gtz Education and Conflict Transformation

Factors Determining Democratic Attitudes in Deeply Divided Societies

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ABSTRACT

The data for this study are drawn from 11 surveys conducted in countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, southeast Europe and the Caucasus. All the surveys used the same questionnaire, which was filled out in face-to-face interviews. The dependent variable is “attitudes towards democracy”: towards the rule of law, the separation of powers, freedom of expression and the press, election fraud, domination by one group and one-party rule, summarised as a democracy index. Independent variables include gender, age, occupation, and religious affiliation, membership of an ethnic or religious group, income and level of education as well as attitude scales for cautiousness, economic satisfaction, religiosity, communalism and conviviality.

The first step is to analyse the 11 surveys individually and then compare them with one another. Gender and age prove to have only marginal significance for democratic attitudes. The incidence of democrats is higher among professionals and white-collar workers than among other occupations. We did not establish a significant relationship between religious affiliation and a clear affinity for or reservations about democracy. In almost all cases there was a direct correlation between democrats and level of income and of education. In eight of the 11 cases democratic attitudes correlate directly with economic satisfaction, in seven cases inversely with membership of an ethnic or religious group. In seven cases there is a significant correlation with conviviality: the proportion of democrats increases with rising conviviality. CART (classification and regression tree) analysis reveals that in one case income, in another two group affiliation, and in eight cases level of education is the best predictor.

In a second step, the complete dataset was analysed using the CHAID (chi-squared automatic interaction detection) method. The results show that the individual case study (i.e., country/city) is the primary predictor, which is not surprising given the wide variation (between 45% and 85%) in the proportion of democrats in individual countries. If only the “hard” social variables are included, the strongest explanatory factor is level of education. In every country, post-primary education is the crucial determinant that distinguishes true democrats from partial and non-democrats: the proportion of democrats jump in the category “some years of post-primary” schooling and continues to rise as people climb the educational ladder. Regardless of differences in itineraries on the way to democracy, the following is true of all countries: education nurtures a democratic outlook, and higher education all the more so.

In a final step, the analysis of social variables is expanded to include scales of social attitudes. In five of the 11 cases level of education still has the greatest explanatory power. However, in four (Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon and Sri Lanka) conviviality now ranks first, and in another two (South Africa and Malaysia) economic satisfaction. Conviviality is particularly important in places that have experienced or are experiencing violent conflict, and economic satisfaction in states transitioning from ethnic to social conflict. Conviviality and economic satisfaction correlate not only with attitudes towards democracy, but also with level of education. At the risk of simplification: if more complex attitude scales are included, education is no longer the exclusive predictor, but is still the relative winner against all other explanatory factors “on points”. All investigative approaches show that education nurtures a democrat outlook.

Why is this? There are enormous differences between the educational systems in, say, Chad and Indonesia. Most interviewees in these countries did not or do not go to school in a functioning democracy. Hence, democratic attitudes cannot be the result of a particular educational system or policy. But what is common to all educational systems is their progressive character: each level is associated with an increase in knowledge. From survey responses it is clear that interviewees with even a few years of post-primary education feel more strongly than interviewees without any post-primary education that a democratic system is a better guarantee of their opportunities in life. They are more likely to grasp the benefits of the rule of law, separation of powers and freedom of expression, regardless of whether they already enjoy them or only cherish hopes of doing so one day.

The conclusion is obvious: it is in the interest of autocrats to keep people ignorant; the most effective way of promoting democracy is by promoting education.

It has long been generally accepted among social scientists that attitudes have only a limited effect on behaviour. Democratically-minded people do not necessarily live in democracies. Whether they are prepared to champion democracy depends not only on the strength of their convictions, but also on their assessment of the chances of realising their objective and of the risks involved. A "democracy without democrats", or more precisely: a state with a limited number of democratically-minded citizens, in which a fortuitous concatenation of historical events has brought about democrat institutions is, of course, a possibility. But the opposite is more common, i.e., "democrats without democracy", people who lack not the will, but the opportunity to act as democrats. Thus, democratic attitudes are not a guarantee that democratic systems will emerge and function. Nor are they a sufficient condition for maintaining democratic systems, but they are a necessary one.

For that reason it is worthwhile to examine the factors that explain democratic – and non-democratic – attitudes. There are many conjectures. Whereas historians tend to view each political system as unique and social scientists search for generally valid "laws", economistic explanations focus on "hard" facts such as occupation, income and level, culturalistic approaches examine the influence of "civilisation", in particular of ethnic groups and religions, and political scientists prefer to analyse the consequences of having and seeking power, of the possibility or impossibility of acquiring it and the formative influence of specific "political cultures".

This study will not favour any particular hypothesis based on one of these assumptions. Rather, it will attempt to empirically examine the relative influence of social, economic, cultural and political factors on attitudes towards democracy using an exceptionally diverse dataset. As we shall see below, a number of apparently plausible assumptions cannot be confirmed.

The dataset

The dataset consists of 11 studies in ten countries carried out between 2002 and 2007. Seven of these are based on nationally representative samples and four on samples representative of the capital or major cities. All surveys used the same questionnaire filled out in face-to-face interviews.

Besides four African and three Asian countries, the dataset includes three countries from the Middle East, southeast Europe and the Caucasus, respectively. The criterion for selection was an ethnically and religiously diverse population. This is also in keeping with the objective of the series of which individual studies form part: the exploration of opportunities of peaceful and democratic coexistence in multicommunal states.[1] Accordingly, the target variables of all the studies are conviviality between ethnic groups on the one hand and attitudes towards democracy on the other. The choice of case studies is particularly suited to the specific purpose of our investigation on account of the diversity of ethnic and religious groups and political systems. A common feature of all the case studies in this analysis is the presence of latent or open conflict – and ambivalent experiences of democracy. According to the

[1] Surveys have also been conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2002), Pakistan (1996), the Palestinian territories (1995) and Rwanda (1993). For reasons of space and manageability, these and earlier surveys in Indonesia (1999, 2001, 2005), Lebanon (1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 2002, 2006), Georgia (1997) and Sri Lanka (1988) are not part of the current analysis.

Freedom House Index,[2] at the time of the respective survey two of the countries were not free, two were free (a fairly recent development in both cases) and the others were classified as partly free, a fairly wide grey zone. Hence, the great majority of respondents were not socialised under conditions of liberal democracy.

Country	***Year***	***NN***	***Freedom House Index***
Chad	2004	1,199	6-5 not free
Zimbabwe	2005	1,012	7-6 not free
Georgia	2003	1,763	4-4 partly free
Indonesia:	2007		3-4 partly free
Jakarta		1,000	
Bandung		400	
Kosovo	2004/05	1,512	5-5 partly free
Lebanon	2007	2,186	5-4 partly free
Malaysia	2005	1,397	4-4 partly free
Sri Lanka	2005/06	1,967	3-3 partly free
Namibia	2005	875	2-2 free
South Africa	2002	2,164	1-2 free

The dependent variable: attitudes towards democracy

Many surveys on attitudes adopt a "nominalistic" approach. For instance, the item: "Do you think democracy is the best form of government?" assumes that democracy means the same thing to the respondents' and those who interpret the collected data. In our surveys, respondents were asked to choose between simply and intelligibly formulated alternatives

- on the rule of law,
- on the separation of powers, and
- on the freedom of the press,

and express an opinion on

- the freedom of expression,
- on election fraud,
- on domination by one group, and
- on a one-party system.

Here is a list of statements which describes different ways in which a society can be governed. For each pair of statements, which one could you agree with?

Judges, who follow instructions given by the government. *Or:* Judges, who apply the law whatever the government says.	**x**
A prime minister[3] who's power is balanced by the parliament. *Or:* A prime minister who can act without interference from members of parliament.	**x**

[2] Sources: www.freedomhouse.org and the indices published each year in the "Journal for Democracy"; on problems raised by this classification, cf. Iliya Harik, Democracy and the Paradoxes of Cultural Diversity. Beyond the Veil of Difference, Byblos: CISH 2003

[3] Or "president", "government", etc., depending on the political system of country in question. This pair of alternatives was not included in the 2007 survey in Lebanon.

Control of newspapers by government in order to prevent disunity. *Or:* Newspapers free to criticise government and enjoy freedom of expression.	**x**

Please tell us whether you find each of the following opinions acceptable or not.

It is harmful for society that individuals or groups have different opinions and pursue different interests.[4]	**No**
It is permissible to falsify election results in order to allow the better candidate for the country to win.	**No**
One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people that refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave.	**Not acceptable**
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition.	**Not acceptable**

These seven items were used to create a democracy index. Respondents who gave no, one or two pro-democracy answers were defined as being non-democratic, three or four pro-democracy answers as partly democratic, and five six or seven answers as democratic.

The independent variables

The target variable "attitudes towards democracy" was examined in relation to three different categories of independent variables.

The first consists of the classic social variables:

- gender
- age[5]
- occupation[6]
- religious affiliation[7]
- membership of ethnic or religious group[8]
- income[9]
- level of education[10].

The second category contains

- self-perception of class affiliation[11]

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4 As an additional item, this question was rephrased replacing the word "harmful" with "normal"; agreement with the "softer" formulation was considerably higher across all groups. For this reason, it was decided to use the "harder" version in the index.

5 18 – 24, 25 – 34, 35 – 49, 50+

6 In the overall dataset classified as: farmer, blue-collar, white-collar, trade/commerce, professional, and economically inactive.

7 Categories: Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, other.

8 Categories: dominant group, influential group, other group

9 Household income: high, middle, low.

10 Local school levels were used in the individual case studies and summarised as follows for the overall dataset: no formal education – primary school – some years of post-primary education – secondary school – university.

11 "Some people say that there are different levels in society which others call classes.
Here we are thinking of economic levels and not of groups with different languages/ethnic groups.

- the most important source of information[12]
- political participation (political abstinence,[13] party affiliation,[14] unconditional allegiance[15])

The components of the third category are complex scales of different fields of social attitudes that could reflect specific attitudes towards democracy:

- "Cautiousness in relations with others"

  I feel uncertain and fearful about my future." –"One must be very cautious with people; you cannot trust the people who live and work around you." – "One should be sure that something really works before taking a chance on it." – "If you try to change things you usually make them worse." – "There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country."

- "Economic Satisfaction"

  "Of course, people always like to earn more, but I consider my income to be reasonable." – "Whatever my personal efforts, I will not get the education and jobs I am entitled to." (Answer: no) – "If I could, I would change to another kind of work." (Answer: no) –"When I see what rich people have I feel that I should have the same." (Answer: no) – "It doesn't matter what workers and/or employees do, they can never win against the bosses." (Answer: no) –"How do you feel about life in ... (country)?" (Answers "Very happy with life as it is", "Happy with life as it is" and "satisfied with life as it is".

- "Religiosity" (belief and practice)

  "I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion." – "Whatever people say, there are hidden forces of good and evil which may help or harm me." – "I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished." – "I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one." – "I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God." (Answer: no) – "How often do you pray?" (Answer: regularly & often) – "Do you practice religious rituals (attending services, fasting)? (Answer: regularly & often).

- "Communalism" (identification with an ethnic or religious group)

  "I prefer to be with people who speak my own language." – "I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth or political views." – "I feel very close to people of my own ethnic group, whatever their education, wealth or political views." – "I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different ethnic group if they loved each other." (Answer: no) – "I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they love each other." (Answer: no).

- "Conviviality" (willingness to coexist with different groups; openness; tolerance.

  "I fear that peace and co-operation between (dominant ethnic/religious group) and others may have become impossible. Or: In spite of everything, peace and co-operation can still be achieved." (Second option) – "I fear that peace and co-operation between (dominant

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To what level in society would you be closest to?" The categories for the overall dataset are as follows: upper & upper middle level – middle level – lower middle & lower level.

12 TV, radio, newspapers, family and friends

13 "If you keep out of politics you have peace and a clean conscience."

14 Categories in the overall dataset: ruling party – opposition – other.

15 "Even if my leader acts in a way I do not understand, I would still support him/her in an election."

ethnic/religious group) may have become impossible. Or: In spite of everything, peace and co-operation can still be achieved." (Second option) – "Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle." – "In the present conflicts of our country all sides concerned should seek compromises and try to find agreement." – "Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting." – "Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights." – "A good friend is a good friend whether he is called Muhammad or Georges."

In most case studies, the correlation between opinions and attitudes on items within each field of opinions and attitudes was high. This permitted the construction of scales with meaningful alpha values.

Statistical analysis

In the first part the 11 samples are analysed separately. The dependent variable is "attitudes towards democracy", broken down into the categories "non-democratic", "partly democratic" and "democratic". The first step is to study the correlation between the target variable and the social variables. For the independent variable "level of education", the analysis applies the divisions in the education system of the country in question. The next step is to analyse perceived class affiliation, sources of political information and political involvement as well as correlations with attitude scales where they exist. After that we determine the relative significance of the independent variables for democratic attitudes using the CART method.[16] As a final step, we summarise the analyses of the individual case studies.

In the second part of the study the 11 surveys are analysed as a single dataset.[17] For this purpose the target variable was simplified: as the focus is on determinants of democrat attitudes, non-democrats and partial democrats are classified together as "less democratic". The independent variables are expanded to include the specific survey (country/city). The variable "level of education" was also simplified.[18] As a first step, the relative significance of the social variables for democratic attitudes is examined using the CHAID method.[19] In a second step, the scales of social attitudes are included.

Comparison of the results of the case studies

Chad is a remarkable instance of "democrats without democracy".[20] Three quarters of the respondents clearly have democratic attitudes, and another good fifth are at least partly

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16 Classification and Regression Trees (CART) breaks down the data into segments that are as homogeneous as possible with respect to the dependent variable - binary node splitting. A terminal node in which all cases have the same value for the dependent variable is a homogeneous, "pure" node. CART ranks each independent (predictor) variable according to its importance to the model.

17 The dataset was not weighted (e.g. by population of the respective country or city) as the objective of identifying determinants of democratic attitudes is best achieved on the basis of individual attitudes. Because weightings encourage over- or undercounting of individual cases, they do not contribute additional insights.

18 No formal education – primary school – some years of post-primary education – secondary school – university

19 CHAID (Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detection) determines in each step the independent variable that has the highest correlation with the dependent variable.

20 Helga Dickow, Democrats without Democracy? Attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics in Chad, Byblos: CISH 2005

democratic. Men are somewhat more likely than women to be democrats.[21] Age is not a significant factor. The number of democrats is above average (87%) among white-collar workers and below average (63%) among farmers. Democrats are a little more common among Christians (79%) than Muslims (71%). The political importance of groups of which respondents are members plays no role, but the level of income does: the proportion of democrats rises from 64% in the lowest income stratum, through 74% in the middle group, to 81% in the highest. The linear correlation between "democracy" and education is remarkable:

LEVEL OF EDUCATION	DEMOCRATS
No formal education	61%
Koran school, Bible school	64%
Primary school	72%
Some years of post-primary education	77%
Secondary school completed (baccalaureate)	88%
University	89%

All figures in this table and in the following tables and lists are given in percent, rounded to the nearest whole number.

Respondents who define themselves as middle class are far more likely to be democrats (78%) than those whose define themselves as upper class (67%). There are also marked differences by source of political information: those who obtain their information from newspapers and radio are more likely to be democrats (78% and 77%, respectively) that those who rely primarily on the market place. Although the willingness to participate in politics is not a significant determinant of democratic attitudes, support for a political party is: 81% of the supporters of opposition parties are democrats, compared with only 66% of supporters of the ruling party. The percentage of democrats among people who give unconditional support to their favourite politician is below average (61%), in contrast to that among those who disapprove of such allegiance (80%).

Chadian respondents' attitudes towards democracy correlate significantly with two attitude scales. The proportion of democrats is correlates directly with religiosity: 71% among the less religious, 72% among the moderately religious and 77% among the very religious. It is inversely proportional to communalist attitudes: 86% of respondents who identify little, 73% of those who identify partly and only 68% of those who identify strongly with their group are democrats.[22]

In other words, democratic and less democratic attitudes correlate with a number of independent variables. Which are the most important? According to the CART analysis, level of education is far and away the primary predictor of democratic attitudes.

The number of democrats does not increase linearly. The percentage of democrats is lowest among respondents who have not completed secondary school and thus have limited career opportunities. By contrast, more than three quarters of the university graduates are democratic. There are no significant differences by self-defined class affiliation, but there are by the most important source of political information: only 39% of respondents who receive their information by word of mouth, but 69% of those who rely on TV and 75% of newspaper

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21 Men: 79%; women: 70%; however, the latter also have a much lower level of education.

22 Cf. Helga Dickow (in cooperation with Petra Bauerle), Ethnisch-religiöse Identifikation und politisches Bewusstsein. Einstellungen und Meinungen im Tschad, in: Peter Molt and Helga Dickow (eds.), Kulturen und Konflikte im Vergleich – Comparing Cultures and Conflicts, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007, pp. 549–561.

readers are democrats. Democrats are more willing than other respondents to participate in politics, and they are more likely to reject unconditional support of political leaders. Party affiliation is not a significant factor.

The proportion of democrats varies considerably with regard to different social attitudes. Democratic attitudes correlate inversely with cautiousness[23] and directly with economic satisfaction[24] and conviviality.[25] The degree of religiosity is not significantly related with democratic attitudes, but the degree of communalism is: the number of democrats is disproportionately high both among respondents that identify weakly and among those that identify very strongly with their group (70% in both cases).[26]

The CART analysis of social factors reveals that educational status is the primary predictor of democratic attitudes.

[23] The proportion of democrats among the very cautious is 59%, among people of average cautiousness 67% and among the less cautious 81%.

[24] 67% (very unsatisfied) – 62% – 69% – 77% – 78% (very satisfied)

[25] 44% (least convivial) – 55% – 72% (most convivial)

[26] It is not unusual to that a low level of communalism correlates strongly with democratic attitudes. In Georgia, the high proportion of communalist democrats signifies that ethnic Georgians identify strongly with the democracy in which they are the dominant group.


Democratic Attitudes - CHAD
not democratic
in the middle
democratic
Node 0
Category % n
not democratic 4,3 51
in the middle 21,4 256
democratic 74,4 892
Total 100,0 1199
Education
Improvement=0,008
coran school, can read; primary school; no schooling
university grad.; sec. sch. graduate; second. school; vocational sch.
Node 1
Category % n
not democratic 6,2 33
in the middle 27,3 144
democratic 66,5 351
Total 44,0 528
Occupation
Improvement=0,002
Node 2
Category % n
not democratic 2,7 18
in the middle 16,7 112
democratic 80,6 541
Total 56,0 671
Education
Improvement=0,003
white collar; trade, commerce; blue collar
econ. inactive; professionals; farmer
second. school
university grad.; sec. sch. graduate; vocational sch.
Node 3
Category % n
not democratic 6,7 16
in the middle 21,2 51
democratic 72,1 173
Total 20,0 240
Age
Improvement=0,002
Node 4
Category % n
not democratic 5,9 17
in the middle 32,3 93
democratic 61,8 178
Total 24,0 288
Education
Improvement=0,003
Node 5
Category % n
not democratic 3,4 15
in the middle 19,9 88
democratic 76,7 340
Total 36,9 443
Income family
Improvement=0,003
Node 6
Category % n
not democratic 1,3 3
in the middle 10,5 24
democratic 88,2 201
Total 19,0 228
Dominant/influential group
Improvement=0,001
<= -25 years
> -25 years
primary school
coran school, can read; no schooling
high
middle; low
dominant
other; influential
Node 7
Category % n
not democratic 12,3 10
in the middle 25,9 21
democratic 61,7 50
Total 6,8 81
Node 8
Category % n
not democratic 3,8 6
in the middle 18,9 30
democratic 77,4 123
Total 13,3 159
Node 9
Category % n
not democratic 5,1 5
in the middle 22,2 22
democratic 72,7 72
Total 8,3 99
Node 10
Category % n
not democratic 6,3 12
in the middle 37,6 71
democratic 56,1 106
Total 15,8 189
Node 11
Category % n
not democratic 2,1 4
in the middle 14,3 27
democratic 83,6 158
Total 15,8 189
Node 12
Category % n
not democratic 4,3 11
in the middle 24,0 61
democratic 71,7 182
Total 21,2 254
Node 13
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 17,9 10
democratic 82,1 46
Total 4,7 56
Node 14
Category % n
not democratic 1,7 3
in the middle 8,1 14
democratic 90,1 155
Total 14,3 172
Income family
Improvement=0,001
Occupation
Improvement=0,002
Religion
Improvement=0,001
Occupation
Improvement=0,002
Religion
Improvement=0,000
high; middle
low
econ. inactive; professionals
farmer
muslims
christians
trade, commerce; blue collar
white collar; econ. inactive; professionals; farmer
muslims
christians
Node 15
Category % n
not democratic 2,8 3
in the middle 16,7 18
democratic 80,6 87
Total 9,0 108
Node 16
Category % n
not democratic 5,9 3
in the middle 23,5 12
democratic 70,6 36
Total 4,3 51
Node 17
Category % n
not democratic 4,9 6
in the middle 43,9 54
democratic 51,2 63
Total 10,3 123
Node 18
Category % n
not democratic 9,1 6
in the middle 25,8 17
democratic 65,2 43
Total 5,5 66
Node 19
Category % n
not democratic 3,8 4
in the middle 17,3 18
democratic 78,8 82
Total 8,7 104
Node 20
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 10,6 9
democratic 89,4 76
Total 7,1 85
Node 21
Category % n
not democratic 1,9 1
in the middle 11,5 6
democratic 86,5 45
Total 4,3 52
Node 22
Category % n
not democratic 5,0 10
in the middle 27,2 55
democratic 67,8 137
Total 16,8 202
Node 23
Category % n
not democratic 1,6 1
in the middle 3,2 2
democratic 95,2 59
Total 5,2 62
Node 24
Category % n
not democratic 1,8 2
in the middle 10,9 12
democratic 87,3 96
Total 9,2 110

Democrats are most frequently found among secondary school, vocational school and university graduates and less frequently among respondents with no formal education or those who have attended Koran or Bible schools. Democrats are also often found among political influential, non-dominant ethnic groups. Moreover, among the better educated in such groups the proportion of democrats is higher among Muslims than Christians (cf. fourth level, Nodes 23 and 24).

In the case of *Chad*, the independent variables in the CART model are ranked by importance (normalised importance; minimum value = 0%, maximum value = 100%) as follows:

Education	100%
Income	61%
Occupation	55%
Gender	41%
Religious affiliation	37%
Age	30%
Group affiliation	14%

Georgia has made great progress towards becoming a functioning democracy. However, at the time the survey was carried out, the young democracy was by no means so firmly in the saddle. That said, 67% of the respondents reveal democratic attitudes, 28% are partly democratic and 5% not democratic at all.

Although gender is not a significant variable, age is: democrats were overrepresented among the youngest respondents and in the 35–49 age group, and underrepresented in the oldest age group. Occupation plays no role, but religious and ethnic affiliation does: democrats are noticeably more frequent among Christians (70%) and members of the dominant ethnic group (69%) than among Muslims (49%) and members of other ethnic groups (58%). The former are Orthodox ethnic Georgians and the latter Azeris. It is easier for the former to identify with the post-Soviet democracy as it has given them the opportunity to exercise power, whereas a substantial number of the minority Azeris feel that their interests were looked after better by the former rulers in Moscow than by the new rulers in Tiflis.[27]

The proportion of democrats rises sharply with income, from 58% in the lowest income group to 72% in the middle and higher income groups. The spread is even wider by level of education:

No formal & primary education	54
Secondary school not completed	51
Vocational school	67
Secondary school completed	63
University not completed	68
University completed	76

In Georgia, religious affiliation is virtually identical with ethnic affiliation. Christians are either Georgians or Armenians, and Muslims are Azeris. For geographic and historical reasons, the

[27] An earlier survey had already established the existence of nostalgia for the Soviet system among minorities. Cf. Theodor Hanf and Ghia Nodia, Georgia Lurching to Democracy. From agnostic tolerance to pious Jacobinism: Societal change and peoples' reactions. Baden-Baden: NOMOS 2000.

latter have a deficit in education. Hence, it is not surprising that education is a more powerful variable for explaining democratic attitudes than religious affiliation (normalised importance):

Education	100%
Religious affiliation	95%
Income	76%
Occupation	3%

In particular, democrats are (Georgian) Christians with low incomes and a high level of education.

If the social attitudes scales are included in the CART analysis, as our discussion of correlation analyses suggests, then conviviality becomes the primary predictor of democratic attitudes.



The strength of the predictors in descending order (normalised importance) is as follows:

Conviviality	100%
Religious affiliation	55%
Cautiousness	55%
Education	37%
Occupation	35%
Group affiliation	31%
Income	30%

Democrats are above all respondents with high conviviality, medium to high cautiousness, medium to high income, white-collar workers and farmers.

If conviviality is treated as a dependent variable, then democratic attitudes are the leading predictor: they explain 78% of the level of conviviality.



A disproportionately high number of convivialists are economically inactive (e.g. students) and express below-average cautiousness and a medium or high level of economic satisfaction. Is this perhaps a statistically induced tautology between democrats and convivialists? There is also another interpretation. As discussed above, the components of our democracy index are "hard" statements about the functioning of democratic systems. By contrast, the components of the conviviality scale are "soft" statements about coexistence, which may be viewed as a catalogue of democratic virtues in divided societies. "Conviviality" determines the limits of a political culture within which democratic institutions have to function. We shall return to this below.

When we conducted our surveys in ***Indonesia***, the country had already made considerable progress in consolidating democracy. The case study in the large city of ***Bandung*** reveals that a good three quarters of respondents are democrats and that most of the rest are partial democrats.

Correlation analyses showed that only two of the social variables are significant: group affiliation and income. Among respondents of the dominant group, 73% are democrats, whereas among respondents drawn from influential, politically non-dominant and other groups 82% and 89%, respectively, were democrats. In other words, groups that do not share political power express a stronger interest in democracy. Democratic attitudes correlate directly with income: 67% of the lower, 76% of the middle and 87% of the upper income stratum are democrats.

Whereas perceived class affiliation, source of information, willingness to participate in politics, party affiliation and unconditional allegiance do not appear to affect attitudes towards democracy, two scales of attitudes do: religiosity and conviviality. Religiosity correlates directly with "democracy",[28] as does conviviality.[29]

As seen above, of all our social variables, only household income correlates strongly with democratic attitudes. CART analysis convincingly confirms this finding.

Income is the primary predictor: respondents in the upper income group are more likely to be democrats than those in the middle and lower income groups. All high-earning interviewees who are not members of the dominant or another influential group are, without exception, democrats. By contrast, the least democratic respondents are low-income members of the dominant ethnic group (and of "others").

[28] 58% of the respondents with low, 73% with medium and 79% with high religiosity

[29] 50% of the respondents with low, 72% with medium and 78% with high conviviality



Bandung is the only case covered in this report in which level of education is not a significant variable. We do not have a really satisfactory explanation for this exceptional behaviour, unless "occupation" is taken as a substitute for education (node 9 und 10): white-collar workers and professionals, i.e., occupations that, as a rule, require higher educational qualifications, have a significantly higher proportion of democrats than blue-collar workers, traders and merchants, and economically inactive persons. Another explanation is the highly significant correlation between level of education and income. As level of education rises, the proportion of respondents in the lowest income group declines[30] and that in the highest income group rises.[31]

[30] Almost linearly: 69% (lowest) – 41% – 71% – 26% – 20% – 0% – 3% – 0% (highest level of education)

[31] 0% (lowest) – 21% – 4% – 22% – 50% – 63% – 94% – 100% (highest level of education)

In ***Jakarta***, the capital of Indonesia, 60% of respondents are democrats, 35% are partly democratic and 5% undemocratic. Among the non-democrats there are twice as many women as men. Age does not play a role. Democrats are overrepresented among professionals (74%) and economically inactive persons (67%), and non-democrats among traders and merchants (9%). By religious affiliation, the proportion of democrats among Muslims and Christians is equal, whereas Muslims are overrepresented among partial democrats and Christians among non-democrats (16%). The proportion of democrats rises almost linearly with income,[32] and, in contrast to the Bandung survey, correlates even more closely with level of education:

No formal education	56
Elementary not completed	47
Elementary completed	50
Junior High School	56
Senior High School	66
Diploma	85
University degree	85

The proportion of democrats among respondents without any formal education is noteworthy, as it is higher than those with primary school education. This inversion aside, democratic convictions correlate directly with level of education.

People who regard themselves as middle-class are more likely than others to be democrats (67%). The same holds for respondents who turn first to television for information (64%). There is no significant correlation between political involvement and party support on the one hand and democratic opinions on the other. However, democrats (64%) are significantly less likely than partial and non-democrats to follow a politician unconditionally.

Cautiousness, religiosity and conviviality do not influence democratic attitudes. Democratic attitudes correlate directly with economic satisfaction, apart from a modest decline among the most satisfied.[33] There is also a significant relationship between communalist and democratic attitudes: 54% of very, 65% of less and 73% of non-communalist respondents are democrats.

The CART analysis for Jakarta confirms the predominance of the level of education.

[32] 49% (lowest) – 57% – 55% – 69% (highest income group)

[33] 52% (least) – 62% – 64% – 66% – 63% (most satisfied)



Whereas 52% of junior high school graduates and respondents with less or no formal schooling are democrats, among respondents with higher qualifications this figure rises to 85%.

The explanatory power of the various social variables can be ranked as followed (normalised importance):

Education	100%
Occupation	39%
Income	14%
Age	8%
Gender	6%
Group affiliation	2%

The results of the survey in ***Kosovo*** differ sharply from the aforementioned cases. Despite the intensive efforts of the authorities to build a democratic state in the international protectorate, the democrats in this territory are still a minority of 41%; 39% are partial democrats and 20% are clearly not democratic.[34]

[34] For a detailed analysis, see Theodor Hanf (in co-operation with Petra Bauerle and Rainer Hampel), Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics in Kosovo. An empirical survey, Byblos: CISH 2005

Among the last group, women are overrepresented at 24%. Democrats are more common among younger than older respondents and among white-collar workers and professionals than traders, farmers and economically inactive persons. They are also better represented among Christians (57%) than Muslims (39%); in Kosovo Christians are by and large Serbs, the former dominant group, and Muslims predominantly Albanians, the current ruling group.

Income does not correlate significantly with democratic attitudes, but level of education does. The proportion of democrats rises almost linearly from one level of education to the next:

No formal education	19
Primary school not completed	34
Primary school completed	31
Secondary school not completed	47
Secondary school completed	46
Technicon	52
University	57

Democratic attitudes are least pronounced among respondents who obtain their political information by word of mouth (20%) and markedly higher among radio listeners (48%) and newspaper readers (44%). People who reject political abstinence are more likely to be democrats (55%) than those who agree (38%). Sixty-four percent of the supporters of parties that cater to the Serb minority express democratic attitudes, but only 39% of the supporters of parties that appeal primarily to the Albanian majority. With respect to unconditional political allegiance, 49% of those who reject it are democrats as against 37% of those who profess such support.

All social attitudes' scales correlate significantly with democratic convictions. On the cautiousness scale, the greatest proportion of democrats is found among somewhat cautious respondents. There is a direct linear correlation between democrats and the level of economic satisfaction,[35] and an almost linear inverse correlation between democratic attitudes and religiosity.[36] Respondents who expressed a low degree of communalism are more likely (53%) to be democrats than those who identify strongly or very strongly with their group. Finally, democratic convictions rise dramatically with conviviality: only 18% of non-convivial respondents are democrats, compared to 31% of the middle group and 49% or those that hold strong convivialist convictions.

A CART analysis of social variables alone identifies level of education as the primary predictor.

[35] 36% (lowest) – 39% – 48% – 54% – 85% (highest satisfaction)

[36] 86% (lowest) – 55% – 36% – 39% (highest religiosity)



The proportion of democrats is much higher among respondents with more than a primary school education (46%), whereas non-democrats are heavily overrepresented among respondents without any formal education (47%). The ranking of the social variables by explanatory power is as follows:

Education	100%
Occupation	75%
Gender	46%
Income	27%
Age	15%
Group	4%
Religious affiliation	<1%

However, if the attitudes scales are included in the CART analysis, the ranking shifts and, as in Georgia, the degree of conviviality is the primary predictor of democratic attitudes.


Democratic Attitudes - KOSOVO
Not democratic
In the middle
Democratic
Node 0
Category % n
Not democratic 21,8 325
In the middle 39,1 584
Democratic 39,2 585
Total 100,0 1494
Conviviality
Improvement=0,023
very high
high; (very) low
Node 1
Category % n
Not democratic 15,0 143
In the middle 36,9 351
Democratic 48,1 457
Total 63,7 951
Node 2
Category % n
Not democratic 33,5 182
In the middle 42,9 233
Democratic 23,6 128
Total 36,3 543
Communalism
Improvement=0,008
Conviviality
Improvement=0,008
high; middle
low
high
(very) low
Node 3
Category % n
Not democratic 15,8 140
In the middle 38,6 342
Democratic 45,7 405
Total 59,4 887
Node 4
Category % n
Not democratic 4,7 3
In the middle 14,1 9
Democratic 81,2 52
Total 4,3 64
Node 5
Category % n
Not democratic 26,9 111
In the middle 46,7 193
Democratic 26,4 109
Total 27,6 413
Node 6
Category % n
Not democratic 54,6 71
In the middle 30,8 40
Democratic 14,6 19
Total 8,7 130
Occupation
Improvement=0,002
Religiosity
Improvement=0,002
Econ. inactive; Professionals; Trade, commerce
Blue collar; White collar; Farmer
very high
high; very low; low
Node 7
Category % n
Not democratic 30,7 93
In the middle 46,5 141
Democratic 22,8 69
Total 20,3 303
Node 8
Category % n
Not democratic 16,4 18
In the middle 47,3 52
Democratic 36,4 40
Total 7,4 110
Node 9
Category % n
Not democratic 68,9 42
In the middle 26,2 16
Democratic 4,9 3
Total 4,1 61
Node 10
Category % n
Not democratic 42,0 29
In the middle 34,8 24
Democratic 23,2 16
Total 4,6 69
Religiosity
Improvement=0,002
very high; very low
high; low
Node 11
Category % n
Not democratic 24,3 42
In the middle 50,3 87
Democratic 25,4 44
Total 11,6 173
Node 12
Category % n
Not democratic 39,2 51
In the middle 41,5 54
Democratic 19,2 25
Total 8,7 130
Age
Improvement=0,002
"25-34" or less
Higher than "25-34"
Node 13
Category % n
Not democratic 17,9 14
In the middle 44,9 35
Democratic 37,2 29
Total 5,2 78
Node 14
Category % n
Not democratic 29,5 28
In the middle 54,7 52
Democratic 15,8 15
Total 6,4 95

The main characteristics of democrats are a very high degree of conviviality and a low level of communalism, whereas non-democrats express little conviviality and are very religious. By explanatory power the dependent variables rank as follows:

Conviviality	100%
Education	30%
Communalism	29%
Economic satisfaction	16%
Religiosity	6%
Occupation	9%
Group affiliation	8%
Age	7%
Cautiousness	6%
Income	3%
Religious affiliation	<1%

If conviviality is taken as a dependent variable, the primary predictor is democratic attitudes, as in Georgia.


Conviviality - KOSOVO
(very) low
high
very high
Node 0
Category % n
(very) low 8,7 130
high 27,6 413
very high 63,7 951
Total 100,0 1494
Democratic Attitudes
Improvement=0,021
Democratic
In the middle; Not democratic
Node 1
Category % n
(very) low 3,2 19
high 18,6 109
very high 78,1 457
Total 39,2 585
Node 2
Category % n
(very) low 12,2 111
high 33,4 304
very high 54,3 494
Total 60,8 909
Education
Improvement=0,002
Education
Improvement=0,007
"Prim. completed" or less
Higher than "Prim. completed"
"No schooling" or less
Higher than "No schooling"
Node 3
Category % n
(very) low 6,6 12
high 23,8 43
very high 69,6 126
Total 12,1 181
Node 4
Category % n
(very) low 1,7 7
high 16,3 66
very high 81,9 331
Total 27,0 404
Node 5
Category % n
(very) low 35,7 20
high 42,9 24
very high 21,4 12
Total 3,7 56
Node 6
Category % n
(very) low 10,7 91
high 32,8 280
very high 56,5 482
Total 57,1 853
Religiosity
Improvement=0,001
Communalism
Improvement=0,007
very high; high; very low
low
high; middle
low
Node 7
Category % n
(very) low 1,2 4
high 14,3 47
very high 84,5 278
Total 22,0 329
Node 8
Category % n
(very) low 4,0 3
high 25,3 19
very high 70,7 53
Total 5,0 75
Node 9
Category % n
(very) low 9,5 76
high 31,8 255
very high 58,7 471
Total 53,7 802
Node 10
Category % n
(very) low 29,4 15
high 49,0 25
very high 21,6 11
Total 3,4 51
Income Household
Improvement=0,002
Democratic Attitudes
Improvement=0,005
Low; Middle
High
In the middle
Not democratic
Node 11
Category % n
(very) low 2,0 4
high 18,7 38
very high 79,3 161
Total 13,6 203
Node 12
Category % n
(very) low 0,0 0
high 7,1 9
very high 92,9 117
Total 8,4 126
Node 13
Category % n
(very) low 5,2 27
high 30,9 162
very high 63,9 335
Total 35,1 524
Node 14
Category % n
(very) low 17,6 49
high 33,5 93
very high 48,9 136
Total 18,6 278
Age
Improvement=0,001
Economic satisfaction
Improvement=0,001
Education
Improvement=0,002
"25-34" or less
Higher than "25-34"
very low; low
middle; very high; high
"Prim. uncomp." or less
Higher than "Prim. uncomp."
Node 15
Category % n
(very) low 1,6 2
high 23,6 29
very high 74,8 92
Total 8,2 123
Node 16
Category % n
(very) low 2,5 2
high 11,2 9
very high 86,2 69
Total 5,4 80
Node 17
Category % n
(very) low 0,0 0
high 12,0 9
very high 88,0 66
Total 5,0 75
Node 18
Category % n
(very) low 0,0 0
high 0,0 0
very high 100,0 51
Total 3,4 51
Node 19
Category % n
(very) low 9,3 7
high 41,3 31
very high 49,3 37
Total 5,0 75
Node 20
Category % n
(very) low 4,5 20
high 29,2 131
very high 66,4 298
Total 30,1 449

The order of the independent variables is as follows (normalised importance):

Democratic attitudes	100%
Education	57%
Communalism	32%
Economic satisfaction	16%
Religiosity	11%
Income	7%
Age	5%
Occupation	3%
Religious affiliation	2%

Democratic attitudes are best explained by conviviality – and vice versa. In both cases, education is the second strongest predictor.

The case study of ***Lebanon*** produces a similar pattern of results, but with a substantially higher acceptance of democracy: 85% of the respondents are democrats, 14% are partly democratic and only 1% of interviewees do not have any democratic attitudes.

There are no differences between men and women and minor differences by age: the youngest age group is overrepresented among partial democrats and the oldest among democrats. Farmers are underrepresented (68%) and professionals and the economically inactive overrepresented (87%). By religious affiliation the difference is small: 88% of the Christians are democrats and 83% of the Muslims. Differences by income[37] are equally modest. By level of education, though, they are greater:

No formal education	80
Reads and writes	84
Primary school	84
Brevet[38]	80
Secondary	85
University	90

Whereas 83% of those who do not want to be involved in politics are democrats, this figure rises to 90% among those who are politically active. Party affiliation plays no role. Among those who are prepared to stick by their favourite politician through foul and fair, 78% are democrats, compared to 88% of those who are not willing to do so.

The proportion of democrats rises gradually with cautiousness and economic satisfaction, but shows hardly any correlation with religiosity. By contrast, differences by degree of conviviality are highly significant: 65% of the non-convivial, 84% of the fairly and 89% of the very convivial respondents are democrats.

Here, too, the CART analysis of the social variables identifies level of education as the primary predictor.

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[37] In the lowest income group 83% are democrats, in the middle 85% and in the highest 88%.

[38] General education: qualification granting admission to the higher level of secondary school; vocational schools: advanced vocational diploma required for various occupations.


Democratic Attitudes - LEBANON
not democratic
in the middle
democratic
Node 0
Category % n
not democratic 1,1 25
in the middle 13,7 300
democratic 85,1 1861
Total 100,0 2186
Education
Improvement=0,002
university
a primary sch.; brevet - sec. sch.; no educ.; higher educ.; read and write
Node 1
Category % n
not democratic 1,3 9
in the middle 9,2 63
democratic 89,5 615
Total 31,4 687
Node 2
Category % n
not democratic 1,1 16
in the middle 15,8 237
democratic 83,1 1246
Total 68,6 1499
Religion
Improvement=0,001
Occupation
Improvement=0,001
Muslims
Christians
trade, commerce; econ. inactive; blue collar; white collar
professionals; farmer
Node 3
Category % n
not democratic 2,8 9
in the middle 12,4 40
democratic 84,8 273
Total 14,7 322
Node 4
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 6,3 23
democratic 93,7 342
Total 16,7 365
Node 5
Category % n
not democratic 1,2 16
in the middle 14,8 203
democratic 84,0 1150
Total 62,6 1369
Node 6
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 26,2 34
democratic 73,8 96
Total 5,9 130
Age
Improvement=0,002
Occupation
Improvement=0,000
Age
Improvement=0,001
Age
Improvement=0,001
16-24 y.
50 y. and more; 25-34 y.; 35-49 y.
trade, commerce; blue collar
econ. inactive; professionals; white collar
16-24 y.
50 y. and more; 25-34 y.; 35-49 y.
50 y. and more
16-24 y.; 25-34 y.; 35-49 y.
Node 7
Category % n
not democratic 4,1 4
in the middle 25,5 25
democratic 70,4 69
Total 4,5 98
Node 8
Category % n
not democratic 2,2 5
in the middle 6,7 15
democratic 91,1 204
Total 10,2 224
Node 9
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 12,9 11
democratic 87,1 74
Total 3,9 85
Node 10
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 4,3 12
democratic 95,7 268
Total 12,8 280
Node 11
Category % n
not democratic 1,1 4
in the middle 18,6 69
democratic 80,3 298
Total 17,0 371
Node 12
Category % n
not democratic 1,2 12
in the middle 13,4 134
democratic 85,4 852
Total 45,7 998
Node 13
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 12,0 6
democratic 88,0 44
Total 2,3 50
Node 14
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 35,0 28
democratic 65,0 52
Total 3,7 80
Age
Improvement=0,000
Education
Improvement=0,000
50 y. and more; 16-24 y.; 25-34 y.
35-49 y.
higher educ.
a primary sch.; brevet - sec. sch.; no educ.; read and write
Node 15
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 5,6 12
democratic 94,4 203
Total 9,8 215
Node 16
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 0,0 0
democratic 100,0 65
Total 3,0 65
Node 17
Category % n
not democratic 0,9 3
in the middle 11,1 38
democratic 88,0 302
Total 15,7 343
Node 18
Category % n
not democratic 1,4 9
in the middle 14,7 96
democratic 84,0 550
Total 30,0 655
Age
Improvement=0,000
Dominant/influential group
Improvement=0,000
25-34 y.
50 y. and more; 35-49 y.
influential
other
Node 19
Category % n
not democratic 0,7 1
in the middle 15,0 23
democratic 84,3 129
Total 7,0 153
Node 20
Category % n
not democratic 1,1 2
in the middle 7,9 15
democratic 91,1 173
Total 8,7 190
Node 21
Category % n
not democratic 1,3 7
in the middle 14,0 78
democratic 84,8 473
Total 25,5 558
Node 22
Category % n
not democratic 2,1 2
in the middle 18,6 18
democratic 79,4 77
Total 4,4 97

In particular, democrats are found among university graduates (90%), among these slightly more Christians (94%) than Muslims (85%), economically inactive respondents, professionals and white-collar workers (96%). Among these occupations, 100% of the respondents aged 35–49 are democrats.

If the attitude scales are included in the analysis, the primary predictor is the degree of conviviality, followed by level of education and religious affiliation.



Malaysia ceased to be a functioning democracy many years ago.[39] According to our survey, a good half of its citizens (54%) are democrats, 34% have some democratic convictions and 12% none.

Gender and age do not correlate with the target variables of democracy. By occupation, democrats are more common among white-collar workers and traders and merchants (both 62%) and less common among farmers and blue-collar workers (both 47%). Whereas religious affiliation does not play a role, ethnic affiliation does: democrats are slightly overrepresented among Malays (57%), the dominant group. Democratic attitudes also correlate directly with income: 50% of the lowest income group are democrats, 54% of the middle and 56% of the highest. However, the spread is substantially broader by education:

No formal education	59
Primary school	45
Secondary school not completed	45
Secondary school grade 5	57
Vocational school	60
Upper secondary school	69
College, pre-university	68
University	79

As already observed in the case of Jakarta, a lack of formal education does not necessarily preclude democratic attitudes. Among those who have attended school, the proportion of democrats rises almost linearly through successive levels of education.

There are considerable differences by source of political information. The lowest proportion of democrats is found among radio listeners (43%) and television viewers (51%); in Malaysia radio and television are state-run. Among newspaper readers, on the other hand, a disproportionately high 60% are democrats. However, among respondents who depend on word of mouth the proportion is a much higher 68%. Democrats are more common among people who like to be involved in politics (65%) than among those who prefer to practise political abstinence (51%). They are more numerous among supporters of opposition parties (67%) than those of the ruling party. Those who disapprove of unconditional political allegiance are far more likely to be democratic (61%) that those who trust a political leader whether they understand the reasons for his actions or not (45%).

There is only a weak correlation between the attitude scales and support for emocracy. The proportion of democrats is slightly above average among respondents with an average degree of “trust”. It is greater among people with a high or very high level of economic satisfaction (59% and 63%, respectively). In contradistinction to most other case studies in this analysis, democrats are more numerous among respondents with a strong sense of communalism (59%) than among those who feel a weaker attachment to their respective group. Religiosity and conviviality do not significantly influence democratic attitudes.

39 Cf. Jürgen H. Wolff, A Plurality of Nations? Malaysia’s Quest for a Viable Polity, Byblos: CISH 2005; see also Theodor Hanf, Leslie Tramontini & Jürgen H. Wolff, Malaien – Muslime – Minderheiten. Konfliktwandel in Malaysia, Baden-Baden: Nomos (in the press).



The CART analysis identifies level of education as the primary predictor. Democrats are most frequent among secondary-school, college and university graduates, among such members of the dominant group and among economically inactive persons. Non-democrats are overrepresented among the less educated and members of “other”, i.e. autochthonous groups.

The explanatory power of factors determining attitudes towards democracy is as follows:

Education	100%
Group affiliation	74%
Occupation	57%
Religious affiliation	26%
Income	23%
Gender	7%
Age	1%

Our study in ***Sri Lanka***[40] was conducted during a spike in the country's violent interethnic conflict, a circumstance reflected in the findings. As in Kosovo, democrats are a minority (45%) of respondents; almost as many exhibit partially democratic convictions (42%) and 13% are obviously not democrats.

Women are less likely than men to be democrats (41% vs. 49%); age does not play a role. Farmers, white-collar workers and professionals are overrepresented among democrats and blue-collar workers and traders underrepresented. There are very wide differences by religious affiliation: 47% of Christians, 46% of Buddhists and 40% of Muslims, but only 6% of Hindu interviewees are democrats. In Sri Lanka religious affiliation and ethnic-group membership largely overlap. Forty-six percent of the dominant Buddhist Singhalese group revealed themselves to be democrats; the proportion was similar for "Others" (Christians and Tamil Muslims); but among the (Hindu) Tamils, who are particularly influential in the north of the country, the figure is only 6%. The proportion of democrats increases with rising income[41] and even more strongly, though not completely linearly, with level of education:

No formal education	21
Primary school	35
Junior secondary not completed	46
Junior secondary completed	39
Senior secondary not completed	43
Senior secondary completed	47
Vocational school	56
College, pre-university	56
University not completed	63
University completed	59

Democrats are more common among respondents who perceive themselves to middle-class (49%), but heavily underrepresented among those who consider themselves to be members of the upper class (30%). They are more numerous among newspaper readers (60%) and least common (34%) among people who depend on word of mouth for their political information. Political involvement and party preference are insignificant factors. The proportion of democrats is lower (42%) among respondents willing to give unconditional support to political leaders than among those who are more critical (55%).

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[40] Cf. the detailed analysis by Rainer Hampel, Case Study: Sri Lanka, in: Omar Chatah & Randy Nahle, Exploring Factors Conducive to Democratic Conflict Regulation, Byblos: CISH 2007, pp. 93–104.

[41] 41% (lowest) – 47% – 48% (highest income group)

Besides religiosity, there is a significant correlation between attitude scales and democratic opinions. Democrats are more common among respondents with little or average "trust". Support for democracy correlates directly with economic satisfaction.[42] It is higher among interviewees that identify strongly with their respective group (49%) than among less communally-oriented persons (42% and 43%, respectively). Conviviality in particular plays an important role:

Conviviality	Not democratic	Partly democratic	Democratic
Low	**41**	40	19
Middle	16	**46**	38
High	8	40	**52**

Non-democratic attitudes correspond inversely and democratic attitudes directly to conviviality.

The CART analysis shows that group affiliation is the primary predictor of democratic attitudes. Democrats are found mainly among members of the dominant group (and other, less influential groups) who have at least a secondary-school education and work in white-collar jobs or as farmers. Membership of an influential, but non-dominant group – the Tamils – is the leading predictor of non-democratic attitudes.

In descending order, the ability of social variables to explain democratic attitudes is as follows:

Group affiliation	100%
Religious affiliation	98%
Education	90%
Occupation	53%
Gender	27%
Age	21%

As discussed above, in Sri Lanka ethnic and religious affiliation overlap almost completely. Education is the third most important explanatory factor. If the ethnic factor is excluded from the CART analysis, religious affiliation is the primary predictor, followed by education.

[42] 37% (lowest) – 38% – 46% – 51% – 54% (highest satisfaction)


Democratic Attitudes - SRI LANKA
not democratic
in the middle
democratic
Node 0
Category % n
not democratic 13,4 263
in the middle 42,0 827
democratic 44,6 877
Total 100,0 1967
Dominant/influential groups
Improvement=0,008
dominant; other
influential
Node 1
Category % n
not democratic 12,4 237
in the middle 42,0 803
democratic 45,7 874
Total 97,3 1914
Node 2
Category % n
not democratic 49,1 26
in the middle 45,3 24
democratic 5,7 3
Total 2,7 53
Education
Improvement=0,005
"6" or less
Higher than "6"
Node 3
Category % n
not democratic 14,1 213
in the middle 43,4 655
democratic 42,5 642
Total 76,8 1510
Node 4
Category % n
not democratic 5,9 24
in the middle 36,6 148
democratic 57,4 232
Total 20,5 404
Occupation
Improvement=0,003
blue collar; econ. inactive; trade, commerce; professionals
white collar; farmer
Node 5
Category % n
not democratic 15,0 186
in the middle 44,9 556
democratic 40,1 497
Total 63,0 1239
Node 6
Category % n
not democratic 10,0 27
in the middle 36,5 99
democratic 53,5 145
Total 13,8 271
Education
Improvement=0,002
Gender
Improvement=0,002
"2" or less
Higher than "2"
male
female
Node 7
Category % n
not democratic 23,9 52
in the middle 43,1 94
democratic 33,0 72
Total 11,1 218
Node 8
Category % n
not democratic 13,1 134
in the middle 45,2 462
democratic 41,6 425
Total 51,9 1021
Node 9
Category % n
not democratic 9,5 20
in the middle 31,9 67
democratic 58,6 123
Total 10,7 210
Node 10
Category % n
not democratic 11,5 7
in the middle 52,5 32
democratic 36,1 22
Total 3,1 61
Age
Improvement=0,002
"35-49 y." or less
Higher than "35-49 y."
Node 11
Category % n
not democratic 13,9 99
in the middle 47,5 338
democratic 38,5 274
Total 36,1 711
Node 12
Category % n
not democratic 11,3 35
in the middle 40,0 124
democratic 48,7 151
Total 15,8 310


Democratic Attitudes - SRI LANKA
not democratic
in the middle
democratic
Node 0
Category % n
not democratic 13,4 263
in the middle 42,0 827
democratic 44,6 877
Total 100,0 1967
Religion
Improvement=0,008
Buddhists; Muslims; Christians
Hindus
Node 1
Category % n
not democratic 12,4 237
in the middle 42,0 803
democratic 45,7 874
Total 97,3 1914
Node 2
Category % n
not democratic 49,1 26
in the middle 45,3 24
democratic 5,7 3
Total 2,7 53
Education
Improvement=0,005
"6" or less
Higher than "6"
Node 3
Category % n
not democratic 14,1 213
in the middle 43,4 655
democratic 42,5 642
Total 76,8 1510
Node 4
Category % n
not democratic 5,9 24
in the middle 36,6 148
democratic 57,4 232
Total 20,5 404
Occupation
Improvement=0,003
blue collar; econ. inactive; trade, commerce; professionals
white collar; farmer
Node 5
Category % n
not democratic 15,0 186
in the middle 44,9 556
democratic 40,1 497
Total 63,0 1239
Node 6
Category % n
not democratic 10,0 27
in the middle 36,5 99
democratic 53,5 145
Total 13,8 271
Education
Improvement=0,002
Gender
Improvement=0,002
"2" or less
Higher than "2"
male
female
Node 7
Category % n
not democratic 23,9 52
in the middle 43,1 94
democratic 33,0 72
Total 11,1 218
Node 8
Category % n
not democratic 13,1 134
in the middle 45,2 462
democratic 41,6 425
Total 51,9 1021
Node 9
Category % n
not democratic 9,5 20
in the middle 31,9 67
democratic 58,6 123
Total 10,7 210
Node 10
Category % n
not democratic 11,5 7
in the middle 52,5 32
democratic 36,1 22
Total 3,1 61
Age
Improvement=0,002
"35-49 y." or less
Higher than "35-49 y."
Node 11
Category % n
not democratic 13,9 99
in the middle 47,5 338
democratic 38,5 274
Total 36,1 711
Node 12
Category % n
not democratic 11,3 35
in the middle 40,0 124
democratic 48,7 151
Total 15,8 310

In this case, the ranking of the explanatory variables is as follows:

Religious affiliation	100%
Education	92%
Occupation	54%
Gender	28%
Age	22%

In short: in Sri Lanka's deeply divided society, group affiliation is the strongest predictor, followed by education.

Despite its ethnic diversity, ***Namibia*** is a far less divided society and its political system, even if dominated by one party, has made considerable progress in democratic consolidation. Of the respondents that participated in our representative survey[43] of the capital, ***Windhoek,*** almost three quarters are democrats, a good fifth partial democrats, and less than 5% non-democratic.

Democratic attitudes do not correlate significantly with gender, age, occupation and religious affiliation. The proportion of democrats is greatest (89%) among members of influential, non-dominant groups and slightly below average (72%) in the politically most important group. Democratic opinions correlate directly with income[44] and particularly strongly with level of education:

No formal education	53
Primary school	59
Secondary not completed	61
Secondary completed	76
University not completed	79
Vocational degree	89
University degree	90

We did not find any significant relationships between democratic opinions and perceptions of class, source of information, openness to political involvement and proximity to a political party. However, democrats are clearly overrepresented among respondents who disapprove of unconditional political allegiance (79%) than among those who agree with it (65%).

Democratic attitudes correlate significantly with all attitude scales except religiosity. Support for democracy correlates inversely with cautiousness[45] and directly with economic satisfaction.[46] Democrats are heavily overrepresented (84%) among interviewees who do not have a strong attachment to their community and among those who strongly favour conviviality (78%).

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43 For a more detailed account, see Heribert Weiland, Die Saat geht auf: Die Namibier sind demokratischer geworden. Umfrageergebnisse 1989 – 2005, in: Peter Molt and Helga Dickow (eds), Kulturen und Konflikte im Vergleich – Comparing Cultures and Conflicts, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007, pp. 476–485.

44 67% (lowest) – 68% – 82% (highest income group)

45 58% among the very cautious, 79% and 78% among the less and the non-cautious, respectively

46 75% (lowest) – 69% – 67% – 74% – 88% (highest)


Democratic Attitudes - WINDHOEK
not democratic
in the middle
democratic
Node 0
Category % n
not democratic 3,5 31
in the middle 22,5 197
democratic 73,9 647
Total 100,0 875
Education
Improvement=0,014
"Incompl. sec. sch." or less
Higher than "Incompl. sec. sch."
Node 1
Category % n
not democratic 5,9 15
in the middle 34,1 87
democratic 60,0 153
Total 29,1 255
Node 2
Category % n
not democratic 2,6 16
in the middle 17,7 110
democratic 79,7 494
Total 70,9 620
Education
Improvement=0,004
"Incompl. univ." or less
Higher than "Incompl. univ."
Node 3
Category % n
not democratic 3,1 15
in the middle 20,2 97
democratic 76,7 368
Total 54,9 480
Node 4
Category % n
not democratic 0,7 1
in the middle 9,3 13
democratic 90,0 126
Total 16,0 140
Dominant/influential group
Improvement=0,001
Dominant; Other
Influential
Node 5
Category % n
not democratic 3,5 15
in the middle 21,3 90
democratic 75,2 318
Total 48,3 423
Node 6
Category % n
not democratic 0,0 0
in the middle 12,3 7
democratic 87,7 50
Total 6,5 57
Age
Improvement=0,002
"25-34 y." or less
Higher than "25-34 y."
Node 7
Category % n
not democratic 3,6 12
in the middle 18,9 64
democratic 77,5 262
Total 38,6 338
Node 8
Category % n
not democratic 3,5 3
in the middle 30,6 26
democratic 65,9 56
Total 9,7 85
Dominant/influential group
Improvement=0,002
Dominant
Other
Node 9
Category % n
not democratic 3,4 9
in the middle 16,5 43
democratic 80,1 209
Total 29,8 261
Node 10
Category % n
not democratic 3,9 3
in the middle 27,3 21
democratic 68,8 53
Total 8,8 77

The CART analysis shows that level of education is the primary predictor. Democrats are most common among respondents with at least a secondary school education; among university students the proportion rises to 90%. Non-democrats, by contrast, are more frequent among less-educated people. The order of the explanatory variables is as follows;

Education	100%
Group affiliation	30%
Age	15%
Occupation	1%

South Africa is also a dominant-party system on the path to democratic consolidation. Although the countrywide representative survey revealed traces of the cleavages of the apartheid years, they are gradually being displaced by economic and social differences.[47] Fifty-two percent of the respondents are clearly democrats, 37% hold partly democratic opinions and 11% are not democrats.

There are no significant correlations by gender, but there are by age: at 46%, democrats are underrepresented in the 16–24 age group, whereas they are more strongly represented in the older age groups. Seventy-four percent of professionals are democrats and 67% of white-collar workers, but only 42% of farmers. Religious affiliation does not correlate significantly with democratic attitudes, but ethnic affiliation does. Among members of the now dominant black population, the proportion of democrats is 48%, which is slightly below average; among whites, still an influential group, the figure is 77%; and among other groups 53%.

Differences between the groups still coincide to a large degree with differences in income and level of education. By income, the proportion of democrats rises from 42% in the lowest, through 48% in the middle to 60% in the highest group. There is also a direct, but not linear, correlation between support for democracy and level of education:

No formal education	47
Sub-A/B, Grade 1 & 2	54
Standard 1, Grade 3	39
Standard 2, Grade 4	50
Standard 3, Grade 5	55
Standard 4, Grade 6	39
Standard 5, Grade 7	39
Standard 6, Grade 8	56
Standard 7, Grade 9	44
Standard 8, Grade 10	49
Standard 9, Grade 11	46
Standard 10, Grade 12	59
Diploma	71
Technikon & higher	75

While democrat attitudes do in general rise with level of education, this trend is subject to considerable fluctuations. This volatility is very probably associated with the transformation of the formerly racially segregated school systems into a single system, in which, however,

[47] S. Valerie Moller, Peaceful co-existence in South Africa in the millennium, Byblos: CISH 2004; idem and Theodor Hanf, South Africa's New Democrats: A 2002 profile of democracy in the making, Byblos: CISH 2007.

ripples of earlier practices of discrimination and privilege are still felt, with the result that the same standard or grade does not mean the same quality of education.

There are significant differences in attitudes towards democracy by social self-perception. Of respondents who regard themselves as lower-class, 48% are democrats – almost identical with the figure among those who classify themselves as upper class. Democrats are most common (59%) among self-described middle-class respondents. Those who believe it is right to be politically involved are far more likely to be democrats than interviewees who think it is better to keep out of politics.[48] Supporters of the governing party are less likely to be democrats (45%) than respondents with other political preferences. Democrats are also more numerous among people who are not prepared to follow their favourite politicians unconditionally.

The dependent variable "attitudes towards democracy" correlates significantly with all attitudes scales, with the exception of communalism. Support for democracy correlates inversely with "cautiousness". The proportion of democrats ranges from 47% among the very cautious, through 52% among the less cautious, to 66% among those who are not cautious. Support for democracy correlates directly with economic satisfaction. Only 43% of the deeply dissatisfied are democrats, but 68% of the satisfied, and 74% among the very satisfied. It is noteworthy that the proportion of democrats also rises with religiosity, ranging from 42% among the non- and less religious to 62% among the more and very religious. Finally, democrat attitudes rise with conviviality: among non- or less convivial respondents 36% and 41%, respectively, are democrats, whereas the corresponding figures for more and very convivial interviewees are 52% and 63%, respectively.

In short: in South Africa democrats tend to be less fearful, economically satisfied, very religious and willing to coexist with different groups.

[48] Former: 60%; latter 46%


Democratic Attitudes - SOUTH AFRICA
Not democratic
In the middle
Democratic
Node 0
Category % n
Not democratic 11,6 238
In the middle 37,5 772
Democratic 51,0 1050
Total 100,0 2060
Dominant/influential group
Improvement=0,011
Dominant; Other
Influential
Node 1
Category % n
Not democratic 12,2 232
In the middle 39,2 748
Democratic 48,6 927
Total 92,6 1907
Node 2
Category % n
Not democratic 3,9 6
In the middle 15,7 24
Democratic 80,4 123
Total 7,4 153
Occupation
Improvement=0,004
Occupation
Improvement=0,002
White collar; Professionals
Blue collar; Econ. inactive; Trade, commerce; Farmer
Blue collar; White collar; Professionals
Econ. inactive; Trade, commerce; Farmer
Node 3
Category % n
Not democratic 7,6 14
In the middle 27,6 51
Democratic 64,9 120
Total 9,0 185
Node 4
Category % n
Not democratic 12,7 218
In the middle 40,5 697
Democratic 46,9 807
Total 83,6 1722
Node 5
Category % n
Not democratic 1,6 1
In the middle 3,3 2
Democratic 95,1 58
Total 3,0 61
Node 6
Category % n
Not democratic 5,4 5
In the middle 23,9 22
Democratic 70,7 65
Total 4,5 92
Education
Improvement=0,003
Age
Improvement=0,003
"9" or less
Higher than "9"
"16-24 y." or less
Higher than "16-24 y."
Node 7
Category % n
Not democratic 8,0 4
In the middle 50,0 25
Democratic 42,0 21
Total 2,4 50
Node 8
Category % n
Not democratic 7,4 10
In the middle 19,3 26
Democratic 73,3 99
Total 6,6 135
Node 9
Category % n
Not democratic 11,7 60
In the middle 47,2 242
Democratic 41,1 211
Total 24,9 513
Node 10
Category % n
Not democratic 13,1 158
In the middle 37,6 455
Democratic 49,3 596
Total 58,7 1209
Occupation
Improvement=0,003
Income household
Improvement=0,001
Blue collar; Econ. inactive
Trade, commerce; Farmer
Middle; High
Low
Node 11
Category % n
Not democratic 12,3 55
In the middle 44,0 197
Democratic 43,8 196
Total 21,7 448
Node 12
Category % n
Not democratic 7,7 5
In the middle 69,2 45
Democratic 23,1 15
Total 3,2 65
Node 13
Category % n
Not democratic 10,4 82
In the middle 37,0 291
Democratic 52,5 413
Total 38,2 786
Node 14
Category % n
Not democratic 18,0 76
In the middle 38,8 164
Democratic 43,3 183
Total 20,5 423
Education
Improvement=0,001
Age
Improvement=0,003
Age
Improvement=0,002
"7" or less
Higher than "7"
"25-34 y." or less
Higher than "25-34 y."
"35-49 y." or less
Higher than "35-49 y."
Node 15
Category % n
Not democratic 13,1 11
In the middle 53,6 45
Democratic 33,3 28
Total 4,1 84
Node 16
Category % n
Not democratic 12,1 44
In the middle 41,8 152
Democratic 46,2 168
Total 17,7 364
Node 17
Category % n
Not democratic 15,8 44
In the middle 41,7 116
Democratic 42,4 118
Total 13,5 278
Node 18
Category % n
Not democratic 7,5 38
In the middle 34,4 175
Democratic 58,1 295
Total 24,7 508
Node 19
Category % n
Not democratic 17,4 54
In the middle 34,5 107
Democratic 48,1 149
Total 15,0 310
Node 20
Category % n
Not democratic 19,5 22
In the middle 50,4 57
Democratic 30,1 34
Total 5,5 113

The CART analysis confirms the degree to which the after-effects of apartheid still colour life in South Africa. The primary predictor for democratic attitudes is group affiliation: among skilled blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and professionals, who are mostly members of the still influential "white" South African group, 95% are democrats. By contrast, among respondents in the present dominant group – the Blacks – who are traders, farmers and less than 24 years of age, only 23% are democrats.

By explanatory value, the independent variables rank as follows:

Group affiliation	100%
Occupation	82%
Age	75%
Education	63%
Income	23%
Religious affiliation	7%

A CART analysis excluding the variable "group affiliation" produces the following result (see below):

In this case, education is the primary predictor. Democrats and others part ways at Grade 11 (upper secondary): among respondents that go beyond this level of schooling the proportion of democrats reaches 65%, whereas among those who did not, the figure is 47%. It is surely not mistaken to assume that South Africa's policy since the mid-1990s of improving educational opportunities for politically disadvantaged groups will help to strengthen acceptance of democratic government.


Democratic Attitudes - SOUTH AFRICA
Not democratic
In the middle
Democratic
Node 0
Category % n
Not democratic 11,6 238
In the middle 37,5 772
Democratic 51,0 1050
Total 100,0 2060
Education
Improvement=0,010
"11" or less
Higher than "11"
Node 1
Category % n
Not democratic 12,5 201
In the middle 40,6 652
Democratic 46,9 754
Total 78,0 1607
Node 2
Category % n
Not democratic 8,2 37
In the middle 26,5 120
Democratic 65,3 296
Total 22,0 453
Age
Improvement=0,004
Occupation
Improvement=0,005
"16-24 y." or less
Higher than "16-24 y."
White collar; Professionals
Blue collar; Econ. inactive; Trade, commerce; Farmer
Node 3
Category % n
Not democratic 10,6 45
In the middle 49,4 209
Democratic 40,0 169
Total 20,5 423
Node 4
Category % n
Not democratic 13,2 156
In the middle 37,4 443
Democratic 49,4 585
Total 57,5 1184
Node 5
Category % n
Not democratic 5,0 8
In the middle 13,8 22
Democratic 81,1 129
Total 7,7 159
Node 6
Category % n
Not democratic 9,9 29
In the middle 33,3 98
Democratic 56,8 167
Total 14,3 294
Occupation
Improvement=0,003
Income household
Improvement=0,002
Blue collar; Econ. inactive; White collar
Trade, commerce; Farmer
Middle; High
Low
Node 7
Category % n
Not democratic 11,4 42
In the middle 45,9 170
Democratic 42,7 158
Total 18,0 370
Node 8
Category % n
Not democratic 5,7 3
In the middle 73,6 39
Democratic 20,8 11
Total 2,6 53
Node 9
Category % n
Not democratic 10,2 78
In the middle 36,7 281
Democratic 53,1 406
Total 37,1 765
Node 10
Category % n
Not democratic 18,6 78
In the middle 38,7 162
Democratic 42,7 179
Total 20,3 419
Gender
Improvement=0,001
Age
Improvement=0,003
Age
Improvement=0,002
Male
Female
"25-34 y." or less
Higher than "25-34 y."
"25-34 y." or less
Higher than "25-34 y."
Node 11
Category % n
Not democratic 14,1 24
In the middle 38,8 66
Democratic 47,1 80
Total 8,3 170
Node 12
Category % n
Not democratic 9,0 18
In the middle 52,0 104
Democratic 39,0 78
Total 9,7 200
Node 13
Category % n
Not democratic 17,5 40
In the middle 41,2 94
Democratic 41,2 94
Total 11,1 228
Node 14
Category % n
Not democratic 7,1 38
In the middle 34,8 187
Democratic 58,1 312
Total 26,1 537
Node 15
Category % n
Not democratic 19,1 31
In the middle 29,6 48
Democratic 51,2 83
Total 7,9 162
Node 16
Category % n
Not democratic 18,3 47
In the middle 44,4 114
Democratic 37,4 96
Total 12,5 257
Education
Improvement=0,001
Education
Improvement=0,001
"7" or less
Higher than "7"
"6" or less
Higher than "6"
Node 17
Category % n
Not democratic 8,3 31
In the middle 36,6 137
Democratic 55,1 206
Total 18,2 374
Node 18
Category % n
Not democratic 4,3 7
In the middle 30,7 50
Democratic 65,0 106
Total 7,9 163
Node 19
Category % n
Not democratic 21,9 16
In the middle 38,4 28
Democratic 39,7 29
Total 3,5 73
Node 20
Category % n
Not democratic 16,9 15
In the middle 22,5 20
Democratic 60,7 54
Total 4,3 89

Such acceptance is very widespread in neighbouring ***Zimbabwe***, notwithstanding the increasingly autocratic nature of the regime – or perhaps precisely because of it.[49] In this country, 71% of respondents have democratic attitudes. Almost one quarter express partly democratic views, while 5% are not democratic.

Democrats are slightly more frequent among men than women and among younger rather than older people.[50] Among professionals, white-collar workers and traders, the figure exceeds 85%. Neither religious nor ethnic affiliation significantly influences democratic attitudes. However, the level of household income does: in the lowest income group 65% are democrats, in the middle group 67% and in the highest 82%.
The proportion of democrats also rises with level of education, though not linearly:[51]

No formal education	47
Primary school	58
Junior secondary not completed	77
Junior secondary completed	80
Senior secondary not completed	70
Secondary completed	72
Vocational school	94
Matric, college, pre-university	87
University not completed	87
Degree	97

By social self-perception, the proportion of democrats rises from 69% of those who regard themselves as lower class to more than 80% among members of the middle and upper class. By the most important source of information, the fewest democrats are found among people who depend on word of mouth (60%) and the most among newspaper readers (91%). Democrats are more common among respondents who do not want to stay out of politics,[52] among opposition supporters[53] and among those who reject unconditional political allegiance.[54]

In Zimbabwe the proportion of democrats does not rise with economic satisfaction, quite the opposite: the largest percentage of democrats is found among dissatisfied (68%) and very dissatisfied (76%) respondents – a consequence of the government's catastrophic economic policies. Relationships between democratic attitudes and the scales for cautiousness, religiosity and conviviality are either insignificant or very weak.

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49 See also the detailed analyses by Helga Dickow, Eldred Masunungure and Beatrice Schlee, Zimbabwe. A Case of Resilient Authoritarianism. Citizens' attitudes, leaders' opinions, and conjectures on a democratic transition, Byblos: CISH 2007.

50 59% (oldest) – 71% – 78% – 70% (youngest)

51 The lower values for secondary-school students may reflect their challenging job prospects; the outlook for vocational school graduates on the other hand is much brighter.

52 80% vs. 69% in favour of political abstinence

53 85% vs. 53% among supporters of the ruling party

54 75% vs. 58%



The CART analysis is unequivocal: the primary predictor is level of education. Democrats and non-democrats part ways with graduation from primary school. Among respondents with this level of schooling – and members of the dominant group – the proportion of democrats drops to less than half.

The ranking of the dependent variables by explanatory value (normalised importance of predictors) is as follows:

Education	100%
Age	21%
Income	19%
Group affiliation	19%
Occupation	18%
Religious affiliation	16%

Comparison of determinants of democratic attitudes: an interim balance of the case studies

How important are the classic social variables for explaining democratic attitudes?

Gender is relevant in five of 11 cases: women are slightly less likely to be democrats than men. However, when women and men have the same level of schooling this difference disappears. In five cases there is a significant correlation with ***age***, although the results vary: in one case (Lebanon), democrats are most common in the oldest age group and in one other (Georgia), in the youngest. In one case (South Africa), the youngest respondents are less likely to be democrats and in another (Georgia) the oldest. In each of these cases the unique experiences of the particular age cohort can probably explain the differences. ***0ccupation*** correlates significantly with democratic attitudes in eight of 11 cases. Professionals (five cases) and white-collar workers (six cases) are more likely to be democrats than people in other occupations. In six of eleven cases, ***religious affiliation*** is significant. In four of these (Chad, Georgia, Lebanon and Sri Lanka), Christians are slightly more likely to be democrats than Muslims; however, these distinctions can all be explained by differences in level of education – among the better-educated in Chad the proportion of democrats is higher among Muslims than Christians. In one case (Indonesia-Jakarta), Christians are overrepresented among non-democrats. Similarly, in one case (Sri Lanka), Buddhists are overrepresented among democrats and Hindus underrepresented. In seven cases, ***membership of a (dominant, influential, or other) group*** is relevant for democratic attitudes. In two of these (Georgia and Malaysia), democrats are overrepresented in the dominant group and in four (Indonesia-Bandung, Kosovo, Namibia and South Africa) in a non-dominant, influential group. By contrast, in one case (Sri Lanka), the number of democrats in an influential minority is below average. An obvious interpretation in this case is rational choice: dominant groups are democratic when democracy serves to preserve dominance; non-dominant, influential minorities see in democracy the best chance of protecting their interests. In Sri Lanka, however, a strong ethnic minority has by and large given up hope of realising their objectives by democratic means. ***Household income*** correlates significantly with the proportion of democrats in ten of 11 cases: democratic attitudes increase consistently with rising income. Similarly, in ten of 11 cases there is a very significant direct correlation with ***level of education***: as level of education increases, so does the proportion of democrats.

In summary, the following holds for the classic social variables:

- Gender and age are of only marginal significance for democratic attitudes.
- By occupation, professionals and white-collar workers (i.e. as a rule people with higher educational skills) are considerably more likely to be democrats than people in other occupations.
- Religious affiliation is of some significance in a small majority of cases; however, this significance declines as differences in levels of education disappear. The individual studies do not provide conclusive evidence for a particular affinity or disregard for democracy on the part of any specific religion.
- In those cases in which group affiliation does influence attitudes towards democracy, there is, as a rule, an instrumental explanation: people support democracy when this can serve the interests of the group.
- In almost all cases support for democracy correlates directly with income.
- The same holds for level of education.

The importance of the second category of independent variables can be summarised as follows:

In five of 11 cases there is a significant correlation between democratic attitudes and ***self-perception of class affiliation***. In four of these five cases (Chad, Indonesia-Jakarta, Sri Lanka and South Africa), democrats are most numerous among respondents who identify themselves as middle class. The most important ***source of political information*** is significant in seven of 11 cases. In five cases (Chad, Georgia, Indonesia-Jakarta, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe), people who depend on word of mouth for their information are underrepresented among democrats and in one case (Malaysia) overrepresented. In three of 11 cases (Georgia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka), a particularly high proportion of newspaper readers are democrats. ***Political abstinence*** is significant in six of 11 cases (Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Malaysia, South Africa and Zimbabwe): respondents who reject such abstinence, i.e. who approve of political participation, are more likely to be democrats. ***Party affiliation*** correlates with democratic attitudes in five of 11 cases (Chad, Kosovo, Malaysia, South Africa and Zimbabwe). In each of these cases, the proportion of democrats among opposition or other non-dominant parties is above average. ***Unconditional allegiance to political leaders*** is significant in nine of 11 cases: in all of them democrats are overrepresented among interviewees who reject such allegiance.

How significant is the third category of independent variables, the attitude scales, in our comparison of case studies?

"Cautiousness" in dealings with others correlates significantly with attitudes towards democracy in seven cases (Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Namibia and South Africa). In one of these cases (Lebanon), cautious people are more likely than others to be democrats, whereas in the others democrats are generally found among respondents who are less cautious or not cautious. ***Economic satisfaction*** is a significant indicator of attitudes towards democracy in nine of 11 cases. In all cases except Zimbabwe the proportion of democrats rises with the level of economic satisfaction. ***Religiosity*** is significant in five of the 11 cases. In four of these (Chad, Indonesia-Bandung, Lebanon and South Africa) the proportion of democrats correlates directly with religiosity and in one case (Kosovo) inversely – this is the only territory in which the least religious are most likely to be democrats. ***Communalism***, the identification with an ethnic or religious group, is a significant indicator of democratic attitudes in seven of the 11 cases. In six of these, the proportion of democrats correlates inversely with communalism. Only in one case (Malaysia) does the opposite hold: democratic attitudes correlate directly with communalism. ***Conviviality*** correlates significantly with democratic attitudes in seven of 11 cases (Georgia, Indonesia-Bandung, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Namibia and South Africa). The proportion of democrats increases with rising conviviality across the board.

Finally, a comparison of the CART analyses produces the following results:
In eight of our cases, level of education is the primary predictor, in two cases (Sri Lanka and South Africa) group affilitation, and in one case (Indonesia-Bandung) income.

The above results are summarised in the following tables and charts:

Relative importance of socio-demographic variables explaining Democratic Attitudes (CART Analysis; normalised importance, max. = 100%)							
Survey	**Education**	**Occupation**	**Religious affiliation**	**Gender**	**Group affiliation**	**Income**	**Age**
Chad	100%	55%	37%	41%	14%	61%	30%
Georgia	100%	3%	95%			76%	
Jakarta	100%	39%		6%	2%	14%	8%
Kosovo	100%	75%	<1%	46%	4%	27%	15%
Lebanon	100%						
Malaysia	100%	57%	26%	7%	74%	23%	1%
Sri Lanka	90%	53%	98%	27%	100%		21%
Namibia	100%	1%			30%		15%
South Africa	63%	82%	7%		100%	23%	75%
Zimbabwe	100%	18%	16%		19%	19%	21%
Average (Median)	100%	53%	32%	27%	25%	23%	18%

Percent of Democrats by Education Level				
Survey	≤ **Primary Education**	**Secondary Education**	**Higher Education**	*Diff.*
	A	*B*	*C*	*C - A*
Zimbabwe	53	80	92	*40*
Lebanon	83	83	90	*7*
Chad	66	83	89	*23*
Namibia	56	69	86	*30*
Jakarta	51	61	85	*34*
Malaysia	52	60	79	*27*
South Africa	47	51	73	*26*
Georgia	54	60	72	*18*
Sri Lanka	28	48	61	*33*
Kosovo	28	47	55	*27*



Education, conviviality and economic satisfaction: competing predictors of democratic attitudes

After analysing the 11 studies in detail and drawing a comparative interim balance, we turn to an analysis of the complete dataset. As already mentioned, we simplify the dependent variable by distinguishing only between democrats on the one hand and respondents with less or non-democratic attitudes on the other. The respective individual surveys (country/town) serve as an additional independent variable. We have chosen CHAID (Chi-Square Automatic Interaction Detection) as analytical instrument because it lends itself to reducing the complexity of large quantities of data.

The first result is the emergence of the additional variable individual investigation (survey/country) as most important predictor. This is not particularly surprising in the light of the wide variance in the proportion of democrats in the different case studies. In Kosovo and Sri Lanka they account for less than half of the respondents, in South Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia-Jakarta between 50% and 60%, in Georgia for more than two thirds, in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Indonesia-Bandung for about three quarters and, lastly, in Lebanon for more than four fifths.
Against this background, what other independent variables best explain democratic attitudes?

We start by considering the “hard” social variables.


Node 0
Category % n
Less democratic 38,3 5957
Democratic 61,7 9613
Total 100,0 15570
Survey
Malaysia; South Africa
Zimbabwe; Windhoek; Bandung; Chad
Sri Lanka
Lebanon
Kosovo
Jakarta
Georgia
Node 1
Category % n
Less democratic 48,0 1709
Democratic 52,0 1850
Total 22,9 3559
Node 2
Category % n
Less democratic 26,4 919
Democratic 73,6 2567
Total 22,4 3486
Node 3
Category % n
Less democratic 55,4 1090
Democratic 44,6 877
Total 12,6 1967
Node 4
Category % n
Less democratic 14,9 325
Democratic 85,1 1861
Total 14,0 2186
Node 5
Category % n
Less democratic 60,8 909
Democratic 39,2 585
Total 9,6 1494
Node 6
Category % n
Less democratic 39,6 396
Democratic 60,4 604
Total 6,4 1000
Node 7
Category % n
Less democratic 32,4 609
Democratic 67,6 1269
Total 12,1 1878
Education
<= Primary
(Primary, Some post prim.]
(Some post prim., Secondary]
> Secondary; <missing>
<= No formal
(No formal, Some post prim.]
(Some post prim., Secondary]; <missing>
> Secondary
(No formal, Primary]; <missing>
(Primary, Secondary]
<= Secondary; <missing>
<= Some post prim.
Node 8
Category % n
Less democratic 51,9 552
Democratic 48,1 512
Total 6,8 1064
Node 9
Category % n
Less democratic 57,9 373
Democratic 42,1 271
Total 4,1 644
Node 10
Category % n
Less democratic 45,0 718
Democratic 55,0 877
Total 10,2 1595
Node 11
Category % n
Less democratic 25,8 66
Democratic 74,2 190
Total 1,6 256
Node 12
Category % n
Less democratic 42,6 98
Democratic 57,4 132
Total 1,5 230
Node 13
Category % n
Less democratic 33,1 405
Democratic 66,9 819
Total 7,9 1224
Node 14
Category % n
Less democratic 22,3 372
Democratic 77,7 1293
Total 10,7 1665
Node 15
Category % n
Less democratic 12,0 44
Democratic 88,0 323
Total 2,4 367
Node 16
Category % n
Less democratic 79,4 50
Democratic 20,6 13
Total 0,4 63
Node 17
Category % n
Less democratic 65,9 166
Democratic 34,1 86
Total 1,6 252
Node 18
Category % n
Less democratic 55,9 717
Democratic 44,1 565
Total 8,2 1282
Node 19
Category % n
Less democratic 42,4 157
Democratic 57,6 213
Total 2,4 370
Node 20
Category % n
Less democratic 16,9 254
Democratic 83,1 1248
Total 9,6 1502
Node 21
Category % n
Less democratic 10,4 71
Democratic 89,6 613
Total 4,4 684
Node 22
Category % n
Less democratic 82,4 56
Democratic 17,6 12
Total 0,4 68
Node 23
Category % n
Less democratic 69,3 382
Democratic 30,7 169
Total 3,5 551
Node 24
Category % n
Less democratic 56,4 343
Democratic 43,6 265
Total 3,9 608
Node 25
Category % n
Less democratic 47,9 128
Democratic 52,1 139
Total 1,7 267
Node 26
Category % n
Less democratic 48,3 262
Democratic 51,7 281
Total 3,5 543
Node 27
Category % n
Less democratic 31,4 125
Democratic 68,6 273
Total 2,6 398
Node 28
Category % n
Less democratic 15,3 9
Democratic 84,7 50
Total 0,4 59
Node 29
Category % n
Less democratic 49,7 94
Democratic 50,3 95
Total 1,2 189
Node 30
Category % n
Less democratic 34,9 323
Democratic 65,1 603
Total 5,9 926
Node 31
Category % n
Less democratic 25,2 192
Democratic 74,8 571
Total 4,9 763

Tree Table – Dependent Variable: Democratic Attitudes - Independent Variables: Social Demographic Variables

Node	Less democratic		Democratic		Total	Predicted Category	Primary Independent Variable		
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Dependant Variable	Independent Variable	Sign.	Split values
Lebanon			1861	**85%**	2186				
20	254	17%	1248	**83%**	1502	Democratic	Education	,001	<= Secondary
21	71	10%	613	**90%**	684	**Democratic**	**Education**	,001	**> Secondary**
Zimbabwe, Windhoek, Chad, Bandung			2567	**74%**	3486				
12	98	43%	132	**57%**	230	Democratic	Education	,000	<= No formal
13	405	33%	819	**67%**	1224	Democratic	Education	,000	(No formal, some post primary)
14	372	22%	1293	**78%**	1665	Democratic	Education	,000	(Some post prim., secondary)
15	44	12%	323	**88%**	367	**Democratic**	**Education**	,000	**> Secondary**
Georgia			1269	**68%**	1878				
29	94	50%	95	**50%**	189	Democratic	Education	,000	<= Some post primary
30	323	35%	603	**65%**	926	Democratic	Education	,000	(Some post primary, secondary)
31	192	25%	571	**75%**	763	**Democratic**	**Education**	,000	**> Secondary**
Jakarta			604	**60%**	1000				
26	262	48%	281	**52%**	543	Democratic	Education	,000	<= Some post primary
27	125	31%	273	**69%**	398	Democratic	Education	,000	(Some post primary, secondary]
28	9	15%	50	**85%**	59	**Democratic**	**Education**	,000	**> Secondary**
Malaysia, South Africa			1850	**52%**	3559				
8	552	**52%**	512	48%	1064	Less democratic	Education	,000	<= Primary
9	373	**58%**	271	42%	644	Less democratic	Education	,000	(Primary, some post primary)
10	718	45%	877	**55%**	1595	Democratic	Education	,000	(Some post primary, secondary)
11	66	26%	190	**74%**	256	**Democratic**	**Education**	,000	**> Secondary**
Sri Lanka			877	**45%**	1967				
16	50	**79%**	13	21%	63	Less democratic	Education	,000	<= No formal
17	166	**66%**	86	34%	252	Less democratic	Education	,000	(No formal, primary]
18	717	**56%**	565	44%	1282	Less democratic	Education	,000	(Primary, secondary]
19	157	42%	213	**58%**	370	**Democratic**	**Education**	,000	**> Secondary**
Kosovo			585	**39%**	1494				
22	56	**82%**	12	18%	68	Less democratic	Education	,000	<= No formal
23	382	**69%**	169	31%	551	Less democratic	Education	,000	(No formal, primary]
24	343	**56%**	265	44%	608	Less democratic	Education	,000	(Primary, secondary]
25	128	48%	139	**52%**	267	**Democratic**	**Education**	,000	**> Secondary**

The result is unequivocal: level of education is the primary predictor. Across the board the dividing line between democrats and those who are less or not democratic lies between primary and subsequent schooling. With “some post-primary” schooling the proportion of democrats jumps and continues to increase as respondents climb the educational ladder: education nurtures a democratic outlook, and university education all the more so, regardless of differences between the road maps the different case studies are following on their way towards democratic rule.

The next step includes, in addition to the social variables, the scales of social attitudes. The resulting picture is more complex:


Democratic Attitudes
Node 0
Category % n
Less democratic 38,3 5957
Democratic 61,7 9613
Total 100,0 15570
Survey
Malaysia; South Africa
Zimbabwe; Windhoek; Bandung; Chad
Sri Lanka
Lebanon
Kosovo
Jakarta
Georgia
Node 1
Category % n
Less democratic 48,0 1709
Democratic 52,0 1850
Total 22,9 3559
Economic Satisfaction
<= Low
(Low, Middle]
> Middle
Node 8
Category % n
Less democratic 54,8 945
Democratic 45,2 780
Total 11,1 1725
Node 9
Category % n
Less democratic 48,0 414
Democratic 52,0 449
Total 5,5 863
Node 10
Category % n
Less democratic 36,0 350
Democratic 64,0 621
Total 6,2 971
Node 2
Category % n
Less democratic 26,4 919
Democratic 73,6 2567
Total 22,4 3486
Education
<= No formal
(No formal, Some post prim.]
(Some post prim., Secondary]; <missing>
> Secondary
Node 11
Category % n
Less democratic 42,6 98
Democratic 57,4 132
Total 1,5 230
Node 12
Category % n
Less democratic 33,1 405
Democratic 66,9 819
Total 7,9 1224
Node 13
Category % n
Less democratic 22,3 372
Democratic 77,7 1293
Total 10,7 1665
Node 14
Category % n
Less democratic 12,0 44
Democratic 88,0 323
Total 2,4 367
Node 3
Category % n
Less democratic 55,4 1090
Democratic 44,6 877
Total 12,6 1967
Conviviality
<= Low
(Low, High]
> High
Node 15
Category % n
Less democratic 81,1 137
Democratic 18,9 32
Total 1,1 169
Node 16
Category % n
Less democratic 61,8 387
Democratic 38,2 239
Total 4,0 626
Node 17
Category % n
Less democratic 48,3 566
Democratic 51,7 606
Total 7,5 1172
Node 4
Category % n
Less democratic 14,9 325
Democratic 85,1 1861
Total 14,0 2186
Conviviality
<= Low
(Low, High]
> High
Node 18
Category % n
Less democratic 35,5 50
Democratic 64,5 91
Total 0,9 141
Node 19
Category % n
Less democratic 16,0 151
Democratic 84,0 793
Total 6,1 944
Node 20
Category % n
Less democratic 11,3 124
Democratic 88,7 977
Total 7,1 1101
Node 5
Category % n
Less democratic 60,8 909
Democratic 39,2 585
Total 9,6 1494
Conviviality
<= Low
(Low, High]
> High
Node 21
Category % n
Less democratic 85,4 111
Democratic 14,6 19
Total 0,8 130
Node 22
Category % n
Less democratic 73,6 304
Democratic 26,4 109
Total 2,7 413
Node 23
Category % n
Less democratic 51,9 494
Democratic 48,1 457
Total 6,1 951
Node 6
Category % n
Less democratic 39,6 396
Democratic 60,4 604
Total 6,4 1000
Education
<= Some post prim.
(Some post prim., Secondary]
> Secondary
Node 24
Category % n
Less democratic 48,3 262
Democratic 51,7 281
Total 3,5 543
Node 25
Category % n
Less democratic 31,4 125
Democratic 68,6 273
Total 2,6 398
Node 26
Category % n
Less democratic 15,3 9
Democratic 84,7 50
Total 0,4 59
Node 7
Category % n
Less democratic 32,4 609
Democratic 67,6 1269
Total 12,1 1878
Conviviality
<= High
> High
Node 27
Category % n
Less democratic 45,5 212
Democratic 54,5 254
Total 3,0 466
Node 28
Category % n
Less democratic 28,1 397
Democratic 71,9 1015
Total 9,1 1412

Tree Table – Dependent Variable: Democratic Attitudes: Independent Variables: Social Demographic Variables plus Attitude Scales

Node	**Less democratic**		**Democratic**		Total		Predicted Category	Primary Independent Variable		
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	Variable	Independent Variable	Sign.	Split values
Malaysia, South Africa										
8	945	54,8%	780	45,2%	1725	11,1%	Less democratic	Economic Satisfaction	,000	<= Low
9	414	48,0%	449	52,0%	863	5,5%	Democratic	Economic Satisfaction	,000	(Low, Middle]
10	350	36,0%	621	**64,0%**	971	6,2%	Democratic	**Economic Satisfaction**	,000	> Middle (high)
Zimbabwe, Windhoek, Chad, Bandung										
11	98	42,6%	132	57,4%	230	1,5%	Democratic	Education	,000	<= No formal
12	405	33,1%	819	66,9%	1224	7,9%	Democratic	Education	,000	(No formal, Some post prim.)
13	372	22,3%	1293	77,7%	1665	10,7%	Democratic	Education	,000	(Some post prim., Secondary)
14	44	12,0%	323	**88,0%**	367	2,4%	Democratic	**Education**	,000	> Secondary (university)
Sri Lanka										
15	137	81,1%	32	18,9%	169	1,1%	Less democratic	Conviviality	,000	<= Low
16	387	61,8%	239	38,2%	626	4,0%	Less democratic	Conviviality	,000	(Low, High]
17	566	48,3%	606	**51,7%**	1172	7,5%	Democratic	**Conviviality**	,000	> High
Lebanon										
18	50	35,5%	91	64,5%	141	,9%	Democratic	Conviviality	,000	<= Low
19	151	16,0%	793	84,0%	944	6,1%	Democratic	Conviviality	,000	(Low, High]
20	124	11,3%	977	**88,7%**	1101	7,1%	Democratic	**Conviviality**	,000	> High
Kosovo										
21	111	85,4%	19	14,6%	130	,8%	Less democratic	Conviviality	,000	<= Low
22	304	73,6%	109	26,4%	413	2,7%	Less democratic	Conviviality	,000	(Low, High)
23	494	51,9%	457	**48,1%**	951	6,1%	Less democratic	**Conviviality**	,000	> High
Jakarta										
24	262	48,3%	281	51,7%	543	3,5%	Democratic	Education	,000	<= Some post primary
25	125	31,4%	273	68,6%	398	2,6%	Democratic	Education	,000	(Some post prim., Secondary)
26	9	15,3%	50	**84,7%**	59	,4%	Democratic	**Education**	,000	> Secondary (university)
Georgia										
27	212	45,5%	254	54,5%	466	3,0%	Democratic	Conviviality	,000	<= High
28	397	28,1%	1015	**71,9%**	1412	9,1%	Democratic	**Conviviality**	,000	> High

In Zimbabwe, Namibia (Windhoek), Chad and Indonesia (Bandung and Jakarta) education remains the most powerful explanatory variable. In Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, however, conviviality is the primary predictor, whereas in Malaysia and South Africa it is economic satisfaction. In other words, education ranks first in five of 11 cases; in another four, positive attitudes towards tolerance and interethnic coexistence are a better predictor of democratic attitudes than education, and in two cases perceptions of economic satisfaction assume this role – a perception, it should be noted, and not social factors such as occupation or income.

In a nutshell: even when the field is widened to include other attitude variables, level of education still wins on points as the best explanatory factor of democratic attitudes. However, it does not have the monopoly it enjoys among the hard social variables alone.

How can we interpret the "divergent cases"? All of our 11 surveys examine deeply divided societies – but some are more divided than others. Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Kosovo and Georgia have experience of violent conflict, either in the past or at present. In trying to regulate such conflicts by democratic means it is not enough to push the central mechanisms of democratic systems of government: particular efforts must be made to highlight convivial virtues. In these countries democratic solutions can only succeed if democrats are also convivialists. Malaysia and South Africa are currently transitioning from ethnic conflict to social conflicts. In these countries the perception of economic satisfaction is the appropriate means to build trust in the effectiveness of democratic institutions and in particular their ability to reduce social inequity and advance redistribution.

As the individual surveys have shown, both conviviality and economic satisfaction correlate not only with positive attitudes towards democracy, but also with level of education. Education nurtures a democratic outlook: this is a conclusion shared by all studies on this subject. The only point left to resolve is why this should be so.

The educational systems in Chad and Indonesia differ in curriculum, school textbooks, quality of teachers and much else. Accordingly, respondents' democratic attitudes in these countries cannot be explained by policies of political socialisation in these schools. Moreover, when most respondents in the surveys went to school their countries were not functioning democracies; indeed, in most of the countries in study this is still the case. Our surveys show that illiterate people can also be democrats, even if far less frequently than university graduates.

However, the educational systems of the countries in our study do have one feature in common: structural progression through a series of stages. Irrespective of the system, each successive stage within the system is associated with a gain in cognitive knowledge. Regardless of curriculum, school, and method of teaching, people who have the opportunity to continue their education beyond primary school obviously feel that a democratic system offers greater assurance that they can realise their opportunities in life. These students are more likely to grasp the advantages of the rule of law, of the separation of powers and freedom of expression – whether they are already able to enjoy them or whether can only hope that they will someday.

The conclusions are obvious. Autocrats act in their own interests when they try to keep people ignorant. On the other hand, people who view democracy as desirable – whether in the case studies included here or elsewhere – are advised to promote and improve education.