POLICIES, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES:

TEACHING THE RECENT CONFLICT IN SECONDARY SCHOOL HISTORY CLASSES IN POST-CONFLICT BANDA ACEH, INDONESIA

Genevieve Wenger (10500936)
MSc International Development Studies
Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam

Photograph 1, front cover:
Cows graze next to a 'Damai itu indah' ('peace is beautiful') sign in Aceh Besar
Cover design: Negin Owliaei & Genevieve Wenger
Contact: Gscwenger@gmail.com

Master's Thesis:

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Genevieve Wenger (10500936)
MSc International Development Studies
Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Mieke Lopes Cardozo
Second Reader: Dr. Margriet Poppema
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Glossary

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CoHA – Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
Daerah Istimewa – Special province status
DOM – *Daerah Operasi Militer* (Military Operations Area)
DoE – *Dinas Pendidikan* (Department of Education, provincial level)
DoRA – *Dinas Agama* (Department of Religious Affairs, provincial level)
EFA – Education for All (A commitment to quality basic education for all worldwide, led by UNESCO)
EU – European Union
GAM – *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement)
IGO – Inter-governmental organization
INEE – Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IPA – *Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam* (Natural science major)
IPS – *Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial* (Social science major)
KTSP – *Kurikulum tingkat satuan pendidikan* (State curriculum, 2006 or 2013)
LoGA – Law on the Governing of Aceh (A framework for self governance in Aceh after *Daerah Istimewa* status was given to the province)
Madrasa – Religious school (A school under MoRA jurisdiction)
Martial Law – Imposition of military rule, supposedly on an emergency basis
MoNE – *Kementerian Pendidikan Nasional* (Ministry of Education and Culture, national level)
MoRA – *Kementerian Agama* (Ministry of Religious Affairs, national level)
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding (Usually in reference to the 2005 peace agreement that officially ended the Aceh-Central government conflict)
MPD – *Majelis Pendidikan Daerah* (Aceh Council of Education)
Mulok – *Mulok muatan lokal* (Local content, in curriculum content)
NGO – Non-governmental organization
Pancasila – The official philosophical foundation of Indonesia (Formulated by former President Sukarno)
PBEA – Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (A UNICEF program, partnered with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and national governments)
Pesantren – A type of madrasa, an Islamic boarding school
PPKN – Civic education subject
Sharia Law – Islamic law
SMA-N – *Sekolah Menengah Atas Negeri* (Public secondary school under MoE jurisdiction)
SMA-S – *Sekolah Menengah Atas Swasta* (Private secondary school under MoE jurisdiction)
SRA – Strategic-relational approach
TKPPA – *Tim Koordinasi Pembangunan Pendidikan Aceh* (Education Coordination Team, unique to Aceh)
TNI – *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian military)
UN – United Nations
UNESCO – United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund
UN MDG – United Nations Millennium Development Goal (Eight international development goals, as put forth by the UN, with a target of achieving the goals worldwide by 2015)
Qanun – Acehnese regional bylaw

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1. INTRODUCTION

Photograph 2: *Police officers stand under one of countless 'Damai itu indah' ('peace is beautiful') billboards bolstering peace in Banda Aceh (Photo Credit: Lisa Stumpel 2013)*

At first glance, Banda Aceh, Indonesia is a calm city, with well-kept new buildings, untarnished by conflict or crisis. There are no bullet holes in the walls or apparent signs of ruin. Stay a little longer in Aceh, however, and you will begin to see beyond this initial reaction. You will become aware of the visible 'symbols' all over the city that allow the visitor to peer into Aceh's tumultuous and violent past. Through the widespread and numerous banners, billboards and monuments reminiscent of harder times, you will become exposed to the fact that Banda Aceh was not so long ago weathered by the forces of both humankind and nature.

In fact, Aceh province has endured a double burden in recent years. After a conflict with the central government that spanned decades, peace was established largely as a result of a monstrous tsunami, which brought the conflict into a new light for both sides. These days, disaster (tsunami) tourism is highlighted in Banda Aceh,[1] showing that in addition to remembrance for locals, there is a desire to display the darker side of the city's history to outsiders. Furthermore, relics of the recent conflict can be seen allover the city in the form of 'damai itu indah' ('peace is beautiful') banners which span the streets,[2] and billboards commemorating the eight-year anniversary of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that marked the end of the decades-long conflict which plagued Aceh province. As can be understood by this public discourse in Banda Aceh, which asks the people to remember that 'peace is beautiful' and celebrate the peace agreement, there is an ongoing struggle to balance remembrance with 'moving forward.' It is this current transition from conflict and crisis, to formal peace agreement, to lasting peace and stability that Aceh is now facing; with recent memories and icons of the violent past remaining and with a hope and even a plea (as seen in the billboards) for enduring peace at the same time.

It is important to note that in spite of isolated violent acts since the August 2005 MOU, Aceh has experienced relative peace (Amnesty International 2013: 20). Even still, many believe this peace to be 'fragile,' and understand the province to be at-risk of falling back into violent conflict for a variety of reasons (Barron et al. 2013: 47, cited in Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2013: 15; Eurotrends 2009: 9, cited in Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2013: 15; I.29;[3] I.8[4]). *"The tsunami provided a unique opportunity to pursue peace and resulted in billions of dollars of aid...Cementing peace, however, is an ongoing long-term process. International experience shows that post-conflict societies face immense challenges and the ongoing risk of relapse into violence"* (Utomo et al. 2009: 171, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013). The conflict may have officially ended eight years ago, but as studies of other contexts have shown, closing the gap between fragile and lasting peace is a long-term process. The research to follow will assess one aspect of cementing this lasting peace in Aceh, namely history education.

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[1] Disaster (tsunami) tourism is portrayed in Banda Aceh in the form of the tsunami museum, tsunami monument, Blang Padang 'Aceh thanks the world' park, and boats washed ashore turned into attractions.
[2] I observed these 'damai itu indah' banners in a wide range of locations in Banda Aceh (and Aceh Besar) including on military buildings, government buildings, restaurants, roundabouts and randomly scattered on signposts throughout town.
[3] I.29 (NGO Official)
[4] I.8 (IGO Official)

Research Purpose and Relevance

This thesis examines how the recent conflict (1976-2005) is taught in secondary school history classes in post-conflict Banda Aceh and the perceived impact of these teaching *practices* on a lasting peace. The post-conflict and peacebuilding education themes of this research are both very much on the current development agenda. The post-conflict aspect is particularly relevant in today's world as fragile, conflict and post-conflict states receive increased attention and interest from a range of actors in our post-9/11 world (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008).

Related to post-conflict provision of social services, interest stems from the fact that 1.5 billion people live in regions affected by "fragility, conflict, or large-scale, organized criminal violence" and not a single country under these circumstances has yet achieved a United Nations Millennium Development Goal (UN MDG) (Affolter 2013). Furthermore, there is a recent growing interest in alternative methods to social service delivery such as education provision, by moving from a humanitarian response of mere education provision in emergencies,[5] to a more actively 'peacebuilding' response to education (Affolter 2013; Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 4). This shift marks a decision to move beyond the widely accepted 'do no harm' practice to a 'do good' practice (Hoffmann 2013; Novelli & Smith 2011) by building stronger states through education during or following conflict.

Although there are many avenues for bridging the gap between fragile and lasting peace post-conflict, education has been acknowledged to have a profound influence on this peacebuilding process worldwide (see for example, Buckland 2006; Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2006; Dupuy 2008; Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008; Novelli & Smith 2011; Smith 2010; Smith 2013; UNESCO 2011). However, as peacebuilding education is still a relatively new field (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008: 473), there is a lack of studies on how this process materializes in practice, both in Aceh and internationally. Hence, as present-day Aceh is reflective of other post-conflict settings in key ways, this study seeks to contribute a case study to the growing body of literature on peacebuilding education in fragile/post-conflict settings, and the impact that education in this setting can have on a lasting peace.

As education is such a broad theme, this research focuses specifically on one aspect that is often understudied, but which can perhaps make the greatest impact (positive or negative) on a lasting peace following a conflict (Cole 2007; Cole & Barsalou 2006; Paulson 2011; Torsti 2008), namely history education. This is because, *"The past must be reckoned with in order for societies to move forward after violent conflict […] With the consensus that understanding the truth about past conflict and its causes comes an obvious role for education in sharing this truth and the never again message"* (Paulson 2011: 2-3).

In examining history education in Aceh, the scope of this study is public (SMA-N) and private (SMA-S) secondary schools under Ministry of Education (MoE)

[5] Education in 'emergencies' also refers to education in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states.

jurisdiction in Banda Aceh specifically, which are comprised of three grades; tenth, eleventh and twelfth. There are a total of sixteen SMA-N and ten SMA-S schools in Banda Aceh,[6] six SMA-N and two SMA-S of which are represented in this research.

To elucidate the structure to come, this thesis begins by presenting the 'local context,' including the research location, historical context of the conflict, current socio-political situation and the education system in Aceh province. Local context played a key role in Aceh's experiences of both falling into conflict and building peace and continues to impact the current situation, such as in how history is taught in schools. Therefore, in order to wholly understand the research undertaken and the findings to follow, one must first understand the context.

Subsequently, the paper's 'theoretical framework' provides a lens through which the research can be viewed, the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), as well as a literature review of dominant theories and debates within the fields of peacebuilding education and history education post-conflict. These theories will be tied to data findings in the final chapter in an analysis of the impact of teaching *practices* on a lasting peace.

The 'research approach,' including methods, limitations and ethical considerations, is explained following the theoretical framework. This chapter bridges theory and practice, and is followed by the empirical findings of this research, divided into three chapters on 'policies,' 'perceptions' and 'practices' of teaching the recent conflict. SMA history teachers' *agency* to teach about the conflict in the classroom will be the central focus of this research, and thus teachers' *agency* is tied into the 'practices' empirical chapter.

Within the scope of this research, *policies* refer to the macro-level policies handed down to teachers that influence *how* the recent conflict can be taught in SMA school history classes. *Perceptions* refer to key actors'[7] perceptions on the importance of teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes. In other words, this looks at if various actors think the recent conflict *should* be taught or not, and if so in what ways. *Practices* refer to the actual teaching practices of teachers in the SMA history classroom. In other words, this examines *if* the recent conflict is taught or not, and if so in what ways. Finally, teachers' *agency* refers to the room versus constraint that teachers work within, which affects their *practices*.

Finally, the thesis concludes with a 'reflection and conclusion' chapter, comprised of a 'theoretical reflection' tying original data findings to the dominant theories presented and 'concluding remarks.' The paper ends by looking forward, stating 'important steps for the future' and recommendations for further research.

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[6] These statistics are based on discussions with multiple teachers.

[7] In referring to perceptions of 'key actors' I refer to the designated actor groups in this entire research project: education policymakers, NGO and IGO officials, secondary school principals, secondary school history teachers, secondary school students and 'other experts.'

Research Question and Sub-questions

The main research question is as follows:

> In what ways do *policies* and key *perceptions* influence secondary school (SMA) history teachers' *agency* to teach the recent conflict (1976-2005), and what is the perceived impact of their classroom *practices* on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia?

I will answer the main question by dividing it into the subsequent four sub-questions, and linking the mini-conclusions of these sub-questions with SRA logic and theory on history education post-conflict, both expressed in the 'theoretical framework' to come.

> 1. What are the *policies* regarding teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes?
> 2. What are the key *perceptions* regarding teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes?
> 3. In what ways do *policies* and key *perceptions* influence SMA history teachers' *agency* to teach the recent conflict, and what are teachers' subsequent *practices*?
> 4. What is the perceived impact of SMA history teachers' *practices* on a lasting peace?

The first sub-question is addressed in the first empirical chapter to come *(chapter 5, 'policies')*, the second in the second chapter *(chapter 6, 'perceptions')* and the third in the third chapter *(chapter 7, 'practices')*. I respond to the fourth sub-question in the final chapter *(chapter 8, 'reflection & conclusion')*, where insights from each section are also brought together to answer the main question of this research.

2. LOCAL CONTEXT

***"Education is deeply embedded in the context, history and cultural norms of the societies, as well as current socio-political realities, making observed outcomes contingent, dynamic and inherently partial within the full realm of possibility"*[8]**

***Photograph 3:** One of many MoU eight-year anniversary billboards in Banda Aceh*

[8] (Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 3)

Research Location

The following research was performed in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia is an island nation in Southeast Asia with an area of 1.9 million square kilometers and a population of 232.5 million. The capital as well as the largest city is Jakarta (The Economist 2013). Within Indonesia, Aceh province, which is a semi-autonomous 'daerah istimewa' (special province), is located on the Northern tip of the island Sumatra. Aceh is bordered by water (the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca) on three sides and by the province of North Sumatra on the fourth (Encyclopedia Britannica n.d.). Aceh province has a population of approximately 4.5 million (UPI 2013) and Banda Aceh, the provincial capital and largest city, a population of 223,446 as of 2010 (Encyclopedia Britannica n.d.). Banda Aceh is located just five kilometers from the sea (*ibid.*) and was hence severely damaged in 2004 when the tsunami hit.

Approximately 98 percent of Acehnese identify as Muslim (Oxford Islamic Studies n.d.), and Sharia (Islamic) law is enforced. Moreover, "Aceh is one of the most deeply Muslim places in Indonesia. Often called the veranda of Islam, it is seen as the birth place of the Muslim religion in Indonesia" (Vaswani 2010). Thus, in addition to the post-conflict and post-disaster context (which will be further discussed in the context to come), the research location should also be viewed through the lens of Islam. Below are two maps of the research area. Banda Aceh is indicated with a blue box in the second map.

Map 1: *Map of Indonesia (Google Maps)*

Map 2: *Map of Aceh Province (Amnesty International 2013)*

Historical Context of Conflict

"Let's write the real history of the country!"[9]

Aceh province has a long history of both outsider intervention and fierce resistance in response. In addition to bringing trade and religion,[10] foreigners frequently brought repression. Having been an independent sultanate for four centuries, Aceh was thenceforth occupied by the Dutch, Japanese and Javanese. The Dutch attempted to colonize Aceh in 1873 and only succeeded in 1903 after decades of crippling war (Ross 2005: 39). Aceh was one of the last regions in Indonesia to submit to colonial rule (*ibid.*) and this courageous opposition is a source of pride for many Acehnese, who often link it to their devout faith and conviction in martyrdom.[11]

The Dutch wars in Aceh only ended in 1942 (Feener 2011: 15) when the Japanese came to occupy the province, brutalizing the public during the Second World War from 1942-45 (World Watch n.d.). Indonesia was finally granted independence from the Netherlands in 1949 (Kooistra 2001: 6) causing Aceh province, long independent from the rest of the country, to fall under Jakarta's jurisdiction (Duva 2007). The province had originally agreed to become a part of Indonesia in an anti-colonial move thinking that its "important contribution to the nationalist struggle against the Dutch would entitle it to an equal stake in the Republic's future, and that Indonesia would be founded on, and strive to uphold, the principles of Islam" (Miller 2006: 293). This soon proved to be false, and the Acehnese would come to regret their decision based on oppressive policies to follow (World Watch n.d.).

General Suharto took over control of Indonesia in 1966 and remained in power until 1998. Suharto had a legacy of centralist policies that were repressive of those living in Aceh. For example, there was a large-scale rebellion in the province from 1953-62. The rebels did not demand Acehnese independence this time, but increased Acehnese autonomy and a larger role of Islam in the national government. The revolt concluded when the Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, offered Aceh 'daerah istimewa' (special province status) meaning newfound autonomy over religious, cultural, and educational decisions. (Ross 2005: 39). However, shortly after ascending to power in 1968, President Suharto revoked Aceh's 'special status' all but in name. Moreover, when plentiful natural gas deposits were found in the Arun fields of North Aceh province in 1971 (ICTJ 2008: 3) Suharto gave a contract to Mobil Oil[12] for the extraction of the deposits. Arun fields supplied about one-third of Indonesia's total natural gas (World Watch n.d.) and would come to be one of the largest and most profitable gas fields of all time (ICTJ 2008: 8). Thus, Aceh's gas and

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[9] I.8 (IGO)

[10] Due to its port location, Aceh province has a long record of foreign encounters, with both positive and negative consequences Arabs, Europeans, and Asians brought trade to Aceh, as well as religion. Buddhism was first introduced by Indian traders in the 7th century, and Islam by Arab and Indian Muslims in the 13th century (University of Washington n.d.).

[11] As was expressed in several interviews.

[12] Later Exxon Mobil.

oil profits mainly aided the elite of Jakarta and overseas companies, and the province was only entitled to a mere five percent of profits (*ibid.*). In addition to oil and natural gas extractions, the central government exploited Aceh for its supply of timber and even bird nests[13] (*The Black Road* 2005).

In response, Hasan Di Tiro founded the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: GAM) in 1976 with the motive of gaining independence from the rest of Indonesia. Many point to Suharto's repressive 'New Order' policies, including the exploitation of Aceh's vast resources, as the main reason for the popularity following the GAM movement (Nessen 2006: 177). Additionally, there was a belief that Acehnese orthodox Muslim identity was inherently in opposition to the more secular conceptualization of Islam in Jakarta (Milligan 2009, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 7). Moreover, the popularity of GAM can be explained by a "steadily deepening and widening perception among Acehnese that they would never attain physical security, dependable economic welfare, reasonable moral standards in government, and justice for grave human rights abuses if Aceh remained *inside* Indonesia" (Nessen 2006: 179). This sentiment was confirmed, as even after the end of Suharto's dictatorship the central government continued to look the other way regarding human rights violations of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) troops positioned in Aceh (Nessen 2006: 179-180).

The central government, fearing that allowing Aceh independence would provide a precedent for other rebelling provinces such as Papua, struggled fiercely with GAM forces (Hillman 2012). TNI suppressed the GAM insurgency in 1979 and Di Tiro and many subordinates fled to Sweden (World Watch n.d.). Hundreds of GAM fighters returned to Aceh a decade later (in 1989) following a few years of guerilla training under Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and a new rebellion commenced (World Watch n.d.; Nessen 2006: 179). The central government then declared Aceh a 'Military Operations Area' (DOM: Daerah Operasi Militer) the following year, meaning that Martial Law could be enacted (World Watch n.d.; Reid 2006: 16). The DOM 'emergency' period lasted from 1989-1998 and during this period "the level and type of repression unleashed in Aceh was new and unparalleled in [Aceh]" (Nessen 2006: 178). Meanwhile, Acehnese civilians suffered doubly, from both the brutality of TNI the intimidation of GAM (Reid 2006). For one, Jakarta doubled the number of troops in Aceh to 12,000 and massive human rights violations were committed against civilians. Between 9,000 and 12,000 people were killed from 1989 to 1998 (World Watch n.d.). Additionally, 1,500 schools were torched and 200 teachers assaulted from 1988 to 2002 (Euro-Trends 2009: 6).

Suharto was forced into resignation in 1998 and his vice-president, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie took over. With Habibie in power, a transition from dictatorship to democracy began in Indonesia (World Watch n.d.). Habibie, wanting to 'bridge the gap' between Aceh and Java,[14] made moves to allow for more decentralization and

[13] Sold abroad for medicinal purposes.
[14] I.1 (Historian/lecturer)

to limit the role of the military in politics. Nevertheless, the human rights abuses of the TNI in Aceh largely continued (*ibid.*). In August 1998 Aceh's DOM status was lifted, yet mass civilian graves were discovered and violence continued *(ibid.)*. Habibie's presidency was short-lived and Abdurrahman Wahid took over the presidency the following year. Wahid had a laxer stance on the situation in Aceh by having fewer TNI troops stationed in Aceh. (Barton 2002: 293). The Law 44/1999 on 'Implementation of the Speciality of the Special Province of Aceh' was enacted in October 1999 meaning that Aceh gained the right to enforce local culture that would also be implemented into education, as well as a policymaking role for religious leaders (May n.d.).

Moreover, Wahid drafted a proposal to give a larger percentage of natural resource profits to the province. Regrettably, the proposal for a referendum was denied by Parliament (World Watch n.d.) and later that year, 1.5 million gathered in Banda Aceh to protest in favor of a referendum and demand Acehnese self-determination (Aspinall 2006: 166). Over the next couple of years the TNI resumed a counter-insurgency operation in Aceh and massacres against civilians and human rights activists ramped up in 1999 (World Watch n.d.; Reid 2006: 166). These abuses were well-publicized and thus led to even more 'ethnic consolidation' of the Acehnese people and an increased level of activism, especially amongst the youth and students. What was once a call for 'autonomy and reconciliation' in the 1950s became a call for 'self-determination and independence' in the 1990s (Aspinall 2006: 166-167).

The Wahid administration began open negotiations with GAM in March 2000 and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed. A six-month long ceasefire held from June 2000-January 2001, but following the ceasefire violence significantly increased (World Watch n.d.). With threats of impeachment emerging, Wahid signed a presidential decree allowing for more autonomy of TNI in Aceh *(ibid.).* A few months later in July he was ousted and the military-backed Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of the first president of Indonesia) took over as President *(ibid.).* Megawati signed the legislature for Law 18/2001 for 'Special Autonomy for The Special Province of Aceh as Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam' in August 2001 (May n.d.; Reid 2006: xxix). The law included further localization of cultural and educational decisions. Notably, Wali Nanggroe was established as a non-political institution "to unify the people of Aceh and provide guidance on traditional norms and culture" (May n.d.). Furthermore, a new right was given for a much larger percentage of revenue from oil and natural gas exploits as well as income tax than in other provinces[15] (World Watch n.d.; Jemadu 2006: 281; May n.d.). Implementation, which began in 2002 however, was mostly limited to the enactment of Sharia (Islamic) law (World Watch n.d.).

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[15] As per Law 18/2001, Aceh would now receive 20 percent of personal income tax revenue (none for other provinces), 55 percent of oil revenue (in addition to the 15 percent given to other provinces) and 40 percent of natural gas revenue (in addition to the 30 percent given to other provinces (May n.d.).

TNI raided GAM headquarters in January 2002, killing GAM commander Abdullah Syafi'ie, yet peace talks were re-commenced the next month (Reid 2006: xxix). Following a brief cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA), violence once again increased. In 2003, Megawati, believing that, "only the military could guarantee peace and stability in Aceh" (Jemadu 2006: 285) placed Aceh once again under Martial Law and allowed 50,000 police and military forces (World Watch n.d.) to mount 'Operasi Terpadu' to destroy GAM. This was the largest attack on Aceh in decades (Ver Berkmoes 2010: 50; Duva 2007). In addition to the devastation of life, 589 schools were burned down over the course of just three months in 2003, affecting the education of the approximately 103,000 children in Aceh province (UNICEF 2003). As well as physical damage to schools, thousands of children quit school due to the violent situation and relocation in IDP camps. At one point 16,352 students were out of school (Bailey 2008, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 8).

Having won the national election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the next (and current) president of Indonesia in 2004. Yudhoyono pledged to seek peace in the warring province (World Watch n.d.). Peace was achieved soon after Yudhoyono came to power, but for reasons out of his control. In fact, the 28-year-long civil war that claimed between 10,000 and 30,000 lives in the province (Amnesty International 2013, cited in UPI 2013) was brought to an end mainly as a result of the worst recorded earthquake and tsunami in history (Reid 2006: 1), which devastated Banda Aceh and the west coast of Aceh province on December 26, 2004. In addition to the conflict's impact on education in Aceh, the natural disaster destroyed 2,000 more schools and left 160,000 students without a school to attend (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 8). The earthquake and following tsunami, claiming another 170,000 Acehnese lives (Al Jazeera 2006; World Watch n.d.) and leaving 500,000 without homes (Ver Berkmoes 2010: 50), brought the loss of life due to conflict into a new light. As a plaque at the tsunami monument in Banda Aceh reads,

> "The sadness from the earthquake and tsunami did not come without blessings. The natural disaster brought people to be more conscious to the meaning of life, about their Creator, about peace and friendship, small gifts of life, and gratefulness. […] All put aside their differences and work[ed] hand in hand to rebuild Aceh and Nias. The Aceh Thanks the World Memorial Park is dedicated to commemorate the spirit of perseverance, friendship and peace shown by the victims of the tsunami and their helpers who have contributed to the rehabilitation of Aceh and Nias. May the events of earthquakes and tsunami in Aceh bring positive influence for better humanity and future."[16]

Inspiration in the wake of such a tragedy coupled with the desperate need for international aid to respond to the disaster led the separatist group GAM and the government back into peace talks once again (Duva 2007). The disaster meant "unprecedented international attention and international resources to Aceh" (Reid 2006: 16), generating a prospect for peace amidst the unspeakable situation. A

[16] Based on personal photo taken of the plaque at Lapangan Blang Padang (Blang Padang Field), Banda Aceh.

peace agreement in the form of a MoU was thus signed in Helsinki on August 15, 2005 and brokered by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, formally ending the conflict (Al Jazeera 2005). The terms of the deal included: the disarming of GAM, a government withdrawal of 'non-organic' troops (World Watch n.d.), a placement of international monitoring missions from the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Reid 2006: xxix), and greater autonomy to Aceh, including the implementation of Sharia law in the province, and a greater share of oil and gas profits for the resource-rich province itself (Ver Berkmoes 2010: 50).

As was stipulated in the 2005 MoU, a new Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) would be enacted starting March 2006, allowing Aceh authority within all arenas except for those of national interest, as stipulated in the Indonesian Constitution.[17] In terms of changes to the education system, LoGA asserted that Acehnese schools would remain a part of the national structure, but that local social and cultural values (including Muslim values) could be specially included (Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 13).

Current Socio-Political Situation

Following the double burden of 130 plus years of near non-stop war and rebellion (Reid 2006: 1) and the 'Boxing Day tsunami' in which more than four percent of Aceh province's population perished (*ibid.*), the current situation in Aceh is understandably fragile. Many facets of life were of course impacted by these two crises, as well as by the 2005 MoU. This section will now briefly discuss the current social and political situation in Aceh province post-conflict, -crisis and -MoU.

Within the social realm and relevant to this research's focus, the conflict and crisis took a notable toll on education in Aceh. In addition to the thousands of schools torched and insecurity that prevented children from attending school, teachers were assaulted and threatened in what they were able to teach, especially regarding the conflict[18] (Euro-Trends 2009: 7). Furthermore, the 2004 tsunami left a visible impact on education. In addition to the incredible loss of life in overall, around 2,500 teachers died[19] and more than 2,000 school buildings were damaged in Aceh province.[20]

As was mentioned, special autonomy was achieved in Aceh as a part of the peace agreement. In addition to disarmament and the application of Sharia law, this means there was a decentralization of the school system. According to the World Bank, "the push for decentralization of service provision was deemed a 'make or break' issue

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[17] As LoGA asserted, "Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs…except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution" (May n.d.).
[18] Many interviewees expressed the fact that they were unable to teach about the conflict before the 2005 MoU in stark contrast to the freedom they now hold.
[19] This statistic is taken from a plaque at the tsunami monument in Banda Aceh.
[20] This statistic is taken from a plaque at the tsunami monument in Banda Aceh. Additionally, several schools I visited in Banda Aceh were completely destroyed in the tsunami and re-built from scratch.

for the post-Suharto nation" (Schwarts 2000, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 9). With this step forward in local educational autonomy, there is now a 20 percent allowance for 'mulok muatan lokal' (local content) in the classroom. Moreover, of the 70 percent of oil and gas profits that Aceh province now enjoys, 30 percent is earmarked for educational funding[21] (Government of Aceh 2012: 19). Because of this, Aceh province now spends the second greatest amount per capita on education in the nation (World Bank 2008, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 8). Yet, despite the potential from increased income for quality education, Aceh ranks only 28 out of all 33 provinces in test scores.[22]

Shifting now to changes within the political realm, 2006 marked the election of the first governor of Aceh by public election (Euro-Trends 2009: 6). Subsequently in 2012, Partai Aceh, a party formed from GAM, came into power when Zaini Abdullah was instated as Aceh's governor (Jones 2012). GAM ties run deep in the incumbent administration, as Governor Zaini is the former co-founder and foreign minister of GAM who spent time in exile in Sweden with di Tiro. Moreover, his vice-president, Muzakir Manaf, was a GAM guerilla commander (Afrida 2012). They ran on campaign promises of "implement[ing] cultural and Islamic values," strengthening the economy, sustainable development, and "maintain[ing] lasting peace" (*ibid.).* Since it is still early on in the administration, it remains to be seen how Partai Aceh will govern: if it will become an "authoritarian one-party enclave in the middle of democratic Indonesia" or rather become a "model for the transformation of a guerrilla movement into a responsible political force" (Jones 2012).

Despite an official peace being established, tensions endure between the central and provincial governments (Cochrane 2013; Ahmed & Akins 2012; ICG 2013), as was made apparent by the flag tension in the spring of 2013. In this incident, the provincial government decided to use the former rebel movement (GAM) flag as the official flag of Aceh province (ICG 2013). The central government ordered that it could not be used as it violated laws against using separatist symbols whereas Zaini and Manaf asserted that the flag should be seen as an important symbol of the historic struggle of the Acehnese against the Dutch, Japanese and Indonesian militaries (Cochrane 2013). Although the flag issue has been peacefully resolved since, many still point to reasons that Aceh is susceptible to falling back into violence. For instance, a recent (2013) report by Amnesty International berated the central government for not constructing a truth and reconciliation committee to address human rights violations committed by TNI in Aceh during the conflict, as well former rebels for not making a former apology of their own crimes (Amnesty International 2013, cited in UPI 2013). All in all, although there is some dispute regarding the fragility of peace in Aceh province, since the actors most likely would not have signed the 2005 MoU of their own wills and since tensions remain, this

[21] I.3 (MPD); I.5 (MPD); I.15 (DoE); I.16 (DoE)
[22] I.3 (MPD); I.5 (MPD); I.15 (DoE); I.16 (DoE)

paper asserts that the situation in Aceh is a 'fragile peace.' Thus, it remains to be seen if the situation in Aceh will develop into a lasting peace, or descend back into conflict.

Education System

Having explained the local context both pre and post-MoU, this paper now turns to present Aceh's education system. This is necessary in order to clarify the scope of this research within the larger education structure in both the province and the nation as a whole. Therefore, an education structure diagram, a product of collaboration between two colleagues and myself,[23] is provided below.

Exploring the diagram below, the reader will see that it moves top to bottom from the macro (national), to the meso (provincial), to the micro (local) level. Beginning at the top, the Ministry of Education and Culture (henceforth MoNE) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (henceforth MoRA) are the two national-level departments based in Jakarta that control the education system. The largest focus of the MoNE is education, whereas it is only a part of the focus of MoRA.[24] Furthermore, the governor of the province (in Aceh's case, Governor Zaini Abdullah) appoints the head of the provincial level Department of Education (DoE), while the Minister of Religious Affairs in Jakarta appoints the head of the Department of Religious Affairs (DoRA).

Space is allowed for local content in the national curriculum, for which input is given from the Aceh Council of Education (MPD),[25] Education Coordination Team (TKPPA),[26] the DoE and DoRA. However, the MoNE and MoRA provide the curriculum, in a top-down manner. Finally looking to the local level, there are four different types of schools in Aceh province: private state schools (SMA-S), public state schools (SMA-N), private 'madrasas' (religious schools) and public madrasas. Additionally, students of secondary school age and in the religious school system attend 'pesantrens' (Islamic boarding schools). As the diagram shows, state schools fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education (MoE) and madrasas under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA).

It is also important to note that although there is a differentiation between state schools and religious schools, even the 'non-religious' state schools in Aceh are religiously oriented, as Muslim prayers are said out loud (in Arabic) before classes begin,[27] girls and boys must sit on separate sides of the class and Muslim dress is

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[23] This diagram was created in coordination with two University of Amsterdam colleagues who also performed research in Aceh over the summer 2013 (Clayton Naylor and Lisa Stumpel). We decided to collaborate on this work in order to triangulate our information. This should be seen as a working document since the diagram will continue to develop as more input is received.

[24] Based on an informal conversation with two Acehnese senior researchers.

[25] MPD was established in 1990 in Aceh province and is since 2002 in use all over Indonesia (Based on interview with an MPD employee).

[26] TKPPA is unique to Aceh province (Based on interview with an MPD employee).

[27] This is in contrast to the prayers that are said in class in Jakarta which are done silently, to allow each student to pray in his or her own language (Based on interview with an Acehnese expert on the topic).

required.[28] Moreover, as was put forth in LoGA, each Muslim in school in Aceh must acquire a basic understanding of Islam; the ability to read the Quran and properly pray (Government of Aceh 2007, cited in Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 13).



Figure 1: *Education System: Aceh Province, Indonesia (Naylor, Stumpel & Wenger 2013)*

[28] This is based on an SMA-N classroom observation that took place on 29 July.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Photograph 4: *A minaret in Banda Aceh*

In order to provide a lens through which the data can be understood I will begin by explaining the Critical Realist ontology and more precisely the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) that I will utilize in interpreting how the recent conflict is taught in history classes in Banda Aceh. The SRA approach is particularly useful in examining the role and *agency* of teachers, which is the main focus of this research. Thus, SRA concepts and terminology will be used throughout the paper and will guide this research. After explaining the approach more in-depth, I will provide important and relevant theories of peacebuilding education and more specifically history education post-conflict for means of both background information and comparison with my own research.

Critical Realism

Epistemologically, this research adopts a realist approach. Realism sees the researcher as a participant and not as completely independent as positivism denotes, nor as a part of what is being observed as relativism indicates (Sayer 1992: 45-49). This is in line with the research methods *(addressed in the following section)*, as I will not attempt to prove a hypothesis based solely on observations (as positivism extols), nor by being a full participant myself (as in relativism).

The theory underlying the methodology of this research is critical realism. Critical realism utilizes 'epistemological relativism,' meaning that reality is objective. Although there is one reality, existing separate from our thoughts and actions, multiple possible interpretations of this reality exist (Lopes Cardozo 2013). Thus, descriptions of the same situation by different people should be understood as relative to the perspective of the individual (Jessop 2005: 43). Critical realism aligns well with this study as it emphasizes the importance of power relations and *perceptions*, both of which will be explored within the scope of this research when examining the *policies*, key *perceptions* and *practices* of teaching the recent conflict, with emphasis on the history teacher's role and *agency* to teach the topic.

Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA)

The Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), which is a critical realist approach to analyzing 'structure' and 'agency' (Jessop 2005: 40), will be applied to the teaching of history post-conflict, and will be a main tool of analysis in this research. This approach, developed by Bob Jessop in 1999 and expanded upon by Colin Hay (Hay 2002: 126), is useful in assessing the interplay of *structure* and *agency* inherent in any education system.

In examining *structure* and *agency*, it is important to remember that SRA asserts the 'relational'[29] and 'dialectical'[30] attributes of the two concepts (Hay 2002: 127). SRA varies from similar past approaches since it is understood to transcend dualism, while still maintaining rational thought process behind actions of both actor and structure (*ibid.* 127). Thus, defining *structure* and *agency* as distinct from one

[29] 'Relational' in this case means "structure and agency are mutually constitutive" (Hay 2002: 127).

[30] 'Dialectical' in this case means, "their interaction is not reducible to the sum of structural and agential factors treated separately" (Hay 2002: 127).

another (as I do in this research, focusing on *teachers' agency*) is done purely to aid in analysis and care should be taken not to reify the concepts into a "rigid ontological dualism" (*ibid.* 127).

Jessop (2005) recognizes the effect of *structure* on *agency* and vice-versa, and labels the two dimensions as the 'strategic actor' and the 'strategically selective context,' which the agent is situated within. The strategic actor and strategically selective context are seen to impact the actions of one another, further informing 'strategic calculation,' which then informs 'strategic action' (Hay 2002). Furthermore, (although out of the scope of this research), this decided action affects both the strategic actor and the strategically selective context, thus also transforming the setting in a cyclical manner (*ibid.*) Determining that 'strategic calculation' is too explicit of a term to describe the teachers' process of weighing pros and cons and being influenced by *structure* versus conveying *agency* in their pedagogy, this research will instead use Lopes Cardozo's (2011) term 'formulation of strategy' (40).

Although labeling them as 'calculations' and not 'strategies,' Hay (2002) does acknowledge (as do I in this research) that not all calculations are conscious, clarifying two types; namely 'intended calculations' that are "explicitly strategic" and 'intuitive calculations' that are "routine" or performed "out of habit" (131-133). This assertion makes interviews with different actors particularly illuminating as it takes into account the motivations for their actions as well as the actions (*practices*) themselves. As it is noted in Hay's *Political Analysis*, any particular strategic action is likely to be comprised of both explicit and intuitive features (*ibid.* 133).

While the strategic actor chooses his or her 'strategic action,' this choice is not wholly based on the strategic actor's formulation of strategy, as other actors and situations of course impact the 'strategic action' as well (Hay 2002: 130). In a self-reflecting critique, Hay (2002) himself notes that there is a danger in too closely merging the concepts of 'strategy' and '*agency*,' as that would make it appear that all actions are the result of "overt and explicit strategic calculation" (*ibid.* 132).

In applying SRA logic to this research, SMA history teachers should be viewed as the strategic actors who are not alone capable of teaching history in ways they see fit because of larger external factors and structures (the so-called strategically selective context) which influence their *practices*. The strategically selective context in this particular research includes education policymakers, secondary school principals, non-governmental organization (NGO) and intergovernmental organization (IGO) officials, and secondary school students. It is the *policies* and *perceptions* of these actors that are seen to influence *teacher agency* and thus teacher *practices*.

This paper's consistency with the SRA approach can be seen in the 'conceptual scheme' to follow. Following the subsequent 'peacebuilding education' section, the theories of peacebuilding education and history education post-conflict will be

connected to the SRA approach in an original conceptual scheme which will be applied to this research and will frame the research analysis.

Peacebuilding Education

"Developments through the education sector represent a very important part of this transformative process, with huge potential to impact positively or negatively on the [peacebuilding] process"[31]

This section provides an overview of the history, contemporary practices and main theories of education for peacebuilding, or 'peacebuilding education.' Peacebuilding education should thus be viewed as the meta-concept or umbrella theme of this research project, and will set the scene for the focus of this research, history education post-conflict. The terms in bold throughout this section are main concepts that will appear again in the 'history education post-conflict' sub-section to come. Here they will be analyzed specific to history education.

Before discussing peacebuilding education, it is important to clearly denote what type of peace we are talking about 'building.' Johan Galtung, often called 'the father of peace studies,' (Galtung Institute n.d.) is a Norwegian social scientist that, on top of creating the academic field of peace studies (Galtung 2013), transformed the field of understanding by introducing the ideas of 'positive peace' and 'negative peace.' Galtung conceptualized negative peace as the "absence of organized collective violence" (Galtung 1967: 17). On the other hand, he envisioned positive peace as "structural changes that address social injustices that may be a cause of violence" (Novelli & Smith 2011: 14). Thus, the aim is not only to mitigate conflict, but also to transform it. Applying the notion of positive peace to education, Smith (2011) asserts that education can contribute to conflict transformation in society by "dealing with the legacies of conflict" in the post-conflict period (5).

In examining the historical record, the concept and aspiration of peacebuilding education can be traced back to 1945 when both the United Nations (UN) charter and UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) constitution were established (Page 2004: 4-5). The UNESCO constitution importantly recognized then that "a lasting peace could only be built on education" (UNESCO 2011: 21). Since then, the topic of education and its role in peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict settings has grown in interest, and is increasingly on the agenda within the field of international development. As was briefly mentioned in the 'research purpose,' increased attention has been given to the subject matter within policy decisions, as well as in the media and academia following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008). Additionally, the UN is now focused on actively peacebuilding more than ever before (ECOSOC n.d.) and lists 'social' (which includes education) as one of five dimensions of building peace (Affolter 2013). UN

[31](Novelli & Smith 2011: 37)

MDGs[32] further drive the international community's increased interest in education in fragile regions, since no MDGs have been met in fragile settings (*ibid.*), as was also stated in the 'research purpose.'

In regard to contemporary practices, UNICEF notably began a four-year Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program[33] in 2011 that is putting peacebuilding education into practice (UNICEF 2013). The program seeks to increase the inclusion of education into the peacebuilding process as well as advocate for and boost capabilities for 'conflict-sensitive' education in conflict and post-conflict regions (UNICEF 2013). This is in line with the current trends in development, namely moving from a humanitarian response to a peacebuilding response. Furthermore, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) was founded in 2000. INEE serves as a forum for experts in the field of education in emergencies to publish and collaborate, as well being an organization that issues documents outlining tools for peacebuilding education (INEE 2013a). As with the PBEA program, conflict-sensitive education is also a current hot topic at INEE. As INEE defines it, conflict-sensitive education is:

> "The process of: 1. Understanding the context in which the education policy/programme takes place; 2. Analyzing the two-way interaction between the context and the education policy/programme; and 3. Acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of education policies and programming on conflict, within an organization's given priorities" (INEE 2013b).

Governance and *policies* play a critical role in ensuring conflict-sensitive education (Smith 2010: 4-9) as the government has the main influence in adapting curriculum content. Therefore, it is important that the government *policies* acknowledge and are cautious of conflict drivers, as well as understand the context. In other words, they should enable locally relevant history content in schools.

It is important to also note that although education has a great potential to transform conflict triggers in fragile settings (Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013), it cannot play a stand-alone role in peacebuilding. John Paul Lederach, a professor of international peacebuilding, developed a diagram *(figure 2, below)* portraying the various fields within peacebuilding, one of them being 'education' (peacebuilding education). Within such a framework, education is expressed as only one route to building peace. While accurate, a common critique of Lederach's model concerns the depiction of these aspects as separate, and not interconnected entities that must be

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[32] The eight MDGs include: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; global partnership for development (UN n.d.).

[33] This UNICEF program is a partnership with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and national governments (UNICEF 2013).

integrated in order to be successful. As a Save the Children[34] publication asserts, "as one element of the peacebuilding process, education can contribute to creating the conditions for peace" (Dupuy 2008: 25).

Figure 2: *Strategic Peacebuilding (University of Notre Dame n.d.)*

One must also acknowledge that education, no matter the intentions, is not always peace 'building.' Citing an example of education's complex relationship with conflict, Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008) assert that although schools can act as safe havens in conflict times, they are also capable of fueling conflict "through social exclusion, violence and indoctrination" (479). Thus, education can provide the catalyst for either peace or conflict.

Furthermore, education can either contribute to or detract from a lasting peace post-conflict, as is most famously asserted by Bush and Saltarelli in their (2000) publication *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict*. The publication examines civil wars ('new wars'), which currently encompass the majority of armed conflicts (Bush & Saltarelli 2000: vii), and the potential 'positive' and 'negative' faces of education, which can add to or detract from violent conflict or peace. Their work is seen to be of particular importance as according to UNICEF and the World Bank, six million children were seriously injured or disabled and two million killed as a result of armed conflict in the 1990s (Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Paulson & Rappleye 2007; Seitz 2004, cited in Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008: 478). More specifically and relevant to this research, the authors examine the positive and negative faces of history teaching post-conflict. These arguments will be discussed further in the following 'history education post-conflict' sub-section.

[34] Save the Children is an NGO involved in education in (post-)conflict areas.

Further exploring the 'education-war interface,' Davies (2006) presents ways in which education can contribute to either 'positive conflict' (building a lasting peace) or 'negative conflict' (breaking a lasting peace). The following figure *(figure 3)* presents these aspects on a spectrum from passive to active approach.



Figure 3: *Understanding the Education-War Interface (Davies 2006: 13)*

As illustrated in the figure, from passive to active, education that contributes to negative conflict is as follows: Omission; War as routine; Stereotypes and allegiances; Defense curriculum; Hate curriculum. Similar to Davies's (2006) concept of 'omission' that leads to 'negative conflict' and thus detracts from a lasting peace, Buckland (2006) notably addresses the problem of reproduction of dominant group values and attitudes because of a single perspective approach (7). Because of this, Shah (2012), argues that other actors can and should play a role in curriculum development and adaption in order to ensure to opposite effect, namely a multiple perspectives approach. He thus contends that shared ownership in the curriculum decision-making process post-conflict is a key component of the conflict transformation process (33).

Furthermore, Davies's concept of 'war as routine' can also be understood in relation to another concept, that of conflict sensitive education. As a conflict-sensitive approach emphasizes conflict sensitivity through also discussing periods of peace, the idea of 'war as routine' conversely normalizes violent conflict.

At the other end of Davies's spectrum, education that contributes to positive conflict, also from passive to active, is as follows: Tolerance; Conflict resolution; Education for humanitarian law; Dialogue and encounter; Active challenge to violence (Davies

2006: 13). These passive and active forms of positive and negative conflict will be analyzed within the Acehnese setting in the final 'reflection and conclusion' chapter.

In summary, "While education systems have the potential to act as a powerful force for peace, reconciliation, and conflict prevention, all too often they fuel violence" (UNESCO 2011: 21). Consequently, it is critical to examine aspects of education that can be changed to aid in the peacebuilding process. Yet, what should education for peacebuilding ideally look like? In short, because of the difficulties and dangers of education in fragile settings, and because of the extreme influence of local context on education, there is no one universal ideal education structure. This being established, there are several positive and negative impacts of education on a lasting peace that I conclude must be taken into consideration in the peacebuilding process, namely the concepts which have been presented thus far.

History Education Post-conflict

"Learning about the past certainly does play an important role in imagining a peaceful future. However, this peaceful future must be imagined against a realistic portrayal of conflict as something social, human and tragically possible and not as an anomaly now overcome"[35]

I now turn to more specifically examine history education and its influence on a lasting peace post-conflict. In examining the topic I survey main theories of history education post-conflict, discussing both its importance and impact. Understanding the impacts of teaching history post-conflict is particularly relevant to Aceh province, as a mere eight years have passed since the formal peace agreement was signed. Furthermore, according to a recent (2013) Amnesty International report, many Acehnese themselves recounted the importance of "their children and the population as a whole to know and understand exactly what happened in the past so that history does not repeat itself" (21). Moreover, in addition to its importance in contexts of recent conflict, history education is understood to be even more influential when peace is achieved by means of outside intervention, as was the case in Aceh. According to Cole and Barsalou (2006), "History taught in schools is highly susceptible to simplified and biased presentations, and this is even more likely after conflicts [...] that end through international intervention" (1). Aceh province, seen through the lenses of recent conflict and outside intervention, is therefore a very relevant setting in which to perform a case study on how history is taught.

In an extension of the themes outlined in the previous section related to how education can best impact a lasting peace ('peacebuilding education'), this section will expand upon the main theories as well as present two more important concepts specific to history education. These key concepts will be displayed in bold font, as well as summarized in a table that will conclude this sub-section.

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[35] (Paulson 2011: 4)

I begin by returning to the relevant work of Bush and Saltarelli (2000) and Davies (2006), this time examining their theories of history education post-conflict. In examining the concept of history education post-conflict, it is important to emphasize that it, like any subject, can have either a positive or negative impact depending on the method of teaching. To give one example of the dual nature of history education post-conflict, history is often seen to be manipulated or distorted, either intentionally or unintentionally, through the mere **commission** or **omission** of historical facts (Bush & Saltarelli 2000: 12; 19). As was shown in the diagram *(figure 3)* in the previous section *(peacebuilding education)*, Davies (2006) also emphasizes omission of facts as a key factor that, albeit passive, contributes to conflict. Very relevant to history education post-conflict, Davies also portrays '**war as routine**' as an aspect that fuels conflict, more actively than omission. History, which inevitably highlights some facts and events over others, often highlights violence and neglects to examine the conditions that created peaceful times. An emphasis on conflict and not the following peace in this way can be problematic as it can normalize violence, making war as if 'routine' (Davies 2006: 13; Bush & Saltarelli 2000: 13).

Conversely related to the concept of 'war as routine' I now turn to '**conflict-sensitive**' **history education**, an extension of 'conflict-sensitive' education addressed in the previous section. As is explained by INEE (2013) guidelines on conflict sensitivity, curriculum should be informed by both the local context and the conflict triggers of the context, and accordingly minimize negative impacts of education on the situation. This is because "this strong focus on historical bloodshed does little to foster a climate of tolerance" (Bush & Saltarelli 2000: 13). Nevertheless, though it is important to maintain a conflict-sensitive pedagogical approach in post-conflict settings, the recent violent conflict must still be discussed in history class, as it is historic fact. In order to minimize the potential negative influence of teaching about the conflict then, it is important to understand and take into account the three concepts that follow.

Expanding on the idea presented in the 'peacebuilding education' section of a **multiple perspectives approach**, the importance of having a pluralistic viewpoint towards historical knowledge and its origins is of central concern (Torsti 2008: 59). The official history curriculum following conflicts too often portrays a single and/or simplified historical narrative, a **single perspective approach**, which further divides the formerly warring groups and is dangerous down the road (Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Weinstein et al. 2007; Murray 2008, cited in Shah 2012: 36).

Although a national history curriculum is of course necessary, many different local voices must also be embraced. History must "engage with local values and beliefs, rather than transfer a set of institutional beliefs presupposing assertions of a uniform, homogenous or imaginary political community" (Brown 2009, cited in Shah 2012: 33). Paulson (2011) further stresses the need for 'polyvocal histories of conflict,' which would include 'lived experiences' of all different groups involved in the conflict to avoid favoritism, in addition to "the causes and consequences of

conflict as interpreted by official bodies like truth commissions and governments" (*ibid*. 3).

Connecting the multiple perspectives approach to the concept of omission, the omission of historical facts as a result of textbooks written by previous repressive administrations is common to post-conflict contexts, and remains quite dangerous (Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Weinstein et al. 2007; Freedman et al. 2008; Murray 2008, cited in Shah 2012: 36). Because of this, Shah expresses the importance of a locally written history curriculum (Weinstein et al. 2007, cited in Shah 2012: 36) developed by a diverse group of actors in order to reflect local identity and values (*ibid.* 33). In relating this notion to Aceh province, Amnesty International urged the MoE in a recent (2013) report to, "Ensure that the national curriculum in schools in Aceh […] includes sections on the history of the Aceh conflict and human rights abuses which occurred at the time" (51).

In addition to learning multiple interpretations of history, it is essential that children learn to be critical about the history they are being taught. '**Critical historiography**' is a term introduced by Bush and Saltarelli (2000), meaning that children can learn to question the version of history they are taught (20). For the purpose of analysis, the term used for the absence of this skill will be '**non-critical historiography**.' Critical historiography is understood to be essential as, "only when young people realize that histories are constructed rather than given, can they even begin to contemplate challenging and changing the behavior that poisons inter-group relations" (*ibid.* 20). Students must therefore be allowed the room to ask difficult questions regarding the recent past (Paulson 2011: 4) and it is their right to know where the historical knowledge they receive comes from (Torsti 2008: 59). Although teachers must balance discussing conflict with discussing the following peace, the students must also learn to be critical about the history and question what they are being taught.

In addition to the more inquisitive and reflective aspects of 'critical historiography,' '**dealing with the past**' (Cole & Barsalou 2006; Cole 2007) speaks to the opportunity for history education to allow victims of a conflict to psychologically and spiritually heal. This is seen as necessary before being able to move forward as a society (Cole 2007) and is thus another reason that history education is an important aspect of peacebuilding post-conflict. Bush and Saltarelli (2000), although labeling it as the 'disarming of history,' agree with the notion that history can and should allow for healing, on top of reflection and critical thinking (19-20). While the geographical focus of these texts is not on Aceh, the idea of 'dealing with the past' as opposed to '**denying the past**' in order to move forward is especially pertinent in the province as the peace agreement was signed just eight years ago, and tensions continue to this day.

I now present a summary table of main concepts as described in this section, to allow for easier reading, as well as aid in the analysis of original data later on in the 'reflection and conclusion' chapter. Following the table, this chapter will conclude

with a conceptual scheme that ties together the local context, SRA approach, theories of peacebuilding education and history education post-conflict, as well as this study's main concepts: *policies*, *perceptions*, *practices* and teachers' *agency*.

Summary Table: History Education Post-conflict		
Positive Aspects (contribute to a lasting peace)	**Negative Aspects** (detract from a lasting peace)	**Sources**
1. Conflict-sensitive history education (Locally relevant; Acknowledges dangers/conflict drivers and acts to minimize them)	**1. War as routine**	Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2006; UNICEF 2013; INEE 2013
2. Commission (of historical facts)	**2. Omission** (of historical facts)	Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2006
3. Multiple perspectives approach	**3. Single perspective approach** (Reproduction of dominant group values/attitudes)	Buckland 2006; Torsti 2008; Smith 2010; Paulson 2011; Shah 2012
4. Critical historiography	**4. Non-critical historiography**	Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Paulson 2011; Torsti 2008
5. Dealing with the past (Psychological healing)	**5. Denying the past**	Cole & Barsalou 2006; Cole 2007; Bush & Saltarelli 2000

Table 1: *History Education Post-conflict Summary Table*

Conceptual Scheme

As a reminder to the reader I begin by referring back to the main question of this research: *In what ways do policies and key perceptions influence secondary school (SMA) history teachers' agency to teach the recent conflict (1976-2005), and what is the perceived impact of their classroom practices on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia?*

The following original conceptual scheme ties together all main aspects of this research, from the local context, to the 'theoretical framework,' to the empirical data chapters (*policies*, *perceptions* and *practices*) to come. It is influenced by Hay's (2002) conceptualization of the strategic-relational approach,' and portrays the factors that affect how the recent conflict is taught in history classes in Banda Aceh with an SRA lens. Furthermore, the diagram shows the perceived 'impact on a

lasting peace,' which can be seen by linking the overlying theories of this research (literature on peacebuilding education and history education post-conflict) with data gathered in the field.



Figure 4: *Conceptual Scheme*

The scheme should be interpreted by reading from top to bottom. Beginning from the top, the first two layers, peacebuilding education and history education post-conflict, are shown to express the meta-framework and framework of this research, and must be included in addition to the more grounded aspects of how the conflict is taught in practice. The reader will see that peacebuilding education (positive/negative aspects) is presented in dashed lines. This is because although it provides the background for theory on history education, it is the more specific positive and negative aspects of history education post-conflict that will be emphasized in the analysis of how the recent conflict is taught. Next, local context is included as to ground these theoretical debates in the particular setting, which is comprised of post-conflict and post-disaster, Acehnese and Muslim characteristics.

Moving now to the white box within these three layers, the reader will see that the SRA approach is depicted on the right side and shown in connection to the four main concepts that will be operationalized in this research: *policies,* key *perceptions*, teachers' *agency* and *practices*. Beginning from the top, the strategically selective context (*policies* of national and provincial education policymakers and SMA principals and the *perceptions* of key actors) is shown to influence the *agency* of the strategic actor, SMA history teachers. SMA history teachers are the focus of this research, and thus displayed in bold font. It is important to note that although the SRA approach asserts the dual influence of both the *strategically selective context* on the *strategic actor* and the *strategic actor* on the *strategically selective context*, this research will focus only on the former. Thus, although a dialectical relationship is acknowledged, the *formulation of strategy* and *strategic actions* of only the *strategic actor* (history teacher) will be discussed.

Moving downwards, this influence on SMA history teachers' *agency* is seen to affect their formulation of strategy based on the room or constraint allowed, which in turn leads to their strategic action, in this case how the recent conflict is taught in the classroom (teachers' *practices*). These *practices* are then perceived to impact a lasting peace (either positively or negatively). Although *practices* are seen to affect a lasting peace it is important to keep the entire sequence of influences on the *practices* in mind when analyzing the impact effect as well. Thus, there are both arrows showing impact from *practices* to 'A lasting peace?,' and from the entire scheme, including the SRA chain of events, local context and theories which will be linked.

Finally, 'A lasting peace?' is displayed in dashed lines in order to demonstrate the understanding that the impact education, let alone secondary school history education can have on a lasting peace is limited. Although it is an essential contributor as was previously established *(see 'theoretical framework')*, education is only one aspect of peacebuilding.

4. RESEARCH APPROACH

Photograph 5: *Classroom wall decorations*

I now turn to review the more practical aspects of this research that was done over the course of ten weeks from June to August 2013 in Banda Aceh. I begin by discussing my research methods (both in preparation at home and in practice in the field) in order to maintain full transparency. Next, I elaborate on the limitations inherent in this research, as well as the ethical considerations that were taken into account in undertaking this study.

Research Methods

Before leaving on research, it is important as a researcher to keep in mind certain quality standards, such as 'transferability' and 'dependability.' Transferability means that the results of the study should potentially be transferable to other contexts (Bryman 2008: 378). Therefore, it is important to provide as much context description as possible, as I have done in the previous 'local context' section, and throughout this paper. Dependability speaks to the importance of keeping records throughout the course of research (*ibid.*). It is essential to maintain documentation on research participant selection, interview transcripts, fieldwork notes and so forth, so that it can be shown as proof to colleagues or a supervisor if necessary. Because of this I maintained a daily fieldwork journal for interview and focus group notes, as well as general observations. Additionally, I backed up all interview guides on my laptop and on Dropbox, and maintained an Excel sheet of all my meetings with research respondents.

Additionally, it is paramount that the researcher constantly reflects on his or her 'positionality' and how it influences the research, both before leaving home and while in the field. In my case, this meant reflecting on how my appearance of being a young, Caucasian and Western woman might affect my interactions with others. Thus, after talking to many locals I decided to wear a headscarf in public in order to optimize interactions with others and show respect for local culture and values.

Prior to leaving for the field I also decided that the unit of analysis for this research would be the *agency* of SMA history teachers in Banda Aceh, to work within the larger structure of influence and teach about the recent conflict in the classroom (*practices*). In order to be feasible within the research timespan of ten weeks, my research examines the influence on teachers' *agency* to teach this topic and perceived impacts of teachers' *practices* on a lasting peace in Banda Aceh specific to secondary school (grades 10-12) history classes.

Secondary (SMA) schools were chosen over primary or tertiary schools for two main reasons. Firstly, generational change must be considered when planning how history will be taught post-conflict (Cole & Barsalou 2006: 6). In this way, secondary school students are an ideal group to study, since they may remember the conflict and its effects pre-2005, but were not directly involved in the conflict. Furthermore, as a result of not experiencing conflict first-hand, these students remain vulnerable to violence if schools avoid talking about the past and if the supposed 'peace dividend' from the agreement in 2005 does not reach them (Smith 2013).

Secondly, this age group is often targeted because of their potential to change the near future. In regards to a former peacebuilding education program for high school students in Aceh, Dr. Nur Ali explained, "Because these students and younger generations are the future of our nation [...], it is through them that we may materialize the striving for peaceful life and freedom from injustice and oppression" (AusAID, NVI & UNICEF 2002: 9). This notion of secondary students as 'future leaders' with the power to shape the future was prominently featured in my interviews and will thus be discussed further in empirical chapters to come.

Although it is important to recognize all the major actors involved in history education in Banda Aceh, because of time feasibility choices also had to be made regarding which groups would be most emphasized. Therefore, I employed a diverse group of respondents in Banda Aceh, but selected SMA history teachers as the main focus of my study. Teachers were chosen since they often play the key role in deciding what is discussed in class. As Cole (2007) explained, teachers are of primary importance since, "a textbook, revised or not, is only as important as the degree to which it is used by the teacher" (17).

While SMA students were not initially chosen to be a main focus of this research, the ease of interviewing students as well as student focus groups with interesting results prompted me to include students as a core group as well. The students afforded a unique viewpoint as the future generation who will thus have a large impact on a lasting peace. Furthermore, by asking SMA students the same questions as SMA history teachers, such as for instance "How often is the recent conflict discussed in the history classroom?" I was able to use student responses to validate or refute teachers' responses, allowing for 'triangulation'[36] of data. Thus, conversations with students were vital to the understanding my main focus of teachers' *agency* as well.

In addition to SMA history teachers and students, education policymakers, NGO and IGO officials, SMA principals and other experts on the topic were also interviewed for the purpose of this research. Policymakers were chosen as they play the important role of writing the education *policies*, principals as they play the role of implementing these school *policies*, and NGO/IGO officials as they play a limited but unique role in post-crisis Aceh province.[37] As can be seen in the figure to follow *(table 2)*, a total of four provincial education policymakers (DoE, MPD), four NGO or IGO officials, five SMA-N principals, one SMA-N vice-principal, eight SMA teachers (6 SMA-N, 2 SMA-S), one pesantren teacher, 19 SMA students (15 SMA-N, 4 SMA-S) and six 'other experts' (including professors, a researcher, a historian and teachers of other subjects) were interviewed. Thus, the entire dataset comes from 29

[36] "Triangulation entails using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena" (Bryman 2008: 379).

[37] Once very involved in school and curriculum reconstruction following the tsunami, I discovered that almost all NGO/IGOs left Aceh in 2009/2010 and their current influence on education is extremely limited (From initial discussions with Acehnese researchers; later NGO/IGO interviews).

interviews with various actors as well as four focus groups[38] with 19 students, and the data derives from the viewpoints of 48 different individuals. Moreover, the significant sample size of SMA schools is significant, as I visited 11 SMA-N and two SMA-S schools out of the total 16 SMA-N and ten SMA-S schools in Banda Aceh. Additionally, I visited one pesantren in order to give perspective to the differences in schooling, as well as to inform possible future research ideas.

In order to be transparent with my data, as much information as possible has been provided in this table, while still keeping the best interests and anonymity of the respondents as the first priority. A more thorough 'respondent list' respondent number *(which footnotes refer to)* and gender will be included in the 'appendix.'

ACTOR GROUPS	NUMBER of RESPONDENTS
Education Policymaker	**4**
DoE	*2*
MPD	*2*
NGO/IGO Official	**4**
SMA-N Principal	**5**
SMA-N Vice-principal	**1**
Secondary School History Teacher	**9**
SMA-N	*6*
SMA-S	*2*
Pesantren	*1*
Secondary school Student	**19** (as 4 separate focus groups)
SMA-N	*15 (as 3 focus groups)*
SMA-S	*4 (as 1 focus group)*
Other Expert	**6**
Professors; Researcher; Historian; English SMA Teacher; PPKN SMA Teacher	*6*
<u>TOTAL</u>	**48** (29 from interviews; 19 from focus groups)

Table 2: *Respondent Summary Table*

In order to triangulate my data encompassing *policies*, *perceptions*, *practices* and teachers' *agency*, as well as to gather as much relevant data as possible over ten weeks time, I employed different qualitative and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods. These methods included in-depth semi-structured interviews with a

[38] "The focus group method is a form of group interview in which: there are several participants (in addition to the moderator/facilitator); there is an emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined topic; and the accent is upon interaction within the group and the joint construction of meaning" (Bryman 2008: 474).

variety of actors, focus groups with students, and a classroom observation. Interviewing and focus groups were chosen as the core method of research since a main component of the project is *perceptions* and *perceptions* cannot be independently observed or described in a closed survey. Although observations of a history class in session would have been ideal in order to see *practices* first-hand, due to the language barrier this was deemed to be not feasible.

In selecting respondents, 'purposive,' non-probability sampling was used (Bryman 2008: 375). Largely a result of the limited research span, I decided that extra care must be given at the start to discovering who the most relevant actors to interview would be. Therefore, after deliberating with local academics I was recommended to meet with a few initial key respondents, and I proceeded to 'snowball sample' from there. Although snowball sampling was the most feasible and effective method in this scenario, it is also important to note that this type of sampling has inherent biases. By mainly obtaining teacher contacts through one initial teacher contact, for example, the sample is giving those teachers with social connections (and thus likely similar ideas) a greater chance to be contacted for an interview. Thus, there is a possible prejudice (Berg 2006). The same goes for other actor types as well. In order to combat this drawback I increased the sample size of my respondents.

Upon returning from the field, I used the qualitative analysis program 'Dedoose' to organize and code my interview and focus group transcripts, some of which had been translated into English from Bahasa Indonesia or Bahasa Aceh. I coded the transcripts mainly with 'policies,' 'perceptions,' 'practices' and 'teacher agency,' as well as with smaller descriptive codes that emerged such as 'past glory' for example.

Limitations of Research

Before proceeding to present the original data findings, it is also vital to note the limitations of this particular research. Firstly, the short time frame, as well as various time restrictions during the research span limited this research. For instance, schools in Aceh province were not in session from mid-June until mid-July for school holidays and further, there were limited school hours during the fasting month of Ramadan.

Secondly, this project is restricted due to the use of a translator. Of course interviews in which a translator must be present (those in Bahasa Indonesia or Bahasa Aceh in this case) are less ideal than those done in one's native language (English), however, limiting interviews to respondents who speak English is also problematic. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind the effect that a translator can have on one's research, as the responses from interviewees are filtered through the translator before being analyzed by the researcher, and thus may be influenced by the translator's own opinions, experiences, and knowledge. I dealt with this problem by discussing the purpose of the research in-depth with my interpreter and by having all Bahasa transcripts translated literally into English.

The entirety of teacher and principal interviews were done in Bahasa, whereas the majority of policymaker, NGO and IGO interviews were done in English. Both English and Bahasa were spoken at each student focus group. The quotes used in this paper have been at times minimally edited, by adding 'and' or 'it' for instance, in order to be grammatically correct while still staying true to the respondent's voice.

Thirdly, the scope of this research is limited to post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia, and thus conclusions made on the *policies*, *perceptions* and *practices* of history education, although in some ways similar to other post-context contexts, must take local context into account and thus cannot be extended to all post-conflict regions of the world. Relatedly, in talking about 'post-conflict' Banda Aceh, it is important to note that not all respondents consider Banda Aceh to have been a 'fire area' in Aceh province during the violent conflict and associate the capital more strongly with a 'post-crisis' (earthquake/tsunami) narrative and the rest of the province with a 'post-conflict' narrative.[39]

In justification of the research location chosen, regardless of the emphasis some may understandably put on the disastrous tsunami, the capital city did experience episodes of violent acts during the recent conflict.[40] Moreover, many of my respondents in Banda Aceh emigrated from other regions of the province that were more conflict heavy. Notably, both teachers and students shared graphic stories about their experiences during the time of the conflict with me. Furthermore, the "double burden" of the conflict and tsunami is a concept that was brought up many times in Banda Aceh, emphasizing the immense strength of the citizens in all that was overcome.

Ethical Considerations

In doing research in a 'post-conflict' region, adhering to certain ethical considerations is vital. The researcher must take extra caution to emphasize confidentiality and privacy because of the 'information economy' that is even more at play in conflict and post-conflict settings (Goodhand 2000: 13-14). For this reason, I have maintained privacy in the thesis by leaving out names of respondents and referring only to type of profession.

Additionally, the researcher must be aware of the trauma respondents may have as a result of the conflict. Therefore, mutual consent is also of the utmost importance. As Goodhand explains, "For traumatized individuals and groups, silence may be a coping, not just a survival, strategy. Researchers may inadvertently re-open wounds by probing into areas respondents may not wish to talk about. Dialogue must always be based on mutual consent" (14). Because of this I asked permission before voice

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[39] Taken from several interviews, conversations and comments following a preliminary research findings presentation in Banda Aceh.

[40] I.29 (NGO official/specialist on conflict in Aceh)

recording any interactions, and emphasized to respondents at the beginning of interviews and focus groups that they were free to stop at anytime.

Finally, it is essential that the researcher not promise anything to respondents that he or she cannot absolutely provide. This is important in building trust, as well as broadly ethically speaking, to avoid any false expectations in the field (Goodhand 2000: 14). This is very much in line with perhaps the main guiding rule of any social research, which is, 'Do no harm' (*ibid.* 14; Olthoff 2013).

5. TEACHING THE RECENT CONFLICT: POLICIES

"The system will shape the country. And through education we shape the country" [41]

Photograph 6: *The wall of an SMA-N classroom with (left to right) a portrait of President Yudhoyono, the pancasila emblem and Vice-President Boediono*

[41] I.4 (IGO analyst)

1. What are the *policies* regarding teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes?

I begin the empirical chapters with the above sub-question since curriculum and textbook *policies* shape how the recent conflict *can* be taught. This chapter is followed by a 'perceptions' chapter regarding how the conflict *should* be taught, and a 'practices' chapter of how the conflict *is* taught and teachers' *agency* to do so. In answering this first sub-question, I discuss *policies* that form how history in general is taught in SMA history classes in Aceh province. Further, I examine local (Acehnese) history *policies*, and finally the *policies* surrounding how the recent conflict (1976-2005) is taught. In examining these relevant *policies*, material is drawn from interviews and focus groups, as well as history curriculum and textbook materials. Two tables summarizing information on the 2006 and 2013 history curriculum are presented in the 'general history policies' section, and a summary of main policy findings will complete this chapter.

As was stated in the 'research approach,' the scope of this research is SMA schools, and although it is important to describe some main overarching *policies* of the religious education system under MoRA's control, this is for means of comparison only. This research will then turn to solely focus on SMA schools (both SMA-N and SMA-S) under the MoE jurisdiction following this chapter.

General History Policies

To begin with general history *policies*, the hours allotted for history class differ depending on class level and the major that is chosen in the eleventh grade,[42] natural science or social science (IPA or IPS).[43] However, each student enrolled in a SMA school in Aceh attends at least one 'class hour' (45 minutes) of history lessons per week.[44] Furthermore, some schools utilize 'Curriculum Plus,' which increases overall history hours by one class hour.[45] Quite similarly, I was told that the hours designated for history per week in pesantren schools range from one to two hours, also dependent on the grade and major.[46]

SMA-N and SMA-S schools[47] both follow the MoE curriculum. Both also utilize the 2006 national curriculum (KTSP[48] 2006) for the eleventh and twelfth grades and have switched to using the new 2013 curriculum (KTSP 2013) for the tenth grade.[49] This is because of a decision made by the MoE to pilot a new curriculum for the first

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[42] Students in tenth grade (first class of SMA) are generally aged 15-16; Eleventh grade (second class) 16-17; Twelfth grade (third class) 17-18.
[43] IPA refers to *Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam* (natural science major) and IPS to *Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial* (social science major).
[44] I.9 (SMA history teacher); I.13 (SMA history teacher)
[45] I.9 (SMA history teacher); I.13 (SMA history teacher)
[46] I.28 (Pesantren history teacher); Pesantren class schedule document
[47] SMA-N is public and SMA-S is private.
[48] KTSP refers to *Kurikulum tingkat satuan Pendidikan* (State curriculum, 2006 or 2013).
[49] I.9 (SMA history teacher)

grade level of secondary schools.[50] As a senior-level DoE official explained to me, this pilot program is meant to ease acclimatization into the new curriculum, and will be rolled out to the second and third grades of secondary school (eleventh and twelfth) in 2014 and 2015 respectively.[51] The KTSP 2013 curriculum for the tenth grade is not very distinctive from that of the KTSP 2013, however. The main modifications are that the objective of learning the epistemology of history was eliminated and that the KTSP 2013 allows for one more history class hour than the KTSP 2006 did, jumping from one class hour to two.[52] According to the DoE, once the eleventh and twelfth grades begin with the new curriculum, the history hours allocated for these grades will increase as well.[53] Interestingly, many teachers and principals understood the soon to be modified hours allocation to be different to what I was told by DoE officials,[54] which may reveal a communication disconnect between the government and the schools.

In terms of comparison, the pesantren I visited[55] uses both the 2006 and 2013 curriculum for the first grade, for which KTSP 2013 is available. I was told that the choice of curriculum depends on the teacher and his or her comfort level, since the MoE provided curriculum training for SMA teachers but the MoRA had as of yet not done so for pesantren teachers. [56] Although an interesting finding, I only spoke with one pesantren teacher over the course of this research, and there is a need for further study of pesantren history teacher perspectives.

Discussing the SMA curriculum more in-depth, main themes for the tenth grade include the traditions of the first humans, mythology, and global ancient civilizations.[57] Moving forward, the eleventh grade includes content on the three kingdoms of Indonesia (Hindu, Buddhism, Muslim), the Dutch colonization period (emphasizing struggles and resistance), global revolutions (e.g. the French, Russian, American) and Indonesian independence.[58] Finally, the twelfth grade is comprised of mainly national (Indonesian) history post-independence.[59] Because of these curriculum guidelines, the topic of the recent conflict naturally comes up the most in the twelfth grade as the curriculum concentrates on the period following Indonesian independence in 1949.[60]

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[50] This is also the case with the first year of junior high school and the first and fourth grades of elementary school.
[51] I.15 and I.16 (DoE senior-level officials)
[52] I.13 (SMA history teacher); 'Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia: Kelas X' ('Teacher's History Book: Tenth Grade') [PDF]
[53] I.15 and I.16 (DoE senior-level officials)
[54] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); I.14 (SMA-N principal); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[55] Since the pesantren school system is out of the scope of this research I visited just one pesantren in my time in Banda Aceh. Thus, statements made about pesantrens are based solely on findings from one school visit.
[56] I.28 (Pesantren history teacher)
[57] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher); FG.1 (SMA-S students); FG.2 (SMA-N students); FG.3 (SMA-N students); FG.4 (SMA-N students)
[58] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher); FG.1 (SMA-S students); FG.2 (SMA-N students); FG.3 (SMA-N students); FG.4 (SMA-N students)
[59] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[60] I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)

To compare once again, the required pesantren history curriculum is the same to that of SMA schools since the MoE and MoRA follow the same history topics.[61] This being said, there is much more supplementary curriculum, particularly in terms of religious study. This is due to the fact that there is additional time available at pesantrens in general, as they are boarding schools with longer class hours,[62] restricted mobile phones and limited Internet access for students.

As can be seen in the table, which summarizes the KTSP 2006 below *(table 3)*, the tenth grade was the most limited in terms of history hours under the 2006 curriculum, with around one hour per week allotted. A large difference is also illustrated between students in the IPS major program and those in the IPA major program. IPS students follow the most hours of history class per week, between three and four class hours, whereas IPA students only follow around one class hour per week.

SMA History (KTSP 2006) Curriculum[63]			
Grade/Semester/Major	**Total class hours**[64]	**Average class hours per week**[65]	**Main competencies to be learned**
10/1	18	1.13	1. Understanding the basic principles of the science of history
10/2	17	1.06	1. Analyzing the Indonesian and world civilization
11/1/Social Science (IPS)	51	3.19	1. Analyzing Indonesia's traveling during the traditional countries
11/2/Social Science (IPS)	57	3.56	1. Analyzing the development of the Indonesian nation since the influx of Western influence until the Japanese occupation 2. Analyzing the history of the world that affect Indonesia's history from

[61] I.28 (Pesantren history teacher)
[62] The class duration at the pesantren visited is between seven to eight hours Mondays through Saturdays. Though there are no classes on Sundays, they are reserved for educational field trips. Examples of historical field trips included the Cut Nyak Dien museum, the Kherkhof Dutch cemetery and the Iskandar Muda cemetery. (I.28-Pesantren history teacher).
[63] Information in table *(table 3)* is taken from 'Silabus dan Penilaian' ('Syllabus and Assessment'), an MoE history (KTSP 2006) curriculum document [PDF]. Translation of Bahasa Indonesia to English was done on Google Translate.
[64] Total class hours were calculated from information in from 'Silabus dan Penilaian'('Syllabus and Assessment'), an MoE history curriculum document [PDF].
[65] Average class hours per week were calculated based on the information in 'Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia: Kelas X' ('Teacher's History Book: Tenth Grade'), the tenth grade KTSP 2013 history book/curriculum document [PDF]. The document lists 32 weeks in the school year, which makes one semester 16 weeks. Therefore, the total class hours per semester were divided by 16.

			the 18th century until the 20th century
11/1/Natural Science (IPA)	17	1.06	1. Analyzing the state of Indonesia's traveling from traditional , colonial , nationalist movement , until the formation of the nation-state until the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence
11/2/Natural Science (IPA)	17	1.06	1. Reconstruct the Indonesian struggle since the proclamation until the birth of the New Order
12/1/Social Science (IPS)	66	4.13	1. Analyzing the Indonesian struggle since the proclamation until the birth of the New Order 2. Analyzing the struggle since the New Order until the time of reformation
12/2/Social Science (IPS)	51	3.19	1. Analyzing the development of world history since World War II to the recent developments
12/1/Natural Science (IPA)	17	1.06	1. Reconstruct the Indonesian struggle since the proclamation until the Reformation
12/2/Natural Science (IPA)	17	1.06	1. Analyze the development of science and technology in the 20th century

Table 3: *SMA History (KTSP 2006) Curriculum*

As is represented in the following table, which summarizes the KTSP 2013 *(table 4)*, the 2013 curriculum indeed shows a class hour increase from the 2006 curriculum, jumping from one to two class hours per week.

SMA History (KTSP 2013) Curriculum[66]

[66] Information in table *(table 4)* is taken from the 'Buku Guru Sejarah Indonesia: Kelas X' ('Teacher's History Book: Tenth Grade'), the tenth grade KTSP 2013 history book/curriculum document [PDF]. Translation of Bahasa Indonesia to English was done on Google Translate.

Grade/Semester	Total class hours[67]	Class hours per week	Main competencies to be learned
10/1	20	2	1. Explore early civilizations in the Indonesian archipelago
10/1 & 10/2	22	2	2. Merchants, rulers and poets in the classical period (Hindus and Buddhists)
10/2	22	2	3. Islamization and cross-cultural in the archipelago

Table 4: *SMA History (KTSP 2013) Curriculum*

Local (Acehnese) History Policies

I now explain the makeup of local history content in SMA school history classes, which, in short, is lacking. This section will describe more specifically what is and is not covered with regard to local history and will utilize national and provincial ministerial *policies* to explain why this is the case.

To begin, Acehnese content is not included in the MoE history textbooks except for mention of the four Acehnese heroes and heroines of the Dutch resistance *(discussed in the 'perceptions' chapter to come)* and the Aceh Sultanate ('Samudera Pasai') since the spread of Islam into the country was first through the sultanate.[68] Thus, the mention of Aceh in textbooks is very small. One principal estimated this mention to be about one percent,[69] which is generally representative of respondents' assessments.

In explaining why there is a lack of Acehnese content in the national history textbooks and curriculum, respondents mainly pointed to the centralized nature of the education system. As an IGO official explained, "That is the strategy of Suharto. His strategy is to generalize everything, don't care about the context [...] So that is still applied until today."[70] Thus, many respondents blamed national education policymakers for the absence of local content, this legacy of Suharto. In triangulating this sentiment, academics often regard the Indonesian national curriculum as domineering as well, saying that it "serv[es] the purpose of control" (Nicolai 2004: 44, cited in Shah 2012: 32) or even harsher, "amounts to cultural indoctrination and an attempt at genocide'' (Caroll & Kupczyk-Romanczuk 2007: 67, cited in Shah 2012: 32).

Relatedly, although Indonesia is an extremely multicultural land, several respondents told me that what is supposedly 'Indonesian history' is largely portrayed as 'Javanese history' in practice.[71] In addition to a need for control, some further suggested that the central government purposefully excludes Acehnese

[67] The KTSP 2013 curriculum divides class hours based on the three different core competencies to be learned instead of by two semesters as in the KTSP 2006 curriculum *(see table 3)*.
[68] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[69] I.21 (SMA-N principal)
[70] I.4 (IGO official)
[71] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.3 (MPD); I.11 (Expert); I.6 (Expert); I.5 (MPD)

history from the textbooks, especially regarding Aceh's resistance, out of a fear of reigniting conflict in the province. As one teacher expressed, mimicking the sentiment of several others, "[If we know] the real history of Aceh, they are afraid that we are going to do something bad."[72]

Although there is a minimum national standard for the curriculum, room is also allowed for supplementary local content ('mulok'). Based on national curriculum *policies*, a 20 percent space[73] is given to teach mulok,[74] and schools can choose which local content to teach within this space, in the history class among other classes *(to be elaborated on further in the 'practices' chapter)*. As a teacher explained, "The Jakarta government and provincial [government] allow teachers to put their own local contents as Indonesia has many diversity upon culture from one province to another, and the local values are the school policy which based on the need of students and environment."[75] Since school *policies* are based on student characteristics and needs according to this teacher, different schools in Banda Aceh may then employ different *policies*, materials and methods in teaching local history. In addition to allowing for different cultural characteristics, this school-based interpretation and variation of local content is also made easier by the fact that the subject of history is not included in national examinations.[76]

An IGO education expert expressed, although there may be coordination with principals in the form of syllabus approval, teachers usually play the main role in defining curriculum content, including local content.[77] As a principal triangulated, "In mulok, teachers have to do several duties, first arrange syllabus and then pick up some materials which is suitable to teach, also scoring system, and makes teaching progression [...] teaching is up to the teachers, the freedom for teachers."[78] Furthermore, teachers are able to effortlessly decide on local content to use since the provincial Ministry of Education does not as of now regulate mulok.[79]

While mulok could hypothetically be used for the teaching of Acehnese history, I was told that the space is generally used more to teach Acehnese language, culture, traditions and religion.[80] In terms of *policies*, the space is often times used to teach students more about the Muslim faith since *(as was explained in the introduction)*, the LoGA requires each (Muslim) student to have a 'basic understanding' of Islam (Shah & Lopes Cardozo 2013: 13).

Also limiting local history inclusion is that with only one to four class hours (45 minutes to three hours) allotted per week, teachers are constrained in how often

[72] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[73] 20 percent space, meaning 20 percent of all class hours (not limited to history).
[74] I.3 (MPD); I.5 (MPD); I.8 (IGO)
[75] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[76] I.13 (SMA-N history teacher); I.14 (SMA-N principal)
[77] I.8 (IGO)
[78] I.21 (SMA-N principal)
[79] I.8 (IGO)
[80] I.1 (Expert); I.3 (MPD)

they can discuss local history while still meeting curriculum requirements.[81] 'Curriculum Plus,' which some SMA schools utilize, allows for more than the normal 20 percent for mulok in the curriculum and integrates local content into every subject taught.[82] A history teacher at a school using Curriculum Plus *policies* explained that because of this curriculum her history class automatically introduces the heritage of Aceh, especially that of the 'colonials in Aceh,' citing examples of fieldtrips to cultural sites[83] in Banda Aceh.[84]

Though Acehnese content is not included in the official history curriculum[85] as it is nationalized, and barely mentioned in the textbooks, a supplementary local history textbook (to be used for all grade levels) is now under production[86] under the recommendation of Aceh's Governor Zaini Abdullah.[87] Two senior-level DoE officials told me that the textbook will be ready in 2014, and assured me that local content (including the recent conflict and following peace agreement) will be included in the history curriculum, textbooks and lessons beginning in 2014.[88] The local history textbook will, according to the provincial Ministry of Education, also include some information about the history of the recent conflict, "discuss[ing] a bit about the Helsinki MoU and the reason why [the conflict] occurred and the history regarding this."[89] The MoU, according to the department, was not discussed in the KTSP 2006.

However, many respondents including teachers and principals seemed to have not heard of such a development as a local history textbook at all, reinforcing the apparent communication disconnect between government and school leaders. Moreover, some experts were skeptical about the motivations of such a production.[90] They pointed to selfish motives of Partai Aceh[91] in creating a local textbook, assumingly seeing an opportunity to begin history with GAM (Hasan di Tiro) and distort history by focusing on themselves. Explaining the issue, one respondent stated, "Winners of this struggle, this fight, this conflict- these people they are trying to concoct history, to change history, or to start history from their own perspective."[92] Thus, there is a concern about *who* creates the new local history textbook in Aceh, just as much as there is about the need for a local history textbook.

This power play is a common issue facing history curriculum development following violent conflict. This is why Shah (2012) *(see 'history education post-conflict')*,

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[81] I. 23 (SMA-N history teacher); I.28 (Pesantren history teacher)
[82] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[83] An example of a cultural field trip was the Kherkhof, the large Dutch cemetery.
[84] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[85] Confirmed this by searching for any mention of 'Aceh' in the 'Silabus dan Penilaian' (KTSP 2006), the MoE curriculum document for all grades.
[86] This book was under production at the time of thesis submission, but may be interesting to follow up on as future research.
[87] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials)
[88] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials)
[89] I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials)
[90] I.10 (Expert); I.11 (Expert)
[91] Partai Aceh is the political party currently in power, which was formed from GAM.
[92] I.11 (Expert)

advocates for shared input in the curriculum development process. Applying this theory to practice in Aceh, I was told by DoE members that there are a variety of actors involved in a 'local curriculum development team' to "adopt and adapt" the curriculum.[93] This team includes the MPD, local council members, sub-attendants, and school principals and teachers from all grade levels.[94] These members strongly support a 'qanun' (Acehnese bylaw) to enforce Acehnese history as a required topic in history classes in Acehnese schools, as a part of the local content allowed.[95] However, as a principal involved in the local content development team explained, the response has been good, but no results have been achieved as of yet.[96]

Recent Conflict History Policies

I now turn to discuss *policies* surrounding the recent conflict and history education. To begin, the history of the conflict is not included in the curriculum as it is a national curriculum.[97] Yet, despite a lack of inclusion, there is no policy against teaching the recent conflict within the flexible local content hours (mulok) if the teacher chooses to. "Because of the LoGA, the specialty of Aceh on education, and also Aceh has what we call MPD- Education Board [...], a lot of room for that to put the conflict prevention and mitigation into the system"[98] Thus, the role of the teacher is of central importance. Furthermore, according to the DoE, the conflict will be included as a part of the new curriculum for all levels, as well as in the local history textbook due out in 2014.[99]

Similar to that of Acehnese history, some respondents expressed strong opinions regarding the current exclusion of the recent conflict in the curriculum, blaming the provincial as well as national policymakers for its exclusion.[100] As an IGO worker involved in education in Aceh told me, "The change should be on politics side. But again, if you are talking about politician, they are not interested in this. They are interested in infrastructure, economy. Everything is about regular irrigation, road. They are not talking about mentality, they are not talking about social degradation."[101] As this quote illustrates, there is a perceived lack of interest on the side of the governance in peacebuilding measures, favoring instead structural development in Aceh province.

In addition to a lack of mention in the curriculum, the recent conflict is also barely (if at all) mentioned in the SMA textbooks. The majority of respondents asserted that there is not even one sentence about the recent conflict in any textbook, including the twelfth grade SMA textbook (KTSP 2006) that focuses on the time

[93] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials)
[94] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); I.14 (SMA-N principal); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[95] I.14 (SMA-N principal) in two separate interviews
[96] I.14 (SMA-N principal)
[97] I.27 (SMA vice principal); I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); Confirmed this by searching for any mention of the conflict in the 'Silabus dan Penilaian' (KTSP 2006).
[98] I.4 (IGO)
[99] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials)
[100] I.4 (IGO); I.6 (Expert)
[101] I.4 (IGO)

period of the conflict.[102] However, when asking respondents including teachers, principals and policymakers about the inclusion or exclusion of the recent conflict in the twelfth grade textbook, I was given a range of responses. As a SMA principal told me, the textbook mentions the conflict in very vague terms, from a national and not Acehnese perspective, and without a sub-title specific to the GAM conflict. "Only slightly tell about it. Some flaming condition for example. It is only about the date and year, the incident."[103] A few others agreed to a brief and vague mention of the recent conflict in the book as well,[104] such as "a rebellion in Aceh because of Hasan di Tiro. Just in general, not specific."[105] Furthermore, one teacher declared there is only a discussion of the peace agreement, whereas according to the DoE, the MoU is not mentioned.[106] Despite a clear conclusion on what is written on this theme in the twelfth grade textbook,[107] it can be concluded that there is little to no information mentioned about the 1976-2005 conflict. Moreover, I got the sense that respondents were generally not hopeful regarding future inclusion of the conflict in the book, often citing the central government's fear of kindling revenge amongst the Acehnese people.

Furthermore, not much that has been written about the conflict in the Indonesian language in any book at all. For instance, I was told about a so-called 'black book' (*buku hitam*) written by an anonymous history expert that discusses the 'hidden truth' of Acehnese history, but is prohibited from being published.[108] The book contains information about the heroes and heroines who fought the Dutch and Javanese (GAM), and more detailed information regarding the conflict. Acehnese told me that this book is forbidden, as it was deemed to be detrimental for the unity of Indonesia.

Having discussed *policies* for teaching the recent conflict (curriculum and textbook content) handed down from MoE and DoE, it is important to also look at the *policies* of SMA principals, who are capable of creating school *policies* or enforcing those of MoE. When interviewing principals it became apparent that most if not all were unsure about how much history teachers at their schools teach about the recent conflict, or even about local history in general. This further reinforces the fact that the role in curriculum decision-making is primarily the teacher's own. Although one teacher told me that the lack of inclusion of the recent conflict causes some principals to make their own *policies*, asking teachers to teach those materials supplementary,[109] this depends on the personality and *perceptions* of the individual principal. Furthermore, it did not seem to be the situation in most cases.

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[102] I.18 (SMA-N principal); I.5 (MPD); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher); I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); I.16 (Expert)
[103] I.14 (SMA-N principal)
[104] I.14 (SMA-N principal); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[105] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[106] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials)
[107] I was unable to confirm the mention of the conflict in the KTSP 2006 twelfth grade history textbook since a PDF copy of the book was unavailable.
[108] I.13 and I.14 (History teacher and principal at same SMA-N school); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[109] I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)

Summary of Findings on Policies

Responding now to this chapter's sub-question *(What are the policies regarding teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes?)*, I have found that there is a lack of local (Acehnese) history, especially regarding the recent conflict, in both SMA history curriculum and textbooks. In spite of inclusion, *policies* are flexible in that they give room for the teaching of the topic within the 20 percent of school hours allowed for local content (mulok). Furthermore, there is no policy prohibiting the teaching of the recent conflict in the SMA history class. Thus, the SMA history teacher plays a central role in if and how the conflict is taught.

In discussing with respondents I found that this space is usually not used to teach local history, but local language, culture, traditions and especially religion. Although the way mulok is used is the choice of the teachers (mainly) and often depends on the support they do (not) receive from principals, this may be in part because of the LoGA that requires each Muslim student to learn a basic understanding of Islam. Even still, neither DoE nor MoE regulates local content in Acehnese schools.

Looking to the future, there is a provincial government move to incorporate the recent conflict and the following MoU into both the local history content and into a new supplementary local history textbook, anticipated to be released in 2014. Despite the lack of results on these two pursuits, the main takeaway is that notwithstanding *policies* to include the history of the recent conflict in SMA history classes, teachers are free to teach about the recent conflict if they so choose.

6. TEACHING THE RECENT CONFLICT: KEY PERCEPTIONS

"Acehnese history is a blessing and a burden" [110]

Photograph 7: *The wall of an SMA-N classroom with paintings portraying heroes and heroines of Aceh*

[110] I.11 (Expert)

2. What are the key *perceptions* regarding teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes?

Having examined the *policies* that regulate the inclusion of the recent conflict in the previous chapter, this chapter assesses key actors' *perceptions* of the importance of teaching the conflict in SMA history classes. Although some *perceptions* were expressed in the 'policies' chapter, the focus was solely on actors' *perceptions* of the *policies* themselves. In answering the above sub-question, I begin by evaluating the *perceptions* of importance regarding teaching local (Acehnese) history in history classes. From here, I delve deeper into examining *perceptions* of importance in teaching the recent conflict in classrooms specifically, according to key actors. In discussing these *perceptions* I firstly analyze the perceived benefits of teaching the conflict, and secondly examine the perceived dangers. A summary of main findings will close this chapter.

One must begin the discussion on *perceptions* of teaching the recent conflict in the classroom with a section on the perceived importance of discussing local (Acehnese) history. This is because the first is rooted in the second. To begin, each and every respondent considered Acehnese history to be a crucial part of history classes in SMA schools. However, the reasons given for its significance as well as the most valuable lessons to incorporate varied from respondent to respondent.

When describing the necessity of teaching local history in Acehnese schools, both teachers and students expressed a need for students to know more about their own province. This is in opposition to the fact that the history of Indonesia is largely taught as the 'history of Java' alone *(see 'policies' chapter)*. Although learning about one's nation is seen to be important, there must be an additional understanding of the history of one's own region. As one student pointed out, echoing the sentiments of others, "We must know about it. It is impossible for us to stay in Aceh, but we don't know about Aceh history while, history of foreign countries, we know about those."[111]

Based on respondents' strong reactions in favor of Acehnese youth attaining provincial knowledge, local history is understood to build an Acehnese identity, which appears to be of the upmost importance. Furthermore, this need for identity formation amongst teenagers is seen as often lacking, as three teachers described their shock at students who are uncomfortable or unable to speak their own language, Bahasa Aceh.[112] In addition to gaining knowledge of local language and culture, I was told that local history lessons can build a sense of pride in the students; a pride in being Indonesian, but also Acehnese.[113] Both teachers and a principal articulated that the aim of teaching local history is for the students to 'love Aceh.'[114]

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[111] FG.4 (SMA-N student)
[112] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[113] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[114] I.25 (SMA-N history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.24 (SMA-N principal)

At the same time as emphasizing Acehnese uniqueness, students highlighted nationalism as an important lesson, tying into concerns of reigniting a separatist movement, but also in complement to provincial pride and identity. As one student stated, internalizing this lesson, "[There was a] conflict with Java […] but Acehnese, Java too, Indonesian too. Now, we are family. In Indonesia, we are family."[115] Thus, in order to secure a peaceful future, students seemingly need to cultivate both Acehnese and Indonesian identities.

Local history lessons perceived to be most important by key actors focused on concepts such as the 'past glory of Aceh,' struggle and bravery of Acehnese descendants, the fierce resistance against the Dutch, and the heroes and heroines of this resistance. These topics could seemingly incite violence among the students. However, I was assured by the majority of respondents that these lessons are in fact meant to generate Acehnese pride, commemorate the sacrifice of the past population, and most importantly teach students to learn from the violent past in order to live peacefully in the future.

In line with identity development, students as well as the majority of teachers expressed a need to emphasize brighter times in Aceh's past,[116] the so-called "past glory of Aceh." This commonly includes discussing the Aceh Sultanate and the past riches and wisdom of the Acehnese during this era. As one historian told me, ""When we talk about the history of Aceh, we talk about the greatness, and not the suffering,"[117] arguing that this practice is a sort of "nostalgia" for the past. Conversely, most others saw teaching about this theme in a more positive light, again arguing for the formulation of pride among the students. For example, one teacher expressed the importance of discussing this in class, by showing students that "Acehnese are not stupid" and that they have "something special that differs from Java or another part of Indonesia."[118]

Another theme teachers and principals stressed students should internalize is the past struggle and bravery of their ancestors.[119] Looking at Aceh's history, the struggle and bravery of the people over the course of centuries is apparent. Yet, as a principal asserted, instruction on this long span of conflict is not done to show conflict as the norm, but quite opposite "so today's children may not fight as much, so they need to maintain that Aceh's future better."[120] Along this same line of thought, the "fierce resistance" of the Acehnese against Dutch rule *(see 'historical context of conflict')* is another point of immense pride in Aceh's past, as well as a dominant theme brought up by all actor groups without prompt, thus central to the

[115] FG.3 (SMA-N female student)
[116] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); FG.4 (SMA-N students); I.23 (SMA-N history teacher); I.25 (SMA-N history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.7 (SMA-N history teacher)
[117] I.1 (Historian)
[118] 1.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[119] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.22 (SMA-N principal)
[120] I.22 (SMA-N principal)

Acehnese history discourse. Triangulating this notion of pride in resistance as a core component of the Acehnese mentality (and thus an important part of local history education), Feener (2011) explains that centuries of violent conflict have fostered "the idea of 'resistance' as a key concept in the formation of Acehnese identity" (15).

In extension of the concept of resistance, teaching about the 'heroes and heroines'[121] of the Dutch resistance is also viewed as fundamentally important. Numerous respondents in all actor groups[122] highlighted lessons that students should learn from the heroes and heroines, such as strength, bravery, sacrifice and devoutness.[123] Furthermore, there is a deep pride throughout Aceh in the immense strength and bravery of the 'heroes and heroines' in resisting Dutch rule for sixty years, much longer than any other region was able to do.[124] This pride pervades schools as posters of heroes and heroines are typically plastered to classroom walls,[125] as well as the city which has a main road named after a war hero.[126]

As is explained to the students, the heroes and heroines' intense resistance was due to their devoutness that made them unafraid of death in the 'righteous battle.' It is this sacrifice that must be acknowledged by the new generation. This message of martyrdom is echoed in a student's explanation, "I am proud of the heroes because they give up their blood, for the Acehnese people. The purpose is for Acehnese people."[127] Yet, even with themes such as blood and sacrifice, respondents generally agree that the goal of teaching about the heroes and heroines is not to preach violence. Rather, it is to have students appreciate their sacrifice and move forward to focus on non-violent development.[128] As one teacher so aptly expressed, "By talking about hero and heroine in the classroom, students may take lessons from their experience and struggle so that they will create and maintain peace."[129]

Perceived Benefits of Teaching the Recent Conflict

Looking now more particularly at discussing the history of the recent conflict in the classroom, the vast majority of respondents agreed that this should also be taught in secondary school history classes. I now address why they expressed this to be an important part of history lessons, as well as which aspects of the topic were perceived to be the most significant.

Although the large majority of respondents agreed that the conflict should be taught in history classes, there was a small debate regarding the degree of importance in

[121] The main Acehnese 'heroes' and 'heroines' according to respondents include: Cut Nyak Dhien, Cut Meutia, Teuku Umar, Tengku Chiek Di Tiro, Ratu Safiatuddin and Laksamana Malaha Yati.
[122] FG.2 (SMA-N students); FG.3 (SMA-N students); FG.4 (SMA-N students); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.18 (SMA-N principal); I.2 (Expert); I.22 (SMA-N principal); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.4 (IGO); I.5 (MPD); I.8 (IGO); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[123] FG.3 (SMA-N student); I.22 (SMA-N principal); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher)
[124] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[125] Based on individual observations.
[126] Such as Jalan Teuku Umar in Banda Aceh.
[127] FG.3 (SMA-N student)
[128] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.22 (SMA-N principal)
[129] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher)

teaching a conflict in the classroom that all students (because of their age range) have lived through. As a history teacher argued, it is very contextual with the students since almost all have lived through the conflict, and thus the importance is amplified in terms of the need for student reflection.[130] In contrast, one principal contended that students already know about the conflict from the Internet, magazines and newspapers, if not personal experience, and thus it is not as important to supplement this knowledge with classroom knowledge.[131] Perhaps most significant, students generally strongly supported the inclusion of the conflict in SMA history classes.[132] Nearly all students expressed a keen interest in learning about the conflict in class and "search[ing] the truth" about this topic, especially when 'hot' issues such as the flag issue[133] arise.[134]

Similar to reasons stated for including local history, there is a belief amongst history teachers and students that the conflict should be taught simply because it is a piece of Acehnese history and that those living in the Aceh must understand simply because they live in the province. Beyond this reasoning, each of the aspects described as building a strong and proud Acehnese identity within the student body is understood to contribute to a better future for Aceh if taught well, as the students are in fact the 'next generation.'[135] For example, I was told that students must learn about the struggle and resistance of descendants, as they are the 'future leaders' and peace will be in their hands.[136] Furthermore, this hope that the 'next generation' will be able to improve the wellbeing of the province is thus heavily linked to *perceptions* of including or excluding the recent conflict in history classes.

In addition to being the future generation, the inclusion of conflict is perceived to be especially important as some of these students, as emphasized by several respondents, will inevitably become the 'future leaders' or 'future policymakers' of Aceh.[137] Consequently, they especially must be the ones to learn from the violent past, in order to prevent another conflict.[138] As a vice-principal avowed, "They have to know which is good act and which is not good so they can make better-- so they would not make wrong decision, wrong policy in the future."[139] Interestingly, this notion of students as future policymakers with the power to shape the future was prominent in my discussions with principals and teachers, and implies the power that they see the provincial policymakers to have. Surprisingly, no policymakers expressed the importance of conflict history education in terms of students as future

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[130] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[131] I.18 (SMA-N principal)
[132] FG.4 (SMA-N students); FG.3 (SMA-N students); FG.2 (SMA-N students); FG.1 (SMA-S students)
[133] The 'flag issue' refers to the Spring of 2013 tension between Aceh and the central government when Partai Aceh chose to make a former GAM flag the official flag of Aceh province, testing Aceh's autonomy limits.
[134] FG.1 (Male SMA-S student)
[135] I.22 (SMA-N principal); FG.3 (SMA-N students); FG.4 (SMA-N students); I.22 (SMA-N principal); I.27 (SMA-N history teacher); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[136] I.22 (SMA-N principal)
[137] I.22 (SMA-N principal); FG.3 (SMA-N students); FG.4 (SMA-N students); I.22 (SMA-N principal); I.27 (SMA-N history teacher); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[138] I.25 (SMA-N history teacher); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); I.27 (SMA-N Vice-principal)
[139] I.27 (SMA-N Vice-principal)

policymakers. Instead they broadly focused on the importance of learning from the past and the various causes and effects of the conflict.[140]

Having examined reasons pointing to the value of including the conflict history in SMA classes, I will now assess which aspects key actors perceived to be the most important to discuss. To begin, several respondents felt strongly that the conflict should be taught within the perspective of Islam, related to God's will and the lessons that can be learned by looking to the Qur'an in times of tragedy.[141] This impression further demonstrates the importance of local context, in this case the prevalence of Islam, in framing locally relevant education. In line with this thought, a few individuals told me that the 2005 tsunami occurred because God was angry with the Acehnese people for fighting.[142] Thus, augmenting faith in Islam is perceived to be an important route to avoiding a reigniting of conflict in the province, and therefore an important component of conflict education. By learning through the lens of Islam, students can supposedly learn about the conflict without being incited to violence, by emphasizing bravery, struggles and resistance, whilst preaching non-violence.

One of the most prevalent concepts to emerge from this research on importance of conflict education is that of "learning from the past."[143] All different groups of people communicated its necessity, and furthermore expressed that if students "reflect"[144] on the lessons from the violent past, they can be utilized to produce a brighter (more peaceful) future. As a principal explained, history should not only be about taking in information, but about applying history's lessons to daily life.[145] Demonstrating that students can in fact internalize historical lessons, one student articulated, "From the history class we can learn that if Aceh remarked something bad in the past time, we can correct it for the future. So, I think that history is absolutely important,"[146] and another student, "History is a lesson for life."[147]

According to interviews, the main lessons that ought to be learned from the violent past include practicing "non-violence" in general, as well as constructing non-violent solutions to problems as a way to avoid future violent conflict in the province.[148] As an Acehnese academic proclaimed, "You have fists. Punching here, punching there. Why in fact these days no more punching we need. But to punch with our brains, with our logic."[149] This demonstrates once again the attitude that reflecting on the violent past can lead to the acquisition of alternative non-violent skills and

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[140] A total of just four policymakers were interviewed.
[141] I.10 (Expert); FG.3 (2 SMA-N students); I.12 (IGO)
[142] FG.3 (Male SMA-N student); other non-respondents that I met in passing
[143] I.18 (SMA-N principal); I.27 (SMA-N Vice-principal); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); FG.3 (Two SMA-N students: one male, one female); FG.4 (SMA-N student)
[144] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[145] I.18 (SMA-N principal)
[146] FG.3 (Female SMA-N student)
[147] FG.4 (SMA-N student)
[148] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); I.11 (Expert); I.18 (IGO)
[149] I.11 (Expert)

solutions for a peaceful future.

Additionally, history teachers, principals and DoE policymakers placed a large significance on students understanding both the causes for the conflict[150] and the subsequent reverberating effects.[151] Surprisingly, no students mentioned this as a primary reason to talk about the conflict in class, instead chiefly focusing on interest and Acehnese identity. Some causes for the conflict, as expressed by respondents, include dissatisfaction,[152] inequalities,[153] and Sukarno's trickery of the Acehnese people.[154] Respondents agreed that teaching youth about the conflict causes is an important part of facilitating peaceful problem solving and smarter decision making for the future. In terms of conflict effects, respondents prominently cited death, orphans, loss of jobs, loss of property, lost years of education (too dangerous to go to school, schools physically burned/destroyed), and trauma.[155]

A few teachers and principals stressed that there were both good and bad effects as a result of the conflict. However, when probed only one respondent was able to name a good effect, affirming that the Banda Aceh airport is now bigger, and that the central government has created new convenient flight routes from the provincial capital,[156] such as to Jeddah for the hajj.[157] The rest only emphasized bad effects. This perhaps shows a perceived need to appear unbiased about such a contentious topic while in a school leadership position.

Perceived Dangers of Teaching the Recent Conflict

Having discussed *perceptions* why the recent conflict should be taught in SMA history classes, this section addresses the *perceptions* why it should not be, or more commonly expressed, why it should be taught, but in a cautious manner.

As materialized in interviews and focus groups, the main danger perceived in teaching about the conflict is that it could provoke the 'next generation' to reignite conflict by cultivating feelings of both "trauma" and "revenge."[158] As a result, a couple of respondents shared the conviction that "talking about history is all about the realities" yet, " not all realities can be discussed with students such as the bitterness of the war itself."[159] This is because, although some lessons can be used to discourage children against violence, "this same event can be used to build the spirit of 'we have to take revenge to the central government or to our neighbor who stand

[150] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); I.14 (SMA-N principal); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[151] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); I.22 (SMA-N principal)
[152] I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[153] I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[154] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[155] I.22 (SMA-N principal); I.11 (Expert); I.8 (IGO); I.4 (IGO)
[156] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher)
[157] The hajj is the pilgrimage to Mecca and is the 'Fifth Pillar of Islam.'
[158] I.18 (SMA-N principal); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher); I.12 (IGO); I.11 (Expert); I.20 (SMA-N PPKN teacher); I.8 (IGO); FG. 2 (SMA-N students); FG.3 (SMA-N students)
[159] I.18 (SMA-N principal); I.6 (Expert)

on the side of the government.'"[160] Although some expressed concerns however, the majority of teachers did not convey worries about teaching the conflict in terms of fostering trauma and revenge. Furthermore, the vast majority of respondents, even those who expressed concern over dangers such as these, believed that the conflict should still be taught.

In dealing with the potential for creating or reawakening traumatic and vengeful feelings when teaching about the conflict, several pedagogical aspects were perceived to be particularly important. Referring back to the impartial role that some teachers and principals were seen to adopt, some respondents urged caution, mentioning that the effects must be taught in an "unbiased" manner, by highlighting both good and bad effects.[161] As one principal assured me, students at this age (15-18) have the maturity to determine good effects from bad effects.[162] Several teachers also emphasized the importance of remaining unbiased in their teaching *practices*. Moreover, one professor told me that if the history is discussed in a "one-sided" (biased) manner, it should not be taught.[163] As he described, it must be taught "properly, honestly, and to include all the strengths and weaknesses, what the benefits, the loss, and not simply just to be very one-sided history."[164] Additionally, he expressed that if it is not taught this way in schools, someone in power will surely manipulate history for their own sake.[165]

Instead of acting as neutral parties by teaching an unbiased version of history, slightly more respondents believe that in heeding caution, teachers should instead emphasize the peace by transmitting facts, but "in a positive way."[166] Correspondingly, I was told that the purpose of teaching the conflict in schools should not be to accentuate "hatred"[167] or to "intimidate"[168] the students. As an IGO education specialist exclaimed, "If the history mostly emphasize on hatred, on the negative side, just telling the bad thing happening, so you transfer the trauma. […] Emphasis should be on peace, sustaining peace."[169]

Whether teaching the conflict in an unbiased fashion, emphasizing the peace, or excluding the conflict entirely from their lessons, the majority of respondents understood the teacher to play the central role in navigating students' potential feelings of trauma and revenge. As one student affirmed (and several others agreed with), although it can be very interesting to learn about, the decision to teach the recent conflict in class should depend very much on the students' mentalities, and it

[160] I.12 (IGO)
[161] I.15 and I.16 (Senior-level DoE officials); I.22 (SMA-N principal)
[162] I.22 (SMA-N principal)
[163] I.11 (Expert)
[164] I.11 (Expert)
[165] I.11 (Expert)
[166] I.8 (IGO); I.2 (Expert); I.27 (SMA-N Vice-principal); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[167] I.8 (IGO)
[168] I.2 (Expert)
[169] I.8 (IGO)

is the teacher who should be able to gauge his or his students best. [170] Recounting a story of a traumatized classmate reacting badly to a lesson on the conflict, one teenager explained, "Sometimes it is important but sometimes it is not important […] So we have to look the condition. So it is depend on the condition. If it is okay, we can tell but if it is not, I think it is going to be a terrible moment."[171] This demonstrates the risk of reawakening trauma and the danger of igniting vengeful feelings within the student body. Thus, the history teacher must be mindful in formulating a strategy for class lessons, based on his or her *perception* of the students' characteristics.

Notably, it was students themselves who emphasized the issue of student trauma[172] more than any other actor group. However, many other interviewees deemed teachers to be of fundamental importance in this arena as well. They agreed that in the end it is the teacher who has the power to either promote vengeful feelings in the classroom, or to teach valuable lessons about the past. Thus, while nearly all respondents concurred that the conflict should be taught, it is of course also dependent on the teacher's purpose in teaching it.

Summary of Findings on Perceptions

Referring back to the main question of this chapter (*What are the key perceptions regarding teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes?*), I will now summarize the most prominent *perceptions*. Although some did express difficulties of teaching local history, all respondents questioned agreed that local history ought to be taught in SMA history classes. Unsurprisingly as it is a far more contentious topic, there was greater disagreement among respondents in terms of whether the recent conflict should be taught in the classroom or not, and more controversially, in what ways.

Even still, an overwhelming majority of respondents expressed that the recent conflict should be included in SMA history classes despite any perceived dangers, most notably awakening trauma and arousing vengeful feelings amongst the students. The main related purposes for teaching the conflict in class, as conveyed by each actor group without prompt, include teaching the causes and effects of the conflict and 'learning from the past.' By discussing the violent past through these themes, the 'future generation' is understood to be able to impact a brighter future.

Furthermore, all actor groups agreed that in the end the teacher plays a central role in this topic, as it is he or she that knows the characters of the students best and also has the power to influence them. Thus, the vast majority agrees to the importance of teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes, dependent on the teacher's purpose in teaching it and on the students' personalities.

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[170] FG.2 (Male SMA-N student)
[171] FG.2 (Male SMA-N student)
[172] FG.2 (SMA-N students); FG.3 (SMA-N students)

7. TEACHING THE RECENT CONFLICT: PRACTICES

"My purpose is to keep peace and make the peace stronger in Aceh" *[173]*

Photograph 8: *Students during an English lesson at an SMA-N school in Banda Aceh*

[173] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)

3. In what ways do *policies* and key *perceptions* influence SMA history teachers' *agency* to teach the recent conflict, and what are teachers' subsequent *practices*?

In reference to the conceptual scheme *(figure 4)*, *policies* and key *perceptions* are understood to influence history teachers' *agency* by either allowing teachers room to teach the recent conflict or by constraining them from teaching the topic. This influence on their *agency* in turn impacts teachers' formulations of pedagogical strategy based on their options (room/constraint) to educate students on the subject. These strategies to work within the room they are allowed then inform teachers' classroom *practices*. The concluding chapter will address the next step, the impact of these *practices* on a lasting peace.

In answering the above sub-question, this chapter is broken into four sections. I begin by examining the influence of *policies (findings in chapter 5)* on teachers' *agency* to teach the conflict. Next, I explore the influence of key *perceptions* regarding the importance of teaching the recent conflict *(findings in chapter 6)* on teachers' *agency* to do so. Furthermore, I look at history teachers' subsequent responses to these impacts by considering their classroom *practices*. Finally, I respond to the entire sub-question by means of a reflection on this whole chain of events[174] from the impact of the *policies* and *perceptions* on teachers' *agency*, to teachers' formulation of strategy, to their strategic action- classroom *practices*. The formulation of strategy is a crucial step in the impact process and consequently must be addressed. However, teachers' formulations of strategy cannot be evaluated until first reflecting on the influences on teachers' *agency* and then examining their subsequent *practices*. Thus, this phase in the SRA chain of events will not be discussed until the reflection section, which concludes this chapter. A deconstruction of the conceptual scheme is presented throughout the sections of this chapter in order to focus the reader's attention to the phase of influence at hand.

Influence of Policies on Teachers' Agency



Figure 5: *Deconstruction of Conceptual Scheme: Policies*

[174] The SRA 'chain of events' refers to the chain of influence on teachers' *practices*. The strategically selective context is understood to influence the strategic actor's *agency*, which in turn influences the strategic actor's formulation of strategy, which influences their *practices*. This chain of events is portrayed within the inner box of the conceptual scheme.

To begin, what is the influence of *policies* on teachers' *agency*? Considering the *policies* surrounding the teaching of the recent conflict in SMA history classes *(see 'summary of findings on policies,' chapter 5)*, the fact that there is no *policy* prohibiting the teaching of the recent conflict implies no impact on teachers' *agency*. Furthermore, the fact that principals generally did not know how frequently their history teachers were teaching about the recent conflict, let alone if the topic was taught at all, implies little or no apparent impact of principals' *policies* on teachers' *agency*.

However, the amalgamation of no mention of the conflict in the official curriculum, minimal or no mention in the textbooks, a 20 percent room for local content within total school hours and limited class hours for history may impact teachers' *agency* to teach the topic in terms of material and temporal constraints. Yet, these constraints could perhaps be lessened if the DoE's plan to provide supplementary local content textbooks and curriculum does in fact come to fruition in 2014.

Influence of Key Perceptions on Teachers' Agency



Figure 6: *Deconstruction of Conceptual Scheme: Perceptions*

Having addressed the impact of *policies*, what now is the influence of key *perceptions* on teachers' *agency*? To start off, a few teachers described the danger of discussing the conflict in public settings prior to the 2005 MoU, for risk of imprisonment, beating, or even death.[175] In contrast, I was told that those who discuss the conflict, in public or private settings, are not in jeopardy of punishment these days.[176] Although some teachers blamed national or provincial governance for the lack of conflict inclusion in the curriculum (which may make it more difficult to teach), none expressed fear in teaching about the conflict.

Further reflecting on key actors' *perceptions* of the importance to teach the conflict in history classes *(see 'summary of findings on perceptions,' chapter 6)*, an overwhelming majority of respondents, including teachers, agree that the recent conflict should be taught in SMA history classes. Actors also agreed on the main aspects to be included when teaching the recent conflict. Namely, respondents agreed that the causes and effects of the conflict be reflected upon with the purpose

[175] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); Teacher friend of I.7
[176] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)

of 'learning from the past.' These equivalent *perceptions* imply little or no impact on teachers' *agency* to teach the topic.

Moreover, the majority of actors concur that the history teacher plays a decisive role in how history is taught, stating that as it is the teacher who knows his or her students best, it is the teacher who must use this knowledge to teach in a way that navigates students' potential feelings of trauma and revenge. The fact that key actors generally support teachers in determining pedagogy with which to teach the conflict that is both reflective of the characteristics of the students and avoids these main dangers shows general support from the strategically selective context in Banda Aceh, and thus little or no impact on their *agency* to teach the conflict. This support and space from dominant actors[177] is essential because, as Lopes Cardozo (2011b) asserts, "In order for teachers to be transformative, they need space to maneuver and genuine levels of support and training within the broader strategic selective context" (17).

Most history teachers pointed to student interest, signified through student questions about the conflict, as a main reason that they discuss the theme in class.[178] As one teacher explained, "It depends on if student want to ask about it or not. If so, I will explain it."[179] Thus, *perceptions* of students regarding the importance of discussing the conflict in class are seen to be a main influence of *perceptions* on teachers' *agency*.

Before moving to the next section concerning teachers' *practices*, it is important to express that *agency* is not only affected by external influences within the broader strategically selective context, but also by internal values such as identity and experience (Hay 2002). For instance, I sensed that some teachers who were very affected by the conflict were more passionate about discussing it in the classroom. This being said, although it is important to acknowledge, this notion is outside the scope of this research and is something that could be examined in future research.

Teachers' Practices



Figure 7: *Deconstruction of Conceptual Scheme: Practices*

In now gauging SMA history teachers' *practices*, I analyze responses from teachers themselves regarding frequency of teaching this type of lesson, as well as techniques and content used in teaching it. Furthermore, I examine students' accounts of

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[177] 'Dominant actors' such as policymakers, NGO/IGO officials, principals and even students
[178] I.13 (SMA-N history teacher); I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.20 (SMA-N PPKN teacher); I.28 (Pesantren history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[179] I.28 (Pesantren history teacher)

teacher *practices* since they are the best indicators of whether teachers are indeed discussing the conflict in the classroom. In interviewing eight SMA history teachers about their *practices* of teaching the recent conflict I asked, "How frequently do you teach the recent conflict in class?" Seven expressed that they teach about the conflict in the classroom, with two stating "often,"[180] one saying "sometimes,"[181] and the rest agreeing to teaching it in the classroom, although remaining more vague about the frequency. In other words, the vast majority of my sample, seven out of eight SMA history teachers self-reported to teaching about the recent conflict in class. Furthermore, the one teacher remaining in the sample did not respond with a flat out "never," but rather responded with "no comment."[182] When further probed about the importance of discussing the conflict in class or not, she answered that students already knew about it from the media and/or life experience so it is not in the teacher's "capacity" to teach about.[183]

A minority of teachers articulated that they only discuss the conflict in the twelfth grade and some more expressed that they mainly discuss it in this grade. This is since the timeline of the curriculum better aligns with the timeline of the conflict in this grade *(see 'policies' chapter)*. However, based on student interest, the majority of teachers interviewed do discuss the conflict in the tenth and eleventh grades at least sometimes as well. I was told that students are very interested in this topic and ask questions about the conflict regularly, particularly about GAM, the leader of the movement, the causes for the conflict, and its effect on Indonesia.[184] Nearly all students confirmed a keen interest in talking about the conflict in class.

On top of student interest, one teacher emphasized the importance of discussing the conflict with all grades instead of limiting it based on ease of curriculum ties, saying, "All grades, because students often forget so we keep discussing the former topic in the next meeting to measure their understanding."[185] Moreover, I was told that if there is a 'hot issue' in the local media related to the conflict such as the Spring 2013 flag issue *(see 'local context' chapter)*, teachers are more inclined to bring it up in class. As one teacher expressed, "If in the media the current issue is about this, about Indonesia and Aceh movement, talking about this hot issue in the society, [teachers] will talk about it."[186]

Considering the dangers of 'trauma' and 'vengeful feelings,' concepts presented as reasons for teaching the conflict cautiously, some teachers believe that they have the ability to help their students transform their negative feelings. This can supposedly be achieved by teaching the conflict in a certain way. One teacher described the ideal situation as a process of making the students "neutral" so that the small percentage

[180] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.28 (Pesantren history teacher)
[181] I.25 (SMA-N history teacher)
[182] I.23 (SMA-N history teacher)
[183] I.23 (SMA-N history teacher)
[184] I.7 (SMA-S history teacher); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[185] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher)
[186] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)

of students in her class who may feel vengeful about the conflict do not hold onto this negative feeling in their hearts. She furthered that by asking students key questions and avoiding "hot discussions" among the students she can help them to "vanish" this feeling. Moreover, this teacher noted that this is a great impact, since it is easier to help an individual student than to try to help society as a whole.[187]

Moving now to instruction techniques and content, the main ways that teachers expressed teaching about the conflict include through class discussions,[188] as examples[189] and by reading supplementary materials when available, [190] such as when there are 'hot issues' in the media. The reasons for using these methods are twofold. Firstly, it is a more interesting and interactive way to teach. As one teacher said, "I often use discussion session with students. It is more effective compared to asking and answering question because only some students participate."[191] Secondly, this further accentuates the point that there is little formal content written regarding the conflict *(see 'policies' chapter)*, which in turn limits teachers' pedagogical toolkit.

More specifically, while discussing the conflict, teachers have to focus on certain content. Although teachers' *perceptions* of how the conflict should be taught (i.e. what content should be emphasized) have already been explored, it is important to also look at what the majority say that they do teach in *practice,* as the two (the ideal and the real) can differ. The majority of history teachers emphasized that they do not talk in detail but "in general," and that the purpose of this is students' understanding of the context and of the 'lessons learned.'[192] Therefore, the emphasis is on basic information such as "who, what, where, when, why and how,"[193] as well as the causes of the conflict[194] and its impacts on Acehnese life and Aceh's relationship with the rest of Indonesia.[195]

With students' input I was able to validate teachers' responses. With a sample of four focus groups, including 19 students in total, all 19 agreed that the recent conflict is brought up in the history classroom, either "sometimes,"[196] "often,"[197] or as much as "very often."[198] Students further agreed with teachers, saying that they are sometimes taught about the conflict by means of supplementary media if they

[187] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher) This SMA-N teacher explained that she can control the questions students ask if they are sensitive questions, and channel them into important discussions which can 'vanish' revenge feelings.
[188] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher)
[189] I.17 (SMA-N history teacher); I.7 (SMA-S history teacher)
[190] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[191] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher)
[192] I.19 (SMA-N history teacher); I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); I.25 (SMA-N history teacher); I.13 (SMA-N history teacher)
[193] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher)
[194] I.25 (SMA-N history teacher)
[195] I.9 (SMA-N history teacher); I.26 (SMA-S history teacher); I.28 (Pesantren history teacher)
[196] FG.2 (SMA-N students)
[197] FG.1 (SMA-S students)
[198] FG.4 (SMA-N students)

are discussing current issues about the conflict.[199] Otherwise, students concurred that teachers teach the topic by means of example[200] and class discussion.[201] The students understood that they talk about this conflict theme in history class for the purpose of "additional information."[202] Furthermore, the topics students stated as prominent within this type of teaching include the reasons the conflict began and its implications,[203] as well as the story of the war from a human-perspective (a 'people story'), focusing on how it affected the Acehnese people.[204] Thus, it can be affirmed through asking students the same questions as teachers that teachers do in fact teach the topics they say, and in the ways they purport to.

However, it should be acknowledged that although these history teachers do generally discuss the topic in class, it is not necessarily the case that all history teachers do. As one student rightly pointed out, the personality of the teacher very much plays a factor in if the conflict is taught or not. He furthered that only the "talkative" history teachers will bring up the topic, but that the "silent" ones will say, "okay, just open your book."[205] Thus, again we note the importance of internal factors such as personality and identity and their role in if/how the recent conflict is taught. Furthermore, it is important to note that although also out of the scope of research, the discussion of the recent conflict, as students and others explained,[206] is not limited to history class, but may also be included in 'PPKN' (civic education), religion, or sociology classes.

Reflection on Teachers' Formulations of Strategy and the SRA Chain of Events



Figure 8: *Deconstruction of Conceptual Scheme: SRA Chain of Events*

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[199] FG.1 (SMA-S students)
[200] FG.1 (SMA-S students)
[201] FG.1 (SMA-S students); FG.2 (SMA-N students); FG.4 (SMA-N students)
[202] FG.2 (SMA-N students)
[203] FG.4 (SMA-N students)
[204] FG.4 (SMA-N students)
[205] FG.2 (SMA-N students)
[206] FG.1 (SMA-S students); I.10 (Expert); I.20 (SMA-N PPKN teacher)

According to Hay (2002), "Intuitive, routine or habitual strategies and *practices* are based upon *perceptions* (accurate or otherwise) of the strategic context and the likely consequences of specific actions" (132). Thus, teachers are understood to reflect on the contingency consisting of specific *policies* and *perceptions* (the strategically selective context) in forming their strategies and then acting upon their *practices*. Having first examined the impacts on teachers' *agency (shown as #1 in figure 8, above)* and second teachers' *practices (#2 in figure 8, above)*, this final section serves two purposes. Firstly, the section reflects on teachers' formulations of strategy, the as of yet overlooked phase in the SRA chain of events *('#3' in figure 8, above)*. This is done by linking data findings on *policies*' and *perceptions*' impacts on SMA history teachers' *agency* with findings on history teachers' *practices*. After having explored this step, I secondly respond to the sub-question of this chapter, utilizing the entire SRA chain of events.

As the majority of SMA history teachers professed the importance of teaching the recent conflict in SMA history classes, we can deduce that in an ideal world with no outside influences that the majority of teachers would teach the topic. Furthermore, since seven out of eight teachers teach the conflict to some extent, the question remains, in what ways do these history teachers strategically formulate their strategies to teach the conflict (the assumed desired result of the majority) in response to the impacts of the strategically selective context on their *agency*. In other words, what strategies do teachers devise in order to teach the conflict within the room given?

Before evaluating teachers' formulations of strategy, it is important to acknowledge my limited understanding regarding the strategic formulations in the heads of teachers, or any actor. Furthermore, even if these strategies can be hypothesized, it is difficult to deduce if they are 'intended' or 'intuitive' (Hay 2002). Even still, these formulations are theorized with humility based on data gathered, in order to place the final link in the chain of events illustrated in the conceptual scheme.

To begin, the fact that some teachers mentioned discussing the conflict either only in the twelfth grade or mainly in the twelfth grade may show a strategy to orient themselves with the layout of the curriculum in their teaching. Furthermore, the fact that teachers teach about the conflict through class discussions, as examples and through supplementary materials indicates a strategy to work within the textbook restraints and absence of books related to the topic in Indonesian in general. Furthermore, teachers themselves generally expressed their freedom (*agency*) to talk about the conflict, showing minimal effect of *policies* on their *agency*. Yet, the discovery that teachers admitted to teaching the recent conflict less or in more vague terms than students expressed perhaps shows that teachers strategically express their *practices* ambiguously in public.

Students' *perceptions* seem to outweigh curriculum restrictions (*policies*) for most teachers who express prioritizing students' wishes in the classroom. For instance, the majority of teachers discuss the conflict in all three grades of secondary school

at least sometimes, despite the curriculum ties and despite the lack of class hours, especially in the tenth grade and IPA classes. The reason for this was often cited as students' questions and eagerness to discuss the topic in class. This is indicative of a general tendency towards a student-centered pedagogy. Even still, as students are interested and ask questions about the conflict and since teachers also find it important to discuss in class, it is difficult to conclude whether the history of the conflict would still be taught were there to be no student questions concerning it.

In terms of the questions asked in class, students mostly ask about the causes and effects of the conflict as well as about Hasan di Tiro and the formation of GAM. Although teachers generally discuss the causes and effects in the classroom, none reported to discuss anything related to GAM in detail. This *practice* may be suggestive of teachers' response to the perceived general support from key actors for lessons such as causes and effects, but not for more contentious or politicized lessons. For example, there is largely support from key actors for lessons that are believed to benefit the students, 'the future generation,' in learning about mistakes in the past and that are also sensitive to potential trauma and vengeance. Contrarily, teaching about GAM's formation is not largely supported in that it could bring trauma to the surface and/or ignite revenge.

To sum up the entire chain of events influencing teachers' *practices*, I now return briefly to this chapter's sub-question, (*In what ways is SMA history teachers' agency to teach the recent conflict influenced by policies and key perceptions, and what are teachers' subsequent practices?)*. In general, *policies* allow for flexibility, but also provide a lack of support for history teachers to teach about the conflict. Overall, key *perceptions* support teachers in deciding to teach the conflict, although only if the teaching is done in a cautious manner, taking students' characteristics into account. These impacts on teachers' *agency* lead teachers to weigh their options of how and in what ways to engage the recent conflict in the classroom. Although it is difficult to make statements about the strategies of others, teachers are seen to make decisions to teach the conflict in ways that align with the room allowed within the curriculum. The support from key actors to teach causes and effects of conflict as well as students' interest are implicated as affecting teachers' decisions. Teachers, who overwhelmingly teach the conflict in class, predominantly focus on the causes, effects and 'lessons learned' in their *practices*. What then is the impact of these *practices* on a lasting peace in Banda Aceh? This will be addressed in the 'reflection and conclusion' chapter to come.

8. REFLECTION & CONCLUSION

Photograph 9: *The sun setting on downtown Banda Aceh with Mesjid Raya Baiturrahman (Grand Mosque) in the background*

In what ways do *policies* and key *perceptions* influence secondary school (SMA) history teachers' agency to teach the recent conflict (1976-2005), and what is the perceived impact of their classroom *practices* on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia?

This final chapter examines the perceived impact of *practices* on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, integrating material from the entire paper. Before answering the main question of this research *(above)*, two things ought to be further clarified. Firstly, the impact on a lasting peace is stated as 'perceived' as it is observed based on data findings tied with dominant theory in the body of literature. Furthermore, by labeling the impact in this more modest manner, I acknowledge the small scale of this study as well as the fact that there are of course more aspects that must work in coordination with education in order to achieve a lasting peace *(see 'theoretical framework')*. Secondly, when addressing the '*practices*' perceived to impact a lasting peace, the reader should view *practices* not as a separate entity on their own, but as affected by a whole chain of events from the influences of *policies* and key *perceptions* on teachers' *agency*, to teachers' formulations of strategy, weighing their options given the room or constraint, which then lead to their subsequent *practices*. Furthermore, teachers' *practices* should be understood as situated within the local context.

It should be stated that the first half of the main research question (*In what ways do policies and key perceptions influence secondary school (SMA) history teachers' agency to teach the recent conflict (1976-2005)?)* has been addressed in the previous chapter *(see chapter 7, 'practices')*. Therefore, in order to avoid repetition by summarizing findings regarding the many influences on *practices* again, the reader should refer back to this chapter, in particular the reflection section at the end, if necessary.

This chapter begins with a 'theoretical reflection' on the as of yet unanswered fourth sub-question of this research, which is consistent with the second half of the main research question, *(What is the perceived impact of their classroom practices on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia?)* and could only be answered now following all three data chapters. Furthermore, while the first three sub-questions were mostly or entirely based on data findings, this sub-question is based entirely on theory and thus conclusions made must be understood to be more modest as such.

In reflecting on this question, dominant data findings will be tied together with the main theoretical concepts of history education post-conflict *(see 'theoretical framework')* that provide a lens with which to evaluate the perceived impact on a lasting peace in Banda Aceh. Following the reflection section, 'concluding remarks' are provided. Finally, the thesis ultimately concludes by looking forward, with 'important steps for the future' and recommendations further research.

Theoretical Reflection

4. What is the perceived impact of SMA history teachers' *practices* on a lasting peace?

Dominant theory on the topic tells us that the violent conflict must be discussed within schools in post-conflict scenarios, even in the 'medium-term post-conflict period' that Aceh province is in (Novelli & Smith 2011), in order to move forward and cement a lasting peace. However, the conflict must also be taught in certain ways so as to avoid reigniting conflict. Because of this, in addition to the room and support that teachers need in order to be 'transformative' in their *practices* (Lopes Cardozo 2011a), there are certain measures that must be taken in order for *practices* to positively influence a lasting peace. In answering the sub-question *(above)*, the perceived impact of classroom *practices* on a lasting peace is analyzed using the following five positive and five negative aspects of teaching history post-conflict *(see also 'theoretical framework,' table 2)*.

1. Conflict-sensitive history education / War as routine
2. Commission / Omission
3. Multiple perspectives approach / Single perspective approach
4. Critical historiography / Non-critical historiography
5. Dealing with the past / Denying the past

I begin this reflection with the concept of **conflict-sensitive history education**, which involves aspects of both local relevance and acknowledgement of conflict triggers. Based on this theory, it is critical that a strong emphasis is not placed on past violent conflict, as it does not nurture a nonviolent present (Bush & Saltarelli 2000). Yet, it is also important to discuss past conflicts in schools, as they are historical fact. Thus, the teaching must be done in a 'conflict sensitive' manner with potential conflict triggers in mind.

According to Smith (2010), government *policies* are especially important in ensuring a conflict-sensitive education post-conflict. However, the *policies* surrounding the teaching of the recent conflict in Banda Aceh do not appear to be conflict sensitive. This is because the official MoE history curriculum does not mention the Java-Aceh conflict and textbooks either do not mention it or do so briefly and vaguely. In terms of dominant *perceptions* of conflict-sensitive history education, there is a disagreement among respondents about how the facts should be conveyed. While some believe that the teaching the conflict should be done in an unbiased or neutral manner, slightly more respondents believe that there should be an emphasis on the peace, with facts transmitted in a positive fashion. As the overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that the conflict should be taught in history classes and the slight majority deemed that conflict facts should be transmitted in a way that

emphasizes the peace in order not to normalize violence, the dominant *perceptions* reflect a conflict sensitive standpoint.

Digging deeper, the aspects of local history that should be discussed according to respondents often highlight violence, for example, the fierce resistance and struggles of the ancestors and the heroes and heroines of the Dutch resistance. Although these themes are related to the Dutch conflict and not the recent Aceh-Java conflict, this lauding of violence, struggle and martyrdom could be interpreted as treating '**war as routine**,' which is in turn understood to detract from a lasting peace. However, according to Acehnese respondents, these 'violent' themes, which are taught by all teachers in *practice*, can be emphasized without reigniting conflict. Contrarily, I was told that they are taught in order to convey certain lessons, such as 'learning from the past' for a brighter and non-violent future. Furthermore, there is a dominant *perception* that by using Islam as a lens for teaching the 'struggle' and 'sacrifice' of the past, history education can remain conflict-sensitive. Although it is difficult to judge if this is the case as an outsider, it could be a good example of history education that acknowledges both historical facts, while still advocating non-violence, and furthermore maintaining local relevance, which in this case is heavily Muslim.

In terms of teaching *practices,* besides the potential normalization of violence in terms of the Dutch conflict, teachers mainly discuss the causes and effects of the conflict in general, and emphasize concepts such as 'learning from the past.' Moreover, teachers expressed a desire for students to 'love Aceh' and be able to make better decisions for the future of the province and the country. Thus, although also problematic to assess as an outsider, *practices* seem to imply hope for a peaceful and successful future, as opposed to intent to recreate a rebel movement.

Turning now to the importance of historical fact **commission**, there is an evident disconnect between the *perceptions* and *practices* surrounding recent conflict history, and the *policies*. Whereas the vast majority of key actors agree that the conflict should be taught in history classes and 88 percent of teachers discuss it in the classroom, the conflict is omitted completely from the curriculum and entirely or practically entirely from the textbooks. Although teaching about the conflict must be done with a conflict-sensitive approach, it is essential to include details about the topic in the curriculum and textbooks. This is because, according to Bush and Saltarelli (2000), the omission of these facts can distort history.

In addition to the commission of historical facts, a '**multiple perspectives approach**' to history education is also vital. This means that although a national curriculum is necessary, many different voices and 'lived experiences' must be incorporated into the class materials (Shah 2012; Paulson 2011). *Policies* seemingly do not support a multiple perspectives approach, as the history shown in MoE curriculum and textbooks is generalized as Javanese history. Furthermore, the national curriculum does not seem to include an Acehnese voice in its recent adaptation from KTSP 2006 to 2013. This reproduction of dominant group values

and history is common to post-conflict contexts, according to Shah (2012), and also dangerous as it presents a '**single perspective approach**.' Because of this, Amnesty International (2013) has urged the MoE to include sections on the Aceh conflict and human rights abuses that occurred in that period into the national curriculum.

Furthermore, insufficient supplementary materials with which teachers can use to teach Acehnese history in the space allowed for local content further constrains teachers' *agency*, and may reveal a dangerous 'single perspective approach' to education in Indonesia. In response to this problem, Shah (2012) emphasizes the need for locally written history curriculum. In applying this to Banda Aceh, the current production of a local content textbook appears promising, yet without having seen the content, a conclusion cannot be made on the assortment of perspectives included in said textbook.

Contrasting again with *policies*, there is a *perception* amongst key actors that local history plays an essential part in building a proud Acehnese identity in the student body, which is also understood as lacking. In reflecting on this *perception*, this pride and love for Aceh could presumably build or break a lasting peace if there were to be a conflict trigger, depending on if it is combined with a sense of nationalism or not. However, since students often expressed pride in their country, and not just their province (perhaps a result of a multiple perspectives approach not solely focusing on either country or province), the love and pride seemingly only contribute to a perceived lasting peace. As a result of *perceptions* of key actors in Aceh, teachers are supported in using a multiple perspectives approach to history education, teaching local history when possible within the room allowed.

In terms of *practices*, teachers demonstrate a multiple perspectives approach, especially in schools utilizing 'Curriculum Plus' as it allows for more hours to discuss local content. Furthermore, teachers often express a desire to teach more local content if *policies* would allow. Paulson (2011) applies the idea of a multiple perspectives approach to teaching *practices*, saying that the causes and consequences of conflict should be taught, while avoiding favoritism. Thus, they should be taught as interpreted by 'official bodies' such as truth commissions (3). Though it is not possible to teach one official history of causes and effects due to the lack of a truth commission, a result of government *policies*, teachers do predominantly teach the causes and effects of the conflict, emphasizing lessons that can be learned.

I now examine '**critical historiography**,' which entails students both learning to question where their historical knowledge comes from (Bush & Saltarelli 2000) and being allowed the room to ask questions about contentious topics such as recent conflict (Paulson 2011) in the classroom. In terms of *perceptions*, the ability to question historical knowledge was largely not mentioned as an important skill for students to learn. Rather, the stress was placed more on the teacher and how he or she teaches the conflict, as well as the policymakers and how they can skew the conflict based on their motives. However, in terms of being allowed room to ask

difficult questions concerning the past, students generally expressed deep interest in learning about the recent conflict and therefore ask about the conflict frequently in the classroom. Thus, students do seemingly have this room to ask the 'difficult questions,' enabled by teachers' *practices*.

I now turn to explore the final aspect of '**dealing with the past**,' which argues for history teaching that allows for psychological healing post-conflict (Cole & Barsalou 2006; Cole 2007). Beginning with *perceptions*, trauma and revenge were presented as the two main reasons to teach the conflict with caution or not teach it at all, perhaps showing a notion of '**denying the past**' instead of framing the facts in a way that can enable psychological healing. However, the vast majority still agreed that the conflict should be taught, and argued that the teacher plays a key role in teaching the conflict while navigating these potential negative feelings as it is he or she who knows the characteristics of the students best. Furthermore, teachers are seen to 'deal with the past' in *practice*, because of the caution exuded in which topics are taught regarding the conflict. As one teacher explained, she can 'vanish' feelings of trauma and revenge in the students affected through careful discussions of the conflict, avoiding 'hot topics.'[207]

Having examined the five aspects of history education presented in this research that are assumed to contribute to a lasting peace, as well as their counterparts that detract from it, I now return now to the final sub-question, *(What is the perceived impact of SMA history teachers' practices on a lasting peace?)*. While recognizing that it is problematic to make assumptions as an outsider, I will briefly review what these aspects of history education post-conflict indicate about the impact of the majority of teachers' *practices* on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh. Firstly, although Aceh's more distant conflict with the Dutch may or may not be taught in a 'war as routine' manner, the recent conflict is taught with a conflict sensitive approach by discussing causes and effects in general terms, and emphasizing 'learning from the past' for a non-violent future. Secondly, teachers overwhelmingly teach the conflict in classes, and commission of historical facts, while still maintaining conflict sensitivity, is done as much as possible. Thirdly, a 'multiple perspectives approach' to history is taken on as much as room allows for local history content, since it is acknowledged by teachers (and others) to be of paramount importance. Fourthly, teachers both allow room for and respond to students' questions about the conflict in class, showing support for a 'critical historiography.' Fifthly and finally, teachers demonstrate 'dealing with the past' in the ways that they take students' potentially latent feelings of trauma and revenge into account in discussions surrounding the conflict. Consequently, since *practices* generally align with aspects argued to positively impact a lasting peace, we can say that SMA history teachers are perceived to contribute to a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia.

[207] I.26 (SMA-S history teacher)

Concluding Remarks

"The past must be reckoned with in order for societies to move forward after violent conflict"[208]

In rounding off this thesis, I would like to bring the focus back to the 'bigger picture' of this research by revisiting the main research question in its entirety: *In what ways do policies and key perceptions influence secondary school (SMA) history teachers' agency to teach the recent conflict (1976-2005), and what is the perceived impact of their classroom practices on a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia?*

Recognizing the profound impact that education,[209] and more specifically history education, [210]can have on peacebuilding, this research contributes a case study to the understudied issue of how this impact occurs in practice in a post-conflict setting. This impact was evaluated by examining teachers' *practices* of discussing the recent conflict, as well as the *policies* and key *perceptions* that affect their *agency* to teach the topic. Furthermore, this study seeks to illustrate the influence that history education can have on a lasting peace in a post-conflict setting such as Banda Aceh. Having reflected on dominant theories and original findings, this research argues that the persons best qualified to attain this goal are history teachers themselves, but that they require greater room and support to have maximum impact.

SMA history teachers are seen to play a central role in how history is taught in the classroom in Banda Aceh. As the majority of respondents agreed, it is the teachers who know their students best. Thus, they have the capacity to strategize pedagogies based on the students' personalities that will achieve the desired goal- for the students to learn from the violent past in order to lead a bright and peaceful future. Furthermore, SMA history teachers generally teach the conflict in spite of any constraints, and reflecting on their *practices* tied with main theories showed an impact on a lasting peace in Banda Aceh. Yet, based on findings, theory, and the understanding of the influence of *policies* and key *perceptions* on the strategic actor's *practices*, teachers are also in need of more room and support to have a greater impact**.**

Perceptions of key actors regarding the importance of teaching the recent conflict generally align with teachers' *practices*, showing overall levels of support. However, *policies* of teaching the conflict, in the form of MoE curriculum and textbooks, do not align with dominant *perceptions* of importance, nor do they allow teachers the room and support they require to teach the conflict effectively. In particular, the omission of historical facts combined with a single perspective approach to history in the

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[208] (Paulson 2011: 2-3)
[209] (See for example, Buckland 2006; Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2006; Dupuy 2008; Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008; Novelli & Smith 2011; Smith 2010; Smith 2013; UNESCO 2011)
[210] (Cole 2007; Cole & Barsalou 2006; Paulson 2011; Torsti 2008)

curriculum and textbooks negatively impacts teachers' *agency* to teach the topic, which in turn does not nurture a lasting peace. Consequently, this study concludes that teachers are powerful change makers who are able to shape the 'future leaders' of Banda Aceh and thus play an important role in securing a lasting peace, but that they also face obstacles. Although education is acknowledged as only one contributor to a lasting peace, SMA history teachers require greater room and support from governance *policies* in order to live up to their true potential and accordingly have a greater impact on the transitioning from a 'fragile' to a lasting peace in post-conflict Banda Aceh, Indonesia.

Important Steps for the Future

While acknowledging my role as a foreign researcher and the short timespan of my research, it is presumptuous to advise policy changes. However, in line with the conclusions above, I recommend a couple of important steps for the future of SMA history classes.

- SMA history teachers require greater room and support to teach the recent conflict in the classroom. As a result, I recommend two main changes:
- I advise that both the MoE curriculum and textbooks include a more polyvocal history of Indonesia.
- Reiterating the Amnesty International (2013) statement, I recommend that the recent conflict (1976-2005) be included in the national curriculum. Furthermore, I advise that it should also be included in national textbooks.

Recommendations for Further Research

Over the course of this research, several ideas emanated in terms of variations on this study that could be further explored. These recommendations are outlined below.

- A comparative study of SMA history classes in conflict 'fire areas' of Aceh province.
- A comparative study of how the recent conflict is taught in pesantren history classes.
- A follow-up study based on the new local textbook (in production) and KTSP 2013 curriculum for the eleventh and twelfth grades (also in production).
- A variation study that in place of focusing on outside influences on teachers' *agency* and their following formulations of strategy and *practices*, explores the influence of teachers' identities and personal experience on their classroom *practices*.
- A variation study analyzing 'conflict sensitive education' and the potential need for conflict sensitivity training in SMA schools.

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Appendix

ACTOR GROUPS	NUMBER of RESPONDENTS	GENDER[211]	RESPONDENT ID NUMBER[212]
Education Policymaker	**4**	---	---
DoE	*2*	M; M	I.15; I.16
MPD	*2*	M; M	I.3; I.5
NGO/IGO Official	**4**	M; M; M; F	I.4; I.8; I.12; I.29
SMA-N Principal	**5**	M; F; M; F; F	I.14; I.18; I.21; I.22; I.24
SMA-N Vice-principal	**1**	M	I.27
Secondary School History Teacher	**9**	---	---
SMA-N	*6*	F; F; F; M; M; F	I.9; I.13; I.17; I.19; I.23; I.25
SMA-S	*2*	M; F	I.7; I.26
Pesantren	*1*	F	I.28
Secondary school Student	**19** (as 4 separate focus groups)	---	---
SMA-N	*15 (as 3 focus groups)*	F; F; F; M; M; F; F; M; M; M; F; F; F; M; M	FG.2; FG.3; FG.4
SMA-S	*4 (as 1 focus group)*	M; M; F; F	FG.1
Other Expert	**6**	---	---
Professors; Researcher; Historian; English SMA Teacher; PPKN SMA Teacher	*6*	M; F; M; F; M; F	I.1; I.2; I.6; 1.10; 1.11; I.20
TOTAL	**48** (29 from interviews; 19 from focus groups)	25 M/23 F	---

Table 5: *Respondent Table*

[211] Listed in chronological order of respondent number.
[212] 'FG' here refers to a focus group and 'I' refers to an interview. The number is in chronological order of meeting respondents.