

# **Synthesis Research Report**

## **State-building, Peace-building and Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-affected States**

**November 2012**

## Acknowledgements

This synthesis report, based on field research undertaken in Nepal, Rwanda and South Sudan, was prepared by a team of people led by Susy Ndaruhutse. The team comprised Janice Dolan, Nigel Pearson, Chris Talbot, Mansoor Ali, Ramesh Bohara, Geoffrey Kayijuka, Sammy Musoke and Rebecca Scott.

Additional inputs were provided by Wyndham James, Cat Smith and the Save the Children Health and Education Teams. Supplementary data analysis was provided by Amir Jones and Ruth Naylor. Helen Baños-Smith provided significant guidance on research approach and methodology. Rahul Chandran and Adrian Leftwich reviewed an initial draft.

The team is grateful to DFID staff and particularly Anna Miles for comments and feedback on the initial draft.

Any errors or omissions remain with the authors.

The names and designations of the field research teams in each country are given in the following tables. The International Team Leader and International and National Sector Experts in each country led the analysis of the data.

### Nepal

Name	Designation
Janice Dolan	International Team Leader and Education Expert
Nigel Pearson	International Health Expert
Ramesh Bohara	National Water and Sanitation Expert
Moushumi Shrestha	Country Research Manager
Reema Shrestha	Logistics Coordinator
Keshav Sharma	Regional Research Manager
Apar Poudel	Regional Research Manager
Bibek K Paudel	Regional Research Manager
Kalpna Poudel	Research Team Leader (Health)
Ram B Singh Maharjan	Research Team Leader (Water and Sanitation)
Buddhi Ram Kumal	Research Team Leader (Education)
Pankaj Kumar Pokharel	Researcher
Suman Dhun Shrestha	Researcher
Swechya Mathema	Researcher
Begum Kunwar	Researcher
Sujan Sharma	Researcher
Pratistha Thapa	Researcher
Gaurav Shrestha	Researcher
Shanta Thapa	Researcher
Sasmita Poudel	Researcher

## Rwanda

Name	Designation
Chris Talbot	International Team Leader and Education Expert
Rebecca Scott	International Water and Sanitation Expert
Geoffrey Kayijuka	National Health Expert
Nicholas Mwizerwa	Country Research Manager
Dominique Muchochori Kanobana	Regional Research Manager
Laurence Ingabire	Regional Research Manager
Elias Gakire	Research Team Leader
Jean de Dieu Byabagabo	Researcher
David Musonera	Researcher
Scovia Busingye	Researcher

## South Sudan

Name	Designation
Nigel Pearson	International Health Expert
Mansoor Ali	International Water and Sanitation Expert
Sammy Musoke	Regional Education Expert
Natalie Forcier	Country Research Manager
Carol Berger	Regional Research Manager
Henry Azuruku	Regional Research Manager
Nadia Kevlin	Research Team Leader
Benedicte Bakkeskau	Researcher
Gatmai Mathiang	Researcher
Samuel Justin	Researcher
Jessica Hayes	Researcher

## Executive summary

The research question examined in this one-year research project is: **How does the fulfilment of people's expectations for services relate to their perception of the legitimacy of the government?** This research question maps onto one of the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) in the New Deal: *Revenues and Services: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery*<sup>1</sup> and one of the four pillars of DFID's state-building and peace-building framework: *Building Peaceful States and Societies: Respond to public expectations* contained in DFID's (2010a) Practice Paper.<sup>2</sup>

Research and analysis from fieldwork in Nepal, Rwanda and South Sudan provide the following headline findings:

### 1) **The context is critical**

Expectations vary across different contexts, both between countries and within a country, and as a result the relative importance that service delivery plays in contributing to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy also varies.

### 2) **Expectations are dynamic**

There is no single set of expectations. Citizens' expectations change over time. As a result, building and maintaining legitimacy is likely to be a layered process as the state responds to these changing expectations.

### 3) **Who should deliver services?**

In situations of limited capacity to deliver, the state would do better to outsource quality service delivery than deliver poor quality services. Where the state has capacity to provide oversight, the role the state plays in coordinating and regulating service delivery is more important for state legitimacy than who delivers the services.

### 4) **How should services be delivered?**

The way in which services are delivered is critical for doing no harm<sup>3</sup> to wider state-building processes and can contribute to building state legitimacy. The research identified four important areas for focus:

- i) Equitable service delivery can make a positive contribution to state legitimacy. Inequitable delivery can undermine state legitimacy and therefore state-building efforts.
- ii) Good public financial management, monitoring of government services and investments, and anti-corruption measures can build confidence in the state.
- iii) Empowerment of citizens and their active involvement in accountability mechanisms that are not politicised can help to build social cohesion and contribute to state legitimacy.

<sup>1</sup> See [www.newdeal4peace.org](http://www.newdeal4peace.org) for further information on the New Deal.

<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/governance/Building-peaceful-states-and-societies.pdf> for a copy of DFID's practice paper.

<sup>3</sup> Based on the OECD-DAC concept of 'Do no harm':

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/donoharminternationalsupportforstatebuilding.htm>

- iv) Whilst access is a more immediate priority than quality where citizens have no access at all to services, as soon as citizens have some access (even if it is basic), their expectations rapidly change to include quality as well as access and cost. This implies that there may be a sequencing of expectations from access to quality. This happens rapidly and in the early stages of a country's development path.

For more detailed discussion of each research finding please see section 3 of the main report below.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Aim of this synthesis report

This synthesis report provides an overview of a one-year research project which explored the contribution played by service delivery to state-building and peace-building processes, specifically asking: What contribution does service delivery make to building the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens? The report first gives a brief background to the overall research programme, then goes on to present a summary of the key findings and evidence from the fieldwork. It closes by drawing conclusions resulting from analysis of the findings from the fieldwork linking these where relevant to the original literature review undertaken for this research.

### 1.2 Objective of overall research programme

This research programme set out to explore the links between service delivery and wider processes of state-building and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). The findings of the research are particularly pertinent to one of the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) within the New Deal: *Revenues and Services: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery*.<sup>4</sup> The methodology and research questions for detailed fieldwork in Nepal, Rwanda and South Sudan were shaped by a literature review and six desk-based case studies adding Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone.<sup>5</sup> This was a one-year research study. The research focus was necessarily narrowed to one element of state-building and peace-building, that of state legitimacy. The existing literature and current peace-building and state-building frameworks (see, for example, DFID, 2010a; OECD, 2008a and OECD, 2011) posit a link between citizens' expectations for services, the government's responsiveness in meeting citizens' expectations and providing those services, and how these factors impact on citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of the state. This interplay between these three elements is the focus of this study. The key question was as follows:

**How does the fulfilment of people's expectations for services relate to their perception of the legitimacy of the government?**<sup>5</sup>

This builds on the work of Migdal (2001) who argues that the state's performance needs to be understood from the perspective of how it is meeting societal expectations; and Whaites (2008), who stresses that meeting public expectations about what the state should deliver is central to building a stable state, expanding the responsiveness of the state and ensuring a more inclusive political settlement. OECD (2010: 12) further argues that:

“The gap between what different social groups expect from the state and the ability of the state to meet these expectations is vital to the legitimacy of the state.”

<sup>4</sup> See [www.newdeal4peace.org/psg](http://www.newdeal4peace.org/psg) for further information on the New Deal.

<sup>5</sup> For more information on the methodology and six main research questions, please see Annex 1.

### 1.3 Conceptual issues

State legitimacy is a contested term as it depends on what is meant by the 'state' (see Ndaruhutse *et al.* (2011: 10-11) for more discussion of this issue) and when translated into a local language may be used synonymously with the word 'government'. This may in turn be interpreted in a number of ways from central to local leaders and may be used by some to refer to the political party in power.

This report uses the OECD-DAC concept of 'Do no harm' in relation to state-building, which identifies ways in which international interventions can inadvertently undermine state-building processes.<sup>6</sup>

During the field research, questions were asked that related to the 'government' rather than the 'state', as it was felt that citizens would be able to relate more easily to questions about the government rather than the more abstract notion of the state. This is consistent with the approach taken in other perception surveys. However, researchers encouraged participants to talk about the government in general rather than a particular ruling party/government and sought clarity on whom citizens were referring to as 'government' if this was ambiguous in their answers. Researchers were careful to set the context for the discussion at the outset to ensure that it was clear to those participating that the current political regime was not the focus of this research. Given the lack of language in many of the fieldwork countries to separate 'state' from 'government', both words are used within this research. Nevertheless the research has been careful to avoid confusing these concepts with the existing party in power.

### 1.4 Limitations of research

This was an ambitious one-year research programme with only six weeks of active field research in each country between September and November 2011. Given the time and resource constraints for this research, attempting to answer the key question was decided as a manageable goal that linked to **one** of the core elements<sup>7</sup> in both the OECD's (2011) and DFID's (2010a) approach to state-building. However, this provided a more narrow view on state-building than the more complex and multi-faceted processes related to the establishment of a political settlement and associated institutions of rule that enable political stability to occur and for politics to happen peacefully,<sup>8</sup> which are outside the scope of this study. The findings summarised in this report thus focus on state-building and peace-building from this more narrow perspective.

The overarching research question explores the links between citizens' expectations, government responsiveness and citizens' perceptions of government legitimacy. There are a number of different interpretations of legitimacy. Given the scope of this research, the aspect of legitimacy considered was that of performance legitimacy, i.e.

<sup>6</sup> Based on the OECD-DAC concept of 'Do no harm':

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/donoharminternationalsupportforstatebuilding.htm>

<sup>7</sup> That of social expectations and perceptions (OECD) and responding to public expectations (DFID).

<sup>8</sup> A view that is more common in the political literature.

the legitimacy “that arises from effective and equitable service delivery” (OECD, 2008a: 17).<sup>9</sup>

The main data gathering came from community-level focus group discussions and a smaller number of local and national semi-structured interviews. There was not sufficient time to undertake primary quantitative data collection or analysis, other than building on the secondary sector statistics and data referenced in the desk-based case studies.

## 2. Country selection for fieldwork

Three countries – Nepal, Rwanda and South Sudan – were selected for fieldwork which took place during the last quarter of 2011. These three countries were selected because they are at different stages of fragility and conflict-affectedness. South Sudan is a newly-emerging state, only created formally in the summer of 2011 after more than 20 years of civil war. It is still experiencing conflict in certain areas of the country and is in the process of establishing and strengthening basic state institutions. Rwanda passed through extreme ethnic conflict culminating in the 1994 genocide and has had ongoing problems with rebel groups on its borders with the DRC. Despite this, it has made considerable progress in post-conflict reconstruction and in expanding access to services over the past 18 years, although there remain concerns about political space. Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement between traditional political parties and the Communist Party (Maoist) was signed more recently in 2006 so it has experienced a shorter period of post-conflict reconstruction than Rwanda and has a history of patronage politics that persists. These contexts are very different but there may be some lessons from the two countries further along a trajectory of stability (Nepal and Rwanda) for South Sudan. Additionally, there is some comparative analysis that can be made from the three different contexts. It must be remembered that the status of South Sudan changed to that of an independent country during the course of this research.

## 3. Key findings

### 3.1 *The context is critical*

***Expectations vary across different contexts, both between countries and within a country and as a result the relative importance that service delivery plays in contributing to citizens’ perceptions of state legitimacy also varies.***

The factors that cause and influence state fragility and the nature of that fragility vary across countries. The history of state formation and state fragility as well as the wider societal context influence citizens’ expectations of the state and how these may be nuanced among different political, economic and social groups. The research found that citizens’ expectations varied between countries and within countries and the role that service delivery plays in building citizens’ perceptions of state legitimacy thus

---

<sup>9</sup> The literature review for this project discusses other forms of state legitimacy in greater detail (Ndaruhutse *et al.*, 2011).



also varies with differences in perceptions between regions and groups within society.

In **Nepal**, service delivery was mentioned as one of the top three priority expectations by nearly all (51/60) focus groups ((28/30) female groups and (23/30) male groups). The most commonly mentioned service expectation was water and sanitation, followed by education, followed by health. Water and sanitation may have been the most commonly mentioned service expectation due to their relative neglect compared with education and health. Water and sanitation were raised as an expectation by two thirds of female groups (20/30) but only a minority of male groups (13/30). Infrastructure was the most frequently mentioned area of expectation after services (32/60), with roads featuring in around half of discussions of both sexes. Issues around livelihoods including jobs and agricultural support were mentioned by 25 focus groups, with little difference between male and female groups. Thirteen focus groups outlined expectations related to equality and social security for disadvantaged groups. Six male groups discussed this in terms of the need for land for the landless, whereas women's groups tended to talk more about their expectations around women's empowerment and equal rights and social support allowances for widows, orphans and people with disabilities, with 3/30 and 4/30 giving these as top priorities respectively. Many groups raised concerns around issues of equality along lines of caste, gender and poverty. These findings highlight the priority expectation of citizens of equitable services from the government and the strong potential this has to contribute to government legitimacy if the government meets these expectations.

Virtually all focus groups (55/57) in **South Sudan** mentioned service delivery as a high priority expectation from the state. Support to agriculture and animal husbandry was frequently mentioned as an expectation from the government, with over a third of groups (20/57) mentioning it. For some groups (12/57) providing jobs and/or ensuring essentials were affordable were high priority expectations. Eleven groups spoke of their expectation of food aid from the government. Food and shelter were the top priorities for two groups of returnee women interviewed in Northern Bahr El Ghazal. Despite service delivery being a high priority expectation, citizens were also very aware of the government's limited capacity to deliver services currently, meaning that in general, citizens were more tolerant of the government's lack of responsiveness and this was not having detrimental effects on state legitimacy at the present time.

In **Rwanda**, groups were asked about their general expectations after having discussed their expectations for service delivery in detail. As a result, there was a greater tendency to discuss other areas of expectation. Nearly all (68/72) focus groups mentioned factors related to livelihoods (jobs, the economy, farming or business); over 75 per cent (56/72) mentioned infrastructure; and around 40 per cent (30/72) mentioned issues related to land and housing. This compares with around 45 per cent (32/72) who mentioned at least one of education, health, water and sanitation as an expectation. Given the different order in which focus groups in Rwanda were asked questions about expectations, it is difficult to make direct comparisons with the responses given to this question in the other fieldwork countries and thus to draw firm conclusions about the relative importance for state

legitimacy of meeting citizens' expectations for service delivery compared with meeting other high priority expectations such as livelihoods.

Despite this finding that context has a bearing on the role that service delivery can play in building the legitimacy of the state, analysis of the research findings provides some universally applicable conclusions. The remainder of this section goes on to discuss these.

### **3.2 Expectations are dynamic**

***There is no single set of expectations: citizens' expectations change over time. As a result, building and maintaining legitimacy is likely to be a layered process as the state responds to these changing expectations.***

The research confirms state-building frameworks' assertions that in FCAS expectations of citizens are dynamic (see for example Ghani and Lockhart, 2008 and Whaites, 2008). In the immediate post-conflict period, security is a critical demand (also seen as a 'survival' or 'core' function) and can outweigh expectations of citizens for governments to deliver services. However, this research indicates that there is a continuum: a progression in citizens' expectations of the state over time. In Rwanda and Nepal where security is established and is no longer a daily concern, expectations of government were more focused on service provision. This contrasts with South Sudan where, whilst service delivery was a priority expectation (albeit an aspirational one rather than a realistic one given the current capacity of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to deliver services), security was still mentioned by a significant minority of focus groups as an expectation and the recent independence was referred to by around 30 per cent of groups as a significant achievement of the current government.

In **Nepal**, service delivery was mentioned as one of the top three priority expectations by the vast majority of focus groups (51/60). By contrast, peace and security were mentioned as a top priority expectation by only three groups, all of whom were male. Many male groups talked of their expectations for political stability (10/30), especially regarding the need for a constitution, which was being debated at the national level at the time of the research. These issues tended to come up more in discussion when participants were asked to reflect on the government's performance. Most male groups (17/30) mentioned peace and security and the need for political stability (24/30) at some stage during the discussions. Fewer female groups mentioned these issues, with only nine groups mentioning peace and security and four mentioning political stability. Instead, they tended to talk more about their expectations around women's empowerment, and the need for social support to widows, orphans and children with disabilities. This highlights how citizens tend to prioritise their expectations based on the current issues in their lives which in Nepal related to issues of service delivery, the constitution and supporting marginalised groups. This also reveals a gender difference in expectations of the state.

In **Rwanda**, peace, security and service delivery were key factors contributing positively to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy. Over 60 per cent (45/72) of focus groups mentioned peace and security as one of the key achievements of the

Government of Rwanda (GoR) or as a reason for their approval of the GoR. Around 75 per cent (53/72) mentioned at least one of education, health, water and sanitation as being a key achievement of the GoR or a reason for their approval. Around 10 per cent (7/72) of focus groups mentioned peace and security as a key expectation of the government. In the case of service delivery, around 45 per cent (32/72) mentioned at least one of education, health, water and sanitation as a key expectation. It could be inferred from these responses that whilst peace and stability have been key factors that have positively influenced citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of the Rwandan state, as a certain level of peace has been established, citizens' expectations appear to have shifted more strongly towards service delivery – demonstrated by the high number of focus groups mentioning one of more services as a priority expectation of the GoR. A further explanation is that peace and security are not current problems relative to 1994. Expectations are not fixed and tend to be related to current circumstances so not mentioning something as an expectation does not necessarily imply that it is not important. It may be that the expectation has largely been met and citizens' immediate concerns relate to other issues.

In **South Sudan**, service delivery was mentioned by citizens in virtually all focus groups (55/57) as a high priority expectation from the state, yet the vast majority (49/57) had limited expectations of the government to deliver services currently due to its infancy and constrained capacity. This highlights the difference between aspirational expectations (i.e. what citizens think they should have) compared to what citizens know they can realistically expect given the capacity of the government.<sup>10</sup> Peace and security were only explicitly mentioned as an expectation of the state in a small number of focus groups (13/57) but around 30 per cent of focus groups (17/57) referred to the government's achievement of peace, security and liberation from "the Arabs". These relatively low numbers, and the very recent independence of South Sudan at the time when the research was undertaken, provide further support for the hypothesis that once achieved, some factors contributing positively to perceptions of state legitimacy cease to be immediate concerns and the level of expectation rises for additional functions to be provided by the state. Only eight groups were overtly positive in their views about the government. Many groups (26/57) had a mixed or neutral perception of the GoSS, with most groups (33/57) indicating that they were waiting to see how the newly independent government was going to perform. Comments from focus groups outlined in Box 1 demonstrate evidence for this view and indicate that the state may enjoy a window of goodwill immediately after a peace agreement.

---

<sup>10</sup> This is also reflected in OECD (2011) as the difference between normative and realistic expectations. It is discussed briefly in the literature review for this research programme – see Ndaruhutse *et al.* (2011: 15) for more discussion on this issue.

### Box 1: Comments from focus groups in South Sudan

“In Dinka culture... the [new] husband cannot build three tukuls the same year on the compound, he has to start with one. Our independence is the first tukul the government has provided for us.” (Aweil Centre)

“If you marry a new wife, you will not say she is good or bad after even two years; we are still observing.” (Juba)

“Time is needed to build a new house.” (Aweil North)

“I am waiting to see what the government will provide then I will make my opinion.” (Health worker, Rubkona)

If the government was to meet expectations in service provision then “each and every citizen of Lologo will be proud of their government.” Conversely if the government “does not provide these things we will feel very sad.” (Lologo)

For many groups, frustrations over lack of services were balanced by appreciation for independence and around half of groups (26/57) gave a mixed or neutral view of the government’s overall performance. Some neutral groups expressed a rather fatalistic attitude to the government, saying that whether or not services were delivered, they would have to live with it and could not change it. Others (seven focus groups) implied a sense of loyalty on the basis that it was “our government” and said that they should accept it regardless of its performance with regard to service delivery. A large minority (40 per cent) expressed anger and frustration at the continued lack of service delivery for their areas, with a significant number of groups (16/57) expressing the view that their needs were being overlooked or ignored by the government. These findings imply that peace and independence have conveyed a significant degree of legitimacy to the government in the eyes of many in the short term. However, considerable improvements in service delivery will be needed in the near future for this legitimacy to be maintained. For some citizens their patience and faith in the government to provide services had already run out.

Comparison across the fieldwork countries indicates that building and maintaining state legitimacy is likely to be a layered process. For instance, it can be inferred from both South Sudan and Rwanda that peace and security (and in South Sudan, independence) has played an important role in building the legitimacy of the state. However, current expectations are less to do with these issues and are more strongly linked to service delivery and livelihoods, which indicates the importance of the government responding to these changing expectations in order to build and maintain its legitimacy. This demonstrates that once certain priority expectations are met, other expectations become more important. Evidence from South Sudan indicates that the transition through the layers of expectations may happen relatively quickly.

For all the reasons discussed above on the importance of context, the research has demonstrated that the link between service delivery and state legitimacy is not automatic as it can sometimes be outweighed by other issues. However, there is clear evidence from the research that service delivery can detract from wider peace-building and state-building processes if not done well, and thus not adhere to the principle of ‘do no harm’. Conversely, if done well, it can contribute positively to

perceptions of state legitimacy in some contexts. The following findings examine this assertion in more detail.

### 3.3 Who should deliver services?

***The role the state plays in coordinating and regulating service delivery is much more important for state legitimacy than who delivers the services. In situations of limited capacity to deliver, the state would do better to outsource quality service delivery than deliver poor quality services.***

The research findings indicate that in general who delivers services is much less important than how services are delivered. The research found evidence that service provision that was not managed or was poorly managed by the state can weaken its legitimacy, in other words ‘do harm’ to the process of state-building. By contrast, where the state plays a strong role in setting the legal and policy framework for non-state service delivery this at the very least adheres to the principle of ‘do no harm’ and in some contexts helps contribute to building state legitimacy. This supports the findings of OECD (2011) and implies that governments do not have to be direct service implementers to contribute positively to citizens’ perceptions of state legitimacy. In fact the research indicates that if state legitimacy is to be built, a government ought to consider encouraging other service providers to deliver services if its own capacity to do this is too weak. This may include contracting out and encouraging all types of non-state actors to provide services. This finding draws on evidence from all three fieldwork countries and is explored in detail below.

In all the fieldwork countries, a range of non-state actors including faith-based organisations (FBOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector were playing some role in delivering services in addition to the government’s efforts. Comments made in focus groups seem to indicate that in general, non-state provision is not detracting from state-building, but that the umbrella role of the state in oversight, regulation and monitoring is important, as is the way in which services are provided by non-state actors (see section 3.4 below).

In **Rwanda**, non-state actors were seen as natural partners of the state rather than undermining government legitimacy.

#### **Box 2: Role of government in Rwanda**

After listing a number of partner agencies active in education, a focus group in Burera, Rwanda concluded: “But Government is number one because they assist all sectors of life, but others assist a small number of sector operations. Government gives visas to those partners.”

Around half of the focus groups talked about the role of NGOs, FBOs and CBOs in providing services. However, there were no negative comments made about this provision by non-state actors, implying that what is important is provision of services rather than who provides them. The only exception to this was that around 30 per cent (8/25) of focus groups in the capital city, Kigali, mentioned the need for more

government provision of pre-schools rather than private provision. These groups were likely to have higher levels of access to education at primary and secondary level and their expectations of the government were then changing as earlier expectations were met.

### Box 3: The provision of services is more important than the provider

In the water and sanitation sectors in **Nepal**, in the two districts (Chitwan and Bhaktapur) where there were a large number of international or national NGOs present, it did not appear to be important to citizens who was providing services. In two remote districts (Humla and Rolpa) where the provision of services from the state was very low and the presence of NGOs very thin on the ground, the legitimacy of the government in relation to service delivery was in question as overall levels of service delivery were very low.

In **South Sudan**, non-state actors, largely NGOs, FBOs and United Nations agencies, are a significant provider of services. Some (9/57 focus groups) saw them as filling a short-term gap but expect to see the government providing services in the future. Others (14/57) saw them as an “arm of government” and the role of government as facilitating NGO provision of services. Eleven focus groups saw NGOs as being fully responsible for some or all service sectors, especially in water and sanitation. In the health sector, many perceived NGOs to be essential in delivering services and to be much closer to communities in terms of listening and quicker in responding to their health needs. For most respondents, effective delivery of services by NGOs would increase perceptions of the legitimacy of the government; in some cases, however, the provision of services by NGOs was interpreted as a sign of government failure to deliver: eleven groups reported that they felt it was better for NGOs to deliver services than the government, indicating that they felt the government was too slow and unresponsive. One source of grievance with NGOs cited by six groups was that people came to do assessments and ask questions but then never came back or followed it up with actions. A group that saw sanitation as entirely an NGO responsibility complained that the NGOs were failing in this area.

### Box 4: Unintentionally doing harm?

In the education sector in **South Sudan** NGOs have adopted a variety of different approaches towards enhancing community engagement and participation (e.g. some provide meals and refreshment to participants; others pay participation or transport allowances; others apply cost-sharing, supporting community initiatives). Whilst the research did not specifically explore the impact of this on state legitimacy, these differences have the potential unintentionally to undermine government legitimacy, especially if in the eyes of the community government service delivery appears to be competing with that of NGOs. This contributes to the finding that coordination and oversight by government is important to ensure NGOs do not appear to be competing with government.

The concentration of NGOs in some areas of **South Sudan** and absence from others (mainly due to security reasons, but also to different levels of community responsiveness) is a possible contributing factor for further conflict. Again, the research did not specifically explore the impact of this, but this could be an unintended consequence of NGO-supported service delivery that could undermine wider processes of state-building and peace-building. This demonstrates the important role the state has in coordinating service delivery and ensuring an inclusive and even geographic spread of service provision by non-state providers.

These examples of the potential of NGOs being seen to do harm unintentionally highlight how important it will be for the GoSS to play a stronger umbrella role in planning, regulating, directing and monitoring NGO activity in line with government policy and priorities in the future, given the large number of NGOs active in the country. This has already been happening to some extent in the health sector, but if this is not maintained and replicated in other sectors, it may generate a dispersion of accountability with no specific agency or institution to be held accountable, making it harder for government to use service delivery as a basis for legitimacy (see section 3.4.3 below for further discussion on the role of accountability mechanisms).

The education sector in **Nepal** provides one example of how non-state providers can do harm to state legitimacy. If not managed well and private service provision is seen to be running in parallel to state provision rather than complementing it, there is evidence that state legitimacy can be undermined. In Nepal, there has been significant expansion of private schools from Kathmandu and large towns into rural areas. Up to 13 per cent of children<sup>11</sup> are now thought to be enrolled in private schools and the pass rate in the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) exam is nearly twice as high (approximately 90 per cent).<sup>12</sup> The growing private sector was exacerbating a feeling of a divided society and importantly the feeling that the government is only interested in those with money or power. Around a quarter (16/60) of focus groups interviewed commented that government schools compared unfavourably with private schools and wanted government schools to be more like private schools, including expectations that schools should be English-medium and have computers. Only one group explicitly expressed opposition to private schools, but several expressed concerns that access to private education was inequitable. Four groups raised concerns that the private sector was doing damage to the public health sector and complained of government doctors neglecting their public duties to work in private clinics. One group felt that there should just be one system in health and in education – public or private. Whilst in the minority, two groups mentioned concerns with NGOs also undermining the government. It is also interesting to note how NGO support can raise expectations of government responsibilities. For example, in one village where an NGO had provided stoves, a focus group gave this as one of their top expectations for what the government should provide. This correlates with findings from the education sector in South Sudan (see Box 4).

In any country, the private sector can highlight the inadequacy in state delivery which, if it acts as a driver for improvement of the state sector, is not a bad thing. However, if improvement is not forthcoming, it could lead to growing disillusionment with the state's legitimacy in relation to service provision. Additionally, private sector provision can undermine state provision if it is seen to be contributing to inequalities. Given the significant difference in the perception of quality of private schools compared with government schools in Nepal, and the fact that only the wealthier and more politically connected can afford to move their children to private schools, this

<sup>11</sup> The World Bank reports private (per cent of total primary) in Nepal at 13.15 in 2010.

<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nepal/school-enrollment-primary-private-per-cent-of-total-primary-wb-data.html>

<sup>12</sup> In the 2004 School Leaving Certificate (SLC) 83 per cent of private students passed compared to just 36 per cent of public schools students. Results such as this are widely reported in the media but an in-depth analysis of these results also showed that the school type (i.e. private) was positive and statistically significant in explaining a student's SLC performance (Thapa, 2011).

growing inequity is leading to feelings of grievance amongst citizens and is negatively influencing perceptions of state legitimacy (see also under finding 3.4.1 below on inclusive service delivery). The next section goes on to discuss in more detail research findings indicating the importance of how services are delivered.

### **3.4 How should services be delivered?**

***The way in which services are delivered is critical for doing no harm to wider state-building and peace-building processes and can contribute to building state legitimacy. Four primary areas of focus are: inclusivity, anti-corruption, accountability, and quality.***

Whilst *who* delivers services is not a major consideration (taking into account the caveats included in section 3.3 above), the research in all three countries found that *how* services are delivered is critical to doing no harm to wider state-building and peace-building processes and in some contexts positively supports these processes by contributing to building the legitimacy of the state. This research highlights four key areas that are explored in turn below: i) the need for inclusive service delivery; ii) the need for strong public financial management in service delivery to combat perceptions of corruption; iii) the need for accountability structures within service delivery processes that empower citizens and are not politicised; and iv) the need for quality services.

#### **3.4.1 Inclusive service delivery**

The literature is clear that equitable service delivery and inclusiveness are key issues for state legitimacy as inequity results in the perception that the government favours some citizens over others, which produces grievances (see for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; DFID, 2010*b* and Pavanello and Othieno, 2008). Within all the sectors, the literature demonstrates a realisation that access to services often reflects social, political and economic inequalities and that service delivery can either reinforce these inequalities or help to overcome them. Inclusive access plays a critical role in contributing to wider social and economic benefits. The research findings presented here support this literature.

#### **Box 5: Marginalisation still an issue in Nepal**

In **Nepal**, the research found that feelings of marginalisation by certain groups in relation to service delivery still remain, despite overall gains in tackling social exclusion. Sixty-five per cent (39/60) of focus groups raised concerns around issues of equality along lines of caste, gender and poverty, particularly regarding access to services and the allocation of government support. Most female focus groups (18/30) specifically mentioned the marginalisation of women. No male focus groups mentioned this except for one that said they disagreed with education support being targeted to girls. Marginalisation of Dalits or other marginalised ethnic groups was mentioned by around a quarter (14/60) of focus group but in eight groups respondents said that it would be better if social support (e.g. scholarships) was allocated according to poverty rather than caste. Inequality between rich and poor was a concern raised by around a quarter (16/60) of focus groups.

These comments from education focus groups in Humla and Bhaktapur are illustrative of some of the concerns amongst citizens in Nepal in relation to marginalisation:



“The Government has no eyes to see poor people.”

“The Government only looks to high class people, the rich and people with political power.”

“The poor and people with no political power do not get anything though they are capable. So the Government should eliminate this discrimination.”

A key expectation of citizens in **Nepal** was equitable provision of education services. Despite the reduction in social exclusion in education particularly through the use of scholarships, high levels of dissatisfaction were expressed in focus groups concerning inequity in services. This was expressed from the non-marginalised community in the most developed district (Patihani in Chitwan) through to the least developed district of Humla. The dissatisfaction was related to the fact that some people gain scholarships and others do not, and that poor people cannot afford to send their children to private schools, which are perceived as delivering a better quality education (see section 3.3 for further discussion on the private sector).

The result is that there is a perception that the government is only interested in those who have power and wealth, as illustrated in comments from different focus groups in Box 5 above. The perception of declining quality of education in government schools is negatively influencing citizens’ perceptions of state legitimacy and the response of the private sector in providing what are perceived to be better quality education services for those who can afford it is undermining government legitimacy further.

Similarly, across all sectors in **South Sudan**, there was a feeling that service delivery was inadequate and inequitably distributed with some gaps being filled by community initiatives or NGO support.

#### **Box 6: Feeling of exclusion amongst certain groups in South Sudan**

Amongst the respondents involved in this research it was found that a group of Muslim leaders in Aweil Centre felt ostracised because they did not have freedom to practise their religion in schools; Mundari people in Terekeka felt isolated from services; and some returnees felt that the government had abandoned them. This implies that a weakening of people’s perceptions of state legitimacy may follow.

**Rwanda** was faring better than the other countries in relation to gender, with near-equity in access to health and primary education according to national data, reflecting the government’s demonstrated commitment to strong gender participation and representation in the Constitution. Around 35 per cent (26/72) of focus groups specifically referred to the empowerment of women as an achievement of the government and a large majority (53/72) of focus groups mentioned at least one of education, health, water and sanitation as being a key achievement of the GoR or a reason for their approval of the government. The near-universal coverage of basic health and education services demonstrates the provision of more inclusive services to a wider group of the population. This is a radical change from the previous political regime which focused on an ethnic quota system for education.

### 3.4.2 Good public financial management, monitoring of government services and investments, and anti-corruption measures

The research findings from Nepal and South Sudan highlight how corruption, nepotism, and weak public financial management (including poor monitoring systems) are undermining citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy. Tackling corruption is critical; the most visible way of doing this for citizens is through service delivery processes.

In **Nepal** corruption, poor quality and low accountability of services are affecting citizens' perceptions of government legitimacy. Most focus groups (34/60) specifically mentioned corruption within service delivery contexts as an issue that they perceived to be undermining state legitimacy in the country. Nepal's legacies of conflict and patronage have created mistrust between the state and its citizens. There was also a lack of information about availability of services, budget allocations and local government plans for services. Corruption was reported by focus groups in budgetary processes in the form of budgets for services or specific groups of the population not arriving at their destination in full; and those funds that did arrive not being spent in a transparent manner. The issue of corruption was mentioned in all four sectors.

#### Box 7: Comments on corruption from focus groups in Nepal

"Government formulates a plan and allocates a budget for the development of the country, but the money does not reach us."

"Monitoring should be done on the allocated budget and planned programmes by the government institutions."

"The government gives a special budget for the Dalit community but the Village Development Committee Secretary takes it all and does not give the Dalit community anything; instead it humiliates and abuses them."

In **South Sudan**, 20 per cent (12/57) of focus groups specifically mentioned corruption or nepotism as something that was undermining their perception of the legitimacy of the government.

By contrast, in **Rwanda** there were no complaints of corruption or nepotism and most groups (37/72) praised the government for its good governance, with four groups explicitly citing the eradication of corruption as one of the government's key achievements.

These findings demonstrate the importance of anti-corruption measures, effective accountability systems and the strengthening of public financial management systems including monitoring of government services and investments in order to ensure that service delivery at the very least 'does no harm' and at best, contributes positively to state legitimacy.

### 3.4.3 Empowerment, accountability and services not being politicised

The responsiveness of a government in meeting the expectations of its citizens for service delivery is important for state legitimacy. The extent to which communities participate in the governance and accountability mechanisms and processes can play a key role in building state-society relations. Where there are unmet expectations, this has a strong potential to lead to disillusionment with the government and the feeling by citizens that it is not responding to their expectations or that its responsiveness is not inclusive.

In **Rwanda**, citizens were aware of and participated in the existing consultative and accountability mechanisms in all sectors<sup>13</sup> and broadly approved of these mechanisms, though rural citizens expected better communication and more rapid response from government than they were currently receiving. Over 75 per cent (55/72) of focus groups talked positively about community participation and their ownership of the development process due to their active involvement. Citizens felt that the mechanisms and their reporting requirements via community participation did give the government both an opportunity to receive information about service needs and a strong influence upon local communities which overall seemed to be contributing to a positive perception of the legitimacy of the Rwandan state. However, citizens did comment that the flow of information and communication ‘downwards’ through the various mechanisms was not as systematic, comprehensive and rapid as they would hope, highlighting the need for strengthening this.

In **Nepal**, there was a strong desire by both men and women in communities to be involved in governance and accountability mechanisms for their services in all four sectors. In the health sector, community participation appears to be more active if the facility is functioning well and if there are management committees. This was found to be the case regardless of caste/ethnic group or socio-economic level. Conversely, where the facility is functioning poorly, the committee is perceived to have little influence and the community does not feel the facility is accountable to them. In the education sector, many citizens were disengaging from involvement in participation and accountability mechanisms as they were perceived as not being effective due to politicisation. In such contexts, even where accountability structures and governance mechanisms have been put in place, there is still some level of fear of using them and they have generally been government-driven rather than grassroots-driven.

---

<sup>13</sup> These include performance contracts (*Imihigo*); Citizens’ Report Cards; the National Dialogue (an annual two-day event during which Rwandan citizens can address central and local government officials, up to and including the President, raising issues of concern); local service sector committees, such as parent-teacher associations, *Partenariats pour l’Amélioration de la Qualité* (community-provider partnerships to improve quality in health) and water users associations; the Councillors who are elected at all levels of government to serve at the district level; and Accountability Days convened regularly by District Executive Committees.

### Box 8: Politicisation of school management committees (SMCs) in Nepal

The very mechanism created to empower and involve communities – school management committees (SMCs) – has in fact undermined community participation due to political capture of the SMCs in some cases. This is linked to the fact that local governance mechanisms from decentralisation are not yet in place so that SMCs become a place to gain political experiences and to control resources. In most cases, participation in SMCs was thought to be tokenistic. Parents and community members perceived they really had little influence or involvement in the SMCs and lacked power and voice. There were slightly different perceptions by gender of this with women feeling that they have only a nominal role – in one Village Development Committee in Humla the women did not know what the SMC was; in both Bhaktapur and Siraha women said they were not involved or only nominally. Men said that they were more involved but only at elections or when specific meetings were called.

In some communities and sectors in Nepal, women feel they have less voice than men and their participation is tokenistic, without decision-making power. There was a clear desire expressed by the women in Siraha and Humla to be more involved in services. During the conflict period women were empowered and hence want to be more active now. A lack of information and transparency at a local level may be further undermining legitimacy – for example in Humla, one of the least developed and most remote districts of Nepal, citizens were not aware of and/or were not receiving their entitlement to free education to Grade 10. Similar findings emerged from the health sector where citizens felt they had limited decision-making power and little influence on addressing poor quality services, with women feeling that their influence was suppressed by men.

By contrast, in **South Sudan**, the vast majority (55/57) of focus groups expected the state to provide or coordinate services, yet the systems of participation, governance, accountability and information flows were at an embryonic stage and very low levels of services are currently being provided. Having clear mechanisms in place for citizens to engage and participate in service delivery will be an important factor going forward in ensuring that service delivery does have a role in contributing more significantly to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy. Evidence from Rwanda and Nepal would imply that this will be especially important as citizens look for more performance from the government in relation to service delivery after the dividend of peace and independence has waned and the government has had time to establish itself. (See section 3.2 for earlier discussion of changing expectations over time.) Participation of citizens can also contribute to improved perceptions of inclusivity of services (see section 3.4.1).

These findings highlight the importance of both the short and long routes of accountability (World Bank, 2004); of empowering men and women and encouraging their active involvement in accountability and decision-making structures that are not politicised. The research from Rwanda demonstrates how where accountability structures are implemented well, this can play a positive role in contributing to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy.

### 3.4.4 Quality of services

Intuitively, it is assumed that access to services is important to establish before focusing significant attention on quality. However, evidence from the research indicates that both are important and that quality is a very early expectation of citizens in relation to service delivery.

All focus groups in **Rwanda** mentioned quality of services as being important, with most of them also mentioning access and cost reduction; the latter especially in the health and water sectors as well as for urban citizens in relation to pre-school education. In **South Sudan**, around 60 per cent (32/55) of the focus groups mentioned access as the main concern, with about 40 per cent (23/55)<sup>14</sup> mentioning quality as the main concern, indicating that they already have some access, even if it is basic. Comments about quality in South Sudan were more about buildings and basic materials rather than issues like learning outcomes and more highly qualified staff. In **Nepal**, quality, access and costs were raised in various combinations by focus groups but around 65 per cent (40/60) mentioned quality.

#### Box 9: The changing nature of expectations

In **Rwanda**, citizens in more economically developed areas tended to have higher expectations of service delivery including a stronger focus on quality, demonstrating how expectations can change as people receive more services.

This would seem to indicate that whilst access is a more immediate priority than quality where citizens have no access at all to services, as soon as citizens have some access (even if it is basic), their expectations rapidly change to include quality as well as access and cost. This implies that there may be a sequencing from access to quality, but this happens very rapidly and in the early stages of a country's development path – as indicated by the concerns about quality in South Sudan. Quality can also be a key factor to basic survival making it as important as access, especially in the water and health sectors. Quality was a particularly strong expectation in the water sector in **Nepal** due to concerns about high levels of physical, chemical and bacterial contamination of water sources.

<sup>14</sup> Two focus groups did not mention service delivery so this is why these focus group numbers are given out of a total of 55 rather than 57.

## 4. Conclusion

### 4.1 Summary of key findings

Summary of key findings	
<b>1. Context is critical</b>	Expectations vary across different contexts, both between countries and within a country and as a result the relative importance that service delivery plays in contributing to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy also varies.
<b>2. Expectations are dynamic</b>	There is no single set of expectations: citizens' expectations change over time. As a result, building and maintaining legitimacy is likely to be a layered process as the state responds to these changing expectations.
<b>3. Who should deliver services?</b>	The role the state plays in coordinating and regulating service delivery is much more important for state legitimacy than who delivers the services. In situations of limited capacity to deliver, the state would do better to outsource quality service delivery than deliver poor quality services.
<b>4. How should services be delivered?</b>	The way in which services are delivered is critical for doing no harm to wider state-building and peace-building processes and can contribute to building state legitimacy. Four primary areas of focus are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Equitable service delivery can make a positive contribution to state legitimacy. Inequitable delivery can undermine state legitimacy and therefore state-building efforts.</li> <li>ii. Good public financial management, monitoring of government services and investments, and anti-corruption measures can build confidence in the state.</li> <li>iii. Empowerment of citizens and their active involvement in accountability mechanism that are not politicised can help to build social cohesion and contribute to state legitimacy.</li> <li>iv. Whilst access is a more immediate priority than quality where citizens have no access at all to services, as soon as citizens have some (even if it is basic) access, their expectations rapidly change to include quality as well as access and cost. This implies that there may be a sequencing of expectations from access to quality. This happens rapidly and in the early stages of a country's development path.</li> </ol>

### 4.2 How the research has added to the knowledge base

DFID commissioned this research as, whilst there had been individual studies across the four sectors on aspects of service delivery and state-building and peace-building, there was no comprehensive review of the literature that synthesised its key findings across the four sectors in one place. The literature review sought to do this and documented in a comprehensive manner the key evidence from a range of studies from both academic and grey literature. This was then built upon by the six desk studies which highlighted some similar issues and gaps in knowledge. The qualitative fieldwork in Nepal, Rwanda and South Sudan supported the key findings of the literature review and demonstrated the importance of ensuring that service delivery at the very least adheres to the principle of 'do no harm' but ideally contributes positively to state legitimacy. The research has demonstrated that the exact ways to do this are likely to be context-specific. However, some general principles include: focusing on equitable service delivery; promoting effective and transparent public

financial management systems; the empowerment and active involvement of citizens in non-politicised accountability mechanisms; and an early focus on quality as well as access. The research has also provided a more nuanced understanding around the hierarchy of expectations and the sequencing of access and quality issues.

This research programme has thus provided a stronger understanding of the links between service delivery and state legitimacy, adding to the evidence base for programming in these contexts.

### **4.3 State-building and peace-building frameworks**

The theoretical underpinning of the OECD (2011) on state-building in FCAS outlines the interaction of three critical factors:

- Political settlements;
- State capacity and responsiveness;
- Social expectations and perceptions.

This is congruent with the vision of DFID (2010a), which emphasises four elements in its approach to state-building and peace-building:

1. Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility;
2. Supporting inclusive political settlements;
3. Developing core state functions;
4. Responding to public expectations.

None of these explicitly mention service delivery even if it is an implicit assumption, but instead focus on the state responding to public expectations. If there are other public expectations that rank higher than service delivery, then the responsiveness of the state in meeting these expectations is going to be more of a significant factor relating to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy than service delivery. To conclude, providing services may be a necessary part of wider state-building processes especially over time, but it is not sufficient. This is because "no state relies on a single source of legitimacy" (OECD, 2008b: 9). Instead, different sources of legitimacy co-exist and interact with each other.

The state's responsiveness to higher priority (realistic rather than aspirational) expectations and to 'core' or 'survival' functions is likely to make a more significant positive contribution to state legitimacy at least in the early post-conflict or post-fragility period with service delivery becoming more of a priority expectation over time. However, since providing services is core to poverty reduction it will always, rightly, take place in post-conflict contexts, whether citizens expect it or not. The research has found that how services are provided is critical, at the very least, to do no harm to wider state-building and peace-building processes. However, in many cases, the way in which services are delivered can make a positive contribution to state-building and peace-building goals through strengthening the legitimacy of the state. The fact that expectations change over time also highlights the importance of the state having flexibility to respond to meeting these changing expectations. This echoes OECD (2008c: 19) which refers to state-building as a dynamic process with "the central dynamic between societal expectations of the state and vice versa".

## References

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War.' In *Oxford Economics Papers* (2004), 56 (4): 563-595.

DFID (2010a). *Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper*. London: DFID.

DFID (2010b). *The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States: Findings from Ten Years of DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010. A Synthesis Paper*. London: DFID.

Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2008). *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Migdal, J. (2001). *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ndaruhutse, S. (ed.) (2011). *State-Building, Peace-Building and Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Literature Review – Final Report*. Reading: CfBT Education Trust, Practical Action Consulting and Save the Children.

OECD (2011). *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*. Paris: OECD.

OECD (2008a). *Service Delivery in Fragile Situations. Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons*. Paris: OECD.

OECD (2008b). *The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity*. Paris: OECD.

OECD (2008c). *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience*. Paris: OECD.

OECD (2010). *Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding*. Paris: OECD.

Pavanello, S. and Othieno, T. (2008). *Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor in Fragile Environments: Education Sector International Literature Review*. Report prepared for the AusAID Office of Development Effectiveness. London: ODI.

Thapa, A. (2011). *Does Private School Competition Improve Public School Performance? The Case of Nepal*. Unpublished dissertation. Columbia: Columbia University.

Whaites, A. (2008). *States in Development: Understanding State-building – a DFID Working Paper*. London: DFID.

World Bank (2004). *World Development Report: Making Services Work for the Poor*. Washington, DC: World Bank.



## Annex 1: Methodology and research questions

The research sought to answer the following key question:

**How does the fulfilment of people's expectations for services relate to their perception of the legitimacy of the government?**

To unpack this overarching research question, research teams focused on gathering answers (from focus groups and semi-structured interviews) to the following six questions:<sup>15</sup>

1. What do citizens expect in general from the government?<sup>16</sup>
2. What do citizens expect should be available in education/health/water and sanitation? (i.e. all services, or are some considered a higher priority than others?)
3. What do citizens expect from the government in education/health/sanitation/water? [This question focused on the sector interest of the focus group – for example education, if a group of education stakeholders]
4. What does the government provide for citizens? [as in the previous question, this question focused on the sector interest of the focus group]
5. How are citizens involved in services (participation, ownership, accountability)? [as in the previous question, this question focused on the sector interest of the focus group]
6. Given what has been discussed, what does this make citizens think about the government?

The research questions were asked of several key groups of stakeholders:

- (i) Citizens at local level (e.g. a group of representative citizens who talked about education) or at site level (e.g. in a school, health clinic, water users group);
- (ii) Other stakeholders at local level (e.g. mayors, community leaders, sector government officials and sector representatives from faith-based, community-based and/or private sector umbrella groups at local level);
- (iii) Stakeholders at national level (e.g. sector government officials and sector representatives from faith-based, community-based and/or private sector umbrella groups at national level); and
- (iv) Donors, international NGOs, United Nations agencies and transnational organisations.

Given that the fieldwork involved a local research team spending about six weeks visiting different sites in each country,<sup>17</sup> the results generated were not supposed to

<sup>15</sup> This built on what has already been captured in the desk-based case studies.

<sup>16</sup> In Rwanda, question 1 was asked last; this may have resulted in less of a focus being given to service delivery in citizens' answers which may already have been largely covered in questions 2–5.

<sup>17</sup> In Nepal, the research team completed a total of 60 focus group discussions (FGDs) across 5 districts involving 464 participants and an additional 67 semi-structured interviews (SSIs). In Rwanda, the research team completed a total of 72 FGDs across 3 districts involving 800 individuals and an additional 31 SSIs. In South Sudan, the research team completed a total of 57 FGDs across 6 counties, involving 354 individuals and an additional 62 SSIs.

be and cannot be assumed to be nationally representative from a statistical perspective. Instead, they should be seen as giving a snapshot picture of what was happening in those locations at the time the research was conducted (September-November 2011).

## Annex 2: Suggestions for future research

### General

- **Changing expectations:** Research would be useful on if and how citizens' expectations, both generally and in relation to service delivery, change over time in early recovery and post-conflict settings and whether there is any general sequencing in when service delivery becomes a top priority or whether this is context-specific.

### Education

- **Curriculum content:** The research was not able to undertake a detailed analysis of the content of the education curriculum to look at its impact (positive or negative) on legitimacy, although the literature review did highlight the key role that the education curriculum has played in different countries in either promoting peace or perpetuating conflict. Future research could investigate the impact of the content of education on legitimacy in addition to the processes of service delivery.
- **Decentralisation and social accountability tools:** Effective decentralisation processes and the use of social accountability tools could improve accountability and quality of services, and enhance participation, especially for women. In countries where social accountability mechanisms are being introduced, qualitative and quantitative indicators should be monitored to measure how both degrees of financial transparency and participation in decision-making affect people's opinion of local and national government.
- **Education services and marginalisation:** More in-depth and longitudinal research in areas of the three countries particularly affected by past conflict (or current conflict in the case of South Sudan) could try to measure the impact of specific policies in reducing marginalisation and improving accessibility, and how this affects legitimacy as well as develop a deeper understanding of how provision of education through non-state providers (particularly the private sector) affects legitimacy. This would provide more evidence on the relationship between equity and legitimacy.

### Health

- **Social accountability tools:** In countries where social accountability mechanisms are being introduced, qualitative and quantitative indicators should be monitored to measure both how degrees of financial transparency and participation in decision-making affect people's opinion of local and national government.
- **Health services and marginalisation:** More in-depth and longitudinal research in areas of the three countries particularly affected by past (or current in the case of South Sudan) conflict could try to measure the impact of specific policies in reducing marginalisation and improving accessibility of health services, and how this affects legitimacy.
- **See also under Nepal.**

## Water

- **Regulation of the private sector:** Where the private sector is playing a significant and increasing role in the provision of water services (such as in Rwanda), identifying the changing role of government from service provider to facilitator, the extent to which the state is effectively regulating the private sector and how this impacts on perceptions of state legitimacy, is an area that merits future research.
- **Payment for services:** Where governments are providing higher levels of access to services but are requiring citizens to pay, such as in the water sector, research on how payment for services impacts on wider issues of state legitimacy in relation to the achieved quality of delivered services could reveal important insights for policymakers.
- **Responding to hard-to-reach communities:** As countries move towards and beyond the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal targets in water and sanitation, there will be greater international interest in monitoring how the government is responding to the needs of hard-to-reach and still under-served population groups, especially those who are on the margins of society and have limited voice in decision-making processes.

## Sanitation

- **Private sector provision and perceptions of the government:** The vast majority of families self-build household latrines, often with help from non-state actors.<sup>18</sup> Where the private sector is becoming increasingly recognised and involved in the provision of public sanitation facilities (such as building and operating latrine blocks in Rwanda) and demonstrating how they can be run efficiently and cost-effectively, research would be useful on how this may influence citizens' perceptions of the quality and responsiveness of government service provision in sanitation, when compared to the alternatives.
- **Changing roles and responsibilities of government and non-state actors:** Responsibility for sanitation services typically spans a number of state institutions, leaving citizens unsure of the extent to which government is responsible for aspects of provision. Research into how changing roles, responsibilities and accountability mechanisms of government – and the extent to which citizens' are informed – influences perceptions of the state, could help guide effective policy processes as states adopt new approaches to sanitation provision.
- **Responding to hard-to-reach communities:** As countries move towards and beyond the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal targets in water and sanitation, there will be greater international interest in monitoring how the government is responding to the needs of hard-to-reach and still under-served population groups, especially those who are on the margins of society and have limited voice in decision-making processes.
- **The costs of self-supply:** Findings from the Rwanda study have shown that sanitation provision is self-supplied, with families mostly bearing the cost of providing a household latrine. A future research project that examines the effects of self-supply on the provision of sanitation services, their quality and sustainability could help reveal the extent to which cost of sanitation services affect the poor, and their expectations of government.

<sup>18</sup> In many countries, the state is not perceived as primarily responsible for the provision of domestic sanitation services, beyond perhaps offering partial support to material needs (as found in the Nepal research), or facilitating land rights issues (as in the South Sudan research). NGOs and small-scale private providers fill the service delivery gap in sanitation to the extent possible within limitations on the enabling environment, such as funding, availability of supply chains, or security of tenure.

Nepal
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Health sector:</b> In Nepal more research looking at the availability of curative services over the next few years would determine whether an increase or decrease in curative services affects government legitimacy.</li> </ul>
Rwanda
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Ethnicity:</b> The research in Rwanda was not able to look at whether/how perceptions of state legitimacy varied according to ethnicity as the Government of Rwanda does not permit open discussion around ethnicity. Undertaking similar research but interviewing different groups such as returnees, genocide survivors, ex-combatants, different diaspora groups with connections to opposition political parties, etc. could enable a proxy analysis of variations in expectations by ethnicity.</li> <li>▪ <b>Research methodology:</b> While the use of focus group discussions produced a wealth of material on expectations, responsiveness and legitimacy, in Rwanda further research should employ more penetrative, confidential, individual interviews for more probing analysis of attitudes towards the government in relation to service delivery.</li> <li>▪ <b>Equity and quality of water services:</b> Citizens consulted in Rwanda generally expressed strong appreciation of the progress achieved by government, particularly in recent years. Further research to identify the influence of equity and quality of water services (such as price control, regulation of private providers, or responding to service failures) on perceptions of state legitimacy, would require data collection from a wider range of less developed areas, based on a method of one-to-one, confidential interviews.</li> </ul>
South Sudan
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Changes over time:</b> Longitudinal research in South Sudan over the next five years would help to map changes in attitudes towards the government in relation to changes in the availability and accessibility of all services.</li> <li>▪ <b>NGO presence/absence:</b> The concentration of NGOs in some areas and their absence from others (mainly due to security reasons, but also different levels of community responsiveness) is a possible recipe for further conflict between communities. This could be an unintended consequence of NGO-supported service delivery that could undermine wider processes of state-building and peace-building and unintentionally do harm by providing inequitable access to services. This is an area for further research.</li> <li>▪ <b>Transition trajectories:</b> Future research could also explore ways of linking service delivery by non-state actors to core state-building and peace-building processes in South Sudan. Such research could inform transition trajectories from emergency interventions by non-state providers to country-led sanitation programmes managed by local ministries.</li> </ul>