

# Cities and Conflict in Fragile States in the Developing World

**Jo Beall, Tom Goodfellow and Dennis Rodgers**

*[Paper first received, May 2011; in final form, March 2013]*

## Introduction

The articles presented in this Special Issue draw on five years of research by the Cities and Fragile States programme of the Crisis States Research Centre, based at the London School of Economics and Political Science. This programme, funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), was an exploratory ‘blue skies’ endeavour that set out to examine the relationship between cities, states and conflict in conflict-affected parts of the developing world. Our starting-point was the neglect of cities in contemporary discourses of state-building and state fragility, despite the fact that it is widely accepted that cities have historically played a critical role in processes of state consolidation, transformation and erosion (see, for example, the work of Charles Tilly, 1989, 1992, 2010). Our research has found that cities are still central to such processes, but in much more

complex ways. The articles that make up this Special Issue represent a sample of the larger research output of the programme, which we also refer to throughout this introductory article.

We begin by exploring the relevance of Tilly’s ideas for cities in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the contemporary developing world, highlighting how these constitute a useful starting-point for analysis, but also how cities, states and conflicts in these contexts differ significantly from those characteristic of the period examined by Tilly. Focusing particularly on the changing nature of conflict, we then outline an original tripartite typology of contemporary conflicts, distinguishing between sovereign, civil and civic conflict. We draw on the research presented in this Special Issue and beyond to explore the ways in which cities are incorporated into these different forms

**Jo Beall** is at the British Council, 10 Spring Gardens, London, SW1A 2BN, UK. Email: jo.beall@gmail.com.

**Tom Goodfellow** is in the Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: tom.goodfellow@gmail.com.

**Dennis Rodgers** is in the Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Bute Gardens, Glasgow, G128RS, UK. Email: dennis.rodgers@glasgow.ac.uk.

of conflict as either targets, spaces of relative security, or incubators of further strife and antagonism. We further suggest that, in relative terms at least, there is a global trend towards the third form: civic conflict. Fundamentally urban in character, when this form of conflict becomes violent and destructive it represents a major contemporary threat to human security world-wide.

The article then discusses in more detail the ways in which conflict of one kind can and does transition into another. In particular, we explore how sovereign and civil conflict have given way to civic forms of conflict across a broad range of contexts, underlining the need for an urban focus in conflict studies. Given this shift towards ‘urban wars’ (Beall, 2006, 2007) and ‘slum wars’ (Rodgers, 2007, 2009) of the 21st century—in contrast to the “peasant wars of the 20th century” analysed by Wolf (1969)—we then turn to the critical question of urban politics. This involves considering the circumstances under which urban political processes can channel social conflict into non-violent forms of *generative civic engagement* with the potential to stimulate dynamic and inclusive development in fragile settings. We also examine how, by contrast, in some circumstances conflict in cities is effectively deferred or suppressed rather than channelled into non-violent politics. Finally, linking these processes back to the question of state fragility and the dialogue with Tilly with which we began, we conclude by reflecting on what these shifting conflict dynamics and their urban ramifications mean for state-building and state fragility more generally.

This article will not present an outline of each contribution to the volume in succession, in the style of a conventional introduction. It will instead weave insights from the various articles contained in the Special Issue—and other works emanating from the wider corpus of research from the Cities and Fragile States programme—into a broader narrative about cities and conflict in fragile

states. This allows us to present a more holistic and structured discussion of the issues.

## Cities, States and Conflict: Varying Forms, Evolving Dynamics

Tilly (1989, 1992) famously analysed how medieval European states emerged principally as a result of wealthy urban elites seeking protection for their capital by striking bargains with power-holders, who in turn were seeking revenue to fight wars and expand their territory. Through their interaction, war-making and urban capital consequently ‘made’ the state. The contemporary global ubiquity of urban violence suggests that the intersection of cities, states and violent conflict remains significant today, albeit in more complex ways, and concomitantly that Tilly’s work potentially constitutes an important point of reference. However, while his posited relationship between war-making and state-making has been explored and problematised in relation to the contemporary developing world (see Leander, 2004; Taylor and Botea, 2008), the current relevance of Tilly’s ideas about the specific relationship between cities and violence in such contexts has not been explored in any detail. It is on this latter connection that we focus here.

A first important point when considering the contemporary significance of Tilly’s theories is to interrogate how cities have changed, how states have changed and how armed conflict itself has changed. At their most basic, medieval cities were critical loci of capital accumulation according to Tilly (1989), and it is this that made them so important for both war-making and state-building. Today, however, many—if not most—cities in the contemporary developing world derive power from a wider range of sources than the accumulation of capital and expansion of productive means. This is particularly clear in the developing world.

Many developing countries experienced some form of colonisation, mostly by Europe. Pre-colonial cities in these territories were generally quite small and any capital accumulation functions they had were transformed, if not destroyed, by the colonial encounter. Under colonialism, cities took on new functions, mostly related to facilitating the extraction of resources and the export of primary products, as well as military protection of colonial regimes (Beall and Fox, 2009). The effect was the disproportionate growth of colonial capitals and ports, giving rise to primate cities without the expansion of productive means that had spurred urban growth in Europe (Herbst, 2000). Critically, urban elites who were central to colonial state-building activities lacked the autonomy vis-a-vis power-holders that Tilly noted their European counterparts had historically exercised. In other words, the subordination of (wealthy) cities to (coercive) states that took place over a long period of dynamic interaction in Europe was in place from the outset of the colonial encounter.

The urbanisation that accompanied early post-colonial experiments with import-substitution industrialisation was often not accompanied by the anticipated expansion of productive capacities and urban employment. These were stunted further by the subsequent shift to primary commodity exportation, a trend reinforced by increasing international pressure for open economies. Urban populations continued to grow apace, however, with the result that today “many low and middle-income countries are suffering the pangs of the urban transition without the potential benefits of extensive industrialisation” (Beall and Fox, 2009, p. 58). The consequence is that, in many parts of the developing world regions, and especially in large parts of Africa, rapid urbanisation has proceeded with neither an autonomous urban capitalist class nor an industrial working class that could engage the state.

States in such contexts are also very different from those in the period discussed by Tilly. International borders are largely ‘fixed’ and the principle of national sovereignty has been established. National borders are protected internationally so that states no longer have to consolidate their internal territorial power and legitimacy (Herbst, 1996). Meanwhile, the international economy has become globalised to the extent that, where state consolidation has not yet fully taken place, global pressures and incentives mean that both economic management and political accountability can become ‘externalised’ (Clapham, 1996). Indeed, there is an extensive literature on the intersection of cities and city-regions as global economic hubs that often operate independently of states (Friedmann and Wolf, 1982; Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991, 2006; Scott, 2001; Taylor, 2004; Robinson, 2006). Given this context, the Tillyean state-making dynamic between domestic coercion and domestic capital is potentially less relevant (on this point, see also Leander, 2004).

Lastly and most critically in recent decades, conflict has also changed. The wars that fostered European state-making were fought between medieval sovereigns and, once state systems began crystallising, between the governments of consolidated states. Yet we know that interstate warfare has been in decline for some decades now (Kaldor, 2006; Newman, 2009). At first, commentators saw this decline as being accompanied by a rise in the number of civil wars, with the violence of the first half of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda seeming to validate this claim. However, civil conflicts have in fact overall been declining since 1992 (Newman, 2009; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). At the same time, many forms of low-level instability and conflict are on the increase (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2009; Fox and Hoelscher, 2010). These are difficult to categorise, but

seem to be increasingly important in a general global context of rapid urbanisation.

It is clear that there is no general relationship between contemporary patterns of conflict and institutions that might parallel Tilly's posited relationship between war and state-making in medieval Europe. Despite this, thinking about the relevance of Tilly's work for the present highlights the fact that the varied relationships that exist between conflict and state-building today are clearly still mediated by urban arenas. On the one hand, this is perhaps not surprising since in the final analysis cities are where much state-building concretely takes place. On the other hand, however, this particular focus is potentially an especially fruitful lens to adopt in relation to so-called fragile states, which have become a major feature of the contemporary developing world. As Di John (2010) has pointed out, there is little agreement as to either the causes or consequences of fragile states, mainly due to a general failure to consider their historical development seriously. Focusing on the experiences and roles of cities in fragile states provides a tangible point of reference to take debates forward, particularly when specifically considered in relation to conflict, which is generally seen to be an inherent indicator of state fragility.

In this regard, our research proposes to frame the relationship between cities and fragile states by means of a new typology for thinking about contemporary conflicts. Our framework goes beyond a categorisation based on the usual internal/international distinction, but also beyond the problematic distinction often made between political violence on the one hand and social, economic or criminal forms of violence on the other. In particular, the parameters we identify provide an analytical vehicle for categorising contemporary conflicts in relation to the spatial particularities of urban vis-a-

vis rural areas, exploring the ways in which cities and urban governance are implicated in violent conflict and its mitigation.

At its most basic, our framework identifies the existence of three types of conflict

- sovereign conflict;
- civil conflict;
- civic conflict.

Sovereign conflict refers to situations where international actors are directly and explicitly involved in warfare. Whether through international territorial disputes or overt external intervention in civil wars, state sovereignty is challenged in juridical or political terms. Cities are affected by sovereign conflicts insofar as these conflicts invariably involve attempts to capture and control capital cities, which (along with primate cities) are important 'containers' of sovereignty. Control of capital cities can obviate the need to seize the whole territory because they are generally seats of executive authority, sites of economic wealth and centres of political power. Thus they constitute what Putzel and Di John (2012) identify as 'significant territory', by virtue of their symbolic and leverage value.

Civil conflict refers to violent conflict between two or more relatively organised groups within sovereign boundaries. While there are major debates concerning how to define civil war, we define it in the following way, based largely on Keen (1998), Cramer (2002) and Sambanis (2004a). In civil conflicts parties to the conflict are politically and militarily organised within sovereign borders (although there is often external support) and have publicly stated political objectives (as well as often unstated economic objectives). The government (or a group claiming to represent it) is invariably a principal combatant and one or more of the groups involved must be seeking to take

control of part of the state, or to supplant or restrict core functions of the state in a given geographical area. In civil conflicts, the monopoly of violence formerly held by the state is already partially taken over by rebels, local warlords, organised criminal groups or private militias.

Classically, civil conflicts have been closely associated with terrain, such as the proximity of ethnic groups to homeland territories and the social and military attributes of rural areas where military organisation can more easily take place beyond state reach (Kalyvas, 2006). More recently, based on studies of civil conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, research has shown that cities also provide the social infrastructure for sustained armed resistance to state power (Staniland, 2010). Our research suggests that the relationship between civil conflict and urban areas is complex: cities sometimes serve as places of refuge or relative security during conflict and can become economic hubs in war economies, but they may also become sites of insurgency and combat, particularly when civil conflict overlaps with civic conflict.

Civic conflict we see as the violent expression of grievances (which may be social, political or economic) vis-a-vis the state or other actors. The term refers to diverse but recurrent forms of violence between individuals and groups that might include organised violent crime, gang warfare, terrorism, religious and sectarian rebellions, and spontaneous riots or violent protest over state failures such as poor or absent service delivery. Civic conflicts can sometimes overlap with civil conflict, and they too may involve high levels of organisation and powerful economic or political interests. However, civic conflict differs from civil conflict in that it is ultimately a reactive process. While civil conflict is essentially instrumental, civic conflict is generally expressive and although

it can involve attempts to reconfigure power relations this usually falls short of taking control of formal structures of power.

Civic conflict generally takes place in cities, which provide the physical, social and demographic infrastructure for significant mobilisation against marginalisation or state neglect. Although civic conflict may spill beyond city boundaries, and there can be commonalities and intersections between civil and civic conflicts, civic conflict is fundamentally urban in nature and is often associated with inherent urban qualities such as density, diversity and compressed inequality (Beall *et al.*, 2010; Rodgers, 2010). Although it is a broad concept that cannot be specified too rigidly, we argue that violent civic conflict is: generally linked to state failures to provide security, growth and welfare in urban areas and is exacerbated by the particular nature of the latter; composed of violent events that may be isolated, or connected by a sustained, organised campaign or set of political demands; rarely an attempt to take permanent control of the state, even in part; and, consequently less 'all or nothing' or 'indivisible' (Hirschman, 1994; Di John, 2010) than sovereign and civil conflict and thus, in theory, more amenable to peaceful resolution. It is the link with the state and the association with citizenship rights (Earle, 2011) that lead us to use the term 'civic conflict' rather than describing these types of violence as variously political, economic or social. This highlights the critical point that many types of civic conflict are deeply political *as well as* being social or economic.

The tripartite construct of sovereign, civil and civic conflict provides a useful and flexible heuristic framework for analysing the ways in which cities and conflict intersect at a time when conflict is changing but there is little consensus as to the fundamental character of this change. At the same

time, it is critical to realise that there is significant fluidity and porosity among these three forms of conflict, which in the real world are often interconnected. Before proceeding to examine these forms, however, it is important to clarify some issues regarding the use of the term conflict in this paper more generally. Broadly conceived, conflict is a normal feature of human societies and is not always considered in negative terms. We therefore make a terminological distinction in the paper between *contestation*—which is an inevitable condition and part of development and change—and the way in which this can either be channelled destructively through *conflict* (taken in the remainder of this paper specifically to refer to violent conflict) or in a more constructive way through generative forms of *engagement*. We return to this in the penultimate section of the paper.

### Cities as Critical Locations in Different Forms of Conflict

In this section, we look more closely at the three forms of conflict and their modes of interaction with cities. In *sovereign conflicts*, capital cities are of unmistakable importance given that they are the sites where sovereign authority is concentrated. While the ‘city-as-target’ has long been a feature of warfare (Bishop and Clancey, 2003), the way in which cities—and especially capital cities—are involved in sovereign conflicts has changed. In the age of mass media, the heightened awareness of (and aversion to) casualties on the invading side strengthens the preference for aerial bombardment of cities as the primary route to military victory, particularly where Western democracies are involved. Moreover, as resource- and population-intensive sites, cities are not only targets for attack but increasingly sites of resistance as well. For example, in

response to the onslaught by US and UK forces on cities such as Basra, Baghdad, Kandahar and Kabul, belligerents in countries under attack increasingly resorted to forms of ‘asymmetric warfare’ that tend to involve unpredictable acts of urban terror as opposed to more ‘conventional’ military approaches (Hills, 2004).

The result is what Arjun Appadurai (1996, pp. 152–153) has called “the implosion of global and national politics into the urban world”, ushering in a “new phase in the life of cities” where enmities have been transformed into “scenarios of unrelieved urban terror”. This ‘urbanisation of insurgency’ has posed enormous challenges to conventional military practice (Graham, 2004; Abrahamsen *et al.*, 2009). Urban insurgents under attack in Iraq and Afghanistan exploited the physical characteristics of their cities to force US military personnel to come into very close proximity, thereby exposing them to much higher casualty risk (Graham, 2007, p. 8). Western democracies expect quick, decisive victories based on superior technology and are particularly vulnerable to ‘asymmetric’ strategies that are casualty-intensive, unpredictable and protracted (Coker, 2002).

Even during lulls in combat or periods of reconstruction, international decision-making impacts on cities. As Esser demonstrates in this Special Issue, international involvement in reconstruction efforts in Kabul led to the marginalisation of the city’s needs as an urban centre (Esser, 2013). The city became a symbolic epicentre of state-building, an important site of national reconstruction, and remains the primary locus of the international presence in the country. Yet ironically the city itself is in dire straits. It has mushroomed in size—in large part as a result of on-going conflict across the country as a whole—but international decision-makers operate ‘over the heads’ of municipal actors. Indeed,



“alliances of national and international political and economic interests” have “challenged the legitimacy of local stakeholders in the city” (Esser, 2013). Esser refers to this phenomenon as ‘overdetermination’, highlighting the way in which the contradictions among multiple competing spheres of power concentrated in the urban space of Kabul can, somewhat ironically, marginalise city-level actors and citizens.

The capture of cities as confirmation of victory is also a goal in many *civil conflicts*. Contemporary sovereign wars often involve formidable air power that moves directly on cities to ensure a quick and decisive win (Llandau-Wells, 2008). By contrast, in civil wars the capture of cities tends to be the end point after protracted periods of guerrilla warfare or armed combat, often conducted in the countryside. The struggle to capture capital cities can ultimately stand in the way of peace. Our research richly illustrates the difficulties that a single military organisation can face in trying to capture both the cities and the countryside, prolonging civil war, as is evident in our studies of Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2009) and Mozambique (Sumich and Honwana, 2007). A consequence is that, for substantial periods of time, capitals and other significant cities can be places of relative calm and security during civil war. One such example is Kinshasa, which has been a relative island of calm in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country ravaged by conflict (Freund, 2009; Kapagama and Waterhouse, 2009). That cities can be ‘eyes of the storm’ (Giustozzi, 2009) has far-reaching implications. It generally leads to the influx of rural or displaced populations into urban areas, resulting in massive urban growth, evident for example in Kinshasa or in Luanda during Angola’s protracted civil war (Beall, 2007).

For cities to provide a haven in civil conflicts is fairly common. In Kashmir, for example, conflict has been confined largely

to the hinterlands, while Srinagar supported a large migrant population that sought security and livelihoods in the city, as well as many ‘floating’ elements of the military and paramilitary forces (Venkatachalam, 2007, p. 23). Smaller, regional urban centres can also become sites of security in civil conflict, as illustrated by the case of Gulu in northern Uganda, explored by Branch in this Special Issue. Here, rural populations were displaced on an enormous scale as a result of the war between the Ugandan state and the Lord’s Resistance Army. While Gulu remained ‘a haven of relative safety’ throughout the civil war, with the cessation of hostilities it mushroomed in size from a modest provincial town to become Uganda’s second-largest city (Branch, 2013).

Hence, somewhat counter-intuitively, rapid urbanisation and urban stability often go hand-in-hand when a civil war is raging nearby. During most of the two decades of guerrilla struggle in Nicaragua during the 1960s and 1970s—until the final stages in 1978 to 1979—and then again during the ‘Contra’ war that broke out in the 1980s, military action was largely confined to the countryside. The capital city, Managua, remained peaceful even as it grew (Rodgers, 2009). Similarly, as Gazdar *et al.* (2010) note, the city of Quetta, which is situated in a conflict-prone region on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, has grown extremely rapidly and absorbed a potentially explosive combination of rival ethnic and sectarian groups, yet it “has historically witnessed relative peace between its major communities” (Gazdar *et al.*, 2010, p. 10). Within Afghanistan throughout the turbulent 1980s, cities had a seemingly ‘protective screen’ that insulated them from the violence. Even after this screen was dramatically smashed in the capital city, certain major urban centres such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat managed

to stay relatively peaceful under the dominance of significant warlords (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 11).

One reason for this is that elites actively involved in warfare often work hard to keep cities secure even if they are benefiting from the conflict at large, as is evident again in the case of Quetta (Gazdar *et al.*, 2010). Cities play a vital role in war economies and as hubs in associated national and transnational networks, which might be jeopardised by open urban conflict. Moreover, elites themselves are often resident in cities and are averse to exposure to conflict, often wielding consolidated coercive power to prevent conflict impacting too heavily on urban centres, as was the case with the warlords dominating Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat (Giustozzi, 2009). It seems, therefore, that there are two principal circumstances under which cities come to represent the 'eye of the storm' in civil conflict: when insurgent parties have not been able to penetrate the city, or when there are deliberate strategies on the part of warring parties or economic elites with access to the city to prioritise urban security.

Under such circumstances cities can become increasingly autonomous vis-a-vis the central state. A clear example is provided in this Special Issue by Vlassenroot and Büscher (2013) in their discussion of Goma in eastern DRC, a town that, in the context of the devastating violence and bloodshed of the Congo wars (1996–2003), began in many ways to thrive. With the central state largely incapacitated, the city's residents benefited directly from being the focal point for cross-border transactions between the densely populated, mineral-rich eastern part of the country and the regional markets of Rwanda and Uganda. Goma was increasingly seen as a place of opportunity with its own distinct 'trans-boundary' identity. At the same time, it was the headquarters of the Rassemblement

Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) rebel movement and viewed as a 'rebel' city, increasing its sense of autonomy from a state largely based in Kinshasa, almost 2000 km to the west. Returning to Tilly, Goma is in some respects like Italian city-states such as Genoa in early modern Europe, in that its autonomy was built primarily on trade and the power of trading elites (Tilly and Blockmans, 1994). However, the city's independent stance has also been fuelled by its role in civil conflict and as a regional centre of gravity for international intervention, and indeed by its links across the border to Rwanda—something illustrated starkly by its capture by rebel groups allegedly linked to Rwanda in 2008 and 2012.

*Civic conflict* is directly related to the urban realm in that it generally takes place *in* cities and it is linked to the socio-economic and spatial particularities of cities, as noted earlier. Civic conflict often reflects a sense of powerlessness among certain urban groups and their efforts to engage in forms of domestic asymmetric warfare against the state, or against city-based elites or other urban groups by whom they feel threatened. To a degree, it is possible to distinguish between civic conflict among different elements of urban society (such as gang warfare, ethnic pogroms, violent crime) and civic conflict between state and society (for example, violent protests, riots, terrorism, violence towards state personnel and property or state violence towards citizens). However, the distinction is rarely clear-cut and our research demonstrates that civic conflict generally implicates the state, either directly or indirectly.

For example, in this Special Issue, Gazdar and Mallah (2013) explore how non-state violence has gained legitimacy in Karachi through the need for contracts to be privately and informally enforced due to the state's failure to provide basic protection of land rights. Violence has become so



prevalent in the city, they argue, because in the absence of the state's monopoly over either force or institutions for planning and contract enforcement, various distinct modes of informal economic governance compete violently to control economic transactions on lucrative urban land. To take another example from our research, the communal riots that have scarred the history of Ahmedabad in Gujarat, western India, and which erupted with particular force in 2002, on the face of it represent conflict between Hindu and Muslim elements in the city. Yet Hindu ethno-religious identity also became associated with an exclusionary state-making project in Gujarat, with the state deploying its power in the service of one religious group over another (Chandhoke, 2009). Ultimately the state withdrew and refrained from either preventing Hindu mobs from implementing their macabre designs, or from protecting Muslim citizens (Chandhoke, 2009).

Systemic discrimination and neglect embodied in state institutions at the city and supra-urban levels are central to almost all civic conflicts. Rodgers argues for the specificity of the urban realm as a locus of both political power and population concentration, noting that

it is the existence of a disjuncture between the two that generally leads to the emergence of urban violence, and not the fact that cities are putatively inherently alienating spaces (Rodgers, 2009, p. 960; see also Rodgers, 2010).

Moreover, Goodfellow (2013) suggests that, where urban citizens feel that they lack adequate voice vis-a-vis state institutions, violent protest can come to be seen as a more effective tool of communication than formal political channels and consequently can become something of a social norm in state-society interaction. More generally, our research—along with several large

quantitative datasets such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset developed by Trinity College Dublin and the University of Colorado<sup>1</sup>—suggests that civic conflicts are an increasing feature of the urban experience. We further suggest that they are often associated with the aftermath of civil and sovereign conflicts. The three forms of conflict and their relationships to the urban arena are summarised in Table 1. In the following section, we trace the dynamics by which conflict transforms itself or can be transformed by external interventions, helping to make sense of the seeming paradox that cities can be islands of stability and security in the midst of conflict, and yet are associated with some of the bloodiest violence of recent times.

## Civic Conflict and Conflict Transitions

Conflicts are not static and can reshape themselves in response to new threats, shifting objectives, fresh actors and changing economic circumstances; indeed, in many countries “civil war is only part of a cycle of violence” (Sambanis, 2004b, p. 193). Sovereign, civil and civic conflicts can become layered upon or replace one another. This section examines the dynamics of such transitions. We begin with a brief examination of some of the interactive effects between sovereign, civil and civic conflicts and then explore how the cessation of civil war can actually generate new civic conflicts, with important implications for peace and reconstruction policy interventions.

The case studies in this Special issue that most clearly illustrate how the involvement of external sovereign powers can jeopardise the stability and security provided by cities in civil conflicts are those from Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. Echoing some of the points made by Esser, Moxham and Carapic

**Table 1.** Three forms of conflict and their relationship to the urban arena

<i>Form of conflict</i>	<i>Role of cities</i>	
Sovereign	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involves conflict explicitly across international borders</li> <li>• State sovereignty challenged In decline since mid 20th century</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capital cities seen as ‘containers’ of sovereignty</li> <li>• Aim of invading power is often to capture major cities swiftly and with minimal casualties (often through aerial bombardment)</li> <li>• Cities increasingly constitute sites of ‘asymmetric’ resistance</li> <li>• Cities are primary sites for international intervention in post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ul>
Civil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Parties to conflict are primarily organised within one state’s boundaries</li> <li>• One or more of the combatants is (or claims to be) the government</li> <li>• One or more parties aim to take control of all or some of national territory</li> <li>• Monopoly of violence by the state is already partially broken In decline since late 20th century</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cities are often ‘endpoints’ for wars largely fought in rural terrain</li> <li>• Cities can be relative havens of security or ‘eyes of the storm’</li> <li>• Cities are often key hubs in civil war economies, protected by warring elites</li> <li>• Where urban areas are relatively secure, this can result in extremely rapid urban growth</li> <li>• Civil conflict can spill into urban areas, particularly when it overlaps with sovereign or civic conflict</li> </ul>
Civic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involves violent expression of grievances against the state or other urban actors</li> <li>• Largely reactive in nature, rather than an instrument to take control of state</li> <li>• Often stimulated by state failures to provide security, growth and welfare in urban areas</li> <li>• Usually less ‘indivisible’ than civil conflict</li> <li>• On the rise relative to other forms of conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cities are the primary sites</li> <li>• Urban manifestations of conflict can be linked to the concentration of elites and state organisations in urban areas</li> <li>• Also linked to (but not caused by) the urban qualities of density, diversity and compressed inequality</li> <li>• May erupt in cities in the transition out of civil or sovereign conflict</li> <li>• Can be observed in many urban areas that were ‘havens’ of relative security</li> <li>• Can be exacerbated by misguided international reconstruction efforts rooted in city</li> </ul>

(2013) explore the ways in which international involvement at the end of civil war can have devastating impacts on capital cities. After the cessation of civil conflict in Timor-Leste, the focus on reconstructing

the capital city, Dili, amounted to an effort to integrate Timor-Leste externally into the global economy at the expense of the state’s internal integration, leading to a ‘disembedded’ city that was “largely distinct from

the national territory itself" (Moxham and Carapic, 2013). A strongly neoliberal approach to reconstruction, rooted in Dili, neglected both poverty alleviation and agricultural production in the countryside and job creation in the city itself. What appeared as urban-biased reconstruction efforts, due to the presence of international actors in Dili, in fact were not; if anything they were nationally and internationally biased with little attention to local needs in the city. Thus Dili's development was economically and politically isolated not only from the rest of the country, but also from the majority of its own urban population. The deceptive appearance of urban opportunity and development, however, stimulated the influx of villagers to the city. Yet the drastic absence of urban infrastructure, services and jobs stimulated the explosion of civic conflict in Dili on a huge scale in 2006, just a few years after the civil war leading to Timor-Leste's independence had officially ended.

If—as our research indicates—civil conflicts tend to drive rapid urbanisation, then civic conflict is a common *response* to that rapid urbanisation. For example, as noted previously, the northern Ugandan town of Gulu was a haven of relative stability during the civil war; however, Branch (2013) suggests that, now the civil war has ended in northern Uganda, the movement of many displaced people into the town has become a major catalyst of instability within the city itself. Rising crime rates and increased insecurity may be harbingers of worse to come. Thus paradoxically, "it is not war but peace that may introduce conflict in Gulu" (Branch, 2013). Presenting Gulu as "a displaced persons' slum with only the most rudimentary 'city' attached", Branch explores how conditions that emerged in Gulu during its decades as the 'eye of the storm' of the northern Ugandan civil war fundamentally reshaped Acholi society. A

new form of 'town life' emerged, previously unknown in northern Uganda and based on a highly monetised economy, which alarmed Acholi elders. However, the enduring crisis in rural Acholiland meant that the large numbers of new urban youth, women and ex-Lord's Resistance Army combatants seeking anonymity were reluctant to leave Gulu and head back to the villages even when the war ended. Consequently, it is becoming "the principal refuge for an anomic, frustrated and economically and socially desperate population", while "many of the factors that had preserved relative stability within Gulu during the war are now absent". Strange though it might seem, this replacement of civil with civic forms of conflict is in fact a pattern observed repeatedly in our research across a range of contexts (Davis, 2007; Rodgers, 2007, 2009; Giustozzi, 2009).

Our analysis of civic conflict serves to draw attention to the fact that interrelated social, economic and political changes have resulted in an urbanisation of conflict in many parts of the developing world. This research helps to fill some of the gaps in existing bodies of work on contemporary violent conflict, providing qualitative insights into what drives some of the new forms of 'low-level' instability that seem to be ascending in place of conventional war and—crucially—why they tend to proliferate in urban areas. Moreover, while the research in this Special Issue was mostly undertaken prior to the 'Arab Spring', the urban dimensions of the uprisings in North Africa are readily apparent and have been discussed elsewhere (de Souza and Lipietz, 2011). These events clearly reflect the degree to which cities have been the locus of the most dramatic conflicts in recent years, and illustrate that new civil wars emerging tend to have their origins in urban, civic discontent rather than rural rebellion. Meanwhile, new work on the

‘urbanisation of displacement’ (more than 50 per cent of refugees globally are now acknowledged to be living in urban centres rather than camps) has further highlighted the links between the urban displaced and violence (Haysom and Loughna, 2013), reflecting many of the trends discussed here.

### Urban Politics: Violent Civic Conflict and Generative Civic Engagement

A key condition affecting the likelihood of progress towards peace in cities characterised by violent conflict—along with control of land, the distribution of economic benefits and threats to group identity—is the extent to which a wide range of urban dwellers have access to policy-making and the political process (Bollens, 2007, p. 11). Our city studies illustrate that the failure to provide and institutionalise vehicles for non-violent contestation over civic issues, or what we term *generative civic engagement*, often leads either to violent civic conflict or to ‘deferred’ conflict with dubious implications for peaceful urban development over the longer term.

The cases of Bogotá and Medellín, which are explored by Gutiérrez *et al.* in this Special Issue, show how political innovation at the city level can reduce violent civic conflict. Colombia has been ravaged by civil conflict for much of the past half-century, with government and paramilitary forces fighting across different parts of the country for over four decades. Homicide rates in the three major cities, Bogotá, Medellín and Cali, were among the worst in the world for much of the 1980s and 1990s, with the violence in these cities being related in part to the wider civil conflict and the role of paramilitaries and other political actors in urban criminal networks, especially in Medellín. Hence, Colombia’s major cities

were never really the ‘eye of the storm’ in the country’s civil conflict.

Since the 1990s, however, Bogotá and Medellín have seen an extraordinary reduction in civic conflict, described by Gutiérrez *et al.* (2013) as a “metropolitan miracle”. Against a backdrop of soaring levels of urban violence, the new 1991 constitution ushered in a fresh style of politics that allowed for wider political participation and debate, facilitating the rise of mayors who were often independent of traditional political parties, which enhanced their room for manoeuvre. Galvanised by these mayors, new coalitions of essentially middle-class and elite interests emerged that crossed traditional divides but were relatively unified in their collective commitment to the provision of public goods targeted at the wider urban society, (albeit largely for their own benefit given that crime was impacting on them as well as on the urban poor). The ‘miracle’ was achieved by the particular configuration of the political coalitions forged in the two cities at critical junctures, alongside the creation of institutions and processes for generative engagement—including the media, which played an important role in facilitating the building of support for the mayors’ agendas (Gutiérrez *et al.*, 2013). It was also arguably the presence of a substantial and differentiated urban middle class that made the critical difference in these coalitions. Had only a narrow coalition of dominant elites been involved in decision-making, the costs of providing private security for themselves would not have been prohibitive and thus the motivation for provision of broader urban public good would not have been present, as Rodgers (2008a, 2008b, 2011) has observed with respect to Managua.

Our research has also analysed processes of developmental urban coalition formation in the face of violence and instability in other contexts—for example, in Durban and the

KwaZulu-Natal region of South Africa during the transition from apartheid. Alongside other factors, a weariness with violent civic conflict propelled disparate elite and middle-class groupings into the inclusive developmental coalition that ultimately secured peace and political stability for the city and province, albeit through difficult and contested processes (Beall and Ngonyama, 2009). At the same time, it is important not to overplay the inclusionary nature of class coalitions in these cities. In Bogotá and Medellín, the majority of poor urban residents were not welcomed into public debate, which reflected the “the self-image of the bourgeoisie according to which the defence of its interests equalled the defence of the society as a whole” (Gutiérrez *et al.*, 2013). While there has been a reduction in violent crime and homicides, the institutionalisation of mechanisms to allow for the articulation and negotiation of conflicts between the lower and higher rungs of urban society needs further attention.

By contrast with these relatively encouraging examples, the case of Ahmedabad illustrates what can happen in the absence of a coalition with shared interests in the promotion of generative urban civic engagement. Here, antagonisms between Hindus and Muslims were longstanding and had been persistently reproduced in the city, especially since 1995 when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took power, further politicising Hindu identity and binding it closely to the state (Chandoke, 2009). Historical failures on the part of civil society organisations in Ahmedabad throughout much of the 20th century contributed to the failure of channels for generative civic engagement to emerge. For example, trade unions in the city never really developed a working-class culture and identity, and neighbourhood politics also failed to transcend caste and religious barriers. It then only took a certain historical contingency—which came in the

form of the rise to power of the religious right—to provide the trigger for the translation from non-associationalism to violence (Chandhoke, 2009).

The lack of channels for urban civic engagement can therefore facilitate the manipulation of social tensions into extremely violent conflict outcomes. In other cases, however, it may be that conflict does not emerge even in the absence of such channels. This is particularly likely in post-conflict contexts where governments benefit from a considerable ‘peace dividend’ among a population fatigued by conflict. For a certain period of time, incoming post-conflict governments that draw their legitimacy from ending war can enjoy high levels of goodwill. In such situations, persistent social tensions and antagonism may be deferred, with people prioritising peace and security over asserting demands against the state or other social groups. However, there is a limit to how long ‘latent’ conflicts can be deferred if new ruling elites fail to deliver on all their promises, and these can often surface in cities—for example, in the form of violent urban riots, as our research has demonstrated in relation to Maputo (Sumich, 2010) and Kampala (Goodfellow, 2010; Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013).

Deferred conflict can take the form of active suppression of urban social conflicts by the state. This has arguably been the case in post-genocide Kigali, where government structures are relatively strong and centralised, taking a very active role in organising and supervising urban associational life. In the aftermath of the horrific events of 1994, a regime with an ambitious agenda for state consolidation and economic growth has managed—through various approaches discussed by Goodfellow and Smith in this Special Issue—to contain violent civic conflict in Kigali to an impressive degree. This cannot, however, be separated from strategies that limit room for political activity. As is often the case in nations torn apart by war,

a suspicion of organised politics of any kind among much of the population has facilitated the maintenance of a prolonged 'post-conflict' moment in which space for civic political engagement is highly constrained. Under such conditions, the possibility remains that civic conflict is effectively being deferred rather than channelled through non-violent political processes, with potentially dangerous implications for the future. Certainly, there are signs both from within Kigali and also from recent events in the Arab world that it is in the urban realm that unaired grievances and tensions are most prone to ignite into violence.

Although they are often spaces that concentrate conflict, cities arguably also offer the greatest potential for the development of inclusive institutions for managing political conflict rather than suppressing it. The concentration of diverse actors and state institutions in cities make them, in theory at least, critical spaces for institutionalised forms of political debate and participation that translate into demands on the state rather than violence. As already shown, such an outcome is far from inevitable, however, and the role of political agency in directing social tensions towards generative ends is critical. In many ways, cities' potential for constructive engagement and their vulnerability to conflict are two sides of the same coin. The challenge of urban politics is to channel (unavoidable) urban social contestation away from (often avoidable) urban violence, but in ways that foster dialogue that advances developmental ends rather in ways that defer and potentially incubate conflict.

## Conclusion: Cities, Conflict and State Fragility

In linking our research on cities and conflict to questions of state fragility, we return to Tilly's concern with processes of state

consolidation, erosion and transformation. Elsewhere, we have discussed in detail how different approaches to managing and manipulating the social tensions that are part-and-parcel of urban life impact on these processes (Beall *et al.*, 2011). The key point is that for fragile states to avoid further erosion of their institutions and instead both to *consolidate* and *transform* into what Tilly and Blockmans (1994, p. 9) call 'multi-purpose organisations' delivering security, growth and welfare, urban political processes allowing for the non-violent expression and negotiation of conflict are essential. This is about much more than urban management or 'good urban governance'. It necessitates a recognition that politics is not about consensus and technocratic solutions; rather, it is about 'dissensus' (Pieterse, 2008) and contentious processes of negotiating political settlements at the city level.

Contrarily to what is often repeated, creating channels for generative civic engagement is not simply about multiparty elections, which in some fragile situations can actually serve to precipitate conflict rather than reduce it when implemented without broader institutional transformations. Instead, promoting generative civic engagement involves recognising the importance of city politics and the urban public sphere for the negotiation and consolidation of interest-groups, from elite coalitions to trades unions, associational life and civil society more broadly, so that counter-powers to the state become institutionalised: a distant but discernible echo of the Tillyean processes whereby urban capitalists bargained with the holders of coercive power in early modern Europe. Cities provide opportunities for people to come together across multiple factional, socio-economic, religious and ethnic divides to coalesce around interests with unifying and constructive potential, including the pursuit of urban public goods that reduce the negative externalities of urban life such as violence



and congestion, from which even elites often cannot fully insulate themselves.

Civic engagement and political mobilisation are therefore not important simply for their own sake: they are steps towards developmental state-building and transformation. While one aspect of state fragility is the incapacity of states to respond to societal demands, it is also paradoxically the case that populations often do not demand *enough* of the state, largely because the mechanisms are not in place for them to do so. Stunted civil societies have focused on individual patrons rather than generating a culture of citizenship and civic rights, and ultimately states can only achieve developmental transformation if their citizens can claim the institutional space to engage the state itself. With this in mind, the collective action advantage of urban relative to rural populations is highly important. This advantage has long been appreciated, but has commonly been painted in negative terms as perpetuating urban biases in policy (Bates, 1981). However, as developing country populations generally, and the poor in particular, become increasingly urban (Ravallion *et al.*, 2007), we need to give due credence to the positive role of urban politics in addressing violent conflict and reducing state fragility.

While one of the main insights of our research is therefore that city-level political processes require greater attention in discourses of state fragility, it is also important that national- and international-level processes pay due attention to their impacts on potentially volatile urban areas. The importance of urbanisation for all three forms of conflict identified in this introductory article—as well as their resolution—should not be underestimated. Even though cities may remain relatively stable during some civil conflicts, this does not mean that urban powerbrokers do not need to be taken into account in efforts to end the

conflict and secure a sustainable peace. On the contrary, it implies that peace-building needs to involve efforts to bridge the rural–urban divide and to bring together stakeholders from both urban and rural areas. Poorly conceived national-level peace settlements can exacerbate the likelihood of violent civic conflict emerging. In other words *it would be a mistake to take urban security for granted* when hostilities have ended. Major population movements and socioeconomic ruptures often lead to widespread conflict in cities *after* civil war, from crime and gang warfare to violent riots and terrorism. However, while contemporary military experts are acutely aware of the importance of cities, there has been a notable lack of attention paid to the real needs of urban centres (as opposed to their symbolic significance) by development specialists concerned with humanitarianism and post-war reconstruction and development.

To conclude, most of our research indicates that, in the wake of sovereign and civil conflict, fragile states continue to urbanise rapidly. Unless issues such as urban employment, housing and basic services are addressed through political processes, civic conflict is likely to emerge in cities. Simply to treat the city as a central node for the rebuilding of national infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications is to overlook some of the profound socioeconomic changes that conflict is likely to have caused among rapidly growing—and often increasingly poor—urban populations. These urban questions need attention in their own right; to neglect them can threaten state stability. Unlike in Tilly's Europe, state-building cannot take place through bargaining between capital and coercion alone, because capital is too often linked to distant international actors with little stake in the state and coercion is delinked from the protection of territories whose sovereignty is guaranteed by international norms. Moreover, cities are

about much more than capital accumulation in the modern developing world, being also the location of burgeoning numbers of the poor who accumulate very little capital indeed, as well as being sites of intense cultural, ethnic and socioeconomic differentiation. This does not mean that Tillyean processes of city–state interaction are entirely irrelevant today, but it does imply that broader and more complex urban political settlements channelling political contestation into non-violent, generative forms are necessary to consolidate states in the modern era.

## Funding

This article is an output from a project funded by UK aid from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.

## Note

1. See [www.acleddata.com/](http://www.acleddata.com/).

## References

- Abrahamsen, R., Hubert, D. and Williams, M. C. (2009) Guest editor's introduction to special issue on urban insecurities, *Security Dialogue*, 40(4/5), pp. 363–372.
- Appadurai, A. (1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bates, R. (1981) *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Beall, J. (2006) Cities, terrorism and development, *Journal of International Development*, 18(1), pp. 105–120.
- Beall, J. (2007) *Cities, terrorism and urban wars of the 21st century*. Working Paper No. 9, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Beall, J. and Fox, S. (2009) *Cities and Development*. London: Routledge.
- Beall, J. and Ngonyama, M. (2009) *Indigenous institutions, traditional leaders and elite coalitions for development: the case of Greater Durban, South Africa*. Working Paper No. 55, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Beall, J., Goodfellow, T. and Rodgers, D. (2011) *Cities, conflict and state fragility*. Working Paper No. 85, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Beall, J., Guha-Khasnobis, B. and Kanbur, R. (Eds) (2010) *Urbanization and Development in Asia: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bishop, R. and Clancey, G. (2003) The city-as-target, or perpetuation and death, in: R. Bishop, J. Phillips and W.-W. Yeo (Eds) *Postcolonial Urbanism: Southeast Asian Cities and Global Processes*, pp. 63–86. New York: Routledge.
- Blattman, C. and Miguel, E. (2010) Civil war, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1) pp. 3–57.
- Bollens, S. (2007) *Comparative research on contested cities: lenses and scaffoldings*. Working Paper No. 17, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Branch, A. (2013) Gulu in war ... and peace? The town as camp in Northern Uganda, *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487777.
- Chandhoke, N. (2009) *Civil society in conflict cities: the case of Ahmedabad*. Working Paper No. 64, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Clapham, C. (1996) *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coker, C. (2002) *Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Military Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Cramer, C. (2002) Homo economicus goes to war: methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war, *World Development*, 30(11), pp. 1845–1864.
- Davis, D. E. (2007) *Policing, regime change, and democracy: reflections from the case of Mexico*. Working Paper No. 22, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Di John, J. (2010) The concept, causes and consequences of failed states: a critical review of

- the literature and agenda for research with specific reference to sub-Saharan Africa, *European Journal of Development Research*, 22(1), pp. 10–30.
- Di John, J. and Putzel, J. (2009) *Political settlements*. Issues paper, Governance and Social Development Resources Centre, International Development Department, University of Birmingham.
- Earle, L. (2011) *Citizenship, the 'right to the city' and state fragility*. Working Paper No. 87, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Esser, D. (2013) The political economy of post-invasion Kabul, Afghanistan: urban restructuring beyond the North-South divide, *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487773.
- Fox, S. and Hoelscher, C. (2010) *The political economy of social violence: theory and evidence from a cross-country study*. Working Paper No. 72, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Freund, W. (2009) *The Congolese elite and the fragmented city: the struggle for the emergence of a dominant class in Kinshasa*. Working Paper No. 54, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Friedmann, J. (1986) The world city hypothesis, *Development and Change*, 17, pp. 69–84.
- Friedmann, J. and Wolf, G. (1982) World city formation: an agenda for research and action, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 15(1), pp. 269–283.
- Gazdar, H., Kaker, S. A. and Khan, I. (2010) *Buffer zone, colonial enclave or urban hub? Quetta: between four regions and two wars*. Working Paper No. 69, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Gazdar, H. and Mallah, H. B. (2013) Informality and political violence in Karachi, *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487778.
- Giustozzi, A. (2009) *The eye of the storm: cities in the vortex of Afghanistan's civil wars*. Working Paper No. 62, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Goodfellow, T. (2010) *The bastard child of nobody? Anti-planning and the institutional crisis in contemporary Kampala*. Working Paper No. 67, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Goodfellow, T. (2013) *The institutionalisation of 'noise' and 'silence' in urban politics: case studies from East Africa*, Oxford Development Studies (forthcoming).
- Goodfellow, T. and Lindemann, S. (2013) The clash of institutions: traditional authority, conflict and the failure of 'hybridity' in Buganda, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 51(1), pp. 3–26.
- Goodfellow, T. and Smith, A. (2013) From urban catastrophe to 'model' city? Politics, security and development in post-conflict Kigali, *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487776.
- Graham, S. (2004) *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Graham, S. (2007) *RoboWar TM dreams: global south urbanisation and the US military's 'revolution in military affairs'*. Working Paper No. 20, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Graham, S. (2010) *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*. London: Verso.
- Gutiérrez, F., Pinto, M., Arenas, J. C. et al. (2013) The importance of political coalitions in the successful reduction of violence in Columbian cities, *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487779.
- Harbom, L. and Wallensteen, P. (2009) Armed conflict, 1946–2008, *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(4) pp. 477–487.
- Haysom, S. and Loughna, S. (2013) *Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement and vulnerability: synthesis report*. Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Herbst, J. (1996) Responding to state failure in Africa, *International Security*, 21(3), pp. 120–144.
- Herbst, J. (2000) *State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hills, A. (2004) Continuity and discontinuity: the grammar of urban military operations, in: S. Graham (Ed.) *Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, pp. 231–246. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1994) Social conflicts as pillars of democratic market society, *Political Theory*, 22(2), pp. 203–218.

- Kaldor, M. (2006) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kalyvas, S. (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kapagama, P. and Waterhouse, R. (2009) *Portrait of Kinshasa: a city on the edge*. Working Paper No. 53, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Keen, D. (1998) *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War*. London: Routledge.
- Leander, A. (2004) Wars and the un-making of states: taking Tilly seriously in the contemporary world, in: S. Guzzini and D. Jung (Eds) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, pp. 69–80. London: Routledge.
- Llandau-Wells, M. (2008) *Capital cities in civil wars: the locational dimension of sovereign authority*. Occasional Paper No. 6, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Moser, C. and McIlwaine, C. (2006) Latin American urban violence as a development concern: towards a framework for violence reduction, *World Development*, 34(1), pp. 89–112.
- Moxham, B. and Carapic, J. (2013) Unraveling Dili: the crisis of city and state in Timor-Leste, *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487774.
- Newman, E. (2009) Conflict research and the 'decline' of civil war, *Civil Wars*, 11(3), pp. 255–278.
- Pieterse, E. (2008) *City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development*. London: Zed Books.
- Putzel, J. and Di John, J. (2012) *Meeting the challenge of Crisis States*. London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Ravallion, M., Chen, S. and Sangraula, P. (2007) New evidence on the urbanization of global poverty, *Population and Development Review*, 33(4), pp. 667–701.
- Robinson, J. (2006) *Ordinary Cities*. London: Routledge.
- Rodgers, D. (2007) *Slum wars of the 21st century: the new geography of conflict in Central America*. Working Paper No. 10, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Rodgers, D. (2008a) *An illness called Managua*. Working Paper No. 37, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Rodgers, D. (2008b) A symptom called Managua, *New Left Review*, 49(January/February), pp. 103–120.
- Rodgers, D. (2009) Slum wars of the 21st century: gangs, *Mano Dura* and the new urban geography of conflict in central America, *Development and Change*, 40(5), pp. 949–976.
- Rodgers, D. (2010) Urban violence is not (necessarily) a way of life: towards a political economy of conflict in cities, in: J. Beall, B. Guha-Khasnobis and R. Kanbur (Eds) *Urbanization and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, pp. 235–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rodgers, D. (2011) An illness called Managua: urbanisation and 'mal-development' in Nicaragua, in: T. Edensor and M. Jayne (Eds) *Urban Theory beyond the West: A World of Cities*, pp. 121–136. London: Routledge.
- Sambanis, R. (2004a) What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(6), pp. 814–858.
- Sambanis, R. (2004b) Poverty and the organisation of political violence, *Brookings Trade Forum 2004*, pp. 165–211.
- Sassen, S. (1991) *The Global City: New York, London and Tokyo*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2006) *Cities in a World Economy*, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Scott, A. (Ed.) (2001) *Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Souza, M. L. de and Lipietz, B. (2011) The 'Arab Spring' and the city: hopes, contradictions and spatiality, *City*, 15(6), pp. 618–624.
- Staniland, P. (2010) Cities on fire: social mobilization, state policy and urban insurgency, *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(12), pp. 1623–1649.
- Sumich, J. (2010) *Nationalism, urban poverty and identity in Maputo, Mozambique*. Working Paper No. 68, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Sumich, J. and Honwana, J. (2007) *Strong party, weak state? Frelimo and state survival through the*

- Mozambican civil war: an analytical narrative on state-making*. Working Paper No. 23, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Taylor, B. D. and Botea, R. (2008) Tilly tally: war-making and state-making in the contemporary Third World, *International Studies Review*, 10(1), pp. 27–56.
- Taylor, P. (2004) *World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis*. London: Routledge.
- Tilly, C. (1989) Cities and states in Europe, 1000–1800, *Theory and Society*, 18(5), pp. 563–584.
- Tilly, C. (1992) *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Tilly, C. (2010) Cities, states, and trust networks, chapter 1 of *Cities and States in World History*, *Theory and Society*, 39(3/4), pp. 265–280.
- Tilly, C. and Blockmans, W. P. (Eds) (1994) *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Venkatachalam, P. (2007) *Municipal finance systems in conflict cities: case studies on Ahmedabad and Srinagar, India*. Working Paper No. 15, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Vlassenroot, K. and Büscher, K. (2013) Borderlands, identity and urban development: the case of Goma (Democratic Republic of the Congo), *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098013487772.
- Wolf, E. (1969) *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper and Row.