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at **BROOKINGS**

PUNCHING BELOW ITS WEIGHT: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO EDUCATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

A SPECIAL FOCUS ON CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND FRAGILE STATES

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OVERVIEW

Global education plays an important role in contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In a recent speech, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted education, along with health, agriculture, security, and local governance as the core areas for U.S. international development investment. She emphasized the importance of education, particularly of girls and youth, in improving global stability, speeding economic growth, and helping global health, all of which advance U.S. interests in the world.[1]

But how effective has the U.S. government been in supporting global education? Unfortunately, its many good education activities and programs are not leveraged for maximum impact on the ground, especially in situations of armed conflict and state fragility. Challenges of U.S. foreign assistance—for example, fragmentation across multiple agencies, lack of policy coherence, diminished multilateral engagement—generally affects its work in education. Luckily some of the core strengths of U.S. assistance have an impact as well, specifically the large amount of resources (in total terms, if not relative terms) devoted to education and the vast breadth and depth of American

academic, philanthropic and NGO partners engaged in pioneering work on education in the developing world.

This report analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. government education work specifically in relation to conflict-affected and fragile states. Findings across five domains—global reach, resources, technical expertise, policy and multilateral partnerships—show that U.S. education aid falls critically short of what it is capable of achieving. The U.S. government has substantial strengths in this area, especially in global reach, resources, and technical expertise, demonstrating a real comparative advantage in the field of education in situations of conflict and fragility. However, its fragmented policy across agencies and its limited multilateral engagement prevent it from maximizing its strengths, leaving it punching below its weight on this important issue. In this sense, the U.S. government is a classic underachiever, failing to efficiently deploy its many capabilities and potential for maximum impact.

There has never been a better time for looking at the aid-effectiveness of U.S. government education work. The Obama administration is bringing increased focus on the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness to its

development initiatives. The U.S. Congress is actively engaged with pending legislative action to modernize foreign assistance and improve U.S. support for universal education. Two major reviews of foreign assistance are underway: the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review led by the Department of State and USAID, and the Presidential Study Directive on U.S. Global Development Policy led by the White House.

Questions about foreign assistance reform asked in these two reviews can be applied to the education sector. For example, how can the U.S. government improve its education assistance by using a "whole-of-government" approach, by focusing on comparative advantages and strengths, and by improving coordination and by increasing multilateral engagement? Careful analysis and answers to these questions can help propel the U.S. from its current position as an underachiever to being a leader in global education, specifically in contexts of conflict and state fragility.

This report makes nine specific recommendations, many of which could be achieved without any substantial increase in funding, that would enable the U.S. government to greatly increase the effectiveness of its education aid to populations living in contexts of conflict and state fragility:

Whole-of-government reforms:

1. Use of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies Minimum Standards[2] by all govern-mental entities working on education in conflict and fragility;

2. Ensure continuity of formal and non-formal education during humanitarian response; and

3. Reorganize government entities that work in education in conflict and fragility by function to improve coordination.

Public-private partnerships:

4. Develop a U.S. government global education roster for emergencies and post-crisis transitions, leveraging excellent education human resources in the U.S.; and

5. Leverage the U.S. NGO, philanthropic and academic communities for innovative and forward thinking programming.

Multilateral Engagement:

6. Support scaling up of the Fast Track Initiative reform;

7. Increase direct support for the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies; and

8. Increase support for the Global Education Cluster.

Congressional Action

9. Action must be taken to reintroduce and support the Education for All Act in the U.S. Congress with clear guidance on education in conflict and fragility.

EDUCATION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND FRAGILE STATES: ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

The contexts of conflict and fragility in which education is delivered vary widely, including refugee camps, situations of acute emergencies, and post-conflict recovery. While there is no single set of criteria universally used to determine which states are conflict-affected and/or fragile, there is some agreement on a core set of characteristics. Namely, core state functions have broken down and, either because the state is unable and/or unwilling, it is not providing "the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations."[3] The U.S. government has expressed particular interest in finding better ways of supporting countries affected by conflict and fragility through its foreign assistance.

Education in these contexts ranges from formal to non-formal interventions serving children, youth and adults. It includes technical, vocational and entrepreneurial training programs for youth as well as early child development for the very young. External humanitarian and development aid can support a wide range of activities, including rebuilding the education system, developing a new national curriculum, delivering education services to marginalized groups, and reforming teacher training methods and content to include a focus on psychosocial well-being and conflict resolution.

The U.S. has signed on to the global Education for All and Millennium Development Goals, which recognize the important role quality education plays in creating a healthier, safer and more economically prosperous world. Armed conflict is one of the largest barriers to achieving these goals. A high proportion, estimates range between one-third and one-half, of the 72 million primary school-age children out of school live in countries affected by armed conflict.[4]

Educating children in contexts of conflict and fragility is an important concern for the U.S. government not only because it is essential for reaching these global goals, but also because it supports U.S. foreign policy objectives. In many countries, the U.S. is heavily engaged with state- and peace-building processes and is increasingly concerned with preventing and mitigating violent conflict. Ignoring the education sector in these efforts is unwise for two reasons:

1. Poor quality education can directly contribute to factors causing violent conflict and therefore work against U.S. foreign policy efforts. Social exclusion and other grievances often at the heart of violent conflict can be exacerbated by such things as the geographic placement of schools, the language(s) in which school is taught, the content of curriculum, and the corrupt practices in teacher hiring and placement. From Rwanda to Kosovo to Nepal, education has played a part in fomenting violence. If education in contexts of conflict and fragility is not seriously addressed, it is likely to play a part in future eruptions of violence.

2. Broad access to an education of good quality helps create the social conditions that prevent violent conflict from erupting and, in this way, can support U.S. foreign policy objectives. Several large-scale, multi-country studies support this finding. For example, education significantly reduces the likelihood of youth violence, which is especially important in countries experiencing a large youth bulge. Youth are 20 percent less likely to engage in violence for every year of education they receive.[5] In societies with a history of ethnic conflict, a higher level of education is the single best predictor of democratic attitude, paving the way for support for tolerance and co-existence.[6]

U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION TO EDUCATION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND FRAGILE STATES

Looking back to the post-World War II era with the Marshall Plan for Europe, the United States has historically been a leader on education, especially technical and vocational education, during post-conflict recovery. Today, despite many existing strengths, this leadership has waned. This decline reflects trends in U.S. foreign assistance more generally. Despite the large total amount of U.S. development aid, the multiplicity of U.S. government organizations working without coordinated policies decreases the overall impact that the United States could have on development. Today the U.S. government is paying increasing attention to reform ideas that would improve aid-effectiveness, which includes better support of education in contexts of conflict and fragility. For example, education team within USAID's Economic Growth and Trade (EGAT) unit, among others, recognizes the problems associated with delivering education aid in these contexts and has shown interest in finding creative solutions.

Below is an analysis of the U.S. government's work on education in conflict and fragility along five domains—*global reach, resources, technical expertise, policy* and *multilateral partnerships*—that represent important elements of effective leadership. To assess the government's work in this area, this report asks: Is the U.S. working in education in conflict-affected and fragile states? Is it dedicating resources to the issue? Does the U.S. have technical expertise in this area? Is the work guided by good practice and coherent internal policies? Are its efforts leveraged through multilateral partnerships?

Global Reach

The programs under the purview of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, which includes USAID and the range of other agencies within the State Department, support education in a large number of conflict-affected and fragile states. Of the 48 countries appearing on the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) list of fragile states, 43 received assistance from the U.S. in FY2009.[7] Of these 43 conflict-affected countries, 19 received funding for basic and/or higher education under the "Investing in People" program area. The countries receiving education funding were: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. The education work supported by this component of U.S. foreign assistance covers almost 40 percent of the world's fragile states. The total amount of foreign assistance for basic and higher education in these countries was $253 million in FY 2009.[8]

USAID and the other agencies within the State Department are not the only parts of the U.S. government that both support global education and have a significant percentage of this work focused on conflict-affected and fragile states. For example, the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) supports education initiatives to reduce the worst forms of child labor through its Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor and Human Trafficking (OCFT). Of the 57 countries where OCFT funded education work between 2006 and 2009, one-third (17 countries) appear on the OECD fragile states list.[9]

The large number and diversity of contexts in which the U.S. government supports education-related work provides fertile ground for assessing what does and

does not work, promoting learning across countries, and supporting innovation and scaling up successes. This diversity is an important strength of the U.S. government, but only if maximized and leveraged sufficiently across agencies implementing these programs.

In comparison, the European Commission (EC) has active bilateral development assistance programs in education in 25 countries which are on OECD's list of fragile states.[10] The Netherlands places a great deal of emphasis both on education and countries that are fragile and face major poverty or inequality in its development policy. It actively supports nine countries bilaterally but the vast majority of its aid for education in these contexts is disbursed through a number of mechanisms, including its partnership with UNICEF and multi-donor trust funds in Afghanistan and Sudan. In 2007, Sweden revised its aid strategy to leverage its comparative advantage by targeting fewer countries (from 125 to 33). Within the 12 countries in which it focuses on peace and security, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has significant active education programs in three: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Timor-Leste.

Resources

The U.S. contributes significant resources to support education in contexts of conflict and fragility. Interestingly, funding comes not only from the government but also from a vibrant philanthropic community supporting this work. Save the Children, in its landmark study *Last in Line, Last in School,* calculates the total resources for FY 2007 that all major bilateral donors spent on education in contexts of conflict and fragility. Using a slightly different list of countries from OECD's fragile states list, Save the Children es-

timates that the U.S. government spent $380 million on education in 19 conflict-affected countries in FY 2007.[11] In terms of total dollars, this makes the U.S. government the largest single donor to education in these contexts, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Canada.[12] This does not take into account the increased spending in FY 2008 and FY 2009 by the U.S. government on education in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Regardless of this, the U.S. is by far the largest donor in terms of total resources dedicated to this issue (see Table 1).

In addition to the U.S. government resources, there are significant funds for education in conflict and fragility derived from various private sources in the U.S. and philanthropic giving is a growing source of funding for international development, with more than $5 billion in 2007 flowing from U.S. philanthropic foundations to international development work. Foundation giving to education in countries other than the U.S. equaled $293 million, of which $47 million was designated for elementary and secondary education. More than half ($25 million) of foundation funds to basic education supported countries affected by conflict and fragility.[14]

The picture becomes more complicated, however, when examining the U.S. government funding to education by *percentage of ODA, "fair share" percentages, country distribution,* and *context selectivity*. As a *percentage of overall ODA*, the U.S. government falls dramatically down the ranks. The U.S. spends just 2 percent of ODA on education in conflict and fragility, compared to 29 percent for Portugal, 25 percent for Greece, and 10 percent each for the Netherlands and Ireland (see Table 2).

Another way to compare donors' performance is to look at each donor's *"fair share"* of what is needed to

Table 1: Ranking of Donor Contribution by Total USD[13]

Donor	Total US$ in Millions to Education in Contexts of Conflict and Fragility
USA	$380
U.K.	$231
France	$168
Germany	$113
Canada	$90
Japan	$79
Netherlands	$68
Norway	$42

Table 2: Ranking of Donor Contribution by Percentage of ODA to Education in Contexts of Conflict and Fragility[15]

Donor	Rank of OECD-DAC donors	Percentage of ODA to Education in Contexts of Conflict and Fragility
Portugal	1	29
Greece	2	25
Ireland	3	10
The Netherlands	4	10
Sweden	5	9
U.S.	18	2

achieve the Education for All (EFA) goals, allocating this responsibility in accordance with each country's gross national income (GNI). Using recently-released estimates from the 2010 EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR), the average annual resources needed to finance achieving the EFA goals is $36 billion, of which $16 billion represent the external "financing gap" –the difference between the total investment required and the levels of domestic financing available. According to the GMR report, low-income countries affected by conflict account for 41 percent of the financing gap, or $6.7 billion.[16] Therefore, the United States' fair share of this estimate of the education financing needed in low-income countries affected by conflict is $2.2 bil-

lion. This amount is a far cry from the estimated $380 million it currently dedicates to the issue.

With respect to *country distribution*, the $380 million that Save the Children estimates the U.S. spent on education in contexts of conflict and fragility in FY2007 was heavily concentrated in a few countries, which directly aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives. Half ($190 million) of that aid went to Pakistan ($97 million)[17] and Iraq ($93 million)[18], leaving the remaining $190 million to be spread across 17 countries.[19]

Furthermore, U.S. government resources for education in conflict and fragility are not distributed evenly

across types of context, demonstrating a high degree of *context selectivity* (the importance of ensuring education continuity across all contexts is discussed below). While the United States ranks second in percentage of total bilateral ODA allocated to humanitarian aid (14 percent), only 0.7 percent of it is allocated to education (see Table 3). This small figure contrasts with significant funding of refugee education and education in post-conflict recovery.[20]

This approach to humanitarian and development funding reveals a "hole in the education doughnut," whereby U.S. assistance falls off dramatically during acute emergencies, only to reappear when contexts change. This becomes especially problematic for the continuity of education across different situations, especially since at country level these contexts are notoriously fluid and may move over a relatively short time period from emergency to post-crisis transition or recovery back to emergency (e.g. Afghanistan). Given the inherently process-oriented and progressive nature of education—in other words final outcomes are only built slowly over time in a carefully sequenced way—the stopping and starting of education can have drastic impacts on the ability not only of individuals to benefit from education, but also whole communities, especially when educated populations are needed to cement progress toward lasting peace and security.

It is now widely recognized that education is a crucial part of humanitarian response. The Sphere Project, which is the main set of global minimum standards guiding good practice humanitarian interventions in health, water and sanitation, food and shelter, has recently recognized the importance of education.[24] They recommend a set of minimum education guidelines to be a complementary and companion volume to their own guidelines and in their trainings they include education along with the other sectors. The

United Nations through its humanitarian reform process has recognized the crucial need of education in emergencies by including education as one of the key sectors involved in its new "cluster approach" aimed to improving humanitarian response. A number of bilateral donors have policies or strategies that prioritize education during humanitarian action, including Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and Sweden.[25] Ultimately, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), the leading global network on education in contexts of conflict and fragility, has well established global minimum standards and a host of supporting technical and implementation tools.

While the delivery of education must be adapted heavily for acute emergency contexts, the importance is its continuity and the transition as soon as possible to the formal learning processes of school. For example, in the height of an emergency, focus will be on safety and survival but also at the earliest point possible the establishment of non-formal learning activities, to both continue the habit for children of learning and to provide critical life-saving skills and messages (e.g. landmine awareness). This non-formal education is also one of the best ways of keeping track and monitoring the welfare of children and young people in the community.

Transitioning these non-formal learning opportunities to resumed school activities should happen as soon as possible—within weeks or a few short months—to ensure crucial study skills are not lost and to minimize the risk of drop-out. Only 31 percent of out-of-school children (school-aged children who have dropped out or never enrolled) are expected to ever enroll in school.[26] In countries such as Nepal and the Central African Republic, only 10 percent of out-of-school children are expected ever to enroll. The likelihood of enrollment varies greatly by gender; in Nigeria, for ex-

Table 3: Ranking of Donors by Percentage of Humanitarian Aid Allocated to Education[21]

Country	Rank (of OECD-DAC donors)	Percentage of Humanitarian Aid Allocated to Education[22] (Avg 2005-2007)	Amount of Humanitarian Aid Allocated to Education in US$[23] (Avg 2005-2007)
Denmark	1	5.2	$9,832,741
Japan	2	3.8	$8,060,373
Australia	3	3.6	$4,045,166
Netherlands	4	2.7	$8,463,779
Norway	5	2.3	$8,538,752
U.S.	15	0.7	$15,400,756

ample, 69 percent of out-of-school boys are expected to eventually enroll, compared with only 31 percent of out-of-school girls. This continuity is especially important for girls, for whom staying in school for just one additional year can increase eventual wages by 10-20 percent.[27] Educating girls can also lead to lower birth rates, reduced infant mortality, improved child health, and lower incidence of HIV/AIDS.[28]

Ensuring both humanitarian and development assistance support for education—not just non-formal education, but also the rapid transition to resume formal education—is crucial for effective transitions from emergency to post-crisis recovery and ultimately long-term stability. To this, U.S. government resources must be available across the full range of contexts.

Technical Expertise

In the U.S., there is a high level of technical expertise on the issue of education in conflict and fragility. This expertise is spread across government, non-governmental agencies and academic institutions. As a relatively new field of theory and practice, this expertise has developed from collective discussion, research

and experimentation by leading international education development experts across these three sets of actors.[29]

Within the U.S. government, there are several technical specialists who are at the forefront of the education in conflict and fragility field. Largely working within USAID, these specialists are leading thinkers on the relationship between education—both formal and non-formal—and conflict and fragility. Two USAID tools—the *Education and Fragility Assessment Tool* and the *Youth and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention*—are good examples, among others, of cutting-edge thinking about this issue. A number of U.S. government experts were also involved in a large-scale, multilateral process to develop the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction, the first global standards for education.[30] USAID and Canadian CIDA are the only bilateral development agencies to target education in conflict assessment.[31] While the U.S. government's expertise on this issue is of high quality, it is in insufficient quantity. Therefore, like most areas of development assistance, there is limited capacity in an over-stretched government staff in comparison to the number of

countries and amount of money the U.S. invests in this area. The education team within EGAT at USAID is hoping to bring additional staff on board in 2010 that can focus specifically on this issue. But this still means that staffers and agencies rely heavily on the expertise of their non-government partners.

The U.S. is home to many of the leading operational non-profit NGOs on this issue. INEE is the main global network dedicated to this issue of education in conflict and fragility. Representation on its leadership bodies (Steering Committee and Working Groups past and present) is competitive and selective, with the technical expertise of both the agencies and the individuals representing the agencies evaluated during admission decisions. Thus, INEE leadership representation gives a good indication of the leading institutions. There are of course a range of NGOs working on this issue and several technically excellent NGOs that do not participate actively in INEE because either they have chosen not to prioritize this type of global work or do not have the resources to do so (e.g. the Aga Khan Foundation). Despite this, INEE leadership still gives a useful, albeit not fully complete, picture of this particular NGO community. Of the 26 NGOs involved in the leadership of INEE, 10 are U.S. NGOs and the others are spread across Canada, Colombia, Kenya, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the U.K. (see Table 4). All of these institutions have high quality staff that plays an important role in leading the thinking, research and innovation in this field.

To build the research base as well as the capacity of the pipeline of future professionals in this field, education in conflict and fragility is increasingly becoming an area of focus within academic institutions, primarily in schools of education and international affairs. Leading scholars on the issue reside, amongst others,

in Northern Ireland, England, Pakistan and the U.S. One area where U.S. academic institutions seem to be excelling especially is the training of graduate students on the issues of education in conflict and fragility. Of the graduate courses on this issue around the world, many are housed within U.S. institutions. While the issue is often covered in a one-day session of a larger course, there are several stand-alone courses on conflict and fragility. Teachers College at Columbia University offers it as an area of concentration for their students studying international education. By far the most ambitious attempt by an academic institution to train students on this issue is being undertaken by the University of Nairobi, with technical assistance from the International Rescue Committee. A full certificate and master's program on education in emergencies is, at the time of publication, in the process of being developed over the next three years.

There are also several non-university institutions that are leading research in this area. UNESCO has well-established research programs, particularly within their International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). The CfBT Education Trust, United States Institute for Peace, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings and the recently-established Education Above All in Qatar all conduct a range of activities in this field. There are many other academics and researchers, who undoubtedly conduct research and scholarship on this issue from various disciplinary perspectives. Hence the list in Table 5 is necessarily partial, but endeavors to include many of the institutions that not only have individual scholars working on this issue, but that also have dedicated programs and training for students.

In both operational non-profit NGOs and independent research institutes and universities, the U.S. has some of the most active communities of practice. These

Table 4: Leading NGOs by Country of Operation[32]

Country	NGOs	Total Number
Canada	CARE Canada	1
Colombia	Fundación dos Mundos	1
Kenya	Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE)	1
Netherlands	Oxfam Novib, War Child Holland, Zoa Refugee Care	3
Norway	Norwegian Church Council, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children Norway	3
Pakistan	Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Empowerment/Basic Education for Afghan Refugees (BEFARe)[33]	1
Qatar	Reach Out to Asia	1
South Africa	ActionAid	1
Switzerland	Foundation for the Refugee Education Trust	1
Turkey	Mavi Kalem Social Assistance and Charity Association	1
United Kingdom	Save the Children U.K., Plan International	2
United States	Academy for Educational Development; American Institutes for Research; CARE USA; Catholic Relief Services; ChildFund International; Education Development Center; International Rescue Committee; Save the Children; World Education; World Vision International	10

Table 5: Leading Academic and Research Institutions by Country

Country	Academic and Research Institutions	Total Number
Austria	University of Innsbruck	1
France	UNESCO (especially the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP))	1
Kenya	University of Nairobi[34]	1
Northern Ireland	University of Ulster	1
Pakistan	Quaid-e-Azam University	1
Qatar	Education Above All[35]	1
United Kingdom	CfBT Education Trust, Oxford University, University of Sussex,	3
United States	American University, Center for Universal Education-Brookings, Colombia University, Cornell University, George Washington University, Harvard University, New York University, United States Institute for Peace, University of Massachusetts-Amherst	9

are important resources upon which the U.S. government can draw and represents an important part of its comparative advantage on this issue vis-à-vis other countries.

Policy

Despite these demonstrated strengths that the U.S. has in its geographic reach, dedicated resources and technical expertise, it has not coordinated them to achieve maximum impact. Instead, a fragmented policy environment across government agencies blocks it from being an effective leader on this issue. This policy fragmentation is one of the two primary reasons that the U.S. government is not leveraging its full potential in the arena of education in conflict and fragility.

Unlike other bilateral donors, such as Norway, Sweden and Canada[36], the U.S. does not have an overarching policy that directs its education work in conflict and fragility. Instead, its work is embedded in 13 organizational entities within seven agencies, all with different approaches and areas of focus. This separation causes real problems on the ground, which can be seen in three major gaps: *the good practice gap, the mandate gap* and *the coordination gap.*

The good practice gap. Only one agency, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration in the State Department, has made it a matter of bureau policy that its work, and the work of the partners it funds, adheres to the globally recognized INEE Minimum Standards. While individuals within other agencies may also employ these basic standards in their work, no other government office is officially guided by these basic standards in their work. Instead, many agencies rely on their partners to be aware of and design and implement their programs according to

global good practice. While this may work sometimes, it is an approach that is inherently ad hoc and cannot guarantee consistent quality control, to the great detriment of effective programming on the ground. However, it should be noted that the issue of education in contexts of conflict and fragility is expected to be an important focus in the new forthcoming USAID education strategy, which may help to close this gap.

The U.S. government also loses a very important opportunity to share lessons learned and promising practices across agencies when the work is fragmented across so many organizational entities. The INEE Minimum Standards are accompanied by a host of practical tools to facilitate the contextualization of the standards to different countries, as well as appropriate program design and implementation. Certainly, even just within its own operations, if there could be a way of harnessing lessons into a broad knowledge management or organizational learning system, the U.S. government would have an extraordinary amount of material which could improve the quality and effectiveness of its work.

Indeed, some of this expertise has contributed to a very recent development in this area: the United States Institute for Peace's *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (S&R) manual seeks to provide civilian actors with a unifying framework and shared set of principles to guide their actions while engaged in helping countries transition from violent conflict to peace.[37] While these *Guiding Principles* have not been adopted formally by the U.S. government, a number of technical personnel from five different government agencies contributed their expertise to their development. Work in the education sector, including references to the INEE Minimum Standards, is covered in this document, which is a useful step toward closing the gap in good practices.

The mandate gap. Continuity of education for populations in humanitarian emergencies is crucial, but is not well supported across the numerous U.S. government agencies working in this area. The education "doughnut hole" in funding during emergency contexts is also reflected in the various mandates of humanitarian agencies in relation to education.

USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has a congressional mandate to "save lives, reduce human suffering and mitigate the economic impact of natural and man-made disasters worldwide."[38] There is nothing explicitly in the mandate that would restrict its work in education. However, the office interprets this mandate—and some within OFDA would say the Office of Management and Budget strongly insists on this interpretation—to make funds available for disaster relief (to sustain life or reduce human suffering); rehabilitation (to restore self-sufficiency and livelihoods); and prevention, mitigation and preparedness (to reduce disaster impacts). For education, this means construction of temporary infrastructure and rehabilitating of schools; providing school supplies to students and psychosocial training for teachers; and support of child-friendly spaces for non-formal education. What OFDA is clear about is that it does not support restoration of formal schooling, outside of the "hardware" supplied (school buildings, books, pens, etc.) and some minimal "software" in the form of training of teachers on psychosocial principles.

Support for non-formal education, especially in ways that further child protection objectives, is excellent and standard good practice in acute emergencies. However, there is also a need, if good practice is to continue to be followed, to move quickly to restore formal schooling, which entails diverse activities over and above supplying hardware inputs. The exact timing of this transition to formal schooling will depend on the specific situation on the ground, but usually should happen within weeks or even a few months of the emergency onset, which is well within the standard OFDA grant period of six or twelve months. While OFDA states that "facilitating the transition from relief to development, sustaining livelihoods and reducing the dependence of disaster victims on relief assistance remains an important focus of OFDA's work," it is not clear from the segmented approach to education that OFDA supports the smooth transition from relief to development within the education sector.

Similarly, within its Humanitarian Assistance program, the Department of Defense (DOD) seeks to provide basic humanitarian aid and services to populations in need and enable countries to begin to recover from conflict. To do so, the DOD supports the provision of on-the-ground activities aimed at assuring friendly nations of U.S. support that includes "rudimentary construction of schools."[39] Thus, neither of the agencies leading humanitarian response for the United States has in its mandate or scope of work the actual provision of formal education. While physical infrastructure is an important aspect of education service delivery, it is not a sufficient input to ensure that children and youth have access to education in these challenging contexts. Indeed, there are numerous examples of newly reconstructed schools empty of teachers, students, and the core processes of learning. Without attention to whether education is provided across these contexts, the ultimate goal of education—that students acquire the skills they need to improve their own circumstances—is at risk. In this case, the U.S. government is faced with multiple organizations with *non-overlapping* mandates– a mandate gap.

The coordination gaps. A 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of foreign assistance to basic education found many missed oppor-

tunities for interagency coordination.[40] According to its analysis, for example, while the DOD guidance calls for coordination of humanitarian assistance projects with other agencies working at country-level before they are submitted up to headquarters, USAID basic education staff interviewed reported that they were not aware of the DOD's humanitarian projects. While country-level coordination is essential to effective coordination, it is not made any easier by the plethora of departments, agencies, and bureaus and offices that all have specific work they do in relation to global education.

Table 6 below details the mandates, approaches and policies of the 13 U.S. government organizational entities that fund education in conflict and fragility.[41] There are several departments that work in this area, including the State Department, the Defense Department, the Agriculture Department, and the Labor Department. Within the State Department, USAID is the major agency leading this work and there are numerous offices within USAID that engage on this issue. Two prominent government agencies—the Peace Corps and the Millennium Challenge Corporation—do support global education, but not in contexts of conflict and fragility.

The table shows that only one entity (State/PRM) has adopted the INEE Minimum Standards, which is existing global good practice for education in conflict and fragility. In terms of target populations, some entities have fragile states in their mandate while others have children at-risk or education, but no single government entity focuses specifically on education in conflict and fragility. Similarly, entities responsible for humanitarian relief do not have the delivery of formal education services in their mandates (although they do support with hardware), contributing to a gap in the resumption of schooling immediately following an emergency. Because some entities focus on refugees while others focus on internally displaced people (IDPs), there is also no mechanism for ensuring consistency of services delivered among the refugees and IDPs from the same country.

Not all of the 13 government entities are involved in this work at the same scale or magnitude. Table 7 shows the vast majority of total funding for education in conflict and fragility flowed through five agencies: USAID, DOD, USDA, State and DOL; and went to five countries: Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and Liberia. These five countries received a total of $354 million in funding for education in FY2007, which was 42 percent of total education ODA and 89 percent of education ODA for conflict-affected countries.[42] Looking across agencies, USAID and DOD contributed 97 percent of the funding for these five countries. However, it is important to note that much of the U.S. funding for refugee education is not adequately captured in the OECD-DAC CRS database because PRM in the State Department routes significant general support through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who in turn supports education programming. Comparing across countries, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan receive the majority of the funding (91 percent), with funding dropping off sharply for Sudan and Liberia.

Support for education in contexts of conflict and fragility within the U.S. government is not guided by an overarching, coherent policy and is highly fragmented across government entities, resulting in significant gaps in good practice, mandates and coordination. Just rationalizing this picture could result in real gains in efficiency and effectiveness for our education aid dollars and go a long way in supporting improved transitions from relief to post-crisis development.

Table 6: U.S. Government Entities: Mandates, Approaches and Policies

Government Entity	Education Approach	Education Standards	Priority Populations/ Contexts	General Mandate	Assistance Type
State PRM (Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration)	K-12 education, non-formal education, tertiary education	INEE	Refugees	Provides aid and sustainable solutions for refugees, victims of conflict and stateless people around the world, through repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in the United States	Humanitarian
USAID EGAT (Economic Growth & Trade)	Houses education section with full programming in basic education, higher education, and workforce development	None identified	Developing countries, including conflict/fragile states	Helps developing countries achieve rapid, sustained and broad-based economic growth to ensure their peoples' well-being over time.	Development
USAID Regional Bureaus	Have education technical experts, education initiatives	None identified	Developing countries, including conflict/fragile states	In conflict-affected/fragile states, each bureau's mission is to respond to the impact of the conflict.	Humanitarian Development
USAID OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance)	Non-formal education, hardware for formal education	None identified	Countries in emergency	Provides humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide.	Humanitarian
USAID OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives)	Non-formal education	None identified	Countries undergoing transition	Helps local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis and conflict by facilitating the transition to peace and stability by aiding in the demobilization of combatants and developing democratic governance.	Humanitarian Development

Government Entity	Education Approach	Education Standards	Priority Populations/ Contexts	General Mandate	Assistance Type
USAID DCOF (Displaced Children and Orphans Fund)	Non-formal education to vulnerable children	None identified	Children at risk, including children in conflict/fragile states	Provides care, support, and protection for the special needs of children at risk, including orphans, unaccompanied minors, children affected by armed conflict, and children with disabilities.	Humanitarian
USAID CMM (Conflict Management and Mitigation)	Toolkit on youth and conflict, school construction	None identified	Countries affected by conflict	Identifies sources of conflict; supports early responses to address the causes and consequences of instability and violent conflict; and seeks to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID's analysis, strategies and programs.	Humanitarian
USAID Office of Food for Peace	Food for education	None identified	People most vulnerable to the effects of hunger: children under age 5, pregnant women, the elderly, and the poorest families in a community.	Food for Peace provides food commodities in emergency contexts and uses both direct food distribution and monetization to support food security activities in development context.	Humanitarian Development
Defense (Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA))	School reconstruction; some teacher training	None identified	Reparations to families and communities damaged by U.S. military activity	Enables local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population.	Humanitarian

Government Entity	Education Approach	Education Standards	Priority Populations/ Contexts	General Mandate	Assistance Type
African Development Foundation	Basic education	None identified	Under-served and marginalized communities in Africa, including several conflict/ fragile states	Funds African community- based small enterprises and cooperatives in eligible countries.	Development
Inter-American Foundation	Basic education, vocational training	None identified	Poor people in Latin America, including several conflict/ fragile states	Funds NGOs in Latin America and the Caribbean for innovative, sustainable and participatory self-help programs.	Development
Labor (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking)	Basic education and workforce development as tool to reduce child labor	None identified	Child laborers, including children in conflict/fragile states	Elimination of the worst forms of child labor and increasing knowledge and information on child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking.	Development
Agriculture (McGovern-Dole Program	Food for education	None identified	Students in developing countries	Provides leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues.	Development

Table 7: U.S. Government Assistance to Education by Agency: Top Five Conflict-Affected and Fragile States Receiving Funds in FY 2007 (in millions of USD) [43]

U.S. Agency	Recipient					
	Pakistan	Iraq[44]	Afghanistan	Sudan	Liberia	Total
USAID	114.9		62.7	18	11.9	**207.5**
DOD		110	25.6			**135.6**
USDA	9.8				0.7	**10.5**
State		0.1				**0.1**
DOL	0.1					**0.1**
Total	124.8	110.1	88.3	18	12.6	353.8

Multilateral Partnership

President Obama has stated the importance of U.S. engagement with partners in order to tackle current global challenges, emphasizing that it is time for the country's active and responsible return to the multilateral arena. In the field of education in conflict and fragility, there are multiple avenues for fruitful partnership with important global actors. The Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and the European Commission, amongst others, have all invested heavily in global and multilateral partnerships that have enabled them to achieve important results that could not have been achieved through isolated action. Many of these donors have fewer core strengths than the U.S. but their strategic investment in these partnerships have allowed them to contribute greatly to the improved effectiveness of education aid in these most difficult contexts. For example, certain multilateral partnerships have improved the field's human resources capacity, coordination, knowledge sharing, implementation approaches and technical guidance, all of which translate into better education results on the ground.

While the U.S. government has participated minimally in some of these partnerships, there are important opportunities for further and more substantial action that would better leverage existing resources and efforts. Active multilateral engagement, along with a more coherent internal policy highlighted above, would both maximize and amplify the U.S. government's strengths in a way that unilateral action could not.

Currently there are five multilateral agencies that are the most important actors in the field of education in conflict and fragility: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Education,

Science, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Food Programme (WFP) and The World Bank (WB). All of these organizations play important roles at the global and country level in improving the reach and quality of this work (see Table 8).

In addition to these five agencies, there is one global network and several multilateral partnerships that each involves one or more of the above agencies. These mechanisms have led to the design and implementation of innovative approaches and improved education work on the ground in conflict and fragility contexts. These examples showcase the ways in which multilateral action can do much to improve the effectiveness of aid in ways that isolated programming cannot.

1. Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)

As the leading inter-agency network for education in conflict and fragility, INEE is an example of an innovative and highly effective multilateral partnership, with more than 4,000 members in 118 countries, drawing from U.N. agencies, donors, NGOs, academia and, most importantly, citizens and officials from countries affected by crisis. It is an open network that is exceedingly flexible and has served, since its founding in 2000, as the major hub of knowledge-sharing that has led to resource and global policy development, resulting in technical advancements for and strengthened capacity within this field.

One example of its ground-breaking work is the development and implementation of the INEE Minimum Standards. In three and a half years, these standards have spread across the globe; they have been translated into 23 languages and used in 80 countries. Evaluations of the standards show they improve the

Table 8: Key Multilateral Agencies in Field of Education and Fragility

Organization	Strengths	Limitations
UNICEF	The lead UN agency on education in conflict and fragility. Has the highest capacity at global and country level of any other single organization.	Primary focus is children under the age of 18.
UNHCR	The lead agency on refugee education.	Primary focus is on displaced populations, especially refugees. Has limited human resources capacity in education.
UNESCO	Expertise in higher education, curriculum reform, and capacity building of ministries of education in post-conflict and post-disasters.	Primary focus is on research, training, and technical assistance. Limited work in acute emergencies.
World Food Programme	The lead agency on food for education interventions, especially in humanitarian emergencies.	Primary focus is on food.
World Bank	Expertise in rebuilding education systems post-conflict.	Primarily works through governments, which can have considerable limitations in conflict/fragility. Does not work in acute emergencies.

coordination, prioritization and quality of education work on the ground in these difficult contexts.[45] Given that there are no other global education standards, the INEE Minimum Standards are in fact being used in a range of low-income but not exclusively crisis-affected contexts, which is another testament to their utility. INEE has a robust plan for continuing to improve the knowledge base, technical guidance, global policy and coordination of actors in this field.

Donors that invest in INEE are able to accomplish things that they would have never been able to do on their own. They also greatly leverage their investments. For example, the INEE Minimum Standards took two years to develop and directly involved 2,500 people around the world. The direct costs of this effort were $559,000, but for every $1 of direct support, INEE leveraged $1 of indirect support. This ability to leverage in-kind support extends beyond specific projects to include INEE's core operating costs.

Virtually every major bilateral donor, U.N. agency, and multilateral organization working in education is actively involved in INEE, including the U.S. government. However, unlike other bilateral agencies, U.S. involvement has largely been confined to representation by USAID technical experts on INEE Working Groups and by providing modest in-kind support through existing contracts for things such as printing costs and short-term consultants. Support from other bilateral donors includes:

- DFID, which has supported INEE for over two and half years with a grant for $674,000;

- the Netherlands, which through UNICEF supported INEE with $815,000 between 2007 and 2009; and

- CIDA, which has given INEE between $50,000 and $88,000 annually since 2006 for core operating costs.

While the United States has traditionally not directly funded INEE, NGOs and multilateral agencies such as UNESCO that are funded by the U.S. government have channeled some of the support they receive to INEE as part of their activities. USAID is however planning to support one of INEE's working groups directly in 2010, a welcomed break from the past. Certainly up until now U.S. government officials managing funding to multi-lateral agencies and NGOs have played an important role in approving and at times encouraging the support to this issue. For instance, $500,000 of the U.S. contribution to UNESCO for "post-conflict reconstruction of education systems" support the network's development and implementation of the INEE Minimum Standards, as well as the network's 2004 Global Consultation. Additionally, U.S. non-profit and for-profit implementing agencies, including the Academy for Educational Development, American Institute for Research, Care, Catholic Relief Services, Creative Associates Inc., International Rescue

Committee and MSI, together have channeled more than $100,000 to network activities since 2004 with USAID funds.

2. Liberia's Education Pooled Fund

The Netherlands has partnered with UNICEF on a five-year global initiative to develop innovative approaches to education work in conflict and fragility. This Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition initiative was launched with $201 million from the Netherlands in 2006, but other donors are keen to join, especially in relation to specific projects that have shown early successes.

An example of one such project is Liberia's Education Pooled Fund, which has pioneered a new approach to supporting a post-conflict government in education delivery. Instead of waiting many months or years for the Ministry of Education to develop the financial management capacity to accept large-scale funds with which to rebuild the education sector, the Education Pooled Fund mechanism has rapidly accelerated the government's ability to revitalize education. The fund, which was launched in May 2008 with $12 million from the UNICEF-Netherlands program and $4 million from the Open Society Institute, supports the Liberian government's plan to rebuild education. Crucially, however, the money is held in a private bank account managed by UNICEF, with a management committee led by the Liberian Ministries of Education and Finance approving disbursements and monitoring expenditures.

One year after the pooled fund was launched, over $12 million was allocated for three core projects: the printing and distribution of the first new texts books in more than a decade reduced the textbook-to-student ratio from one book for every 27 children

to one book per two children; 40 new schools were under construction across the country and three teacher training institutes in rural areas had been re-established.[46] There are also simultaneous capacity building exercises underway to ensure that over time the Ministry of Education will be able to directly accept and responsibly manage significant funds. The success of the Education Pooled Fund has encouraged investments from other donors, and it is believed that the finalization of the country's education plan will serve as a tool to attract new investment. Further, this education plan will help the pooled fund to solidify its legitimacy and, in doing so, appeal to the international donor community. But most importantly, it provides a new model for both post-conflict state-building and education system revitalization that can be applied to other contexts and pave the way for an improved way of doing business.

3. Norway's Emergency Preparedness Rosters

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports a number of emergency preparedness rosters aimed at increasing the effectiveness of U.N. humanitarian action through providing highly-skilled individuals to key positions. Human resources capacity for humanitarian response is a large gap in the U.N. system, as many organizations have a long time-frame for hiring and deployment. This is especially true for the education sector, with a recent global study highlighting the significant gaps in human resources capacity for emergency education response both in the U.N. system and civil society agencies.[47]

One such roster supported by the Norwegian government is NORSTAFF, which is managed by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), a non-profit humanitarian aid organization. For more than two de-

cades, NORSTAFF has deployed more than 3,000 staff in over 50 countries across a wide range of sectors, including education. The roster has standing agreements with 11 U.N. agencies, including UNICEF, UNHCR, UNESCO and WFP. As needed, education specialists, many with direct teaching and education management experience, are seconded from Norway's department of education. NRC provides specialized management and technical training to its roster participants prior to deployment. By partnering with a range of U.N. agencies, the Norwegian government is able to have a broad reach and fulfill an important need for flexible, rapid and high quality humanitarian specialists.

NORSTAFF, along with associated rosters managed by NRC, is one-of-a-kind for the education field. It is cited as an effective way to improve education work in humanitarian settings. However, the human resources needs for this field remain great and could absorb more such mechanisms. While the U.S. government does not support anything similar in the education field, State/PRM and USAID/OFDA both support similar roster models for the protection field. PRM supports the Surge Project, managed by US-based NGO the International Rescue Committee, which provides short-term experts to UNHCR to protect refugees during crises. Similarly, OFDA funds the Protection Surge Capacity Program (PROCAP), a standby protection program that deploys protection experts to UNHCR, UNICEF, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs and the Office of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights.[48] This is an important model that needs to be expanded in to education for conflict and fragility contexts.

4. Education Cluster

The Cluster Approach is one part of the U.N. Humanitarian reform process and was created es-

pecially to improve predictability and accountability in the humanitarian response to emergencies. The Education Cluster is one of several sectors where there were identified gaps in leadership and predictable response on the ground. While only established in 2008, the Education Cluster, according to its support unit in Geneva, has already been activated on the ground in more than 30 countries around the world and globally through an inter-agency working group. Early evaluations have shown that the use of the Cluster Approach has "considerably improved the effectiveness and efficiency" of humanitarian responses by providing a clear point of coordination, collaboration and decision-making in otherwise chaotic environments.[49]

The work of the global Education Cluster, which is co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children, is designed to strengthen systematized preparedness and coordination of technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies to support the effective implementation of the country-level Education Clusters. Several projects are underway and planned that would, across multiple agencies, address some of the core challenges with which country-level Education Clusters struggle. These projects include ensuring country-level clusters have adequate human and material resources and a high-quality and streamlined knowledge management system, as well as ensuring that national actors, such as ministries of education and other front-line responders, have adequate capacity to effectively support emergency education response.

As one of the newer initiatives, the evidence base on the Education Cluster's success is limited, but nevertheless it is generally regarded to have promise, if properly resourced and implemented, by clarifying the division of labor and defining roles and responsibilities among organizations. For example,

two natural disasters in Pakistan—the October 2005 earthquake in the North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir and the summer 2007 floods in Balochistan and Sindh provinces—demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the Cluster Approach. According to UNICEF's education focal point in its Pakistan office, the emergency response through the Cluster Approach enabled the first-time enrollment in school for more than 26,000 students, increased the participation of parent-teacher associations in community development, and trained teachers in psychosocial skills. When flooding occurred the following year, however, the Education Cluster was reactivated, but without the same engagement from the national government or adequate levels of funding to support the work of the NGOs participating in the cluster.[50] Thus, while the Education Cluster was deemed a successful approach after the earthquake, it was less successful the following year during the floods, demonstrating that flexibility and adaptability to individual country and emergency contexts are essential. Essentially, it is about making the international humanitarian community more structured, accountable and professional, so that it can be a better partner for host governments, local authorities and local civil society.

While U.S. education officers in individual country missions may be engaged with the local Education Cluster, to date, the U.S. government has been absent from engaging with the Education Cluster at the global level. Initially, to establish the cluster and as part of the global capacity building appeal 2007-2008, four donors gave $922,000.[51] In this appeal, education was the least funded cluster at only 30 percent through contributions made by Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. The U.S. did not financially support the establishment of the education cluster during this time. In 2009, there was no global appeal, and the majority of global level funding of the Education

Cluster was from existing UNICEF contributions from the Netherlands and the U.K.[52] Currently, the work of the education clusters remain only partially funded and additional resources from the U.S. government could help establish it as an effective mechanism for improving humanitarian assistance.

5. Education for All-Fast Track Initiative

The Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is a fifth multilateral partnership of note. While it historically has been a global mechanism focused on coordinating bilateral and multilateral education support to "good performing" countries on the "fast track" to reaching universal education, in recent years the FTI has demonstrated considerable commitment to finding an improved mechanism for supporting education in these most difficult contexts, as demonstrated through the establishment of its Fragile States Task Team in 2005 and on-going work to establish an Education Transition Fund. Currently, the FTI is about to undertake significant reform, which will mostly likely include, among other items, a mechanism to specifically support countries experiencing state fragility and conflict. While the U.S. has supported education in countries with FTI-endorsed sector strategies bilaterally, it has not played a significant role in the governance of the FTI or in offering its technical capacity to the Partnership. However, the United States was a primary funder of the recent external evaluation that is prompting many of the strategic reforms, demonstrating its interest in the effectiveness of the Partnership. Now there are important opportunities for the U.S. government to be part of the multilateral process moving this agenda forward. Indeed, if successful, a reformed FTI that is able to effectively address the education needs of populations living in conflict and fragility would be the most important multilateral partnership in which the U.S. government could engage.

NINE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. TO IMPROVE ITS AID TO EDUCATION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND FRAGILE STATES

The U.S. government has significant and important strengths in the field of education in conflict and fragility, including robust NGO, philanthropic and academic communities with which to partner. However, its fragmented policy across agencies, its limited multilateral partnerships, and, to a lesser extent, its concentrated distribution of resources means that it does not leverage these strengths for maximum impact at country level. Below are nine recommendations to maximize the U.S. government's strengths, address its weaknesses, and move it from being an underachiever to an overachiever on this issue.

Whole of Government Reforms:

1. All government entities should use the INEE Minimum Standards as the guide to global good practice.

The U.S. government should set an inter-agency policy that requires all actors working on education in contexts of conflict and fragility to use the INEE Minimum Standards, the current source of good practice in this field. Drawing on the PRM example, proposal guidelines for government partners could emphasize various components as they align with specific projects and general aid effectiveness principles. Other bilateral donors have similar approaches, including:

- Norway, which states in its policy papers that, "development policy is based on minimum international standards for education during humanitarian crises and in the early reconstruction phase"[53] and established an Emergency Education Team tasked with providing advisory support on humanitarian assistance and education in emergencies and is committed to ensuring increased awareness, practical application, and systematic utilization of the INEE Minimum Standards, including recommending that utilization of the standards is a criterion for funding;

- Sweden, which has produced a set of *Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance in the Education Sector* and a specific policy on *Education in Situations of Emergency, Conflict, and Post-conflict* that outlines options for providing assistance in these more challenging contexts; and

- The European Commission, which has a specific policy and strategy for work in fragile states that links immediate service delivery, including education, to longer-term development assistance.[54]

2. Ensure continuity of formal and non-formal education during humanitarian response.

The U.S. government should close its "mandate gap" by ensuring the full continuity of education in humanitarian response. Specifically, the existing education support in emergencies—namely non-formal education and hardware for formal education—should be expanded to include the full resumption of formal schooling as soon as possible. The U.S. government could find useful lessons from Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and Sweden, which have all established clear policies requiring that education be an integral part of humanitarian response.

How exactly to do this will require further consideration, however several things are clear. The focus should be on improving education continuity in IDP and other conflict-affected communities that have not crossed international borders. For refugee contexts, PRM currently does support non-formal education as well as the rapid resumption of formal education during humanitarian interventions. The best placed agency to address this gap in IDP contexts is OFDA, as the leading entity for humanitarian assistance with

in the U.S. government. DOD also has an important role to play but given its core skills and comparative advantages should remain focused on rapid delivery of school materials and reconstruction of buildings and not expand into further types of education "software."

Discussion across and within departments and agencies will be needed to identify the best ways of meeting this mandate gap. If OFDA were to take a lead on closing this mandate gap, they would need high-level support for an expanded interpretation of their mandate. The current focus within the U.S. government on improving relief to development transitions could provide the necessary incentives for this support. OFDA would also need greatly expanded technical capacity. Currently there is hardly anyone in the office with any education expertise.

How to provide that expertise, especially in a context when there are severe human resources constraints across all of OFDA's sectors, is a subject of debate. Some argue that OFDA should develop its own education team if it were to expand its education portfolio while others argue that it should leverage the education expertise in USAID's EGAT and regional bureaus, some of whom have humanitarian experience. Regardless of the approach used, more staff is needed with expertise on education in humanitarian contexts if this mandate gap is to be filled. The National Security Council's (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committee, which coordinates executive branch agencies around global development, could be a forum to review and facilitate discussions on this issue.

3. Consider reorganizing by function to improve coordination.

Coordination is quite difficult given the high degree of fragmentation across multiple U.S. government entities. Addressing this coordination gap will certainly require increased communication across agencies. Additionally, restructuring and perhaps consolidating or aligning these entities differently should also be considered. A range of principles can be employed to guide such restructuring efforts. One approach, albeit certainly not the only one, is to consider central functions of government entities and ensure that form supports function. In other words, to ensure that the way of organizing institutions maximizes, rather than hinders, their ability to perform their core functions. Using this lens, suggestions for reorganizing U.S. government entities by function are offered. Ultimately, however, these suggestions are made in an effort to spark further and more detailed discussion on the topic by those currently engaged in processes such as the QDDR and PSD.

- *USAID, PRM and OFDA* all share the core function of systematically delivering services and building local capacity in countries affected by conflict and state fragility. Using a combination of humanitarian and development aid modalities, these three entities are all guided by mandates that are motivated by principles of assistance and support to people and communities in need (e.g. alleviating suffering for disaster victims, sustainable solutions for refugees, economic growth for the poor). They all work broadly across a range of social service sectors and have a core set of basic approaches and interventions that they commit to regularly supporting.

Each entity brings a set of specific expertise that *in combination with the others* is important for providing continuous support to populations– from preparedness and emergencies through early recovery and development. PRM focuses on refugee population both while they reside outside of their countries and when they initially return back home; OFDA focuses on internally-displaced and otherwise conflict or disaster-affected populations that

have not crossed an international border and does so in acute emergencies; and USAID supports communities affected by conflict and disasters (but not refugees) in a wide range of contexts from on-going crises like Afghanistan to more classic early recovery and long-term development situations such as Liberia.

Organizationally, PRM sits outside of USAID as a separate bureau in the State Department, whereas OFDA is housed within USAID. However, the organizational culture within USAID leads to limited interaction between the humanitarian team housed within OFDA and the various other entities within USAID, such as EGAT. While certainly individuals do work together across units and strategic communication exists, comments such as "OFDA does its own thing" and "we don't have much to do with them [OFDA]" from EGAT staff and "we have tried to engage people but they [EGAT staff] do not seem interested" from OFDA staff are typical.

Finding an organizational structure that would decrease transaction costs for coordination, communication and collaboration between PRM, OFDA and USAID would be one way to foster better links between relief and development. Certainly for the education sector, this would be of tremendous utility for ensuring continuity of services. Ultimately, this should be done in a way that retains any specific ways of operating that supports the efficiency and effectiveness of each entity. For example, if flexible funding mechanisms or procedures are essential for continuing the good performance of any one entity, they should not be sacrificed in the search for better aligned organizational structures. Additionally, it is important to note that PRM also has as a core function the facilitation of refugee admissions to the United States, however this is done closely

with and falls much more within the purview of the Department of Homeland Security.

- *OTI* has a mandate that is at its core functionally distinct from PRM, OFDA and USAID. Its mandate is to support stabilization of countries transitioning out of conflict or authoritarianism, which is fundamentally a political objective, not a developmental one. OTI certainly uses development assistance as one of the central tools by which it seeks to support positive political change in these fragile contexts. However, it will choose what sectors and what development strategies to use based on a careful political analysis of the context and select the most leveraged areas in which to invest that will promote political stability. This is important work, but it means that OTI's function is more aligned with work carried out in the State Department outside of USAID. By necessity, OTI's interventions will vary widely according to what the particular political needs are of any given context in which they work. In this way, they are not set up to be a reliable service delivery partner of OFDA or PRM or for that matter USAID. While certainly OTI staff work closely on the ground with OFDA staff when they coincide, the office itself is not structured to systematically pick up in the early recovery period the humanitarian work that OFDA or PRM has initiated. Certainly within the education sector, along with other core sectors in humanitarian response such as health, OTI will not be able to regularly pick up during the early recovery period formal or non-formal education interventions that may have been started by PRM of OFDA during the emergency phase. In some contexts, like in Sierra Leone after the war, education interventions may be seen as important for supporting political stabilization and peaceful transition and hence supported by OTI. But in many contexts it is not, which is purely a function of their political mandate.

- CMM is also housed within USAID but has a very unique function that is relevant beyond the agency boundaries. Its central objective is to mainstream "best practices of conflict management into tra-

ditional development sectors."[55] Indeed, CMM is the analytical brain behind how U.S. government development interventions should be designed to mitigate and manage conflict risk. Largely serving a role of technical advisors across USAID units and staff, they do important work developing guidance as well as guiding policy around conflict mitigation and management. This technical assistance and guidance is also crucial for other entities in the U.S. government that engage in development work. For example, in the education sector, CMM's advice on addressing youth is equally important for the education work carried out by the Department of Labor in conflict-affected countries as it is for USAID's EGAT team or Regional Bureaus. Finding a way to ensure this technical and analytical expertise can be utilized outside of USAID programming would be an important step toward having conflict-sensitive programming across all agencies.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) housed in the State Department, but not within USAID, has several functions that are similar to the work of CMM. S/CRS is focused heavily on operational supports and leadership for U.S. government response in conflict contexts. This includes managing and training a cadre of professionals to be deployed in these contexts through the Civilian Response Corps; funding programming; and leading "whole of government" responses to and lessons learned from work in conflict contexts. The detailed technical guidance on how development programs should be designed and implemented that CMM provides remains an important function for achieving conflict-sensitive programming that complements S/CRS's work. Having two entities working on conflict necessarily increases the transaction costs for close coordination between the two and potentially duplication of efforts. Closer alignment without losing the unique features that each entity brings would be useful.

• Other entities within the U.S. government that have programs and activities contributing to humanitarian and development objectives—such as the Departments of Labor, Defense, and Agriculture—approach these activities within a fundamentally different framework and set of objectives. The core functions for example of DOL's education interventions are specifically to reduce the number of children exploited by hazardous child labor. Closer collaboration and coordination across these actors with agencies whose central mandate are humanitarian and development assistance continues to be important.

Public-Private Partnerships:

4. Develop a global education roster for emergencies and post-crisis transitions.

The U.S. has a large pool of very talented educators—both from the number of teachers and education administrators working in U.S. schools and community education programs as well as from the global education experts in academia, the NGO and philanthropic communities. Working with teachers unions, universities and non-governmental organizations, the U.S. government could develop a mechanism for supporting human resources capacity in this field. Lessons from Norway's experience in humanitarian rosters as well as PRM's and OFDA's experience in protection rosters could inform such an initiative. An "EDCAP" education roster would greatly improve the ability for aid in this area to be effectively managed and implemented. Within the State Department, the new Civilian Response Corps, which currently does not have a technical or sectoral focus, could be something upon which an EDCAP roster could be built. This roster could support education work across a range of contexts, from humanitarian relief through reconstruction, and across a range of institutions, including the U.N., civil society and even country-level governments. This would provide crucial human resources

support that could make a real contribution to the improved effectiveness of education aid.

5. Leverage the U.S. NGO, philanthropic and academic communities.

The U.S. has a significant depth of expertise on education in conflict and fragility in its NGO, philanthropic and academic communities. However, the U.S. government is not drawing on these resources in any strategic and forward-thinking way. Providing a series of structured opportunities to engage these communities together and develop some shared, concrete goals would likely achieve a great deal. For example, collaborative innovation grants dedicated to developing new forward-thinking approaches to meeting persistent problems could move the whole field forward.

Multilateral Partnerships:

6. Support Scaling up the Fast Track Initiative reform.

The Education for All-Fast Track Initiative is poised to undergo significant reform. If the reform is undertaken with the level of ambition needed to make the necessary strides toward quality education for all, it could be the opportunity for multilateral engagement with the highest payoff. U.S. government engagement—both by its technical expertise in working in conflict-affected and fragile states and by its political leadership in the donor community—would have a notable impact on the strategic reform process of the FTI and could help put this global education partnership on the right track toward achieving education for all.

A scaled-up FTI must be prepared to support conflict-affected and fragile states, where a very large portion of the out-of-school children currently reside. Effective support of education in these contexts de-

mands some changes to the FTI's existing ways of working. First, since contexts with either contested or extremely weak national governments will not be able to successfully lead or engage in the FTI process, FTI should be open to engagement with alternative actors—U.N., NGOs, provincial governments—when national governments are not a viable option.

Second, given the varying gaps and needs in post-conflict contexts, it is particularly important to ensure country ownership of the plan by allowing each country to identify which strategies, education levels (for example primary, secondary, or technical), and service delivery types are most important. Currently the FTI is focused on supporting primary education, which may not always be the most urgent education intervention in post-conflict contexts (e.g. technical education for out of school youth is often a key priority in early recovery).

While a scaled-up FTI should expand its pooled fund mechanism through innovative financing and a regular replenishment cycle to meet the financing needs of conflict-affected and fragile states, it should not eliminate the "virtual fund" component that allows donors to contribute bilaterally as part of the single coordinated global education process. The reformed FTI should maintain support for both bilateral and pooled contributions and count all funding that is aligned behind country-led plans toward closing the overall financing gap.

7. Increase Support of INEE.

The U.S. government should scale-up its existing engagement with INEE. First, technical expertise in USAID and other departments should be leveraged through consistent representation on Working Groups and Task Teams. Second, as members of the network, U.S. government representatives work in the field

should promote the network's advocacy messages and utilize its tools in donor coordination meetings. Third, in response to the current administration's expressed desire to engage in multilateral efforts that have proven successful, the U.S. government should contribute direct funding to the INEE to support its work, as well as leverage support from other donors.

8. Increase support for the Global Education Cluster.

The U.S., as one of the major global supporters of education in conflict affected and fragile states in terms of funds, could better support coordination with other actors through strategic funding to the Education Cluster, especially at the global level. In 2009, it was funded only at 31 percent at the global level,[56] and the amount of work that is achieved is proportionate. At the global level, additional funds provided to the Education Cluster co-leads of UNICEF and Save the Children, or to another partner, would allow for improved efforts in areas such as joint capacity development and knowledge management.

Congressional Action:

9. Support Education for All Act in the United States Congress.

The Education for All bill, which was introduced by Senators Hillary Clinton (D- NY) and Gordon Smith (R-OR) and by Representatives Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Spencer Bachus (R-AL) in May 2007, marked a historic, bipartisan step forward in the United States' effort to help all children access a quality basic education, and specifically addresses education in contexts of conflict. In 2010, the U.S. Congress should introduce and pass revised Education for All legislation that adequately addresses and coordinates the U.S. approach to the educational needs of children affected by conflict and fragility.

Language within the 2007 bill provides a strong foundation for the revised legislation by specifically channeling resources to children in developing countries that are affected by armed conflict, emerging from armed conflict, or impacted by humanitarian crises. It echoed many of the recommendations made in this brief, including developing and implementing a comprehensive integrated U.S. government strategy on education for all that:

- outlines how the government will ensure a transition and continuity of educational activities in countries affected by armed conflict and humanitarian crises;

- assigns priorities to the relevant executive branch agencies and officials;

- improves coordination and reduces duplication among these agencies and officials, as well as with foreign donor government and international organizations;

- expands public-private partnerships and the leveraging of resources; and

- maximizes U.S. capabilities in the areas of technical assistance and training.[57]

In reintroducing the Education for All Action, the content of the 2007 bill should be maintained and augmented to reflect the important learning about global good practices that has occurred in the intervening three years.

First and foremost, there are a number of ways to assist the U.S. government strategy in ensuring the continuity of education while improving coordination among government agencies and with foreign partners. The independently-developed INEE Minimum Standards should be used as government-wide guidance on the provision of education in situations of conflict, emergencies and early recovery. Second, as

mentioned in the earlier legislation, agency-specific priorities and coordination among these agencies should be part of the government-wide strategy on education. This increased coordination could be accomplished through a strategic restructuring of the various agencies to improve efficient use of funds and ensure continuity of support across development contexts. The ongoing in-depth reviews of the government's global development policies and procedures provide a window of opportunity for such internal restructuring to occur that could be further supported through legislative action. While such restructuring will need to closely consider the impact on all development sectors, not just education, clarifying mandates to close gaps will improve the overall efficacy and efficiency of U.S. work in this area.

Finally, coordination with foreign donor governments and international organizations as well as leveraging resources can be supported through improved multilateral engagement. The U.S. government can engage multilaterally in a number of ways, including providing financial, technical and personnel resources to pooled funding mechanisms and international organizations (including a scaled up Fast Track Initiative, the INEE, and the Global Education Cluster), providing secondment services of its technical expertise to other organizations through both immediate and short-term capacity rosters as well as active participation and leadership in these multilateral groups.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. government has important comparative advantages in supporting education in contexts of conflict and fragility. It has a wide global reach and supports education in many countries affected by conflict and fragility. Both from the government and the private sector, significant resources in total dollar terms are dedicated to this issue and strong technical expertise can be brought to bear. However, currently the U.S. government is a classic underachiever, failing to efficiently deploy its many capabilities and potential for maximum impact. Fragmented policies and limited multilateral engagement mean that its numerous strengths in this field are not leveraged in a way that best assists those living in contexts of conflict and fragility. Supporting whole-of-government reforms, as well as improved public-private partnerships, multilateral action and congressional legislation can transform the U.S. from an underachiever to a leader on this issue. Ensuring the U.S. "punches above its weight" in its support for education in contexts of conflict and fragility can have incredible benefits for the millions of children, youth and adults who live in these most difficult contexts and need access to quality education.

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ENDNOTES

1. Clinton, 2010.

2. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies Minimum Standards housed the accepted global good practice for education in conflict and fragility.

3. OECD, 2007

4. Save the Children, 2009; UNESCO, 2010

5. Wedge, 2008

6. Hanf & Bauerle, 2009

7. U.S. Department of State, 2009

8. Due to the reporting format of the U.S. Office of Foreign Assistance, this amount does not include countries that may have technical and vocational education, but not basic and higher education programming. However, workforce development interventions are a crucial part of education approaches in contexts of conflict and fragility, especially in post-conflict contexts where there is often a need for technical training of youth and adults tailored to the new economic situation (U.S. Department of State, 2009).

9. ILAB, 2009

10. Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud, 2009

11. These data are derived from the OECD-DAC database, which depends on self-reported data from donors. Both formal and non-formal education may be included within the education sector data, but it is also possible that education activities, especially non-formal education activities, may also be categorized as education activities within other sectors, such as protection, water and sanitation, health and economic recovery. This figure of U.S. spending on education in these contexts would be higher if it included those countries affected by non-conflict-based fragility.

12. Save the Children, 2009

13. Save the Children, 2009

14. Foundation Center, 2008

15. Save the Children, 2009

16. UNESCO, 2010

17. According to Whitehill (2009), for FY2010, $364 million has been allocated for education, more than double the amount provided in FY2009. However, Save the Children's estimates are using FY 2007 data. While the total numbers may vary from FY 2007 to FY 2009, the story remains the same with a few countries receiving a bulk of the funds.

18. The majority of the funding for education in Iraq was through the Department of Defense for school rehabilitation and reconstruction.

19. Save the Children, 2009

20. Despite this low percentage of humanitarian aid to education, the U.S. is still the largest donor to education in emergency contexts in terms of total dollars, a factor of its large economy and overall size.

21. Save the Children, 2009

22. Save the Children, 2009

23. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009

24. Sphere & INEE, 2009.

25. Save the Children, 2009

26. UNESCO, 2008

27. Pscharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002

28. Herz & Sperling, 2004

29. Winthrop, 2010

30. Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2004

31. Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud, 2009

32. Organizations listed by country headquarters,

not by location of person representing the NGO. (INEE, 2009)

33. Organization in development at time of publication.

34. Academic program in development at time of publication.

35. Organization in development at time of publication.

36. Major donors that do not have overarching policies but are currently developing or reviewing their strategies to include education and fragility include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S. (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, and Rigaud, 2009).

37. USIP, 2009

38. OFDA, 1998

39. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009

40. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007

41. The term "entity" is used here since within the thirteen groups listed, there are bureaus, offices, funds, and programs listed.

42. The U.S. funded $841.4 million in ODA to education worldwide in 2007, with $399.3 million for countries on the OECD list of fragile states (OECD, 2009).

43. The figures in this table are calculated from OECD-DAC CRS and OCHA Reliefweb. The numbers are higher than the Save the Children calculations because in the Save the Children data, USDA and DOL allocations are categorized outside of the education sector, USDA and DOL projects related to education are included here.

44. An additional $30 million in humanitarian aid was spent for education in "Iraq and neighboring countries." Because it is unclear how much of the aid was spent in Iraq, the figure is not included in this table (U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).

45. INEE, 2008

46. Schmidt, 2009

47. Houghton, 2009

48. USAID, 2008

49. Houghton, 2008

50. Haiplik, 2007

51. Only $922,000 was contributed on a full appeal for $3,050,400. Donors and amounts were: Norway, $82,000; Denmark $350,000; Sweden, $225,000; Ireland, $270,000.

52. Funding for education was also quite low at the country-level. At the country level, across the 2009 Consolidated Appeals Process, education was the least funded sector at 31 percent globally.

53. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008

54. Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, & Rigaud, 2009

55. USAID, 2007

56. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009

57. H.R.2092/S.1259, 2007.