Surviving school
Education for refugee children from Rwanda 1994-1996

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List of abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEPZA	Communauté des églises de Pentecôte au Zaire
CODE	Centres d'occupation
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DEO	District Education Officer
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECC	Education Co-ordination Committee
EPMU	Education Programme Management Unit
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
ILOT	International Language Oriented Trust
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOEC	Ministry of Education and Culture
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République du Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PDO	Project Development Officer
SCF	Save the Children Fund
TEP	Teacher Emergency Package
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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Series preface

UNESCO is increasingly requested to provide an educational response in emergency and reconstruction settings. The Organization is in the process of developing expertise in this field in order to be able to provide prompt and relevant assistance. It will offer guidance, practical tools and specific training for education policy-makers, officials and planners.

The fifth of the eleven objectives adopted by the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children in emergencies. It stresses the importance of meeting "… the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict". The *Dakar Framework for Action* (*World Education Forum*, 2000*a*: 9) calls for national Education for All plans to include provision for education in emergency situations. Governments, particularly education ministries, have an important role to play in an area that has often been dominated by the actions of NGOs and United Nations agencies.

Moreover, the field of educational planning in emergencies and reconstruction is still young. It has to be organized into a manageable discipline, through further documentation and analysis, before training programmes can be designed. Accumulated institutional memories and knowledge in governments, agencies and NGOs on education in emergencies, are in danger of being lost due both to the dispersion and disappearance of documents, and to high staff turnover in both national and international contexts. Most of the expertise is still in the heads of practitioners and needs to be collected, since memories fade fast. Diverse experiences of educational reconstruction must now be more thoroughly documented and analyzed before they disappear.

This task includes the publication in this series of eight country-specific analyses being conducted on the planning and management of education in emergencies and reconstruction. They concern the efforts currently being made to restore and transform education systems in countries as diverse as Burundi, Kosovo, Palestine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,

Sudan and Timor-Leste. They have been initiated and sponsored by IIEP, in close collaboration with the Division of Educational Policies and Strategies in UNESCO Headquarters.

The objectives of the case studies are:

- to contribute to the process of developing knowledge in the discipline of education in emergencies;
- to provide focused input for future IIEP training programmes targeting government officials and others in education in emergencies;
- to identify and collect dispersed documentation on the management of education in the eight countries; and to capture some of the undocumented memories of practitioners;
- to analyze response in eight very different situations to educational provision in times of crisis;
- to increase dissemination of information and analysis on education in emergencies.

IIEP's larger programme on education in emergencies and reconstruction involves not only these case studies, but also a series of global, thematic, policy-related studies. In addition, IIEP is producing a handbook for education authority officials and the agencies assisting them, and developing training materials for a similar audience. Through this programme, IIEP will make a modest but significant contribution to the discipline of education in emergencies and reconstruction. Its hope is to enrich the quality of the planning processes applied in this crucial field.

Gudmund Hernes
Director, IIEP

Executive summary

Conflicts are becoming ever more prevalent in the world and in most cases it is children who suffer most. Education can play a critical role in helping children return towards normalcy and laying the foundation for a productive role in society, either in their country of origin or in the country of settlement. This is vital psychologically for the community, but particularly so for children. School is one of the most effective methods of healing psycho-social trauma and it is a fundamental right of children that they should not have to wait for the much-needed security that education provides. This study explores how education in situations of emergency can be established and maintained as a vital psychological support to children and communities.

The study investigates how education for refugee children emerged and developed, after the genocide in Rwanda caused hundreds of thousands to flee to neighbouring countries. The focus of the study is Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) and the period under investigation is from 1994-1996, when the vast majority of refugees returned to Rwanda.

The study is divided into five parts:

1. The context leading up to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, including the humanitarian responses in Tanzania and DRC;
2. The educational responses in emergency situations;
3. The case study relating directly to Tanzania and how education was established in the refugee camps, covering issues of policy, access, quality, management and funding and the situation of the current caseload of remaining refugees;
4. The case study relating directly to the situation in DRC covering similar issues;
5. Critical issues arising from the analysis of the research findings and recommendations.

The context

The roots of the conflict in Rwanda can be traced to the social and political implications of colonial policies dating back to the nineteenth

century. These led to the creation and maintenance of the ethnic divisions that were the most significant feature of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Ethnic division, engendered and exploited by various rulers, resulted in the mass slaughter of close to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This occurred while the international community largely ignored the warnings and the subsequent massacres. The consequence of the 100 days of butchery led to mass panic on the part of Hutus, who fled in fear of reprisal killings by the conquering Tutsi army who had invaded and quickly gained control of government.

The humanitarian need and response to the refugee crisis was staggering as nearly 2 million people fled into neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania and DRC. Nearly half a million crossed into Tanzania, most settling near the town of Ngara. An even greater number - estimated at one million – fled to the DRC. The cost involved, in financial and technical assistance, was enormous: over $2 billion had been spent in Goma (DRC) alone as aid flooded in to support the humanitarian effort. Although the overall response in humanitarian terms was overwhelming, the amount of funding to education was relatively minor, with education receiving far less than other sectors. Such limitations in funding and support reflected the prioritization of agencies and donors that favoured sectors that were seen as life supporting. This undervalued the vital role education had to play both in the development of the crisis and by restoring normality to a beleaguered population.

To capture all the determining factors that contributed to the education response, the study addresses how the relevant stakeholders tackled refugee education. The issues are analyzed under the categories of policy, access and equity, quality and management.

Tanzania case study

Policy

Although the Tanzanian Government had historically integrated refugees into their existing school system, the scale of the influx obliged the local authorities to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) based on UNHCR's policy of education for repatriation. That policy called for provision of education that was relevant and applicable to the refugees' country of origin. This MOU was not reflected in the official government

refugee policy, which contained no mention of education for refugees at that time.

Access and equity

Access in terms of availability of schooling was not an issue in the camps in Tanzania, as once the schools were fully operational, the majority of children had access to educational facilities. Despite relatively high enrolment rates for both sexes in the early grades, the rate of attrition in the upper grades was very high, particularly for girls. The reasons for the high attrition rates were numerous, centring chiefly on clothing and domestic responsibilities. In some instances, particularly in the Karagwe camps, efforts had been made to cater for children with physical disabilities, although the much-needed psycho-social assistance was inadequate for the large numbers of children requiring assistance. Access to non-formal education, pre-school and post-primary education was limited as agencies did not fund these areas beyond non-formal literacy classes and some vocational training facilities. However, refugees themselves established informal secondary and pre-schools, which required parental contributions.

Quality

Access seemed to be of a higher priority to most agencies at the earlier phases than quality issues. Quality was further affected by the decision in the early stages to adopt a three-phase implementation model: (a) Recreational phase, (b) TEP phase, and (c) formal curriculum phase (this became known as the 'Ngara' model). This was an externally imposed model, which was out of line with the education needs of most of the clients and caused delays in establishing a formal education system similar to the one in Rwanda. Other issues, such as the availability of pedagogic materials and the physical environment of the schools, had significant impact on the quality of teaching and learning in the later stage when the programme became more structured. The refugee situation provided a window of opportunity to improve on and add to the existing curriculum, with the introduction of different thematic curricula such as peace education and environmental education. Peace education proved to be politically contentious in Ngara as key community leaders tried to jeopardize the programme at a later stage, believing it to be a mechanism to force the refugees to repatriate.

Certification was a key issue in guaranteeing that the education children received had some validity. Unfortunately, the certificates that UNHCR and UNICEF issued to Grade 6 leavers were not of use on their return. Cross-border efforts in subsequent programmes for the Burundian and Congolese refugees proved more successful.

Management

UNHCR took a strong leadership role alongside UNICEF, UNESCO and GTZ as the key co-ordinators and managers of the programme. While this proved to have a positive impact in terms of the harmonization of the programmes across camps, it led to an initial response that allowed little involvement from refugees in the decision-making process. The situation changed gradually over time, as a more participatory approach was introduced.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) case study

The refugee crisis, during which close to a million refugees invaded the environs of the Virunga National Park, had tremendous political, social and economic impact on the DRC. The local population was overwhelmed as agencies struggled to cope with the influx, and as mass cholera outbreaks killed tens of thousands. Intimidation and violence were part of daily life, particularly in the camps around Goma, where members of the militia and former Rwandan soldiers who were participants in the genocide, ruled with impunity. Some aid agencies withdrew from the programme fearing their assistance was only fuelling support to mass murderers. Not only did the refugee influx affect the country during 1994, it was a significant factor in the subsequent two civil wars that started in 1996 and again in 1998 and which continues to date. It is estimated that approximately 3.5 million people have died either directly or indirectly as a result of the war (since 1998). The current situation in DRC is a complex struggle between three factions, each supported by external forces.

Policy

The Ministry of Education historically integrated refugees into the national education system. However, the scale of the influx prevented the vast majority of refugees inside the camps from being accommodated in this way, although some children living on the fringes of the camps did

attend local schools. While initially the MOE did not prevent education in an ad-hoc fashion from being initiated, it issued instructions in February 1996 to stop all educational and community-service activities in the belief that education was delaying repatriation of the refugees. UNHCR also discouraged educational activities in the camps and did not fund educational activities for at least the first six months of the refugees' arrival – although globally its policy is to support education in situations of emergency.

Access and equity

The lack of co-ordinated UNHCR support to education, resulted in a positive burst of creativity from parents and some NGOs to establish some ad-hoc educational activities which at least allowed some children access to basic education. Unfortunately this led to later inconsistencies of access for many children. While some camps, particularly in Bukavu, had well-developed educational structures in place, other camps had little or no educational facilities and depended on the will or ability of parents to initiate activities with no external support. By the end of 1995, when UNHCR was supporting education more fully with increased funding and technical expertise, a more structured approach came into force, until the local authorities banned all educational activities in February 1996. This obviously had a severe impact on programmes, although many activities continued surreptitiously. Parents and teachers had also established post-primary education, but as no external funding was available the initiatives were poorly resourced. The situation for the Rwandan refugees currently remaining in the east of DRC is harsh. There are substantial numbers living in the forests and in the internally displaced persons' camps in the east of the country, but these are not considered as refugees by many international agencies and are thus given little support. Therefore children of these people have limited or no access to education.

Quality

In terms of teacher quality and training, there were large numbers of trained teachers in the camps in DRC, which was a positive aspect despite the lack of support for formal education. The teaching environment however was challenging; classes were conducted largely in the open air, with children sitting on the lava rock under trees. The timing and duration of classes was thus dependent on the weather. Quality was severely affected by the lack of school materials at least for the first nine months of the

crisis. Teacher Emergency Packages (TEP) were brought in by UNESCO and UNICEF in May 1995, but these were 'too little too late' and were not sufficient to meet the growing need for educational materials. The lack of textbooks was a severe problem as teachers did not even have basic texts and often used journal notes or old textbooks brought from Rwanda when they fled.

Management

The variation of education provision from camp to camp was a critical factor in how programmes were managed, as there was no overall co-ordination structure. Some regions such as Bukavu had a management system in place, using committees that had originally been set up by parents. The lack of technical education expertise amongst NGOs and United Nations agencies impacted on their ability to harmonize programmes across camps and between districts.

Critical issues

Several critical issues emerged from the study:

Government and United Nations roles

The lack of a formally signed government policy for education in either country jeopardized the safety of education programmes that might be initiated. This was particularly so in DRC where education in the camps was banned. While refugee policies existed that covered other aspects of refugee life in the camps, education was not included in the development of these.

Initial response

The tendency at the beginning of the crisis for 'quick and dirty' programming undermined the potential to support community-led initiatives. Community participation came into vogue later in the programme after a series of budget cuts and was perceived by some refugees to be a pretext for their provision of cheap labour.

Donor funding for education

Many donors felt that education was low in the list of priorities at the onset of the emergency and this was reflected in the budgeting for education,

which received less than one-sixth of the budget allocated to health. Furthermore, in the early stages, the heavy intimidation by the Rwandan militia in the camps caused the reluctance of some agencies to be seen as 'feeding the killers'.

Disparity of support to local population

While some ad-hoc interventions in terms of school rehabilitation and improvements to government infrastructure were undertaken, the billions of dollars that went into the emergency operation at the earliest phase were not reflected in the support to the local populations. The local populations and the authorities felt that the compensation they received was inadequate for hosting such a large number of refugees and the consequent degradation to the surrounding environment.

Agency response

The agency response varied between the two countries according to the line that UNHCR adopted. In DRC, UNHCR did not fully support the programme until much later, causing a fragmentation of response that undermined co-ordination and consistency. In Tanzania, UNHCR took a strong role in leadership and co-ordination with other United Nations agencies and GTZ, which facilitated the effective development of a strong programme, but hindered refugee involvement and creativity.

Data collection and analysis

While attempts were made to collect rapid baseline data in the early phase of the emergency, the assessments conducted at that time, and the later collection of education statistics, were donor-driven, with little analysis of trends or improvement of obvious shortcomings illustrated in the data. This compromised the accurate determination of need and led to implementation of some strategies that delayed the establishment of an education programme reflecting the needs and wishes of the refugee population.

Building on past experiences

The lessons learned from the Ngara programme in particular led to the rapid establishment of education for the Burundian and Congolese

refugees in subsequent years. This highlighted the potential for refugees to establish their own programmes rapidly and efficiently, without the use of pre-packaged kits, but with technical and basic material support alone.

Repatriation and reintegration

More cross-border sharing of information would have assisted in the future integration of children, although most children apparently had little trouble reintegrating into schools on their return. To date no assessment has been conducted on the impact, value or relevance of the education children received in the camps.

Recommendations

- Education should be treated as a first-line priority by donors and agencies.
- Regional policies should be established on education for refugees in regions of conflict.
- Access should be ensured for all children including the most vulnerable. The curricula for refugees should enhance values of self-esteem, tolerance and respect.
- Cross-border negotiations between concerned governments and United Nations agencies should be instituted immediately to ensure a relevant curriculum that is validated and certified.
- Possibilities for developing a 'refugee education passport' similar to an International Baccalaureate for refugees should be investigated to facilitate validation of refugee education.
- Refugee expertise should be capitalized upon and management and co-ordination should reflect refugee participation at all levels.
- Refugee-affected areas should form part of the emergency response and donor funding should have the flexibility to include both refugee and affected-area programmes.
- Peace-building and peace education activities should be introduced as soon as possible, with sensitivity to the political and social context, and build upon community-based mechanisms for conflict resolution.
- Additional research should be conducted to assess the impact of emergency education after the reintegration of children to their home country.

Great Lakes region: Refugees and internally displaced (July 2002)



Source: Adapted from a map prepared by OCHA Regional Support Office, Central and Eastern Africa, Nairobi.

Refugee camps in the Great Lakes region (as of 1995)



Chapter 1

Introduction

This case study is part of a process by which UNESCO/IIEP plans to provide constructive criteria, guidance and practical tools for education policy-makers, officials and planners within the overall context of strengthening the ability of governments to plan and manage education in situations of emergencies and reconstruction.

A range of activities is being carried out in the period 2002-2003 covering all aspects of education in emergencies. One of the activities is to conduct case studies to document evidence of both successes and failures in the provision of education for children in situations of emergency and reconstruction. Eight case studies were planned, of which Rwanda is one (the others being Burundi, East Timor, Honduras, Kosovo, Palestine, Sierra Leone and Southern Sudan).

The case study is divided into two volumes. The companion volume, *Never again: Educational reconstruction in Rwanda*, written by Anna Obura, investigates the response to the 1994 emergency within Rwanda – the destruction of the system, emergency educational provision and reconstruction since 1994 (Obura, 2003). The aim of this second volume is to document the emergence and development of education in the refugee context in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo during the major period of the Rwandan exodus, 1994-1996. While the major focus of the case study is on that period, some reference is made to subsequent developments in the education of refugees in the two countries.

The Rwanda crisis resulted in one of the largest and most rapid exodus of refugees that has been seen in recent history, and the resulting responses to education for the subsequent refugees provide valuable lessons in the field of education in emergencies. This study addresses how various stakeholders tackled education for refugees. The issues are analyzed under the following categories:

- policy planning and implications;
- providing access and equity;
- ensuring quality and relevance;
- building planning and management capacity.

1. Methodology and information sources

Field visits were made to Tanzania (13-22 October 2002) and the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] (22-29 October 2002), where a wide-ranging group of people was interviewed in government ministries, international agencies and NGOs. International specialists who worked in the Rwandan refugee operation were interviewed by telephone, or in person, in Europe.

Although a considerable number of documents available on the Internet and in research libraries were studied and analyzed, they were not adequate to corroborate the interviews conducted. Documentary evidence was very difficult to find in Tanzania and DRC. In DRC, many agency offices were looted at the start of the 1996 war and consequently valuable documents were destroyed. The high level of staff turnover in many agencies further affected the availability of documentary and verbal evidence. Many agencies regarded emergency situations as temporary and did not see the necessity of keeping documentation beyond a few years after the end of the crisis.

The dearth of documentation in the field sites necessitated a visit to UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva to conduct documentary research in its archives. Fortunately the material consulted, particularly about DRC, provided valuable research evidence to substantiate the verbal claims made in interviews concerning the provision of refugee education in the DRC camps around Goma, Bukavu and Uvira.

2. Historical context

Education of refugee children in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) cannot be fully understood without reference to the historical and political implications of the genocide in Rwanda that led to the refugee crisis in its neighbouring countries. An historical time-line of the build up to the genocide to the present day is contained in *Appendix 1*; a summary of the key events leading to the genocide and some of the contributing factors is presented below.

The roots of the genocide

The roots of the genocide stretch back to pre-colonial times, particularly to the reign of the Tutsi King Rwabugiri in the second half of the nineteenth century. The regime he instituted between 1860-1895 not only introduced a feudal system that discriminated against the Hutu peasantry, but also created the ethnic differentiation based on social positions that was later exploited by both the German colonialists and Belgian trustees in the early part of the twentieth century. In 1933 the Belgian colonialists issued identity cards, which indicated each person's ethnicity: Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. They further reinforced the divisions by emphasizing what they perceived as Tutsi superiority (the Tutsis were regarded as more aristocratic and educated) over the Hutu peasantry. They consequently educated the Tutsis to become skilled administrators and leaders in the country (Millwood, 1996: *Synthesis Report,* Chapter 1).

Following the Second World War, a new generation of egalitarian, anti-Walloon, Flemish missionaries reversed this policy of favouring Tutsis by educating increasing numbers of Hutus. As a result, the two ethnic groups (one educated by the former Belgian regime to believe in its superiority and the other, through recent education provision, beginning to resent its perceived enslavement), became more polarized and the potential for conflict exacerbated (Massey, 1998: 2).

The subsequent revolution by the Hutu majority in 1959 that led to tens of thousands of Tutsis fleeing to neighbouring countries, reflected the build up of tensions and its consequence between the two groups. In an attempt to regain control, the Rwandan People's Front (RPF), the rebel Tutsi army, convened outside the country, staged a counter-insurgency in 1990 through incursions from Uganda, but this failed and it was forced to retreat. The resultant civil war of the early 1990s appeared to be close to an end in 1993, when the moderate Hutu President Habyarimana and the Tutsi-led RPF signed the Arusha peace accord.

The genocide

Determined not to allow a power-sharing structure to come into existence, extremist elements in the divided Hutu groups planned to undermine the peace agreement. They had already been building up the Interahamwe (militia) and influenced the presidentially appointed mayors

(the infamous *bourgemestres*), who initiated and maintained a highly centralized system of political and social control. On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down, probably by the extreme elements in his own party who then proceeded to dictate developments within the country. The strong social control, combined with the highly effective public information system through the local and national radio networks, then enabled the systematic killing of over 800,000 people to take place in the space of 100 days (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

The role of the international community

The moral authority of the international community was absent both before and during the genocide. Six months before the events, a key actor in the planning of the genocide informed the United Nations about the preparations being made, and this information was passed to United Nations Headquarters, warning of the potential violence and requesting assistance (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The United Nations and the international community ignored the warnings. As Amnesty International reported:

> *"In one of the great historical betrayals of conscience, the Security Council, led by the United States at the urging of Belgium, voted to withdraw the peacekeepers, leaving a small contingent of 270 in Kigali who protected some refugees in a stadium and who assisted with protection of expatriates. The flight out of Rwanda had begun for anyone who could escape"* (Amnesty International, 1995: Chapter 16).

As the genocide unfolded, the US State Department refused to publicly acknowledge what was taking place (Aspel, 2000: 3). The past US experience in Somalia, where 18 of its soldiers were killed by one of the faction warlords, ensured that the US was reluctant to attempt any intervention in Africa unless its own population was under threat. Without US backing no security force could be mobilized.

The consequence

The resulting massacres and horrific accounts of the frenzied butchering of hundreds of thousands of people have been adequately documented elsewhere and will not be covered here (for more detailed information on the genocide see Berkeley, 2001; Millwood, 1996;

Gourevitch, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Prunier, 1995). However, it is important to remember quite how devastating the genocide was for so many and the two accounts below illustrate the fate of the near million people who suffered torture and death during the few short weeks of the genocide.

> *Authorities had transferred six to seven hundred children from an orphanage in Kigali to the Groupe Scolaire and also had allowed several hundred other displaced persons from Kigali to take shelter in the school buildings and courtyard. On April 21, soldiers and Interahamwe, some of whom were wearing the distinctive green and yellow patterned tunic of the militia, came to the Groupe Scolaire as the orphans and displaced persons were eating their noon meal. They called them out to the courtyard, separated them into two groups on the basis of their identity cards, and began killing the Tutsi, mostly with machetes and clubs.*
>
> (Human Rights Watch, 1999)

> *The killers killed all day at Nyarubuye. At night they cut the Achilles tendons of survivors and went off to feast behind the church, roasting cattle looted from their victims…and drinking beer…And in the morning, still drunk after whatever sleep they could find beneath the cries of their prey, the killers at Nyaburuye went back and killed again. Day after day, minute to minute.*
>
> (Gourevitch, 1999: 18)

The aftermath

The RPF, waiting for its opportunity to regain control of the country, took little over three months to assert its ascendancy and push out the Hutu extremists. These fled along with hundreds of thousands of women and children into neighbouring countries during the period from mid-April to the end of July 1994. The war in one sense was over and the nation was left reeling and half empty from the aftermath. The new leaders began the long struggle towards reconstruction in Rwanda, while neighbouring countries coped with the influx of close to 2 million refugees fleeing the RPF and possible consequences of capture.

3. The humanitarian response to the refugee crisis

The influx

On 28 April, over a period of 24 hours, 250,000 Rwandan refugees crossed a small bridge spanning the swollen Rusumo River that constitutes the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. While dead and bloated bodies floated beneath them, women and children walked over the bridge carrying their few possessions and camped on the hill ahead of them outside the small village of Benaco in the west of Tanzania (interview with former TRCS member). Three weeks after the start of the genocide on 6 April, the mass exodus of Hutus fleeing from the fear of reprisals by the RPF and the new Tutsi-led government, had created one of the largest refugee crises the world had seen since the Second World War (see map of the camps in 1995, *supra*).

In July 1994 more than 1 million refugees fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to the small towns of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira. Almost overnight these became cities of blue plastic sheeting that swathed the countryside. In the initial phase of the crisis, the overcrowded, damp and unsanitary conditions were rife with disease. In Goma, by the end of August, 46,000 people had already died of cholera, dysentery and other communicable diseases. As the crisis in health subsided towards the end of the year, yet another deadly enemy gradually took over the camps. Crime, intimidation and even murder were routine occurrences in the life of the camps, particularly around Goma where the Interahamwe reigned supreme. The situation for some NGOs, which also became targets, was so intolerable that many of them left the operation in protest at the inadequacy or unwillingness of the authorities to separate and remove the killers or *génocidaires* as they became known (IFRC, 1995*b*: 25).

The number of refugees in Tanzania eventually stabilized at just over 500,000. There the situation was less extreme, and while the camps did have intimidators, stability was soon sufficiently established to allow the first site of Benaco, near Ngara, to be decongested into two other camps of Lumasi and Musuhura. The de facto 'cities' of Benaco, Musuhura and Lumasi housed approximately 360,000 Rwandan refugees. An additional camp, Kitali Hills, was established to assist both Rwandan and Burundian refugees in late 1995. In Karagwe, 200 kilometres further north, over 160,000 refugees were housed in the five camps of Kagenyi, Rubwera,

Kyabalisa I and II and Omakariro (formerly Murongo) (UNHCR, 1995*g*: 1).

Aid overload

The humanitarian response in Tanzania and DRC in terms of personnel, supplies and other forms of aid was colossal. For example, "in the first two weeks of the Goma operation, the international community spent an estimated $2 billion" (Wilkinson, 1997: 8). Many have questioned since whether the level of aid was justified given that so many of the refugees were perpetrators of the genocide and that much of the aid in the early stages was diverted to the militia. As the vast majority of refugees were women and children who for the large part were innocent victims of the crisis, many agencies and individuals chose to take the view that their job was to assist those in need, not to engage in politics (Oxfam, 1995: 9, 11; IFRC, 1994: 20, 25, 26).

By mid-1995 the situation had calmed considerably both in Tanzania and DRC. In Tanzania, NGOs had already started education programmes, services were increasing and the camps, which had been in chaos, were now orderly and well-serviced, with functioning medical, social and education services. In DRC, some services had also been established, although they were considerably less well structured than in Tanzania.

Impact on the local population

During the time of the influx, the local population had no choice but to accommodate refugees wherever they appeared, in schools, dispensaries, churches and any public or communal building commandeered to house the refugees. Many schools were destroyed, with furniture being burned for firewood, so that they were rendered inoperable. Farms were invaded and crops destroyed or eaten. Some businesses profited from the influx, but the poorest in the community (the majority) only saw house rents and food prices rise. In Karagwe, farmers were happy to employ cheap refugee labour to expand their farms and businesses. This sometimes gave more opportunities to women, who could employ refugees to look after the children while they set up small businesses (Whitaker, 1999: 12).

Although there were many donor missions, one of which was the joint UNDP/UNHCR Mission in 1995 to the Great Lakes concerning

support to refugee-affected areas (UNDP/UNHCR, 1995), very limited assistance was provided to the local population particularly in the early days of the emergency. Communities saw little benefit in terms of the improvement to their own infrastructure when compared to the level of support afforded to the refugees. Although some schools were rehabilitated in both Ngara and Karagwe, in general the level of assistance to the local population was very low.

The impact of the refugees on the local population is still a critical issue concerning both government and local communities in DRC. As one government official in DRC stated, "How do you talk of education for refugee children when our own children are not even being educated?" (interview with a government official). Rwandan refugees are currently held responsible for initiating the civil war and the continued presence of many ex-combatants is perceived to exacerbate the conflict with Rwanda (interview with UNESCO official).

Chapter 2

Educational response in emergencies

Conflict and the consequences of conflict are becoming more prevalent in the world and in most cases it is children who suffer most. Schooling provides a sense of stability in an environment where all around is chaos; children need that sense of security and need it immediately. In this way education can play a critical role in helping children return towards a normal life and in laying the foundation for a productive role in society, either in their country of origin or in the country of settlement. This is vital psychologically for the community, but particularly so for children. School is one of the best methods of healing psycho-social trauma and children should not have to wait for their much-needed reassurance of security.

However, education does much more than provide a place of healing for the psycho-social ills of children, it is the key to the future of a nation, not only providing essential social cohesiveness for adults and children alike, but also ensuring the potential for future economic and social growth. It can also be an important focal point for the community and perhaps be the first mechanism to bring those most affected into decision-making processes within a refugee environment.

Education as a right

Education is not only a right of children (as defined in Article 28 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26), it is equally a life-saving activity. Unfortunately in situations of crisis, education is often competing with other sectors for scarce resources and is rarely considered as a first-line priority. This has serious consequences where, "for refugee and displaced children, boredom and absence of education is a dangerous combination. It produces unstructured days where traumatizing memories linger, fears thrive, and violence is always possible" (Sommers, 1999: 3).

Ensuring access

Unfortunately, relatively few donors or even concerned agencies consider education as a necessity at the onset of an emergency. Only the

Swedish and Norwegian development agencies Sida and NORAD have included education as one of their first-line priorities in their policy statements (Sida, 2002; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003: 11). *Shelter, food, water* and *health* are the primary concerns of the majority of agencies dealing with an emergency and education is often the last service to be considered. Regrettably, "as it is perceived by many agencies as a development rather than a relief measure, education is seldom given priority in the context of emergencies" (Boyden and Ryder, 1996: 5). The director of an international NGO in DRC stated categorically that education was not on his list of priorities when a country was in crisis, and he had no intention of making it so. Likewise, a representative from one of the key donors to the emergency programme in Tanzania stated that "education will only be funded depending on the context, it is not automatic" (interviews, October 2002).

These statements are contrary not only to the principle of education as a fundamental right, but also to what are considered basic principles as recognized by key educators in the field of education in emergencies (Bethke, 1996; Sinclair, 2001: 18-38; Pigozzi, 1999: 7). All these specialists agree upon a few basic principles:

- education is a fundamental right of all children including any child caught in the middle of a crisis;
- education should be part of emergency preparedness and start as soon as possible after an emergency has started;
- education should follow the curriculum that the children are most familiar with;
- education should be community-based and supported;
- education should be inclusive and non-discriminatory, catering for children with special needs and meeting the psycho-social needs of all children;
- education should be a continuum covering all aspects of early childhood, primary and adolescent schooling;
- education should contain elements that support children's reintegration into their home society, whether that includes additional elements of peace-building, environmental awareness or land-mine awareness.

United Nations agency responses to education

The response of many agencies to education in emergencies is to insist that basic education is an "essential part of every emergency

programme" (UNICEF, 1994: 4). Many do this by using a strategy of rapid response through the use of emergency education kits. However, where the emergency response focuses on kits or packages, the establishment of an effective education system can be severely delayed waiting for materials and expertise. It can also hamper the community's own response to establishing education if the expectation is that the agencies will be providing the necessary input. This was the case in the Rwandan crisis, where the response to education-sector needs for the refugees was the production and use of Teacher Emergency Packages (TEPs), which were used in Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC. United Nations agencies assumed that TEP covered the needs of the refugee 'problem', and conducted little or no assessment of the existing skills and education potential among the refugees. Such an assessment would have determined more effectively the level of need to ensure education for the children and the teacher capacity to deliver it (interview with former UNESCO staff member).

UNHCR insists that education is a right of all children and in its guidelines asserts that, "UNHCR should ensure that the ladder of educational opportunity is open to refugee children, in some form, from entry to Class 1 to the level of at least the first secondary school leaving examination" (UNHCR, 1995*c*: v). Although the ideal of ensuring access to education is espoused, the reality is often not matched on the ground, where individuals in positions of power have the autonomy to follow their own agenda rather than their agency policy. This was highlighted in DRC where there was a distinct lack of UNHCR support for education in the early stages (interview with former senior UNHCR official).

The neglected status of education for refugees is reflected in the fact that refugee children are not included on any international education database. Although refugees and education in emergencies are discussed in a small section in one chapter of the EFA global monitoring report, it is difficult to determine where they are represented in the statistics for most countries (UNESCO, 2002*a*). It was evident that both during the Rwandan crisis and after, Tanzania did not represent the 100,000 or more refugee schoolchildren in their EFA monitoring reports.

Negative inheritance of education

While the benefits of education are lauded in many documents, both in terms of EFA and in situations of emergency, conversely, little attention

has been paid to the negative role of education and the possibilities for manipulation and indoctrination. The role that education can play in promoting conflict has frequently been ignored, as it is often perceived as a moral element that can curb or even prevent conflict (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 19).

There are many instances when education can have a negative effect, particularly in conflicts with clear ethnic divisions (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). The Rwanda genocide is a case in point, where ethnicity was politically and socially manipulated and where the education sector played its part in fuelling the social divide. Accusations that children were manipulated through the curriculum and indoctrinated with hate messages against the Tutsis have been numerous. A senior Ministry of Education official in Rwanda stated that in a mathematics lesson it would be common for a teacher to say "You have five Tutsis, you kill three, how many are left?" (interview with Ministry of Education official in Rwanda). Another story of a Tutsi girl's experience in school highlights the level of insidious manipulation and fear that was transmitted, building up towards the genocide:

> *"I remember in school we were afraid. They said, 'Tutsis, raise your hands'. But we were afraid to raise our hands, because the Tutsi was always described as a snake. A snake is dangerous and it should be destroyed. I can never forget this, because this story was repeated year after year in school, from the first to the sixth grade."* (Blackside Inc., 2000).

Conversely, many Rwandans recognized the *lack* of education as a factor in not being able to distinguish reality from myth and as one reason why they could be manipulated so easily. Many of the accused could not even understand afterwards how they had come to perpetrate such atrocities. As Berkeley discovered when he interviewed some of those accused in prisons in Rwanda and on trial in Arusha, Tanzania, " 'We cannot understand it ourselves,' Isadore conceded…. 'Illiteracy is part of it…... They believe what they hear on the radio. They believe what their leaders say. They cannot discover the truth for themselves because of the low level of their education' " (Berkeley, 2001: 272).

Education clearly has a significant role to play in the formation of value systems, both positive and negative. The history behind the genocide

of 1994 indicates that education in a formal and informal sense had a significant role in perpetuating the myths and fear that underpinned the ethnic hatred behind this conflict (Utterwulghe, 1999: 7).

Counteracting the negativity

NGOs and United Nations agencies closely monitoring education programmes in a refugee context can counteract the potential for negative manipulation. In this way it is possible to try to ensure that the type of education promoted in the camps is not only in line with repatriation, but is essentially child-friendly, and actively promoting aspects of tolerance, co-operation and peace building. However, while elements of peace education or peace-building may counteract the potential for political manipulation, it is an area that until recently has been undervalued by many agencies and donors, which have not seen it as a substantive topic. This was the case in the Rwandan refugee operations in Tanzania and DRC. The measurable outcomes of peace education were not clear to donors, which required statistical proof of success before they were prepared to fund new peace-education programmes. After the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, it was not surprising that there was an immediate increase in resources and interest in peace-building activities; an area that was previously neglected.

The increasing demand for the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Peace Education programme developed initially by UNHCR in Kenya, reflects a rising interest in programmes that are designed to promote community peace-building. This programme has its foundation in community-led development to assist children and communities to acquire the concepts, values, skills and knowledge that will enhance their ability to deal with a variety of conflict situations and to work towards the creation of a more peaceful and tolerant community environment (INEE web site, www.ineesite.org).

1. Issues relating to provision of education in emergencies

The provision of education in emergency situations is by its nature ad hoc, and may even be somewhat chaotic. However this section attempts to capture the determining factors that contribute to more effective implementation of education programmes in situations of emergency, namely policy, access and equity, quality and management.

Policy

James H. Williams (2001: 94) suggests that certain general policy questions must be addressed in a refugee context. These have been adapted to include issues relating to Tanzania and DRC:

- *Language of instruction:* Which language should be used at which level? How this is determined depends on the context. In the case of Tanzania and DRC it was determined by the curriculum adopted which established the medium of instruction for each grade.

- *Curriculum:* Which curriculum should be used, that of the host country or the country of origin? For the countries within this case study, there was a clear policy of 'education for repatriation' rather than 'integration' as the crisis was expected to be a short-lived affair. Education for repatriation implies education that follows the curriculum of the country of origin and prepares children for return to their own country. Education for integration utilizes the curriculum of the host country and prepares children to integrate fully into the life of the host country. It is evident that adoption of either policy must be reviewed as a refugee situation unfolds.

- *Purpose of education vis-à-vis refugee status:* Arising from the initial response in Tanzania there was a decision taken that education for repatriation was the most appropriate option. There was no discussion of an alternative 'education for transition' which could cater more specifically for each context, and use the 'window of opportunity' while the children were in a camp environment to promote alternative methods of teaching and learning more suitable to the environment of a refugee context.

- *Teacher qualifications:* What is the basic requirement or level that is acceptable for a teacher in a refugee context? In Tanzania there were adequate numbers of trained teachers, except in Karagwe, where there were fewer trained teachers so secondary-school leavers were often taken as para-professionals. This severely impacted on the quality of teaching and learning. In DRC there was a predominance of trained teachers within the teaching corps, so it was not difficult to ensure that at least the majority of teachers in each school were trained.

- *Certification/accreditation with existing system:* This implies certification and accreditation both within and outside the refugee context. This was a constant issue within the camps under study, and both Tanzania and DRC relied ultimately on certificates issued by UNHCR and UNICEF. These certificates were not recognized in Rwanda when children returned in 1996.

- *Second chances:* Opportunities for children or adults who have missed education in the past. In Tanzania and DRC there were many non-formal and vocational training activities established for literacy and numeracy both for adults and youth.

While all of the above are vital considerations in an emergency education programme, there are some additional policy aspects, particularly in relation to DRC and Tanzania, that also need attention, namely:

- *Refugee-affected-area policies:* The level of disparity in funding between the refugee and host populations was of particular concern during the crisis in the Great Lakes area. UNHCR developed a policy of assistance to refugee-affected areas (RAA) in 1995, in which assistance was regarded as a mechanism to reduce tensions between the two populations and to pacify the Tanzanian Government, which saw the refugees as an additional burden on communities in already deprived areas. As the refugees outnumbered the local population by a factor of between four and ten, the aim was to provide 'tangible benefits' that could be attributed to the refugee presence. The type of aid provided at that time and more recently has ensured renovations of transport infrastructure, such as major trunk road and airstrips. A number of local schools were rehabilitated by various agencies such as CONCERN, Oxfam, GTZ, UNICEF and UNHCR as part of their assistance to the affected communities, although these efforts were by no means sufficient to dispel the sense of disparity of provision. These initiatives were ongoing throughout the Rwanda emergency and afterwards for the Burundi and Congolese influxes, alongside environmental repair, and tree planting.

Access and equity

It is essential to guarantee that children can physically access education and that the host country accepts the responsibility for education

throughout the period that the refugees are in country, preferably through an established policy. Such responsibility can best be enforced where early and accurate assessments (with Ministry of Education and refugee participation) are conducted. This assists agencies to provide more relevant and useful pedagogical materials and technical expertise. As will be indicated in the following chapters, both Tanzania and DRC reneged on their initial stance that allowed primary education in the camps. This hard line against education could have arisen as a consequence of the lack of involvement of the ministries of education in the formulation of decisions relating to refugee education. They were in effect marginalized in terms of offering either advice or assistance to the refugee education programme. The decision-making authority was therefore delegated by the security Ministries (Ministry of Home Affairs in Tanzania and Ministry of Interior in DRC) to the United Nations agencies. These agencies had rarely experienced education personnel on the ground and, as a result, the process of establishing an education programme was frequently in the hands of personnel who were not professional educators.

- Universal primary education

Universal access is always considered one of the highest priorities in a refugee emergency. It is the second of the six key goals in the Education for All targets, which states that "by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality" (World Education Forum, 2000*b*: §7 (ii)). While the EFA goals are admirable, their achievement is far from being realized, and the overemphasis on access and equity, has often been at the expense of another key goal of quality.

- Post-primary education

It is short-sighted of agencies to ignore the need for secondary or even higher education in the refugee context, given the potential for trouble among youth who have no access to meaningful activities beyond primary schooling. Post-primary education provides a mechanism for the engagement of youth, as well as being "an incentive to study seriously and complete primary education, and access to higher education provides an incentive and hope for students at secondary level" (World Education Forum, 2000*a*: 12). The World Bank (Bregman et al., 2002:1) suggests

that there are a number of basic tenets on which the need for post-primary education can be based:

- post-primary education is vital for economic growth and for the development of higher-order skills and knowledge that promote that growth;
- in terms of important aspects of socialization, post-primary education reaches young people who are potentially at risk and who are at the age of propensity for behaviour change;
- while primary education might give a basic grounding it does not give the skills, attitudes and competencies that orient young people towards job opportunities and skills (Bregman et al., 2002: 1).

The increasing demand by young people, as well as their parents, for secondary-school places has not been recognized by United Nations agencies. Both UNICEF and UNHCR in their policy documents support post-primary education as part of provision for 'basic education'. However, in practice it is rarely the case that they do provide education beyond primary level in a camp context, despite the advocacy at many levels for them to do so. In the case of the Rwandan emergency, many documents researched stated that post-primary education should be provided to children in the camps. This did not happen. It is an indicator of the power of individuals on the ground to determine the activities on the ground, regardless of the policy statements of their organizations to the contrary. Many United Nations and government officials saw post-primary education as an indication that the refugees would remain in exile. It was a sign of permanence both to United Nations agencies and local authorities and therefore resisted.

Early childhood education

Early childhood education is a critical stage in every child's education. In a refugee context, many over-age children, who had no previous access to education, enrol in Grade 1, pushing up the average class sizes. Likewise, many parents enrol their under-age children, as they are anxious to send children to school early if there is no pre-school provision, so class sizes are pushed up even higher. Pre-school provision is one way to alleviate the pressure on primary schools having to take under-age children. As many of the refugee initiatives established by the community are ad hoc and have very little provision, they require more systematic support to ensure

that key factors regarding early childhood development (such as socialization, play and health etc.) are covered.

- Most vulnerable children

The area of assistance to categories of children considered as most vulnerable, such as unaccompanied minors, children with disabilities, children with psycho-social problems, is often considered as a separate issue from education, particularly where 'community services' and education are separated. Successful education programmes that cater for the needs of all children, including the most vulnerable, are those with strong collaboration between community services and education agencies.

Quality

When one examines what quality education implies in the context of a refugee crisis, some argue that any type of education is better than none at all. Such a belief leads to frequent downplaying of quality issues, where quality is often the last aspect of a programme to be considered. Also, the interpretation of what quality represents is dependent on the stakeholders who are defining it. Parents or teachers, NGOs or education inspectors, each will have a different definition of what quality aspects are most important to them. For some, quality may only relate to inputs such as school buildings, materials, furniture etc. To others it may imply a combination of factors relating to child characteristics, inputs, enabling conditions and the teaching and learning process, all of which are valued as essential ingredients in ensuring a quality education that will produce the best achievements (Williams, 2001: 90).

The model below (*Figure 1*) is often used to look at the process of defining quality. When considering it in terms of the refugee context, it is apparent that while there are many similarities with a developing-country situation, the contextual factors that influence all aspects of input, process and outcome can significantly alter the education programme. These can often be negative influences, but where innovation and creativity become part of the process, they can develop into positive experiences.

Figure 1. Quality in a refugee context



Source: Adapted from a model presented by Angela Little at the EFA Conference, London 2002.

Quality often comes low down the hierarchy of priorities in most developing-country situations in the scramble for UPE (Hawes and Stephens, 1990: 9) and the refugee situation is no exception. In order to enhance quality education, agencies need to assist and guide refugee communities to establish schools from the outset of an emergency. Emphasis within education in emergencies at the time of the Rwandan crisis was on enrolment and ensuring that as many children as possible received 'some' form of education. There was no real critical analysis of the quality issue. This was also the case for the subsequent refugee programme for the Burundi/Congolese education programme in Western Tanzania which, under the circumstances, achieved relatively high enrolment rates (77 per cent average) and a "remarkably well-developed

education system with a solid administrative infrastructure" (Eversmann, 1998: 6-9). Eversmann suggests that quality is based on a combination of factors, community support, pertinent materials and competent and dedicated teachers. Where community support was highest and a 'bottom-up' approach used, the results and quality of what was achieved were greatest.

Management

Management systems and their success can vary considerably in refugee contexts, depending on a number of key factors:

- *Availability of experienced education personnel both in the refugee community and agencies:* Frequently in situations of emergency, few expert educators are employed with significant experience of education in emergencies to lead the education process.
- *Organizational strength and policies of the leading education agency:* This can result in a top-down or bottom-up approach depending on the policies and ideals of the agency concerned.
- *Previous administrative structures of education in the country of origin:* It is not always possible or desirable to replicate the administrative structures of the education system used by the refugees in their country of origin. What is retained has to be carefully thought through.
- *Activity of the community:* where the community is particularly active and keen to establish initiatives on its own, this reduces the potential for a dependency culture to develop.

Chapter 3

Case study: Tanzania

1. Overview

Tanzania has a long history of accommodating refugees with very little assistance from the outside world. It supported South African freedom fighters in the 1960s, Burundian refugees since 1972, Mozambicans in the 1980s and Rwandans in the 1990s. In the 1960s Tanzania openly offered refuge to exiled leaders of the wars of liberation. Those with political claims were welcomed and their education encouraged. Special schools were established where they could continue their studies in order to return to the struggle for freedom when they had finished. Several such schools were set up throughout the country, such as the Frelimo School in Bagamoyo and the ANC School in Morogoro.

However, as a result of the Rwandan crisis, the Tanzanian Government has pursued varying policies. It has been alternately welcoming and rejecting of more recent refugees, creating virtual prison camps (for example the Mbuba transit centre in Ngara), or allowing integration and supporting refugees to study up to university level within its education system. It even reduced school fees at all levels of primary, secondary and tertiary education (interview with senior MOEC official). It has both housed refugees and, it is alleged, even sent them to their death. The latter was the case when it sent 123 Burundian refugees across the Tanzania/Burundi border at Kibeho, knowing that it would be likely that they would be killed. In the valley just after the border crossing, the Burundian army shot all 123 (World Food Programme, 1997: Part 1; personal interviews with United Nations staff members).

In 1994 there were four camps in Ngara with an initial population of over 437,000 refugees, although there was an influx of more than 1,000 per week still coming in from Burundi. In Karagwe, which is 200 km further north towards the Ugandan border, there were five camps housing over 160,000 refugees (CONCERN, 1994*a*: 8-11).

In both Ngara and Karagwe, the camps became vast complexes of blue plastic sheeting that provided numerous services, from health and

feeding centres to barber shops and restaurants serving Italian cuisine. If the inventiveness and resourcefulness of the refugees had been capitalized upon earlier in the emergency, there might have been considerable reductions in the amount of aid that was required to house, feed and care for half a million people. The approach adopted during the initial phase of the emergency was one that leant towards immediate response, which ignored the expertise and initiative of the refugee community. This had a tendency to create a dependency culture which was difficult to break when the philosophy of community participation became more established later in the programme. This initial disregard of refugee expertise applied equally to the educational provision for refugee children, which started with top-down agency-driven policies, moving later in the programme towards a refugee-led approach.

2. Policy

There was effectively no formal written education policy established by the Government of Tanzania to cater for a large refugee influx. This was a dangerous precedent when a security ministry, MHA, with no expertise in education in emergencies, became responsible for determining when and how education programmes should be established. That decisions could be reversed or reneged upon at any time is symptomatic of the need to establish clear international agreements on the provision for education in emergencies. While the Convention on the Rights of the Child might be legally binding on paper, in practice it is not enforceable, so agencies have little leverage to lobby for education as a legal right of children. Fortunately for the Rwandan programme, the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed between MHA and international agencies at the beginning of the Rwandan emergency was crucial in ensuring that education could continue throughout the period the Rwandan refugees were in exile in Tanzania (see *Appendix 3*). No such agreement existed for the Burundian and Congolese caseload that arrived in December 1996; therefore the MHA decision on provision of education was rescinded with impunity for the first year of the Burundian and Congolese influx. Formal primary education was banned, and only informal 'children activity centres' were permitted. These were effectively non-formal temporary shelters where teachers worked on a voluntary rather than paid basis.

Although the MHA had signed this MOU with United Nations agencies and agreed to provision of primary education in the camps during

the Rwandan crisis, the absence of a formal national policy guaranteeing access to education at all levels led to additional confusion over the level of provision of secondary or tertiary-level education in the camps. While MHA had little problem with primary education, it saw post-primary education as an indication of the refugees' intention to stay and therefore refused permission for agencies to support it. Yet again, by the late 1990s the ruling changed when both primary and secondary schools started to receive full support from NGOs and United Nations agencies. The arbitrariness of decision-making over education for refugees in Tanzania should change with the new refugee policy coming into force in 2003, which has a section supporting the principle of education for repatriation and allowing all levels of education to be initiated in the camps (interview with MHA official).

The principle of Education for Repatriation was instituted in the Rwandan camps, and relates to "refugee children following the curriculum of their home country with their own teachers, so that trauma is lessened and repatriation facilitated" (UNHCR, 1994*f:* 2). The MHA accepted this principle as it believed the refugee crisis was a temporary problem whereby education for repatriation would facilitate the return of the refugees (letter supporting Education for Repatriation from MHA to UNHCR 1994). This standpoint, which saw the Rwandan refugee crisis as a temporary situation, expected the refugees to stay only a few months, and as such did not consider the long-term implications of hosting the refugees over a period of many years. The traditional policy of 'integration', which allowed refugees to enter the Tanzania education system and attend local Tanzanian schools, was not considered for the camp refugees. This was instituted for the old caseload refugees (refugees who came before 1994 and were more fully integrated into the Tanzanian system, were offered citizenship etc.) but was not deemed applicable for the camp situation.

It was only in 2002 that MHA reviewed whether education for repatriation or education for integration was the best refugee education policy. The new Refugee Policy will go through parliament and be introduced in 2003. Refugees were originally covered under the Refugee Control Act of 1965 which was updated to a new Refugee Act in 1998.That Act has been further revised to include education. Education had not featured strongly in any of the earlier refugee policy documents, but despite the inclusion of education in the new refugee policy, the MOEC was not

involved in the development of the education section of the new policy. Although the MOEC had limited involvement in the refugee education programme, the fact that MHA had signed an MOU guaranteed that the "approval of the Tanzanian Government was a vital legitimating factor" in ensuring the effective implementation of education activities (UNHCR, 1994*g*: 3).

Despite the MOU, implementation of education activities was still not considered a priority. 'Conditions' had to be right: "It is important that agencies/NGOs managing camps get the basics of survival – security, food, water, sanitation, health and shelter – under reasonable control before management time is used to set up a school system" (UNHCR, 1994*g*: 4-5). Even in Ngara, where many conditions were favourable for the rapid establishment of education activities, it was expected to take up to six months to get an education programme up and running. Yet there were sufficient teachers, some curriculum materials to work from, an agreed budget, and willing parents and teachers. It is not clear why such a delay was expected when in the subsequent Burundian and Congolese refugee programmes, schooling started within a month of their arrival in the camps.

When the education programme did take off, many attributed its success to the "unusual degree of inter-agency collaboration [that] was cultivated in Ngara" (UNHCR, 1994*g*: 3). This level of co-operation was considered a key factor in the success of the policies underpinning the Ngara programme. The United Nations agencies worked closely together and the signing of the MOU with GTZ and MHA at the outset of the emergency in July 1994, set out the parameters of the establishment of the education programme. The close relationship with NGOs was significant as a limited number of NGOs were engaged in community services which included responsibility for education. In practice, the education section was given a considerable degree of autonomy to try and ensure that the maximum number of children had access to education of a reasonable quality.

3. Access and equity

There were limited comprehensive data available that had real meaning. Statistics were rarely disaggregated or analyzed to try and determine where successes occurred and how these could be capitalized upon, or where poor schools needed assistance and could be boosted by

neighbouring schools. This was where the focus on access, getting as many children into school as possible, had a downside. It led to overcrowded classrooms, as NGOs had insufficient funds to increase the number of classrooms and teachers. Planning was not systematic enough at the early stage to predict the high demand for education in the lower grades, especially the number of both over-age and under-age children wanting to enrol in standard 1 (interview with NPA staff member).

An out-of-school survey, conducted in the Ngara camps in 1996, revealed that approximately 60 per cent of primary school-age children were enrolled in primary school.[1] Of the 40 per cent of children out of school, it was difficult to assess how many had never gone to school for various reasons and how many were drop-outs. Given the high attrition rates noted in the operating schools in the early grades, it can be assumed that the majority of children out of school were drop-outs (personal observation in Ngara camps, July 1996).

One can see from the table of enrolment figures for 1995 (*Table 1*) that attrition is a much greater issue than gender disparity. Almost 50 per cent of both sexes drop out per year in the first three grades, with the high level of drop-out tailing off in the higher grades. One possible explanation for this dramatic decline in enrolment in higher grades is that the examination system usually failed approximately 40-50 per cent of all grades, so children would have to repeat the year in which they failed. There was perhaps little incentive in the early grades to continue repeating years of indifferent schooling, but by the time children reached Grade 5 the investment of time and money made it more likely that the children would continue to the final grade.

1 These were defined by the refugees as being aged 6-14, but, as in many refugee situations, there were significant numbers of over-age children wanting to enrol in Standard 1.

Table 1. Enrolment figures for Karagwe and Ngara camps, 1995

		Karagwe 3 camps	Karagwe 2 camps	Ngara all camps	Total
Grade 1	**M**	3,764		13,479	
	F	3,548		13,334	
Grade 2	**M**	2,049		6,051	
	F	1,850		6,119	
Grade 3	**M**	873		3,230	
	F	757		3,335	
Grade 4	**M**	599		2,591	
	F	536		2,369	
Grade 5	**M**	298		1,552	
	F	290		1,697	
Grade 6	**M**	220		1,185	
	F	139		1,155	
Total	**M**	7,803	3,304	28,088	
	F	7,120	3,026	28,009	
Total		**14,923**	**6,330**	**56,097**	**77,350**

Sources: Karagwe – UNHCR (1995*b*: 4); Ngara – UNHCR (1995*e*: 3).

Combining *Table 1* with *Tables 2 and 3* shows an increase in enrolment of approximately 48 per cent from 1995 to 1996, indicating the very high demand for education despite large numbers of drop-outs. The increase was much greater in the populous Ngara camps (62 per cent) than in Karagwe (8 per cent).

Table 2. Primary-school enrolment in Ngara, 1996

Camp	Total
Benaco	32,083
Lumasi	22,365
Musuhura	12,970
Kitali	16,643
Keza	7,002
Total	**91,063**

Source: UNHCR (1996*g*: 2).

Table 3. Primary-school enrolment and attendance in Karagwe, 1996

Camp	Boys	Girls	Total	% Boys	% Girls
Kyabalisa 1	3,121	2,913	6,034	86.05	86.30
Kyabalisa 2	4,080	4,053	8,133	84.20	85.04
Kagenyi	1,584	1,409	2,993	76.95	75.90
Rubwera	1,974	1,775	3,749	86.23	85.27
Omukariro	1,098	1,122	2,220	90.40	90.60
Total	11,857	11,272	23,129		

Source. UNHCR (1996*f*: Table 8).

Ngara local population

The above figures represent approximately 60 per cent of the refugee school-age population. When they are compared to the Ngara District figures (shown below in *Figure 2*) it is hardly surprising that there was some resentment by the local population towards what were perceived as better services for the refugees. The very low enrolment rates reflected a district education system in crisis, with Ngara coming in the bottom five of the Tanzanian league table of results in 1996. This was despite having had consistent support for the previous 25 years from UNICEF, and significant support from the Dutch Government. A brief education assessment conducted by UNICEF in 1996 (undertaken by the author on behalf of UNICEF in November 1996) revealed systemic problems: lack of motivation of teachers, under-qualified teachers, no real functioning inspectorate and high levels of absenteeism and drunkenness amongst the teaching staff. The situation has improved significantly with changes in the district administrative and education staff. But even to date, Ngara district still has far to go to match the enrolment, attendance and examination figures of the refugee camps.

Figure 2. Ngara District enrolment rates: percentage Ngara District, 1996-2000



Source: Ministry of Education and Culture, Tanzania, 2001*b*.

Attrition rate of girls

Although enrolment and attrition rates of both boys and girls were almost equal in the lower grades, by Standard 5 the high attrition rate of girls meant that in Standard 6 the ratio of girls to boys dropped to 1:2, as approximately 50 per cent fewer girls attended the final year (Houtart, 1995 in Aguilar and Richmond, 1998: 137). Various reasons were given, such as domestic work, lack of clothes and lack of sanitary material. In an out-of–school survey many children were asked why they had not enrolled in school or had dropped out. One pervading myth that was shattered by the survey was that of teenage pregnancy. Many parties had assumed that the increase in attrition rates for girls in the higher grades was due to pregnancy. This was found not to be the case. There were in fact very few girls (running into dozens rather than the hundreds expected) leaving school because of pregnancy. It seemed that the most significant factor was that, as the girls got older, they had an increasing burden placed upon them domestically, either by looking after younger siblings or other forms of domestic work. This was seldom the case for boys. Boys did drop out, also in large quantities after Grade 2, but this was largely equated to the examination-driven system that meant that children who did not succeed in their grade examinations had to repeat a year. As many found school 'boring', with little prospect for continuing education (another key reason for drop-out given in the survey, particularly for boys), their motivation to earn money meant that they were not prepared to sit through another year of schooling (interview with former UNICEF staff member).

Education for special needs

Special-needs education received little attention in the early phase of the education programme, although in Karagwe in 1995, some schools were encouraged to open special-needs classes attached to the mainstream school. These aimed to assist children who were blind or deaf, and some with mental disabilities who could not be integrated into the mainstream. With a relatively limited level of training, teachers in the camp schools accepted that it was possible to include children with severe physical disabilities into the school and that, both socially and academically, there were better opportunities for them in school than if they had been kept at home. The class was built within the grounds of the main school, so all the children could mix socially and interact with each other, aiming to reduce barriers and stigmatization. The separate classes were often more for children with mental disabilities, who required more attention than the teacher was able to provide in the mainstream classroom (CONCERN, 1996: 4).

There is a danger with mainstreaming in suggesting that it meets the educational needs of all children with disabilities. It does not. It does provide them with a social environment, which they may not otherwise have had, but it does not give them the specialist education they require to meet their educational potential. This 'something is better than nothing' approach is understandable in the context, but one has to be circumspect in describing it as an effective education for special needs.

Psycho-social provision

In Ngara the focus was more on psycho-social issues than on physical or mental disability. Each school had a psycho-social teacher who was trained in identification of signs of stress or psycho-social need. When a child was identified, he/she would be referred to a team of specially trained counsellors who would provide more intensive support than the psycho-social teacher could provide. The job description of the psycho-social teacher, however, reveals the limited time actually dealing with specific psycho-social issues. The duties included:

- following up on absenteeism;
- providing psychological support for those in need;
- giving additional tuition to the academically weak;
- acting as a liaison between the class teacher and parents (CONCERN, 1995).

Only one component of the job description relates to the psycho-social aspects of the post. In reality the psycho-social teachers were more classroom assistants. Furthermore, as most of the teachers, including the psycho-social teachers, were male, the counselling of girls, especially pubescent girls, was not covered adequately.

The principle of providing some form of psycho-social assistance was sound, but in practice had not been adequately thought through. The psycho-social needs of the children were very important in the context of the severe trauma that children had suffered, but these issues were not fully addressed in the Ngara or Karagwe camps.

Unaccompanied minors

There were two different definitions of Unaccompanied Minors (UAMs) used in the Rwanda programme. These were unaccompanied children who were not living with parents or relatives, and separated children who were those separated from their parents but living with relatives. The terms were often used interchangeably. The 'Ngara model' for the care of UAMs was unusual for the time, in that non-institutional approaches were adopted, where centres to house the UAMs were not permitted in the camps. Wherever possible, children without any relatives were fostered with willing families, which were supported in caring for these children both materially and emotionally. Although UAMs were supposed to be given first priority for schooling, many did not attend, due to work responsibilities, lack of school space, lack of uniforms, or embarrassment with their poor clothing (UNICEF, 1995*b*: 1-3).

In an analysis of all children living in 'especially difficult circumstances' it was estimated that in Ngara, 33 per cent of all UAMs were living alone in child-headed households. This presented particular problems for children who were reluctant to leave their 'blinde' (house) unattended. The analysis estimated that approximately 30 per cent of all UAMs did not attend school or vocational courses, largely for the reasons given above. But this also occurred because in some cases foster families prevented children from attending school, expecting them to take on excessive domestic work. There was a complaint among some UAMs that the foster families only assisted them so they could exploit them as a form of cheap labour. This issue was addressed later in the programme when effective follow-up teams had been well established and foster families more carefully selected and trained (UNICEF, 1995*a*: 1-5).

Post primary

Very few children had access to post-primary education. Although no policy framework of either UNHCR or MHA prevented post-primary education, it was not considered a priority and was in fact discouraged by both parties, as this statement from UNHCR indicates: "UNHCR will not support, or be in any way involved in post-primary education." This was apparently because the Tanzanian Government had given no permission in writing for post-primary education in the camps, but another likely reason was the limitation of funds. UNHCR instructed refugees and NGOs to discuss the establishment of post-primary schools with MHA if they decided to go ahead alone (letter from HOSO UNHCR, Ngara to heads of agencies, 25 September 1995).

The issue of post-primary education has been a contentious one, with few donors recognizing the need for post-primary education in a refugee situation. Refugees, however, were very clear about their own needs and considered it a high priority, realizing the role of highly educated people in the future development of their country. In the camps in both Ngara and Karagwe, refugee schoolteachers initiated some secondary schools on a semi-formal basis without any external assistance. Three secondary schools in Benaco, Musuhura and Lumasi, were established by the refugees, but UNHCR refused to accept responsibility for them or support them in any way (letter from HOSO UNHCR, Ngara to MHA, 12 September 1995). This lack of support to post-primary education resulted in a system that had a tendency to be elitist as only those students who could afford to pay attended. Refugee students even requested university education in the camps. They saw it as essential to continue their studies so as not to waste any more precious time as they had "just lost two academic years" (memorandum issued by the Rwandan refugee students group exiled in Tanzania, June 1995).

Non-formal education

Save the Children Fund (SCF) initiated a non-formal education programme for 14-49 year olds, in all of the Karagwe camps, which aimed to provide some basic literacy and numeracy skills to older children and adults who had not had schooling opportunities in the past (interview with former SCF staff member). A particular issue of concern arose when children younger than 14 years were being included in the programme,

when they should have been attending the formal schooling. An agreement was established between CONCERN and SCF that as far as possible children who were of school age should be encouraged to attend the formal school in age-separated classes. Children who refused to attend the formal for genuine reasons could be offered the non-formal class, rather than be denied any form of education (Save the Children UK, 1996*a*: 10-11). This issue is frequently raised in other accelerated learning programmes, which run the risk of creating parallel primary education systems alongside the formal structures. Ensuring that all children have access through alternative learning structures without undermining the formal primary system is a challenge to many education programmes in developing countries.

Pre-school

In Ngara there were relatively few pre-school activities, but in Karagwe the International Language Oriented Trust (ILOT) had taken responsibility for approximately 2,000 pre-school children. Unfortunately some of these pre-schools, instead of being places of play and creativity to promote a child's creative, cognitive and developmental abilities, had a tendency to become mini preparatory schools for primary schooling. They were already teaching three-year-old children in a formal structured way. The competitive element that is a common feature of schooling in the Rwandan education system, encouraged parents to contribute to a system that they believed would give their child added advantages. Ensuring that pre-schools were places for child development, not child competition, was an issue that had not been fully addressed at this time.

4. Quality

The 'Ngara model'

As mentioned above, education in the refugee camps was not established immediately on the arrival of the refugees. The July 1994 Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Ministry of Home Affairs, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNHCR and GTZ (see *Appendix 3*). outlined the guidelines for the establishment of education for the refugees. It introduced a model that structured educational provision in three phases. This formed the basis of the 'Ngara model' hailed as one of the better approaches for education in emergencies. These phases comprised:

A *recreational phase* at the onset of an emergency, where games, songs and play activities would be undertaken, and materials provided for such activities. This phase was designed to aid psycho-social recovery while also giving an opportunity to plan and initiate the next stage of the process. In reality in Ngara there was no 'recreational' phase, but what could be termed a 'preparation' phase, where children were registered, teachers identified, sites plotted etc. in readiness for formal education to begin (interview with former NPA staff member).

The *TEP phase,* which utilized the TEP Kits (see *Appendix 2* for list of contents), using a basic curriculum for the first three grades of literacy, numeracy and language and a 'box' of teaching materials necessary for equipping a classroom of approximately 40 children. Teacher training in the use of the TEP kits was also a vital component, with teachers also being instructed in basic pedagogy and classroom management. This phase effectively ignored the skills and experience of refugee teachers and educators on the ground, who were clear about their own needs. The preference of the Rwandan teachers and experienced education personnel in the camps was for a rapid move towards a full Rwandan curriculum. They did not subscribe to the TEP approach and found the material in the kits useful but not sufficient and the teacher's guide 'patronizing' and irrelevant to their needs (personal interviews with Rwandan teachers in 1994-1995).

The *formal curriculum phase* was based on the concept of education for repatriation, with a curriculum that followed the one used in the home country and used its textbooks and materials. This phase aimed to assist the eventual smooth reintegration of children back into their own system of education, once they had returned home. This was the phase that the refugees wanted to start with, where support was provided for them to adopt their home-country curriculum and the education provision improved through better facilities for teachers and pupils and provision of all basic education materials.

It was evident that in the initial phase of the Rwandan crisis there was an insufficient and inaccurate needs assessment to determine what approach was the most appropriate initial response to education in this emergency (interview with former UNESCO staff member). While the TEP kits may have been applicable in the Somali situation – where they were first developed - there was little apparent recognition of the differences

of the Rwandan refugee situation, where there were sufficient numbers of skilled and trained educators who could have established an effective education programme of their own. It was assumed that TEP had some universal merit, for all situations. The process of providing kits (the lead-time from ordering kits to their eventual delivery was approximately six months) delayed the initial response considerably. Had local school materials been purchased, the education programme could have started months earlier.

A significant factor in the refugees' concern over the TEP kit was the Teachers' Guide. Most teachers distributed the school materials in the box (which were insufficient for the large number of pupils), appreciated and kept the sturdy wooden box, and discarded the guide (personal observation and interviews in the Karagwe programme). The guide (which was only useful for the first three grades) had been translated from Somali into Kinyarwanda without substantial revision of the curriculum content, so there was a significant reduction in the quality of the final product when the Rwandan teachers in Tanzania, DRC and Rwanda received it. There was effectively no real curriculum development in what was produced for the revised guide. This would account for the scepticism of many of the teachers (interview with former UNESCO staff member).

A similar situation was observed in Rwanda, where the kits were also utilized during the reconstruction phase of the education programme. The Rwandan Government later stated that while it appreciated the aid that was provided immediately after the emergency, much of it was ad hoc and not what it required. The government cited provision of the TEP kits as an indication of a process in which its needs were not being effectively registered or assessed. The Rwandan Government wanted to continue the formal primary-education programme and would have preferred greater assistance with basic materials and reproduction of textbooks, rather than the kits which had no basis in its culture. In this way the TEP kits had a marginal impact on the provision of education for Rwandan children; they were seen as more of a public relations exercise for the agencies distributing them (interview with former UNESCO staff member).

Pedagogic materials

A critical issue for the quality of the programme was the provision of textbooks. There was an initial dependence on the battered and dog-eared

textbooks that refugees had brought with them, before textbooks could be procured from Rwanda. Some books were printed locally in Ngara (UNESCO, 1994), but these were insufficient and the printing time consuming, so it was decided to stop the printing and to purchase textbooks from Rwanda. However, there was some resistance by the Government of Rwanda to this purchase, which resulted in a gap of more than six months while UNESCO continued negotiations with the Rwanda Government to purchase the textbooks (interview with former UNESCO staff member).

The whole process of textbook provision took a long time, so teachers were without textbooks for much of the first year of the programme, until limited numbers of teacher guides were printed and distributed in September 1995 (letter from UNESCO Ngara to UNHCR Ngara, September 1995). As it is generally accepted that most learning in an impoverished school environment comes through textbooks, it is essential that they be provided rapidly, to ensure a degree of quality learning. As noted by one senior education consultant when reviewing the education programme in Ngara, "When textbooks are not available pupils tend to be subjected to long sessions of repetition or copying from the chalkboard" (Benoy, 1995 in Eversmann, 1998: 9). The reliance on memory, a limited number of textbooks and teaching notes that was a feature of the Rwanda programme in the early phase was not sufficient to guarantee an education of minimum quality.

The provision of basic education materials such as exercise book, pencils, chalk etc. was also an issue as there were considerable delays in provision of sufficient school materials to meet the needs of the children. While GTZ funded much of the early provision of materials and school construction in the initial phase of the emergency, UNHCR was subsequently the chief source of funding to NGOs. Often funding from UNHCR to the NGOs was delayed or cut, and education supplies was frequently one of the first services to be affected (interview with NPA staff member). The purchasing of materials from neighbouring countries, or through the United Nations central ordering system, caused some of the delays (interview with former UNICEF staff member). Local purchase of education materials should always be the preference, not only to ensure speedy delivery but also to boost the local economies of the neighbouring towns. While the quality of the local materials may be fractionally lower than those purchased centrally or through the United Nations supplies

warehouse, this negative is offset by the significant reduction in administrative and transport costs.

The use of radio

In 1995 the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) established an interesting addition to camp education services with Radio Kwizera, initially designed to "offer an alternative media source, while promoting dialogue between the communities, and supplying accurate, balanced and comprehensible information." It broadcast programmes in Kinyarwanda, of which many were made by the refugees themselves. Radio Kwizera was also particularly involved in the peace education programme initiatives and would broadcast on issues such as environment, health and culture (InteRadio, 1998: 26). The use of radio as a tool for reconciliation was born in 1995, as a direct opposition to the propaganda of hate promulgated by Radio Mille Collines, the Rwandan radio station used to incite the ethnic hatred leading up to and during the genocide. The name *kwizera* means 'hope' in the Kinyarwanda language (http://www.comminit.com/11-342-case_studies/sld-636.html). Radio Kwizera later became a mechanism for conducting distance teacher-training courses for Burundian refugee teachers in the camps (interview with NPA staff).

Thematic curricula

One aspect of education in emergencies in a refugee camp situation is that refugees are a captive audience and agencies are anxious to implement projects that reflect their own political and /or developmental agendas. In this way, environment education, peace education, HIV/AIDS education and many other 'thematic curricula' become additions to the already overloaded curriculum being taught. Each agency competes for space in the timetable to include their project. In order to avoid curriculum overload, it is necessary to co-ordinate the structuring of these different subjects so overlap can be avoided.

- Peace education

The following description concerning the implementation of peace education in Ngara camps is primarily drawn from the author's observations and discussions with refugees, NGO and United Nations agency staff from April 1995-December1996. In Ngara, peace education started with a UNICEF project in Rwanda to introduce peace education based on a

programme initiated by UNICEF New York. It was brought to camps in Ngara, where UNICEF, UNHCR and NGOs became involved in promoting discussion and elaboration of the concepts in peace and conflict resolution with the different sectors of the refugee community.

While agencies had been keen to introduce peace-building activities into the camps, the introduction of programmes had not been adequately thought through. What had not been foreseen was that peace was the most politically contentious word in the camps. For many refugees 'peace' was synonymous with forced repatriation. They assumed that the promotion of peace and peace activities was a conspiracy to force them to repatriate. There were still militia leaders controlling much of camp life, intimidating other refugees and even aid workers. These leaders threatened the members of the peace group, to an extent that one member had to be evacuated. Regardless of such threats, the peace group persisted in its work, trying to broaden the scope of the peace initiatives to the wider community. Peace manuals for a formal and non-formal education programme were produced in a draft form, but were unable to be completed as the refugees were forcibly returned in December 1996, before the manuals could be edited and reproduced. However, a few elements of the programme philosophy developed in Ngara were adapted for use in the subsequent UNHCR/INEE peace education programme now operational in several African countries (interview with UNHCR staff member).

- Psycho-social

While there was training for teachers and community-service workers on issues relating to psycho-social issues and trauma, there were relatively few programmes that engaged the children and communities in a process of addressing their own psycho-social needs. The tendency was for 'crisis intervention' which targeted the more extreme and visible manifestation of psycho-social problems. In Karagwe a programme called 'Cognition through games' was introduced and aimed specifically at all children in a school environment, regardless of their psycho-social needs. It encouraged children to build up their own tools for dealing with their psycho-social problems. This training, which was conducted in early 1996, was originally designed for Bosnia and adapted for the refugee programme. It focused on building trust, tolerance, self-esteem and co-operation through a series of graded workshops lasting two hours twice per week, with approximately 12-15 children per group throughout the six school grades (Save the

Children UK, 1996*a*: 13). Good child-centred education practices were thus advocated as the foundation for good psycho-social practices, because a secure, stable and welcoming environment is essential for developing children's sense of security and return to a 'normal' life (http://ineesite.org/edcon/psy_soc.asp).

Certification

One issue that concerns the quality of the education provision is that of validation and certification. In the refugee camps the issue of certification was raised in mid-1996 and cross- border negotiations were instituted to try and formalize the certification process. At that time school leavers taking the Standard 6 examination would have received no recognized certification of their examination and therefore no validation of the years of schooling they had completed while in the camps. This was vital for them to ensure their continuing education on return. In an attempt to resolve some of the concerns raised by refugees on certification, UNHCR and UNICEF improvised certificates that were issued shortly before the refugees returned, but evidence suggests that these certificates were of little use for children integrating back into the education system on their return (interviews conducted with NGO workers and Rwandan refugee teachers in Ngara).

Teacher quality and training

There were significant numbers of unqualified teachers working in the camps, particularly in Karagwe where many were secondary-school leavers. In the first six months of the emergency, apart from the TEP training, there were four training sessions by UNICEF/UNESCO/GTZ on general teacher training (classroom management, record keeping, etc.), pedagogy and cholera awareness. UNHCR conducted two trainings on psycho-social issues, while CONCERN led two on management and curriculum development. Christian Outreach held one session on effects of trauma (CONCERN, 1995: 8). Ad-hoc training was also conducted in areas such as peace education, health education and environment. While attempts were made by the different agencies to provide training and upgrade teachers and para-professionals on the skills education personnel felt most appropriate, there was little opportunity to assess the impact of the training and its improvement of pedagogical and knowledge-based skills of the teachers. The Project Development Officers (PDOs), who were

effectively the 'inspectors' of the schools, were in general the only education personnel monitoring the effectiveness of the programme and the quality of the teaching in the classrooms. These refugee staff had neither the qualifications nor the independence to monitor the programme effectively and impartially. National and expatriate education staff were often more concerned with logistical and programmatic issues than with trying to ensure quality (interview with former NPA staff member).

Learning environment

As the story below indicates, the environment in which children learned was harsh.

Amos' story

Amos was in Karagwe refugee camp in Tanzania for three years, "I cannot remember much", he says. He was 8-11 years then. "There was a school in the camp and we were the only Rwandan children there. The teachers were Rwandan. They did not come to school regularly. The school walls were made of mud and wattle, not brick. We had to buy our own exercise books and pens and our parents had to go out looking for food in the villages around the camp. I remember that the Tanzanians used to mistreat us, especially when we went to the well to get water. Sometimes you would be insulted and beaten. NGOs gave us maize and beans and cooking oil."

(Obura, 2003)

The poor teaching and learning environment, particularly in the early stages of the crisis, compromised quality, with dark classrooms built from mud and poles that were not conducive to effective teaching and learning, and restricted the introduction of any alternative pedagogical styles. The classes were cramped, often with fixed benches, so that there was little room for any movement other than facing the blackboard. While attempts were made in some camps to introduce pair work, it was very difficult for teachers to undertake such activities in overcrowded and under-equipped classrooms. Occasionally one would see glimmers of creativity, where a teacher would use the plastic-sheeting walls as a place to draw an alphabet chart, or allow children to pin up their drawings. This was rare and the potential for exploiting such creativity as models of good practice was not sufficiently explored.

More permanent structures were built towards the end of the operation, with the understanding that these could be used by the local population once the refugees had left. Unfortunately, although in principle the idea was sound, some key issues had not been fully addressed. Firstly, if the structures were to be useful as school buildings they needed to comply with the regulations for state schools. Secondly, they needed to be in a location where a school was necessary, or additional classes could be utilized. After the Rwandans returned home, the school buildings in Benaco Camp, Ngara, were stripped of their iron sheeting and left to disintegrate after they had been temporarily used by the military.

Monitoring

The monitoring of the quality of education was very ad hoc, particularly in the early phases. Agencies conducted their own internal assessments of their programmes but these rarely concerned issues of quality of teaching and learning. The PDOs were the supposed arbiters of quality. These were refugees who had been involved in education in some way in Rwanda. However there was a degree of corruption amongst many of these officials who were responsible for the recruitment of teachers, which compromised their effectiveness. The national and international staff trying to monitor the programme were more concerned with ensuring timely delivery of supplies, organizing training, paying teachers and so forth, than with the monitoring of the quality of such a fledgling operation. There were also very few external assessments that monitored quality of teaching and learning. Assessments that were carried out tended to focus on enrolment, attendance, drop-out and examination outcomes to the detriment of deeper quality issues (personal observations during 1994-1996).

5. Management

Co-ordination

It was evident from the Ngara programme that the United Nations had considerable influence over the development and shaping of the implementation of educational activities. Although it demonstrated effective inter-agency collaboration and – later – community participation, those outcomes could have been achieved more rapidly, had the importance of community input been fully recognized at the outset. Although initially the top-down orientation, which had been adopted as a result of the

insistence on a phased approach, was a factor in delaying the provision of 'education for repatriation', the programme was fully supported in spirit and education was organized in a co-ordinated and structured way. The clear and structured organization and co-ordination between agencies applied to all sectors including education. This was attributed to the strong commitment and collaboration that the lead agencies had towards education and the willingness of GTZ and later UNHCR to fund it.

Schools were initially established in tents and, in order to avoid overcrowding, children were grouped into a three-shift system, for the first three grades, each of three hours' length, morning, midday and afternoon. While a double-shift system was familiar in overcrowded Rwandan schools, the three shifts proved difficult for children and teachers to cope with, and the middle shift was very poorly attended. At this stage it has to be remembered that education in emergencies was still experimental in many ways, and it is recognized now that this approach was not effective. The Burundian and Congolese refugees from subsequent influxes into Kigoma region were able to build on the lessons learned from the Rwandan experience and improve the initial establishment of the education process in terms of management and community participation. By 1995 UNHCR had issued guidelines on education in emergencies, but at the start of the Rwanda crisis there was very limited documentation available on best practices for education practitioners new to this field.

Arising from the July 1994 MOU, an Education Programme Management Unit (EPMU) comprised of United Nations agencies, was established in Ngara at the end of 1994 to co-ordinate all aspects of the management of the Ngara education programme. The Karagwe programme, however, was managed from a distance by UNHCR, and the NGO, CONCERN, that was running the programme, had no effective reporting function to the EPMU of Ngara. The Tanzanian Government's District Education Officer (DEO) was also invited to attend EPMU meetings from September 1995, although rarely did so. Prior to that, the local education authorities had not been involved, although the DEO suggested that the government had a role to play and should be involved in the refugee programme (letter from UNHCR to Acting District Education Officer, September 1995).

The model below in *Figure 3* shows how the initial structure of the management process was perceived by the United Nations agencies. Note

the significant absence of the refugee community, which is only represented at the lowest level of the co-ordination structure. All major decisions were taken by the EPMU, a fact that concerned the implementing agencies, which noted the high staff turnover, thereby reducing the continuity of decision-making and implementation strategies (letter from Christian Outreach and other implementing NGOs dated 21 December 1994).

Figure 3. Organigramme for Kagera Region – Education in Emergencies programme for Rwandan refugee children



Source: UNHCR, 1994*f*: 2.

Community participation: The new mantra

Education management meetings in early 1995 included NGO staff alone, with no refugee presence. Refugee education staff held their own separate management meetings with only representatives of the ECC present. This essentially top-down approach was eventually recognized to be counterproductive to effective community participation, not to mention effective management. In June 1995, therefore, the EPMU decided to "relinquish some of the decision-making and control over the school management so that community participation could be more encouraged" (EPMU Education meeting minutes, 12 June 1995, UNHCR). However, it was not until mid-1996 that refugee participation in the education co-ordination meetings became formally recognized. Although the rhetoric concerned the empowerment of the community to take over the management of 'its own' education, there was little recognition that the top-down approach taken from the beginning had hindered the involvement of the community (minutes of an education meeting, 18 June 1995).

School committees established early on by the refugee management teams had a limited role. Attempts were made to strengthen school committees in late 1995, to encourage the dialogue between parents and management. This 'voice' of the community was a Rwandan representative body that was to be included as part of the co-ordination structure. It was a de facto education governing body comprised of representatives from the 'camp committee', derived from two representatives of each school. In this way the EPMU was to revise its 'isolationist' approach and what was perceived as a 'dictatorial role' (see *Figure 4*). Agencies believed that the refugee communities "by remaining at the lower level ….are continuing to create a refugee dependency on the NGOs and this is possibly the biggest sole mistake we have made in the Education programme" (memo from UNHCR to all education co-ordinators, October 1995, on Restructuring of the Education programme).

Community contribution versus teacher incentives

Passivity and dependency have to be counteracted at the beginning of an emergency if community contribution is to be an effective mechanism and a means of promoting partnership rather than exploitation. Frequently at the height of an emergency, agencies want the work done quickly and efficiently and are prepared to pay for it. This has a serious impact on

education as a supposedly 'non-essential' service, as teachers and other educated refugees are poached and paid by other sectors wanting to initiate their programmes quickly. When the remaining teachers are then expected to work on a voluntary basis, it is hardly surprising that they are reluctant to do so. The debate concerning teacher incentives is a critical one and one that agencies need to be clear on before they embark on payments of any kind. On the one hand, the argument against incentives is that they encourage dependency, increase demands by refugees and create divisions between different sectors of the community. On the other, is the opinion that incentives ensure continuity and stability of a programme, as paid refugee staff are more likely than volunteers to be fully committed to the job. From the Ngara experience, it was evident that while teachers would work willingly on a voluntary basis for a certain time, they expected compensation eventually and even threatened strike action to make their case (interview with former NPA staff member).

Figure 4. Organigramme of revised education management structure, Ngara



While NGOs welcomed the new participatory approach, and each was anxious to promote it, many refugees were more cynical about the reasoning behind its rather sudden introduction. It came at a time when the humanitarian aid that had flooded in at the beginning of the crisis was starting to dry up. Some refugees felt that community participation was the new watchword for community exploitation (personal interviews with refugees at the time).

In light of experience

What is clear from subsequent experiences and what is now more or less accepted practice, is that formal primary education can be established immediately if there is the will to do so. When the influx occurred at the end of 1996, refugees in the Congolese camps in the Kigoma region of Tanzania, established basic schooling within weeks of arrival in the camps. They had timed their flight according to the academic break in the school year, and resumed as normal but in the camp environment. They had very little external support at that juncture, but were determined that their children should not miss out on any stage of their education. An external assessment evaluating education programmes for the Congolese and Burundian refugees suggested that where these community-based initiatives were most supported and education programmes established through a bottom-up approach, the programmes were more successful and the achievement of the children higher (Eversmann, 1998: 6-9). As community participation was established at an early stage in the process, it was evidently a genuine dialogue, rather than something that the refugees perceived as exploitation.

6. Situation for the current caseload of Rwandan refugees in Tanzania

The forgotten crisis

Currently there are 24,191 Rwandan refugees out of a total refugee population of Burundian, Rwandan, and Congolese in Kigoma and Kagera regions of 505,745 (UNICEF, 2002: 2-3). The continued fighting in the north of Burundi has led to further influxes of Burundian refugees at over 1,000 per day. This makes Western Tanzania one of the largest refugee programmes in the world. It is the forgotten crisis. The Government of Tanzania presented a deadline of 31 December 2002 for the repatriation

of Rwandans in the camps, causing many refugees to flee to other countries of asylum such as South Africa, Mozambique, and Malawi through fear of forced repatriation. It is difficult to determine the reasons for their fear of return to their countries of origin, perhaps because they are suspected of crimes during the genocide or they believe that the Government of Rwanda is harassing them to return against their will. The only topic for the cross-border meetings on Rwanda between UNHCR and the government officials on both sides, focused on repatriation. Other issues concerning repatriation and reintegration, such as education and separated children were not discussed (interviews with United Nations staff and Rwandan refugees in Ngara).

Mbuba transit camp

Many of the Rwandan refugees who returned to Tanzania, from Rwanda, shortly after the forced repatriation in 1996, were not granted *prima facie* status, but were held in a transit camp at Mbuba for a full year after they arrived in the country. The refugees in the transit camps were denied basic services guaranteed to those in the other camps, such as education, full medical facilities, independent shelter and individual food rations. The conditions were more like a prison camp, with communal housing, latrines and meals. There was no possibility of schooling for the refugee children in this camp, despite the willingness of teachers to start a programme. Agencies were reluctant to contradict the stance of the government and therefore provided no support for education (personal observations in 1997-1998).

Curriculum issues

The Rwandan curriculum is still not being used in the camps in Western Tanzania as no textbooks have been made available to refugees for them to teach their own curriculum (interviews with Rwandan refugees in Ngara). The Government of Rwanda apparently refuses to supply textbooks for the refugees as it argues that they should repatriate. Therefore children are being forced into using the Burundian curriculum. Language is a problem for teachers who are trying to teach in a language which is not their mother tongue. This impacts on children, who inevitably do not receive an effective education where teachers are not confident in the language used as the medium of instruction. The children are also learning Burundian history and geography, which are entirely different from their

own. All of these issues will cause problems of reintegration for children when they eventually do repatriate.

An interview with Rwandan refugee children in Ngara

The children were worried that if they went back to Rwanda, they would have to return to Grade 3 due to their lack of English and that the subjects taught would be different from the ones they were taught now. They believed that being able to study in their own language with their own social and cultural education was best for them, believing it was their right to study in their own language and not in the Burundi language. They wished that "the Rwandan Government should stop nagging us to come home when we don't want to".

A Rwandan teacher interviewed in Ngara was insistent that the quality of the education the children are receiving is an issue not just because the medium of instruction is different but also the curriculum. He thought it strange that, "in Lukole B you find that a Rwandan teacher teaches a Rwandan child by using the Burundian language and the Burundian curriculum. It is a serious problem as the children have to cope with these changes" (interview conducted in Ngara). It is not only the children, but also the teacher who has to cope with the change.

Attrition

As *Table 4* above indicates, there were high attrition rates in the camps particularly in the upper grades. One major cause was the lack of clothing or school uniforms. These had previously been supplied by UNHCR, but recent budget cuts had meant serious restrictions in 'non-essential' items. Children were also supplementing their food ration by working, which led them to frequent absenteeism and subsequent drop-out (interview with NPA staff in Ngara, October 2002). Rwandan children were scattered throughout schools for Burundian refugee children in the Ngara camps, except for those registered in Imena School which catered only for Rwandan children, with 1,330 pupils attending in total (686 boys and 644 girls) (personal communication, UNICEF staff member, 7 March 2003).

Table 4. School statistics of all camps in Ngara and Kasulu, December 2002

Camp	Grade 1		Grade 2		Grade 3		Grade 4		Grade 5		Grade 6		Boys	Girls	Total
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G			
Lukole A													6,381	5,830	**12,211**
Lukole B													4,683	4,135	**8,818**
Mtendeli	1909	1909	1321	1224	861	701	730	630	692	502	498	245	6,011	5,211	**11,222**
Nduta	1883	1932	1684	1617	1360	1267	911	900	937	650	522	234	7,297	6,600	**13,897**
Kanembwa	561	583	482	432	410	459	317	345	307	275	243	210	2,320	2,304	**4,624**
Mkugwa	56	54	46	47	37	49	28	31	28	31	22	25	217	237	**454**
Karago	1476	1364	1246	1230	962	758	370	220	212	102	118	48	4,384	3,722	**8,106**
Mtabila	2345	2509	1813	1963	1645	1769	1522	1387	1245	942	568	317	9,138	8,887	**18,025**
Muyovosi	1232	1273	1140	1078	959	949	852	786	754	681	519	309	5,456	5,076	**10,532**
Nyaragusu	1550	1636	1496	1585	1505	1532	1417	1323	1228	1047	964	643	8,160	7,766	**15,926**
Lugufu I	1841	1847	1652	1676	1774	1733	1710	1572	1403	1021	1099	533	9,479	8,382	**17,861**
Lugufu II	1646	1563	1297	1091	1268	1120	1101	886	787	622	691	316	6,790	5,598	**12,388**
Total	**14,500**	**14,670**	**12,177**	**11,943**	**10,781**	**10,337**	**8,958**	**8,089**	**7,593**	**5,873**	**5,244**	**2,880**	**63,837**	**63,748**	**134,064**

Source: Personal communication, UNICEF staff member, 7 March 2003.

The importance of language is highlighted as another cause for high attrition rates This is likely to be a major cause for drop-out for Rwandan children, who are struggling not only with the difficulties of the camp life, but also trying to study an unfamiliar curriculum in an unfamiliar language. Another reason cited for drop-out of Rwandan schoolchildren, was the uncertainty surrounding their future given the Government of Tanzania's deadline for repatriation and the movement of many of their parents to other countries (personal communication, UNICEF staff member, 7 March 2003).

High level of service

The level of sophistication of the current education programme for the Rwandan, Burundian and Congolese refugees is highlighted by the degree of training and materials they currently receive from the different agencies co-ordinating the education programme. Teachers undergo 452 hours of training over a nine-month period if they are unqualified (interview conducted in Ngara). This covers all aspects of pedagogy, class management and subject training. Education inspectors monitor the training programme, although no independent evaluation of the quality of the training they have received has yet been conducted. The service provided is an indication of the level to which refugee programmes can achieve given adequate resources, political will and availability of experienced personnel.

Post-primary

Post-primary education provision is now available to refugee children in Western Tanzania. This is highly significant given that neither UNHCR nor other agencies supported post-primary education for the Rwandan refugees in 1994-1996. The situation for refugee post-primary education in Tanzania improved when NGOs began their support in 2000 and assisted the development of a post-primary curriculum that follows the country of origin. It is now recognized within the Tanzanian programme as a crucial component of education in emergencies. The Refugee Education Trust (founded by Sadako Ogata to promote post-primary education for refugees) is increasingly involved with providing funds to support education for secondary-school students.

Chapter 4

Case study: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

1. Overview

In July 1994, the DRC, at the time known as Zaïre, hosted one of the greatest refugee influxes the world had seen since the Second World War. Nearly 1 million Rwandan refugees crossed the border into the east of the country around Goma, Bukavu and Uvira (in North and South Kivu provinces) fleeing from fear of reprisals after the genocide. As the largest refugee-hosting area, Goma was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the crisis, with refugees at one point dying at an estimated one per minute (IFRC, 1995: 25).The Interahamwe, the notorious militia mainly responsible for perpetrating the genocide, controlled many of the camps and were determined to ensure that Hutus in the camps remained in exile, through a process of fear, intimidation and sometimes murder.

> *"Failure to separate genocide suspects from the mass of refugees means that the camp populations continue to be denied official refugee status, as people suspected of crimes against humanity cannot claim refugee status under the OAU Refugee convention"* (Mills, 2002: 9).

The militia possessed such a hold over the camps that some agencies pulled out at the end of September 1994, reluctant to be seen to support mass murderers. Other agencies however saw the humanitarian effort as a means of supporting the hundreds of thousands of vulnerable women and children, the vast majority of whom were innocent victims caught up in the crisis. The moral dilemma that aid agencies suffered was critical and is an issue frequently bypassed in times of conflict when a humanitarian crisis overtakes principles of justice.

It was not only the effect of intimidation by extremists in the camps (who exaggerated the frequency and nature of abuses in post-genocide Rwanda) that frightened refugees sufficiently to prevent them from

returning home. It was also the Rwandan Government which appeared reluctant to facilitate the return of the refugees. Newbury states that an equally important factor was "the pervasive climate of insecurity in Rwanda and an apparent lack of political will on the part of the government to promote confidence-building measures. The political conditions inside Rwanda have convinced numbers of refugees that their fears are well founded" (Newbury, 1997: section on imperatives and dilemmas of repatriation).

The situation in the DRC camps worsened as donor fatigue - donors had been spending a million dollars per day - led to a drastic reduction of the food ration. The resulting tensions, heightened by the anniversary of the genocide in April 1995, led to attacks on one of the camps by Rwandan militants anxious to force the closure of the camps which they saw as threatening their borders. The increase in the sense of insecurity within the camps in general led UNHCR to request the government to post military protection (Jesuit Refugee Service, undated: 7). It was in this environment of continual instability and heightened tension that education had to struggle to survive.

In an environment where the vast majority of children had little access to education, variations in the response to education for refugees and the delays in implementation were in part due to the following factors:

(a) concerns by the Congolese Government on establishment of schools in camps;
(b) the lack of co-ordination by UNHCR;
(c) significant financial constraints.

How these impacted on the establishment and development of education for refugee children in the camps around Goma, Bukavu and Uvira are examined through a review of aspects of policy, access and equity, quality and management.

2. Policy

The Ministry of Education (MOE) had been integrating refugees (mainly from Angola) into the national education system from the 1960s. This remains DRC policy though it applies primarily to those living outside emergency camp environments. Some Rwandan children even before the

genocide were attending primary schools in DRC (an example was given from 1993 where children from Gisenyi in Rwanda would cross the border into Goma to attend school), indicating a high level of acceptance of people from neighbouring countries (interview with MOE officials). The preferred approach of the MOE was and continues to be in favour of integration of refugee children into the Congolese education system - but this would appear to be meaningless when considering the reality of the camp context in 1994. There appeared to be no formal written policy by either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry for the Interior that defined the approach to be taken regarding access to education for refugee children. In 1996, this lack of documented permission for education allowed the local authorities to ban education activities in the camps with impunity.

As the Rwandan refugee crisis was seen as temporary, the Government of DRC did not consider any long-term implications of hosting Rwandan refugees It was not considered an option for the majority of refugee children, to integrate children in the DRC school system, for several reasons:

(a) the medium of instruction would be different (French was not introduced until secondary level in DRC);
(b) the refugee school population far exceeded that of the Kivus' local school population;
(c) the Congolese infrastructure was not sufficient to cope with the large numbers, and as the parents paid the teachers this would mean that refugees would also have to pay;
(d) *prima facie* refugee status was not granted, and as refugees were classified as migrants they would have to pay double the fees of the local population (UNHCR, 1996*c*: 8).

At the early phase of the refugee crisis in DRC, UNHCR refused to support any education activities; in fact, establishment of education was discouraged by UNHCR at that time (interview with former UNHCR staff). This was contrary not only to its own guidelines, but also contravened the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The obvious reluctance of UNHCR to encourage education sent a clear signal to both refugees and agencies that its priorities lay elsewhere. However, by early 1995, UNHCR did start to provide minimal support for the construction of classrooms, using plastic sheeting, and for training to be conducted in some camps.

Secondary and tertiary education

There was an unwritten policy not to assist post-primary education on the part of United Nations agencies, which used the government stance on education as a means to circumvent their responsibilities as far as post-primary provision was concerned. Prior to the emergency, UNHCR had been providing long-term support for tertiary education to a number of refugees, including Rwandans, in Kinshasa, and a UNHCR mission was conducted to determine the continuation of this support. Poor academic results and high failure rates had led to uncertain future prospects for these students and the high financial liability for such a poor return was leading UNHCR to question its strategy (UNHCR, 1994*a*: 6). But a handful of urban refugee university students had no incidence upon the larger issue of denying the large numbers of refugee youth in the camps access to secondary schooling.

3. Access and equity

Even by late 1994, education was not supported by UNHCR and was viewed by some UNHCR officials as a mechanism to delay refugees from repatriating (interview with former UNHCR staff member). It was the ad-hoc interventions by parents and teachers, with limited support from some independent NGOs, that ensured that children in some of the camps were at least receiving education of a kind. The examples below taken from a UNHCR mission report in December 1994 indicate that large numbers of children were being catered for in a basic way, and teachers and parents were on the whole enthusiastic. The report highlights the significant disparity between the different refugee sites in terms of provision and motivation of parents and teachers.

Bukavu

In Inera Camp, Caritas Internationalis had reacted to parent and refugee teacher initiatives. One hundred and fourteen teachers engaged in teaching 6,732 children from Grades 1 to 6, using the Rwandan curriculum: mathematics, Kinyarwanda, religion, geography, science, history in two shifts. Thirty-six classrooms and functions well. Exercise books are not enough, as the mode of teaching is through a great deal of copying, so children fill their exercise

books too quickly. However the teaching and learning are conducted without any political disturbances and a remarkable sprit of motivation and discipline.

Uvira

The 24 camps and spontaneous settlements of Uvira along Lake Kivu have not received as much attention as camps in Bukavu and Goma. Very little community spirit here, refugees expect to get paid for any activities they undertake. In one camp poles were lying not used waiting for someone to construct a shelter for the children. In one camp 11 school sites were identified for the estimated 10,000 school-aged children and 144 classes organized.

Goma

Thriving scene of educational ad-hoc activities. Sitting on lava rocks, nursery, primary and secondary-level refugees listen to teachers under the sun. Caritas and ADRA setting up schools, for example in Kahindo camp two spaces for schooling activities for 5,000 children were established and classes organized. Basic materials were provided through their own means and donations.

(UNHCR, 1994*g*: 7-10)

Establishment of community-led initiatives

These camps were mini cities, vast sprawling places where space was at a premium. Camps were built on the old lava flows, a lunar landscape where the competition for space for all services was fierce. In this hostile environment, education was a lower priority than other sectors, all of which believed they had more right than the other to the assistance that was being offered. Education took a back seat certainly in the first six to nine months of the emergency (interview with former UNHCR staff member).

Despite the official lack of enthusiasm, even by October 1994 there were several refugee-led initiatives set up in different camps in the region, some supported by NGOs such as Caritas, which assisted a recreation centre in Mugunga. All of these initiatives were essentially ad hoc, and because of the reluctance of UNHCR to engage in education activities, the diversity of initiatives made later attempts at co-ordination a difficult task.

Some camps tried to open recreational centres to ensure the children were occupied, but these were under such deplorable conditions that it was unlikely that much teaching was happening. The camp leader of Mugunga tried to show UNHCR how committed the parents and children were to education, by the numbers enrolled (8,501 children enrolled in primary education and 1,728 in secondary, in October 1994). He addressed UNHCR at a meeting, stating:

> *"the children are gathered in the mornings by 489 teachers under the sun or in the rain, either sitting on the ground, on stones or on their hands. Nevertheless they seem happy"* (UNHCR, 1994*c*: 7, translated from French).

Such examples of the spontaneity of parental contribution is an indication of the need for early and consistent support and intervention by UNHCR and other key United Nations agencies, such as UNICEF, to provide effective co-ordination to ensure that education is not only available to all, but is of sufficient quality.

There is limited documentary evidence on the extent of educational provision during the two years that the children were in the camps. The available documents indicate that an apparent divide existed between those camps which had a well-established education system by mid-1995 – supported and funded by UNHCR, NGOs and religious organizations, mainly in Bukavu –, and those camps initiated by refugees with little external assistance, which were limited in their ability to provide education services (camps in Goma and Uvira). In the former situation, the infrastructure was well developed with classrooms of plastic sheeting, bamboo, or wooden poles and mud, and in some cases with tin roofing. Most of these classes also had blackboards and benches. In the Goma camps, children were sitting on rocks or the bare floor, if possible under trees but more often than not open to the elements.

By the end of 1995, despite initial reluctance, UNHCR provided technical support and advocated for additional funds to support the initiatives already off the ground. However, many of the camps, particularly in Goma, still did not have functioning education programmes due to the lack of adequate support.

The report of a UNHCR Education Officer's visit to Bukavu, below, illustrates how teaching took place in an active and social way even with the very limited materials available. Bukavu apparently had committed educators along with support from the UNHCR Community Services Officer:

> **Kashusha camp Bukavu:** a cheering spectacle of a large compound with a plastic sheeting surround enclosing a large number of primary-school classes, with teachers and children vigorously at work on basic literacy and numeracy. Blackboards had been placed around the inside of the boundary 'wall' and also under simple plastic sheeting shelter (on poles) inside the compound. In front of each blackboard were a teacher and a group of children. The camp management NGO (and others) had donated the blackboards and writing materials for the children. (Chalk supplies were almost exhausted). The compound was said to house 5,000 pupils in two shifts. This active work with young children on letters and numbers would not be an effective avenue for indoctrination, even in this 'political' camp. The field officer stated that young people gather in the evenings for political discussions under quite different auspices.
>
> (UNHCR, 1995*d*: 4)

Enrolment statistics

The numbers of children enrolled are inconsistent between documents, but the summaries below give an indication of the numbers of schoolchildren who were receiving education, nearly 140,000 in total. It is generally accepted in the African context that on average 25 per cent of a given population should be school-age children. As Goma had succeeded in enrolling 14 per cent of its population into school, Bukavu 8.4 per cent and Uvira only 4.5 per cent, it indicates that although the numbers appear relatively high given the circumstances, the actual percentages of enrolment per population were very low. Surprisingly, even though Goma had poorer conditions and less support, proportionately fewer children attended school in the seemingly better-resourced Bukavu.

- Goma

Out of a population of 708,000 refugees registered in the camps of North Kivu, 99,545 children aged between 6-17 years (48,733 girls and

50,812 boys) were registered for school. With approximately 40 pupils per class, there were 2,666 classes for 2,666 teachers. The schools were in 52 centres but only 18 were constructed, some of these semi-permanent. A total of over 1,400 TEPs were distributed in March 1995, but as many education programmes had already started by this time, they were too late to be of real benefit (UNHCR, 1996*d*: 1).

- Bukavu

Bukavu apparently had stronger initiatives in education with more documentation. It had 33,239 pupils attending schools out of a camp population of 395,591 (UNHCR, 1994*j*: Annex B). In Bukavu, NGOs established schools with very little support from UNHCR. NGOs such as JRS and ADRA assisted the schools, under the overall umbrella of Caritas as camp managers. There were a number of teachers and university students who were able to mobilize action for education after the first weeks in the camp (Jesuit Refugee Service, undated: 6).

The figures for the number of schoolchildren in the different camps vary. *Table 5* indicates that significant numbers of children at all levels were attending some form of schooling. The ratio of teachers to pupils varied considerably from camp to camp. The ratio of teachers to pupils varied from 1:42 in Kashusha Camp primary schools, to 1:21 in Kalehe, suggesting that the teaching force was not evenly distributed between camps.

Table 5. School statistics for Bukavu, January 1996

Camps	Pre-schools		Primary schools		Secondary schools		Vocational schools	
	Pupils	Teachers	Pupils	Teachers	Pupils	Teachers	Pupils	Teachers
Kabira	3,479	95	4,553	117	249	31	0	0
Kalehe	520	26	919	42	201	45	0	0
Katana	37	4	459	29	143	21	0	0
Kashusha	2,200	82	4,005	95	850	80	0	0
Inera	0	0	7,713	134	3,217	95	1,200	36
Mudaka	195	6	769	27	325	87	1,332	28
Nyakavogo	209	12	592	29	213	19	0	0
Shabarabe	227	6	648	15	157	17	0	0
Nyamaringwe	920	22	2,927	86	657	62	315	18
Nyangeze 1	204	18	1,027	28	700	31	0	0
Nyangezi Mulwa	1,350	47	2,758	93	1,915	-	0	0
Muku	88	9	391	14	-	-	-	-
Mushweshe	113	19	240	11	250	17	0	0
Bideka	102	13	196	11	75	3	0	0
Izirangabo	129	8	261	11	138	4	0	0
Adi-Kivu	150	4	801	21	526	43	33	4
Cimanaga	681	25	2,191	69	3,630	161	0	0
Katana/CRB	0	0	245	-	25	-	0	0
Bideka/CRB	35	9	128	-	25	-	0	0
Idjwi/S. Bwina	0	0	314	10	0	0	0	0
Idjwi/S. Nkuvu	0	0	284	8	0	0	0	0
Idjwi/S.Mugote	0	0	337	7	0	0	0	0
Idjwe/S. Bwando	0	0	306	7	0	0	0	0
Idjwe/S.Boza	80	2	705	14	0	0	0	0
Idjwe/S. Karama	90	4	470	17	125	16	0	0
Total	**10,703**	**411**	**33,239**	**895**	**13,444**	**732**	**2,880**	**86**

Source: UNHCR, 1996*c*: Appendix 4.

- Uvira

Uvira had a population of approximately 69,000 Rwandan and 89,000 Burundian refugees, with approximately 7,100 children attending the various education activities. The education programme established in some of the camps was set up by a local NGO, CEPZA (Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte au Zaire). Depending on the prevailing nationality within the camps, the teachers followed either a Rwandan or Burundian curriculum, using either Kinyarwanda or Kirundi as the medium of instruction. French mathematics, science, geography and history were taught. After the closure of the schools, in February 1996, by the local authorities there was a dramatic increase in the number of street children observed in Uvira town, which was linked with an accelerated rate of juvenile delinquency (UNHCR, 1996*e*: 4).

The consistent feature of all of the sites where education was established was that there were not enough classrooms for the numbers of children and all schools operated a two-shift system for the lower grades. In Uvira, in some camps, the Congolese local schools were taken over for use once the local children had gone home. As the parents were reluctant to allow children to go outside of the camp, enrolment in these classes was very low. In camps where schools were less well established, classes were conducted outside, either under trees, or on the bare rock, with blackboards propped up as their only teaching aid. Attendance of both teachers and pupils was dependent on the weather (UNHCR, 1995*a*: 3-4).

The establishment of a school in Panzi, illustrated below, is an example of the determination of parents and NGOs continuing the struggle to provide education to children in most difficult circumstances.

A school in Panzi

Panzi was a camp that UNHCR refused to assist as it contained many Rwandan combatants who had been involved in the genocide. It was argued that these could not be classified as refugees because they had committed crimes against humanity and therefore could not be granted the status of refugee. The militarization of the school system appeared to be a feature of the school in Panzi, where teachers would ask their pupils why they didn't want to return to Rwanda, only to be answered by the fact that they were afraid of being killed by the RPF. As a means of counteracting the involvement

of the military in the schools, JRS established a school that catered for both primary and secondary students, that aimed to encourage a more tolerant attitude. Even the camp leader subscribed to the new ideology:

'With the opening of the secondary school in our camp.....[students] will learn to read and to reflect, but especially to respect the rights of difference, to assure a peaceful future for all the Rwandan children who will be reconciled. We, the parents have acted poorly, but let us teach to our children to be different'.

(Jesuit Refugee Service, undated: 39)

Children with disabilities

As education was not considered a high priority on the list of emergency responses at the start of the crisis, it is doubtful that sufficient attention would have been paid to the access of marginalized groups such as children with disabilities. In the available documents there is no mention of education for children with disabilities, or of classes attached to mainstream schools.

Unaccompanied minors

Just over 1.6 per cent of the total population of the Bukavu and Goma sites were unaccompanied minors, while only 0.7 per cent of the population were UAMs in Uvira. It is not clear why there were relatively few UAMs in Uvira. What is known is that approximately 30 per cent of all UAMs attended school, indicating the low priority of education for this vulnerable group. *Table 6* below gives the number of UAMs per site in relation to population size.

Table 6. Number of unaccompanied minors per refugee population in each site

Name of site	Refugee population	UAMs
Goma	700,000	11,214
Bukavu	360,000	6,153
Uvira	158,000	1,090

Source: UNHCR, 1996*e*: 5.

Post-primary

The majority of the camps had no secondary schooling, and post-primary education was certainly not supported by UNHCR except in Uvira. Some refugees established their own private secondary schools with limited support from faith-based organizations or local NGOs. There was no shortage of qualified teachers and willing students, just the means with which to undertake a fully-fledged programme. The demand was high and in this case the refugees were innovative in their improvisation, some in Uvira even using Congolese classrooms when the local population had finished with them (UNHCR, 1994*a*: 7). The low priority given to post-primary education by agencies was surprising given the security implications of large numbers of youth roaming the camps with little or no occupation. Although some efforts were made for primary and secondary levels, it was very difficult to assist those at university level, so students were unable to pursue studies either within the camps or outside in the Congolese universities (UNHCR, 1996*c*: 8).

While many donors and some agencies still do not see the critical need for provision of post-primary education, it was clear from the experience in Tanzania and DRC that for the refugees it is of the highest priority. The first buildings to be constructed by the refugees themselves were usually churches, followed by secondary schools. The arguments in favour of provision of post-primary education are strong, not only in terms of future economic and social development of the individuals concerned, but also for the country as a whole when the refugees participate in reconstruction after the crisis.

Pre-schools

Pre-schools were not considered as a priority by agencies concerned with education for refugees. Some parents however realized the importance of the continuum of education and although very few camps initiated pre-school education, some refugees did establish *'écoles maternelles'* with no external assistance. These helped the primary schools by reducing the number of under-age children enrolling in Grade 1.

Educational activities banned by local authorities

Access for all children was effectively withdrawn in February 1996 when the local authorities banned all community services and educational

activities in the camps (see *Appendix 7* for a copy of letters from the local authorities concerned with refugees). This had serious implications in sustaining any meaningful education process for the children. Some activities apparently continued surreptitiously, but teachers were operating under such tension that it would have been difficult to promote fully-fledged education programmes. Education officials were concerned that the cessation of educational activities would not only have an impact on the continued education of the children, but also that it could increase already-serious tensions within the camps leading to a heightened sense of insecurity. The reason given for the closure was that education was a decisive factor in whether a family decided to stay or go home. However, other factors such as security, peer information, rumour and information from the home country are perhaps more significant to the decision-maker (usually the men) rather than access to education in the camps (Sinclair, 2001: 14).

Some agencies felt that the positive forces of education used as a counter to the more violent tendencies manifested in the camps were being impeded as a result of the cessation of educational activities. The Congolese government authorities however were adamant that the closure continue and classes remain empty, with the Congolese military watching to ensure no one attended the schools (Jesuit Refugee Service, undated: 9). UNHCR at this time was either unable or unwilling to insist that the local authorities continue to guarantee education activities. While the Convention on the Rights of the Child had been ratified by DRC, and is a legally binding document, it was impossible to use it as a mechanism to ensure the continuation of education.

Some activities did continue, however, albeit in a closet fashion. In October 1996, Caritas proposed an alternative for formal schools, which it called *Centres d'occupation d'enfants* (CODE). These aimed to ensure that at least the children were protected from the negative influences of the intimidators and could continue with some form of studies appropriate to their age (Caritas, 1996: 1).

4. Quality

While textbooks and the training of teachers are typically assumed to have the most direct impact on quality, there are other key factors that affect children's cognition and learning outcomes, such as health, hygiene and sanitation. These, alongside parental involvement and literacy, are

often considered long after the hardware of the education programme has been put in place (Lucas, 2002: 18; Williams, 2001: 90-97). In DRC there was little evidence that these additional factors affecting quality outcomes had been considered.

A positive factor was that a large percentage of teachers were already trained, and had previous teaching experience from Rwanda and Burundi. As in Tanzania, there was no shortage of trained teachers, which is why many of the refugee teachers also found the TEP training, which was introduced in March 1995, to be patronizing. However, while the teachers may well have been trained in their own country's specific pedagogy, the camp environment could have offered a window of opportunity for the introduction of new styles of teaching and learning and for innovation and creativity to be encouraged within the teaching environment.

Goma and Bukavu (although not Uvira) were supplied with TEP kits, which unfortunately did not meet the needs of the school population. Only 50 per cent of the kits required were supplied to Bukavu, while in Goma approximately 80 per cent of the kits were supplied. Some kits had missing materials and the late arrival of the kits and their insufficiency caused many NGOs and refugees to say it was 'too little, too late' (UNHCR, 1995*a*: 5).

The quality of education that was provided was seriously compromised by the absence of textbooks. The Rwandan curriculum was used in most of the camps except where there was a majority of Burundian refugees, where they followed a Burundian curriculum. The shortage of textbooks for both teachers and pupils meant that the curriculum taught came from a mixture of memory, teacher manuals, odd textbooks and notebooks brought from Rwanda when they fled. As a result, only the main themes of the subject were elaborated, so children received a partial curriculum (UNHCR, 1995*a*: 4).

The examinations that children took were internally set and validated by teachers from the camps. As they had no recognition outside the camp in which they were set, this raises doubt over the quality of teaching and learning that was taking place. Only in Uvira, where a limited number of students took the Congolese examinations in the local school, did any official examination take place (UNHCR, 1995*a*: 4).

With nothing to write on, no desks to sit at, it is small wonder that some people were confused about whether education actually existed in the camps. The fact that so few educational materials were supplied, except on an ad-hoc basis through agencies and church organizations, could be said to negate the positive efforts of providing an education programme. It was presented as one of the major reasons for student drop-out (UNHCR, 1995*c*: 5).

Testimonies of school life in refugee camps in DRC

In the refugee camps school was free and pupils were generally provided with exercise books and writing materials. *"Teachers were paid by the NGOs. Some teachers were qualified"*, Laurent remembers of his camp school in the Congo, *"and they were good. However, school there was just for the emergency situation. It was not normal school with all the essentials. For example, we did not do tests or exams to enter any particular class. We just registered in any class of our choice. Life in general in the camp was not good at all. Things were difficult…"*

"I went to a school in a refugee camp in Ibanza, in the Bukavu area in Congo", said Frédérick. He was seven years-old at the time. *"The school was made of poles and plastic sheeting. Exercise books and pens were given by NGOs – but sometimes our parents had to provide them. I enjoyed school there. We played games and the teachers were good. Later we had to move to Kisangani. Then I stopped going to school and life was difficult. That is where my father died. He was a pastor and many people knew him. Then some people took care of us and brought us back to Rwanda in 1998 where we found our mother"*.

To add to the trauma of exile, horrendous living conditions and deprivation of all kinds, some children lost their parents in the refugee camps. Thomas' father died at the start of 1994, then, a year later, when he was eight years old, his mother died of an illness while they were in the refugee camp in the Congo. *"Getting firewood was a big problem"*, he remembers sadly. He was placed in a refugee school to do his first and second grades, restarting the first grade. *"Most teachers were not qualified and they were not very good. Ntabwo bigishaga babishaka (they did not seem to enjoy teaching) and they only came once in a while"*. It was difficult for him to concentrate on school.

Léonard also went to school in the Congo. *"Classes were held in the open and when it rained we had to stop. Sometimes we received books and other supplies. Most of the time we struggled to buy our own writing*

materials, which was not easy. Teachers came irregularly but sinabalenganya nabo baritangaga (I cannot blame them – they were also making a sacrifice for us). We followed the Rwandan syllabus but we did not learn foreign languages. And now we are behind, while those who stayed in Rwanda are ahead of us. Things were bad in the camps. I am glad I came back".

(Obura, 2003)

5. Management

The DRC experience illustrates how the lack of harmonization of agencies at the beginning of the emergency, where no guidelines existed and NGOs implemented programmes in an ad-hoc fashion, made any later co-ordination of the programmes very difficult.

Management of schools varied greatly in the DRC camps. Some camps operated a system whereby NGOs with responsibility for camp management were also contracted to oversee education; while in Goma, for example, there might be up to seven different NGOs within one camp running different education programmes. Not all NGOs concerned with education programmes were supported by UNHCR (e.g. JRS, which was independently funded) which made the co-ordination of activities difficult for UNHCR to manage.

In the initial phase of the emergency when support from UNHCR was not forthcoming, parents established school committees to initiate educational activities for their children. There were many teachers and university students willing to establish classes on a voluntary basis using the few textbooks they had brought with them from Rwanda. The organigramme in *Figure 5* below outlines a proposed administrative structure that followed similar lines of authority as those in Rwanda, but it is not clear whether this proposed structure was ever implemented. This structure was suggested to UNHCR and the NGO partners by the Community Services Co-ordinator, Goma (UNHCR, 1994*g*: 5/6).

Figure 5. Proposed organigramme of education line of authority



Source: UNHCR, 1994*c*: 5.

Many NGOs and United Nations agencies lacked the technical expertise to ensure the effective planning and implementation of the education programmes. This was also a serious issue in terms of quality as well as management of the programmes. As a United Nations staff member suggested, some of the personnel sent out by relief agencies had very little experience in education in emergencies, and for many it was their first time in an overseas post.

The late attempts at harmonization of the programmes by UNHCR were seriously hampered by the different implementation strategies that had been employed by the various agencies in the initial stages. To try and harmonize the activities between the camps in Bukavu, a committee was created which was composed of representatives of the education committees of each camp, the Education Officer of UNICEF and a representative of UNHCR. This committee met once a week to cover the following:

- the minimum infrastructure needed in each camp, i.e. the number of classes required using plastic sheeting, which would include an office, store and latrines;
- programme of teaching, i.e. which should follow the same programme as that in Rwanda with some changes that focused on the most important subjects and reflected the limited availability of teaching hours;
- certification of the programme: it was decided that at the end of the academic cycle the final-grade students would receive certificates signed by UNICEF and UNHCR;
- retraining teachers on the new content of the programme relating to peace studies.

As UNHCR did not support the payment of incentives in DRC, NGOs were able to set the incentives at variable rates, which led to intense competition between agencies for the best staff. However, the majority of teachers were volunteers and this caused tension between them and the approximately 30 per cent of teachers who were paid (albeit the small sum of US$15-20 per month) (UNHCR, 1994*a*: 6).

6. The current situation for Rwandan refugees

In DRC, thousands of Rwandan refugees continue to suffer in the bush, as they are not recognized by UNHCR as refugees. Therefore it is important to document the recent conflict briefly, in terms of how it has affected the remaining Rwandan refugees, many of whom are inextricably linked with the build up to the war and its exacerbation. The US Committee for Refugees suggests that 2.5 million people have died since August 1998 in DRC, either directly or indirectly as a result of the recent conflict, and a further 2.3 million have been displaced from their homes (US Committee for Refugees, 2002).

The two wars

There were a number of key events during the period when the Rwandan refugees were still in DRC that led to the current crisis (see *Appendix 6* for the BBC's Timeline on DRC). The refugee influx itself was one of the factors, destabilizing a region that was already fragile and on the brink of implosion. The build up of hostilities during the 'first' war started in early 1996, when Hutu extremist refugees, with the backing of

the Zairean army and local Zairean officials (already anxious to oust the unpopular President Mobutu Sese Seko), started to expel locally born Tutsis, many of whom had been living in the area for generations. The 'ethnic cleansing strategy' was all too familiar to Tutsis, who had witnessed their neighbours being killed in the genocide across the border. However, as in the case of the genocide in Rwanda, the international community did nothing to prevent the expulsion of the Tutsis or the worsening of the consequent civil war (Drumtra, 1996: 1).

In September 1996, when the Tutsis of South Kivu (known as the Banyamulenge and reportedly trained and supported by the Rwandan Government) were also being expelled, they retaliated, taking an opportunity to oust the remaining Hutu extremists in the east of the country. The resultant fighting factionalized the conflict into a battle between Hutu extremists, who had the support of the Zairean military, against Zairean Tutsi rebels supported by Rwanda. When the Zairean army and Hutu extremists were driven out of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in November 1996, as many as 400,000 refugees returned to Rwanda in the space of a few days (Washington Office on Africa, 1996: 1). Many more refugees decamped into the forests, where large numbers remained to continue their insurgencies. Laurent Kabila, the leader of the anti-Mobutu rebels, swept to power in 1997, taking Kinshasa and being installed as President of the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo. The country returned to a brief period of apparent stability until the rival factions within Kabila's rebel army resumed hostilities.

In 1998, rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda, who rose up against Kabila and advanced on Kinshasa, sparked the 'second' war. A number of other countries became involved at this time, whether to protect their own borders, or to try and exploit the enormous mineral wealth of the DRC, is not clear. The subsequent plundering of the country by foreign troops is perhaps an indication of their reasons for intervention. So Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to assist Kabila and resist the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels who took control of much of the east of the country. However, the situation became even more complex when rifts emerged between the Ugandan and Rwandan rebels, dividing into the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels, supported by Uganda, and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels, backed by Rwanda.

The continuing conflict deepened when in 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph. The country in effect became divided into three almost separate territories, with Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa heading the 'virtual' government, controlling only 40 per cent of the country in the South-West, while 35 per cent of the country in the North-West was controlled by the MLC backed by Uganda. The remaining 35 per cent in the East was controlled by the RCD backed by Uganda. Surprisingly amidst this conflict, Grade 6 examinations were flown from Kinshasa to the eastern provinces, under escort from the military, so children in the East could sit their examinations. The papers were then flown back to Kinshasa for marking (interview with OCHA staff member).

The consequence of both wars is a deeply divided nation, despite peace talks, which appears to have reached some form of agreement on the removal of foreign troops from the country. The victims of the wars (including over 2 million already dead) are as usual mostly women and children, suffering not only from disease and hunger due to the breakdown of services, but as victims of rape and violent abuse:

> Thirty-six-year-old Seraphim is finally packing to go home. She has spent 10 months being treated for psychological and physical injuries. She was among a group of women abducted from their home village of Shabunda by Mayi-Mayi militia. For one month, they were held naked in a forest and raped by 10 men every day.
>
> *"The rapes were in public. They took place in front of everyone else. They did whatever they wanted to you."*
>
> Seraphim still experiences urinary problems. But she is looking forward to going home to see her husband and children.
>
> *Her return is brave. The men who raped her belong to the group in control of her village.*
>
> (BBC News: www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/)

In such appalling circumstances, Congolese parents continue to struggle to educate their children. The prospect of support to Rwandan refugees is a sensitive issue, as Rwandans are still perceived by many as an invading army. There is a reluctance to be seen supporting children of refugees who are suspected *génocidaires* when there is as great a need for support to children within the local population. The situation for the remaining Rwandan children continues to be very difficult. Some are unaccompanied minors (estimated to be about 1,500) of whom only 66 are being supported in school in Kinshasa, although the centres where these children have been assisted and educated in the past were closed in July 2002 (interview with UNHCR Community Services Officer, Kinshasa).

There are large numbers of ex-combatants and militia living in the forest or among the 'internally displaced' in camps. It is not known how many children there are attached as dependants to the combatants or how many additional families might be hiding in the forest. As they are not recognized as refugees by UNHCR there are few agencies taking responsibility for their well-being or for the education of their children. MONUC, the United Nations agency charged with peacekeeping in DRC, suggests that for every one combatant there may be up to five dependants. The estimates of numbers of combatants in the east of the country range from 4,000 (Government of DRC) to 40,000 (Government of Rwanda), with MONUC suggesting 8,000. The likelihood is that the figure is somewhere in between. So there are several tens of thousands of dependants living with little or no support, where children are unlikely to be receiving any education.

Chapter 5

Critical issues and recommendations

1. Critical issues

The following critical issues, which have not been covered in depth in the text, affect the initiation and implementation of education in situations of emergency.

Government and United Nations roles

In both Tanzania and DRC there were no formal written agreements that would ensure access to education. This allowed both governments the opportunity to close the education programmes with impunity, although Tanzania did not change its original open policy until the influx of Burundian and Congolese refugees in December 1996. Where there is no formal government policy in place it is essential – as in Tanzania with the Rwandan crisis – to obtain a written Memorandum of Understanding so that the provision of education at all levels is permitted and guaranteed by some formal document. The role of UNHCR was also crucial in the development and success of the education programmes in both countries. In DRC, where education was initially discouraged by UNHCR, the education provision was at best ad hoc and at worst non-existent. The United Nations stance on education in emergencies is a critical factor in determining the successful implementation of co-ordinated efforts. The process should have been fully supported and co-ordinated by UNHCR in DRC, as UNHCR has a duty to ensure that provision of education is guaranteed, and "as long as budding ideas and efforts do not deviate from UNHCR's Education Policy, NGOs deserve UNHCR's support" (UNHCR, 1994*g*: 15).

Initial response

The role of the communities in management of the schools is frequently ignored at the initial stage of the response, as agencies are more concerned with ensuring that their own management structures are in place. The tendency for 'quick and dirty' programming at the outset

undermines the possibilities for effective community partnership, which is essential for longer-term planning. So when the community participation 'mantra' is invoked at a later stage, many refugees see through the rhetoric of partnership which, in the Ngara case, was initiated when funds were low. They saw that agencies were prepared to do many things for them while the funds were available. In Tanzania, while most schools instituted parent committees, these were more a force for mobilization of the community rather than an integral part of school planning, dealing with such issues as teacher recruitment and retention. While mobilization is important, it underestimates the capacity of parent committees to act as a mechanism for monitoring the effectiveness of the teachers and the school. If effective and genuine community participation is to be achieved, it is critical to establish the basis for such an approach at the onset of the emergency. Partnership rather than participation should be the guiding principle as this implies a dialogue and negotiation over what constitutes effective provision and how to achieve it.

Donor funding for education

Donor response to the refugee crisis in DRC was complex, as initially there had been massive injections of funds as a result of the humanitarian appeal. However it soon became clear to many donors that the camps were largely under the control of the militia, especially in terms of food distribution. Education for refugees during this time was not a priority among donors or agencies despite the massive humanitarian response. A review of publications in the UNHCR archives revealed that education featured minimally in comparison to water, health, and site planning. In 1995, the funding available for education was US$6.4 million compared to US$43.1 million for health, US$38.3 million for transport and logistics and US$12.8 million for sanitation. Community services also fared better, with a budget of US$11.2 million (see *Appendix 4*: Assistance budget to Rwandan refugees by sector in 1995).

It was not until later in the emergency, when it was felt that 'life-saving' issues had been dealt with, that education was attended to. Refugees, however, already within the first two months of arrival, had started gathering children together to register them and start the process of teacher identification (interview with NGO worker, Ngara). If such community-based approaches had been implemented during the planning and funding process, not only would costs have been reduced, there would have been

fewer delays at a time when children most needed the stability of a familiar school environment.

Disparity of support to local population

Even though education may not have been fully funded at the early stages of the crisis, it was evident that the millions spent on other sectors, as seen above, were not reflected in the expenditure on the local population. The continued disparity of funding and support to refugees when compared to support to the local population in the surrounding districts, led to severe criticism by the Tanzanian authorities. Such disparities were noted in President Mkapa's opening speech to Parliament in March 2002, which stated that unless the international community started compensating the country for hosting the refugees, he would forcibly return them to their own countries.

It is still the case that most donors engaged in humanitarian relief want to visit the camps, not the local Tanzanian villages, when they visit the emergency programme in Western Tanzania. This attitude of the donors and their disposition to fund only the refugee programme has widened the divide between the two populations even further. Such criticism has arisen because donors working with refugee programmes have not fully recognized the heavy burden paid by local communities and the need for adequate compensation.

The negative perception towards refugees by the host country in Tanzania is often expressed in everyday newspaper stories and cartoons and depicts refugees as having far more than the local population. The lack of recognition by the media of existing contributions to the affected host population is hardly surprising, given the government's progressively hard line towards what is perceived as the international community's disproportionate support for refugees.

Agency response

In DRC particularly, there appeared to be little funding for any formal education, as UNHCR, being the chief funding agency, did not actively support its initiation. The lack of government involvement in the refugee situation left UNHCR to act as the gatekeeper, paymaster and supervisor of NGOs competing for funds, deciding funding priorities according to its

own agenda. As a result of the massive humanitarian response to the crisis, the high level of media exposure compromised co-ordination and increased competition between NGOs that had flooded the region in an attempt to contribute towards the humanitarian response (IFRC, 1994*a*: 17, 34).

A particular feature of the Rwanda programme was the critical role that individual personnel played in the emergency, both positively and negatively. Heads of agencies had tremendous autonomy and control over enormous budgets, but education typically constituted only a fraction of those budgets. This could be seen in the case of DRC, where education was not considered a priority for the initial response and therefore was not funded until much later in the programme.

A key issue raised by international NGOs was that agreed core funding for educational activities from UNHCR and UNICEF needs to be guaranteed and timely in order to ensure effective programming and implementation by NGOs. Funding provision appears to have been characterized by delays and budget cuts. One NGO even returned funds to a donor because the money donated, to accomplish a number of activities over a 12-month period, arrived in the bank 9 months late, leaving only 3 months to implement a year's worth of activities (interview with the Head of NPA).

Data collection and analysis

The assessments conducted at the beginning of the refugee emergency were inadequate to determine the needs of all the children. A quality assessment is crucial at the beginning of the programme, and data should be disaggregated fully in terms of age, previous school experience, gender, special needs, family status, etc. There was a great emphasis on collecting of statistics, but little reflection or analysis on the implications for programming and for ensuring qualitative improvement in service. The analysis of trends as to why certain changes were taking place was not conducted or reflected in reporting. For example, the frequent dip in attendance during the planting season should have led to special actions (interview with senior UNHCR official). The importance of such data collection is not only to ensure effective provision and implementation at the time, but also as a component of overall documentation that records the experience of establishing a refugee education programme for use by

future practitioners or researchers. Many new practitioners dropped into an emergency situation have little to assist them in their decision-making on policies and practices. Provision of materials that critically analyze the successes and failures of emergency education programmes would prove valuable for all personnel engaged in promoting the establishment of education in a refugee context.

Building on past experiences

The biggest difference between the Ngara programme for the Rwandan refugees and the education provision for the Burundian and Congolese refugees post-1996, was the willingness of agencies to adapt and learn from the past experience in Ngara. Lessons from that experience were built upon, to ensure that the subsequent programmes for the Burundian and Rwandan refugees were started immediately by the refugees on arrival in the camps. In Tanzania, the community response was also boosted perversely by the fact that the Government of Tanzania had banned the implementation of formal educational activities. It is often the case that when states or agencies fail to provide, the communities step in. Agencies technically supported the refugee-based initiatives and worked with them to improve the overall material service when funds became available. It was widely recognized as a consequence of this experience that education can be very quickly established without the use of pre-packaged kits, when teachers and educators are supported to start their own schools. A clear example of this is the case of refugees coming from DRC into the camps of Nyaragusu and Lugufu in Kigoma, Western Tanzania, in December 1996. Within two weeks of arrival they had established makeshift classes and were teaching children, under trees, with little assistance from concerned agencies (personal observations and interviews with Congolese teachers, 1996-1998). When these kinds of initiatives are supported from the outset, they can ensure that education provision is initiated without delay, and development of an improved system can be implemented in time with negotiated support.

Repatriation and reintegration

The speed and scale of the refugee repatriation from DRC in November 1996 and Tanzania in December 1996 left most agencies unprepared. Contingency planning and co-ordination mechanisms had been put in place in all three countries, but the sheer enormity and rapidity of

the repatriation process overtook these. In DRC repatriation occurred as a result of the explosion of civil war, while a month later the Tanzanian Government forced the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees from Tanzania. The onset of both was unforeseen and took place over two to three weeks instead of the orderly months that had been planned for. The technical services in Rwanda were overwhelmed and, while trying to cope as best they could, their actions sometimes led to duplication of activities. In some cases agencies caused the separation of children by their excessive zeal (interview with an aid worker who worked in Rwanda at the time). Contingency planning in these situations is vital, but the flexibility to adapt procedures is equally important. While best practices for the repatriation were adopted on paper during the contingency planning process in Tanzania in 1996, many activities that could have assisted reintegration of schoolchildren were not included in the process (personal observations of a UNICEF staff member in December 1996).

The reintegration of children into schools in Rwanda was largely successful, according to a few schoolchildren who had lived in the camps. When interviewed by Anna Obura late in 2002, they all said that they suffered no discrimination on their return to school (see *Appendix 5* on interviews conducted in Rwanda with returnee children). Some had to sit tests to determine what grade they went into, but all said they hated being a refugee and were very glad to be back home in their own country. Although the sample size was small, and could not be considered representative, it reflected the typical situation that many refugee children would have found themselves in on their return. It appears that the children's experiences of education in the camps were variable depending on where they were located. What is not clear from the interviews or analysis is the impact the education children received in the camps had on their future learning in Rwanda (Obura, 2003).

2. Recommendations

- Education in situations of emergency should be treated as a first-line priority by all United Nations agencies and donors, alongside other life-supporting activities such as water, health, shelter and food. This prioritization should be incorporated in policy statements and documents and be fully reflected at the implementation level, regardless of the priorities of individual personnel.

- Ministries of education, ministries for home affairs, United Nations agencies and concerned donors should establish regional policies on education for refugees in regions of conflict. The policies should form binding obligations that would ensure access to education for all refugee children whether residing in or out of a camp environment.
- Access for all refugee children should be ensured, including the most vulnerable children such as unaccompanied minors, children with disabilities, street children and children with psycho-social problems. The curriculum for refugees should include strategies to assist these particular children, build their self-esteem, respect, tolerance and other life-enhancing skills.
- Refugee expertise and creativity should be captured at the outset of a programme, and should form the basis for all future educational programming. Education initiatives started by refugees should be encouraged and supported immediately, and management and co-ordination structures established to reflect refugee participation at all levels.
- Donors and agencies should consider the refugee-affected areas where refugees have settled and provide adequate support and compensation to the local population commensurate with the burden placed upon them by the refugees. Donor funding should have the flexibility to ensure that education programmes offer parity of provision for both the refugee and local community education systems.
- Cross-border negotiations between the host and home-country governments, as well as the United Nations agencies concerned, should be initiated immediately to ensure firstly that the most appropriate curriculum is adopted. Secondly, negotiations should be opened with regard to validation and certification, which should be guaranteed in order that the education received in refugee camps is valid and relevant.
- United Nations and concerned agencies should undertake a feasibility study to assess the potential of an 'Education Passport' for refugee children which would guarantee the validation of their education in an emergency context. This could be based on standards agreed either at regional or international level – akin to the International Baccalaureate – which would validate pupils' progress, beginning with a Primary School Leaving Certificate.
- Peace education or peace-building activities should be introduced as quickly as possible into the education programme, but only as part

of a well-constructed strategy to introduce the topic into the community in general, building on local mechanisms of conflict resolution.

- Additional research should be conducted to assess the full impact and value of emergency education programmes for children when they have returned to their own school systems.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. BBC time-line: Rwanda

A chronology of key events:

1300s Tutsis migrate into what is now Rwanda, which was already inhabited by the Twa and Hutu peoples.

1600s Tutsi King Ruganzu Ndori subdues central Rwanda and outlying Hutu areas.

Late 1800s Tutsi King Kigeri Rwabugiri establishes a unified state with a centralized military structure.

1858 British explorer Hanning Speke is the first European to visit the area.

1890 Rwanda becomes part of German East Africa.

1916 Belgian forces occupy Rwanda.

1923 Belgium granted League of Nations mandate to govern Ruanda-Urundi, which it ruled indirectly through Tutsi kings.

1946 Ruanda-Urundi becomes United Nations trust territory governed by Belgium.

Independence

1957 Hutus issue manifesto calling for a change in Rwanda's power structure to give them a voice commensurate with their numbers; Hutu political parties formed.

1959 Tutsi King Kigeri V, together with tens of thousands of Tutsis, forced into exile in Uganda following inter-ethnic violence.

1961 Rwanda proclaimed a republic.

1962 Rwanda becomes independent with a Hutu, Grégoire Kayibanda, as president; many Tutsis leave the country.

1963 Some 20,000 Tutsis killed following an incursion by Tutsi rebels based in Burundi.

1973 President Grégoire Kayibanda ousted in military coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana.

1978 New constitution ratified; Habyarimana elected president.

1988 Some 50,000 Hutu refugees flee to Rwanda from Burundi following ethnic violence there.

1990 Forces of the rebel, mainly Tutsi, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invade Rwanda from Uganda.

1991 New multiparty constitution promulgated.

Attempted genocide

1993 President Habyarimana signs a power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis in the Tanzanian town of Arusha, ostensibly signalling the end of civil war; United Nations mission sent to monitor the peace agreement.

1994 April – Habyarimana and the Burundian president are killed after their plane is shot down over Kigali; RPF launches a major offensive; extremist Hutu militia and elements of the Rwandan military begin the systematic massacre of Tutsis. Within 100 days around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus are killed; Hutu militias flee to Zaire, taking with them around 2 million Hutu refugees.

1994-1996 Refugee camps in Zaire fall under the control of the Hutu militias responsible for the attempted genocide in Rwanda.

1995 Extremist Hutu militias and Zairean Government forces attack local Zairean Banyamulenge Tutsis; Zaire attempts to force refugees back into Rwanda.

1995 United Nations-appointed international tribunal begins charging and sentencing a number of people responsible for the Hutu-Tutsi atrocities.

Intervention in DR Congo

1996 Rwandan troops invade and attack Hutu militia-dominated camps in Zaire in order to drive home the refugees.

1997 Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels depose President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire; Laurent Kabila becomes president of Zaire, which is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.

1998 Rwanda switches allegiance to support rebel forces trying to depose Kabila in the wake of the Congolese President's failure to expel extremist Hutu militias.

2000 March – Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, resigns over differences regarding the composition of a new cabinet and after accusing parliament of targeting Hutu politicians in anti-corruption investigations.

2000 April – Ministers and members of parliament elect Vice-President Paul Kagame as Rwanda's new president.

2000 November – International donors, meeting in Kigali to discuss aid to Rwanda, urge the country to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

2001 February – President Kagame says Rwandan troops are ready to leave the DR Congo key border town of Pweto, but only on the condition that United Nations military observers move in.

2001 October – Voting to elect members of traditional 'gacaca' courts begins. The courts – in which ordinary Rwandans judge their peers – aim to clear the backlog of 1994 genocide cases.

2001 December – A new flag and national anthem are unveiled to try to promote national unity and reconciliation.

2002 April – Former president Pasteur Bizimungu is arrested and faces trial on charges of illegal political activity and threats to state security.

2002 June – The International Court of Justice in The Hague begins to consider a suit filed by DR Congo against Rwanda and its rebel allies for genocide, armed aggression and human rights abuse.

2002 July – Presidents of Rwanda and DR Congo sign a peace agreement aimed at ending their four-year war. South Africa and the United Nations act as guarantors for the deal committing Rwanda to withdrawing troops from eastern DR Congo, and DR Congo to helping disarm Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for the killing of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda's 1994 genocide.

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/1070329.stm)

Appendix 2. Teacher emergency package contents

Teacher Emergency Package (TEP)

TEP is designed as a quick response, self-sufficient 'classroom'.

At a *practical level* it provides all the materials necessary for a class of students and a teacher (in a single shift) even where buildings do not exist.

The kit contains:

- forty slates and seven boxes of chalk;
- forty pencils with erasers and eighty exercise books;
- ten blank scrabble sets (for four children per set, to utilize for language and number games);
- cloth charts with the alphabet, a number chart and a multiplication chart;
- a Teacher's Guide with daily structured lesson plan in literacy and numeracy;
- an activity book to accompany the lesson plans;
- a set of story books for the teacher to read to the children;
- marker pens for marking the scrabble sets;
- white and coloured chalk and a duster;
- a tin of chalkboard paint and a brush and a tape measure for the teacher to create a chalkboard;
- a record book, attendance book, pens, extra pencils, erasers and a pencil sharpener.

At a *support level* the Teacher's Guide provides the teachers with structured lesson plans in initial literacy and numeracy that enable them to teach even if they are untrained or semi-trained. In addition the teachers undertake training programmes in the use of the kit.

At a *psychological/emotional level* it provides the children with a stability of environment that may otherwise be non-existent. It allows for continuity of schooling in their home language and provides illustrations of their culture through stories, songs and games.

(UNHCR, 1994*b*: Appendix 1)

Appendix 3. Memorandum of Understanding between United Nations agencies, GTZ and Ministry of Home Affairs, Tanzania

PTSS/94/0815 (p.14)
Annex 4

Memorandum of Understanding
signed by UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, GTZ
and the Government of Tanzania

Memorandum of Understanding

between

the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR),

the Ministry of Home Affairs of the
United Republic of Tanzania (the Government),

the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO),

the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and

Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).

on

**Emergency Education for
Rwandese Refugee Children in Tanzania**

Preamble:

Given that the parties to this Memorandum have agreed to fully co-operate and act in consultation with each other and to avail themselves of each others advisory services during the establishment and implementation of Emergency Education for Rwandese Refugees in Kagera Region.

Given that the parties have agreed to operate in the manner and in accordance with the implementation procedures and responsibilities outlined in the attached Description of Activities.

PTSS/94/0815 (p.15)
Annex 4

Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Education Programme

It is hereby understood by the parties that:

1. Resources will be made available by UNHCR, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusmmanarbeit (GTZ), UNESCO and UNICEF, as indicated in the attached budget for the purpose specified in the Description of Activities.

2. All activities undertaken under this agreement will be in line with the UNHCR guidelines for educational assistance to refugees in emergencies.

3. All parties will attend the meetings of an Education Coordination committee including interested agencies to be convened by UNHCR.

4. An Education Management Unit will be set up and staffed by UNICEF-UNESCO and GTZ technical advisor. A senior Tanzanian educationist will be invited to join the team. The main tasks of the Unit will be:

   provide technical guidance for educational activities in the camps
   develop human resources among the refugees through training of refugee educators
   develop and provide educational materials
   identify any needs for additional resources and funding
   provide technical guidance to the NGOs implementing School Programmes in the Camps and in receipt of educational resources under this agreement
   coordinate with UNHCR and Camp Management NGOs through the Educational Coordination Committee.

5. UNHCR, the Ministry of Home Affairs and GTZ will sign separate agreements with NGOs selected to act as implementing partners for School Management on camp level. The 'emergency education programme' will be carried out in each camp as a district sector.

6. The parties will ensure that all customs and registration documents, licenses and operating permits which may be required for the importation of project supplies and the operation of equipment, including vehicles, telecommunications and computer equipment will be applied for in ample time prior to the forecasted importation date in order to avoid delays at the port of entry, and the Government will ensure issuing thereof within the shortest possible time after receipt of the application.

Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Education Programme

7. The parties will inform each other of contributions received towards the project requirements and which are related to the achievement of the project's objective.

8. Through this Memorandum of Understanding, GTZ will be registered as an Implementing Partner of UNHCR in the field of education in line with the applicable procedures established between the Government of Tanzania and UNHCR for this purpose.

9. The Ministry of Home Affairs, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNICEF and GTZ will not be liable to indemnify any third party in respect of any claim, debt, damage or demand arising out of the implementation of this project and which may be made against the other parties to this memorandum.

10. The Ministry of Home Affairs, UNHCR, UNESCO and UNICEF, and GTZ will not accept liability for compensation for the death, disability, or the effects of the hazards which may be suffered by the employees of the other parties to this Memorandum as a result of their employment on work which is the subject matter of this Memorandum.

11. The confidentiality of any information pertaining to any individual or group of beneficiaries of the project shall be respected. The contents of any files, including computerized database, can only be released to persons duly authorized by the High Commissioner to receive such information, and then only when in the interest of the individual or group of beneficiaries.

12. If, during the implementation of the activities, revision of any terms of this Memorandum or the Annexes thereto becomes advisable, including this extension beyond the termination date, that such revisions shall be made only with the written consent of the parties to this Memorandum and prior to the expiration of the Memorandum.

13. If, during the period covered by this Memorandum, the parties involved are prevented from carrying out their respective obligations referred to in the Memorandum, this fact shall be reported to the High Commissioner and the other parties. The High Commissioner shall, in consultation with he other parties to this Memorandum, decide what arrangements, if any, shall be made to further implement or curtail the activities.

3. The beneficiaries of the activities should be involved and participate, to the extent possible, in any activities related to the planning and achievement of the objectives of the activities.

14. The activities governed by this Memorandum effectively commence upon signature by all parties and are planned to terminate on 31st December 1994.

Signed in five originals by the duly authorised signatories on behalf of the following parties:

	For the High Commissioner	For the Government	For GTZ
Name:		L. Dominic	
Sign.:			
Place:	DSM	DSM	DSM
Date:	02/08/94	02/08/94	12.8.94

	For UNESCO	For UNICEF
Name:	G. ROTHAL	
Sign.:		
Place:	DAR ES SALAAM	
Date:	10/08/94	10.08.94

Annex 1: Description of Activities
Annex 2: Budget
Annex 3: Organisational Set-up

Annex 1 to Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Education for Rwandese Children in Tanzania:

Description of Activities

1. Project Objective / Overview

Refugee children of primary school age from Rwanda will receive schooling on an emergency basis, to relieve post-traumatic stress, provide a sense of stability, maintain and develop literacy and numeracy skills and study habits.

UNESCO-UNICEF 'Teachers Emergency Packages' and, as soon as possible, standard textbooks familiar to the children and teachers' guides will be provided and utilised to promote co-operative rather than conflictual attitudes in the aftermath of the 1994 civil conflict and to facilitate repatriation and the re-establishment of schooling in Rwanda.

A carpentry workshop will be established to produce equipment and structures for Rwandese refugee schools on the various sites in Kagera region.

2. Description of beneficiaries

The direct beneficiaries are Rwandese refugee children of primary school age. The number of children wishing to enrol for schooling at this level (classes 1 - 6) is estimated at 40 000. Refugee teachers, school inspectors and support staff will receive training and incentives as indirect beneficiaries.

School attendance will relieve pressure on refugee women in allowing them to attend to the needs of their youngest children and other duties.

3. Implementation procedures

Schools will be established on an emergency basis using tents to be supplied by UNHCR. The use of tents will permit necessary adjustments as refugee populations are relocated or if school enrolment levels change.

The schools will be equipped and operated according to guidelines developed jointly through the Education Coordination Committee chaired by the UNHCR, to ensure a consistent approach on the various refugee sites.

Teaching materials and teachers guides supplied under this agreement will be utilised in the refugee schools and the teachers will participate in in-service training provided by a team set up by the Education Management Unit.

A workshop facility will be established, to produce, store, and distribute or erect as necessary blackboards with stands, latrines, and other equipment or structures according to a schedule to be agreed with UNHCR and the Education Management Unit.

4. Related Projects

The Education Management Unit and UNHCR will ensure best possible coordination with health, sanitation and other relevant sector programmes in the camps.

UNESCO's Programme for Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER) in Nairobi will ensure the timely production of standard textbooks and teachers' guides for Rwandese primary education to be utilised in the refugee schools in Tanzania.

These standard materials will be made available as soon as possible in order to complement the Teacher Emergency Packages. UNESCO will provide a production schedule to coincide with the beginning of the project activities. The GTZ will contribute to this effort through technical advice.

5. Description of assistance

Schooling will be provided to the estimated 30 000 interested refugee children in Ngara district and some 10 000 children in Karagwe district.

Some children may drop out quite quickly, especially if they come from families without much tradition of school attendance. It is therefore proposed to begin the programme using a three-shift sys-

tem which could be transformed into a two-shift system if student numbers decline.

Student numbers per school will be approximately as follows:

shift 1 (2 hours)	4 x class 1	(40x40=160 pupils)
	4 x class 2	(40x40=160 pupils)
shift 2 (2 hours)	same as shift 1	
shift 3 (4 hours)	2 x class 3	(2x40=80 pupils)
	2 x class 4	(80 pupils)
	2 x class 5	(80 pupils)
	2 x class 6	(80 pupils)

This system, which needs to be adapted to actual needs in each location, gives the following 'average' profile per school:

about 960 pupils	(rounded to 1 000)
16 teachers	(8 for shifts 1 and 2, 8 for shift 3)
4 other staff	(principal, clerk, watchmen)
8 teachers assistants	(if required)

8 classrooms
1 staffroom

There will approximately 10 schools on each of the four sites, which are Benaco, Lumasi, and 'Site III' for Ngara and Karagwe (estimated as one site).

Health of the school children will be monitored regularly by a qualified nurse, who will refer pupils for medical treatment or nutritional enhancement as necessary.

A workshop will be established which will undertake tasks such as erection, repair and maintain of tents and latrines, centralised storage and distribution of materials, and the production of supplementary equipment at low cost by refugee labour.

Appendix 4. Assistance budget to Rwandan refugees by sector in 1995

ASSISTANCE BUDGET BY SECTOR
1 January - 31 December 1995

(includes assistance measures in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire)

Sector	US$
FOOD (complementing WFP)	9,073,513
TRANSPORT/LOGISTICS	38,293,437
DOMESTIC RELIEF ITEMS	20,566,629
WATER SUPPLY	14,085,309
SANITATION	12,777,587
HEALTH/NUTRITION	43,115,706
SHELTER/INFRASTRUCTURE	15,349,498
COMMUNITY SERVICES	11,179,853
EDUCATION	6,432,906
CROP PRODUCTION	848,823
LIVESTOCK/VETERINARY SERVICES	163,000
FORESTRY	633,136
INCOME GENERATION	23,495
PROTECTION/LEGAL SERVICES	15,297,990
AGENCY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT	20,895,335
PROGRAMME DELIVERY COSTS	45,899,661
SUB-TOTAL OPERATIONS	***254,635,878***
UNHCR ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT COSTS	8,626,356
GRAND TOTAL	**263,262,234**
Income as of 10 July 1995 (including carry-over from 1994)	125,933,953
SHORTFALL	**137,328,281**

Source: UNHCR, 1995*g*: 6.

Appendix 5. Experiences of returnee children in Rwanda

These are extracts from interviews conducted in Rwanda by Anna Obura and her assistant researcher in October 2002 for the companion volume to this case study on the reconstruction of education in Rwanda, post 1994. They include examples of interviews conducted and analysis by Dr Obura of the interviews with children who had been in refugee camps (Obura, 2003).

Analysis of the interviews

The purpose of interviewing pupils in schools was to hear the voices of children and to get a flavour of their perceptions and experiences in terms of schooling in Rwanda today. Eighteen pupils were interviewed on a one-to-one basis during field visits to nine schools in the east, west and south of the country, in the provinces of Kibungo, Cyangugu and Kigali-Rural. Since 90 per cent of the population currently lives in rural areas in Rwanda, pupils were interviewed from schools in rural areas or in small provincial towns. Schools chosen reflect a range of school types: government, government assisted (mainly church schools) and private schools, primary and secondary. They were all mixed schools. There was no attempt at scientific random selection, due to the small size of the sample. Pupil respondents were chosen through a preliminary visit to sixth and twelfth-grade classrooms (P6 and S6), where the interviewer had an informal discussion with the class, noting those pupils who were ready to talk and appeared to have information. She then chose a boy and a girl from the class. If there were children from child-headed families she would make a point of selecting one of them. The interview lasted one hour per pupil. An unstructured and flexible format was used. During the interview Kinyarwanda was used, which is the most common language of communication in Rwanda today.

Heads were also interviewed on a one-to-one basis, but in several cases both the head and the deputy were not in the school and the teachers did not have access to the school statistics, nor did they always know the history of the school. Since schools do not have telephones it was not possible for the district education offices to inform schools of the visit in advance.

Maranyundo primary school

Pupil A

Sex: Male; *Age:* 15 years; *Class:* P6

This child lived in Kayindo refugee camp in Congo for one year. The child now lives with two sisters and a brother. One of the sisters is the oldest in the family and she is 20 years old. The brother is 19 years old. Pupil A is the youngest in the family and the only one in school. The parents are both dead, the father died during the war and the mother died of illness in 1995.

What type of school did you go to in the refugee camp?

In the refuge camp I studied outside. We sat on stones. We were sometimes given books and pens by NGOs but the teachers would take most of these and give us a few. The number of pupils per class in the refugee camp was about 20, here we are 40+.

What was school like in the refugee camps?

I liked some of the lessons, mathematics, English and French, but most teachers were not qualified, they were not very good *ntabwo bigishaga babishaka* (they did not seem to enjoy teaching) and only came once in a while. I did not like the life in the camp because I was a refugee. Also getting firewood was a problem.

What class did you complete in the refugee camp?

I completed P2. I left Rwanda after finishing P1. When I returned to Rwanda I went back to P1. Since I spent a whole year without joining school again, I had forgotten what I had studied so my family advised me to go back to P1 in 1998. I was not tested before joining school.

Which authorities put you in school?

Local authorities like Nyumbakumi came to verify which children should be in school and wrote down their names, but as returnees we were not given any special treatment.

Do you pay fees and how much do you pay?

I pay 200 FRW per term and I buy the uniform and books. Although I am an orphan I have failed to get an authorization. We were told to first pay for health insurance in order for me to get this authorization exempting me from paying fees *(the child looked sad at this point).* We do not even have the money for health insurance.

How do you get enough food to eat in your family? How do you earn money?

We cultivate and grow our own food. Sometimes we go out to dig for other people. One can make about 300 FRW per day. Out of this money we pay my fees and buy books and other things. *Amafaranga tuyabona atugoye* (we get money through hardship).

What is school like here within Rwanda? What do you like/ don't you like?

I like my school and the teachers and most subjects except that mathematics is difficult. What I do not like is when I have to be sent home from school because of school fees when I am not sure of when to get it. I also lack school supplies

Pupil J

Age: 15 years *Class:* P6 *Sex:* Female

This child lives with her parents, three sisters and three brothers – seven children altogether. In 1994 they ran to Congo with her family and lived in Nyangezi camp; later they moved on to Biro camp in Kisangani and finally decided to come back to Rwanda in 1996.

What type of school did you go to in Congo?

I attended a school in the refugee camp, the school was made of sheeting, but it was OK. We were given books and pencils and our teachers were Rwandan.

What was school like in the camps?

School was OK, we were given books, we played and the teachers were good - but the living conditions were bad, we lived in sheeting, we walked all the way to Kisangani, it was hard for me, I am happy to be back.

What class did you complete there?

I completed P2, although we were there more than one year. For some time (about six months) I was not in school - when we moved to Kisangani. When I came back to Rwanda I went to P3. No test was given to me.

How long did you take between the time you returned to your colline and getting back to school?

We came back around July/August, schools were on long vacation. I started as soon as schools opened in September 1996.

Which authorities put you back in school?

We did not get assistance from anybody, it was just my parents who decided to put me back to school.

Do you pay fees? How much do you pay?

My father pays my fees, 200 FRW per term. He buys the books and pens. It is not easy for my parents to pay for us all. Sometimes, when I need 15 books, I am only given a few because I have to share with my brothers and sisters. At home also we do not have a big place where to dig. Sometimes we have to borrow other peoples' gardens in order to get somewhere to grow food. Food is not plentiful at home.

What is school like here?

This school is good, the teachers are good and all the children are treated the same. *(Interviewer probes)*: In a school like Cyangugu Cathedral, children who came from outside are mistreated by teachers. The other children laugh at them. Here the relationship is good.

What is not so good here?

One bad thing happens when we come late. Home is about 45 minutes walk away. We are beaten. The headteacher does not listen to us. We are caned strongly, about four or five canes, and we cry. But my class teacher is good. If we give a good reason, she does not punish us. She is still young, unmarried. She's good. If we ask for forgiveness, she will not punish us, unlike other teachers. She is kind and does not get angry quickly. *(The child was excited talking about her teacher and genuinely seemed to like her).*

Are you hopeful about school? What would you like to be in future?

I am hopeful about school although I had to repeat P5 and P6. My father made me repeat P5, although I had passed, so that my brother could go on to P6. He said he could not afford to have two children joining secondary at the same time. I was bright. I could have passed P6. I got one mark less than I needed so I am repeating, but I hope to make it this time. I wish to be a doctor in future.

Appendix 6. BBC time-line: Democratic Republic of the Congo

16th-17th centuries British, Dutch, Portuguese and French merchants engage in slave trade through Congo intermediaries.

Belgian colonization

1870s Belgian King Leopold II sets up a private venture to colonize Congo.

1874-1877 British explorer Henry Stanley navigates Congo River to the Atlantic Ocean.

1879-1887 Leopold commissions Stanley to establish the king's authority in the Congo basin.

1884-1885 European powers at the Conference of Berlin recognize Leopold's claim to the Congo basin.

1885 Leopold announces the establishment of the Congo Free State, headed by himself.

1891-1892 Belgians conquer Katanga.

1892-1894 Eastern Congo wrested from the control of East-African Arab and Swahili-speaking traders.

1908 Belgian State annexes Congo in the wake of condemnation of widespread human rights abuses there.

1955 Belgian Professor Antoin van Bilsen publishes a '30-Year Plan' for granting the Congo increased self-government.

1959 Belgium begins to lose control over events in the Congo following serious nationalist riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).

Post-independence turmoil

1960 June – Congo becomes independent with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu as President.

1960 July – Congolese army mutinies; Moise Tshombe declares Katanga independent; Belgian troops sent in ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens and mining interests; United Nations

Security Council votes to send in troops to help establish order, but the troops are not allowed to intervene in internal affairs.

1960 September –Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba as prime minister.

1960 December –Lumumba arrested.

1961 February – Lumumba murdered, reportedly with US and Belgian complicity.

1961 August – United Nations troops begin disarming Katangese soldiers.

1963 Tshombe agrees to end Katanga's secession.

1964 President Kasavubu appoints Tshombe prime minister.

The Mobutu years

1965 Kasavubu and Tshombe ousted in a coup led by Joseph Mobutu.

1971 Joseph Mobutu renames the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko; also Katanga becomes Shaba and the river Congo becomes the river Zaire.

1973-1974 Mobutu nationalizes many foreign-owned firms and forces European investors out of the country.

1977 Mobutu invites foreign investors back, without much success; French, Belgian and Moroccan troops help repulse attack on Katanga by Angolan-based rebels.

1989 Zaire defaults on loans from Belgium, resulting in a cancellation of development programmes and increased deterioration of the economy.

1990 Mobutu agrees to end the ban on multiparty politics and appoints a transitional government, but retains substantial powers.

1991 Following riots in Kinshasa by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu agrees to a coalition government with opposition leaders, but retains control of the security apparatus and important ministries.

1993 Rival pro- and anti-Mobutu governments created.

1994 Mobutu agrees to the appointment of Kengo Wa Dondo, an advocate of austerity and free-market reforms, as prime minister.

1996-1997 Tutsi rebels capture much of eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad for medical treatment.

Aftermath of Mobutu

1997 May – Tutsi and other anti-Mobutu rebels, aided principally by Rwanda, capture the capital, Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo; Laurent-Desire Kabila installed as president.

1998 August – Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rise up against Kabila and advance on Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, Namibia send troops to repel them. Angolan troops also side with Kabila. The rebels take control of much of the east of DR Congo.

1999 Rifts emerge between Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels supported by Uganda and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels backed by Rwanda.

Lusaka peace accord signed

1999 July – The six African countries involved in the war sign a ceasefire accord in Lusaka. The following month the MLC and RCD rebel groups sign the accord.

2000 United Nations Security Council authorizes a 5,500-strong United Nations force to monitor the ceasefire but fighting continues between rebels and government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces.

Laurent Kabila killed

2001 January – President Laurent Kabila is shot dead by a bodyguard. Joseph Kabila succeeds his father.

2001 February – Kabila meets Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington. Rwanda, Uganda and the rebels agree to a United Nations pull-out plan. Uganda, Rwanda begin pulling troops back from the frontline.

2001 May – US refugee agency says the war has killed 2.5 million people, directly or indirectly, since August 1998. Later, a United Nations panel says the warring parties are deliberately prolonging the conflict to plunder gold, diamonds, timber and coltan, used in the making of mobile phones.

2002 January – Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo devastates much of the city of Goma.

Search for peace

2002 April – Peace talks in South Africa: Kinshasa signs a power-sharing deal with Ugandan-backed rebels, under which the MLC leader would be premier. Rwandan-backed RCD rebels reject the deal.

2002 July – Presidents of DR Congo and Rwanda sign a peace deal under which Rwanda will withdraw troops from the east and DR Congo will disarm and arrest Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for the killing of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda's 1994 genocide.

2002 September –Presidents of DR Congo and Uganda sign peace accord under which Ugandan troops will leave DR Congo.

2002 September/October – Uganda, Rwanda say they have withdrawnmost of their forces from the east but local militias take advantage of the vacuum left by the troop departure. United Nations-sponsored talks begin in South Africa, with the Kinshasa government and the two main rebel groups discussing power-sharing plans.

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1072684.stm)

Appendix 7. Letters from the Government of Zaire regarding the cessation of all education and community services activities, February 1996

REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE

ACTION

REGION DU SUD-KIVU
COMMISSARIAT URBAIN CHARGE
DES QUESTIONS DES REFUGIES
A BUKAVU

Bukavu, le 20 07 1996

TO: H.S.O.

Transmis copie pour information à:

- Monsieur le Gouverneur de Région du Sud-Kivu à BUKAVU
- Monsieur le Délégué du HCR-Bukavu à BUKAVU

NOTE CIRCULAIRE N° 402/CUCR/S-KI/68/96 RELATIVE A LA FERMETURE DES ECOLES & CENTRES DE FORMATION DANS LES CAMPS D'HEBERGEMENT DES REFUGIES DANS LA REGION DU SUD-KIVU

A l'attention des: - Inspecteurs des sites (tous)
- Administrateurs des sites (tous)

Conformément aux instructions du Gouverneur de Région du Sud-Kivu et attendu que les réfugiés rwandais cantonnés dans notre Région sont appelés à rentrer dans leur pays dans le cadre de rapatriement ciblé, j'ai l'honneur de vous demander de procéder à la fermeture de toutes les écoles et tous les centres de formation éducative ouverts illicitement dans les camps des réfugiés dès réception de la présente.

Cependant, les bâtiments et les mobiliers qui servaient à ces écoles ne doivent pas être détruits car ils pourront servir pour d'autres fins aussitôt le rapatriement terminé.

Vu que cette mesure ne doit souffrir d'aucune défaillance, il est prié aux Administrateurs des sites et à tous les collaborateurs de terrain de veiller à sa stricte application.

Fait à Bukavu, le 20 février 1996.

LE COMMISSAIRE URBAIN CHARGE
DES QUESTIONS DES REFUGIES.

Modeste MUSSAMBA KIVUKA-ma-BAYA
Chevalier de l'Ordre National du Léopard

RI PUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE
REGION DU SUD-KIVU
REGIONALE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT
SECONDAIRE & PROFESSIONNEL

AU DU CHEF DE DIVISION REGIONALE
B.P. 283 - TEL. 2550
- B U K A V U -

Bukavu, le 16 février 1996.

N° MINEPSP/REGED/SKV/51.01 071 /96.-

TRANSMIS COPIE POUR INFORMATION A :

- Monsieur le Gouverneur de Région du Sud-Kivu à BUKAVU.-
- Monsieur le Commissaire Urbain Chargé de Questions des Réfugiés à BUKAVU.-
- Madame l'Inspecteur Principal Régional de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel à BUKAVU.-

- -

: Expulsion des élèves réfugiés des écoles publiques et privées de la Région du Sud-Kivu.

A Madame et Monsieur le Gestionnaire des Ecoles Publiques et Privées de la Région du Sud-Kivu (TOUS).-

Madame et Monsieur,

Me référant aux instructions reçues de Monsieu le Gouverneur de Région du Sud-Kivu en date du 16 février 1996, j'ai l'honneur de vous instruire impérativement d'ordonner aux Chefs d'Etablissements Scolaires sous votre ressort respectif de procéder dès réception de la présente, à l'expulsion sans condition de tous les élèves réfugiés des écoles dont la direction leur est confiée.

Tout Chef d'Etablissement Scolaire qui ne se conformera pas à cette instruction sera considéré comme ayant causé des obstructio à la mesure du Gouvernement Zaïrois qui vise le retour volontaire des réfugiés dans leur pays d'origine. Les mesures correctionnelles seront réservées aux Chefs d'Etablissements Scolaires récalcitrants.

Par ailleurs, je demande à Madame l'Inspecteur Principal Régional, qui me lit en copie, de donner des directives à ses Inspecteurs itinérants pour vérifier et contrôler l'application de la présente mesure par les Chefs d'Etablissements concernés.

Il va sans dire que les réfugiés ne doivent plus présenter aucun examen de fin de cycle même comme autodidactes.

Veuillez agréer, Madame, Monsieur le Gestionnaire, l'expression de mes sentiments patriotiques.-

REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE - DIVISION REGIONALE - ENSEIGNEMENT PRIM. SEC. ET PROF - REGION DU SUD-KIVU-BUKAVU

LE CHEF DE DIVISION REGIONALE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT PRIMAIRE, SECONDAIRE ET PROFESSIONNEL DU SUD-KIVU,

MWENYEMALI KASILEMBO M.-

(1) Rappeler dans la réponse la date et le numéro.

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