DRIVERS OF (IN)COHERENCE IN THE DELIVERY OF EDUCATION IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

May 2024

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The education system in Northeast Nigeria has faced severe disruptions as a result of persistent clashes between multiple militia groups and government security forces since the late 2000s. The protracted conflict has led to displacement of teachers and students and widespread school closures, as well as physical and psychological harm to children.

While much of the policy discourse focuses on rebuilding and securing school infrastructure in the northeast, this paper takes a deeper look into how relationships and dynamics among key actors in the education sector are affecting the coherence of the system, a crucial factor in enhancing quality of education.

Specifically, the paper explores horizontal and vertical alignment within the education system in areas such as financing, curriculum, teacher training and measures of learning outcomes. The study brings attention to several critical issues: low normative commitment to education among humanitarian and federal-level government actors; suboptimal coordination between humanitarian and state-level government actors; ambiguous distribution of responsibilities within the government's education sector; challenges in teacher recruitment and training; and gaps in data utilisation.

Furthermore, this paper contributes theoretically to the field of Education in Emergencies (EiE) by linking the concepts of 'coherence for learning' (Pritchett, 2015) with those of 'humanitarian–development coherence' (OECD, 2017; INEE, 2021). By doing so, it enhances our understanding of education systems in protracted crisis settings, anticipating further refinements and application of the framework developed here in future research.

Research findings presented in this paper suggest that, to improve access, quality and continuity of education in Northeast Nigeria, development and humanitarian actors should:

- **Prioritise coordination at the state level** – where the political office is most directly affected by the conflict – to create meaningful joint strategies for humanitarian, development and government actors. A combination of political negotiation and joint capacity assessment is most likely to produce clear objectives for each sector to create system-level improvements.

- **Work with existing government-led coordination structures for conflict-affected regions** (e.g. the North East Development Commission, NEDC) to create explicit and collective objectives for the education of conflict-affected children.

- **Transition to a state-level funding model for EiE** – in both conflict-affected states and those receiving internally displaced persons – instead of a vertical funding model where global-level funding from donor headquarters is earmarked to a sector and then cascaded to implementing organisations at the national and then state level. Distribution of funding directly to the state level could be more predictable and responsive to the protracted nature of conflict and climate-induced displacement. This means focusing on the needs of ministries of education within those states and creating integrated funding budgets across humanitarian and development sectors at the state level.

- **Share information across sector actors before launching education programmes at the state level.** For example, for teacher training programmes in conflict-affected states, donors and implementing partners should disclose the data on (i) the nature of training to be undertaken and how it fills a gap in present training, (ii) the geographical area of focus and any previous similar trainings undertaken, (iii) planned deployment of teachers once they are trained and (iv) clear impact indicators of training, thus moving beyond recording only 'numbers of teachers trained.' Existing groups such as NEDC and the Education in Emergencies Working Group (EiEWG) provide a good starting point for gathering and sharing this type of information.

Suggested citation

Sarwar, M., Homonchuk, O., and Nicolai, S. (May 2024). Drivers of (in)coherence in the delivery of education in Northeast Nigeria. ERICC Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.25849012.v4

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ACRONYMS

ADC	Annual School Census
BAY	Borno, Adamawa and Yobe
BESDA	Better Education Service Delivery for All
CHF	Common Heritage Foundation
CSO	civil society organisation
EDOREN	Education Data, Research and Evaluation in Nigeria
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EiEWG	Education in Emergencies Working Group
ESSPIN	Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria
ERICC	Education Research in Conflict and Protracted Crisis
FAAC	Federal Account Allocation Committee
FBO	faith-based organisation
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FME	Federal Ministry of Education
FMHDSD	Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development
FRN	Federal Republic of Nigeria
GCPEA	Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
GDP	gross domestic product
GEC	Global Education Cluster
GEP	Girls' Education Project
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Commission
IDP	internally displaced person
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
INEE	International Network for Education in Emergencies
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IQTE	Integrated Qur'anic and Tsangaya Education
ISWAP	Islamic State's West Africa Province
KII	key informant interview
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGEA	Local Government Education Authority
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NEDC	North East Development Commission
NERDC	Nigerian Educational Research & Development Council
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NMEC	National Mass Education Commission
NTI	National Teachers' Institute
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOSC	out-of-school children
PEA	political economy analysis
PERL	Partnerships to Engage Reform and Learn
PLANE	Partnership for Learning for All
RISE	Research on Improving Systems of Education
SBMC	School-Based Management Committee
UNEC	Universal Basic Education Commission
UBEC-IF	UBEC Intervention Fund

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I. INTRODUCTION

The decade-plus-long crisis in northeast[1] Nigeria with its roots in ethnic and religious group tensions, government repression and organised insurgency has led to the emergence of a layered and complex set of conflicts (Dorff et al., 2020). The insurgency has led to more than 350,000 deaths, most of which were the result of indirect causes such as lack of food and resources (Hanna et al., 2021). In Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (the BAY states) in North East Nigeria (where the conflict is the most intense and for which we have the most data), an estimated 143,000 civilians have been killed since 2009, 80% of this number in Borno alone (FRN et al., 2021).

Persistent clashes between multiple militia groups and government security forces have contributed to a decrease in the quantity and quality of education provision in conflict-affected areas across the northern states. Many schools have been closed because of damage to infrastructure caused by bullets and explosives, use of schools as shelters by the military or internally displaced persons (IDPs), teacher displacements and deaths, and kidnappings of students (EiEWG and FME, 2021). As a result, as we discuss below, government education strategies have tended to focus on rebuilding and securitising school infrastructure. Qualified teachers are often unwilling to work in conflict-prone regions owing to security risks combined with low remuneration.

Existing analyses of the education system in Nigeria's conflict-affected regions are key to understanding this context. These have included studies on the role of north–south cultural and religious divisions in the political economy of Nigeria (Bano, 2009, 2002a, 2002b), the financing and regulation of accelerated learning programmes for out-of-school children (Egbujuo, 2022), the impact of gendered social norms (Ishaku, 2020) and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic school closures on learning (Olanrewaju et al., 2021; Ogenyi, 2022). However, these analyses have tended to focus on factors internal to the education system (e.g. education sector financing by the government, state rules around teacher recruitment); there is little research into how different providers of education are aligned across the system in areas such as financing, curriculum, teacher training and outcomes measures.

This paper aims to fill this gap by analysing coherence across different system-level stakeholders that shape the political economy of education provision in crisis-affected states in Nigeria. It focuses on four areas: the Federal Capital Territory, to include a national-level lens, and the states of Adamawa (North East), Borno (North East) and Kaduna (North West), as some of the key conflict-affected states that have also been more accessible for data collection. The paper first presents a conceptual framework which combines both the humanitarian–development coherence and Education Research in Conflict and Protracted Crisis (ERICC) frameworks and then sets out the methodology for this work. It goes on to describe the Nigerian context in relation to education system coherence and then presents an analysis of norms, capacities and operations. The conclusion draws out findings on education system coherence, or lack thereof, in Nigeria, as well as identifying lessons around the application of the conceptual framework and its link to education access, quality and continuity for learners in Nigeria and elsewhere.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study has been carried out under the ERICC Research Programme Consortium, which seeks to identify the most effective approaches for improving access, quality and continuity of education to support sustainable and coherent education systems to provide holistic learning and development for children in

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[1] In this paper, 'North East' refers to Nigeria's geopolitical zone comprising six states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe). An uncapitalised 'northeast' refers to the conflict-affected states covered in this study (Adamawa and Borno).

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conflict and crisis. Not only is there is a paucity of evidence in relation to education in conflict and protracted crisis but the evidence that exists is often fragmented across a diversity of research initiatives, disciplinary perspectives and methods used (Nicolai et al., 2016; Burde et al., 2023). In response, an ERICC conceptual framework has been developed to set out overarching questions and identify research gaps (Kim et al., 2022).

The ERICC conceptual framework identifies four drivers of learning and development in contexts of conflict and protracted crisis: access, quality, continuity[2] and coherence. The first three of these are framed at the local systems level; the latter is located at the policy systems level. The framework highlights the need to consider alignment and coherence in assessments of education:

> *The policy-level education systems, authorities, and stakeholders may or may not be aligned in goals, procedures, resource arrangement, and incentives. This incoherence in turn, affects the provision of system-wide policies, financing, and accountability mechanisms to achieve access, quality, and continuity of education at the local level* (Kim et al., 2022, p. 9).

The concept of coherence has a range of relevant meanings for the study of education systems in conflict and protracted crises. While the development of the ERICC conceptual framework drew on an interrelated set of metatheories from multiple disciplines,[3] the most significant of these relating to the concept of coherence is Pritchett (2015), which theorises 'coherence for learning' to draw out types of incoherence and how these prevent the achievement of high-quality learning outcomes. Pritchett sets out coherence as the existence of feedback loops between education strategies, financing, workforce incentives and information (outcomes measures), with four accountability relationships (politics, compact, management and client power), as determined by four design elements (delegation, finance, information and motivation).

While Pritchett's framing of 'coherence for learning' highlights a range of factors internal to the education system, it does not place great emphasis on the role of external actors. This contrasts with a parallel understanding of the term used in development cooperation – that of 'humanitarian–development coherence.' Humanitarian–development coherence, sometimes framed more widely as part of a humanitarian–development–peace nexus, is the combined effort of many actors to analyse settings, define collective outcomes and discover ways to work better together, based on their comparative advantages, principles and mandates (OECD, 2017). Underlined by commitments at the World Humanitarian Summit, this 'new way of working' has driven a shift from humanitarian and development actors working in silos to a more integrated and collaborative approach to reducing humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability (OCHA, 2017, p. 7).

In relation to education, humanitarian–development coherence has been theorised and applied in several instances, with an emphasis on how these external actors can find greater alignment in support of education systems (Nicolai et al., 2019; INEE, 2021; Sommers et al., 2022). In practical terms, humanitarian–development coherence in education can include protecting the integrity of humanitarian and development spaces, layering interventions for maximum impact, working in the same locations and identifying shared outcomes (Sommers et al., 2022). A key applied framework proposed by Nicolai et al. (2019) and further evolved by the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) (2021) highlights

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[2] Access: programmes and policies will improve children's holistic learning and development to the extent that they improve access to education – within schools and classrooms, as well as in households and communities (especially in distance learning conditions or other home- or community-based learning). Quality: quality of the resources and support within classrooms/schools, households and communities and of the relationships, norms, practices and interactions. Continuity: sustained exposure to education that allows progression in both learning and grade/school transition (Kim et al., 2022, p. 6).

[3] Including coherence for learning frameworks (Pritchett, 2015), systems frameworks for understanding social settings (Tseng and Seidman, 2007), developmental contextualism (Cicchetti and Aber, 1998; Lerner, 1998) and bioecological developmental theory (Bronfenbrenner and Morris, 1998, 2006).

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norms, capacities and operations as analytical categories key to thinking about humanitarian-development coherence.

This paper takes these divergent concepts and begins to link elements of 'coherence for learning' with those of 'humanitarian–development coherence.' This link contributes to a systems-level analysis of features that enable or constrain access, quality and continuity of education for learners affected by conflict and crisis. Placing learners at the centre, the paper highlights the role of education providers (both state and non-state) within broader government responsibility (at federal, state and local levels). The efforts of government, humanitarian and development actors in relation to government education providers are highlighted as influential elements shaping the education landscape at a systems level within conflict and crisis contexts. An interplay of norms, capacities and operations determines the space for actors to achieve idealised education offers as well as the reality on the ground. This can result in both (in)coherence horizontally across stakeholder groups and vertically across national, state and local tiers of action. Figure 1 illustrates these linkages and framings.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework for education system coherence in conflict and protracted crises

Our analysis focuses on dynamic features within the education system, set out here as norms, capacities and operations, and looks more deeply at how both horizontal and vertical aspects of the education system align – or not – across these layers. While it is possible to explore a range of elements and relationships in this framework to better understand an education system in conflict and crisis contexts, we have chosen to highlight potential tensions across each of these dimensions. We do so by examining data to identify *de jure* vs. *de facto* norms, presumed vs. actual capacities and planned vs. delivered operations. This enquiry begins with a contextual analysis to better understand both the current state of and most notable

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fragmentation in an education system. Figure 2 presents the features as first set out in Nicolai et al. (2019) and elaborated in INEE (2021), as follows:

- *Norms* – the rules that guide educational responses in conflict and crisis, including principles, goals, standards, mandates, strategies and expected outcomes (Nicolai et al., 2019). Here, we are interested in both formal or *de jure* norms (as expressed in laws, decrees and policy frameworks) and *de facto* norms (unwritten rules) that guide action and that can be similar to or different from formal norms (Sarwar, 2017).

- *Capacities* of those who lead and organise education provision, including education officials, school management groups, donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and the coordination groups that they use (Nicolai et al., 2019). Such capacities are closely linked to norms that often determine the specific facets of roles government officials can enact in practice (e.g. an official has the legal authority to report on discrepancies in a senior's professional conduct but the norm may frown upon such disclosure) (Sarwar, 2017).

- *Operations* – the delivery of educational initiatives. This covers the type of education programme on offer; the nature of teacher cadres delivering programmes and the supporting education workforce; curricula and pedagogy; data systems and use; and financing and funding. In this layer, we are interested in examining how operations at the level of delivery on the ground match or are different from planned interventions and their aims (Nicolai et al., 2019).

Figure 2. Three dynamic features that influence education system coherence in conflict and protracted crises

This framework is used to guide our research, including data collection and analysis, into education systems coherence in selected conflict and protracted crisis areas of Nigeria. As we look for alignment/misalignment across the three layers, we keep in mind different forms in which these can be observed (Scott et al., 2016):

- Sequencing between short-term emergency responses and long-term efforts linked to overarching education sector goals so that short-term responses feed into longer education aims;
- Layering, where different actors intentionally provide different forms of assistance to the same groups in the same area in a concerted attempt to address multiple needs; and
- Complementarity, where different actors intentionally work in different geographical zones based on the strength of their comparative links at the local level.

III. CONTEXT: CONFLICT AND CRISIS-RELATED THREATS TO EDUCATION IN NIGERIA

A range of contextual aspects shape the education system and opportunities within Nigeria's conflict and crisis-affected regions. These aspects are critical to understanding existing (in)coherence and how it may affect access, quality and continuity of education.

Nigeria is facing an enduring learning crisis that interrelated and protracted crises have amplified. The decline in learning achievements dates to the early 2000s: we see literacy and numeracy levels for Primary 6 students go from approximately 41% to 35% (literacy) and 36% to 31% (numeracy) between 2003 and 2011 (Obiakor, 2023). Moreover, students' learning between Years 1 and 6 has remained stagnant, as evidenced by their lack of progress on assessments (Adeniran et al., 2020), and currently 75% of Nigerian children between the ages of 7 and 14 are not able to read a simple sentence or solve a basic maths problem (UNICEF, 2023). Potentially 10–20 million children are not attending school at all (Busari, 2022; UNESCO, 2022; World Bank, 2022; see also Table 1). Addressing the gap in education has been challenging because of several interlinked conflicts and shocks, including the 13-year jihadist insurgency in the North East; population pressures and climate-induced farmer–herder clashes in the Middle Belt and the South (ICG, 2017; Daniel, 2021); and, most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic.

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Table 1. *2021 school attendance and literacy rates based on Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data*

	% of primary school-age children not attending formal schools (OOSC) as of 2021			% of children in non-formal education (counted in OOSC)	% of literate people aged 15–49	
	Total	Girls	Boys	Total	Women	Men
Bauchi	60.8	61.1	60.4	31.7	10.9	25.6
Yobe	57.8	58.4	57.3	26.1	15.9	29.5
Gombe	53.7	51.1	56.3	17.8	28.1	49.8
Borno**	50.6	52.0	49.3	23.2	23.8	43.4
Adamawa	30.2	32.7	27.7	7.1	33.3	53.9
Taraba	29.4	30	29.1	6.0	22.4	49.8
Kaduna	18.0	19.3	16.8	8.7	39.2	50.6
North East	49.5	–	–	20.8	21.5	40.7
North West	40.2	–	–	27.0	23.8	40.8
Country average	25.6	–	–	12.0	42.5	55.2

* Literacy was assessed based on the ability of the respondent to read a short simple statement or on school attendance. Respondents who had attended higher/tertiary education were considered literate and not tested.

** Numbers in Borno are based on only seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) owing to conflict, which is why the numbers might be lower than the Education in Emergencies Working Group (EiEWG) estimate.

The protracted conflict between jihadist insurgent groups and the Nigerian government has had a severe impact on the learning and well-being of children in the North East. This is particularly the case in Borno, which has the highest rates of out-of-school children (OOSC) in the country.[4] Depending on the source, between 51% and 70% of children in Borno state are not attending school (EiEWG, 2020; NBS and UNICEF, 2022). These rates are substantially higher than those in Kaduna and Adamawa, of about 18% and 30%, respectively, and higher than the national average of 25.6% (NBS and UNICEF, 2022). Out-of-school rates for the 20 LGAs in Borno that are not accessible by the humanitarian sector are likely to be much higher.

The ongoing insurgency has emerged from a longstanding power struggle between the Muslim north and the Christian south, with education forming a key locus of contestation. The jihadist group Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram, has capitalised on public discontent around the lack of formal government investment in both formal and Qur'anic education in the region. Boko Haram forbids ('haram') western education ('boko') as a hindrance to the development of northern Nigeria, while the government often views the Qur'anic education predominant in the northeast as a security and cultural hazard that needs to be regulated or abolished (Brechenmacher, 2019). In recent years, the group has splintered into two factions, of which Boko Haram is the smaller.[5] A larger faction has branded itself the

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[4] In the seven LGAs accessible by the humanitarian sector.
[5] Mainstream analyses and commentary continue to use the term Boko Haram to cover ISWAP and other religious militancy groups in the northeast.

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Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and expanded its reach in the northeast, where it is now a significant actor (ibid.).

In 2013, the government imposed a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe – the BAY states – in North East Nigeria to curb Boko Haram's increasingly violent attacks. Since then, out of the 260 state school sites in the BAY region, about 70 have reported damage from bullets, shells or shrapnel, 53 have deliberately been set on fire and 83 have been looted (EiEWG, 2020, p. 18). As a result, some schools have relocated, with staff and students starting to share educational facilities in safer locations. About one in four schools in the region now share infrastructure (EiEWG, 2020), which entails two-shift school provision and longer commuting distances for children and teachers. In Borno and Adamawa, the average class size stands at 122 and 66 students, respectively. The student–teacher ratio in state-funded formal schools is 66:1 in Borno and 41:1 in Adamawa.[6] In some areas where school buildings are still standing (e.g. in Hong in Adamawa), schools have not opened because of fears of imminent attacks and kidnappings such as that of the schoolgirls in Chibok (stakeholder interview, Adamawa). In some cases, schools have been used – either wholly or partly – as military camps, often by government forces (stakeholder interview, Borno).

Polarisation and clashes between pastoralists and farmers have intensified through the spread of weapons alongside population growth and climate-induced migration. While 3,641 people were killed in clashes between farmers and herders between 2016 and 2018 (Amnesty International, 2018), the scale has increased drastically, with 1,200 deaths between May and July 2023 alone (Jimoh et al., 2023). Intermittent conflicts frequently result in school closures as schools get burned down (Adetayo, 2022). In Kaduna in North West Nigeria, the combination of jihadist-government and herdsman-farmer conflicts has led to permanent school closures and displacement of whole communities (USAID, 2017).

Children living in boarding schools and camps for IDPs across northern states are most vulnerable to interrupted access to education. Typically, areas to which IDPs move are not supplied with educational facilities (Edema, 2021) and are often at a substantial distance from existing school infrastructure in local host communities (interviews 2022). Official camps to host displaced populations and refugees are rare, and those that exist are severely congested, lack basic services and are prone to cyclical cholera outbreaks and fires (OCHA, 2022c). Borno state has recently shut down camps, upending the limited provision of education that was available (HRW, 2022).

Increasing numbers of children in the northeast are experiencing complex trauma symptoms owing to prolonged exposure to violence and acute deprivation that inhibit their ability to learn. Accounts of trauma-related symptoms frequently reported include inability to concentrate, insomnia, generalised fear, confusion (Isokpan and Durojaye, 2016), anxiety, panic attacks (Yusuf and Edemenang, 2018), hostile attrition bias[7] and severe depression (Diazgranados and Lee, 2018). These symptoms are especially common among girls and women who return to school after a school attack (GCPEA, 2019). Formerly abducted girls additionally report experiencing shame and stigma when reintegrating into society (GCPEA, 2019; Ogun et al., 2020; Oketch, 2021; Oladeji et al., 2021). Experiences in IDP camps and boarding schools tend to perpetuate and deepen these traumas, as children resettled in other regions often experience bullying in host communities (Diazgranados et al., 2019; Adesina et al., 2020).

Given the protracted nature of the conflict in the northeast of Nigeria against a long-term setting of exclusion, it is important to understand how different actors are working together, since the situation no longer represents a short-term emergency but remains affected by periodic violence to the extent that the context remains unstable and crisis-affected. This context has led to the involvement of multiple actors in the education system, often with different ways of working that vary in terms of alignment. The sections

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[6] Ratio calculations include volunteer teachers.
[7] Where individuals interpret the behaviour of other people as threatening.

below further explore where and how (in)coherence exists, looking at the norms, capacities and operations that shape the education systems in these states.

IV. RESEARCH APPROACH

This research uses qualitative research methods partly inspired by the political economy analysis (PEA) approach to understand (in)coherence in the provision of education in crisis and conflict-affected areas in Nigeria. The substantial impact of political processes on educational outcomes has been widely acknowledged (Kingdon et al., 2014; Pritchett, 2018; Hickey and Hossain, 2019). This reality holds true, if not more so, in contexts of protracted conflict and crises (Novelli et al., 2014, 2017, 2019; Shah and Lopes Cardozo, 2015). In understanding the motivating forces within societies, PEA is used to systematically explore the underlying reality of policy, contestation and decisions as well as the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time, including in the education sector (Fritz et al., 2009; Gershberg, 2021). The primary strength of this approach lies in its ability to provide insights into how formal structures put into place for education and formal and informal rules guiding education, resources and power dynamics among key humanitarian and development stakeholders shape the practical landscape of policy solutions.

This paper explores the political economy of education system coherence in Nigeria, building from the ERICC conceptual framework and further adapting and utilising elements as proposed in the education coherence frameworks by Pritchett (2015), Nicolai et al. (2019) and INEE (2021). It uses the concepts of norms, capacities and operations to explore how coherent or incoherent education is in four crisis-affected states and hypothesises how this affects education access, quality and continuity. Its central research question and associated sub-questions are as follows:

What shapes education system (in)coherence in Nigeria's regions most affected by conflict and protracted crisis?

- What rules guide education provision by government, humanitarian and development actors?
- What are the differences between the presumed versus the actual capacities of those who lead and organise education provision?
- What educational initiatives are being planned, funded, managed and evaluated by different actors?
- To what degree do norms, capacities and operations of key humanitarian and development actors match or diverge to deliver quality education for crisis-affected learners?

Methodology

The research draws on primary data gathered by the Common Heritage Foundation (CHF) for the ERICC Nigeria country scan and stakeholder analysis, both of which are products separate from this study. The CHF interview topic guide included two questions relevant to this paper (see Questions 3.4 and 3.3 in Annex 1A). These questions explored the extent to which education policies and programmes had adapted in light of the protracted crisis. The questions were incorporated into the topic guide in consultation with the ODI research team by nuancing the existing semi-structured interview questions designed for ERICC country

scan.[8] CHF did not conduct separate key informant interviews (KIIs) for this research for reasons related to budget and personnel availability under the ERICC project as well as considerations of sample exhaustion.

CHF interviews were conducted between July and August 2022. Interviewees included key government and donor stakeholders, representatives of CSOs and NGOs, teachers, traditional leaders and religious actors (see Annex 2 for a sample breakdown). The interviews were carried out in the language of each participant's choosing, in either English or Hausa. In Borno state, interviewees chose to be interviewed in Hausa even though there were Kanuri native speakers on the CHF research team. Following the fieldwork, CHF provided ODI with summaries of interviews in the English language.

CHF obtained ethics approval for the KIIs by submitting the research protocol, data collection tools, and informed consent forms to the National Health Research Ethics Committee Nigeria for ethical review exemption. Approval was given on 31 August 2022 (see Annex 3).

In February 2023, ODI conducted three additional interviews in English. For these interviews, ODI developed a second KII topic guide to shed light on the extent to which government officials, development funders and humanitarian actors coordinate in conflict-affected regions of Nigeria (see Annex 1B). These KIIs were conducted by a locally based Nigerian researcher affiliated with ODI.

Aligned with the ERICC umbrella project's emphasis on the impact of protracted conflict and crisis on education, the research concentrated on Adamawa, Borno and Kaduna states. The data collection also encompassed perspectives of federal government officials in Abuja. The CHF team played a pivotal role in selecting these three states for the ERICC Nigeria country scan. Adamawa and Borno states in North East Nigeria were chosen because of the severity of conflict in the area and their lower learning outcomes compared with in other parts of the country. Kaduna state in North West Nigeria was included to enable insights into relatively positive results from conflict-affected states: attendance and literacy rates in Kaduna are close to the national average. The selection process also considered factors such as level of risk to researchers, cost of safety measures and ease of access to informants. See Annex 4 for a detailed rationale from CHF on site selection.

Combined CHF and ODI interview data were coded in MaxQDA using categories drawn from:

- The conceptual framework developed to look at education system coherence: norms, capacities, operations (Nicolai et al., 2019; INEE, 2021);
- The ERICC conceptual framework as relevant to educational outcomes: access, quality, coherence and continuity (Kim et al., 2022).

The interview coding began as a deductive process whereby we first read transcripts and coded descriptive reports under the features outlined for norms, capacities and operations in Figure 2. For example, transcripts were first coded for mentions/descriptions/discussion under 'education policies on conflict' (a sub-code for norms). At this stage the process switched to inductive coding, whereby the initial set of sub-codes was used to develop additional analytical codes – for example 'adaptation in existing education policies to conflict,' 'lack of adaptation in existing education policies to conflict' and 'uncoded/informal policy.' The coding and literature review proceeded side by side, with researchers meeting frequently to discuss the direction of analysis under each of the themes as they applied to access, quality, continuity and coherence. To ensure the coding process remained grounded in the data, the researchers continually revisited the transcripts while refining and modifying the codes as needed. This iterative approach facilitated the

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[8] The process of collaboration was experimental since it was the first ERICC study, and it began when standardised processes around research as well as research products and their final shape were still under discussion among consortium members. As such, the process of including PEA elements in the KII questionnaires consisted of CHF sharing its draft with ODI, including suggestions around PEA prompts. CHF finalised the tool based on ODI suggestions and launched into the KIIs, which did not include pilots owing to the nature of the existing contract.

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identification of any gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies within the coding scheme, ultimately strengthening the overall analysis.

The themes emerging from the interviews were used to triangulate results from the literature review, as well as to guide deeper explorations in certain parts of the literature. Since the interview data were made available to ODI in the form of summary notes translated into English, rather than full transcripts, this paper does not include interview quotations. However, in some instances, citations indicate where information has been drawn from the KIIs.

Given the limitations of interview data, our paper draws extensively on the literature review. Within this review, we considered approximately 150 sources of secondary data. The literature search process was iterative, involving the analysis of interview data and refinement of the conceptual framework. We identified relevant literature through various sources, including the EBSCO database, Oxford Libraries Online Search engine, Google Scholar, federal and state ministries' websites and the websites of key donor partners in Nigeria (e.g. the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Education in Emergencies Working Group (EiEWG), etc).

Our first round of secondary data collection compiled information about:

- Federal, state and local-level government sector strategies and implementation guidelines focusing especially on education sector plans since the early 2000s;
- Humanitarian and development country-wide and sectoral strategies, project-specific planning and evaluation reports, and press releases since the early 2000s;
- Country-level scholarly publications on education system politics, planning, financing and reform;
- Datasets on enrolment and learning outcomes in Nigeria;
- Academic and grey literature on the nature of interrelated conflicts and crises and peacebuilding initiatives.

For subsequent rounds of data collection, we focused on specific topics that emerged as important from our preliminary analysis, such as the role of the religious schooling system and accelerated learning programmes.

V. NORMS: THE RULES THAT GUIDE EDUCATION PROVISION

The analysis of norms in Nigeria presented below is based on a comprehensive review of federal, regional and state-level education strategies, evaluations of humanitarian and development sector programmes, relevant academic literature and KIIs. While we use policy frameworks and programme strategies, to assess informal or de facto norms, we triangulate against our primary data and findings on capacities and operations. We highlight examples of norm incoherence that negatively affect access, quality and continuity of education for children in the northeast of Nigeria.

In 2021, the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria approved the National Policy on IDPs (FRN, 2021), which addresses the education needs of IDP children. The policy recognises that, at minimum, children displaced by conflict and other shocks should have access to basic education. It tasks the education sector lead (the Federal Ministry of Education, FME) alongside the technical co-lead (UNICEF) to liaise and coordinate with government and humanitarian agencies to deliver education. A key proviso under the policy is to ensure displaced children are issued with replacement documents that allow them access to schooling in host communities and to encourage relocation of children to neighbouring schools in their home communities

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where such schools have been destroyed. The policy identifies development and humanitarian agencies as key in delivering instructional materials for IDP children.

While the policy may exist at the federal level, in CHF's interviews with government officials as well as development and humanitarian partners, no mention was made of the existence of the policy or its relevance to their work. At the state level, key informants were of the belief that the impact of conflict on education is unaddressed directly at the federal level.

Overall, and beyond IDPs, Nigeria's goals on education focus on expansion of access with an explicit aim (as embedded in strategies and policy frameworks) to include all, irrespective of their gender, socioeconomic status, rurality and age, with the eventual aim of achieving economic growth in the country. Within strategic frameworks, the government – at both federal and state level – recognises that OOSC are a priority for education initiatives, given the high incidence (i.e. 20 million, or one out of five, children are out of school (UNICEF, 2022a)). The federal government contests this figure, citing perverse incentives at local level to inflate OOSC numbers in a bid for unjustified increased funding. [9] As such, in practice, the impact of conflict on education seems to be subsumed within the discussion and policies on the status of OOSC across Nigeria.

However, government policy frameworks do not engage with the disaggregation of OOSC. The majority of OOSC are in conflict-affected states in the northeast. For example, among children of lower secondary school age, net attendance in the North East was only 25.9% in 2021, substantially lower than the 46.5% national average and the 74.5% in the South East (NBS and UNICEF, 2022). The main policy strategies on OOSC focus on enrolment drives and meeting the infrastructure and human resource needs of schools (e.g. see the 2017–2019 National Medium-Term Basic Education Strategic Plan and the 2018–2022 National Education Framework Education for Change), and do not directly engage with limitations imposed on these activities by ongoing conflict/insurgency.

A significant number[10] of children identified as OOSC in conflict-affected states in reality attend religious schools, as Islamiyya, Qur'anic, Tsangaya and Almajiri schools together often outnumber registered state-funded schools (NBS and UNICEF, 2022). There are important distinctions between the different types of religious schools. Islamiyya schools work in a similar fashion to private schools, with fees, a curriculum and a set schedule. They teach the conventional Nigerian curriculum as well as the Qur'anic curriculum so as to gain accreditation by the state. Meanwhile, Qur'anic schools have only religious teachings and include Tsangaya schools (the oldest traditional type, with boarding facilities) and Tafeez schools (which offer two to three hours of after-school religious teaching for children attending regular school). Tsangaya boarding schools are in rural areas while Almajiri (literal meaning 'migrant/apprentice') schools are urban Qur'anic boarding schools (Hoechner, 2018). Religious schools very rarely receive state resourcing or provision of qualified teachers (KII, state officials in Kaduna); most of their limited resources come from local communities (Bano, 2022b).

Over the past two decades, government actors from federal to state level have varied in their support of religious schools, with the federal level government's discourse shifting between an emphasis on secular education provision (Adedigba, 2019) and cognisance of the popularity of religious schools at community level. President Buhari in 2018 indicated his wish to limit the operations and outreach of Tsangaya schools (ibid.). Buhari's predecessor, President Jonathan, had invested in infrastructure for Almajiri schools in 2009 (Ibrahim, 2022) around the same time as the federal government worked with the World Bank under the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) to formalise Integrated Qur'anic and Tsangaya

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[9] Reflections of stakeholders at the Nigeria-focused day during the ERICC first Annual Conference in July 2023.
[10] Around 20.8% of OOSC in the northeast were attending non-formal education as of 2022, with 36.6% of this number enrolled in Qur'anic/Madrasa/Islamic schools.

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Education (IQTE) to include basic numeracy and literacy within the religious curriculum (Lawal, 2019).[11] Recent announcements by President Buhari on extending school feeding to Almajiri schools (Erunke, 2021) and establishing the National Commission for Almajiri and Out of School Children with a mandate to formulate policy and guidelines for these groups (Alkassim, 2023) signal a potential softening in the federal approach towards religious schools.

However, state-level responses continue to vary significantly. For example, Kano instituted a commission for the repatriation of students of Tsangaya schools to their hometowns during the pandemic (Adewale, 2020). In Adamawa, efforts have focused on building relationships between religious schools and the state ministry to facilitate the transition of students to formal schools (KII, state officials in Adamawa). Furthermore, Oyo, Osun and Sokoto states have made commitments to revive and remodel Tsangaya schools (Ibrahim, 2022).

In the three focus states of this study (Adamawa, Borno and Kaduna), officials express frustration that the federal government typically does not recognise the long-standing network of religious schools as a valid form of education.[12] According to these respondents, the absence of federal-level recognition, where religious schools are not acknowledged as a form of basic education, restricts the application of federal funds and curriculum regulation in these schools. Key informants expressed further regret that examinations in non-formal schools, such as the Tsangaya schools, were not standardised to allow students equivalence with formal school systems (KII, Abuja National Assembly; KII, TRCN). This points to vertical and horizontal incoherence resulting from differential treatment of religious schools in conflict-affected states by federal and state governments.

Meanwhile, development and humanitarian actors increasingly recognise religious schools as an important mode of provision for OOSC given that existing public schools do not have the capacity to absorb them (KIIs, Adamawa and Abuja). Both development and the humanitarian sectors have leaned on networks of religious schools to broaden access to education and to ensure outreach to school populations vulnerable to recruitment by insurgents.

As an illustration, the USAID Nigeria Northern Education Initiative collaborated with Qur'anic school systems and state stakeholders to enhance political support for the integration of core subjects into the Qur'anic education system (Solomon, 2015). This initiative was influenced primarily by the US Muslim World Outreach agenda, which aimed to mitigate animosity towards the US within Muslim communities following the events of 9/11 (USAID, 2004).

The World Bank has advocated for and provided technical and financial support to IQTE within the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC). IQTE was piloted as early as 2009 in the states of Kano, Kaduna and Jigawa (ESSPIN, 2012) and has scaled up since with the aim of broadening access and improving quality of teaching in Islamiyya and Tsangaya schools (ESSPIN, 2017). Additionally, the ongoing World Bank Better Education Service Delivery for All (BESDA)[13] project has established non-formal learning centres across 17 states to incorporate some of the existing Islamiyya/Tsangaya schools into the UBEC system, for example in Zamfara (The Guardian, Nigeria, 2020).

There is no overarching framework shared across government, or by development and humanitarian sectors, for ensuring continuous access to education for IDPs. Approaches to providing access to education for IDPs are fragmented and localised within states, despite the existence of a Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHDSD). For displaced populations

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[11] See also www.esspin.org/what-esspin-did/iqte

[12] If 'Islamiyya schools are able to manage to teach the state-approved Islamiyya school curriculum, which requires equal coverage of Islamic and modern subjects, they get accredited by State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), and their graduates are awarded formal primary- and secondary school certificates, as in the regular schools' (Bano, 2022b).

[13] See https://besda.ng/

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residing in camps and camp-like settings, government support to education in camps is generally limited. Education is typically provided by local level CSOs, either funded by local philanthropists or subcontracted by international donor organisations or local churches.

At the federal and state executive levels, the approach appears to be driven by a general impetus to show that conflict in the northeast has been brought under control. For example, the 2020–2030 North East Stabilisation and Development Master Plan states that 'government authorities are currently making a huge effort trying to break the current dependency on humanitarian aid' in the region (p. 5). In practice, this ambition is enacted through the closure of IDP and refugee camps. In December 2021, Borno State Governor Babagana Umara Zulum announced that Borno would not allow food and non-food items distribution to 'newly resettled communities' in 11 key locations under the premise that the populations should be 'self-reliant and not aid-dependent' (HRW, 2022). The state government has been pursuing the objective to close all camps in Borno state and return IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin since 2017 (Sida, 2022).

Informally, though, displaced populations in some states, such as Kaduna, can attend classes in schools running in host areas (KII, state official in Kaduna). In the past, the Presidential Commission on the North East Initiative (now the North East Development Commission, NEDC) promoted a consensual transfer of students from conflict-affected areas to boarding schools in states not affected by the crisis. The absorption of IDPs by remaining state schools has led to an increase in class size to 140 children per class in some parts of Borno (EiEWG, 2021).

Key informants remarked on the absence of an overarching official framework to guide state responses (KIIs, state officials in Adamawa, Borno, Kaduna and Abuja). In 2021, although FMHDSD began to co-chair the Alternate School Programmes Committee with FME, the mandate of the partnership focuses on school feeding and establishing and strengthening non-formal education centres (including Tsangaya), and does not appear to include IDP education. The Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs under FMHDSD is – on paper – responsible for education provision for IDPs, although interviewees, including government and non-government officials, were unable to say whether it played any active role at the time of interview.

None of the main actors see peace education as a focus in terms of efforts to address tensions between conflicting groups and reduce future violence. The federal government envisions a minimal role for education in conflict prevention and mitigation, while state level measures concentrate on securitisation of education infrastructure. In part, the discussion around OOSC, and access as the main focus, as well as the low importance accorded to the IDP policy, is reflective of the weakness in federal-level commitment either to addressing the key root causes of the conflict (e.g. the different patterns of development between the Muslim-majority north and the Christian-majority south, traceable to the colonial era) or to achieving peace between conflicting groups in the area for sustainable service delivery in education (de Simone and Iocchi, 2022).[14] For example, the National Policy on Safety, Security and Violence-Free Schools centres on providing security guards for school buildings, establishing neighbourhood vigilante groups and instituting protocols for early warning of attacks. There is no discussion on, for example, how education, through its ideological content and the economic opportunities it provides, can be leveraged as a driver for peace.

Similarly, the 2020–2030 North East Stabilisation and Development Master Plan focuses largely on recovery through the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, and as such appears to work within a 'post-conflict' framework rather than one suited to an ongoing, unresolved conflict (KII, government organisation in Abuja). Neither state- nor federal-level key informants from the development and humanitarian sectors were able

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[14] In Kaduna, State Governor Nasir El-Rufai prohibited the locally led peacebuilding agency, the Kaduna State Peace Commission, established in 2017 to foster community relations, from engaging with the Shiite community during its outreach programme owing to ongoing tensions between the Shiite community and the national military. The initiatives of the agency are largely underfunded, with the Ford Foundation the sole non-state donor. In Adamawa, the State Agency for Peace, Reconciliation and Reconstruction, established by former Governor Bindo Jibrilla, was suspended in 2019 by incoming Governor Ahmadu Fintiri. Other national-level initiatives, including the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, face similar issues (Kew, 2021).

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to identify structured, long-term peacebuilding efforts that could resolve regional tensions. Local efforts at achieving peace through the church have reportedly been short lived and unpredictable in terms of their success (KII, religious organisation in Borno).

Lastly, international actors continue to assign a limited role to education as part of their crisis response, typically looking for government to lead here. For example, humanitarian sector needs assessments rank education at a lower priority than shelter, nutrition and livelihood needs (REACH, 2023) and explicitly note they 'will look to the government for increased leadership in [the] coordination of education-in-emergency responses' (OCHA, 2023, p. 85). Humanitarian interventions (through actors such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children and UNICEF) and those of development partners (e.g. through BESDA) continue to focus on traditional responses – such as provision of temporary learning centres, reconstruction of damaged school buildings, strengthening of School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs) where they exist and supply of learning materials and curricula. As following sections illustrate, such approaches do not meet the educational needs of children in protracted conflict and crisis.

VI. CAPACITIES: LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATION OF THE EDUCATION RESPONSE

This section focuses on the differences between the presumed versus the actual capacities of those who lead and organise education provision. Our findings indicate that current coordination mechanisms lack specificity regarding responsibilities for delivering education in conflict, leading to a situation where the political executive is the predominant force. As in the previous section, our findings are based on triangulation of primary and secondary data, in this case with results from the norms and operations sections.

Vertical and horizontal formal mechanisms coordinating education are complex and often involve conflicts of jurisdiction and diffused responsibility. In the government sector, it is not always clear who is responsible for implementing federal-level basic education policies. FME articulates strategies for basic education. Responsibility for their implementation is usually divided between the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), the Universal Basic Education Boards (UBEBs), and the Local Government Education Authorities (LGEAs). In some instances, responsibility for secondary education policy implementation is shared between State Ministries of Education and State Education Boards. The National Mass Education Commission (NMEC) and State Agencies for Mass Education (SAMEs) also have the power to articulate and implement basic education policies.

Two key horizontal coordination groups covering education policy in the North East and BAY states – the government-led NEDC and the humanitarian-led Nigeria EiEWG – work independently of each other (see Figure 3). The literature suggests the development sector has engaged with the NEDC: the NEDC's 10-year strategy was drafted in consultation with the World Bank (Goni, 2022). The EiEWG, which focuses primarily on relief for immediate needs, has limited engagement with the government and development sectors, even though it was intended to be chaired by State Education Ministries or SUBEBs. It is currently led by UNICEF and Save the Children, and has put very little emphasis on planning for building transitions from emergency provision to existing longer-term programmes operated by development or state actors (e.g. EiEWG, 2021). The state-level EiEWG dialogue structure is varied and inconsistent, as suggested by the level of documentation of its meetings (EiEWG Borno, 2022). The bulk of membership consists of local NGOs. State government KIIs pointed to a lack of awareness of a coordinated humanitarian action group addressing education in the BAY areas.

Figure 3. Overview of primary education structure in conflict-affected states in Northeast Nigeria

Against a background of weak vertical and horizontal coordination, state governors play a crucial role in driving forward reforms. This influence translates into diverse outcomes, ranging from swift progress in certain programmes to occasional challenges and cherry-picking in the implementation of federal-level strategies. Former State Governor of Kaduna Nasir El-Rufai is a well-known example of a political champion of the education agenda. El-Rufai leveraged the State Development Plan to streamline Sector Investment Plans and coordinate international development actor support (Derbyshire and Williams, 2021). Furthermore, he collaborated with the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) (on ESSPIN and the Global Partnership for Education) and UNICEF to improve state-level education outcome monitoring (PLANE, 2021a) and to advance the 2017 state-level Teacher Examination Reform. KIIs with both state and non-state actors lauded efforts made through the Education Data, Research and Evaluation in Nigeria (EDOREN) programme in Kaduna (KIIs in Kaduna). The teacher reform replaced two-thirds of the Kaduna workforce, who did not pass the basic skills test, with newly qualified hires. El-Rufai also – not dissimilarly to other states in Nigeria – rolled out the 2016 Kaduna free school feeding programme, which for eight months ran concurrently with the National Home-Grown School Feeding Programme, resulting in a short-term spike in enrolment (Ogbonna, 2016).

According to ESSPIN reports, in many other states, initiatives such as SBMCs, teacher training and direct school funds have not materialised because governors have had the discretion to implement particular aspects, rather than the integrated whole, of the school improvement package (Ogbonna, 2016, p. 20). Adamawa and Borno states did not have the same level of leadership continuity and alignment with the federal level as Kaduna, which could have contributed to the relatively low prioritisation of education and coordination with the development sector. In Adamawa, state governors frequently discontinue or financially starve out initiatives rolled out by their predecessors as a tactic to undermine the political legacy of outgoing competing politicians (Darren, 2021).

There is a lack of layering in the humanitarian and development sectors' response in conflict-affected states. This is driven, in part, by limited physical access to conflict-affected states for development actors, whereas humanitarian actors generally have extensive on-the-ground networks. This weakens both sectors' ability to transition from humanitarian to development programming.

For example, FCDO, which is the largest bilateral donor in the education development sector in Nigeria after the World Bank (Piron et al., 2021), has increased its investment in non-crisis regions (see Figure 4). Although its flagship projects, such as ESSPIN, Partnerships to Engage Reform and Learn (PERL) and the Girls' Education Project (GEP) do cover severely conflict-affected states, FCDO does not engage states in crisis such as Borno or Adamawa to the same extent. This is because of the high levels of insecurity and continued humanitarian needs in the region.

For example, the 2017–2022 North East Nigeria Transition to Development Programme in the BAY states aimed to facilitate the transition from humanitarian to development assistance in collaboration with PERL. Nonetheless, there was limited engagement between the two sectors. Previous evaluations suggest the development actors were waiting for a gradual wind-down of humanitarian financing in the crisis region before initiating programming (Derbyshire and Williams, 2021). The 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview also stated that 'development-oriented programming [in northern Nigeria is] disrupted … within months of commencing' and that 'current insecurity severely limits opportunities for development action and HCT [the Humanitarian Country Team] does not expect that to improve soon' (OCHA, 2022a, pp. 28–29).

Figure 4. *Overview of key education projects in northern Nigeria*

Are any of the three case states included?	Programme Years (2005–2024)
Kaduna	NESP (2003-2010) £137m
Kaduna	CUBE (2003-08) £18m
Kaduna	GEP (2005-2020)
Kaduna	ESSPIN (2009-2017) £124.3m
Borno, Adamawa	SEPIP (2010-2017) $350m
Kaduna	TDP (2013-2019) £34m
Borno, Adamawa	NECRP/ECR (2014-2018)
Kaduna	EDOREN (2015-18) £9.6m
K/B/A not included	NEI Plus (2015-2020)
Kaduna	PEARL (2016-2021)
Borno	NENTAD (2017-21)£425m
Kaduna, Borno, Adamawa	BESDA (2018-2023) $611m
Borno	AENN (2018-2021)
Kaduna	NPEP (2019-2023) $500m
Kaduna	PLANE (2019-2029) £170m
Adamawa	SENSE (2019-21)
Borno, Adamawa	AGILE (2020-2025) £500m
Borno	DIV (2020-22)
Adamawa	*(2022-26) $125m

Legend: World Bank, USAID, DFID

* Transforming Education at State Level

Local stakeholders, such as teachers and parents, continue to have limited capacity to influence school or state leaders and hold them accountable. This hinders local actors' ability to challenge education sector norms and operations. At the community level, the establishment of SBMCs by the UBEC was supposed to give local stakeholders power and voice to hold school leaders accountable for adequately financing and managing local schools. However, more than half of schools have yet to comply with legislation mandating the establishment of such committees (RISE, 2019). Recent evidence from northern regions questions SBMCs' practical ability to channel input to enable improved quality of education: they are apolitical initiatives by design and as such they constrict rather than enable local actors' capacity for education policy advocacy (Bano, 2022a).

Meanwhile, for teachers, the Teacher Registration Council of Nigeria (TRCN) serves as the main body for channelling their interests to school leaders and state actors. Similar to SBMCs, the TRCN is seen to have high

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interest but little to no impact on education policies (CHF, 2022). The literature suggests teachers are largely disengaged and absent from schools because of persistent delays in salary payments. Low and unpredictable pay, in addition to the risks involved in teaching in conflict-affected areas, undermines morale and motivation (EiEWG, 2021). Salary payments face significant delays because the transfer of funds from the Federal Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) to the local government and then to SUBEBs is still done manually (Bano, 2022a; Turner et al., 2020). Secondary literature points to education sector corruption in the payment process: lack of transparency and opaque procedures around salary payments are often seen as providing cover for diversion of funds into the private purses of public officials (ICPC, 2018; Hoffman and Patel, 2021).

Opportunities exist to combine humanitarian and development funding at the local level during programme delivery and contracting. An example is the IRC Accelerated Education Programme, which works across non-formal and formal school settings to promote school-level staff capacity-building, funded by USAID, FCDO and EiEWG (IRC, 2019). In some cases, delivery partners, including local NGOs, CSOs and faith-based organisations (FBOs), are already implementing the humanitarian–development nexus norms (Infante, 2019, p.3). However, as we move up the funding chain from the local to the federal level, there is a widening gap between funding streams for the two sectors, which we explore further in the next section, on operations.

VII. OPERATIONS: DELIVERY OF EDUCATION INITIATIVES

This section looks at delivery-focused activities where implementation is funded, planned and managed overall and where assessments take place. We showcase how key functions are enacted and in doing so also discuss how operations match or diverge from actions needed to achieve coherence across the education system.

A. Planning and funding

Within the broader trend of de-prioritisation of education, there is some reluctance in both the development and the humanitarian sectors to increase focus in the northeast. Figure 5 shows the number of humanitarian and development education projects across Nigeria between 2006–2015 and 2016–2023 (pre- and post-conflict escalation), with no increase registered over the past decade. In 2021, only 2.4% of humanitarian aid in Nigeria was allocated to education, reinforcing our finding in Norms of the low priority accorded to education. In comparison, food security and nutrition and health take up 26.6% of the humanitarian budget (OCHA, 2021).

Figure 5. *Heatmap of humanitarian and development education projects in Nigeria*

Note: On the left are 2006–2015 education projects. On the right are 2016–2023 education projects.[15] *Source: (Developmnet-portal.org, 2024)*[16]

On-the-ground operations suggest limited appetite for linking humanitarian responses to development priorities, with each sector lacking awareness of the other. The Nigeria HCT, constituted by the United Nations for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is recognised as a key presence by humanitarian international NGO actors at the federal level. The HCT has carried out two Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessments – purportedly in conjunction with state-level authorities in the BAY states plus FMHDSD and state ministries of humanitarian affairs. However, our interviewees in state-level education-related organisations (e.g. TRCN) did not mention participation or discussion with the HCT or with the EiEWG when probed on alignment between humanitarian and development agendas. The traditional scope of humanitarian response means humanitarian actors go directly to the local level for implementation, often bypassing sector priorities within the state (KIIs in Adamawa).

The Nigeria HCT remarks that, 'The 25-year Borno State Development Strategy, which links the humanitarian response to early recovery and development, will shift from life-saving interventions to sustainable self-reliance. This will be an added expense for humanitarian partners, who will now be required to work towards longer-term development goals' (emphasis added). The protracted nature of the crisis and limited involvement of the development sector in the region means the role of humanitarian agencies as short-term actors is untenable: either they need to actively explore handovers to development actors in the region or the time horizons of their operations need to be extended beyond emergency responses. The former currently seems more viable, given that humanitarian funding to Nigeria decreased from its peak of $943 million in 2017 to $626 million in 2020 and has since remained stagnant (OCHA, 2022). Meanwhile, the 2023 Nigeria humanitarian programme has received funding of $704 million out of the required $1.1 billion (OCHA, 2023).

Within the sphere of (both state and federal) government, financing primary education learning materials and teacher skills training is not a clear priority. Nigerian government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP has been on a decline since 2014 (UNESCO and World Bank, 2021) and is one of the lowest

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[15] 2016 is the date for the Borno famine, which in other papers is mentioned as important for shifting attention to the North East region.
[16] Other sources checked for regional data were the Nigeria Aid Information Management System website (http://dad.synisys.com/dadnigeria/), which is not working; AidData Geocoded Basic Education Aid Data for Nigeria, with data unfortunately available only up to 2016; Development Gateway (https://developmentgateway.org/), which has no regional data on education aid; and a locally led aid tracker: although we tried several times we were unable to register/log into this website.

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among African countries (UNICEF, 2022c). In addition, Nigerian states and local governments obtain different allocations from the federation account for education,[17] which has an urban bias and thus enables higher-income households to reap larger benefits from public spending (Amakom, 2016). States' ability to formulate and achieve their own policy objectives around education in crisis has been prey to overall low revenue amassed at state level and unequitable distribution of funds per school: spending per school is nearly six times larger for the highest-spending regions compared with the lower-spending regions (World Bank, 2022).

The establishment of UBEC-IF (the UBEC Intervention Fund) has had limited success in decentralising fiscal powers since 2014–2015 because the conditions for states accessing this money are quite restrictive. For instance, one of the conditions is that states have to provide 50% funding to UBEC-IF but many of the conflict-affected states do not have this capacity (PLANE, 2021b). Even though Borno, Kaduna and Adamawa spend a large share of their budgets on education (21–30%), this is often concentrated at the tertiary education level and the majority spend is on salaries. Overall, the three states have low expenditure per person relative to other states in Nigeria and currently some 75% shortfall in humanitarian financial contributions against need (GEC, 2022).

The lack of a federal framework on education in conflict constrains state and local actors from reallocating budgets at the subnational level in response to crises. It also creates discord across states on the position of IDPs and conflict-affected populations in the public education system. As noted in the section on Norms, state-level actors look for guidance to federal frameworks. Given the significance assigned to federally established parameters, state-level actors as well as international NGOs/CSOs working at the local level remarked on the absence of a coherent planning framework for education. The framework most informants saw as applicable was the Safe Schools Initiative, although operationalisation appears to be focused at the local government level and ownership of the policy is unclear across the high number of fragmented actors in the education system in Nigeria. Meanwhile, education stakeholders have not picked up or absorbed the 2012 and 2021 National Policies on Internally Displaced Persons, which set out IDPs' rights to education.

In Kaduna, a state official (KII, state education agency in Kaduna) highlighted how the gap in guidance undermined ability to repurpose funds for crisis spending (e.g. for IDPs) and resulted in long discussions with FME with regard to authorising emergency spending (see more on funding across sectors below).

B. Education quality

In line with the importance humanitarian and development actors have accorded to religious schools, international donors have paid a great deal of attention to the quality of non-formal education in the northeast. In particular, there is a clear focus on the development of non-formal curricula and pedagogies. For example, non-formal education has been provided in native languages in the northeast since the 2014 USAID Nigeria Education Crisis Response Project, which funded nine-month accelerated learning programmes based on Nigeria's SAMEs' non-formal curriculum (USAID, 2017). Such provision is crucial for conflict-affected children given that, in the public school system, it has been unfeasible to implement the 2022 National Language Policy, which aims to educate children in their mother tongue, owing to conflict volatility (KIIs). Meanwhile, in 2019, the government formally approved the National Accelerated Basics Curriculum and developed a Nigerian Educational Research & Development Council (NERDC) with support from the EU and Plan International.

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[17] There are four main streams of funds for education: (i) FAAC, part of which goes to education to cover teacher salaries; (ii) the Universal Basic Education Intervention Fund (UBE-IF) (a mix of different streams of funding, including donor and federal); (iii) federal funds supporting infrastructure; and (iv) donor funds sent directly to the states. Our assessment relies on Amakom (2016)'s production of a consolidated figure across the streams.

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While notable progress has been achieved, some challenges remain. Within non-formal education, the curricula used vary, and are not always linked to state assessment systems. Donor efforts to standardise the non-formal education system are hindered by the absence of government administrative and regulatory frameworks for implementing it .

Both humanitarian and development sectors are attempting to address gaps in teacher proficiency, with the former focusing more on the delivery of accelerated learning programmes and alternative modalities of teaching while the latter is prioritising delivery within the public-funded system. For example, the World Bank worked on the State Education Program Investment Project (SEPIP), which aimed to support needs-based teacher deployment to crisis-affected areas, working with both federal- and state-level teacher organisations (e.g. TRCN) and delivering psychosocial training (World Bank, 2016). Meanwhile, during the pandemic, Education Cannot Wait (ECW), supported by UNICEF, trained 978 teachers on remote pedagogy, distributed 3,943 radios to individuals and community hubs, and broadcast translated lessons five days a week (ECW, 2020). Currently, charities funded by the humanitarian sector provide radio education in 13 states, including Borno, Kaduna and Adamawa. The lessons are designed in Hausa and Fulfulde languages and align with the Nigerian education curriculum (Ebubedike et al., 2022).

While donors play a significant role in steering reforms aimed at enhancing teacher quality, the sustainability of improvements is rendered uncertain by the absence of government leadership, the typically short duration of donor projects and persistent challenges posed by the frequent transfers and reassignments of teachers across Nigeria. Addressing these issues requires consistent efforts to maintain and uphold quality standards. Moreover, current strategies for improving quality reportedly place excessive burdens on public school teachers. Those who undergo additional training for tasks such as Social and Emotional Learning in Borno or the Reading and Numeracy Activity curriculum in Adamawa attend multiple sessions for a curriculum they are unfamiliar with. Subsequently, they are expected to implement these in classrooms with student–teacher ratios as high as 100 to 1 (KIIs, state officials and CSOs in Borno and Adamawa). Lastly, the current compensation system for training completion incentivises non-teachers to attend. Key informants from Adamawa claimed that local actors sometimes nominated non-teachers (friends and family) to complete the training purely for financial gain (KII, CSO in Adamawa).

Encouragingly of late, humanitarian actors have started planning for longer-term interventions focused on teachers. Most recently, UNICEF has focused more on the northeast, and with FME, TRCN and the National Teachers' Institute (NTI) has begun a two-year training programme to support 18,000 unqualified teachers to pass the national qualifying exam (UNICEF, 2022b, 2023b). Humanitarians are working directly with government actors on this initiative, marking a significant step towards improving horizontal coherence in a protracted conflict setting. Alongside this, ECW has committed to a Multi-Year Resilience Programme and provides stipends and coaching to teachers to reduce absenteeism and incentivise public school teaching in conflict-affected contexts. (ECW, 2020). However, project documents suggest that, for the most part, ECW is funding traditional local humanitarian actors, such as NGOs, to provide school-level interventions, rather than financing actors within the public school system. This approach may pose a risk to the long-term development of the public education system in the states of the northeast.

C. Data systems

Multiple forms of assessment and data sources have led to confusion and tension between government and international actors (horizontal incoherence) and, while development actors continue to prioritise project-based data, humanitarian actors have recently aimed to coordinate data-gathering. As mentioned earlier, for example, UNESCO recently (2022) published data suggesting that Nigeria has the highest number of OOSC globally, reaching a staggering 20 million. The national government has challenged this number, citing the World Bank's estimate of 11 million and the UBEC estimate of 7 million (Busari, 2022).

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Overall, development sector actors promote data collection in line with their project cycles. For instance, the ESSPIN Composite Household Survey had only three waves (2012, 2014, 2016) and the USAID Early Grade Reading and Mathematics Assessments across six northern states (Bauchi, Sokoto, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano and Katsina) were conducted only twice, in 2013 and 2014. At the national level, education data come from two types of household surveys – the Nigeria Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey and the Nigeria Education Data Survey – and two types of administrative-level data – the Annual School Census (ASC) and the Nigeria Management Information System supported by the ESSPIN project.

State- and federal-level informants reported knowledge of government data sources but were less clear on how information was used to guide interventions or plan sector thinking. Meanwhile non-state actors reported drawing on results of the ASC at the state level to make assessments on the state of education in intervention areas. In Kaduna, the EDOREN project was seen to be significant in shifting norms of data collection and use on education by state officials, including their personal outlook on data (this was less frequently discussed by informants in other states). In the BAY states, over the past five years humanitarian actors have begun to coordinate assessment of education needs to feed into the EiEWG, which has state government representatives (but no federal member). REACH has been collecting quarterly data for the region since 2018 and sharing it with the EiEWG. Building on these insights, the EiEWG has conducted two Joint Education Needs Assessments, in 2019 and 2021, providing generalisable education needs analysis for the BAY area. However, as noted above in the sub-section on Planning, informants in the BAY states were not aware of the work of the EiEWG or mechanisms of decision-making underlying interventions.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This paper has analysed relationships between the main actors who shape the education system in Northeast Nigeria. We have examined the current norms, capacities and operations that underpin education provision through a lens of coherence and, equally, incoherence. We place our analysis along the horizontal and vertical axes of the education system, with horizontal coherence referring to relationships between different types of actors working on the same level of the system and vertical coherence referring to relationships between actors along different levels of the system (i.e. federal, state and local levels). By focusing on the dynamic features of norms, capacities and operations of education provision, we have been able to identify misalignments that constrain the achievement of robust educational outcomes for Nigeria's conflict-affected children. Below, we outline key areas where we see disjuncture and highlight opportunities for building coherence. We then return to our conceptual framework and highlight how our analysis of EiE in Nigeria can inform its further development.

Normative commitment to education for conflict-affected children remains low: education is not a top priority for government stakeholders and is seen as a latter-stage emergency response by humanitarian organisations. Funding to education has in general been declining as a percentage of total government expenditure in Nigeria. In relation to education of conflict-affected children in particular, the federal government's National Policy on IDPs is not used, or even mentioned, by practitioners in the region. Despite the availability of a formal federal-level framework, in practice response to crisis has been largely left to the discretion of states, where contestations around the status of IDPs and variations in the places assigned to them in host communities (official camps, informal camps, temporary boarding houses) shape the working conditions for humanitarian and development actors. In humanitarian and development sectors, the lack of commitment to EiE has been compounded by a reluctance to increase funding in the BAY states. Moreover, humanitarian actors have continued to work within an 'emergency' framework during more than a decade-long insurgency, with projects typically lasting between nine months and a year. Very recently, EiEWG as well the OCHA-led HCT has begun to acknowledge the need to shift from short- to longer-term planning (OCHA, 2023). However, it is not yet clear whether normative or operational capacity exists to

ensure that humanitarian responses in a protracted conflict are complementary to longer-term development efforts, especially given the observed pushback from humanitarian actors to moving into what they consider a development space (KII, international NGO in Abuja).

There is evidence of unintentional positive layering between responses of government actors and humanitarian/development actors on the role of religious schools in the northeast. For sustainability, a coherence in norms is necessary, and this will require coordinating agencies to engage meaningfully with differing objectives of key sector actors. On one hand, executive-level leadership (at the federal and often the state level) is wary of admitting that the insurgency is still ongoing and consequently does not engage or lead on frameworks for peacebuilding and peace education. In parallel, federal-level government norms regard Islamic schools as inimical to national development. Meanwhile, international development and humanitarian actors support non-formal schools, which encompass religious schools, in line with their mandates to focus on areas of highest need. The division highlights an unintended layering of response when it comes to non-formal schools even while there is no base-level consensus on educational outcomes for conflict-affected children and children in religious schools.

A clear opportunity to address this gap across different sectors in the northeast lies in developing the relationship between the government-led NEDC and the humanitarian-led Nigeria EiEWG. At present, these organisations operate in silos, lacking meaningful synergy. While both entities involve state and/or local non-state actors in principle, it is unclear the degree to which the government can or want to take a greater role in setting direction on the status of EiE. An opportunity to improve alignment here requires actively working to shape a collective objective and milestones for EiE in conflict-affected states. As a starting point for NEDC and EiEWG, there is a clear advantage to the use of these fora for regular information-sharing and joint decision-making along both horizontal and vertical axes of the education system, at least at the state level.

There is evidence that state-level political guidance is crucial to overcome fragmentation of actors in the education sector. Responsibilities for primary education at the federal, state and local levels are not clearly delineated, which impedes the capacities of various stakeholders unless these are supported by a strong political actor. Numerous entities, such as the TRCN, the Teachers Service Board and the NTI, have similar or adjacent mandates, all involved with or focused on teachers. Such fragmentation is not uncommon in bureaucratic systems with multiple entities, as noted by Hinds (2015), and can lead to discord between prescribed and actual responsibilities.

However, coherence can be improved with the help of strong political guidance. In highly fragmented contexts, the capacity of local actors to carry out their prescribed responsibilities is highly dependent on strong political actors. In Nigeria, both federal-level executives (PLANE, 2021b) and state-level executives (as illustrated in the discussion on Kaduna in the Capacities section) play pivotal roles in determining the level of support and protection afforded to actors in executing their designated functions within the education system. Generally, however, advocacy to ensure mandates are clearly spelled out at both the federal and the state levels, will allow lower-level officials to be empowered to respond and adapt effectively to local crises. This would help ensure the delivery of education remains meaningful and resilient in crisis situations.

The public funding system for the disbursement of funds from federal to state level disadvantages regions in most need and constrains state officials' capacity to respond to crises. Meanwhile, humanitarian actors do not engage closely with state- or local-level officials, missing an opportunity for enhancing coherence. For example, UBE-IF provides conditional grants to state governments to cover costs related to school feeding and capital projects and standing operational costs. To access these funds, states must provide matching contributions. Conflict-affected and poorer states often face difficulties meeting this requirement. These allocations are granted at a flat level, ignoring the fact that conflict-affected states may

need more support. Even where state officials would like to channel money into emergency education from other budget lines, they struggle to do so in the absence of permissive federal regulations.

While in most of Nigeria public funding is allocated to formal school systems in line with federal norms, states in the northeast exhibit a more varied approach, with state governors often disbursing funds to religious schools. However, according to our informants, humanitarian actors working in conflict-affected states often circumvent state-level officials, focusing instead on federal- and local-level coordination.

For humanitarian actors and development donors, engagement at the state level is a clear opportunity to develop and advocate for integrated EiE budget lines. This is particularly relevant in the BAY states, where state governors, akin to the humanitarian sector, frequently advocate for the financing and integration of religious schools.

A critical area for improvement relates to operational coherence around interventions targeting teachers, whose capacity is a key factor influencing the availability and quality of education. In the northeast, teacher training programmes are often short- term and disconnected from state-level teacher allocation systems. This raises questions about the sustained impact of teacher training programmes, especially when teachers equipped with conflict-sensitive pedagogies relocate away from environments where students require such approaches.

Beyond the substance of the training, the enduring effectiveness of these programmes is compromised by inclusion of non-teachers in training sessions. Both literature and interviews revealed that humanitarian and development actor programmes frequently unintentionally provide training to individuals who are not educators. These non-teachers, motivated by stipends offered by training organisations, participate in sessions but do not subsequently contribute to the teaching workforce. This practice undermines long-term benefits of training initiatives and points to the need for a more targeted and strategic approach to ensure training efforts align with the actual needs of the education sector and lead to meaningful impact.

While recent efforts in data collection have sought to bridge the humanitarian–development divide, subsequent operational efforts have not yet followed suit. For example, in the case of teacher training, current efforts to coordinate data have not been leveraged to arrive at better ways of identifying teachers for training and ensuring they are indeed teaching in local schools and have basic qualifications. As such, there remains a significant gap between formal objectives and delivery in practice. This is because operational coherence relies strongly on state-level actors aligning the aims and methods of delivery along the vertical axes of the system. In other words, findings presented here give an indication that the success of vertical operations is a function of committed political actors.

Our analysis points toward several key recommendations for strengthening education system coherence for humanitarian and development actors to enhance access, quality and continuity of education for conflict-affected children in Nigeria:

- **Prioritise coordination at the state level** – where the political office is most directly affected by the conflict – to create meaningful joint strategies for humanitarian, development and government actors. A combination of political negotiation and joint capacity assessment is most likely to produce clear objectives for each sector to create system-level improvements.

- **Work with existing government-led coordination structures for conflict-affected regions** (e.g. NEDC) to create explicit and collective objectives for education of conflict affected children.

- **Transition to a state-level funding model for EiE** (in both conflict-affected and IDP-receiving states) that is predictable and recognises the protracted nature of conflict and climate-induced displacement. This means focusing on the needs of ministries of education within those states and

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creating integrated funding budgets across humanitarian and development sectors at the state level. In the past, integrated funding models at the state level – such as the EU-funded programme for Borno, which financed educational initiatives through Plan International and Save the Children – have shown some success at placing OOSC in mainstream schools (Perret, 2019; Haruna, 2022).

- **Share information across sector actors before launching education programmes at the state level.** For example, for teacher training programmes in conflict-affected states, donors and implementing partners should disclosure the data on (i) the nature of training to be undertaken and how it fills a gap in present training, (ii) the geographical area of focus and any previous similar trainings undertaken, (iii) planned deployment of teachers once they are trained and (iv) clear impact indicators of training, thus moving beyond recording only 'numbers of teachers trained.' Existing groups such as NEDC and EiEWG provide a good starting point for gathering and sharing this type of information.

Our analysis of education system coherence in Northeast Nigeria also allows us to reflect on our conceptual framework and develop it further for future application. First, our analysis points out that the concept of coherence must come with an endogenous direction for the type of policy change we are interested in. In other words, we are not interested in coherence for coherence's sake, but in coherence for achieving access, quality and continuity in education for children. Second, our framework tries to extend pre-existing coherence models by considering interactions at the same time and in the same space of a range of stakeholders, principally government, humanitarian and development actors (but also at times non-state providers), as opposed to focusing either on government leadership or the humanitarian–development coherence of external actors. Third, the Nigeria case study has allowed us to verify the value of distinguishing between vertical and horizontal coherence and to recognise and place the multiple actors within these axes.

However, one of the limitations of the framework is that it does not accurately represent different permutations of (in)coherence along both vertical and horizontal axes, such as:

- When actors at one level within the same sphere may have contested jurisdictions or aims (e.g. state-level UBEC and SUBEB);
- When actors may be coherent across different levels in different spheres (e.g. where humanitarian actors consult at the federal level and then proceed to working directly with the local-level government without engaging the intermediary state-level actors);
- When there is some vertical coherence but it is not complete (e.g. in states where state-level officials and local government support religious schooling within a context where the federal-level government does not).

Another weakness in our conceptual framework emerges precisely from its education sector lens on relationships and its bias in its focus on officials and individuals who work with or in education-related organisations. This lens means the framework does not directly cast a light on how the relative importance of education overall within the larger political economy of the country plays a role in determining the horizontal and vertical coherence of actors in conflict and crisis.

Overall, this study has resulted in the initial development of an applied conceptual framework for education system coherence in conflict and crisis settings, which we expect to iterate and adapt in future research. It has provided an analysis of the (in)coherence of education provision in crisis-affected states in Nigeria, with detailed analysis across the norms, capacities and operations of different key actors. As part of the ERICC programme of research, it is anticipated that actors within the Nigerian education ecosystem can further refine and use these findings to identify opportunities for greater coherence and engagement in ways that advance access, quality and continuity of education for learners in the crisis-affected states in the northeast of Nigeria.

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ANNEX 1A: CHF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE

Key informant interview protocol

The researcher is to use this protocol for obtaining information from stakeholders. The protocol has a guide (in the Annex session), which is a set of introductory statements to direct the respondent towards the issue of interest.

Objective

The objective of the KII is to obtain information from stakeholders about (a) the most pressing issues in education in conflict and protracted crises in their context and (b) the existing landscape related to students' access, continuity and quality of education in areas of conflict and protracted crisis.

Combined with other components of the country scan, answers to these questions will guide the formation of a country research agenda.

Overarching research questions *(strictly for the researcher)*

The research questions are for the research team, not for the key informant. At the end of the interviews (*I prefer end of each day when the team reflects*), the team should go through these questions to check how much information they have obtained for answering the research questions.

At the end of the study, the research should be able to use the obtained information to answer the following questions:

1. What policies, programmes and practices are in place that affect access, quality and continuity of education in a setting of conflict and protracted crisis? [**Policy and programme availability**]

2. Which policies and guidelines are absent for ensuring access, quality and continuity of education in settings of conflict and protracted crisis? [**Gaps in policy and practice**]

3. For whom were policies and programmes made? Which groups are currently not included in policies and programmes? [**Policy-focused and beneficiary groups**]

4. How are policies are being implemented in practice? Which policies are not being adequately implemented in practice? [**Policy–practice coherence**]

5. What factors facilitate and inhibit the design and implementation of policies and programmes for ensuring access and continuity of quality education? [**Influencers of policy and practice**]

6. Do policies, programmes and practices affecting quality, access and continuity apply universally to host country and refugee students or are there separate policies, programmes and practices for each? [**Refugee education and host policy and practice coherence**]

Approach

The research team will select, engage and obtain the desired information from the selected key informant.

It is expected that the **interviewer** (research team member) is a highly experienced qualitative researcher with techniques for interactive engagement with the respondent. The interviewer will keep the respondent focused on the desired theme through a series of probes.

The notetaker will make copious notes during the interaction.

Step 1. Select the respondent.

1. Once the respondent is identified, the interviewer should gather information about the organisation (its mandate, objectives, purpose of establishment). Such information is best sourced from the organisation's website, institution documents or informers, etc. The preparation will help match the respondents' statements with the information the researcher has regarding the organisation. Probing is easier when the interviewer has previous knowledge about the issues and the context in which they apply.

2. Use the KII guide (see Annex below) to guide the representative of the stakeholder organisation to provide the information that is required for answering the research questions. The respondent is the person who is purposefully identified during the brainstorming sessions as the key informant stakeholder in the study location.

Step 2. Make notes of the responses; record when possible.

While the interviewer asks the questions and probes for information using the guide, the notetaker should make notes. The notes should be reviewed with the interviewer and then finalised as the interview record.

Step 3. Collect other sets of information, where applicable.

Use the opportunity the interview gives to carry out other protocols and to apply the other tools where feasible and desirable. This may require arranging for a second visit by the same or another team of interviewers to:

1. ***Collect literature*** (reports, policy and practice documents). Request literature on education in crisis and protracted conflict settings that may not be online or accessible to the literature review consultants. If they are not available, seek assistance about where to find them.

2. ***Review the data system*** (information about types of data collected on education, by whom, where, on what, for what purpose, when, repository, retrieval and use by whom). The required PEA information will be teased out during the interviews.

The following outputs are expected at the end of the KIIs:

- Notes from the stakeholder KIIs;

- List and copies of literature (report, policy, practice documents) that are not online;

- Data system review reports;

- [Nigeria only] PEA notes.

This is the end of the protocol. The KII guide is an Annex to the protocol.

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KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Instructions: Please use this guide to interview each person identified as a key informant stakeholder

Introduce yourself:

Good day, I'm (name). I am a researcher with [organisation]. I want to thank you for taking the time to speak with me today.

Explain project:

We are conducting a project to improve education in six countries that have regions affected by conflict or crisis. [Country] is one of those countries.

Our goal is to better understand the state of education in [country] in order to build upon what is already happening. We then want to identify the most effective areas for research to address.

To achieve this goal, we are talking to individuals who work in education or education in emergencies in [country]. We want to better understand issues related to students' access to schooling, their ability to progress through school and the quality of that schooling. We are particularly interested in hearing about your experience in this area through your work with [company/organisation].

Before we start, we want to let you know that we will be recording this interview and it may be transcribed to ensure that the information that we document is accurate. Results from interviews will not specifically identify individuals interviewed or their organisations. Rather, the results will be reported in aggregate and by the types of stakeholders that have been engaged.

Your participation in this session is voluntary, and there will be no individual benefit from your participation. There will not be any negative effects if you decide you do not want to participate. Your responses will be written anonymously and reported in aggregate. No one will know how you responded in the final report. We would like to hear your honest opinions about the topics we discuss. There are no right or wrong answers to any of our questions. You can choose not to respond to a question at any time. You can also end the discussion at any time. If one of my questions is unclear, please stop me and I'll ask it in a different way. All information collected from these sessions will be stored securely and kept confidential. None of the comments you make during today's discussion will be linked with your name in any way. The discussion should take about 60 minutes. If you have any questions you can please ask them now or at any time during the discussion.

For more information about this project, contact [INSERT EMAIL AND PHONE NUMBER]. Do you want to continue?

1. **Respondent information**

Country (e.g. Nigeria, Jordan)		*[If applicable]* **Subnational** (e.g. Adamawa)	
Sub-subnational (e.g. Local Government Area)		**Office** (e.g. Planning Division, Adamawa State Ministry of Education)	

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Position (e.g. Director)		Authority (e.g. education research)	
From stakeholder analysis			
Influence		**Interest**	
Power			

2. Policy and practice document availability (where applicable)

Please describe the types of policy documents, guidelines and practice instructions that you have regarding access, quality or continuity/transition in [state], which is a setting of conflict and protracted crisis.

S/N	2.1 Document title, when developed, approving authority	2.2 Purpose of policy or guideline 1. Access 2. Quality 3. Continuity 4. Coherence 5. Other (specify) *(Multiple response enabled)*	2.3 Availability 1. Yes, hard copy 2. Yes, seen soft copy 3. Yes, seen online 4. Yes, not seen 5. No not seen	2.4 Target beneficiaries 1. Students 2. Teachers 3. Schools 4. Other (specify)	2.5 Where 1. National 2. Subnational 3. Sub-subnational 4. Other (specify)	2.6 If you obtain a copy/ photocopy, please assign a reference number to it here (e.g. 2.6.1/country/ subnational/ sub-subnational/ office/position)
e.g.	Relocating students from insurgency areas, guideline issued by Ministry of Education 2018, governor approved					

	Main issue/theme	Probe for
3	**Background**	**I would like to know about your organisation**
3.1	Please describe what you and your organisation do with respect to education in conflict and crisis settings	• Organisation's overall goal/mandate • Specific roles/activities of organisation • Specific roles/activities of respondent *(Use the pre-interview information to probe further)*
3.2	Please tell me what you consider as the main threats (dangers) to education where there is conflict and protracted crisis in [country]	• Effect of conflict on education in their location • Impact on students, teachers and parents • How it may affect the stakeholder in the future • Role of the education sector in a conflict (i) at the subnational level and (ii) at the national level

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Note: questions 3.3 and 3.4 are for PEA in Nigeria, optional in other contexts		
3.3	Have your organisation's work, policies and activities adapted to the conflict? If so, how?	• Review of goals/objectives • Changes in long-term activities/programmes • Any new short-term activities/programmes • Changes in roles of the respondent • Evidence used to make adjustments/changes • Evidence that will be used to make future changes
3.4	Please share with me the policies that guide the work you and your organisation do in education	• Adaptation of the policy for a national-level response to conflict and crisis • [Where applicable] Adaptation of the policy for a subnational (state)-level response to conflict and crisis • Adaptation of the policy at a local level for responding to conflict in the area that is directly under impact
4	**State of education**	**I would like to know about the state of education in the country/state/area**
4.1	What education issues are most pressing in [country]?	• Access • Quality • Effect of conflict • Alignment of policy, programme and practice
4.2	What are the strengths of the system?	• What seems to be working well? • What could be improved?
4	**Access**	**Let us talk more about access to education in conflict settings**
4.1	What do you think are the most concerning challenges for students accessing education in areas of conflict and crisis?	• Are students/families/communities aware of educational opportunities that exist? • Are students *able* to participate in educational opportunities? If not, why? • *Potential issues to provide for include* location, cost**,** disruption of schooling, fear of schooling, safety issues, coping with new curriculum, teachers, environment
4.2	Are there policies or programmes that affect students' access to schooling in conflict and crisis? What are they?	• Focus on *awareness* and *ability to participate* • Are these policies/programmes funded? Are they implemented? Implemented as intended? • Do these policies and programmes apply equally to host country, internally displaced and refugee students? Are some specific to each group? If so, what are they?

4.3	What policies would be helpful for increasing access in areas of conflict and crisis in [country]?	• Awareness about education opportunities
		• Refugee issues/displaced persons
		• What populations are affected by this gap in policy?
		  o Displaced persons
		  o Marginalised groups (gender, special needs persons)
		• How does the gap you mention affect education access?

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5	Quality	Let us now talk about quality of education in conflict settings
5.1	What are the challenges to providing high-quality education for students in areas of conflict?	• Human resource (teachers, counsellors) • Norms and practices (low teaching quality, corporal punishment, low teacher expectations) • Funding and material resources (books, chalk, tablets) • Location • Parental norms or expectations
5.2	What policies, programmes and practices affect the **quality of** education in areas of conflict and protracted crisis?	• Quality for the general population • Quality for those marginalised from education (special needs, gender) • Are these policies/programmes funded? Are they implemented? Implemented as intended? Do these policies and programmes apply equally to host country, internally displaced and refugee students? Are some specific to each group? If so, what are they?
5.3	Please tell me other resources that are in place, such as human resources for improving quality of education in a conflict setting	• Resources at school (e.g. teachers, teacher qualifications, teaching aids, etc.) • Resources at household and community level • Relationships (e.g. teacher–student relations; community/care-giver involvement, etc.)
5.4	Can you think of policies that would be helpful for increasing quality in areas of conflict and crisis in [country] that don't currently exist?	• Resources at school (e.g. teachers, teacher qualifications, teaching aids, etc.) • Resources at household and community level • Relationships (e.g. teacher–student relations; community/care-giver involvement, etc.)
6	Continuity	We now focus on continuity of education in conflict settings
6.1	What are the challenges to **keeping students in school** in areas of conflict and crisis?	• Challenges with regular attendance (teachers or students) • Challenges with grade repetition/failing grades • School disruption (Covid-19, elections, attacks, etc.) • Challenges with transitions from primary to secondary, etc. • Issues may include fear of schooling, lack of infrastructure (school buildings, etc.), human resources (teachers, counsellors)
6.2	What policies, programmes or practices are in place that affect students being able to sustain an education in regions affected by conflict and protracted crisis?	• Probe for regular attendance (teachers/students), grade repetition/promotion, school transition, school disruption • Are these policies/programmes funded? Are they implemented? Implemented as intended? • Do these policies and programs apply equally to host country, internally displaced and refugee students? Are some specific to each group? If so, what are they?
6.2	Can you think of policies that would be helpful for increasing students' sustained learning in	• Probe for regular attendance (teachers/students), grade repetition/promotion, school transition, school disruption

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	areas of conflict and crisis in [country] that don't currently exist?	● What gap would the policy address? To whom would it apply?
6.3	Please describe the impact of conflict on **psychosocial outcomes** for children?	● Any observation or anecdote about the impact ● Any documentation of the impact (request document) ● How are these considered in policy-making – is there a specific aspect of policy that addresses these issues?
9	**Success indicators**	
9.1	Of all the policies/programmes for ensuing education access, quality and continuity in settings of conflict and protracted crisis, which ones would you consider most successful?	● Please mention them ● Why are you impressed by the policy/programme?
10	Interviewee-guided	
	Are there other issues regarding education in conflict and protracted crisis that you would like to share with me?	

Thank you for your time and for sharing your experience and knowledge with us. We can be reached on the phone should you want to contact us.

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ANNEX 1B: ODI KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Instructions: Please use this guide to interview each person identified as a key informant stakeholder.

Introduce yourself:

Good day, I'm (name). I am a researcher with [organisation]. I want to thank you for taking the time to speak with me today.

Explain project:

This interview is part of the data collection for a multi-country research study on the provision of education in the context of conflict and protracted crises. Nigeria is one of the six countries where we are conducting research. The research is funded by FCDO (the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office).

The aim of the project is to improve access and quality of education in areas of conflict and crisis, building on the progress that the countries have made in the past two decades. To achieve this goal, we are talking to individuals who work in education or education in emergencies, including in Nigeria. We want to better understand issues related to students' access to schooling, their ability to progress through school and the quality of that schooling and how the conflict or crisis has affected that. We are particularly interested in views on how different actors work together in this space, including both development organisations (those focused on long-term development) and humanitarian actors (those focused more on crisis response), noting that there is often overlap in mandates and actors may do both. We are particularly interested in hearing about your experience in this area because of your work with [company/organisation].

Explain participant rights:

- *Before we start, I would like to let you know that, if it is okay with you I would like to audio record our conversation. Having a recording would help me accurately write up the notes after the discussion.*

- *Notes from the discussion will not include any of the information that can identify you. Key takeaways from this discussion will be combined with the themes that emerge from other interviews and written up in a summary report. No one will know how you responded in the final report as none of the comments you make during today's discussion will be linked with your name in any way.*

- *Your participation in this session is voluntary, and there will be no individual benefit from your participation. There will not be any negative effects if you decide you do not want to participate.*

- *I would like to hear your honest opinions about the topics we discuss. There are no right or wrong answers to any of our questions.*

- *You can choose not to respond to a question at any time. You can also end the discussion at any time. If one of my questions is unclear, please stop me and I'll ask it in a different way.*

- *All information collected from these sessions will be stored securely and kept confidential. The notes will be deleted after six months of us writing up the final report.*

- *The discussion should take about 60 minutes. If you have any questions, you can please ask now or at any time during the discussion. You can also contact the research manager of this project [insert name and contact details].*

Ask for consent:

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Do you have any questions about the research project or the interview?

Can I check that you are still happy to take part in this research?

Would be it okay if make an audio recording of our discussion?

Respondent information – fill out before/after the interview

State(s) work focuses on (e.g. Adamawa)	
Sub-subnational (*e.g. LGA*)	
Type of organisation (e.g. local NGO, state official, donor)	
Position (e.g. director)	
Level of influence (political/financing/community)	
Key areas of interest in education	

Key informant background	Duration
To the interviewer. The goal of the opening section is to establish rapport with the participant and to understand what areas of education policy and provision they are most knowledgeable about. Please tailor questions in the following sections based on the participant profile as appropriate. 1. **To begin with, I would like to better understand your work. Could you please tell me a bit about your role and responsibilities at [organisation name]?** *Probes*: • How long have you been at this organisation/in this role? • Can you let us know what projects you are working on and what your role is on them? • Can you let us know a little bit about how your organisation decided to (i) work on this area of focus (e.g. access/curriculum, etc.) and (ii) work on this geographical area you are mentioning? *Probe for what kind of evidence was used to make these decisions/whether they first scanned to see if other actors were already doing this work in the geographical area/ whether it was demand-led; if it was demand-led who made the demand/whether the presence of conflict/crisis influenced this decision* 2. **Thinking about the broader context of working in Nigeria, have the insurgency in the northeast and the recent worsening of other conflicts changed the relationship or the ways of working between your organisation and (i) the federal government** [*once they have answered (i), move to ask about the relationship with*], **(ii) state government and (iii) community-level CSOs?** *Probe as appropriate IF THERE WAS CHANGE:*	10 min

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- What was the relationship like between [organisation] and the federal government before and after the insurgency?
- In what ways are you working differently now, if at all?
- What it a positive or a negative change? Why?
- What were the key drivers of the change?
- How about the relationships with the state actors? *Use the probes above to explore*
- How about the LGA officials? *Use the probes above to explore*
- *Please make sure you probe about the conflicts separately: the insurgency in the northeast; the herder–farmer crisis generally; the Niger Delta crisis*

IF THERE WAS NO CHANGE:
- Do you think there should have been a change in the relationship between the international and the state actors? Why/ why not?
  IF YES:
  - In an ideal world, what that should look like?
  - What were the key barriers to changing the ways of working?
  - What could help promote this change going forward?

3. **Thinking about the working relationships with other humanitarian or development organisations and donor agencies, have the insurgency and other conflicts affected the way you work with other international actors?**
   IF THERE WAS CHANGE:
- What was the dynamic like before and after the insurgency?
- Any changes in the organisations you collaborate with? If yes, why?
- Was it a positive or a negative change? Why?
- What might have been the key drivers of the change?

IF THERE WAS NO CHANGE:
- Do you think there should have been a change in the relationship between the humanitarian and development actors? Why/why not?
  IF YES:
  - What were the key barriers to changing the ways of working?
  - What could help promote this change going forward?

Coordination on specific education policies and programmes	

Note to interviewer. Questions in the following section are anchored in specific education policy areas, but the overarching focus should still be on cohesion, especially on cohesion between humanitarian and development actors. You don't have to explore all questions in this section (take into consideration time allocated/participant expertise). **Thank you so much for your insights so far. If it is okay with you, next I would like to explore a few different areas of Nigeria's education system, such as provision for OOSC, displaced persons and teachers.** 4. **With regard to OOSC, are you aware of any initiatives in [Adamawa/Borno/Kaduna] focusing on provision of education to children not attending formal schools?** *Examples: Non-formal or alternative learning programmes include the Accelerated Basic Literacy Programme and non-formal Learning Centres funded by Save the*	20 min

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Children, the World Bank and USAID. These programmes are sometimes short in length (nine months) and aimed at children who have not been attending formal schools for more than two years. The provision can also happen through the Qur'anic school network.

IF YES:

- What does the programme/initiative entail? (content, place, frequency, duration)
- Who is delivering this support? (NGOs/local actors/international organisations)
- Who are the initiatives funded by? If joint funding (state/donor), how is it coordinated?
- Do you know of other actors, international or domestic, who are doing something similar? Are they doing it in different or similar areas as your work? *Probe for examples*
- What in your view is the difference between what local actors are doing (e.g. CSOs), what the government is doing and what humanitarian or development actors like yourselves are doing for non-formal education for children and OOSC? Which of the initiatives have been most supported by local communities? Can you give examples?
- To what extent are the mentioned initiatives successful? Why?
- What would help make these programmes more effective?

IF NO, *probe where appropriate*:

- Do you think there is need and scope for such initiatives? Why/why not?
- What would/have been the main barriers? Please provide examples of how this barrier impacted a programme

IF NOT DISCUSSED SO FAR:

5. **Are you aware of any initiatives to help transition children from non-formal to formal education in [Adamawa/Borno/Kaduna]?**

Interviewer: If the respondent does not know of any initiatives, please reassure them that it is no problem as it is just an informal exploratory discussion, and there are no wrong or right answers.

Probes:

- Could you please tell me a bit more about what actions have been taken and by whom? *Probe for specific actors*
- In your opinion/knowledge do these actors work together or they work separately? *Probe for coordination efforts; jointly funded initiatives; whether there are formal or informal meetings*
- Has there been any resistance to mainstreaming from state actors/international actors/ parents/teachers/community leaders?
- What are the key barriers to linking non-formal and formal education/accreditation of non-formal education? Does the conflict or crisis affect present a barrier in any way? If so what? *Probe for examples that illustrate the key barrier*

6. **The conflicts in Nigeria seem to have greatly affected teachers. Would you be able to say, based on your work, which areas of Nigeria you see teachers being most affected and if there is any support available to teachers in the affected states?**

   Note to interviewer: Examples of support initiatives include training to provide emotional support to students; help with work placements for teachers who have been

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displaced; timely payment of salaries; instructions on mitigating short-term disruptions owing to conflict.
- Who is delivering this support? Who is funding it?
- Are there any differences in what the government is doing to support teachers and what humanitarian actors like yourselves are focusing on?
- If there a difference, then why? Do different approaches lead to better/worse outcomes for children?
- Which actors in Nigeria are supporting your efforts? Which actors are not involved in supporting teachers, but you feel like could play a bigger role?

7. **Do you know whether anything is being done to provide learning opportunities for children living in camps/camp-like structures for internally displaced persons and refugees?**
- Who are the key actors working on this issue? (state/humanitarian/donors)
- To what extent is there a shared visions/coherence in their efforts?
- What are the gaps in provisions? What are the causes?
- Any examples of duplication of efforts?
- Are there any differences in views of what the support should look like between local and foreign actors?

8. **Do you know what, if anything, is being done to make the schools safe?**
Probe as appropriate:
- Who are the actors most interested in addressing this issue?
- To what extent is there effective coordination/cohesion between stakeholders?
- Are there any gaps or duplication of efforts?

9. **Do you know of any peacebuilding efforts in [Adamawa/Borno/Kaduna]?**
Probes:
- In what ways do these current peacebuilding efforts, or lack of thereof, impact education provision?
- Are peacebuilding efforts ever actioned via schools, e.g. as part of the curriculum or through associated clubs?
- Can you think of any examples of peacebuilding efforts having positive or negative impact on education?
- To what extent are these efforts sufficient to promote peace in the northern region?

Mechanisms to coordinate strategies and funding

10 min

Building on everything we have discussed so far, I would like to better understand to what extent there is coherence between humanitarian and development efforts.

10. **Based on your experience, are there any differences in how humanitarian and development actors approach education in crisis in general?**
Probes:

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- Which factors do they consider when deciding which geographic areas (states/local authorities) and organisations (schools/NGOs/etc.) should get the funding? Why?
- Who has the final say on where the funding from humanitarian and development agencies is allocated?
- To what extent do the humanitarian and development actors have an overview of national and international donor funding flows?
- Do the two groups differ in the extent to which they engage the federal, state and local practitioners?
- Do they engage with different actors at the state and local authority level?
- To what extent do they engage with the local practitioners?
- What groups of children are they targeting? Are they the same? Why/why not?
- To what extent are the two sectors aligned in their vision and end goals for education in Nigeria?
- What are the key communications channels between the humanitarian and development actors? (Regular meetings/forums/mailing lists/regular publications)

IF IT HAS NOT COME UP YET, then just light touch on this.

10a. Are you aware of the Education in Emergencies Working Group for BAY States?
   IF YES:
- To what extent is the EiEWG effective in promoting coherence? Why?
- Is it seen as legitimate and helpful? If so, by whom?
- What can be done to improve the effectiveness/visibility of this group?
- How does the EiEWG connect with any broader education coordination groups also working in the state?

Thinking ahead and wind down

	3–5 min

As we are coming to the end of the discussion, I would like to spend a few minutes reflecting on the upcoming elections and their potential impact on the provision of education in conflict-affected areas.

11. **Do you think the 2023 election will affect education in conflict-affected areas?**
Probes:
- Have previous elections affected education in conflict-affected areas? If so, which ones and in what ways?
- Can you think of any specific example where the election might affect education?
- You have mentioned several [positive/negative] examples of [in]coherence during the discussion. What entry points are likely to open up following the election to promote coherence? What might be the potential to improve this?
- What can be done to ensure that there is no duplication going forward and that the goals of humanitarian and donor actors align?

Thank you and close

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	2 min
- Thank you for your time and for sharing your experience and knowledge with us. - In terms of next steps for the research project, we are going to combine your insights with what we have learned from other participants in a written report. Just to reassure you, all of your data will be kept anonymous and your name will not be mentioned anywhere in the notes or in the report. - The notes and the recording will be deleted securely within three months of us submitting the report to FCDO. - If you would like to learn more about the project, you can do so online by looking up ERICC (Education Research in Emergencies and Protracted Crisis) or emailing me. - Thank you.	

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ANNEX 2: BREAKDOWN OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Name of organisation	Level of coordination			Sector			
	Federal	State	LGA	Government	International donor	International NGO	CSO/NGO/faith-based organisation
Ministry of Education	2	11	0	x	x		
UBEC/SUBEB	0	4	0	x	x		
NMEC/SAME/SMEB	1	2	0	x			
IRC	1	1	0			x	
World Bank	1	0	0		x		
UNICEF	0	2	0		x	x	
CASCEFA/KADBEAM	1	3	0				x
NUT	0	2	0				x
NAPPS	1	0	0				x
State Governor's Office	1	1	0	x			
NERDC	1	0	0	x			
Save the Children	1	2	0		x	x	
TRCN	1	1	0	x			
TEP	1	0	0				x
Atiku Institute of Development	0	1	0				x

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CAN/Muslim Council	0	3	0				x
Traditional leaders	1	2	0				x
EiEWG	0	1	0			x	
SBMC	0	1	0				x
State universities	0	2	0	x			
LGA	0	0	1	x			
CHAD	0	1	0	x	x		
NRC	0	1	0		x	x	
Formal primary and secondary schools	0	4	0				x
NCNE	0	1	0	x			
Hope for the Community Initiatives	0	1	0				x
Ministry of Internal Security	0	1	0	x			
Projects (funded) PERL ARC	0	1	0			x	
PTA	0	1	0				x
NTI	0	1	0	x			x
Total	13	50	1				

ANNEX 3: RESEARCH ETHICS EXEMPTION

National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria (NHREC)

Promoting Highest Ethical and Scientific Standards
for Health Research in Nigeria

Federal Ministry of Health

NHREC Protocol Number NHREC/01/01/2007-30/07/2022
NHREC Approval Number NHREC/01/01/2007-31/08/2022
Date: 31st August, 2022

Re: Documentation of evidence for assessing the problem of education in conflict and protracted crisis settings in Nigeria

Health Research Ethics Committee (HREC) assigned number: NHREC/01/01/2007

Name of Principal Investigator:	Professor Oladele Akogun
Address of Principal Investigator:	International Rescue Committee
	902 Olu Awotesu Street, off Idris Ibrahim Crescent, off Obafemi Awolowo Way
	Abuja, Nigeria
	Email: Email Oladele.Akogun@rescue.org
	Tel: +2348037220460

Date of receipt of valid application: 30/07/2022
Date when final determination of research was made: 31-08-2022

Notice of Research Exemption

This is to inform you that the activity described in the submitted protocol/documents have been reviewed and the Health Research Ethics Committee has determined that according to the National Code for Health Research Ethics, the activity described there-in meets the criteria for exemption and is therefore approved as exempt from NHREC oversight.

The National Code for Health Research Ethics requires you to comply with all institutional guidelines, rules and regulations and with the tenets of the Code. NHREC reserves the right to conduct compliance visit to your research site without previous notification.

Signed

Professor Zubairu Iliyasu MBBS (UniMaid), MPH (Glasg.), PhD (Shef.), FWACP, FMCPH, FFPH(UK)
Chairman, National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria (NHREC)

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ANNEX 4: CHF NOTE ON SITE SELECTION

Background

The ERICC Research Directorate discussed and approved the following criteria as most appropriate for subnational site selection in Nigeria (details   below).

(a) **Nature of the conflict and the effect on education**:

Features the conflict exhibits, level of international attention they attract, impact of the conflict on education access and quality

(b) **The immediate impact of results on education/effort of getting things done**:

States that have a history of providing a good return on research efforts owing to government proactivity (goodwill, timesaving, engagement, responsiveness, presence of past projects to build upon, available FCDO projects that could benefit from the study, likelihood of accomplishing expected project objective, media presence and visibility)

(c) **Resource requirement**:

The cost of safety measures, security compliance level, ease of access to the state (by train or air) and minimum road use.

Method

The Country Research Lead sent 15 individuals with knowledge and experience working on education in the north, either as intervention project officers or research team leaders, the criteria for rating eight states: Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in the North East; Kaduna, Sokoto and Zamfara in the North West   ; and Niger and Benue in the North Central. All eight states have been notorious for crisis and conflict in the past five years.

The Country Research Lead held informal conversations with five current experts in education in the North West and North East to obtain greater in-depth insight into the most plausible preference for the country scan and follow-up research. The Country Research Lead then summarised the ratings, comments and conversations in the following selection order.

1. **Borno:** North East, category 1 conflict, high/quick impact, easy to access by air, IRC presence

2. **Adamawa:** North East, category 1 conflict, medium impact, **least studied**, easy to access by air), IRC presence

3. **Kaduna:** North West, category 2 conflict, quick results, high impact possible, historical and resource benefits, FCDO presence high, media presence, no IRC presence, PLANE, FCDO intervention project present, likely to help explain relative results from other states concerning policy and practice

4. **Niger:** North Central, category 2 conflict, large-scale kidnapping of Islamiyah boarding schools, government collaboration medium, only access from Abuja two hours by road

5. **Zamfara:** North West, category 2 conflict, in news for large-scale schoolchildren kidnapping, challenging environment regarding government collaboration, no direct access to Abuja

6. **Sokoto:** North West, similar to Zamfara

7. **Katsina:** North West, similar to Zamfara

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8. **Benue:** North Central, category 3 conflict, schools not targeted per se but collateral effect of on schools, IDPs, government collaboration not certain, access from Abuja by road three to four hours

Conclusion

The states that will be included in the country scan are therefore in the above order of priority. If only one state is required, Borno will be selected; if three states are required it will be Borno, Adamawa and Kaduna; and so on.

ANNEX 5: POLICIES GUIDING EDUCATION SUPPORT IN NIGERIA

The study reviewed the following policies that guide education support:

- 2017–2019 National Medium-Term Basic Education Strategic Plan
- 2018–2022 Education for Change: A Ministerial Strategic Plan
- 2020–2030 North East Stabilisation and Development Master Plan, written by the North East Development Commission in collaboration with the World Bank
- 2021–2023 Education in Emergencies Working Group North East Strategy written by Save the Children and UNICEF (leaders of the Education Section Working Group in Nigeria)
- Borno 25-Year Development Framework and 10 Year-Strategic Transformation Plan
- 2019–2029 Kaduna State Education Sector Strategic Plan
- Education Sector Analysis for Adamawa State
- National Policy on Safety, Security and Violence-Free Schools implementation and minimum standard guidelines
- 2018–2022 UN Nigeria Sustainable Development Partnership Framework
- 2021–2023 Early Recovery and Livelihoods Sector Strategy for Northeast Nigeria
- 2022–2023 Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan
- 2023–2024 Humanitarian Response Plan

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ABOUT ERICC

The Education Research in Conflict and Protracted Crisis (ERICC) Research Programme Consortium is a global research and learning partnership that strives to transform education policy and practice in conflict and protracted crisis around the world — ultimately to help improve holistic outcomes for children — through building a global hub for a rigorous, context-relevant and actionable evidence base.

ERICC seeks to identify the most effective approaches for improving access, quality and continuity of education to support sustainable and coherent education systems and holistic learning and development of children in conflict and crisis. ERICC aims to bridge research, practice and policy with accessible and actionable knowledge – at local, national, regional and global levels – through co-construction of research and collaborative partnerships.

ERICC is led by the International Rescue Committee with Academic Lead IOE, UCL's Faculty of Education and Society. Expert partners include the Centre for Lebanese Studies, the Common Heritage Foundation, Forcier Consulting, ODI, Osman Consulting, Oxford Policy Management and the Queen Rania Foundation. During ERICC's inception period, NYU-TIES provided research leadership, developed the original ERICC conceptual framework and contributed to early research agenda development. ERICC is supported by UK Aid.

Countries in focus include Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar), Jordan, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, South Sudan and Syria.