Study on Governance Challenges for Education in Fragile Situations

Haiti Country Report
Foreword and Acknowledgements

The European Commission study management team, Brussels, consisted of representatives from the Social and Human Development and Migration Unit of DG, European Aid. The Study Reference Group consisted of representatives from the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, Education and Training Foundation, DFID, GTZ, CIDA, IIEP UNESCO, World Bank, Ulster University and the European Commission.

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It is hoped that this analysis will be a useful contribution to the development of education in Haiti in the coming years. It is also hoped that the analysis accurately reflects the views and analysis of those consulted as well as the relevant documentation. The lead author of this report is Ms Erika Boak with inputs from Dr Harvey Smith, designated consultants for the Haiti case study. The Study and consultancy team has been managed by Euro-Trends.

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## Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

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<th>Acronym/Term</th>
<th>French/English</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECI</td>
<td><em>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional</em> (Spanish Agency for International Cooperation)</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td><em>Agence Française de Développement</em> (French Development Agency)</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Accelerated Learning Programme</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td><em>La Commission Episcopale pour l’Éducation Catholique</em> (The Episcopal Commission for Catholic Education)</td>
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<td>DAEPP</td>
<td><em>Direction d’Appui à l’Enseignement Privé et du Partenariat</em> (Directorate of Support to Private Education and Partnership)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFACAP</td>
<td><em>École Fondamentale d’Application Centres d’Appui Pédagogique</em> (Basic Education School Implementation and Centres of Training Support)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPT</td>
<td><em>Education Pour Tous</em> (Education for All)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPT PMO</td>
<td><em>Education Pour Tous: Plan de Mise en Œuvre</em> (Education for All Implementation Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEPH</td>
<td><em>Fédération des Écoles Protestantes d’Haiti</em> (Federation of Haiti’s Protestant Schools)</td>
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<td>FOHNÉP</td>
<td><em>Fondation Haïtienne de l’Enseignement Privé</em> (Haitian Foundation for Private Education)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTEF</td>
<td><em>Groupe de Travail sur L’Éducation et la Formation</em> (Working Group on Education and Training in Haiti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICF</td>
<td><em>Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire</em> (Interim Cooperation Framework)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENFP</td>
<td><em>Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle</em> (Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENJ</td>
<td><em>Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Jeunesse</em> (Ministry of National Education and Youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td><em>Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti</em> (UN Mission for the Stabilisation of Haiti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>Non-State Provider</td>
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<td>ONAPE</td>
<td><em>Office National de Partenariat en Éducation</em> (National Office for Partnership in Education)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNEF</td>
<td><em>Plan National d’Éducation et de Formation</em> (National Plan for Education and Training)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA/EPT</td>
<td><em>Stratégie Nationale d’Action d’Éducation Pour Tous</em> (Education for All National Action Strategy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>School Management Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNNOH</td>
<td><em>Union Nationale des Normaliens en Haïti</em> (National Union of Trained Teachers in Haiti)</td>
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1. Historical Perspectives: Sector Performance and Resilience

1.1 Analysis of Long-Term Sector Performance and Resilience

Country context. Haiti is one of the largest countries in the Caribbean, with a population of around 10 million, land area of around 27,750 km² and a population density of 360 people per km². Historically, Haiti achieved independence in 1825, with US occupation over 1915/1934, followed by the Duvalier dictatorship until 1986. Further political instability was prevalent until very recently, with continued street protests and rebellion. Executive power is exercised by both, the President and Prime Minister, with two chambers of National Assembly based on a 1987 Constitution.

The continued insecurity and political instability have undermined economic development, with per capita income at only US$ 570 per year. Haiti’s location makes it particularly hurricane-prone, especially in highly populated coastal areas in the north (e.g. Gonaïves and Port-de-Paix), with extensive hurricane damage to homes and social infrastructure in recent years. Deforestation has also contributed to extensive flooding, once again, disrupting households and schooling. Haiti is divided into 10 regional administrative departments, with lower level arrondissements and communes, with limited decentralisation powers. French is the official language for schooling and administration. 95% of the population are of African descent, with the remainder mixed race.

Haiti has one of the fastest rates of population growth in the world and a chronic shortage of jobs. This, in turn is linked to the existence of a large and active Haitian diaspora of around 1.5 million, who remit home around US$ 1.7 billion per annum (2006), especially from the US, Canada and France. It is reported that households accord significant priority to using remittances for school fees and other education charges.¹ Education is organised in three cycles, elementary², secondary and tertiary and is roughly 90% privately-run through community organisations, church organisations and NGOs. The education system is based on the French education system, with competitive secondary examinations. There are a reported 11 universities.

Education Sector Context and Performance. Trends in exclusion from basic services are anchored in Haiti’s history; even during the 1940s and 1960s only a thin layer of the population had access to education. Nevertheless Haitian governments have repeatedly prioritised education in policy documents and constitutions since the country’s independence in 1804.

² Elementary education is made of up of 3 cycles lasting 4, 2 and 3 years respectively
In 1805, the constitution declared that education was free and that primary education was compulsory. However, the state has never been able to guarantee Haitian citizens’ rights as declared in national legislation. The rules of ‘Papa Doc’ and ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier were characterised by autocracy and corruption under which order was instilled by a secret police force. State institutions were established including for education, however provision remained skeletal, despite the slogan of *negritude* and opening up access to the black majority. Public education provision did not recover following the Duvalier regime owing to the absence of a legitimate government until 1994. Indeed Haiti has been plagued by political instability for more than two decades, with 14 governments and five coups during that time.

In the past, education policies have not been backed by implementation strategies and action at the service delivery level. Historical political instability and rapid changes in government have meant that the development of education reform programmes and sector wide policies are started but not completed and rarely implemented. As a result, public education provision has suffered more directly from fragility than non-public provision which has been and remains poorly linked to state regulatory functions.

Indeed public provision has advanced at a very slow rate compared to non-public education provision, which has mushroomed since the country’s independence in 1804. Figure 2 reveals that over the four decades spanning 1965 to 2003 the percentage of pupils enrolled in non-state primary schools has increased by 55 points.

Owing to a lack of education data at national and sub-national levels it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the association between fragility and poor education performance. However, during the fragility experienced this decade, anecdotal evidence suggests a drop in enrolment in
urban centres affected by violence between 2004 and 2007. Public and non-public education provision in slums such as Cité Soleil (the biggest slum in Port-au-Prince, PAP) has suffered due to banditry and armed gangs, while education in rural areas in the North and South has been affected by natural disasters. A Save the Children Report revealed that in 2008 on average 76% of children between 6 and 15 years old were out of school in the 5 slums of PAP. The majority were children who had dropped out rather than children who had never enrolled in school\(^3\). A recent report by the Presidential Commission (for Education) identified that the main barrier to children’s access to school is poverty in both urban and rural areas\(^4\). An additional factor affecting education performance in public schools is the regular occurrence of teacher demonstrations and strikes, due to the non-payment of salaries, particularly in rural areas.

The government took early action to stabilise the situation in the slums and the reach of armed gangs, which were threatening to have a negative and far reaching impact on the country’s overall transition process, by seeking external military help from the UN in late 2006. Following the stabilisation of the slums, NGOs and non-state providers (NSPs) were able to have access and support education provision, thus reducing the negative cycle of violence and marginalisation. Mindful of the potentially destabilising impact of the slums on the country, donors have invested fairly heavily in them, at times to the detriment of other poor areas.

In 2004, there was severe flooding in the South West and Storm Jeanne struck the North of the country, leaving approximately 5,000 people dead. Hurricane Dennis, in 2005, reaped chaos on Haiti’s already weak infrastructure in the South but there were few deaths. In 2008, four cyclones and hurricanes in close succession affected eight out of Haiti’s 10 départements (provinces) and despite the events of 2004 and 2005, the government was again caught off guard with no disaster preparedness plans in place. It is difficult to estimate the extent of the impact on education performance at the department level since there are no available EMIS data since 2003, however NGOs testify to the drop in enrolments following the disasters.

As a result of these natural disasters, some of which were due to Haiti’s unsustainable farming practices and widespread deforestation, development partners and the government are frequently forced to temporarily halt their longer term programming in order to respond to the humanitarian disasters. This, together with the ongoing need to manage and contain politicised armed gangs in the bigger towns, mean that the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training’s (MENFP) focus is regularly diverted from moving forward in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. For example, MENFP is currently re-considering the minimum standards for school construction in light of the widespread damage to school infrastructure caused by the storms, hurricanes and floods. In addition, the imperative of the provision of relief has a negative impact on the government’s domestic education budget while increasing opportunity costs.

This complex mix of factors has contributed to significant regional disparities in enrolment/attendance in primary and secondary education. At primary level, enrolment rates range between 30-40% in central and northern regions to an estimated 70% in the metropolitan area.

urban/rural access gap is around 20-30%. The pattern is similar at secondary level, ranging from 10% enrolment in northern and western regions, up to 35% in more urban areas, with a similar 20-30% urban/rural opportunity gap. A mixture of poverty-related, security-related (especially in the northern cities) political and environmental factors (e.g. schools destroyed by hurricanes), all contribute to system fragility.\footnote{5}

**Box 1: Formal financial flows**

Forty percent of the fees collected in the minority public schools are sent to the Department Directorate (Direction Départementale). A proportion of this percentage is sometimes shared with the District Education Office. Sixty percent of the fees remain with the school for repairs and running costs. The government pays the teachers’ salaries however teachers who are in the process of being accredited by the government are not paid. Teacher salaries constitute the majority of Haitian’s domestic education budget.

### 1.2 Analysis of Factors Affecting Sector Resilience and Fragility

Historically, sector resilience has been seen largely in the role of the NSPs. The state system never recovered from the dismantling of the government and the resultant liberalisation of the markets following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship. In the period immediately after Duvalier’s overthrow in 1986, there was a vacuum without regulations or rules and NSPs quickly took over this space.

Figure 3: Key Events in Haiti’s History, 1986 to Present

\footnote{5 Education Policy and Data Centre, 2008. Haiti : National Educational Profile}
Umbrella organisations were set up: the Episcopal Commission for Catholic Education (CEEC) in 1987 and the Federation of Haiti’s Protestant Schools (FEPH) in 1986. Both had comparatively well developed systems of financing, data collection and analysis and of teacher recruitment and payment, which were entirely parallel to those of MENFP. The influential Haitian Foundation for Private Education (FOHNEP) was created out of these two associations in 1988. The original mandate of faith-based schools\(^6\) was to provide education in marginalised areas, and non-state actors quickly became the most important service providers.

The growth of non-state provision was not part of a deliberate government strategy but happened de-facto in the face of grave institutional weaknesses within the Ministry. As outlined earlier, demand for education in adverse circumstances is being stimulated through the provision of substantial financial support by the active Haitian diaspora living in the US and Canada: it is estimated that almost all Haitians have relatives abroad and that households benefit from remittances worth $150 per month. These remittances are often earmarked for school fees and hidden school costs in the hope that Haitian students will obtain education qualifications and professional skills that might make them eligible for emigration.

\[\text{Box 2: Adaptability of Education Provision by NSPs in the Slums}\]

A Catholic elementary school was established under difficult circumstances in Cité Soleil, with 22 classrooms and 1,000 pupils. The elementary school-age population of Cité Soleil is estimated at 22,000. Due to overcrowding in this slum, families left to settle in Jalousie, a new slum in PAP, and as a result the enrolment of the school decreased to 250. CEEC coped with the change: the state is unlikely to have the capacity and resources to adapt to such a dynamic situation. CEEC also established a technical and vocational education training centre in Cité Soleil as part of a series of initiatives to generate income for the Commission. Nevertheless in 2007 this centre was looted by local armed gang members and was therefore closed.

The fact that non-public education provision was and remains highly decentralised and emerged from grass roots movements through churches, town halls, community members and local entrepreneurs meant that it was and is better equipped to withstand the various shocks and crises which the country suffers cyclically and which are the key feature of sector fragility. Fragility in Haiti is regionally specific and affects particular départements at particular times (for example the instability due to the rise in the price of food and its scarcity and the ensuing violent demonstrations took place mainly in PAP, due to the fact that food is more expensive in urban areas and therefore urban dwellers are more vulnerable to spikes in prices). As a result, schools in particular areas close during instability but are able to re-open again comparatively quickly (unless school infrastructure has been damaged) due to strong local level decision-making.

\(^6\) Faith-based schools include the following categories, schools established by congregations (écoles congréganistes), schools established by priests or pastors (écoles presbytères), independent non-associated faith-based schools.
2. Education Sector Fragility Assessment: Status and Outlook

2.1 Key Features of Sector Resilience and Fragility

*Macroeconomic governance features.* In the past few years, a number of political and economic/administrative governance issues have helped improve the prospects for a degree of sector resilience. The restoration of macroeconomic policy and stabilisation has resulted in 2-3% GDP growth rates, with Haiti qualifying for HIPC debt relief in 2006, meaning that public expenditure on education has the potential for more predictability. Another important feature has been the formulation of the government’s development strategies, including the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) and Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP) in 2006. These frameworks set out a mix of peace building, political institution building and social reforms, of which education has been identified as a priority.

The government has committed itself to a wide ranging set of macroeconomic, public financial management and governance reforms. Encouragingly, significant progress has been made in budget formulation although the results orientation of budgets, including for education and related accounting system remains under-developed. There is a comprehensive institutional and legislative framework for budget management, but internal and external oversight capacity (e.g. from parliamentary select committees, supreme audit authorities) are in their infancy. Another source of fragility has been the unpredictability of aid flows, both loans and grants, which have been sensitive to political instability.

One source of promising resilience is the growing share of public resources devoted to defined priority sectors, including education. Over 2005/2007, health and education expenditure allocations have increased by around 30%, admittedly from a low baseline. For example, at 2.5% of GDP, the education allocation is below low-income country averages of 3.2%. Notwithstanding, a major challenge will be to better align expenditure allocations with sector performance results (e.g. EFA targets) and accelerate budget execution improvements (currently only three-quarters of education expenditures are realised).

*Education sector governance features.* The key features of sector resilience can be summarised as i) encouraging restoration and recovery of schools and their operations from the various hurricanes in recent years, due to Haitian historical capacity to cope and deal with difficult circumstances; ii) the historical role of the churches and other social organisations in providing not only social

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welfare/social protection (e.g. after hurricanes or after political upheaval), but also as a main education provider.

A more positive feature in terms of access, is that the supply of schools has increased even during the country’s turbulent years but a high number of children remain out of school. In 2005/2006, 706,000 primary school-aged children were out of school\(^8\), which provides a key indication of the capacity of the education system to enrol and retain children.

On the other hand, Haiti has one of the largest shares of very over-aged children in primary education: over 70% of primary school pupils are 2 or more years older than the expected age\(^9\), limiting places for other children. In 2004/2005, an average 9 percent of children repeated their primary school year\(^10\). The culture of repetition and the concept of education as a filter are deeply engrained. Senior Ministry officials themselves confess that the system is elitist.

Education is perceived as the opportunity for children to exit poverty, and school represents a powerful symbol of social well-being. The high value which Haitians attach to education straddles geographic and class distinctions. This commitment is demonstrated by parents’ willingness to pay school fees which can take up to 75% of their income. Owing to the high demand for education, further categories of schools emerged in response to the absence of national state provision: secular non-public schools (set up by local community members), secular private schools (founded and managed by local business people for profit), and public communal schools (established by local town halls).

The core features of sector fragility include i) Learning spaces are not yet safe and poor governance in school construction endangers children’s lives. In November 2008 a non-state school collapsed in a suburb of PAP killing approximately 100 pupils and wounding many others; and ii) the majority of teachers work in non-public schools and are not accredited, as a result NSPs adhere to their own internally developed standards and teachers earn widely differing salaries depending on the type of school in which they teach, a cause for major discontent and low morale amongst many teachers\(^11\).

In relation to quality, the proliferation of non-public schools and weak regulation has meant the curricula and pedagogy are increasingly fragmented with minimal standardisation; quality in the majority of schools remains very low with limited textbooks and inadequate numbers of trained teachers (only 10% of teachers in public and non-public schools have a teacher training qualification while 28% have only completed elementary education\(^12\)); and iv) the non-implementation of Haiti’s

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11 Public school teacher salaries are on average over four times higher than those of non-public school teachers. 60% of teachers in non-public schools do not have the requisite teacher training qualifications, further reducing quality in these schools.
bilingual education policy has also had a major impact on quality since parents insist on French as the language of instruction despite the poor mastery of French by many teachers.\footnote{Creole is spoken by all Haitians whether educated or not, however French is seen as the language of power and progress.}

The growth of non-state schools has not been managed and coordinated by the Ministry or by any other overarching body, rather it was provoked by high local demand as well as the considerable financial incentives to provide education and often with little regard for quality concerns. Nevertheless the adaptability and initiative of the non-state sector have facilitated the expansion of the supply of schools in difficult environments.

In summary, the resilience of the education system can be seen most clearly at the service delivery level in terms of the supply and continued expansion of coverage, but decidedly less so in terms of the overall management of the education system by the Ministry. Planning, information, personnel, regulatory, accreditation and monitoring and evaluation systems have suffered under the various crises and regime changes and remain weak and in some cases dysfunctional. There is a lack of institutional memory regarding how things used to or should happen amongst senior Ministry cadres. The low share of public elementary and secondary schools, together with the weak role played by the Ministry in relation to enforcing standards and providing subsidies, has meant that MENFP has been and continues to be a somewhat marginal player in relation to education provision. This dynamic presents important challenges to donors.

2.2 Overall Education Fragility Status Assessment

Haiti does not fit neatly into any of the OECD categories for fragile states, partly due to the multifaceted nature of its fragility and partly due to the apparent contradictions within the country, seen in the high capacity amongst the upper echelons of MENFP and key NSPs but the inadequacy of formal Ministry systems.

It is important to note that Haitians do not perceive the country to be a fragile state rejecting the application of the fragility terminology in their country. They deem the political system to be fragile in the conventional sense of the word, but not in relation to will and capacity. When asked what stage of recovery or development the country is in, Haitians respond that it is in transition. Owing to the cycles of political stability, violence and civil unrest, change of parliament and resumption to comparative stability, the stages of transition are often short-lived. Indeed between the end of the 1970s and 2005, real economic growth averaged 0.34% per year.

Impunity, poor governance, natural disasters and insecurity compounded by illicit drug trafficking and revenue streams from criminal activities have affected the country’s ability to follow a linear path towards recovery and reconstruction. The collapse of Haiti’s productive industries and inadequate national resources render the country particularly vulnerable to international shocks in the world market. All this makes the production of Haiti’s human capital – its most valuable resource – through an appropriate and inclusive education system all the more important.
The following are key factors contributing to the status of education sector fragility: i) political instability within government reduced its capacity to follow through on plans and implement programmes since donors re-directed their funding; ii) support by key donors in funding NSPs during the late 1980s and 1990s compounded the legitimacy deficit within government; iii) institutional politics within MENFP in relation to the de-facto divide between senior and middle/junior officials constrains capacity compounded by the insufficient numbers of middle officials in implementing and monitoring plans and programmes14; iv) the highly centralised system together with a lack of logistical capacity and financial resources at sub-national levels reduce MENFP’s ability to respond to service delivery and accreditation needs at the school and zonal levels; v) the government’s lack of capacity for leadership within the sector displayed by a heavy dependence on the poorly harmonised agendas of development partners; and vi) the rapidly expanding population with the imminent risk of many unemployed youth who are unlikely to be absorbed by the faltering job market.

Between 2003 and 2006, with escalating violence, political turmoil and a series of natural disasters, the country most resembled the arrested development phase of fragility. Since democratic elections in 2006, a clampdown on violence and a semblance of stability in the country, Haiti may be classified in the post-conflict reconstruction stage, with the qualification that conflict in Haiti is very localised while capacity challenges are widespread. The threat of civil unrest is ever near and despite the comparative current political stability, riots and demonstrations can easily be exploited, and even bought, by parts of Haiti’s politicised groups to generate a larger crisis. Security, governance, better coordinated aid and market access have been identified as the core and inter-dependent areas which must be addressed in order to lift Haiti out of fragility15. Indeed, some would argue that Haiti’s prospects of emerging from fragility are better than other fragile states’, due to endogenous factors (such as good political leadership) as well as exogenous factors (such as favourable market access), thus validating its categorisation in the post-conflict reconstruction phase.

Nevertheless due to the pervasive disconnect between Haiti’s potential and the status quo, some features of the education sector are still characterised by the arrested development phase. In relation to the FTI Progressive Framework Service Delivery Matrix, strategies and actions taken in

14 80% of Haiti’s professionals live abroad and many of the remainder work in non-public organizations. Despite Canada boasting a whole-of-government approach, the flight of Haitian professionals was accelerated by Canada’s immigration policies.

Haiti can mainly be located under ‘interim arrangements’, or between interim arrangements and transitional mechanisms.

### 2.3 Sector Fragility and Resilience: Outlook, Opportunities and Risks

There are key strengths in the sector which contribute to its resilience. Bolstered by support from donors, NSPs have played a key role in ensuring continuous education provision through the country’s various cycles of fragility. The structure of certain NSPs is highly decentralised with decision-making being taken entirely at the school level, improving responsiveness to local demand as well as to the changing circumstances of fragility. The existence of School Management Committees (SMCs) and parent committees has also contributed to building stability. Strong demand for education by Haitians has been constant even during extreme adversity.

Haiti’s trajectory towards improved resilience and stabilisation differs between education sector variables. Using the categories of the FTI Progressive Framework, the following are the key opportunities and challenges in relation to stabilisation and fragility reduction. There is potential for the promotion of community involvement in school management through School Councils. However, many schools are still very unsafe due to precarious infrastructure and non-adherence to Ministry standards. These standards are being reviewed by MENFP in light of the susceptibility to natural disasters.

Another promising feature is donor support for institutional strengthening and clarification of accountabilities related to education provision and regulation through the imminent creation of the National Office for Partnership in Education (ONAPE). The creation of the Presidential Commission in 2006 is particularly welcome. It has a policy development mandate and has been tasked by the President to update the National Plan for Education and Training (PNEF). It is made up of a broad base of key stakeholders from a range of different interests, including representatives from non-public providers, teacher unions and civil society. In addition, there is increased awareness of the barriers to access and completion of elementary education by MENFP and NSPs and identification of strategies by MENFP to promote inclusion through Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALPs), albeit on a small scale.

A factor increasing the fragility of the education system is the high rate of repetition. Children in rural areas often start going to school late, particularly when the school is far away. Meanwhile some non-public schools do not accept children if they are younger than 6 and repetition rates are highest in the first year of elementary school. Nevertheless it is also widely acknowledged that over-aged children are much less likely to complete primary education.

In relation to economic issues, the Haitian curriculum, particularly at secondary level, has been strongly influenced by French colonialism and can be considered insufficiently relevant to the needs of the Haitian job market. Links between education and employment are also undermined by nepotism, which plays a key role during recruitment processes. The overall politicisation of education and national political instability are major constraints in the government’s capacity to provide education since there is a lack of continuity in education policies and programmes due to
the turnover of officials. Nevertheless there is a high level of capacity among senior staff of MENFP, as well as in the Presidential Commission: the Directors are trained and qualified, often with postgraduate degrees from abroad, and provide in-depth insight and analysis into the issues and challenges of the Haitian education system.

More encouragingly, the Ministry has demonstrated the capacity to develop sector wide plans and policies but there is a challenge in getting these followed through with change at the school level. The fact that the Presidential Commission is not part of the structure of MENFP means that there is a risk that sustainable capacity and authority are not being built within the Ministry. Furthermore, the Ministry has felt threatened by the weight and organisational capacity of the non-state sector and FOHNEP has at times been perceived as an alternative Ministry, further reducing the latter’s legitimacy in the eyes of Haitians.

Nevertheless, a priority is to strengthen the capacity of the education system to cater for the needs of the many marginalised children and youth for whom formal education is not an option, owing to the high opportunity costs. Despite the large number of over-aged children in elementary education throughout the country, the government ALPs are only being implemented in a small number of Basic Education School Implementation and Centres of Training Support (EFACAP) schools. A non-formal education policy is only now being developed and the non-formal education directorate is seriously under-resourced. Awareness in the Ministry and NSPs regarding the imperative of inclusion remains academic and inadequate action is being taken at the policy and service delivery level to increase poor children’s access to good quality education in a sustainable way.
3. Education Sector Governance Assessment: Status and Outlook

3.1 Summary of Overall Macro and Sectoral Governance Environment

Regulating public/private partnership is a priority. The most pressing governance reform needed in the education sector is related to the accreditation of non-public schools. The establishment of ONAPE is an urgent requirement in order to create a formal coordination and regulation mechanism in the Ministry for NSPs however, although legislation was passed in Senate in October 2007, ONAPE had not yet been created by May 2009. This calls into question whether there is sufficient political will within MENFP, or indeed amongst NSPs who lack real incentives to become regulated by the Ministry. There is also a need to re-establish the capacity and authority of the Ministry to develop and coordinate education reforms and policies and within that to address the standardisation of quality norms. This is a challenging issue which goes beyond the mandate of ONAPE and relates to wider issues in terms of MENFP’s institutional mandate, capacity and legitimacy within the context of the prevalence of the non-public sector. This is further discussed under 3.2.

Figure 4: Chronology of the Macro Governance and Education Legislation

Legislative frameworks are developing. A more positive development was the creation of the Presidential Commission which is composed of members from all spheres of interest (universities, teacher unions, former Ministers of Education and the non-public sector). Although the members do not formally represent their interest group, they were clearly chosen to bring about broad-based consensus on education policy priorities. The Commission was created in response to the fact that donor-led strategies and mechanisms such as ICF lacked national ownership, whereas the Commission was established by the President and is not entirely funded by donors. It is active with
very strong technical capacity. Through this Commission it is hoped that wider civil society will also be engaged in the process of policy development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Bernard Reform. Principal legislation governing the education sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Constitution. Education Ministry given the mandate to elaborate, implement and evaluate the policy related to education and training; state and local governments are responsible for education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Decentralisation reform. Not truly implemented, no provision for local capacity building or additional resources; as state capacity at central level was limited in practice very little to decentralise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>PNEF. Was intended to establish the Ministry’s mandate and authority to set standards, regulate and monitor education nationwide and develop an active partnership with all non-state operators. Never fully implemented or reviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>ICF. Supported by 26 bilateral and multilateral agencies for revival of international support. Perceived to be donor-led, over-ambitious and lacking government ownership but seen by certain donors as an effective coordination mechanism. Extended for one year in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>SNA/EPT. Education for All National Action Strategy sets out 5 actions: increase supply of pre-primary schools; increase equitable access to formal and non-formal elementary education; promote greater internal and external efficiency; improve sector governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>ONAPE. Law on creation and structure of ONAPE, the key structure in establishing the regulatory function of MENFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>PRSP 2008-2010. Education and training is the first section under the second pillar: overall objective is to increase access to pre-school, elementary and vocational education. Fails to provide a simple and realistic strategy to achieve economic security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>EPT PMO. Education for All Implementation Plan developed in order to formally apply for FTI Catalytic Fund; costed at US$ 714.6 million; FTI has pledged US$ 22 million for 3 years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil society engagement is its infancy. The concept of the role of civil society in monitoring state and non-state delivery of education is still new whether at school, sub-national or national levels. During the development of the emblematic sector-wide plan, the PNEF, members of civil society were engaged. Nevertheless, while particular bodies participated in parts of the PNEF (such as FOHNEP on the curriculum section), the consultation process was limited largely to asking NGOs to validate the plan following its development.

There is currently no Education Round Table where civil society is formally part of the development of government policy or reviewing the implementation of government plans. Engagement tends to be ad hoc, and in response to donor requirements. Given Haiti’s pervasive history of uprisings and violent demonstrations, the absence of democratic avenues and structures through which civil society can voice their concerns deserves serious consideration by the Ministry and NSPs alike.

State accountability is uneven. Owing to the geographic proximity of users to local state and NSPs, the short route to accountability is better developed than the long route. The vehicles for this are the parents’ committee and the SMC, as prescribed in the PNEF. The composition of the SMC is different in public and non-public schools and civil society members are better represented on non-public SMCs. Where these structures exist, they have served to build the resilience of schools.

Policy making is insufficiently results-led. The absence of analysed education data at the central level presents an important obstacle to sector-wide governance improvements as it severely

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constraints monitoring and planning within MENFP. Historically, decisions have been taken based on political considerations rather than statistical evidence. UNESCO supported the then Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports to conduct a school census for the 2002/2003 academic year and data have also been gathered for 2006/2007 academic year but are not yet available. Data collection and analysis systems appear to be better developed amongst non-state education providers such as the CEEC and FEPH.

The fact that public schools send a proportion of the fees collected to the département level means that there is an incentive to underreport enrolment. The situation is further compounded by the absence of an institute dedicated to monitoring and evaluation. Conducting any kind of comprehensive and regular performance monitoring or joint sector reviews is therefore seriously hampered. Indeed, owing to political instability and inadequate capacity, the PNEF has not yet been reviewed or evaluated. It remains emblematic but is not in practice a road map for education planning, budgeting and monitoring.

3.2 Analysis of Stakeholder Participation and Interests

NSPs are influential stakeholders. The education system is dominated by NSPs who offer education to the majority of children in Haiti. Only 19% of primary school-going children attend public schools; 92% of schools are non-public\textsuperscript{17}, hosting approximately 81% of primary school children (2002/2003 data)\textsuperscript{18}. Community members’ expenditure on education amounts to 12% of GDP, while the government’s is only 2 percent. The fact that only 35% of non-public elementary schools and 14% of non-public secondary schools are accredited by MENFP means that community members are more susceptible to exploitation since many schools do not even meet the criteria to begin the application process for the operating licence, yet they continue to levy fees.

Financial transparency is a challenge. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at times very high fees are levied by unscrupulous individuals for extremely poor quality education; owing to low levels of literacy amongst adults, parents are unable to discern good from bad quality education. The ongoing proliferation of non-public schools threatens to continue to push up the cost of education for Haitian children since NSPs do not have the mandate to provide education to scale or in an affordable and equitable way.

A regulatory framework for quality assurance is a priority. The accreditation process for non-public schools is complex, involving many different steps, and is influenced by nepotism. Since non-public schools do not stand to gain a net benefit from being accredited, they largely ignore government accreditation standards. Currently pupils who attend non-accredited non-public schools must also enrol in accredited schools so that they can sit the formal exams, further reducing the providers’ incentive. The legitimacy deficit of the government discourages NSPs from embarking on this bureaucratic and time consuming process.

\textsuperscript{17} There are 2,227 Catholic schools, the majority of which are elementary, representing the largest share of enrolments with 485,957 pupils, a further 40% of non-public schools are Protestant.

\textsuperscript{18} World Bank. 2008. Public and Non-Public Partnerships for Improved Access to Quality Primary Education in Haiti.
**Donor support for institutional reform is a priority.** Development partners unanimously agree on the importance of accrediting all non-public schools and many schools are being supported by NGOs through this process. An important milestone in this area was the passing of the law in 2007 creating ONAPE, which symbolised a step forward in improving relations between the state and NSPs. ONAPE is to be an independent administrative body under the leadership of the Minister of Education and will also be decentralised. Its mandate is to: provide a space for collaboration between MENFP and non-public partners; manage public private partnerships in education; promote non-public actors’ participation in the development and implementation of education policies and programmes. MENFP is being strongly supported by the World Bank in this area, as part of the Education for All (EPT) programme.

Despite MENFP’s comparatively marginal role in education service delivery it maintains control over policy development. NSPs have not been systematically involved in Ministerial planning processes in the past, for example during the development of the PNEF in 1997, but more recently, with the elaboration of the EPT PMO and the creation of the Presidential Commission there has been more concerted effort to involve non-state actors.

### 3.3 Education Sector Governance Outlook, Opportunities and Risks

**The political importance of education is growing.** The increasing weight of education as a priority sector over the past decade is a key opportunity in improving governance. There is political commitment to the importance of the sector in the country’s overall development and stabilisation. Nevertheless limited government financial streams and poor public financial management continue to blight the sector, reducing MENFP’s credibility particularly amongst NSPs and civil society. The pending creation of ONAPE should improve MENFP’s capacity, mandate and legitimacy to regulate schools and enforce standards. It also potentially paves the way for a future compensatory role for the Ministry, as Haiti emerges from fragility, providing widespread subsidies to non-public schools and reducing the burden of direct education costs on parents.

**Strengthening sector planning capabilities are essential.** The impact of the Ministry’s limited capacity to develop, plan, execute, monitor and evaluate education programmes and align its budget is made worse by the limited availability of valid and accurate education data, as well as budget data. Budget preparation does not follow particular timeframes and budget proposals are not based on the PNEF or the EPT PMO. Allocations are not in line with strategic and realistic objectives and proposals are over-ambitious given MENFP’s absorptive capacity. Sectoral allocations are made on a historical basis, rather than based on costed programmes and expenditure targets. Sub-national education authorities are not involved in the budget preparation process.

**Results-oriented and improved budget execution is critical.** Detailed information on budget execution is inadequate, however execution rates are reported to be fairly slow, symptomatic of problems during the formulation stage as well as the low absorptive capacity of MENFP. The absence of clearly articulated procedures, institutionalised transparency and accountability mechanisms as well as the use of *comptes courants* (outside normal checks and balances) result in
weak public expenditure management\textsuperscript{19}. There is not yet a Medium Term Expenditure Framework for education.

\textbf{Box 4: The impact of national budgeting on capital investment}

School construction has been identified as an area which is highly susceptible to poor governance. Nevertheless the government regularly asks donors to fund school construction owing to the widespread devastation caused by natural disasters and the resultant impact on children’s access to education. The national budgeting process for capital expenditure lacks transparency, investment needs are not identified and planned in a coherent framework and over the years the capacity of the government to monitor the public sector investment programme has reduced. Furthermore impromptu changes are made to the budget during execution. The absence of strategic planning in this area has meant that public sector

The absence of formal performance monitoring systems, due to a lack of EMIS data, is concerning. This has important repercussions on the ability of Haitians and development partners to hold the government to account. Performance monitoring takes place within the better established NSPs such as CEEC and FEPH. Owing to the fact that national system-wide information management systems are poorly developed, once data are collected it can take several years before they are analysed and published, thus reducing their validity and accuracy. This will need to be addressed if development partners are eventually to move towards increased financing using government systems.

4. Main Findings: Scope and Diversity of Local and Donor Supported Initiatives

4.1 Summary of Findings: Local Initiatives

The principal local initiative is the creation of schools. Unfortunately there is a proliferation of poor quality schools established by NSPs and private individuals, but the existence of School Councils according to education legislation as well as parent committees and SMCs is generally stronger in the non-public schools.

Strong capacity has been built up amongst NSPs over the years. There are high performing national education organisations such as the Knowledge and Freedom Foundation (FOKAL) and FOHNEP with strong governance, nevertheless they do not provide an avenue through which civil society organisations can engage in policy or monitoring of service delivery. Two local initiatives illustrate key issues:

**Good practice: TiPa TiPa (‘Step by Step’)*** uses a model of good quality education in rural areas based on child-centred methodologies, adapted from a similar programme in the US, developed in 1997 by FOKAL with funds from the Soros Foundation. The long-term intention was to influence national level education reform through good practice. The model, developed through collaboration with a broad range of actors including parents, MENFP officials, faith-based education providers and technical experts from the US, focuses on active participation by parents in the life of the school and entails a fundamental shift in the attitude of teachers.

**TiPa TiPa** initially targeted eight pre-schools, then extended to 15 primary schools. Since its foundation, FOKAL has developed a good reputation for sound financial management and good governance, but the model has remained very marginalised, only addressing small pockets of exclusion from school and peripheral to the main debates on access and completion. The programme has been unable to generate sufficient interest on the part of MENFP or donors to be mainstreamed or to diversify its funding, even though the former Director of FOKAL is now the Prime Minister.

**Education is the Key to the Future (Edikasyon Kle Lavni, Ekla)** is an ALP developed by FOHNEP targeting out-of-school children who do not have time to attend formal education. Reception centres were established to host street children, children in domesticity and children in rural areas looking after livestock. The two cycles of primary education were condensed into 3 levels and the content was strongly linked to the children’s every day life and local context. Materials were put on cassette and CD in order to facilitate teaching outside urban centres. The first level was piloted and useful data were generated. However, funding from USAID was stopped before the development of
all the levels owing to a change in USAID’s approach, with its emphasis reportedly changing from developing good practice and finding innovative ways of reaching vulnerable children to a focus on deliverables and MENFP ownership.

Both of these initiatives have contributed to developing relevant and good quality education for hard to reach children in Haiti, and both FOHNEP and FOKAL benefit from strong female leadership. Nevertheless the programmes were very small scale and have been constrained by short term international funding. The organisations spend considerable time managing and reporting on donor contracts taking time away from providing technical support to schools, NSPs or MENFP.

4.2 Summary of Findings: Donor Supported Initiatives

There are many donors in the education sector, some with a long institutional presence in Haiti. There is a PRSP supported by donors, but the absence of strong government programmes and policies against which donors can align is a constraint, thus certain donor approaches are unharmonised and fragmented, even draining Ministry capacity. Governance and capacity challenges within MENFP mean that donors are not willing or able to use national systems for data collection, procurement or financing. However, an opportunity to support the education sector in a way that is more consistent with the principles of aid effectiveness has arisen with the future disbursement of FTI Catalytic Funds.

Table 1: Matrix of Donor Support to the Education Sector in US$, 2007 to 201220

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>4,666,666</td>
<td>4,666,666</td>
<td>4,666,666</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>13,599,998</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB/CDB</td>
<td>13,750,000</td>
<td>13,750,000</td>
<td>6,250,000</td>
<td>6,250,000</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>34,494,375</td>
<td>34,494,375</td>
<td>34,494,375</td>
<td>34,494,375</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>137,977,503</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>3,816,201</td>
<td>5,639,049</td>
<td>4,479,807</td>
<td>4,479,807</td>
<td>1,822,848</td>
<td>1,822,848</td>
<td>22,060,560</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>3,816,201</td>
<td>5,639,049</td>
<td>4,479,807</td>
<td>4,479,807</td>
<td>1,822,848</td>
<td>1,822,848</td>
<td>22,060,560</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB/CDB</td>
<td>341,102</td>
<td>941,102</td>
<td>941,102</td>
<td>37,124</td>
<td>37,124</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>2,237,554</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>5,007,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>13,007,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57,488,344</td>
<td>70,111,192</td>
<td>62,444,950</td>
<td>62,761,306</td>
<td>5,359,972</td>
<td>3,822,848</td>
<td>261,988,612</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate in %</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-91%</td>
<td>-40.21%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Donors are making efforts to strengthen capacity and ownership, sometimes leading to funding being curtailed. The Ekla programme described above was initially funded by USAID but the funding stopped following a change in USAID’s approach to financing education in Haiti. Understandably, USAID intended that MENFP should be more greatly involved in Ekla and encouraged FOHNEP to shadow Ministry officials in completing the levels, but in practice there is a lack of ownership of Ekla within MENFP and unwillingness to relinquish control of the design of the programme by FOHNEP.

As has been stated, the most pressing governance reform relates to the accreditation of non-public schools. The government and development partners are faced with a dilemma: if standards are enforced by MENFP, assuming that it has the capacity to do so, many schools in Haiti will be closed immediately (including certain public schools which do not meet MENFP’s standards) and access will be reduced. This is not a solution in the short term. A more feasible strategy is to build the state’s

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20 Data provided by Mr Mathurin, Director of the Steering Committee, MENFP. ‘NC’ means not communicated
capacity to regulate and provide technical support on quality issues to non-public schools in the short term, while developing a longer term approach whereby MENFP subsidises non-public schools in order to gradually reduce the burden of education financing on parents.

A significant approach is being taken by the World Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and CIDA through their joint support to the EPT Programme, which provides subsidies via MENFP systems to accredited non-public schools to support the enrolment of poor children. This addresses the inadequate staffing and capacity of MENFP’s Directorate of Support to Private Education and Partnership (DAEPP) and its decentralised structures, which are currently tasked with managing the process of accrediting non-public schools. In doing so, the programme explicitly strengthens governance impacting on the management and regulation of the sector. Approaches to capacity development such as this can build the legitimacy and authority of the state in the eyes of Haitians as well as NSPs, and renew the trust and formal links between state and NSPs.
5. Main Findings: Lessons Learned and Good Practice

5.1 Analysis of Local Initiative Good Practice: Lessons Learned

As the examples of TiPa TiPa and Eklá (section 4.1) have shown, in order to be effective and influence mainstream debates regarding quality education provision for marginalised children, it is necessary to include plans for national level reform or for going to scale within the programme design at the start. In TiPa TiPa for example the formal curriculum was not used and therefore it would only be possible to integrate the methodology into pre- and in-service teacher training. FOKAL’s success lay in its development of expertise in a niche area (child-centred methodologies for poor excluded children) and use of targeted external technical support and collaboration with a broad range of national actors during the TiPa TiPa design phase. There was strong emphasis on community participation in the running of schools. Using both Creole and French as languages of instruction made the programme more accessible. In addition FOKAL benefited from strong governance and management. On the other hand, its inability to diversify funding sources meant an over-reliance on an external funder and subsequent reduction in activities. The small scale of the programme resulted in an inability to influence mainstream debates on reaching marginalised children or good practice in teaching and learning methods.

Box 5: Eklá (FOHNEP)

The success of FOHNEP’s Eklá programme lay largely in the relevance of its content to the lives of out-of-school children. The formal curriculum was condensed and the learning content was strongly embedded in the local context to increase relevance for out-of-school children. Learning outcomes could be assessed and formally certified. Adapted materials were developed to facilitate transport to and use in rural areas. FOHNEP had strong technical capacity and experience related to curriculum development and conducted a pilot. It maintained strong links with NSPs such as CEEC and FEPH. However, an inability to diversify funding sources meant over-reliance on USAID and subsequent unexpected halting of the programme due to a change in approach. Further, plans had not been made within the design phase for scaling up and developing Ministry ownership in order to position Eklá as a viable national non-formal education option for out-of-school children.

Both organisations identified niche areas, which neither MENFP nor NSPs were able to address, namely flexible programming specifically adapted to poor, out-of-school children. There is an urgent need for a sustainable and good quality ALP in Haiti. An ALP would be an effective way of addressing the needs of the many marginalised children for whom formal education is not an option owing to the high opportunity costs of primary education. A discrete programme which does not seek to replace formal school but provides a tailored option for out-of-school children, such as Eklá, would be easier to scale up in areas identified by the government and NSPs hosting high proportions of out of school children.
Strategies need to be put in place to increase awareness of programme methodologies and achievements amongst key policy-makers through participation in national level forums on education policy issues. Where possible, discussions should be held by FOHNEP, MENFP, USAID and other interested donors to assist local organisations in securing additional funding, including through in-country funders, so that programmes can be completed and become more sustainable, reducing their dependency on the vagaries of external funding. The presentation and packaging of such programmes need to be planned carefully in order that they can easily be aligned with Ministry or non-public processes and systems. In order to ensure wider impact, links to vocational education, sustainable livelihoods or alternatively children’s transition to the last cycle of elementary education should be planned during the design phase.

5.2 Analysis of Donor Supported Initiative Good Practice: Lessons Learned

Approaches used by donors vary widely and the situation is compounded by the absence of strong Ministry plans and programmes against which donors can align funds and technical support. Furthermore the lack of institutional memory and capacity within MENFP in planning, information, personnel, regulatory, accreditation and monitoring and evaluation systems means the Ministry is very open to and dependent upon the sometimes incompatible international agendas of donors. The fact that there are many different donors investing heavily in the education sector, renders harmonisation particularly challenging. There is no delegated lead donor for example, supporting the government on sector-wide policy development. The Education Sector Group, coordinated by UNESCO, is an information sharing forum rather than for joint decision taking or coordination.

The politicisation of education and political instability in Haiti have led to a lack of continuity in education policies and programmes. Following the development of the PNEF in 1998, the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) pledged a loan to implement part of it. Due to the subsequent political instability and the dismissal of parliament by government, the World Bank withdrew the loan and IDB was reluctant to disburse funds. The plan was not implemented until 2003 by which time the data and financial costings were no longer accurate. In addition, the plan lacked Ministry ownership given that the policy and decision-makers had changed since it had first been developed.

The rapid turnover of politicians and senior Ministry staff mean that donors still prefer to adopt project approaches, and financial flows are unpredictable over the long term. Project approaches are seen to be lower risk and deliver results in shorter timeframes, despite the important limitations of such approaches in building national systems and capacity. Haiti has been known in the past as a graveyard of donor projects given its poor record on governance. Nevertheless, with the return of comparative political stability and a democratically elected government, many donors are now seeking to build the capacity and legitimacy of MENFP, through support to service delivery in relation to formal and non-formal education, governance, regulation and policy development, rather than seeking to make quick wins in education provision by funding NSPs.

USAID’s Bilateral Education Project (PROBED) was designed to increase access, quality and the equity of elementary education while building the organisational capacity, structures and systems of the private sector. This strategic funding from USAID helped to consolidate the existence and legitimacy
of NSPs and build their capacity to provide education and manage donor relations. A decision was taken in 2001 to broaden its partners and to focus more closely on state capacity development.

Since 2005, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) has provided general budget support targeted to the education sector, the only donor to do so despite the fact that the EC, WB, IDB, French Embassy (and formerly CIDA) are providing general budget support. The conditionalities and indicators set by AECI are very light, due to the limited capacity of the government and MENFP to meet more prescriptive indicators as well as the absence of up to date data with which to monitor performance. AECI is keen for more donors to move towards targeted budget support and eventually develop joint indicators, however many donors are unwilling to provide budget support due to Haiti’s very weak public financial management capacity.

The World Bank is leading the discussions regarding FTI and the development of the EPT PMO was strongly supported by the World Bank and other development partners. It was initially thought that the FTI Education Transition Fund, managed by UNICEF, would be appropriate for Haiti given the fragility of the country. Nevertheless it was felt that it would be too challenging to use a new financing mechanism which has not yet generated substantial learning or with clear institutional arrangements in a setting like Haiti.

Box 6: Basic Education School Implementation and Centres of Training Support (EFACAP)

An example of a well-designed Ministry programme in public schools is the EFACAP programme which has been running for over a decade and is a strategy to create a network of educational establishments centred around quality while building local capacity. The 36 EFACAP schools (which are public) are hubs of good practice which are intended to positively influence a cluster of about 20 non-public and private surrounding schools. The schools are well equipped and the teachers receive a top-up to their normal salary since some shifts take place in the afternoon. The teachers are graduates of the Primary Teacher Training College and benefit from in-service training, thus these schools are much better quality than others. This has led to an unintended impact: EFACAP schools have become centres of excellence attracting elite children rather than marginalised children, thus deviating from their original mandate. In order to maintain the high success rate, teachers are turning children away who are unlikely to get good results, thereby reducing access. In the past, IDB and CIDA funded this programme and the EC is currently funding it. EFACAP is an important demonstration of the potential capacity of MENFP when harnessed effectively. It remains however a small-scale initiative, addressing quality rather than extending access. The fact that none of the costs of the programme is borne by MENFP poses an important challenge for EFACAP’s sustainability.

Following 9 months of debate regarding the modality to be used to disburse and manage FTI funds, it was decided in May 2009 that the US$ 22 million, pledged in support of the EPT PMO, would be implemented by the World Bank as the Supervising Entity of the Grant through the Catalytic Fund in basket funding since the management costs are lower than for a Multi-donor Trust Fund.21 There are many more arrangements to be negotiated before funds can be disbursed. Nevertheless the willingness of donors to use basket funding in Haiti is a sign of progress made in the country and may be a precursor to increasingly aligned support by donors to the education sector.

Box 7: World Bank, CDB and CIDA/MENFP Education for All (EPT) Programme

The success of this multi-donor programme, in which three donors support one harmonised approach, results from a number of factors. The design of the programme is aligned with the SNA/EPT and explicitly targets poor, marginalised out-of-school children. The programme builds the legitimacy and authority of MENFP by channelling funds through it and increases the capacity of MENFP to manage funds in a transparent and accountable way by establishing clear rules regarding the governance of financial flows and procurement. This is reinforced by the fact that the technical advisers report to MENFP’s Director General, rather than creating a parallel reporting structure. The programme strengthens the formal linkages between MENFP and non-public schools and creates an additional incentive for non-public schools to become accredited, thereby increasing NSPs’ service delivery capacity while simultaneously reinforcing the state. It also builds the management and governance capacity of SMCs by giving them responsibility for managing the subsidy. The advantage of the Programme is that it is addressing a core area of priority reform for the whole sector, which, if successful, will unlock substantial governance improvements for the management and regulation of education.

Development partners agree on the policy imperative of accrediting all non-public schools in order to reduce fragmentation and enforce standards across schools, nevertheless the actual approaches taken by different donors in relation to accreditation are poorly harmonised, with the exception of a ‘hub’ of harmonisation in the World Bank, CDB and CIDA.

In Haiti it is clear that strengthening the legitimacy of MENFP in the eyes of civil society as well as non-public providers and building linkages amongst those actors, which in some cases have never existed, is a priority for development partners and an important factor in the effectiveness of their programmes. Alignment and harmonisation are particularly challenging due to the absence of strong government leadership and its dependence on development partners’ various agendas. The rapid turnover of political regimes in response to civil unrest, a key feature of institutional governance in Haiti, also remains a key challenge for donors trying to promote accountability on the part of MENFP for delivering programmes. Indeed until donors can commit to more tangibly harmonised approaches, it may not be worthwhile for MENFP to embark on a comprehensive education reform process. Furthermore given the current social fragility there is a need for donor support to provide clear dividends in building MENFP’s legitimacy, by increasing Haitians’ perception of the Ministry’s weight within the education sector\textsuperscript{22}.


6.1 Conclusions and Key Issues

One conclusion is that the dominance of NSPs in the education sector, which has in the past been the sector’s redeeming feature, now threatens the Ministry’s credibility and the sector’s progress towards the provision of quality education on an equitable scale. During the country’s various cycles of fragility, the growth of non-state schools did not reflect the resilience of the formal education system, since it was not managed, coordinated or regulated by the Ministry.

Another conclusion is that without the adaptability and initiative demonstrated by the non-state sector, the impact of political instability, poor governance, localised conflict and natural disasters would have taken a much greater toll on education performance. Non-state education provision remained buoyant due to strong demand throughout periods of instability and violence, although there was great disparity in the levels of quality offered. The fact that non-public education provision was and remains highly decentralised and emerged from grass roots movements through churches, town halls, community members and local entrepreneurs meant that it was and is better equipped to withstand the various shocks and crises.

Another conclusion is that while education provision has survived the country’s fragility, the same is less true of the Ministry’s planning, monitoring, accreditation and regulatory systems. The ongoing proliferation of non-public schools, coupled with limited capacity within MENFP to regulate, have resulted in minimal standardisation. The financial and technical support of key donors to NSPs during the late 1980s and 1990s served to compound the legitimacy deficit of the Ministry vis-à-vis NSPs and the Haitian public.

A further conclusion is the absence of clear or worthwhile benefits from being accredited encourages non-public providers to ignore government regulations and accreditation standards. The fact that only a minority of non-public elementary and secondary schools are accredited by MENFP23 means it is impossible to enforce and maintain standards across all schools, which has a negative impact on non-public providers’ accountability to children and parents and to the Ministry. Legislation providing for the creation of ONAPE is particularly welcome. Another conclusion is that the government’s commitment to improving education in Haiti and re-establishing the role of MENFP is demonstrated in the increasing allocations to education over the past decade, amidst other competing priorities, which is reversing negative trends from the late 1980s onwards.

23 Data from 2002/2003
An important conclusion is MENFP’s policy on repetition. The ensuing high numbers of over-aged children in school has a direct impact on the already inadequate supply of places. It reduces efficiency since children can take more than double the official length of primary education to complete school. Given the fees charged in non-public schools, there are incentives to keep children in school for as long as possible, despite the fact that research reveals that repeaters are more likely to drop out than correct-aged children. As the Ministry has limited ability to address this issue on a suitably large scale, for example through the provision of tailored ALPs, it would be preferable and more efficient to develop and enforce policies related to enrolment and repetition and adopt approaches from elsewhere.

Another conclusion, is that despite the high capacity amongst senior MENFP staff, the Ministry lacks the ability to translate policies and plans into realistic strategies and concrete programmes. Furthermore, education is politicised and the Ministry is sensitive to regime changes, thereby limiting the continuity of the staff and their capacity to see through medium-term reform programmes. Nevertheless the establishment of the Presidential Commission heralds a new era in broad-based policy formulation, involving key stakeholders from a range of different interests, including representatives from non-public providers.

A final conclusion is that the breakdown of Ministry systems, its limited role as a service provider and reduced legitimacy, has presented challenges to donors. The situation has been aggravated by inadequately aligned approaches in the past and to date. There is, however, a general shift to employing capacity development approaches which build the authority of the state in the eyes of Haitian citizens as well as NSPs. The approach taken by the World Bank, CDB and CIDA in building the capacity of MENFP to regulate and provide subsidies to accredited non-public schools appears to be a very appropriate design. A related ultimate conclusion is that if implemented effectively, the programme will help re-establish the Ministry’s authority and mandate and is likely to have an impact on the governance of the whole sector. Furthermore, such a programme may lead in the future to an increasingly important financing/subsidising role for MENFP.
6.2 Key Recommendations: Improved Education Programme Planning/Design

Specific recommendations to MENFP would be:

i) To fully involve NSPs and local organisations, which have demonstrated that they are better equipped to withstand the various shocks and crises, in the development of Ministry strategies and plans.

ii) To develop clear and worthwhile benefits for NSPs from being accredited so that they have an incentive to follow government regulations and accreditation standards, and to operationalise ONAPE as rapidly as possible as a vehicle for facilitating this.

iii) To develop and enforce policies intended to increase enrolment and reduce repetition by adopting alternative solutions, learning lessons from successful approaches adopted elsewhere, such as: 1) encouraging correct-age enrolment in class 1; 2) establishing reception classes in primary schools to prepare children’s entry to class 1; 3) developing a policy of automatic promotion for children who are one year older than their expected age.

6.3 Key Recommendations: Enabling Aid Effectiveness and Sector Governance

Specific recommendations to the international education donor community in Haiti would be:

i) To further develop appropriate and harmonised approaches to capacity development and financial support for MENFP, avoiding the creation of parallel systems. This includes strengthening MENFP’s sector planning and budgeting capabilities, EMIS and national performance monitoring and review systems, which will strengthen the ability of Haitians and development partners to assess the accountability of government as well as NSPs.

ii) To facilitate the operationalisation of ONAPE to support the formation of formal and informal links between MENFP and NSPs.

iii) To strengthen the approach taken by the World Bank, CDB and CIDA in building the capacity of MENFP to regulate and provide subsidies to accredited non-public schools and support quality, through re-establishing the Ministry’s authority and mandate within the sector.
Selected Bibliography


