghanistan and the CAR. Overall, this has been more successful in Afghanistan than in the CAR where greater instability has led to unpredictable support for teachers. While the IRC’s commitment to the long-term sustainability of programmes should be applauded, the organization should be encouraged to assess how teachers in crisis situations can be supported if communities are unable to provide regular compensation.

5.3 Save the Children UK

Policy and strategy

Save the Children UK is part of the International Save the Children Alliance. The Alliance consists of 28 members working in over 120 countries. Save the Children has developed a child rights programming approach to work based on the principles, rights and responsibilities contained within the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted in 1989) and in each country is informed by a child rights-focused situational analysis. Save the Children UK’s programming is based on six core principles:
1. best interests of the child;
2. child participation and accountability;
3. non-discrimination;
4. sustainability;
5. value for money;
6. using learning to influence change.

In September 2006, the International Save the Children Alliance launched its first global campaign, *Rewrite the Future* (Save the Children, 2006). The campaign aims to improve the quality of education for 8 million children living in CAFS and enable a further 3 million children to access education. In order to achieve this, it hopes to raise awareness of the millions of out-of-school children in CAFS and advocate for governments and international organizations to mobilize more resources to fund education in these countries. The key factors driving the launch of *Rewrite the Future* included:

1. the shift in the international agenda over the past five years, with fragile and conflict-affected states taking more prominence in the aid and education dialogue and the shift in some countries such as the Netherlands, the USA and the UK towards a higher profile for supporting fragile and conflict-affected states;
2. internal recognition that there was little chance of achieving the education MDGs if CAFS were not prioritized;
3. internal restructuring with a conscious decision to create fragile state adviser posts in each sector team;
4. the need to show that something could be done by raising the profile of fragile and conflict-affected states and pushing for change.

In April 2007, *Rewrite the Future* produced its first significant policy-based report entitled *Last in line, last in school: how donors are failing children in conflict-affected fragile states* (Save the Children, 2007b), which outlined the 23 DAC donors’ low prioritization of CAFS when compared to their funding for other LICs. This report estimated that over half of the US$9 billion estimated funding gap that donors need to fill if they are to meet the UPE goal by 2015 must be focused on CAFS.

Since the launch of the *Rewrite the Future* campaign, further policy reports and advocacy publications have been released, including annual updates on the campaign and *Last in line, last in school* (see Save the

Policies, strategies and practices of two INGOs in relation to financing education

Children, 2007a, 2008b, 2008d).77 A two-year update on the Rewrite the Future campaign (Save the Children, 2008d), looking at the achievements made in the first two years of the campaign, reported that the quality of education had been improved for 5.7 million children and of these, the International Save the Children Alliance has provided access to 815,000 children who were out of school.

At the outset of the Rewrite the Future campaign, the education team at Save the Children UK included a fragile states adviser who oversaw all educational interventions and programmes in CAFS. This embedded the campaign within the education team, with this team’s advisers having written or significantly contributed to the main Rewrite the Future publications. However, Save the Children UK is currently going through restructuring to focus more exclusively on child survival. This means that within CAFS there is going to be a much bigger focus on health and hunger, with less of a focus on education and protection. While there is still recognition that education is important in the humanitarian response, the new organizational structure will mean that there will be less support for the Rewrite the Future campaign from the media and campaign teams as there are other more pressing priorities related to emergency response and child survival. This will potentially have an impact on fundraising for education projects in CAFS if the educational aspects of Save the Children’s work become less visible. In addition, the removal of the fragile states adviser post will diminish specialized headquarters capacity to support country programmes.

Coordination

Save the Children UK’s education team includes advisers with specialist remits in emergencies, and education and conflict. They work closely with country programmes to provide guidance and technical support where needed. The Emergency Education Adviser in the Education team is also a member of the Emergencies Section of Save the Children. This section is in turn part of the ‘Alliance Cooperation in Emergencies’ Initiative (ACE), which seeks to strengthen and scale up country level emergency preparedness and contingency planning, disaster risk reduction, and global emergency response systems across all Save the Children members.

77. See also: Where peace begins: education’s role in conflict prevention and peace building (Save the Children, 2008a) and Delivering education for children in emergencies: a key building block for the future (Save the Children, 2008c).
The Save the Children Alliance *Rewrite the Future* campaign has well-established coordination mechanisms, at a number of levels, for the Save the Children members. There is a ‘Key Challenge Team’ (made up of senior staff representatives from Save the Children UK, USA, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and from the Alliance Secretariat), the purpose of which is to steer the implementation of the Alliance’s campaign, to monitor progress and to propose alterations if needed. There are also working groups focused on technical support, advocacy, communications and fundraising.

At the country level, Save the Children staff work with government bodies (local or national) as the ‘duty bearers’ responsible primarily for the delivery of relevant services for the protection of children. Save the Children also works closely with other NGOs (both international and national), children and parents, community-based organizations, civil society coalitions, UN agencies, donors, professional training institutes, faith-based organizations and local businesses. The intention is to engage with government but this is not always possible depending on the context of fragility and the capacity and will of the government.

In Sierra Leone, Save the Children UK sits on many high-level committees at the national level to help with communication and co-ordination, and is committed to reporting its activities to the MOEYS every quarter at the national level and every month at the district level. This takes place at the meeting of education partners with the District Education Office, which is chaired by the Inspector of Schools in Kailahun district. Plan, Concern and IRC are the other INGOs with substantial education programmes and they all sit on similar committees in the capital, Freetown. The Save the Children education programme was designed to complement the work of these other INGOs rather than to duplicate it. At the national level, the programme is involved in policy formulation and engaged in the development of the MOEYS’ 10-year Education Sector Plan. Save the Children is the lead NGO on a sub-committee in Freetown that is reviewing the content of the ESP in light of the recommendations made since its endorsement in 2007.

In the Côte d’Ivoire, the education programme’s initial objectives were developed in consultation with the MOE at the national and regional levels. Save the Children participates in the national and regional education sector groups in order to coordinate and share its work in the education sector. These groups meet at least monthly and
include government officials, UN agencies and international and local NGOs. The Côte d’Ivoire education programme is a good example of collaboration between two agencies (Save the Children UK and Save the Children Sweden) to reach maximum coverage in the country (together the two organizations work in nine out of twelve regions), which greatly helps capacity building coverage and advocacy. The programme was planned with reference to the government’s EFA plan, and also involved comprehensive consultation and analysis with a wide range of stakeholders throughout the country, from children to parents, government authorities, UN agencies, NGOs and teachers.

At the global level, the Save the Children Alliance is an active member of three main networks – INEE, the Global Campaign for Education (GCE), and the Consultative Group on Early Childhood and Development (CGECCD). The Save the Children Alliance is a founding Steering Group member of INEE and an active member of the working groups on minimum standards and education and fragility. It also participates on several INEE task teams.

Additionally, Save the Children UK co-managed, with Oxfam and ActionAid, the Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF). Established in 2002 with £10 million in start-up money from the UK Government, the CEF worked in 16 commonwealth countries, including Sierra Leone, Pakistan and Uganda, to promote free primary education for all children and to address the barriers preventing children from attending school.

UNICEF and the International Save the Children Alliance co-lead the IASC Global Education Cluster, working in close collaboration with other leading agencies and INEE. The IASC Education Cluster is the only cluster at the global level to be co-led by the UN and an NGO (see Box 3 in Chapter 1 for more information on the IASC Education Cluster).

Educational activities

In 2009, Save the Children UK was working in 53 countries, with education programmes in 45 of these. Fourteen of these education programmes were in CAFS.78 Save the Children UK’s humanitarian response usually focuses on basic education, safe spaces and psychosocial care. The 4 to 14 age group is generally targeted but in some CAFS, older

78. Afghanistan, Chad (emergency response), Colombia, the Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe (emergency response).
youth may also be included, particularly when there are issues surrounding
the reintegration of child soldiers into the education system. Adult
education is not covered by Save the Children UK. The organization’s
developmental response usually focuses on basic education, life skills
and a small amount of peace education in some country programmes.
The same age group of children is targeted in Save the Children UK’s
humanitarian and developmental responses.

Save the Children UK’s organizational strategy, Change for
Children, sets out its long-term ten-year ambition and its three-year plan
for realizing that ambition. The overall goal in education is “to increase
access to, and completion of, inclusive, quality basic education” (Save
the Children UK, 2008a: 20) The specific ‘breakthrough’ for children
in education is that, by 2017, “Children caught up in crisis can expect
to get a basic education – we’ve helped get education established as a
fundamental part of all emergency responses”.79

Box 18 provides an overview of Save the Children’s education
programmes in the Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

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**Box 18** Save the Children’s education programme in the Côte
d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone

Save the Children UK started working in the Côte d’Ivoire in 1996, focusing
on reintegration and family tracing for Liberian refugees, in response to
the humanitarian crisis spilling over from the civil war in Liberia. It was
when a crisis hit the Côte d’Ivoire itself in 2002 that the programme shifted
towards a focus on the Ivorian communities (in the areas of protection,
education and health). From 2005, the programme included elements of
non-formal education for the reintegration of girls associated with armed
forces. In 2006, a full education programme was launched, after a Child’s
Rights Situational Analysis (CRSA) revealed education as a gap in children’s
rights and in light of a strategic decision for the Côte d’Ivoire to participate
in the Rewrite the Future campaign. Save the Children UK and Save the
Children Sweden jointly implement the education programme, which
focuses on primary school-aged children, especially girls in the northern
regions where female enrolment and retention remains low. The programme
finances development costs as well as providing support to regional
education authorities and school inspectors to fulfil their supervisory role
through in-kind contributions of office materials and fuel. It does not support

recurrent costs such as teachers’ salaries. The programme has been funded jointly since 2006 by bilateral donors, International Save the Children Alliance members and private companies (£3.03 million from Sida; €82,250 from Save the Children Italy and Lavazza; €1.8 million from Save the Children Netherlands and the Government of the Netherlands; €128,174 from IKEA Sweden). The overall goal is to enable over 250,000 primary-aged children in nine regions to access quality education in safe, participatory learning environments. The core funding from Sida is due to finish at the end of 2008 as Sida’s support shifts away from the Côte d’Ivoire towards other priority countries. External funding for the country is complicated in all sectors as there is no longer emergency funding and development funding has not yet entered the country in a significant way.

Save the Children UK started work in Sierra Leone during the emergency period in 1999 as the civil war was coming to an end. Key aspects of its initial work involved conducting family tracing and reunification of separated children, and it became the lead agency in Kailahun district in the far east of the country on the border with Guinea and Liberia. This was the last district to go through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In response to requests from communities to support schools and the need for rebuilding the education system, an education assessment was completed in 2005. This mapped the existing education stakeholders, identifying niche areas for Save the Children UK, assessing the capacity of the then Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, and outlining the recommendations for interventions. The recommendations were agreed by the country programme and Save the Children UK headquarters, and the country programme then went through an internal planning process involving the drawing up of concrete plans for expansion into the education sector, which were incorporated into the Country Strategy Plan. There is one integrated Save the Children education programme, which is part of Rewrite the Future. The programme receives joint funding from DANIDA (£290,000) via Save the Children Denmark, a private British donor (£206,000 until June 2010), a Danish TV collection (£100,000) and Novo Nordisk (£22,000). The funds cover the period 2007 to 2010 and are managed by the country programme. The main objective of the programme is to improve the quality and safety of schools while building the capacity of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MOEYS) at the district and national level to provide good quality, protective education. The education programme is operational in Kailahun district and the Western Urban Area district (in the Freetown slums), and it was to expand to Pujehun District in the south of the country in 2008/2009.

Source: Personal correspondence with Save the Children representatives in country offices.
Donors’ engagement

Financial mechanisms

Save the Children UK accesses a variety of sources of funding, including core funding, donor funding (bilateral, pooled funding and MDTF funds), UN funding and funds from foundations and large alternative donors (such as Comic Relief and the Big Lottery Fund). Save the Children UK has a very large fundraising department that covers three main areas: institutional fundraising, corporate fundraising and supporter fundraising. During the 2007/2008 UK financial year, income from Save the Children UK’s largest institutional bilateral and multilateral donors amounted to over 75 per cent of grant income. The largest donor is DFID, followed by the EC and the US Government. In 2007/2008, Save the Children UK spent £29.8 million on its education work – the largest sector for the organization (Save the Children, 2008b). Emergency funding is also used to support education in emergency contexts.

The mix of funding from different types of income varies significantly from one project to the next. In years with major emergencies, the Disasters Emergencies Committee (DEC) and Save the Children’s own appeals provide about one third of the income. The proportion of income from core institutional donors (DFID, the EC and the USA) has declined steadily over the past five years – partly because of the significant growth of other income streams, including direct and channelled funds from other Alliance members, and partly because a growing portion of donor funds is channelled through UN agencies.

All funding for country programmes is devolved to the country level, with country programmes managing both core funding and any other funding they raise at the country level. The latter is usually far more significant than the core funding they receive from Save the Children UK. Funds are then disbursed directly from the Save the Children UK offices or via local partner organizations.

One of the main challenges that Save the Children UK has found in accessing different funding sources is the bureaucracy of obtaining money from UN agencies and MDTFs due to the long procedures involved in applying for funding and then delays in disbursements actually flowing (Save the Children UK, unpublished: 48). Save the Children UK’s experience is that very few organizations disburse money quickly. In addition, some of the organizations, such as Comic Relief, which used to fund small projects, now require applications for bigger
sums of money to reduce transaction costs and are not willing to fund in smaller amounts. This means that at times, NGOs like Save the Children UK are forced to apply for bigger pots of money or large programmes even if they do not technically need all this money as an urgent priority or have the capacity to manage it. This underlines the need for funding organizations to be more flexible in terms of the funding models they follow. This does, however, give Save the Children UK an opportunity to work in consortia with other Alliance members or partners, and to consider how projects could be scaled up.

The main challenge to the sustainability and predictability of funding is the limited amount and specific focus of core funding that Save the Children UK depends on. For country programmes, this can be very challenging and quite insecure as it depends on year-on-year fundraising. This can require country programme staff to spend a significant amount of time on proposal writing and grant applications, detracting from time which could be spent on service delivery. However, even when funding is cut, Save the Children UK tries to maintain a minimum presence in the country. Another lesser challenge is the focus and priority of the country programme director, who may place more or less importance on education. In addition, with the organizational focus shifting much more strongly towards child survival, this may have some scaling-down effect on the priority of education interventions in country programmes in the future.

**Service delivery and capacity development**

The Child Rights Situation Analysis (CRSA) is the main analytical tool used by Save the Children UK for any engagement (Save the Children UK, unpublished: 26, 28) and has three core pillars that underpin its child rights programming in all countries, including CAFS:

1. direct actions on gaps and violations of rights;
2. strengthening mechanisms and structures;
3. strengthening communities’ and civil societies’ capacities to support children’s rights.

This means that Save the Children UK actively focuses on delivering education services directly and building the capacity of state and non-state providers of education to better manage, coordinate and deliver services. Save the Children UK works with governments (where possible, even if it is at the local education authority level) and NSAs. The degree of
Donors’ engagement

involvement will vary according to the context but includes the provision of TA to MOEs, involvement in regular coordination meetings, liaising with local authorities when planning and implementing new programmes, and working with NSAs as local partners. In the Côte d’Ivoire, the education programme works with 40 community education centres run by parents and local communities, located for the most part in rural areas. The programme provides training on school management, training for volunteer teachers, school materials and rehabilitation materials. Advocacy is targeted towards regional education authorities to provide, support and integrate these community centres into the national system. In Sierra Leone, the education programme focuses its capacity-building efforts at the national and district level, with MOEYS being involved in all of the local-level training. The country programme has organized a training session on INEE’s Minimum Standards in partnership with UNICEF, and is planning education management training and training of trainers for teachers to better manage children’s behaviour in schools. Both local and national MOEYS staff benefit from these training sessions. Save the Children also supports service delivery and has at the same time built the capacity of district staff to monitor and supervise schools through direct training. Support for institutional and functional capacity is also key to the programme and includes the provision of motorbikes to the MOEYS at the district level to enhance its logistical capabilities, as well as other office equipment at the national and district level, which the MOEYS needs to carry out its work.

In the Côte d’Ivoire, Save the Children focuses its capacity-building efforts at the local and regional levels. The rationale behind this is to support areas beyond the operational reach of the government and where there is no strong government presence for top-down planning. The country programme works with 40 community education centres run by parents and local communities, located for the most part in rural areas. The programme provides training on school management, training for volunteer teachers, school materials and rehabilitation materials. Communities have been supported to develop education projects that are either partly supported by Save the Children or submitted to government funding mechanisms. Currently, Save the Children is working with four local NGOs on girls’ education campaigns and protection reference cases.

The capacity of NSAs is generally very low in Sierra Leone and it can be challenging to find organizations with which to partner. The
country programme is, however, working quite closely with the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) in both Kailahun and Freetown and plans are afoot to establish a National Civil Society Education Fund along with others in the country (building on the work and experience of the Commonwealth Education Fund).

In fragile countries where the government is unable or unwilling to provide basic services to areas of the country, and in new emergencies where local capacity has often been overwhelmed or has collapsed, Save the Children’s work usually focuses more heavily in the initial stages on direct service delivery to address immediate needs and because the impact of working with the government may be limited. In these cases, Save the Children aims to build links with local and national partners that can help sustain or develop services and provide protection for children across the country, until systems can be strengthened and the government is able or willing to take on its responsibilities again.

If the situation improves and the country becomes less fragile, then Save the Children UK hopes to be able to form an exit strategy and hand over responsibility for service delivery to local partners or the government. If the situation deteriorates and the country becomes increasingly fragile, Save the Children UK will start an emergency response process, where relevant. There are four emergency response personnel within the education team, who spend several months at a time in country offices in CAFS advising on different aspects of education planning and implementation in country programmes in light of the deterioration.

Engagement, disengagement and risk management strategies

Save the Children UK has generally engaged in CAFS for historical reasons or due to emergency or crisis links, where it has provided humanitarian assistance in line with the needs of vulnerable children. Within education, a lot depends on the identified priorities of the in-country programme through the CRSA and the skill set of core staff, including the country director. Another key factor is that Save the Children UK programmes should target the poorest 10 per cent in the most marginalized areas, but for political and logistical reasons (safety and access to remote areas) it is not always possible to do this. Reaching the most remote and poorest communities is a challenge for all organizations and it invariably requires higher cost solutions to enable access and create appropriate bespoke solutions, for example for nomadic communities.
Internationally, Save the Children UK engages as part of the International Save the Children Alliance. This means that if there is another Alliance member already operating in a given country, any intervention by Save the Children UK needs to be coordinated with that member to ensure that there is a ‘unified presence’ and no duplication. A good example of this is Myanmar, where Save the Children UK has overall management responsibility but there is participation from the USA, Japan and Sweden and all staff are housed in one office. They each report to their own Save the Children branch but have an umbrella approach, where the policies of each organization are accepted during the initial phase of implementation and then over time these are aligned. This alignment may present some coordination challenges in the initial phases if the different Save the Children branches have different priorities or motivations, as determined by their funding agencies or branch-specific operational approaches. In practice, approaches may become more harmonized to reflect these than aligned under one umbrella, particularly in the short term. However, this is also true of inter-organizational coordination between NGOs and donors, where consensus needs to be reached on priorities and principles for partnerships.

If a country specifically requests intervention by Save the Children UK, as Sierra Leone did in wishing to join the Rewrite the Future campaign, Save the Children UK will check if it has the capacity to take on the management of another programme (which it did not, in this instance). If it does not, it will coordinate with other Alliance members to see which one might be best placed to intervene (in this case Save the Children Denmark took the lead with Save the Children UK assisting with implementation).

The length of a project invariably depends on the funding reality and how successful Save the Children UK is at either attracting core funding or raising other funds. There is also the issue that theoretically the philosophy is to engage quickly but to have an exit strategy for Save the Children UK to withdraw in a sustainable manner and the government or local community to take over service delivery in the longer term. A balance between these two approaches (long-term investment and having an exit strategy) is very difficult in CAFS as it is challenging to put a clear exit strategy in place at the start of an intervention without any certainty that the situation will stabilize or improve.
The main factor that would prompt Save the Children UK to disengage from the education sector in a country affected by fragility or conflict is lack of security. In May 2008, Save the Children UK withdrew temporarily from Chad after the murder of its country director. It pulled out permanently from Darfur at the end of 2004 due to the killing of four workers (two were shot and two killed by landmines), although there is still a Save the Children UK presence in Khartoum. Save the Children UK also withdrew from Iraq as it was considered too dangerous to operate a full programme there. However, Save the Children UK believes that permanent withdrawal is not the best option as this makes future engagement more difficult if there is an improvement or a humanitarian disaster strikes. Despite the difficult operating environment, Save the Children UK has had a presence in Myanmar for 12 years and due to its extensive work across the country, it was able to lead a rapid response with a good understanding of the local context after the May 2008 cyclone. While this is encouraging, the dangers involved in working in fragile and conflict-affected states should not be underestimated and this is likely to have an impact on the ability of NGOs such as Save the Children to attract and retain suitably qualified members of staff.

Another factor that might lead Save the Children UK to disengage is a lack of funding. However, most country programmes depend only to a small degree on funding from Save the Children UK headquarters and are able to access significant other funding channels, so country operations in education are unlikely to stop overnight even if Save the Children UK finds that its funding for a specific programme needs to be cut due to budgetary limitations.

For each sector and the overall country programme, every country office has to undertake a risk assessment in relation to scenario planning for different financing scenarios as well as security risks. The overall risk management strategy is developed by the country programme manager and then assessed by a global risk assurance manager, who ensures that robust mechanisms are in place to identify and mitigate risks. In 2007/2008, the most significant risks discussed were the sustainability and potential for growth of various income streams in order to deliver the strategic objectives; attracting the right people to lead Save the Children’s pioneering work throughout the world; and effectively managing relationships with institutional donors.
Effectiveness of response in fragile and conflict-affected states

In 2007, Save the Children UK commissioned a detailed study entitled *Treading a delicate path: NGOs in fragile states* (Save the Children UK, unpublished) drawing on its experience of working in fragile and conflict-affected states and identifying lessons learned. This included three in-depth case studies from Afghanistan, Southern Sudan and Zimbabwe outlining the role played by Save the Children UK in partnership with other NGOs, donors and governments in these three countries and showing that NGOs can effectively support service delivery in fragile states while also building national systems. A thorough contextual analysis was also shown to be critical to good programming applying the three pillars of child rights programming, with the context dictating the emphasis on each pillar. For example, in some contexts there would be a need for more emphasis on practical action than for building constituencies of support. In terms of education, Save the Children has helped raise the profile of CAFS through the *Rewrite the Future* global campaign.

Save the Children has a strong framework of tools and guidance – Emergency Standard Operating Procedures (ESOPs) have been developed for each sector, and for Education in Emergencies there is also a toolkit and training materials. A great deal of support has been given to country teams to develop Emergency Preparedness Plans (EPPs), as well as to identify and support Emergency Focal Points (EFPs) in each country. To respond quickly, Save the Children UK has built up a global standby team of 30 staff in country offices and the UK, available to be deployed within 72 hours of a disaster occurring.

Save the Children expects country programmes to carry out a structured review of results achieved and lessons learned against the planned objectives and impacts of each thematic programme plan, roughly at the mid point of the plan (after 2 to 3 years) and towards the end (6 to 12 months prior to completion). Significant emergency responses are expected to have a structured review at the end of the first and second phases (that is, after 4 to 6 months and after 18 to 30 months). To assess the sustainability of approaches, there is a need to improve capacity to review the legacy of its work and the impact following the withdrawal of Save the Children.

80. See Save the Children UK (2008c).
5.4 Emerging issues for the International Rescue Committee and Save the Children UK

Both the IRC and Save the Children adopt a rights-based foundation for their education work in fragile and conflict-affected states. The primary aims of interventions are improving education access and quality. Both NGOs often combine education interventions with initiatives linked to child protection and safety, with some engagement starting with a child protection remit and extending to education. Initial engagement often takes place during relief stages, but both NGOs aim for long-term engagement. Although education is often included in the initial relief response, in some instances the IRC and Save the Children UK had been engaged in a country for up to five years before starting an education programme. Education interventions are often phased in over time, transitioning from child protection schemes. A later education response may also have occurred because other stakeholders were addressing education needs. From the outset of education interventions there needs to be clarity in objectives and the long-term focus of the scheme, including an exit strategy. Long-term commitments are required in these circumstances to have a sustained impact on learning and education systems. While for both NGOs the length of engagement is contingent primarily on funding and security of operations, they both exhibited long-term engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Coordination throughout interventions is emphasized by both organizations, from community participation to coordination in delivery (for example, consortium membership or partnerships within the Save the Children Alliance) to aligning with government approaches and working with state structures where possible. Both NGOs had numerous relationships with other NGOs and networks. Coordination was seen to be beneficial for service delivery (for increased coverage and division of labour) and also for advocacy work, to strengthen the voice with which the messages are given. With the emergence of larger grants and challenges to scale-up successful activities, greater coordination could perhaps take place during delivery through consortia or more active co-ordination mechanisms. This in turn could increase project coherence among organizations.

Both NGOs accessed a diversity of funding from donors, UN agencies, trust funds, foundations and other private sources. The latter has become an increasingly important revenue stream, particularly for the
IRC, which has received significant pledges for education. UN funding is also becoming increasingly important for NGOs, especially during the initial relief responses, due to pooled and other mechanisms. Accessing such funds can, however, involve time-consuming procedures and slow NGO responses.

The NGO project or programme size was generally much smaller than those of the donors highlighted in Chapter 4. An education programme such as the IRC’s in the DRC, the total budget of which was $50,000, was a drop in the ocean given the education needs in the DRC and its significant challenges in meeting the EFA agenda. This underlines the need for NGOs to develop effective fundraising strategies and to improve their ability to attract and then manage larger sums of money so that they can have a greater impact in fragile and conflict-affected states. However, this is likely to involve significant internal capacity building of programme managers in attracting – and then having the ability to manage and spend – substantially larger amounts of money.

A recurring theme from the NGO perspective is their dependence on the available funds in order to deliver programmes and keep delivering these in the long term. The IRC and Save the Children provide some degree of core funding but it is often country staff that lead the fundraising processes for their programmes. People on the ground with in-depth knowledge of the situation are undoubtedly those best placed to express needs to donors and communicate the reality of conditions faced on the ground. But proposal writing can be incredibly time-consuming and potentially detracts from service delivery if there is insufficient capacity to manage this.

A particular focus of both NGOs was on the relationships built with communities to transfer a sense of responsibility for education and empowerment. The challenge then is how to build on local service delivery models and scale these up in scope and geographically, if necessary. Save the Children UK and the IRC provide examples of how this can be done, working with stakeholders at different levels (community, district, regional and national) and concurrently where possible to help forge links between levels and to build capacity. As a common challenge, the evidence base needs to be developed to demonstrate how this process can be tackled in different contexts. Such evidence may already exist within organizations or with individual staff members, but these experiences need to be captured, collected and disseminated in order to gain from past practice.
Policies, strategies and practices of two INGOs in relation to financing education

At a more central level, while the effects of the Save the Children restructure are yet to be seen, the process does raise awareness of how capacity and team skill sets, at both the country and headquarters levels, are vital components in programme delivery. Having high-level support and therefore dedicated capacity to support or lead programmes is essential for interventions to flourish and develop.

One of the strengths of NGOs is their closeness to communities and therefore their ability to more closely target the poor and needy recipients. An analysis of aid allocations by NGOs generally supports this widely held belief, but also finds that this does not always hold true in difficult environments (Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2008). Dependence on external funding can dictate the location and scale of operations rather than decisions being made autonomously. Koch et al. (2008) attribute this to NGOs becoming increasingly risk adverse as they compete for funding and are called upon to demonstrate success. Therefore NGOs are not only led by donors’ preferences for investment, but they also have incentives to choose locations and programme approaches which will lead to more easily demonstrable results. The analysis also identifies a preference of NGOs to cluster activities for ease of operations and to build upon investments made by others into local partners’ skills (Koch et al., 2008). Whilst Save the Children and the IRC’s ability to deliver programmes was affected by availability of funding both have showed steps towards increased autonomy from donor influences through private financial support and use of core funding.

Security is paramount for both NGOs, particularly since each has experienced a tragic loss of staff in the field in recent years. Both NGOs take the safety of their staff very seriously and have suspended operations in response to violence against staff. Unfortunately, the risk remains when working in fragile and conflict-affected states. This can make it difficult to attract and retain staff. High staff turnover can mean that operations potentially do not benefit in the same way from the long-term experience of staff, and projects face higher transaction costs for staff training.
Chapter 6

Policies, strategies and practices of the government, donors and INGOs in relation to financing education in Liberia

6.1 Introduction

There are different priorities for the core stakeholder groups involved in aid funding in fragile and conflict-affected states. As outlined in at the beginning of Chapter 4, for donors the focus is often an overriding security, political and poverty reduction agenda coupled with the need to manage fiduciary risk from a top-down perspective. In contrast, as stated at the beginning of Chapter 5, for INGOs the focus is often strongly on service delivery from a bottom-up perspective though increasingly, some are attempting to work in a bottom-up and top-down manner. For governments, there is a whole range of priorities depending on the context, capacity, legitimacy and will. Some are very committed to ensuring that there is a coherent policy environment within which to deliver services, while others have very limited capacity or will to commit to serious change. For beneficiaries, there is often no concern over how aid funding flows, provided that services are delivered. It is essential to take into account these different priorities of the key stakeholders, as they lead to different ways and priorities of operating.

Chapter 6 outlines the policies and in-country practices of education engagement by the government and donors in Liberia. At the end of the chapter, we summarize some lessons learned and emerging issues in engaging in funding of the education sector in Liberia.

6.2 Background to fragility

Liberia emerged from nearly two decades of instability and conflict with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra on 18 August 2003. During the 14 years of intermittent conflict, between 5 and 10 per cent of the population was killed, and over a million people (approximately one third of the population) were displaced, some forced to flee as many as five times (World Bank, 2005a: 2). Soon after the signing of the CPA, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established.
and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) processes began. A transitional government was in place until Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president in October 2005. Since then, Liberia has continued to make progress in reconstruction and development efforts, although the challenges remain great.

During the civil war, poverty levels soared, with over three quarters (76.2 per cent) of the population living in absolute poverty, and just over half (52 per cent) in extreme poverty (UNDP, 2006). The school system also declined during this period. By 2004, the primary school net enrolment rate had fallen to 46 per cent and of those enrolled in Grade 1, only 35 per cent of boys and 27 per cent of girls completed Grade 5 (Liberian MOE, 2004; NTGL, 2004b); an estimated 75 to 80 per cent of schools were destroyed or damaged during the conflict (NTGL, 2004b; UNDP, 2006: 45); and nearly two thirds (62 per cent) of the teaching population was unqualified (Liberian MOE, 2007).

Donor engagement during the period of conflict was sporadic. UN Security Council sanctions against Charles Taylor’s regime in 2001 prompted the suspension of aid by the EC and US, and the withdrawal of many international agencies working to provide education services in the country. With the signing of the CPA, many donors returned to provide humanitarian aid to support disarmament, the return of refugees and displaced populations, and peacekeeping efforts.

6.3 Government policy and strategy

The transitional government and development partners quickly recognized the need for a framework through which to focus and coordinate activities towards achieving the MDGs, leading to the development of the Results Focused Transition Framework (RFTF), which was formally adopted at the donors’ conference in February 2004. The framework was based on the Joint Needs Assessment carried out by the World Bank, the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on behalf of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and established the agenda and priority areas for reconstruction efforts. Donors at their first conference pledged a total of US$522 million in February 2004.

81. The proportion of the population living on less than US$1 and US$0.5 per day, respectively.
The RFTF’s main focus was on restoring stability; enabling the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); disarmament and the demobilization of combatants; establishment of the rule of law and governance structures to enable free elections; and restoration of some public services, including education. The framework included time-bound targets agreed by the NTGL and donors and was divided into ten cluster areas, each of which was managed by a working committee. These targets were summarized in a matrix and monitored via the RFTF activity tracking sheet. Progress was overseen by an RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) and a support officer.

The RFTF was a transitional planning tool, to which the NTGL and its partners made several revisions in response to an ongoing review. These adjustments had a particular emphasis on ensuring greater accountability and transparency, and working more closely in partnership. They also included a narrowing of the ten cluster areas to six, at the Copenhagen 2005 review meeting. The RFTF was only ever intended to support the operations of the NTGL and with the establishment of the elected congress and president, the priority became the development of a full poverty reduction strategy (PRS). This was approached incrementally, firstly through the 150 day action plan (Government of Liberia, 2006a), which incorporated many of the RFTF benchmarks and bridged the gap between the RFTF and an interim PRS (IPRS) (Government of Liberia, 2006b). An underlying aim of all of these documents was to provide an accountability framework for the prioritization of reconstruction activities and for donor engagement. The 150 day action plan, IPRS and now full PRS (Government of Liberia, 2008) based the reconstruction process on four pillars, simplifying the previous cluster system. These pillars are:

1. enhancing peace and security;
2. revitalizing economic activity;
3. rebuilding infrastructure and providing basic services;
4. strengthening governance and the rule of law.

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82. Clusters included: security; DDRR Programme; refugees, returnees and IDPs; governance, democratic development and rule of law; elections; basic services (including education); restoration of productive capacity livelihoods; infrastructure; economic policy and development strategy; and coordinating implementation of the framework. The six clusters formed in 2005 included: 1. DDRR, 2. Security Reform, 3. Good Governance and the Rule of Law, 4. Basic Social Services, 5. Economic Revitalization, and 6. Conduct of National Elections in October 2005.
The education sub-component within pillar three includes the strategic aims of rebuilding and repairing schools around the country, and improving educational quality (Government of Liberia, 2006a). The full PRS was released in 2008 and reiterates the pivotal role of education in reconstruction efforts:

Strengthening Liberia’s primary, secondary and tertiary education system is crucial to building the capacity of Liberia’s workforce and governance structures over the long term. To complement these efforts, it is critical to also strengthen vocational and skills training to build capacity and enhance the skills of Liberian workers over the short and medium terms (Government of Liberia, 2008: 145).

6.4 Donors’ policies, strategies and engagement

The end of civil war in Liberia led to the re-emergence of humanitarian and development organizations in the country. This included a range of bilateral and multilateral agencies, INGOs, international financial institutions and 13 UN agencies. Bilateral donors included China, Denmark, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the UK and the USA; while multilaterally the EC engaged, along with the World Bank, the AfDB and the IMF.

By far the most dominant bilateral donor was the USA. Total financial assistance for all sectors provided between 2004 and 2006 nearly equalled the cumulative total of all other donors (UNDP, 2007). In the education sector, the World Food Programme provided the majority of assistance for education projects via financial and in-kind contributions for school feeding programmes, followed by the World Bank, USAID and the EC (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Donor funding in Liberia, 2004-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Education funding (US$)</th>
<th>Total funding all sectors (US$)</th>
<th>Education as a proportion of total funding (%)</th>
<th>Commitments made from 2006 onwards (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>645,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>739,552</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>3,486,799</td>
<td>153,928,642</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>25,230,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFATM</td>
<td>23,192,099</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>5,375,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Aid</td>
<td>446,670</td>
<td>11,550,522</td>
<td>3.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>20,790,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTI*</td>
<td>16,500,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soros Foundation</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden*</td>
<td>41,203,804</td>
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<td>Switzerland*</td>
<td>11,300,000</td>
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<td>UNDP*</td>
<td>14,526,587</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>677,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFAO</td>
<td>1,108,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>1,629,023</td>
<td>39,939,956</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>1,052,112</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>1,333,618,500</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>8,400,000</td>
<td>85,200,000</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>14,358,209</td>
<td>163,400,000</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>23,631,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>10,486,488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>722,753,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,370,701</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,690,183,650</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.31</strong></td>
<td><strong>87,747,706</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An asterisk (*) indicates those donors that have described education activities as part of their response but have been unable to provide a breakdown of funds granted to the sector.

Source: UNDP, 2007 and LRDC Donor aid flows database.(a)

(a) www.emansion.gov.lr/content.php?sub=Aid%20Coordination&related=LRDC

Donors interviewed expressed a combination of factors influencing their decisions generally to engage in Liberia and, more specifically, in educational activities. These included historical, social and geo-political reasons, as well as moral reasons for humanitarian aid.
The level of US involvement in Liberia can largely be attributed to its close historical ties and subsequent prolonged presence in the country. USAID representatives interviewed ascribed the USA’s continued in-country prominence in the post-conflict period to this historical legacy, and also due to high levels of awareness in the US Congress and State Department of the situation in Liberia. In the 1980s, there were several hundred members of American staff based in Monrovia, working within ministries and at the embassy. Many of these officials are now back in the USA, working within US government department headquarters, often with decision-making abilities. “People with those links and background knowledge of the country are more likely to fight for its inclusion in the spending budgets” (USAID representative).

US operations were scaled down during the conflict period, with a brief influx of funds between 1999 and 2001. Since 2003, the historical linkages between the two countries has been built upon, facilitated by a good relationship between the two presidents. The US Office of Transition Initiatives managed the initial re-engagement activities until 2006. Liberia is now one of USAID’s priority countries and is its second largest operational country after Sudan. In 2007, staffing and funding to Liberia increased, and in principle the education sector can receive a maximum of 10 per cent of the total annual budget for the country. Financial assistance is received not only from USAID, but also from other US departments, including the Department of Labor and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.

Sweden also has a historical legacy in Liberia, dating back to the 1960s and Swedish mining activities in the north of the country. At its peak, the Swedish expatriate population reached between 20,000 and 30,000. In more recent years, the Swedish population has been present via peacekeeping forces. The Swedish Government, through Sida, has been providing financial assistance for humanitarian and relief operations since 2003. These have been focused particularly on the restoration of basic services, including education. Swedish relationships with Liberia have developed to the extent that during the recent revision of development cooperation policy (August 2007), Liberia became a priority programme country. A contributing factor in this developing relationship has been

84. Liberia was settled by freed American slaves from 1822 onwards, and then established as a republic in 1847. As a result, the two countries have retained close ties, to the extent that the executive, judiciary and legislative institutions within Liberia closely mirror that of the USA, as does Liberia’s flag.
diplomatic visits, relationship building and the strength of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s approach to reform and redevelopment. Indeed, following a ministerial visit in November 2007, Sida’s process to develop a comprehensive strategy document for Liberia was prioritized to try and secure development funding in the 2008/2009 fiscal year rather than waiting until 2009/2010.

A number of other donors, such as Germany, Ireland and Spain, have also provided funding for a range of humanitarian and development programmes, despite Liberia not being included on their lists of priority countries. For Ireland and Germany, this has included some educational work, while Germany and Spain have recently re-established diplomatic representatives in country. Ministry representatives have spoken positively about the emergence of these new donors, as well as of Switzerland, Italy and Denmark.

The signing of the CPA in 2003 was a signal to donors to reengage in Liberia. The UN and other multilateral agencies reengaged after differing periods of absence. The UN managed to maintain some level of in-country presence throughout the conflict, scaling down its operations in response to security concerns. The short period of relative stability between 1999 and 2001 saw a small rise in engagement, which diminished as the conflict increased again and UN sanctions were imposed. The UN then returned in 2003, including the creation of UNMIL. By comparison, the World Bank withdrew from Liberia as early as 1987, during Doe’s leadership, and did not return until 2003.85

The World Bank’s activities are aligned to the national reconstruction and development agenda, as outlined in the IPRS and encapsulated in its current interim strategy note. Work had already started on developing a full Country Assistance Strategy, which was to be implemented following the issuing of a full PRS, expected in mid-2008. The Country Assistance Strategy was to outline a four-year plan for IDA assistance.86

6.5 Education sector strategy

Donors’ initial education interventions have, to a large degree, sought to address the basic education issues initially outlined in the joint UN and World Bank needs assessment undertaken in 2003/04. The priorities identified in this assessment were originally outlined in the RFTF and


Donors’ interventions have subsequently focused on tackling basic education issues such as the restoration of school infrastructure (China and Germany), teacher training (LTTP, Liberia and USAID), accelerated teacher training (UNICEF/MOE), accelerated learning (various), gender disparities (a Girls’ Scholarship Program, USAID), the provision of psychosocial support (for example, children’s clubs), rights awareness, community involvement (PTA development), school feeding (WFP) and literacy programmes. The latter tend to be funded by multiple donors and implemented by local and international NGOs. Donors have also provided funding for certain positions, seconded staff and provided TA. Additional funds are now beginning to filter into higher education, support to EMIS, enhanced monitoring and evaluation of education programmes, and basic and vocational skills work with out-of-school youth.

Engagement in education activities has often flowed from work being undertaken with Liberian refugees in the Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone, with implementing agencies, such as the IRC, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Christian Children’s Fund, Catholic Relief Services and various refugee councils, continuing to support refugee communities as they choose to return home. Engagement during the immediate post-conflict transition period (2003-2006) generally formed part of donors’ emergency or relief response. As the country has stabilized and begun the process of longer-term planning, development strategies have begun to emerge. This has included the creation of an Education Pooled Fund (EPF) to act as a transitional mechanism as Liberia moves towards FTI Catalytic Funding and budget support to the education sector.

Thus far, there have been two broad phases of engagement in education since the cessation of conflict in 2003: firstly, the initial humanitarian response during the time of the transitional government; secondly, the post-election period, which has seen a further transition from humanitarian responses towards development approaches.
During the humanitarian stage, education responses tended to be cross-sectoral, with educational activities forming part of child protection, feeding initiatives, infrastructure reconstruction and demobilization responses. A large proportion of funding flowed through UN agencies, particularly UNICEF, UNESCO and UNHCR, and implementing partners. In-country offices and embassies had closed or minimized operations during the conflict but were gradually re-staffed or reopened during this period, some continuing to work out of other regional offices, particularly Freetown. This has continued to happen, although it is still common for some donors’ education advisors to be based in regional offices or even in headquarters rather than based permanently in-country. The exception to this is the USA, where an education advisor has been in position since 2006.

Under the development response, donors have begun to consider longer-term development plans for their activities in Liberia, including education. In 2006, USAID started its large teacher training and ALP programmes, and the EC committed a further €12 million to education as part of a larger aid package made available after the inauguration of President Johnson-Sirleaf.87 In addition to these initiatives, the establishment of the EPF is an important step in moving towards longer-term financing strategies to support the education sector at the systemic as well as the programme level.

Most education activities in Liberia are currently in a process of transition, as programmes move from a humanitarian response towards longer-term development. Programmes delivered as part of the initial response, such as accelerated learning schemes and some psychosocial programmes, are entering their review and exit stages, with donors and NGOs now looking towards longer-term planning. Even those donors that have not previously been heavily involved in education are beginning to consider developing the education component in their longer-term plans, for example, Sida and the EC.

6.6 Financial mechanisms used by donors

The majority of funding to date has been project-based, with funds bypassing the state and being delivered directly from donors to implementing partners or NGOs. In some instances this has also included

non-monetary support; for example, German and Swiss assistance has been received in the form of seconded labour and materials rather than cash donations. Frequently, funds are dispersed via UN agencies; for example, the Italian Government provided US$547,000 between 2005 and 2006 to UNESCO for a women and youth literacy programme. Initial justification for this was that the transitional government lacked the accountability, transparency and fiscal discipline to manage external aid flows effectively.

The prolonged insistence of some donors on project support could inhibit the development of state capacity to plan and manage budgets effectively. This is a particular concern for Liberia due to USAID’s explicit preference for project support. The reasoning behind the US’s preference is that project support clarifies the links between funding and impact, to enable more straightforward monitoring, evaluation and accountability. While in the short term this may enable more effective and timely implementation of projects than would have occurred due to the MOE’s limited capacity, the continuation of this approach could, in the long term, hinder priority setting and the MOE’s capacity for financial management.

Some MOE representatives, particularly those in the central planning and financial teams, were clearly frustrated by the lack of information flowing between donors, NGOs and the state, despite initiatives and commonly voiced opinions that the issue should be addressed. They compared their concerns about the lack of transparency, coordination and response to information requests to the concerns voiced by donors as justification for not engaging more with the state on financial management and exploring options such as direct budget support. However, new modalities are beginning to emerge as the capacity of the Liberian government has developed. Positive signals have also been sent to donors by the establishment in 2005 of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) (see Box 19), and Liberia’s FTI endorsement in 2007.
In response to FTI endorsement, and also to an unsuccessful application for catalytic funding (see Box 20), UNICEF began the process of setting up an Education Pooled Fund (EPF), which was officially launched in May 2008 and totalled US$15 million. It comprised US$12 million from the Dutch government via UNICEF and US$3 million from the Open Society Institute88, with a further US$2 million pledged

88. A private grant-making trust from the USA.
by the latter. The funds are initially to be used for implementation of the LPERP. The UNICEF representative said of the EPF:

In the context of reduced humanitarian financing and the absence of regular development funding, our intention was to assist in moving the financing agenda forward by finding mechanisms that would build both the capacity of government to handle larger resource flows to the sector and the confidence of donors to contribute larger amounts to Government.89

Government ownership is a key pillar in the implementation of the EPF, which is seen as a stepping stone to the provision of direct budget support to the sector. The fund is managed by a Project Management Financial Unit, which spans the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education, and uses government financial management and procurement procedures. Financial management procedures are based on the Government of Liberia’s budget cycle rather than contributors’ reporting requirements.

There are hopes that the successful implementation of the fund will prompt additional donors to contribute to the fund, as well as provide a model for successful transitional funding for other fragile and conflict-affected states through the FTI Education Transition Fund (ETF). Development partners were consulted during the establishment of the fund and continue to advise on its implementation through an Education Sector Development Committee. UNICEF, as the lead partner for the EPF, is commissioning a consultant to document and review the processes involved in its implementation, including the shift in UNICEF’s role. The final outcomes of this consultancy, which were expected in 2009, will be invaluable for the operations of UNICEF and the ETF, as well as containing general lessons for pooled fund management in fragile and post-conflict countries.

Preliminary discussions have also begun among donors to prepare the way for direct budgetary support.90 There is recognition that in order to do so, further work needs to be undertaken on public financial management reforms, but it is hoped that EPF use of government systems will strengthen public financial management processes. At the 2007 Partners’ Forum it was agreed that partners should explore a

90. http://go.worldbank.org/GPNU6H9XS0
Mechanism to deliver targeted budget support, disbursed in response to the achievement of agreed benchmarks consistent with those in the IPRS. Progress on this is continuing.

**Box 20 Liberia’s 2007 application for funding from the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund**

At the February 2007 Partners’ Forum, UNICEF and the World Bank presented an education paper to the partners. The importance of education was recognized but rather than any funds being committed bilaterally at this stage, a recommendation was made to approach the FTI for funding from the CF. In order to secure any funding before the start of the academic year in September, this required preparing the LPERP proposal in less than a month, in time for the Bonn FTI meeting in May. Partners from the World Bank, UNICEF, USAID, the EC, UNDP and the MOE were involved in the preparation of the programme. At the Bonn meeting, rather than allocate funds from the CF, however, it was suggested that equivalent funding should be identified from the UNICEF-Netherlands fund for education in fragile states. This would be complemented by funding from the EPDF to enable Liberia to develop a more comprehensive education sector plan and reapply for funding from the CF at a later date, if necessary (FTI Secretariat, 2007c).

The reasoning behind the rejection of the FTI proposal included doubts as to the strength of the plan and the level of MOE ownership. The latter was partially related to the conditions under which the plan was formulated and the capacity levels existing within the MOE at the time. In the short timescale, there was insufficient time to engage all of the senior leadership and to develop this sense of ownership and readiness to prepare internally and then apply the plan. Consequently, the process was to a large extent externally driven. The stakeholders involved in the preparation of the LPERP proposal expressed, on reflection, that they were aware that the proposal could be turned down for these reasons and because of the lack of a full national plan for education. The process of applying for funds from the CF itself has, however, had some positive benefits. It was voiced that the approach to preparing the plan was itself useful for the MOE and has helped focused attention on the national plan, and how to tackle the planning process for the secondary and tertiary sectors. There is still progress to be made in these areas. The hope is to reapply for funding in 2009 with a more comprehensive plan.

*Source: FTI Secretariat 2007c and personal correspondence with those interviewed in country.*

During the first RFTF meeting in September 2004, representatives recognized the need to increase attention on specific sectors where funding shortfalls were apparent – this included education. Recommendations also
included establishing a stronger mechanism for tracking disbursements (World Bank, 2004) as, even six months into the RFTF, disbursements lagged seriously behind commitments and pledges made, with gaps in donor information making coordinating the process challenging. Between February 2004 and March 2006, just over US$946 million was contributed to reconstruction activities. Of this, only US$692 million was disbursed (UNDP, 2007).

The need for more efficient, clearer and up-to-date tracking of donor flows seems to be a recurrent theme in coordination meetings, emphasized again at the 2007 Partners’ Forum. This is essential to enable the government to incorporate external assistance into its own budgeting and planning processes. Despite this repeatedly recognized need, efforts by the Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC) to establish a database of flows have been slow.

The timely and predictable disbursement of funding is particularly critical in the education sector due to the constraints of the academic year. Funding for activities often needs to be secured prior to September to ensure timely project start up. Delays in disbursements by only a few months can have consequences for the whole year. For example, the IRC found that following the 1997 elections, it took over six months for funds to be released for education programmes. Grants were not signed until September or October, sometimes up to four months after the intended project start date (IRC, 2005: 11-12). For the IRC this meant that there were delays in procuring educational materials and they were unable to undertake orientation training for school staff before the start of the school year. The organization also expressed concern that this contributed to a delay in repatriation, as some families were hesitant to return and interrupt their children’s schooling if no schools were going to be available. The IRC was frustrated in the second and third years of operations when funds were again delayed by six months in the third year. Similarly, in 2007 requests by the government for FTI catalytic funding in preparation for the 2007/2008 school year were unsuccessful and the alternative funding to be received through the EPF took time to set up, again missing the start of the school year.

6.7 Coordination

There is an array of coordination fora in Liberia, each with a slightly different remit according to their sectoral focus or membership. These have developed according to the specific stage of transition or
reconstruction and also in response to government and agency needs. The multitude of mechanisms, contrasted with calls for greater coordination, raises the question of how effective the current system is and whether or not there is potential for it to be streamlined.

The coordination of humanitarian activities in Liberia was initially the responsibility of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This was organized through a Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), which collated and provided a mechanism for sharing information. In November 2004, this was replaced by the Humanitarian Coordination Section (HCS) of UNMIL. Liberia was unusual in that the HIC remained as a project after the transfer of responsibility to the HCS. This provided continuity of information and filled the potential gap in coordination. OCHA and HCS based coordination efforts around the IASC Cluster system. At the time this did not include an Education Cluster but a sector working group emerged to fill the gap and ensure some coordination.

Recent cross-country studies have emphasized that effective donor coordination processes need to maintain a focus on results, both in terms of institution building and outcomes, such as school enrolment (World Bank, 2005b; Birdsall and Vaishnav, 2005). In Liberia, this took place during the humanitarian phase via the RIMCO Support Officer, whose remit was to monitor the implementation of the RFTF. Here, activities were tracked according to the ten (then six) clusters identified in the RFTF. The RFTF Tracking Sheet provided a means to assess joint progress towards time-bound targets and identify gaps in provision. It enabled both the government and donors to prioritize and sequence activities, and also became a communication tool to prompt dialogue on development plans, manage expectations and hold stakeholders accountable (World Bank, 2005b: 17). An additional strength of the RFTF was its six-monthly reviews. These allowed the RFTF to be refined and adjusted according to the needs of stakeholders and to keep the tool relevant. The meetings also provided a forum for discussing cross-sector issues and identifying solutions.

The LRDC was established in 2006 to coordinate recovery and reconstruction activities under the four IPRS pillars: security, economic revitalization, governance and rule of law, infrastructure and basic

services. It acts as the main coordination body for aid activities. The PRS has provided a framework to enable donors to invest more strategically and prioritize areas in line with government priorities, but sentiments are that coordination still needs to be strengthened, and there are concerns about the government’s capacity to achieve this, at a central planning level and within line ministries.

Now, more effort is being made to manage donors strategically and increase the available information on aid flows and donor activities. The LRDC, together with the UNDP National Information Centre, has been working on an aid information management process to collect data on aid flows. This has involved the development of data collection templates, which are sent to donors for completion. Data are then stored in an online database.93 Despite the simplification of the template at donors’ requests, the response has been slow. The LRDC tried approaching individual ministries to obtain income data instead, but again there were considerable gaps in information. The LRDC was exploring the options for different forms of aid management information systems to speed up the process and hopefully keep information updated more regularly.

The LRDC recently introduced a monthly meeting with all donors – the LRDC Strand Committee meeting. The Committee started meeting monthly in 2008 to review different development strategies and its progress. The agenda is set around the four pillars identified in the IPRS and the meeting is chaired by the president. At each meeting, a different donor presents an overview of its portfolio of activities.

The coordination of donors at a high strategic level is particularly strong among the key partners in Liberia (the World Bank, the USA, the IMF, the AfDB and the EC). In addition to in-country liaison, they have to date held two donor conferences, which provide an opportunity for reflection and agreement on issues for a combined response. The 2007 Partners’ Forum included a series of seminars on education and was followed by a meeting hosted by UNICEF to discuss education strategy going forward.

The Monitoring and Steering Group (MSG) is a group of over 50 INGOs working in Liberia and was established to facilitate co-ordination and advocacy. The MSG has an appointed liaison officer, whose role it is to ensure that information is shared with the government,

93. www.emansion.li/lrdc/aidcoordination
members and the UN. They have a significant presence in reconstruction efforts, with a combined budget of tens of millions of dollars (UNDP, 2007). Several coordination mechanisms also exist for national NGOs, including the Liberian National NGOs Network and the New African Research and Development Agency.

Coordination also takes place at the county level between the government and development partners via County Support Teams. These are coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and seek to strengthen county-level activities and capacity (UNDP, 2007).

Within the MOE, another layer of coordination exists. This includes donor partner and development partner meetings. These are held monthly and have been running since late 2007. The donor partner meeting is attended mostly by implementing partners, such as the Jesuit Refugee Service, the IRC, Oxfam GB, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, the NRC, Vision in Action and the Christian Children’s Fund. The agenda includes short briefings from all involved, with updates on activities to identify any gaps or duplication, and to share experiences. The development partner meeting also takes place monthly, but has a higher level agenda, attended by the World Bank, UNICEF, the UNDP and the EC. While stakeholders at both meetings have been keen to attend, there have been challenges in getting partners to commit to the process, namely by submission of quarterly or annual reports, work plans and actual attendance of meetings. The MOE has also had difficulty obtaining financial information, with most being obtained through work plans and MOUs. This is particularly difficult in multi-sector work, where classifications vary as to where activities lie; for example, school building is classified by some as education, but by others, as infrastructure. Similarly, school feeding programmes can appear under food or education.

6.8 Emerging issues

A challenge echoed by all stakeholders interviewed – from the government to donors and NGOs – was the low level of (financial) information sharing and coordination despite a number of existing coordination mechanisms, including regular meetings being in place. Attempts to coordinate financial information have been fraught with difficulty, not least that donor responses to requests for information have been slow, making it difficult to make standardized profiles of activities and maintain up-to-date information. There is also a risk of double
counting for organizations that, in addition to their core budget, receive funds from donors and also themselves act as donors in Liberia, often as a channel for the disbursement of funds; for example, UN agencies and some large NGOs.

The terminology and categorization of activities has also proved a challenge for financial reporting, as organizations define their activities in different ways. This has been the case particularly in the transition to redevelopment, where development activities have not fitted neatly in the humanitarian clustering of certain activities under sectors. An example of this can be seen in Table 6.1 at the beginning of this case study, where five donors described education activities within their responses, but did not report any financial information for education funding. This inconsistency in interpretation makes it difficult to harmonize a standard list of sectors through which to track donor activities. Ideally, a coordination and information-sharing framework should have been established earlier to clarify spending categorization and reporting expectations. This should have been a priority for the development partner group if the MOE was unable to lead on this.

In addition to information sharing for coordination purposes, individuals interviewed felt that donors should be doing more at the ministerial level to build capacity to manage funds effectively and support coordination. The hope is that this will enable the MOE to plan more proactively and address their concerns. For the MOE, the exploration of new funding mechanisms such as the EPF will hopefully lead to greater involvement of the MOE in financial management and reduce the occurrence of funds bypassing the state.

Observations made by several interviewees, including donors, identified the problem of ‘hesitant investors’ in fragile and conflict-affected states. These are investors who are willing to provide initial support to ensure continuity of service delivery during the emergency or relief stages, but who are then cautious of engaging in the longer term and committing funds, in case their activities are not aligned with local priorities. It was felt that engagement during the emergency phases was often easier for donors, because activities and expectations were more clearly defined. In the initial transition period, donors struggled to respond or commit education finances as they were wary of working in parallel to the forthcoming IPRS or even being counter-productive to its aims, and being left without clear
mechanisms to engage with the state. However, waiting until fledgling priorities become the long-term plan is not necessarily a good option. Donors’ eagerness to enact the values enshrined in the DAC Principles by ‘doing no harm’ and ‘aligning with local priorities’ is undertaken at the risk of failing to ‘act quickly enough to ensure that service delivery continues to take place’.

So donors are faced with the dual role of concurrently supporting the government in its planning process and alignment with national priorities, while also working with implementing partners to deliver services. One donor representative interviewed expressed concern that (education) approaches are driven by the perceived strengths of donors, rather than by the state and MOE, which can better fill gaps, channel investment where needed and coordinate with other donors and implementing agencies. It is a difficult balance to strike; for example, the USAID LTTP has been successful in developing the capacity of teacher training institutes and improving the skills level of currently under-qualified teachers, while engaging with the MOE to inform policy and infrastructure development. While educationally it is having a positive impact and has met the immediate needs, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability and cost of the programme. Successful mitigation of such challenges requires local knowledge, strong leadership and a willingness to take risks. There is a need to minimize the potentially destructive nature of these risks by working in close consultation and partnership wherever possible.

There was concern among various partners that as this shift towards reconstruction takes place there will be a significant funding gap until the government is able to step up its provision. Any gap would leave areas at risk of neglect and possible deterioration. At the Partners’ Forum in February 2007, the EC Commissioner emphasized the importance of minimizing service delivery costs that could occur as humanitarian organizations depart and before development projects are in place. He pledged the continuation of EC humanitarian support to bridge this transitional gap. Despite this, donor funding fatigue was evident in Liberia, where funds for vocational training for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) process were scarce. In early 2007, over 23,000 ex-combatants were still to receive training and posed a potential risk to continued stability (IRIN news, 2007). Charles Achodo,

head of the UN’s DDRR programme in Liberia, says that donors “forget that these people need assistance to become productive members of the community – psychological counseling, trauma healing support, access to employment” (Hanson, 2007).

Although new partners and programmes that could cover the predicted funding gap are beginning to be established in Liberia, it is difficult to predict accurately if this will cover needs (UN, 2007). To a large extent, current donor funding is running parallel to the MOE’s budget, which makes it challenging to estimate the full scale of activities and the requirements of the education sector. This, combined with insufficient financial understanding within the MOE itself, has resulted in a lack of oversight as to the cost of education at the sub-sectoral level (primary, secondary and tertiary) in Liberia (Liberian MOE, 2007). This makes it difficult to assess the true cost of education provision, to identify areas in need of further financial support and areas of inefficiency, and to align external funding with state priorities. One area of ministerial priority in 2007/2008 was developing an appropriate method to allow for budgetary analysis by level of education so as to inform future planning, monitoring and policy.

Those working closely with the MOE’s finance and planning teams felt strongly that the issue for Liberia has not been the level or number of donors wishing to engage, although there is a shortfall in funding. Liberia was described by some as a bit of a ‘darling’ due to the president’s strong international relationships with donors (particularly the USA and private foundations). Instead, they felt that the issue was the capacity for programmes to be implemented, in order to sustain long-term development and MOE ownership. Donors have tried to address this, with individuals seconded to work with MOE staff and to transfer skills, but the impact thus far has been limited due to time and financial constraints.
Chapter 7

Common findings, emerging good practice and lessons learned in relation to financing education

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is a summary of the common findings in relation to the financing of education in fragile and conflict-affected states, based on the three donors researched in Chapter 4, the two INGOs researched in Chapter 5 and the field work undertaken in Liberia in Chapter 6. We present the main lessons learned from the case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, outlining emerging good practice and supporting evidence in the context of DAC Principles 1, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Following this, we provide a summary of the application of the main lessons learned and emerging good practice in each of the four DAC categories of fragile states.

7.2 Common findings

Among all three donors, there is a preference for pooled funding around SWAps and ideally to pursue budget support if and when this is appropriate, but there is also a realization that in certain contexts, other modalities may be more appropriate. In reality, each of the donors uses a mixture of aid modalities. Operationally, Sida’s main experience in funding education programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states is via NGOs and UN agencies. For the Netherlands, the majority of Dutch funding is channelled via UNICEF for greater harmonization. Only three of its bilateral programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states include education components. In contrast to the other donors examined, the EC has the largest range of modalities operational in fragile and conflict-affected states. The EC uses budget support in Sierra Leone, pooled funding in Ethiopia, MDTFs in Southern Sudan, TA in Liberia and pooled or project funding in Somalia. This demonstrates the level of flexibility possible in responding to different contexts, and ensuring that responses are appropriate and bespoke to particular needs.

Save the Children UK receives funding from a range of sources, including core funding, donor funding, UN funding and funds from
foundations and other private organizations, as well as individual funding. Its country programmes in the Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone are funded jointly by donors (Sida in the Côte d’Ivoire and DANIDA in Sierra Leone) and private donations (from individuals and organizations). In contrast, most of the IRC’s funding is from private sources (individuals, corporations and more recently foundations, with NoVo contributing US$15 million) even though some funding does come from development cooperation, including the EC, UN agencies and US government agencies (the latter being the most significant donor in relation to volume).

7.3 Emerging good practice and lessons learned

In Chapter 3, we presented an outline of the different DAC categories of fragile states along with a commentary on the likely appropriateness of various aid modalities in the contexts of the different DAC categories. The evidence gathered from the brief case studies outlined in Chapter 3 as well as the more indepth country-level analysis of donor education programmes in Chapter 4, INGO programmes in Chapter 5 and the Liberia case study in Chapter 6 corroborates the commentary given in Chapter 3. The evidence from case studies and a country-level analysis is summarized according to lessons learned, applicable for DAC Principles, in Table 7.1.
### Table 7.1 Summary of lessons learned from case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DAC Principle 1: Take context as the starting point</strong></td>
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</table>
| Lesson 1: Making decisions to engage based on a needs assessment and an understanding of the role and comparative advantage of other stakeholders has a greater impact on effective programme implementation. | • The EC principle of complementarity means that the EC will only focus on providing sectoral support in two sectors where it has a comparative advantage as well as providing budget support.  
• In Sierra Leone and the Côte d’Ivoire, Save the Children’s education programmes were designed having undertaken a Child Rights Situational Analysis (CRSA) and assessed local needs, and in collaboration with the MOE and with an awareness of what other organizations were already doing in the area. |
| Lesson 2: Using a variety of aid modalities depending on the context is more effective than following a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’. | • The EC uses a range of aid modalities depending on the context, with a preference for budget support if it is appropriate, given its role in facilitating harmonization with other donors and the government. However, it recognizes that there is no ‘best’ approach for supporting education in fragile and conflict-affected states and that each modality has advantages and disadvantages. In Somalia, the funding of all of the EC’s education programmes is disbursed through INGOs and this has been more cost effective than using UN agencies; however, the EC would prefer to follow a pooled funding approach for greater harmonization and to reduce transaction costs. (The EC had 13 active education programmes in June 2008 across the three zones of Somalia, each one for between €0.5 million and €3.8 million.) Despite the theoretical advantages of coordination and harmonization using budget support, this has been a difficult process to implement in Pakistan. Disbursing funds through NGOs has been more efficient.  
• The Netherlands uses a range of aid modalities and partners depending on the country context and the capacity and/or legitimacy of the government. In Yemen, the Dutch Government provides a mixture of funding, including pooled funding through direct funding to UNICEF and funding via an NGO. |
### Lessons learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sida’s preference is for budget support to support a country’s poverty reduction strategy (PRS) wherever possible, although it does recognize the need to provide funding via other routes where this is not possible, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states. (In the three brief case studies of Afghanistan, the DRC and Timor-Leste, Sida is channelling all of its aid through UN agencies, humanitarian assistance, technical assistance and NGOs.) Sweden also provides around 10 per cent of UNICEF’s global annual budget.</td>
</tr>
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### DAC Principle 3: Focus on state building as the central objective

**Lesson 3: Ensuring a balance between immediate service delivery and longer-term capacity building contributes to increased country ownership and the sustainability of interventions.**

- The EC and the Netherlands are both committed to service delivery and capacity building (at the local and central levels), understanding that there are sometimes competing demands between these two.
- Save the Children UK’s CRSA, which is used at the country level, focuses on both immediate service delivery and the longer-term development of capacity of all stakeholders (state and non-state) to better manage and deliver education services. The IRC follows a similar approach with communities and regional- and national-level authorities in the DRC.

**Lesson 4: Working as far as possible with a broad range of education stakeholders including non-state actors (NSAs) leads to more holistic state building.**

- In Somalia, the EC works with government officials at the national and regional levels as well as with NSAs.
- The Netherlands recognizes the need to work with governments (both bilaterally and multilaterally) as well as working with the private sector, NGOs and other civil society groups, with one quarter of the total Dutch development budget being channelled through NSAs. The Netherlands is also engaged in a pilot project (in Southern Sudan, Afghanistan and Colombia) with Dutch NGOs and their local partners, which will involve more extensive collaboration between themselves and other local government stakeholders.
- Sida is committed to strengthening the role of civil society, provided it does not undermine the legitimacy of the state.
- Save the Children UK has worked closely with district and national MOE personnel in Sierra Leone but has found that the capacity of NSAs is very low, so it is difficult to find a good local partner to work with.
- Where appropriate, as well as working with the government, the IRC works with local implementing partners and NSAs. In the CAR, the IRC has successfully worked with communities and engaged them in projects through consultation, participation and a staggered approach to the implementation of projects.
### Lessons learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson 5: Building capacity, even when governance structures are weak or at their early stages, is possible though this can be challenging.</th>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The EC has worked to strengthen the capacity of local and regional government stakeholders in Somalia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The IRC’s interventions in the DRC were planned after extensive local consultation with other education and child protection agencies working with a range of education stakeholders (teachers, IDPs, religious leaders, elders, communities and youth). The organization also works closely with the provincial government through the MOE to build capacity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• While the EC has worked to build capacity at the local and central government levels in Myanmar and Eritrea respectively, it has been difficult to build state capacity in a wider way through civil society due to the limited number and capacity of NSAs, as well as the fact that most INGOs were not granted registration post-2005 in Eritrea, while INGOs are not permitted to operate in the formal education sector with government schools in Myanmar.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Lesson 6: The capacity of the state to manage and implement existing and potentially additional aid more effectively can be a constraint.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In Liberia, the main issue perceived by those working closely with MOE officials was not that more aid is needed for education (although there is clearly a need for this) but rather, whether the MOE has the capacity to manage and implement any more aid programmes effectively.</td>
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### 7. Align with local priorities

<table>
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<th>Lesson 7: Harmonization is important.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In Myanmar, the EC has found that the MDEF has provided a good opportunity for donor coordination and harmonization through a pooled fund in the context of a government-owned strategy. This high level of harmonization has probably been easier to achieve than in other contexts, however, due to the limited number of external agencies (two) permitted to work directly in the education sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Netherlands mostly uses the multilateral channel to provide funding for education to fragile and conflict-affected states as this is likely to be more harmonized. However, in its funding for Yemen (a bilateral programme), the Netherlands has provided pooled funding through the Basic Education Development Project (BEDP) and the Social Fund for Development (SFD). In this way, it has made progress in harmonization and alignment in the education sector and feels that this is critical and should be formalized through a partnership declaration.</td>
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### Lessons learned

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sida and the EC seek to provide funding wherever possible using government public financial management systems, thus strengthening their capacity to absorb larger volumes of financing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The IRC’s community-based education (CBE) activities in Afghanistan are harmonized with those of the MOE’s CBE policy, making any scaling-up easier.</td>
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**Lesson 8: Having a country programme or education project that broadly supports the government’s education sector policy and plan, where available, leads to a more coherent and strategic intervention.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The EC education programme in Eritrea broadly supports the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) although a project modality is used as the ESDP was not fully developed when the EC programme started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In Yemen, Dutch support for the BEDP and SFD both support the implementation of the national education sector plan. The Netherlands has discovered the need to apply a sector-wide approach (SWAP) at all stages of the project cycle as well as coordinating with other Dutch thematic advisers (politics, public financial management and decentralization).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Save the Children UK’s country programme in the Côte d’Ivoire was designed and planned in line with the government’s EFA plan. In Sierra Leone, Save the Children UK’s country programme supports the Education Sector Plan and the organization is the lead NGO on a sub-committee reviewing this plan.</td>
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**Lesson 9: Where governments have issues of illegitimacy and governance or public perception concerns, it is still possible to plan a strategic response through shadow aligned systems.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Since 2007, the EU Common Position now permits the EC to provide development as well as humanitarian assistance in Myanmar, but the EC is still not permitted to support the central government directly, so funding is provided via UNICEF in a shadow aligned way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In Yemen, Dutch support for the SFD is shadow aligned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In Somalia, while INGOs are the implementing partners of EC funding, they are working closely wherever possible with local, regional or zonal education authorities in a shadow aligned way.</td>
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</table>

**8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors**

**Lesson 10: Coordinating the humanitarian and development responses ensures the long-term sustainability of interventions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The EC’s LRRD strategy involves three steps to coordinate humanitarian and development assistance: a situation analysis, a needs assessment and consolidation of response, incorporating a wide range of stakeholder participation, from donors to government to local communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The IRC’s three-stage model of operation provides a framework for establishing then scaling up interventions according to the context.</td>
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</table>
### Lessons learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson 11: Coordinating with international bodies creates more strategic interventions.</th>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sida’s humanitarian aid policy was revised to strengthen compliance with the principles of good humanitarian donorship and to focus on the relationship between humanitarian and development cooperation.</td>
<td>• All the agencies interviewed work on coordination issues internationally with bodies such as the INEE and the IASC education cluster.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The EC, the Netherlands, Save the Children UK and the IRC have high-level representatives on the INEE Education and Fragility Working Group.</td>
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<p>| Lesson 12: Effective coordination at the country level with government and other stakeholders ensures the efficient use of resources. | • Given the EC’s major role in the scheduled scaling up of aid, it has recognized its leading role in coordination efforts with other donors and, wherever possible, encourages joint review missions and pooled funding approaches in line with government education plans. In Myanmar, the joint donor programme with EC funding, which is implemented by UNICEF, has effective coordination mechanisms to coordinate donors, NGOs and government departments working within the education sector. As a result, the EC and the donor group more generally have found themselves in a stronger position to negotiate and engage in dialogue with the government on education issues. |
| | • In Yemen, the Netherlands was nominated as the education donor coordinator for 2007/08. |
| | • Sida has developed Strategy Framework Papers for co-ordinating its funding to UN agencies. |
| | • Save the Children UK plays a key part in education co-ordination meetings at the country level with implementing partners, other donors, NGOs and the government, wherever possible (for example, Sierra Leone). Sector specialists within the IRC attend regular coordination meetings at the country level with the relevant authorities, donors and other NGOs. |
| | • In Afghanistan, the CBE forum has been an effective means of coordination (visible by its increasing membership, greater alignment with MOE activities and strong facilitation), largely because it has focused on action-oriented outcomes to maintain stakeholder participation. In contrast, in the CAR, the IRC education programmes are small and focused on humanitarian assistance, and they have worked through the cluster system to coordinate interventions with those of other stakeholders. However, these clusters (education and protection) have not been as purpose-driven and action-oriented as they could have been, and they lack clear objectives and communication between stakeholders. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>Supporting evidence and emerging good practice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In Liberia, the Liberian Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC) was established in 2006 to coordinate interventions under the interim PRS. It now works with the UNDP to collate data on aid flows, although it has found a slow response to requests for information sharing and a need for better communication with line ministries and donors. There has, however, been strong strategic coordination between the key donors in Liberia, with two donor conferences to date. In addition, two main coordination networks exist for national NGOs in Liberia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesson 13: While intentions to coordinate may exist among different stakeholders, implementation challenges remain.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Even though desired and attempted, the EC has not managed to fully engage the government in its coordination efforts in Eritrea.</td>
<td>• The implementation of the EC’s linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) strategy has been constrained by cumbersome procedures for the transition from relief to development assistance, and through the limitations of funding mechanisms such as MDTFs, which have not always disbursed money as rapidly as they should have even though they have contributed to better coordination and harmonization. The experience of the Netherlands and Save the Children UK confirms the slow disbursement rates of MDTFs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where countries are split into different zones, coordination is further complicated by the need to coordinate separately with each zone or with governing bodies resident outside the country (for example, the case of Somalia).</td>
<td>• In Afghanistan, there is both a CBE forum initiated by the Partnership for Advancing Community-based Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A) programme as well as one more recently established by the MOE. This has created some duplication and an overlap of remits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The MOE in Liberia felt that there was a lack of information flow between donors, NGOs and the government, despite repeated talk by all parties that information should be shared better. This has led to concerns in the MOE that donors use this as a reason not to engage more fully, citing the lack of transparency.</td>
<td>• The MOE in Liberia felt that there was a lack of information flow between donors, NGOs and the government, despite repeated talk by all parties that information should be shared better. This has led to concerns in the MOE that donors use this as a reason not to engage more fully, citing the lack of transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• While disbursing funds through the UN or World Bank may lead to greater coordination in country, especially where pooled funds are involved, the high administrative costs of this approach can mean that there is not good value for money. This is evidenced in the EC’s programmes in Somalia.</td>
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</table>
Lessons learned

9. Act fast ... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance

Lesson 14: The long-term predictability of finances contributes to sustainability.

- The 10th Education Development Fund (EDF) has a six-year funding programme and the EC seeks to design and plan its education interventions along this timeframe, wherever possible.
- The Dutch-UNICEF partnership has a four-year funding programme.
- By not paying teachers’ salaries in Afghanistan but encouraging community contributions, the IRC feels that it has emphasized the long-term sustainability of projects. It has also enabled the organization to lobby the MOE to include CBE teachers on the MOE payroll, ensuring even longer-term sustainability. However, this approach has not worked as well for the IRC project in the CAR, where communities (particularly where people have been displaced) have struggled to contribute, meaning that sufficient compensation has not been guaranteed for teachers, leading to some sustainability issues.

10. Avoid pockets of exclusion

Lesson 15: Working in a complementary way with existing interventions leads to greater coverage of projects or programmes.

- In the Côte d’Ivoire, Save the Children UK has worked closely with the local and regional education authorities to build capacity and help to deliver services, particularly in areas where the government does not have a strong presence.
- Where possible, the IRC works in consortia with local implementing or partner organizations to build capacity and to reach more challenging areas that it could not reach on its own. It also works to assist in building the capacity of the MOE and communities (that is, at all levels – for example, in Afghanistan).

A summary of the application of these lessons is provided in Table 7.2.
### Table 7.2  Summary of the application of lessons learned and emerging good practice for different DAC categories of fragile states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC category</th>
<th>Most appropriate existing donor funding modalities</th>
<th>Disbursement channel</th>
<th>Application of lessons learnt and emerging good practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Deteriorating.</td>
<td>Project support; humanitarian aid.</td>
<td>Through donors, NGOs or UN agencies.</td>
<td>• Even with regard to this DAC category it is possible to plan for the medium to long-term as shown by the EC supported pooled fund implemented by UNICEF in Myanmar where UNICEF has a five-year plan supported by several donors for the first three years with the possibility of further funding for the entire period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Arrested development.</td>
<td>Project support; humanitarian aid.</td>
<td>Through NGOs or UN agencies.</td>
<td>• In arrested development contexts, it is still possible to work with a range of actors to build state capacity as evidenced by the EC in Somalia where projects are implemented by INGOs that work closely with government officials at national and regional level in a shadow aligned way; and the IRC in the DRC who is working closely with provincial government as well as implementing partners and NSAs. • Where countries are divided into different zones (e.g. Somalia) or rebel groups control some areas (e.g. the DRC and the CAR), coordination is complicated by the need to coordinate interventions separately with each zone or with governing bodies resident outside the country, but it is still possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC category</td>
<td>Most appropriate existing donor funding modalities</td>
<td>Disbursement channel</td>
<td>Application of lessons learnt and emerging good practice</td>
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| 3. Post-conflict transition.         | Mixture of projects, trust funds, budget support and pooled funding. | Through UN agencies, MDTFs managed by UN or World Bank, donor-managed pooled funding or individual projects. | • Evidence emerging from several countries on the use of MDTFs has shown that whilst they may contribute significantly towards greater coordination and harmonization in post-conflict transition settings, they are often very slow to disburse money and their high administrative costs can mean that they are not the most cost-effective modality.  
• Encouraging community support and participation in post-conflict transition contexts can lead to greater sustainability as evidenced by the CBE programme managed by a consortium of donors including the IRC in Afghanistan which, despite working predominantly with communities through a project approach, has contributed significantly to the coordination of other CBE actors and is strongly aligned with MOE activities.  
• NGO project interventions in these contexts can be successfully aligned with a government’s education plan as evidenced by Save the Children UK’s education programme in the Côte d’Ivoire which was designed and planned in line with the Government’s EFA plan. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC category</th>
<th>Most appropriate existing donor funding modalities</th>
<th>Disbursement channel</th>
<th>Application of lessons learnt and emerging good practice</th>
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<tr>
<td>4. Early recovery.</td>
<td>Budget support and pooled funding.</td>
<td>Through pooled funding or direct budget support managed by recipient government.</td>
<td>• This is the easiest category within which to work and to apply the DAC Principles; to use a variety of aid modalities evidenced by the range of education programmes supported by the Netherlands in Yemen; and to align more closely with the government’s education plan where this exists as evidenced from Save the Children UK’s programme in Sierra Leone, the EC’s education programmes in Pakistan, and the recently established EPF managed by UNICEF in Liberia in support of the LPERP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4 Application of the DAC Principles of good international engagement

The DAC Principles are a really important basis for donors to engage in fragile and conflict-affected states and there is recognition that it is a work in progress that will need updating and adjusting as more is learned from operations. One important reflection on the DAC Principles is that the principles cannot all be pursued fully at the same time and there are trade-offs between some of them. There is a desire to act fast (Principle 9) and prioritize prevention (Principle 4) but at the same time to build state capacity (Principle 3) and coordinate donor interventions (Principle 8). The first two require quick action while the latter two require long-term, sustained interventions. There is a need to build state capacity, which requires a strong civil society (Principle 3) yet focuses on using government systems (Principle 7), which at times exclude civil society. While Principle 10 reiterates the need to avoid pockets of exclusion, the issue of regional fragility is not addressed anywhere in the principles (Haslie and Borchgrevink, 2007: 37-38). For example, Rwanda has limited aspects of fragility, yet it is bordered by the fragile states of Burundi and the DRC. Sudan is fragile and this affects northern Uganda, which is also fragile, yet Uganda as a whole is not generally considered to be fragile. Where fragility affects a country with quasi-autonomous states (such as Somalia and Sudan), there are no clear guidelines about how donors should engage. Consequently, many donors are trying to follow the overall discourse of peace building at a national level while working at the sub-national level with each of the states, as if they were autonomous countries. There is clearly some inconsistency here.

As a practical example, in Sudan there has been a focus on co-ordination, joint funding mechanisms and building state capacity in Juba, but less attention has been paid to building state capacity in Southern Sudan and therefore in building a united Sudan. There has also been very little attention given to building the relationship between government and civil society. Civil society is marginalized through the focus on joint funding mechanisms that are very government-focused. The MDTF has strict requirements for funding civil society, which may be difficult for Sudanese civil society groups to meet. This has led Haslie and Borchgrevink (2007: 37-38) to conclude that “a broader approach is required in the international engagement with Sudan” and “having a variety of different funding mechanisms may therefore imply advantages”. This
Donors’ engagement

Conclusion is valid not only for Sudan but as the case studies presented in this chapter have shown, for fragile and conflict-affected states in general. The view that governments are ‘good’ and NGOs are ‘bad’ or at least ‘second best’ is not a helpful one, especially in contexts in which the government has little will and legitimacy. In these contexts, the DAC Principles are useful, but there is a need to ensure that service delivery takes place, whether through long-route or short-route accountability, and that it involves all stakeholders. As Berry (2007: 1) notes:

The most effective approaches are in situations where the international community develops and supports national government capacity to lead a sector or sub-sector process which allows broad stakeholder involvement (including national and local level, and state and non state actors).

7.5 Donor engagement versus long-term exit strategies

An emerging issue was that of how to engage in the long term to ensure sustainability (DAC Principle 9) but at the same time, work in a way that has an exit strategy so that the national government of the fragile state can manage its own affairs fully as it moves out of fragility. As already mentioned, the IRC’s average length of engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states is around ten years, which is way above the longest donor funding programme (that is, the EC’s current European Development Fund (EDF), which has a six-year funding cycle). A recent paper (Chand and Coffman, 2008) published by the Center for Global Development discusses an economic model for projecting the time it takes to build the necessary capacity and institutions for a post-conflict state to stand fully on its own feet. The authors examined four post-conflict states – Mozambique, Liberia, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste – and discovered that donor support for the recurrent budget would need to continue from 2005 for at least 5, 13, 23 and 21 years respectively before each of these countries could be free from the need for donor support (Chand and Coffman, 2008: 6).

This research, if its modelling assumptions are correct, reiterates the urgent and ongoing need for donors to continue to support fragile and conflict-affected states financially. Given that education is one of the key sectors for ensuring that individuals have the core skills and competencies needed for the labour market to contribute directly to state building in the future, this underlines the need for donors to engage
effectively in supporting the development of the education sector in fragile and conflict-affected states.

7.6 Summary

This chapter has shown that in all of the DAC categories of fragile states, it is possible to pursue many of the DAC principles, albeit in an incomplete way in some situations. The evidence presented shows that a mixture of aid modalities can be effective; there is no one modality that is the ‘best’ in all contexts; state building must encompass the widest meaning of the term (government and civil society) and even in deteriorating or arrested development contexts, working in close collaboration with local, regional or central governments is still possible when working through NSAs as implementing partners; coordination and harmonization are possible in all environments, but this is made easier where governments are open to working with a range of stakeholders and have a clear education plan and strategy in place; it is possible to work with the medium to longer term in mind, even in a deteriorating context; and INGOs and donors can play a key role in providing services to groups that the government finds it challenging to reach, thus avoiding pockets of exclusion.
Chapter 8

Recommendations and conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the principal recommendations for donors (bilateral and multilateral), UN agencies, foundations and INGOs (referred to as external stakeholders) seeking to strengthen their engagement in education in fragile and conflict-affected states. It offers perspective on how some of these can also be applied to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states to ensure that they can contribute to an enabling environment that provides incentive for external stakeholders to engage more deeply. These recommendations are drawn from the lessons learned and common findings detailed in Chapter 7, and link to the DAC Principles.

8.2 Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** Develop responses to address immediate needs, but with long-term development goals to ensure the coordination of humanitarian and development responses.

**Lesson 10:** Coordinating between humanitarian and development responses ensures the long-term sustainability of interventions.

**Lesson 14:** The long-term predictability of finances contributes to sustainability.

**Lesson 3:** Ensuring a balance between immediate service delivery and longer-term capacity building contributes to increased country ownership and the sustainability of interventions.

**Lesson 8:** Having a country programme or education project that broadly supports the government’s education sector policy and plan where available leads to a more coherent and strategic intervention.

**Lesson 12:** Effective coordination at the country level with the government and other stakeholders is a valuable use of resources.

**DAC Principle 1:** Take context as starting point

**DAC Principle 5:** Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives

**DAC Principle 9:** Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance

Engagement in education requires a long-term commitment for any learning outcomes to be sustainable. Responses after emergencies and in fragile and conflict-affected states address immediate learning
and psychosocial needs, but also form the foundation for longer-term system reform. They affect stakeholders’ expectations and demands of education, and the institutional structures put in place (for example, ALPs need to be certified and integrated with national curricula and the training of volunteer teachers needs to be recognized by national governments). Consequently, education planning on the part of all stakeholders needs to prioritize short-term service delivery in the knowledge that it will impact upon longer-term policies and approaches.

**Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs**

Time spent planning for the medium to long term can facilitate the transition of responsibility back to the government and not disadvantage beneficiaries (for example, with regard to issues surrounding certification and teacher compensation). This also includes setting up systems that can be handed over to the government without resulting in an unmanageable financial burden. For example, when providing training programmes for teachers, the teachers need to have future prospects of paid employment, and schools and teacher training institutes need to be assured of receiving the minimum running costs. This underlines the need for external stakeholders to plan for long-term commitments and be willing to commit to multi-year projects, working with and through the government where possible (see Recommendation 7).

Greater consistency is needed between donor policy and practice. Donors should be encouraged to formalize their commitments to education in humanitarian responses (as displayed in practice) within their humanitarian policies. This should also include a framework for transition towards development responses outlining how interventions provide a platform for longer-term responses. More generally, there is a need for further evaluation and reporting of good practice as to how transitional approaches from relief to development responses can be managed and financed successfully.

**Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states**

Where governments at the central or local level are willing and able to address both the short-term immediate needs of service delivery and reconstruction as well as take some time to think strategically about how this is consistent with a longer-term response, this will enable a more holistic approach between the humanitarian/emergency response and the longer-term developmental response, giving governments more
predictable funding over a longer period. It will also give external stakeholders more confidence to invest in longer-term commitments. However, this does require some capacity and political will on the side of governments, which will not always be there, particularly in arrested development or deteriorating contexts.

**Recommendation 2:** Select aid modalities that are appropriate to the context and to the level of stakeholder capacity, balancing recipient and donor needs, contexts and capacities.

*Lesson 2:* Using a variety of aid modalities depending on the context is more effective than following a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’.

*Lesson 14:* The long-term predictability of finances contributes to sustainability.

*Lesson 3:* Ensuring a balance between immediate service delivery and longer-term capacity building contributes to increased country ownership and the sustainability of interventions.

*Lesson 5:* Building capacity even when governance structures are weak or at their early stages is possible, though it can be challenging.

*Lesson 6:* The capacity of the state to manage and implement both existing and potential additional aid more effectively can be a constraint.

*Lesson 7:* Harmonization is important.

**Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs**

As outlined in *Table 5.2 of Chapter 5*, different aid modalities are likely to be more appropriate and effective in the four DAC categories of fragile states. In deteriorating and arrested development contexts, humanitarian aid and project support managed and disbursed by donors or through UN agencies and NGOs are likely to be the main options that can be pursued. In post-conflict transition settings, there is a greater range of options, including MDTFs, donor-managed pooled funds and projects. Using a mixture of these might be appropriate for achieving education objectives in any given country in this category of fragility. In the context of early recovery, an even wider range of aid modalities can be considered, including budget support managed by the recipient country if there is appropriate will and some capacity. Donors may understandably be hesitant in providing funding to states with a poor governance record, weak public finance and monitoring systems, and lower capacity, but rather than being deterred by these challenges, donors need to more readily accept these as opportunities for positive change.
and reform. Donors need to be flexible in their responses and criteria for engagement, recognizing their position in which they can help develop states’ absorptive capacity and work to strengthen government systems. It will be important for external stakeholders to examine the level of capacity in government and among NSAs, the reliability of public financial management systems and the legitimacy of the government before deciding on which modality or set of modalities to use in a given situation.

Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states

While this recommendation applies mainly to external stakeholders, it is important for governments to be in close dialogue with donors during the planning and design stage of any interventions, to ensure that governments have a voice in the final decision on which aid modalities are selected.

**Recommendation 3:** Align the education response with the identified needs and comparative advantage of stakeholders.

*Lesson 1:* Making decisions to engage based on a needs assessment and an understanding of the role and comparative advantage of other stakeholders has a greater impact.

*Lesson 8:* Having a country programme or education project that broadly supports the government’s education sector policy and plan, where available, leads to a more coherent and strategic intervention.

*Lesson 12:* Effective coordination at the country level with the government and other stakeholders is a valuable use of resources.

*Lesson 15:* Working in a complementary way to existing interventions leads to greater coverage of the project or programme.

**Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs**

When initially deciding how to engage in fragile and conflict-affected states, external stakeholders need to consider in which sectors their resources can best be placed to ensure needs-based, appropriate responses. Some external stakeholders may have to consider if they have the necessary in-country capacity and infrastructure to respond quickly, or whether it is more appropriate to fund as silent partners or contribute to a pooled fund.
At the level of more immediate service delivery, external stakeholders need to coordinate their responses so that there are no gaps or duplication in terms of geographical coverage, sector support and beneficiary groups and that partners’ strengths are maximized. Models and standardized approaches to education intervention should be adapted to the local context and needs and informed by community consultation.

Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states

Where governments are operating in a decentralized manner, they should engage in real consultation and participation with NSAs in identifying and prioritizing the main needs of the beneficiaries of the education system, and maintain open dialogue with external stakeholders. This will ensure any planned education response really does address the needs of beneficiaries and is aligned with local priorities.

**Recommendation 4:** Work through shadow-aligned systems if unable to support the state directly.

*Lesson 9:* Where governments have issues of illegitimacy and governance/public perception concerns, it is still possible to plan a strategic response through shadow-aligned systems.

*Lesson 6:* The capacity of the state to manage and implement both existing and potential additional aid more effectively can be a constraint.

*Lesson 5:* Building capacity even when governance structures are weak or at their early stages is possible, though it can be challenging.

*Lesson 4:* Working as far as possible with a broad range of education stakeholders, including non-state actors (NSAs), leads to more holistic state building.

**DAC Principle 1:** Take context as starting point

**DAC Principle 2:** Do no harm

**DAC Principle 7:** Align with local priorities

**DAC Principle 8:** Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors

**Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs**

Where external stakeholders are unable to work in any way with government systems due to serious legitimacy or governance concerns, the use of shadow-aligned systems may be justified but should be applied for short periods of time, with the objective of ensuring the transfer of ownership to the government in the longer term. As a country moves towards reconstruction and recovery, external stakeholders should seek to engage more with state systems and begin to integrate responses that have been shadow aligned in the past. Both donors and NSAs should also be encouraged to explore ways in which their interventions can foster the re-establishment of long-route accountability mechanisms.
Recommendation 5: Identify opportunities to engage with NSAs, to build capacity and ownership of education response, but be careful not to undermine the legitimacy of the state.

Lesson 4: Working as far as possible with a broad range of education stakeholders, including non-state actors (NSAs), leads to more holistic state building.

Lesson 5: Building capacity even when governance structures are weak or at their early stages is possible, though it can be challenging.

Lesson 1: Making decisions to engage based on a needs assessment and an understanding of the role and comparative advantage of other stakeholders has a greater impact.

Lesson 7: Harmonization is important.

Lesson 15: Working in a complementary way to existing interventions leads to greater coverage of the project or programme.

DAC Principle 1: Take context as starting point
DAC Principle 2: Do no harm
DAC Principle 3: Focus on state building as the central objective
DAC Principle 6: Promote non-discrimination

Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs

Working with NSAs and communities allows for more holistic state building as it helps strengthen local mechanisms with which to hold states to account. In a context with high operational risks, working through local NSAs can help maintain the delivery of educational services, although capacity may be low. Engagement with NSAs should be with the intention of supporting the strengthening of states in post-conflict transition and the early recovery stages. As such, activities should be aligned with state strategy and educational priorities (see also Recommendation 7).

In many fragile and conflict-affected states, local NSAs (including faith-based groups, community-based groups and the private sector) have often assumed responsibility for providing education, particularly in remote areas. External stakeholders should seek to form partnerships with these NSAs to rehabilitate education infrastructure and to broaden access in the short and long term. When initiating projects with local NSAs, external stakeholders should consider the balance of partnerships; the extent to which initiatives will be locally driven and owned; and how they respond to particular needs, as these factors have an impact on the sustainability of projects and their ability to be scaled up.

Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states

Where governments are willing to engage and open to engaging with NSAs, this leads to greater partnership options, and often to an ability to reach areas of the country where the government has limited capacity.
or resources (for example, in remote geographical areas). Also, where governments are unable (from both a capacity and a financial aspect) to ensure direct service provision for the entire eligible population, NSAs can play an important role in partnering with the government as service providers. For example, in some countries (such as Rwanda and the DRC) faith-based organizations (churches and Islamic groups) and community-based organizations contribute significantly to the delivery of educational services in rural communities.

**Recommendation 6:** Recognize that coordination is not easy; maintain realistic expectations.

**Lesson 12:** Effective coordination at the country level with the government and other stakeholders is a better use of resources.

**DAC Principle 1:** Take context as starting point

**Lesson 13:** While intentions to coordinate may exist among different stakeholders, implementation challenges remain.

**DAC Principle 8:** Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors

**Lesson 6:** The capacity of the state to manage and implement existing and potential additional aid more effectively can be a constraint.

**Lesson 7:** Harmonization is important.

**Lesson 11:** Coordinating with international bodies creates more strategic interventions.

**Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs**

Coordination efforts are often complicated by factors beyond the control of the participating parties, especially in deteriorating contexts. Financial coordination can be costly for project-based funding and the time needed to establish a pooled mechanism. Where this is inhibitive or inefficient, external stakeholders should seek to use ‘next best’ approaches. External stakeholders need to support and coordinate with emerging government systems, including through information sharing. This is particularly important in the post-conflict transition and early recovery stages, where there is a transfer of responsibility for co-ordination mechanisms back to the government.

To remain relevant and effective, coordination mechanisms should be results focused with clear remits, frameworks for action, common understandings of purpose and direct benefits for members. Coordination mechanisms should also be inclusive, with membership including government representation where possible and appropriate (even if this is only feasible at the regional or local levels in deteriorating or
arrested development contexts), in a way that encourages the sharing of information between external stakeholders and the government.

**Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states**

Due to important international frameworks such as the Paris Declaration, the focus on and responsibility for coordination has often been placed on the shoulders of external stakeholders. However, governments in post-conflict transition and early recovery stages should ideally be in the driving seat leading the coordination efforts. They need to be open to engaging with internationally initiated mechanisms to ensure that they will work in a harmonized way with existing state structures. Government stakeholders will need to ensure that they take time to invest in coordination forums, while being clear to external stakeholders that coordination should not be at the expense of service delivery.

**Recommendation 7:** Prioritize local ownership and support education sector policy and plans where possible.

*Lesson 8:* Having a country programme or education project that broadly supports the government’s education sector policy and plan, where available, leads to a more coherent and strategic intervention.

*Lesson 15:* Working in a complementary way to existing interventions leads to greater coverage of the project or programme.

*Lesson 5:* Building capacity even when governance structures are weak or at their early stages is possible, though it can be challenging.

*Lesson 7:* Harmonization is important.

*Lesson 9:* Where governments have issues of illegitimacy and governance or public perception concerns, it is still possible to plan a strategic response through shadow-aligned systems.

*Lesson 12:* Effective coordination at the country level with the government and other stakeholders is a valuable use of resources.

**Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs**

This recommendation is applicable at all levels, from central governments with national education sector plans down to local communities with community-level sub-sector plans. To ensure that responses are needs-based, external stakeholders should be wary of transposing models of approaches to different contexts without proper consultation or needs assessments.
External stakeholders should seek to work with, if not through, state systems to act quickly to build state ownership and capacity of response and to coordinate responses. State priorities should be used as a foundation for harmonizing efforts and maintaining a focus on joint goals. This is particularly important for foundations and INGOs responding in specific geographical regions or in initial emergency stages where there is a priority to act fast.

While this approach encourages responsive programming with a focus on service delivery, it only reinforces short-route accountability mechanisms. Donors such as the Netherlands and the implementing NGOs operating on their behalf should be encouraged to explore ways in which the foundations can be laid for the re-establishment of long-route accountability mechanisms. This may be through working with local government officials or even local community structures where the state is absent.

*Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states*

Governments need to be open to external support and advice in the development of plans so that all stakeholders feel that they have had a role in contributing to national planning processes that will best meet the needs of beneficiaries. Extensive consultation and participatory planning (involving external and national stakeholders) are important principles for governments to pursue to ensure wider ownership of national plans.

**Recommendation 8:** Ensure service delivery responses also contain an element of capacity development.

*Lesson 3:* Ensuring a balance between immediate service delivery and longer-term capacity building contributes to increased country ownership and the sustainability of interventions.

*Lesson 4:* Working as far as possible with a broad range of education stakeholders, including non-state actors (NSAs), leads to more holistic state building.

*Lesson 5:* Building capacity even when governance structures are weak or at their early stages is possible, though it can be challenging.

*Lesson 6:* The capacity of the state to manage and implement both existing and potential additional aid more effectively can be a constraint.

*Lesson 10:* Coordinating the humanitarian and development responses ensures the long-term sustainability of interventions.

**DAC Principle 1:** Take context as starting point

**DAC Principle 3:** Focus on state building as the central objective

**DAC Principle 5:** Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives

**DAC Principle 7:** Align with local priorities
Recommendations and conclusion

Application to donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs

Opportunities should be sought not only to provide essential services, but also to develop local capacity. This recommendation should be applied at all levels, from the central state down to local communities, to develop institutional and social capital and local skills. Where engagement with the central government is not possible, stakeholders should seek to engage with the district or regional education authorities or officials.

Institutional memory and experience of donor funding procedures and public financial management requirements are often low in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. This low capacity should not be a deterrent to working through governments; rather, time needs to be taken to support states and, where appropriate, procedures should be adjusted to the local context. Efforts to build capacity should be linked to broader development goals and multi-sector approaches (see also Recommendation 7).

Application to governments in fragile and conflict-affected states

For governments, time needs to be taken to identify and invest in (or find external stakeholders to invest in) capacity development needs that are appropriate to the context. There is often a belief that the best training is to send staff overseas to do formal university-level qualifications when, in fact, more appropriate skills-based training around management issues, strategic planning and budgeting would enable them to work more effectively on the key tasks at hand and take them away from their jobs for shorter periods of time.

8.3 Conclusion

This book set out to explore to what extent donors are engaging in financing education interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states and to undertake a series of detailed case studies from which to draw out lessons learned from and emerging good practices of donor engagement in these contexts. On the basis of this evidence, we offer recommendations to external stakeholders and governments to encourage deeper engagement and more effective use of resources in fragile and conflict-affected states. The evidence base and the recommendations have deliberately been tied closely to the DAC Principles in order to provide a framework for applying these principles more strategically, but also seeing some of their limitations.
What is clear from the evidence presented in this book is that some donors have increased the political and financial priority given to education in fragile and conflict-affected states. However, without additional funding flows and a more effective use of existing and new funding for education in these countries, many of them will not achieve the MDGs and the wider EFA agenda by 2015, undermining the compact set up at Dakar in 2000. Current engagement can and does help contribute to achieving the challenge of getting the 40 million out-of-school children living in fragile and conflict-affected states into school by 2015, but it is not sufficient, and deeper and more effective engagement is needed.

While there are risks associated with investing in fragile and conflict-affected states, it is possible, as well as preferable, for donors and other actors to invest in education even in countries at war. Not investing in such countries has the potential to create more harm and to cost more in the longer run in reconstruction. Not investing in education in countries where the national expenditure allocated to education is often extremely limited can lead to continued poverty, the creation of more instability and tension, which in turn could lead to terrorism and the destabilization of neighbouring countries (DFID, 2007b). It may also result in the continuation of piecemeal financial support for education and a tendency for donors to disengage from interacting with states and MOEs. This is likely to mean a reduction in the quantity of aid funded through a multiplicity of uncoordinated and duplicated humanitarian interventions. This can result in the ineffective use of financial resources with little regard for the longer-term sustainability of these interventions or the consideration of building national ownership and state partnership (a necessity to be able to scale up aid when the country becomes more stable).
Recommendations and conclusion

Box 21  Summary of recommendations

1. Develop responses to address immediate needs, but with long-term development goals in mind, to ensure the coordination of humanitarian and development responses.

2. Select aid modalities that are appropriate to the context and to the level of stakeholder capacity, balancing recipient and donor needs, contexts and capacities.

3. Align the education response with the identified needs and comparative advantage of stakeholders.

4. Work through shadow-aligned systems if unable to support the state directly.

5. Identify opportunities to engage with NSAs, to build capacity and ownership of the education response, but be careful not to undermine the legitimacy of the state.

6. Recognize that coordination is not easy; maintain realistic expectations.

7. Prioritize local ownership and support education sector policy and plans where possible.

8. Ensure that service delivery responses also contain an element of capacity development.

The recommendations presented outline a framework and rationale for external stakeholders (donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs) to engage more deeply. They also suggest how governments in fragile and conflict-affected states can do more to create an enabling environment for external stakeholders in order to support service delivery, which strongly depends on the legitimacy and capacity of the government in question. In some cases, external stakeholders may not be able to follow the DAC Principles to the full extent but this should not in itself justify non-engagement. A thorough situation analysis is needed, thus reiterating the centrality of DAC Principle 1 – Take context as the starting point – as the overriding priority in fragile and conflict-affected states.
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245


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## Appendix 1

### Individuals and organizations consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<td>Edwin Kamara</td>
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The book

Education is a key factor in restoring normalcy and hope and in providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection in emergency situations. However, few donors have humanitarian policies that explicitly include education from the onset of a humanitarian response.

This book gives an overview of the policies, strategies and financial commitments of the 23 influential Western donors that constitute the OECD in relation to education in fragile and conflict-affected states. Three donors, including the European Commission, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, together with two international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) - the International Rescue Committee and Save the Children UK - were interviewed to draw out lessons learned and emerging good practice. A field visit to Liberia obtained a more detailed country perspective.

Recommendations are presented for deeper engagement by external stakeholders (donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs). Suggestions are also made to advise governments in fragile and conflict-affected states how to create an enabling environment for external stakeholders to support service delivery.

The authors

Laura Brannelly works for CfBT Education Trust as a researcher and consultant. Her expertise lies in education policy, strategy and finance with a particular focus on states affected by fragility and conflict.

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Carole Rigaud is a political scientist and is currently working at the EC Delegation in Damascus, Syria, as a programme officer for health and social protection.