Policy Roundtable on Education in Emergencies, Fragile States and Reconstruction:

Addressing Challenges and Exploring Alternatives

CIDA-INEE Policy Roundtable Outcome Report

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 22 June 2006, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) sponsored a policy roundtable on *Education in Emergencies, Fragile States and Reconstruction: Addressing Challenges and Exploring Alternatives* at UNICEF headquarters in New York.

This one-day roundtable created a unique opportunity for a diverse group of donors, UN and NGO practitioners, and academics to engage with several of the most pressing policy issues surrounding education in emergencies, fragile states and reconstruction. The event built upon ongoing efforts by partner organizations in related areas (e.g. UNICEF-Oxford University Education and Conflict conference, Education Service Delivery Workstream within the OECD DAC Fragile States Group). This event also served as INEE's first policy roundtable and donor collaboration of this kind while simultaneously contributing to CIDA's internal policy development objectives on education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction.

The roundtable participants formed working groups on each of the following three objectives and discussed the challenges, constraints, opportunities, recommendations, outstanding questions and possible next steps for each:

1. Contribute to policy dialogue that will effectively connect and leverage the various educational initiatives being carried out in the domains of humanitarian assistance, development, gender equality, fragile states and child protection.

2. Identify alternative financing mechanisms that can be used to achieve Education for All goals within emergency and reconstruction contexts.

3. Examine the ways in which INEE's Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction can be used by donors and other stakeholders to support their work in education.

In addition to the framing papers that were prepared in advance for each of the objectives, brief outcome documents were compiled in order to elucidate the key points of discussion that surfaced during the roundtable and are briefly summarized below.

Connecting and leveraging educational initiatives across domains

The participants in this group spent the majority of their time identifying and discussing the overarching challenges that often prevent international actors from more effectively connecting with one another and leveraging educational initiatives across domains. The key challenges that were discussed in depth included the following: (1) the disconnect between humanitarian response and development work; (2) competing organizational mandates and spheres of influence across international actors; and (3) a lack of coordination across international actors that is instigated further by the absence of donor support for coordination activities as well as a general lack of capacity among national staff to engage in and assume these activities.

To address these challenges, the participants recommended that current initiatives and collaborations—such as the IASC cluster process, the Fast Track Initiative and the OECD DAC Fragile States Group—be strengthened in order to reinforce the need for greater advocacy on education in emergency and post-crisis reconstruction contexts, to consolidate and expand the pool of education research, and to involve national governments and civil society more effectively in order to ensure continuity and sustainability of educational innovations over time. Participants also discussed extensively the need for capacity building for international actors, especially national education authorities, on coordination-related activities and

responsibilities as well as donor support that includes funding for these purposes.

Identifying alternative financing mechanisms

The participants in this group organized their discussion around the key points illustrated in the framing paper which included the challenges presented by: (1) inadequate aid for education for conflict affected fragile states; (2) the discontinuity of funding between emergency and development phases; (3) limited accountability in education provision; and (4) the deficiency of finance models that can be used to scale up education provision or funding when a state is unable to assume these responsibilities. The group felt strongly that the issue around inadequate aid for education could only be remedied once the other challenges had been addressed due to donors' reluctance to engage with fragile states suffering from unstable or corrupt governments.

In addition to drafting questions for future discussions and possible next steps which are included in this report, the group concluded that there is a need for a systematic global mechanism that can finance education in emergency situations and fragile states, and that there is a need for more systematic exploration and accessible documentation regarding country level financing frameworks. The group also agreed that current financing mechanisms are insufficient in scope and effectiveness. The participants strongly encouraged the FTI Task Team on Fragile States, the OECD DAC Education Service Delivery Workstream and INEE to assume an active role in advancing this discussion and identifying adequate, larger-scale financing mechanisms.

Using the INEE Minimum Standards as a tool for donors

The discussion began by highlighting potential challenges that donors have identified in using the INEE Minimum Standards which included the need for contextualization, internal divisions within agencies, limited awareness and capacity, differing levels of institution-alization and a general skepticism about the standards. Once these challenges had been identified, the working group clearly outlined the various ways in which donors could utilize the INEE Minimum Standards to overcome these challenges in order to conduct their work more effectively. These potential uses include the following: (1) to improve internal coordination; (2) to advocate internally and externally for the important role that education plays in times of crisis; (3) to build capacity and technical expertise; (4) to develop policy; (5) to coordinate internal funding streams; (6) to promote preparedness; (7) to frame and foster inter-agency policy dialogue, coordination, advocacy and action; (8) to promote quality and relevance to donor-funding programs; and (9) to promote accountability.

Finally, additional recommendations highlighted the need for INEE to prioritize fundraising for evaluation studies of the Minimum Standards as well as collaborations with other key groups (i.e. FTI) to produce case studies that illustrate how implementation of the INEE Minimum Standards can help meet the Education for All goals.

Although the overarching objectives for the event were complex in scope and require ongoing dialogue, the opportunity for engagement, reflection and collaboration that the event afforded to the wide range of participants was as beneficial as the outcomes. INEE hopes that others will join its efforts to build upon the momentum generated during this event by creating additional opportunities for individuals and organizations to advance the policy dialogue and policy-making process in the field of education in emergencies, fragile states and reconstruction.

CIDA and INEE hope that you find the outcome document helpful to your work, welcome your feedback on the enclosed materials, and encourage you to disseminate the roundtable report to your colleagues. Please submit any comments and questions that you may have to coordinator@ineesite.org.

POLICY COHERENCE[1]

Highlights from Framing Paper #1

Synopsis:

This paper addresses the following five domains, their respective "stakes" in education as well as the primary constraints that prevent more effective convergence, coordination and leverage across each domain's educational initiatives:

DOMAIN	STAKE(S)
Humanitarian Assistance	Consists of project-based non-formal and formal educational activities that provide physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection for children, adolescents and youth.
Development	Supports long-term, durable educational planning that is connected to economic trans-formation, local governance and capacity building for future stability.
Fragile States	Promotes education as an important component of the "political-security-development" nexus by contributing to political stability, strengthening state legitimacy, and promoting child protection.
Gender Equality	Seeks to promote access to and equity in education in accordance with EFA and the MDGs.
Child Protection	Supports education to the degree that it enables the rights enshrined in the Convention for the Rights of the Child and becomes integrated with other key life-saving and life-sustaining sectors: shelter, health, water and sanitation, and food security.

Constraints:

The primary constraints across these five domains involve power dynamics, lack of capacity across stakeholders, competing organizational priorities and divergent timeframes for implementation.

1) **Power dynamics** as illustrated in: a) the decision-making process, b) organizational agendas/mandates, and c) the potential neglect of local stakeholders in the decision-making process.

2) **Lack of capacity across stakeholders** that prevents certain actors from fully participating in the decision-making, coordination, implementation and accountability processes.

3) **Competing priorities** which may be exacerbated by limited resources, organizational mandates, "stakes" in education, points of entry (e.g. acute phase vs. reconstruction) and/or lack of coordination and consensus across donor agencies.

4) **Time frame and transitional disparities** may present challenges to effective information exchange across various stakeholders and become further compounded by calls to "act fast… but stay in engaged".

Suggestions:

• Coordination meetings for relevant international, national and local stakeholders/organizations across domains; consensus about decision-making process and clear understanding about the policy-practice linkages/implementation.

• Trust-building exchanges through training sessions or modules early in an emergency between international and national actors.

• Technical training for national education administrators and specialists.

• Funding for coordination costs needs to be provided.

Working Group on Policy Coherence— Outcome Document

Challenges & Constraints

The group agreed upon and identified the following challenges and constraints in terms of education policy coherence across five domains (i.e. humanitarian assistance, development, gender equality, fragile states and protection of children):

- Conceptual differences, competing organizational priorities, and lack of effective linkages between the many stakeholders engaged in the multiple and overlapping domains in which the work of education is conducted

- Power differences and changing spheres of influence across international actors in the decision-making and agenda-setting processes

- Lack of human resources and capacity on the ground with regard to education as well as coordination (including humanitarian and local/national staff)

- Lack of funding and disparate funding mechanisms across domains

- Timeframe/transition differences for entry and exit across organizations and crises (reflected in the disconnect between humanitarian response phases and development work)

- The term "education in emergencies" as a misnomer; does not accurately capture the full spectrum of the work conducted from early onset of a crisis to reconstruction

- Costs of coordination need to be highlighted by international actors and supported by donors

- Lack of data to support role/impact of education, particularly how education saves lives

Discussion

The group began by discussing which other domains might need to be included and debated whether the following were separate domains, cross-cutting issues and/or areas of convergence within education: participation (particularly youth participation), rights-based approaches, peace-building and crisis prevention. The group also discussed the need to unpack the term development into two core components (i.e. recovery and reconstruction). Due to the time constraints, the group chose to focus on the five domains included in the framing paper.

With regard to the possible misconceptions generated by the phrase/term "education in emergencies", an alternative— *"Education for All, Always"— was suggested not only to help young people better understand their right to education, but also to help clarify the linkages across domains.*

Recommendations

The group proposed recommendations for the following three overarching challenges/constraints:

CHALLENGE/CONSTRAINT	RECOMMENDATION(S)
Disconnect between humanitarian response and development phases due to issues around coordination, funding and capacity building	• Formation of an education cluster within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) cluster process 　> Encourage coordination meetings for relevant international, national, and local stakeholders/organizations to build consensus on decision-making processes and establish a clearer understanding of the policy-practice linkages • Advocacy by INEE to create stronger linkages between INEE and both the Fast-Track Initiative (FTI) and OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) structures

CHALLENGE/CONSTRAINT	RECOMMENDATION(S)
	• Formulation of closer linkages, through research evidence and good practice cases, between education and protection in order to access the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and other funding mechanisms • Greater involvement of national governments and civil society to increase the continuity of actors working over time
Lack of capacity and coordination among national stakeholders	• Earmark donor funding for capacity building and coordination costs • Include capacity development initiatives for national staff, especially the Ministry of Education, that foster full participation in decision-making, coordination, implementation, and accountability processes • Promote transparency and coordination among Ministries in order to strengthen political will
Lack of knowledge management system	• Facilitate access to and use of existing data, including sharing databases and examples of good (and bad) practice • Create a coherent information and knowledge management system that could be used by actors from all five domains. • Develop monitoring criteria and mechanisms to evaluation the outcomes of interventions

Next Steps

In addition to acting on these specific recommendations, important next steps include collaboration among INEE members to define further the role of the network in global advocacy as well as the overarching objectives, particularly as it pertains to donors.

Framing Paper/Objective #1: Policy Coherence

ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS[2]

Highlights from Framing Paper #2

Synopsis:

This paper attempts to analyze the aid resources available to finance education in emergencies and chronic crises by examining the track record of both development and humanitarian aid, reviewing disbursement mechanisms and laying out key challenges.

Conflict Affected Fragile States (CAFS)

The following CAFS countries identified in this paper appear on at least two of the following: (1) Project Ploughshare list of states having experienced at least one armed conflict during the period 1995-2004; (2) the Failed States Index 2006 (with scores above 90) published by Foreign Policy magazine and Fund for Peace, which assesses violent internal conflicts and measures mitigating strategies; or (3) the World Bank LICUS group 2004, comprised of countries in the lowest two quintiles of the Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA).

The CAFS include[3]: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor Leste, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.

Inter-agency frameworks' potential role in donor harmonization and scaling up of education aid for CAFS:

- Joint Assessment Missions (JAM) – Multiple donors
- Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) - UN
- Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTF)
- Post-Conflict Fund – World Bank
- Central Emergency Response Fund – UN
- IASC cluster process - UN
- Education Sector Transitional Fund – proposed by Greeley and Rose (2006)

Possible disbursement channels for aid include:

direct budget support, sector budget support, project-based, and community funds; although some of these mechanisms tend to favor stable countries with minimum levels of good governance.

Challenges to be overcome:

1) Reluctance by donors to take the associated risks involved in financing education in emergencies or chronic crises; applies to both development-oriented and humanitarian aid donors.

2) Inadequacy of current aid allocation to education which is caused by: 1) an overall lack of aid, 2) unwillingness among donors to take risks in difficult environments, and 3) an inability of the donor community to determine the most appropriate financing mechanisms that will lead to an effective use of funds.

3) Discontinuous funding modalities between emergency and development phases coupled with short-term funding cycles that prevent adequate capacity building within national institutions.

4) Lack of accountability and effectiveness in education delivery, partly due to lack of capacity by an equally affected civil society.

5) Ability to scale up and engage in state capacity building without creating unnecessary parallel systems.

Working Group on Alternative Financing Mechanisms —Outcome Document

Challenges/Constraints

The group reviewed the framing paper which identified the following challenges in terms of financing education in humanitarian crises and fragile states:

- *Inadequate aid for education* as a whole and more specifically for conflict affected fragile states which receive a smaller proportion of aid per capita yet have a greater distance to go in achieving Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).
- *Discontinuity between emergency and development phases*, with funds coming from separate donor pots coupled with short-term funding cycles.
- *Limited accountability in education provision*, with few existing standards outside of the INEE Minimum Standards, exacerbated by the inability of civil society to hold the government accountable due to the effects of the conflict on themselves.
- Lack of models that can be used to *scale up education provision or funding* when a state is unable or unwilling to provide themselves.

Discussion

There was a strong feeling by the group that the first of the above issues, *inadequate aid for education,* was only possible to address once the other issues were tackled. Donors are reluctant to put money into fragile states due to distrust of unstable or corrupt governments. Due to a lack of recognition of the life-saving and life-sustaining role that education can play during and immediately following humanitarian crises, donors are also reluctant to fund educational activities during these early phases.

Looking at greater continuity of funding, increased accountability, and mechanisms for scale up could show how aid can be used effectively to alleviate some of these concerns. The issue of mechanisms for scale up was of particular interest to the group, with the feeling that this needs to be tackled at both a country-based and international level.

At the country level there are a number of existing funding frameworks used, both in the realm of humanitarian and development aid. These include prioritisation via assessments (i.e. Joint Assessment Missions - JAM), appeals (i.e. Consolidated Appeal Process – CAP), coordination (i.e. trial clusters) and pooled funds (i.e. multidonor trust funds - MDTF). However, there has been little effort to systematise these different frameworks in a way that will consistently facilitate larger flows of aid to support an education system. Moreover, the learning from different experiences has not been documented accessibly to enable application to new crises situations.

At the international level, there are no existing mechanisms to channel large scale funding into education in emergencies or fragile states. Thus, if donors are not present in a country, they would be unlikely to support education. Furthermore, humanitarian funding mechanisms (such as the Central Emergency Response Fund – CERF) do not emphasise education as a core response. While there is scope that education could receive more support, competing demands of other sectors would make humanitarian sources an unlikely source for large scale, predictable education financing. On the development side, criteria for the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), the main mechanism for financing EFA, make it difficult for fragile states to become eligible for funding. While there are pilots in place exploring Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) (technical support) use in fragile states, it is unlikely that more substantial funds would be forthcoming from the Catalytic Fund. This is based on a decision made at the last EFA High Level Group in Beijing that the Catalytic Fund would not be expanded to fragile states.

The discussion concluded by emphasising the following:

1. There is a need for a systematic global vehicle that can be used to finance education in emergency situ-

ations and in fragile states; existing vehicles within the FTI are not adequate.

2. There is need for more systematic exploration and accessible documentation regarding country level financing frameworks for education in emergencies and in fragile states, including channelling aid through UN bodies, NGO coalitions and multi-donor trust funds.

Remaining Questions/Possible Directions

The group did not reach a stage where it could confidently determine a set of recommendations. Rather, a number of questions and possible directions were illustrated which need further consideration. Groups that may take this further include the FTI task team on fragile states, the OECD DAC sub-workstream on education delivery in fragile states, or a working group within INEE. Questions include:

1. Could a separate trust fund be based within the FTI architecture specifically for education provision in fragile states – a kind of Education Transitional Trust Fund (ETTF)?

   a. Or, should the decision on use of the Catalytic Fund be revisited at a future FTI partnership meeting?

2. Would any other actors be better placed than the World Bank to act as a trustee for a separate fund for fragile states (e.g. UNICEF as they are present in emergencies as well as fragile states)?

3. Could INEE play a central role in administering and monitoring, or perhaps serve on an advisory committee?

   a. Should INEE sit on the FTI steering group as it currently stands?

4. How could a systematic review of country-level mechanisms be taken forward in order to consider better support to fragile education systems? (it was mentioned that both the World Bank and DPKO are undergoing reviews of MDTFs which are soon to be available)

5. Could more be done to push education within some of the existing humanitarian mechanisms (i.e. CERF, CAP, Peacebuilding Commission)?

6. How could civil society play a greater role in holding governments accountable in emergency affected and fragile states? What role could the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) play in being a catalyst for this?

Highlights from Framing Paper #3:

Synopsis:

This paper examines the ways in which the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction can be used by donors and other stakeholders to support their work in education and to identify the most pressing challenges that confront donors today.

Potential Uses of the INEE Minimum Standards for Donors:

- *To develop policy:* Serve as a framework for developing policies for education in emergencies, fragile states and reconstruction contexts that promote rights-based programming and establishing relevant linkages to child protection.

- *As a tool for internal advocacy:* Provide a concrete demonstration of education's position as a humanitarian sector, and of the important role that education plays in times of crisis; can contribute to increasing funding allocations earmarked for education.

- *To promote quality in donor-funded programs:* Provide a practical framework and detailed good practice guidelines that donor agency staff at all levels can readily use to promote quality and assess performance at the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages of education program development.

- *To promote accountability:* Serve as transparent, aspirational good practice norms for all stakeholders to know and utilize, and as a resource for constructive feedback and self-correction by implementing agencies, donor monitoring and external evaluators.

- *To improve internal coordination:* Serve as a tool to promote collaboration and coordination between departments within large agencies (e.g. education sector, emergency sector, child protection sector).

- *To coordinate internal funding streams:* Represent global consensus on good practice and necessary interventions as well as a blueprint for quality education spanning emergency and development phases; can be used to advocate for longer-term and better coordinated programs and funding streams.

- *To facilitate inter-agency coordination:* Provides an overall framework for coordinated efforts in the education sector that makes it much easier to identify funding gaps and priorities.

Framing Paper/Objective #3: INEE Minimum Standards

Use of the INEE Minimum Standards— Potential Challenges to Overcome

- *Need for contextualization:* the broad menu of qualitative indicators can provide overall guidance, but it does not provide immediately useable formulas, for example with regard to class size and student-teacher ratios.

- *Internal divisions within agencies:* Collaboration, policy and program coherence as well as multi-sectoral synergies and linkages are required in order to fully meet the Minimum Standards in education; they cannot be met entirely by educationalists, nor entirely through short-term emergency education budgets.

- *Budget support/SWAPs strategies:* Acceptable ways need to be found of integrating the Minimum Standards into SWAPs and other budgetary support programs and of presenting the standards to recipient governments as a guiding framework to support them in their work.

- *Limited awareness, limited capacity, and differing levels of institutionalization:* Awareness may be limited to a small number of individuals who do not nec-

essarily have the authority and/or the capacity to institutionalize the standards within their own departments.

- *General skepticism:* Even where people are aware of the INEE Minimum Standards, skepticism about their 'added value' may exist. With no formal evaluation evidence of the impact of the Minimum Standards as yet, this is especially difficult to counter.

Working Group on the INEE Minimum Standards —Outcome Document

The INEE Minimum Standards as a Tool for Donors: Potential Uses, Challenges and Recommendations

This document represents a summary of the framing paper on potential donor use of INEE's Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction (INEE Minimum Standards), together with the additional recommendations and suggestions made during the working group discussions at the policy roundtable.[5] The recommendations address different challenges for donors that were identified in using the INEE Minimum Standards: need for contextualization; internal divisions within agencies; budget support/SWAPs strategies; limited awareness, limited capacity, and differing levels of institutionalization; general skepticism towards the standards.

Potential Uses of the INEE Minimum Standards for Donors

To improve internal coordination: The INEE Minimum Standards can serve as a tool to promote collaboration and coordination between departments within large agencies (e.g. education sector, emergency sector, child protection sector, humanitarian action, policy, multilateral, partnerships etc), and also between the additional divisions which operate between different geographical regions, between HQ and the field.

This may include/require the following actions:
- Map information about who/which unit is responsi-

ble for education in emergencies, and if it does not exist, create a mechanism for bringing together various units/branches;

- Nominate a focal point for the standards (distributing the handbook and related policies /widely), participating in INEE activities and INEE Minimum Standards trainings, organizing internal agency intersectoral meetings/discussions etc;

- The standards enable policy/program actors to utilize a common framework across departments as they explore the various mechanisms for working together and moving the process through the system.

As a tool for advocacy: The INEE Minimum Standards can provide a concrete demonstration of education's position as a humanitarian sector, and of the important role that education plays in times of crisis; this can then create the necessary political will for policy development and for increased funding allocations earmarked for education.

This may include/require the following actions (*see also section on: 'To develop policy' below*):

- *Internal Advocacy Process:* Internal campaigns and mobilization of the different departments/units working in the above, as well as building a diverse coalition of actors within agency, including non-program sections, such as finance, to make the case for

---

[5] Adapted from paper written by Jackie Kirk for the CIDA-INEE Policy Roundtable, June 2006.

the standards. This may require significant intra-organizational learning to understand the priorities and work strategies of other departments. Even if not directly involved in the work, non-operational departments and non-like minded departments (e.g. finance) are briefed on education in emergencies and the Standards as a tool.

- *External Advocacy:* Donor support of education in emergencies as a humanitarian intervention in donor meetings and initiatives involving donors, such as the IASC Cluster process;
- Post the INEE Minimum Standards and other INEE resources, including a link to the INEE website, on intranet and internet sites.
- Use the standards in dialogue with Ministries of Education to promote and provide examples of disaster preparedness planning in the sector;
- Work with governments to compare government standards with the INEE Minimum Standards, and identify areas of convergence for collective attention.

To build capacity and technical expertise: The INEE Minimum Standards can be used explicitly as a training and capacity building tool within the agency and for partners working with it.

This may include/require the following actions:
Briefings for all new staff on the standards during orientation;

- INEE Minimum Standards modules included in in-house knowledge development/organizational learning processes (e.g. intranet);
- INEE Minimum Standards materials are used within staff training systems (at various levels) and included within training materials;
- Sponsor INEE Minimum Standards trainings in countries where education/protection/humanitarian assistance programs are supported
- A nominated Focal Point for the standards takes a lead on dissemination/training activities and also monitors training and capacity building on the Standards and its impacts;
- Support implementing agencies to ensure that there are qualified key staff who focus on the issue of education in emergencies.

Recommendations were made that INEE develop a package of on-line training and capacity building materials on education in emergencies, and that complementary materials on the INEE Minimum Standards be tailored to donors.

To develop policy: The INEE Minimum Standards can serve as a framework for developing stand alone and/or integrated policies relating to education in emergencies, fragile states and reconstruction contexts (education, humanitarian response, protection) that promote rights-based programming and establish relevant linkages to child protection.

This may include/require the following actions:
- Use the standards as a checklist to review policy in development;
- Use as a framework around which to structure new policy;
- Endorse the INEE Minimum Standards within policy, and explain why the agency endorses the standards, their complementarity to existing policies, and how they should be applied;
- Explicitly say 'use the INEE Minimum Standards' in the policy document;
- Education policy is disseminated to staff at all levels and partners, as appropriate.

To coordinate internal funding streams: The INEE Minimum Standards represent global consensus on good practice and necessary interventions as well as a blueprint for quality education spanning emergency and development phases; once different units are working together around the standards then it is hoped that longer-term and better coordinated programs and more continuous funding streams will be established.

This may include/require the following actions:
- Use standards as a framework for analysis of different funding schemes regarding timing and sequencing, compatibility, gaps, etc;
- Use standards to guide the sequencing of funding and promote internal coordination in order to bridge stages of response and longer-term concerns (e.g. use the standards to bridge potential funding interruptions between humanitarian, protection, and education sections);

- Use information gained through initial assessments to prepare and share across departments and use information/knowledge for preparing funding channels for the future.

To promote preparedness capacity of the agency and its partners to respond to and mitigate emergency situations in and through education: The INEE Minimum Standards can be used as a basis to develop preparedness before emergencies.

This may include/require the following actions:
- Ensure that education is always included in country contingency plans;
- Use the standards to identify conflict prevention/disaster preparedness activities in education sector to prioritize for funding;
- Use the standards in dialogue with Ministries of Education to promote and provide examples of disaster preparedness planning in the sector;
- Ensure that all education staff in all country programs (even development programs in apparently stable countries) are familiar and able to work with the Minimum Standards (rather than waiting for emergencies to occur).

To frame and foster inter-agency policy dialogue, coordination, advocacy and action (through the program cycle): The INEE Minimum Standards provide an overall framework for coordinated efforts across different agencies and stakeholders in the education sector that makes it much easier to identify funding gaps and priorities.

This may include/require the following actions:
- Use the standards as a framework for joint analysis of a situation and coordination around which actions will be taken up by which actors, where, when, etc. For example, use of the standards within cluster processes and as a framework for Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs);
- Use the holistic nature of the INEE Minimum Standards to help target/prioritize funding gaps, to make sure key components are funded;
- In specific country contexts, agencies develop a white paper on education in emergencies, and link with

other policy agendas about how the standards fit in with various initiatives. For example, paper would look at the underpinnings of INEE Minimum Standards, how these fit within country policy frameworks (e.g. EFA linkages, poverty reduction, vulnerability reduction);
- Donors, in bilateral negotiations with partners, work in a coordinated way to promote the use of the standards;
- Use the standards to understand capacity and to support organizational analysis of potential partner capacity.

To promote quality and relevance in donor-funded programs: The INEE Minimum Standards provide a practical framework and detailed good practice guidelines, following the Do No Harm philosophy, that donor agency staff at all levels can readily use to promote quality, consistency and equity and assess performance at the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages of education program development. They can help to regulate and standardize the quality of education programs and help hold donors accountable as they build capacity to monitor and ensure quality.

This may include/ require the following actions:
- Use the standards to refine funding proposal guidelines;
- Ask for potential recipients of funding to explain how they will use the standards in proposals;
- Use the standards to inform program design;
- Use the standards for assessment, monitoring and evaluation;
- Give input to INEE feedback process about the standards content, which will inform the revision (2008);
- Allocate resources to additional research studies and tool development, linked to/building upon the standards, in order to inform and drive forward the field of quality and relevant education in emergencies. An identified priority are case studies of good practice for presenting the standards as a tool for governments, and for partnering with governments;
- Match policy statements with institutional mechanisms to ensure that funding is available for all the key components of education activities as highlighted in the standards.

To promote accountability: The INEE Minimum Standards provide transparent, aspirational good practice norms for all stakeholders to know and utilize, and as a resource for constructive feedback and self-correction by implementing agencies, donor monitoring and external evaluators. As actors become aware of the INEE Minimum Standards, and they become normative, donors themselves will be accountable for meeting the standards.

This may include/require the following actions:
- Using the standards' right-based format for assessment, design, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting activities (of agency and implementing partners);
- Use the standards as a common framework for reporting;
- Dialogue with other stakeholders to select and commit to contextualizing and working on specific indicators;
- Use the standards to encourage/advocate for beneficiary/ community participation;

- Ask for potential recipients to incorporate the standards in proposals, particularly those around accountability. Also use the standards as a guide for opening up a discussion on accountability – using indicators;
- Expect to receive from partners on the ground a map/menu of indicative indicators that can help to set specific indicators for projects/what is relevant (based on contextualization of the standards);
- Expect and support matching/comparison of local/national standards and the INEE Minimum Standards from implementing partners;
- Work with governments to compare government standards with the INEE Minimum Standards, and identify areas of convergence for collective attention (including monitoring);
- Use the standards to ensure continuity of funding and programming and thereby maximize impact of aid for financial efficiency/aid effectiveness.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS TO INEE WHICH WILL SUPPORT DONORS' USE OF THE INEE MINIMUM STANDARDS

- INEE should prioritize fundraising for evaluation studies in order to help counter the 'general skepticism' to the standards;
- INEE and FTI (and others) should work together to produce case studies that illustrate how implementation of the INEE Minimum Standards can help meet the Education For All goals.
- INEE should develop and implement a strategic advocacy plan around the standards that emphasizes the fact that the INEE Minimum Standards are not new; rather that they are a consensus on best practice around the world. Some of the different stakeholders INEE should engage with in relation to advocacy around the standards are:

  > Governments (i.e. donor governments and recipients governments, especially Ministries of Education, but also other ministries and departments)

  > World Bank and other International Finance Institutions

  > Private donors/foundations

  > Regional bodies (such as ADEA)

  > Continental and regional NGO/ NGO networks (i.e. FAWE, Global Campaign for Education, Cooperation Sud)

  > UN agencies

  > Multi-donor funding mechanisms (i.e. FTI)

  > Universities

Review and Synthesis of Framing Papers

(This matrix was prepared and presented by Michael Gibbons during the opening session of the roundtable)

	1 – POLICY COHERENCE	2 - FINANCING	3 – INEE MINIMUM STANDARDS
ISSUES	Divergent priorities vs. areas of convergence among Education in Emergencies policy domains: • Humanitarian • Development • Fragile states • Gender equity • Child rights/protection	Fragile/conflict affected states funding: • High risk under-funded generally • Humanitarian under-funded • Education under-funded • Under-funding converges for Education in Emergencies	Possible donor uses of INEE MS: • Develop policy • Internal advocacy tool • Promote quality • Promote accountability • Improve internal coordination • Coordinate funding streams • Facilitate inter-agency coordination
CHALLENGES	Policy discontinuity due to: • Power differences in decision-making process, agenda-setting, participation • Competing priorities and capacity gaps among stakeholder/agencies • Timeframe/transition differences for entry, exit, mandates	Why the under-funding pattern? • Risk aversion • Reward performance policy • Funding discontinuities • Low accountability/effectiveness of civil society providers • Concern regarding scaling parallel systems	Challenges in using the INEE MS: • Need for contextualization • Internal divisions • Integration into budget support • Limited/varied capacity/buy-in • Need for more evidence of impact
OPTIONS	Better coordination and linkages via: • Formal coordination meetings • Initial trust-building exchanges/training • Technical training for nationals • Funding to support coordination • Data and information-sharing	• Donor harmonization/coordination of Education in Emergencies funding via mechanisms such as JAM, CAP, MDTF, PCF, CERF, IASC, ESTF (proposed) • Better orchestration of disbursement mechanisms	• Formal adoption of INEE MS by agencies and inter-agency mechanisms as policy • Adoption/use of MS by agencies as program guidelines • Informal use as recommended program development and coordination resource
COMMENTS BY REVIEWERS	• Current national/regional cases illustrating coordination/linkage successes/problems? • Matching/orchestrating different mandates as comparative advantages for different stages/needs • Consider transitions, linkages and connections beyond coordination • Question rigid category designations • Acknowledge how general funding scarcity exacerbates mandate divisions	• Absorptive capacity problem in crisis severely limits ODA allocations and use • Problem of transition from alternative to institutional funding channels	• More realistic to assume varied adoption(s) of INEE MS by agencies • Is RBA a basis for or challenge to adoption? • Don't forget 'inward' accountability to communities too • Need to engage adoption dialogue with MOEs and donors together • INEE MS not only mechanism • Add perspective on prolonged armed conflicts and HR abuses

OBJECTIVE # **1**:

Effectively connecting and leveraging the various educational initiatives being carried out in the domains of humanitarian assistance, development, gender equality, fragile states, and child protection.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

- Which "domains" or areas of work need to be considered in this discussion in addition to those presented in this paper (i.e. humanitarian assistance, development, fragile states, gender equality, and child protection)?

- Apart from the challenges/constraints presented in this paper (coordination, power dynamics, lack of capacity, competing organizational priorities and divergent time frames), what other constraints need to be addressed within this discussion (e.g. accountability, funding)?

- How can these challenges/constraints be overcome to contribute to more effective convergence, coordination and leverage across each domain's educational initiatives? In what ways can INEE and its Working Group on Minimum Standards contribute to connecting and leveraging educational initiatives with the aim of enhancing education quality in emergency, crisis and reconstruction settings?

- What are the areas of convergence across these different domains? How can they be integrated more effectively into these various areas of work?

- What aspects of coordination can be organized at an international level and used as a model/framework in each setting and what aspects depend on national and/or local context? What actions do you recommend in this regard?

OBJECTIVE # **2**:

Identifying alternative financing mechanisms that can be used to achieve Education for All goals within emergency and reconstruction contexts.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

- How can the shortfall of education aid in emergencies and chronic crises be overcome through the funding mechanisms that currently exist?

- How can education's role in saving lives be better articulated to donors in an effort to mobilize more sufficient funding for education?

- How could current funding mechanisms be scaled up sufficiently to provide necessary support to Conflict Affected Fragile States? How can these funds be made available in a timely fashion?

- How could greater use of pooled funding improve education provision in emergencies and chronic crises? How could these be introduced systematically?

- How can the challenges presented by the transition from humanitarian assistance to development be overcome?

- What are the most effective ways for non-governmental actors to participate in building accountability, capacity building, program support and scaling up?

- What suggestions can be offered regarding the contribution of INEE and its members to improving education financing in emergency and chronic crisis settings?

OBJECTIVE #3:

Examine the ways in which INEE's Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruc-tion can be used by donors and other stakeholders to support their work in education.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

- In addition to the different ways highlighted in the paper in which the Minimum Standards may be used by donors (i.e. policy development, internal advocacy, quality, accountability, coordination between internal functions and funding streams, and inter-agency coordination) are there other important ways in which they can be used which have not been addressed?

- Of the challenges to using the Minimum Standards that are highlighted in the paper (i.e. contextualization, internal divisions within agencies, budget support strategies/SWAPs, limited awareness, capacity and differing levels of institutionalization, possible skepticism), which have you/are you dealing with? Are there other challenges which have not been addressed?

- What possible solutions are there to overcoming these challenges? Are there examples, experiences and lessons from which we could learn, for example, of donors using the Minimum Standards to bring together staff from different units to identify and address possible gaps and discontinuities? Of donors including Minimum Standards in their proposal guidelines?

- What is needed to enable donors to ensure that the INEE Minimum Standards can be used to their full potential within their agencies (e.g. integration within their agency across departments as well as to country level offices)? What are the roles of non-governmental actors in helping donors in this process?

- Are there opportunities and/or areas of convergence with other initiatives (e.g. EFA, FTI, MDGs, DAC, humanitarian cluster response, etc) in which donors can coordinate their efforts and work together, as well as in collaboration with other institutions and organizations, to further promote and utilize the Minimum Standards?

FRAMING PAPER FOR OBJECTIVE 1:

Effectively connecting and leveraging the various educational initiatives being carried out in the domains of humanitarian assistance, development, gender equality, fragile states, and child protection.

Sarah Dryden-Peterson—*Harvard Graduate School of Education*

Prepared for the CIDA-INEE Policy Roundtable on Education in Emergencies, Fragile States and Reconstruction: Addressing Challenges and Exploring Alternatives —New York, June 2006

INTRODUCTION

Lubuto is one of approximately 100 million children worldwide who are not in school.[1] Lubuto is doubly vulnerable in her lack of opportunity for education: she is a refugee from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and she lives in exile in Uganda. Globally, more than half of the children not in schools live in countries that, like DRC, are engaged in or recovering from conflict.[2] Further, like most other countries of the global South, Lubuto's country of exile has not yet met Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of equitable access to primary school for all children.[3]

Despite the massive challenges, there are several reasons for optimism for Lubuto and the millions of children like her.

- First, the role of education in preventing the recurrence of violence, in providing protection – both physical and psychological – to crisis-affected communities, and in creating economic opportunities for both present and future situations is now well documented both in the field experience and research literature.[4]

- Second, although education was omitted from even the latest edition of the Sphere guidelines (2004),

EFA guidelines clearly support education as a critical element of humanitarian assistance,[5] and many humanitarian agencies and their donors are beginning to see education as a fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance.

- Third, some national governments are recognizing their responsibilities to include refugees in national development plans, including access for refugee children to national institutions of education while they are displaced.[6]

- Fourth, recent international collaborations around development effectiveness, particularly focused on fragile states, highlight the importance of institution building to the long-term legitimacy, effectiveness, and resiliency of states.[7] Education, as a central institution in all countries, is critical to this process in emergency and reconstruction phases.[8]

- Fifth, the emergence of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and its work to raise awareness of emergency and post-emergency education and to develop minimum standards for education in these settings has catalyzed the formation of a distinct field of education in emergencies and reconstruction in both research and practice.[9]

CONNECTING AND LEVERAGING EDUCATION IN FIVE DOMAINS:

- Humanitarian assistance
- Development
- Fragile states
- Gender equality
- Child protection

One of the greatest challenges to harnessing the potential of these developments is the lack of effective linkages between the many stakeholders engaged in the multiple domains in which the work of education is carried out. With the goal of reaching the EFA and MDG targets by 2015, *how can international, national, and local stakeholders work together to access resources, manage competing priorities, and ensure long-term sustainability for education in emergencies, fragile states,* *and reconstruction?* This paper examines the stake in education for each of the relevant domains of humanitarian assistance, development, fragile states, gender equality, and child protection in an attempt to guide discussion that will effectively connect and leverage thevarious initiatives being carried out in these domains. In so doing, the paper first provides an overview of the stakes of actors in each domain in their education work, which serves to highlight both conceptual differences between the domains and spaces for connecting and leveraging initiatives. Second, it identifies the lack of coordination among stakeholders and domains as the most pressing challenge confronting donors and synthesizes several central reasons for this lack of coordination. The paper concludes by suggesting some guiding questions that can be used during the roundtable to assist in the exploration of policy alternatives and definition of next steps in connecting and leveraging initiatives in these domains.

STAKES IN EDUCATION

In thinking about how to connect and leverage different domains that work in education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction, it is essential to identify the 'stakes' that each domain has in education. A 'stake' is the interest(s) that a person, agency, or collection of actors has in education, in this case within five domains: humanitarian assistance, development, fragile states, gender equality, and child protection. Analyzing these stakes assists in understanding why actors, who often work in multiple domains, care about their domain of work in the education field and in identifying what some of the philosophical or policy-level barriers to coordination across domains may be. The answers to three questions aid in defining the stakes for each domain:

- What are the reasons actors in this domain engage in education?
- What does education 'look like' for actors in this domain, ie. formal, non-formal, systemic, *ad hoc*?
- How does education connect to other initiatives in each domain, ie. to state-building, to protection?

Humanitarian Assistance

REASON TO ENGAGE IN EDUCATION

• The traditional humanitarian stance has been that education is not an essential part of humanitarian assistance, based presumably on the assumption that humanitarian assistance relates to a very short time frame: the acute phase of saving lives. Some donor agencies have based their policies on this belief, although others have provided immediate and long-term support to emergency education programs such as refugee education. Indeed, Nicolai and Triplehorn note that "[b]ecause education has traditionally been seen as part of development work, not humanitarian relief, humanitarian donors have generally been reluctant to fund emergency education responses. Moreover, until recently, few bilateral donors had a policy specifically on education in countries in, or emerging from, conflict."[10] However, extensive field experience and a growing body of research demonstrates that education protects children, builds community, and anchors reconstruction, motivating humanitarian actors to see education increasingly as the fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance.

STRUCTURE/CONTENT OF EDUCATIONAL WORK

• Humanitarian actors focus on education in emergencies when scarce resources are available and priorities allow, usually after life-saving priorities of shelter, food, and health and sanitation have been addressed. Typically, emergency education focuses on children and youth, begins with nonformal learning and childcare, and moves toward more formal ministry of education sanctioned primary schooling where possible. Adult and secondary education are usually lesser priorities. It is usually project-based and dependent on short-term contracts with international and/or national NGOs. The role of national governments (if they exist) is variable, however, it is often limited during acute emergencies, typically because of limited government capacity in the locations concerned, and comes into focus as a crisis subsides. Importantly, in recent refugee situations, the focus of durable solutions has shifted to repatriation rather than local settlement, and since host governments are thus keen for refugees to leave, they are wont to be involved.

CONNECTION TO OTHER INITIATIVES

• Emergency education focuses on service-delivery, ie. providing access to schools for all children, but is also a space to address issues of peace education, values formation, conflict-mitigation, and other child-focused activities. Rapid organizing of safe spaces and nonformal education for children is often a first response that allows humanitarian agencies to protect and treat children, both physically and psychologically, and frees up adults to engage in other humanitarian and life-saving activities. Even though "service delivery [can be] a key entry point to further development in difficult environments,"[11] there is often limited attention to longer-term social, economic, and political change in humanitarian settings. However, as education evolves, it can become increasingly structured and predictable, serving as a foundation for more consistent services for children and families, a basis for community organizing, and an interface with government institutions.

Development

- Primary and secondary education are complex bureaucratic systems devoted to long-term development goals that rarely respond well to emergencies. However, education – with benefits that accrue to individuals, households, and societies – is a cornerstone of international and national development plans aimed to meet EFA and MDG targets. Many countries that receive multi- and bi-lateral development aid for these purposes also are recipients of humanitarian assistance. Often, however, these forms of assistance are earmarked for different purposes or are funded on different cycles, creating a potential disconnect between emergency education and education as part of national development strategies. In crisis or conflict-prone countries, though, investments in basic education can serve as means of crisis prevention and preparedness, as well as a general investment in human capacity to cope and adapt.

- Whether relief and development are seen as separate or sequential processes, education spans the two. INEE suggests that to be effective, "[e]mergency education programmes [must be] planned and implemented in a manner that provides for their integration into longer-term development of the education sector."[12] With this goal in mind, education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction that is guided by a development agenda focuses on "[b]uilding the government's ability to coordinate …, because the government will be able to better respond to the current crisis and those in the future."[13] Development actors usually emphasize the creation/support of a formal and universally accessible education system linked to the national government and/or local education ministries to facilitate reintegration after the crisis. Emergency education, however, often emphasizes more flexible nonformal forms of education in response to the contingencies of the situation. This inherent tension between the flexibility of NGO responses and the bureaucratic aims of formal schooling is one of the biggest challenges in emergency education work.

- Education for development is intimately connected to economic transformation through the creation of non-agrarian workforces and/or women in the formal labor force, for example. It is also linked to nutrition (school feeding), water and sanitation, government decentralization, local governance and to state building in which strong institutions, such as ministries of education, are central to future stability. School spaces are often used as community centers. Nonformal education is usually applied to a range of sectors to build skills, raise awareness and communicate new information.

Fragile States

- As a key strategy for poverty alleviation and as one of the most critical paths to sustained turnaround,[14] education is central to the long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states that seeks to promote "a durable exit from poverty and insecurity."[15] In this way, education delivery in fragile states is similar to the development agenda, except that it prioritizes failing, failed, and recovering states[16]. Whereas the focus of education in development is on human resource building for economic and social development, in fragile states the functions of education also include child protection, social stability, and building legitimacy of the state to its citizens through mass service delivery.

STRUCTURE/CONTENT OF EDUCATIONAL WORK

- Initiatives in the domain of fragile states focus on helping "national reformers to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions."[17] In this way, outputs of involvement may center on building the capacity of institutions, such as ministries of education, to deliver services on a large scale. Issues of educational quality and achievement are not immediate priorities.

CONNECTION TO OTHER INITIATIVES

- The fragile states approach recognizes the "political-security-development" nexus, within which education plays an important role in creating political stability, promoting child protection, and creating a citizenry that can hold elected officials accountable.

Gender Equality

- In countries engaged in or recovering from conflict, two-thirds of the children out of school are girls.[18] This underrepresentation of girls in school has consequences for societies in areas such as health outcomes and overall economic growth,[19] especially as they attempt to rebuild from conflict. Paradoxically, in areas where girls are traditionally excluded from school, crises often open space for girls to be included in emergency education, especially those forms adapted to their needs and availability. Gender equity can therefore be enhanced in and/or around an emergency.

STRUCTURE/CONTENT OF EDUCATIONAL WORK

- A gender equality agenda in education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction addresses personal security concerns, both at and en route to school, the need for adequate hygiene and sanitation facilities in places of learning, lack of female teachers, and different treatment of boys and girls in classrooms. Emphasis can be placed on institutionalizing within government schooling the wider access allowed for girls in emergency situations. Methods of overcoming the cost barriers to girls' education – through the provision of free school materials and textbooks, abolishing fees, as well as providing incentives targeted to girls – are critical, given that families living in poverty frequently prioritize investment in boys' education.

CONNECTION TO OTHER INITIATIVES

- In promoting gender equality within education, the goals of actors in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction overlap with humanitarian and development agendas that seek to promote access to and equity in education in line with EFA and MDG. One challenge is that family survival needs during an emergency still can limit girls' participation in education even when other cultural or economic barriers may be removed.

Child Protection

- Children in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction are doubly vulnerable: as children and as "the grass on which two elephants … engag[e] in combat."[20] In these situations, actors' focus on child rights and protection, as enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, includes education as a central component. Schools, or informal sites of learning, are spaces to access and organize/protect children and ensure that their physical, psychological, and cognitive needs are met.

STRUCTURE/CONTENT OF EDUCATIONAL WORK

- Education programs developed by actors focused on child protection vary in their structure and content. Initiatives will sometimes target already established sites of learning or may seek out children who do not have access to these opportunities and whose protection may be at greater risk. Some programs start with safe space, child protection and psychosocial support, and move toward more formal learning activities over time. Others blend psychosocial and rights content into education curriculum and teaching. One key intervention is strengthening and supporting teachers in their caregiving as well as instructional role.

CONNECTION TO OTHER INITIATIVES

- Child protection is central to humanitarian agendas as it engages all aspects of a child's security including shelter, health, water and sanitation, and food security. Education with child protection is an integrated package that surrounds the child with support.

Education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction, involves the agendas of each of the domains examined above, each of which involves multiple actors including United Nations agencies, national governments, international NGOs (INGOs), national/local NGOs, and members of affected communities. In outlining the stakes of each domain in education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction, areas of overlap are clear. Protecting children, physically and psychologically, for example, is central to all agendas as is an aim to contribute toward achieving EFA and MGD targets.

On the other hand, one substantial and critical difference in priority-setting is evident throughout the domains: Is education in these settings a short-term endeavor, focused on direct service provision usually by outside actors, or is it a long-term endeavor, focused on development of government and institutional capacity? Whether the situation is an emergency, a fragile state, or reconstruction, how much attention is paid to the previous or next steps in education provision and to the actions of other international, national, and local actors in the same or different domains? These priorities need not, of course, be mutually exclusive. The challenge, nevertheless, is to coordinate actions in each domain so as to best serve those children, youth, and communities affected by conflict. It is to this challenge that the paper turns in the next section.

Why is coordination of educational initiatives in the domains of humanitarian assistance, development, fragile states, gender equality, and child protection so hard? Most actors would agree that coordination is a sensible process toward achieving overarching and wide-ranging goals in education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction. However, numerous constraints limit the ability or motivation of the multiple actors in different domains to work together. The first two of these constraints – power and capacity – are generic to all coordination. The second two constraints – priorities and time frame/transitions – relate specifically to the stakes of each domain in education, as outlined above.

Power

It has been well established that teachers from affected communities are often the first actors on the scene in emergency settings. As time goes on, however, and more actors get involved – with their humanitarian, gender equality, or other agendas – these teachers invariably have less and less "power." Power, particularly the power to make decisions and the power over other actors to enforce one's agenda, quickly becomes a central factor in the processes of coordination of education in emergencies, fragile states, or reconstruction. This power is usually tied to funding, which is often

linked to international actors. It allows donors, or the agencies that receive their financial support, to exert their particular agendas motivated by a humanitarian, development, fragile states, gender equality, or child protection approach and to assume an authority over educational coordination processes.[21] Donini identifies this form of coordination as *coordination by command*, which is evidenced as strong leadership "accompanied by some sort of authority, whether carrot or stick"[22] (see text box for a description of Donini's three forms of coordination). This strategy does not adequately account for the fact that accountability to local stakeholders and building mutual respect between international and national actors are critical to providing effective and sustainable international assistance.[23]

Capacity

Lack of capacity also causes problems for coordination. Sometimes relevant stakeholders working in implicated domains will strive for what Donini calls *co-ordination by consensus*, involving leadership by orchestration, which is "achieved without any direct assertion of authority by the coordinator in charge."[24] However, fragile states as well as national and local NGOs often lack the capacity to be part of these collaborations, resulting in authority resting with actors who have the kind of power described above and the domains in which they work dominating the agenda for educational initiatives.

Priorities

Coordination by consensus can also be challenging when priorities differ. As evidenced in the stakes outlined above, actors in different domains are motivated by disparate priorities in their involvement in education in emergencies, fragile states, and reconstruction. Often these priorities are determined by the different phases, such as emergency or care and maintenance, in which actors operate. What most often encumbers coordination are differences of approach between a role that emphasizes immediate action and a role that includes in its current actions consideration for a transition from emergency to development processes, or between a role that focuses on education service-deliv-

---

THREE VISIONS FOR COORDINATION, OUTLINED BY DONINI:

- coordination by consensus: leadership by orchestration, which is "achieved without any direct assertion of authority by the coordinator' in charge";

- coordination by command: strong leadership "accompanied by some sort of authority, whether carrot or stick";

- coordination by default: "absence of a formal coordination entity," resulting in "the most rudimentary exchange of information and division of labour among the actors."

ery and a role that focuses on development of institutional capacity within ministries of education. While attention to both priorities is certainly necessary, a lack of consensus on the activities of each domain in working toward individual priorities or how they fit together, in synthesis or in sequence, often results in duplication of resources and/or gaps in service-provision or capacity-building.

Time Frame/Transitions

A further challenge to coordination by consensus is lack of agreement on the time frame of involvement by actors in each domain or the transition between actors and/or from one form of involvement to another. Sommers quotes an NGO official who says that "[c]oordination with host governments will surely influence the quality of [educational] services down the line, but it can compromise an agency's immediate work because it can be a lengthy time investment."[25] This same conundrum is evident in one of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States: "act fast … but stay engaged e.g. 10 year plans."[26] Acting fast and staying engaged are not mutually exclusive but are different approaches often adopted by separate actors or domains and rarely synthesized into coordinated plans of action. This frequent disconnect between some entities acting fast and some entities investing for the future or some entities acting in the immediate term and others taking over in the extended term can result in what Donini calls *coordination by default*, the "absence of a formal co-ordination entity," resulting in "the most rudimentary exchange of information and division of labour among the actors."[27] In some cases, organizations deliberately withhold information on their plans to enhance the possibility that *they* will gain donor support rather than 'competing' agencies. Sommers suggests that competition between organizations "can be exacerbated and trust further undermined by the policies of donors, particularly when donor actions are uncoordinated," recommend-

ing donor coordination "that emphatically demonstrates inclusion, receptivity to a diversity of national and international actors, and a long time frame."[28] As in the case of divergent priorities, this lack of coordination also results in both duplication and gaps in initiatives.

In the face of these challenges, what are the possibilities for effective coordination among initiatives in domains of humanitarian assistance, development, fragile states, gender equality, and child protection? INEE, among other elements of its policy and coordination standards, advocates coordination meetings that all relevant organizations, in all implicated domains, attend.[29] This strategy certainly eschews a model of coordination by default, but it is not prescriptive about whether coordination takes place through command or consensus. It also does not specify the depth of coordination, most particularly how what happens at meetings gets translated into daily practice. In current situations of emergency, fragile states, and reconstruction, the dynamics of power and capacity between actors and domains mean that certain priorities and vision of time frame are privileged over others. In order to connect and leverage the initiatives, these issues of power and capacity need both to be recognized and addressed through active engagement of stakeholders who are not often at the table or who are silenced even when present. Sommers has proposed training sessions or modules early in an emergency to permit trust-building exchanges between international and national actors, as well as technical training for national education administrators and specialists. He also stresses the need for funding of coordination costs.[30] On-going dialogues, both at the table in coordination meetings and in the field in practice, will likely not result in the need to abandon roles or priorities valued by actors in certain domains but rather in the alignment and integration of these roles

ENDNOTES

1 UNESCO. (2005). *Education: primary education.* Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved December 20, 2005, from http://portal.unesco.org/education

2 DFID. (2001). *Children Out of School.* London: Department for International Development, p.7. Retrieved May 27, 2006, from http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/childrenoutofschool.pdf.

3 UNESCO. (2005). *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2005 - The Quality Imperative.* Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved May 29, 2006, from http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=35939&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

4 See, for example, Sommers, Mark. August 1999. "Emergency Education for Children." Mellon Reports Series. Available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/mellon/1_sommers.html; Triplehorn, Carl. 2001. *The Field Guide for Education Programs in Emergencies.* Wesport, CT: Save the Children. Available at http://ineesite.org/core/SAVE_USA_field_guide.pdf; Sinclair, Margaret. 2002. "Planning education in and after emergencies." *Fundamentals of Educational Planning*, No. 75. Paris: IIEP. Available at http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/Fund73.pdf; Brown, Timothy. "Improving Quality and Attainment in Refugee School: the case of Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal." In UNHCR. January 2002. *Learning for a Better Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries.* Geneva: UNHCR. Available at http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/epau/learningfuture/learning-toc.htm; Nicolai, Susan and Carl Triplehorn. March 2003. "The role of education in protecting children in conflict." *Humanitarian Practice Network.* Available at http://www.odihpn.org/pdfbin/networkpaper042.pdf

5 UNESCO. (2000). *Education For All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments, Strategy 5, Dakar Framework for Action.* Text adopted by the World Education Forum Dakar, Senegal, 26-28 April 2000. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from   http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/dakfram_eng.shtml.

6 See, for example, Betts, A. (2004). 'International cooperation and the targeting of development assistance for refugee solutions: Lessons from the 1980s,' *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Working Paper No. 107, Geneva: UNHCR; Crisp, J. (2001). 'Mind the gap: UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process.' *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Working Paper No. 43, Geneva: UNHCR; UNHCR. (2004). 'Convention Plus: Issues Paper on Targeting of Development Assistance,' Geneva: UNHCR, 2004; UNHCR. (2005). 'Convention Plus at a Glance.' Geneva: UNHCR.

7 OECD. (2005). *Building Partnerships for Progress, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States.* Retrieved May 23, 2006, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.

8 See, for example, USAID. (2005). *Fragile States Strategy.* Washington, DC: USAID. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf.

9 See the INEE website (http://www.ineestie.org) and INEE. (2004). *Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction.* Paris: UNESCO.

10 Nicolai, S. & C. Triplehorn. (2003). *The role of education in protecting children in conflict.* Humanitarian practice network paper. London: Overseas Development Institute, p.16.

11 Berry, Chris, Ali Forder, Sonya Sultan, & Magüi Moreno-Torres. (2004). *Approaches to Improving the Delivery of Social Services in Difficult Environments.* London: DFID, p. 4. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/0/34041738.pdf.

12 INEE. (2004). *Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction.* Paris: UNESCO, p.76.

13 INEE. (2002-2006). *Training and Capacity Building: The Role of the National Government.* Retrieved May 29, 2006, from http://www.ineesite.org/training/government.asp.

14 Chauvet, Lisa & Paul Collier. (2005). *Policy Turnarounds in Failing States* (mimeo). Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics.

15 OECD. (2005). *Building Partnerships for Progress, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States.* Retrieved May 23, 2006, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.

16 USAID. (2005). *Fragile States Strategy.* Washington, DC: USAID, p.1. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf.

17 OECD. (2005). *Building Partnerships for Progress, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States.* Retrieved May 23, 2006, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.

18 UNESCO. (2003). *Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality, 2003.* Paris: UNESCO, pp.128-9. Retrieved May 30, 2006, from http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=23023&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

19 Stromquist, N.P. (2006). Comparative and International Education: A Journey toward Equality and Equity. In *Education for the Millennium: Towards Access, Equity, and Quality* (B. Piper, S. Dryden-Peterson, Y.S. Kim, Eds). Cambridge: Harvard Education Press.

20 Dongala, Emmanuel (translated by Marie Louise Ascher). (2005). Johnny Mad Dog. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

21 Sommers, Marc. (2004). *Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities.* Paris: UNESCO, p.85. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/pubs/136154.pdf.

22 Donini, Antonio. (1996). *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coodrination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*, an occasional paper. Providence, RI: The Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, p. 14.

23 Sommers, Marc (2004). *Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities.* Paris: UNESCO, p.88-90. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/pubs/136154.pdf

24 Ibid.

25 Sommers, Marc. (2004). *Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities*. Paris: UNESCO, p.84. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/pubs/136154.pdf.

26 OECD. (2005). *Building Partnerships for Progress, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States*. Retrieved May 23, 2006, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.

27 Donini, Antonio. (1996). *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coodrination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*, an occasional paper. Providence, RI: The Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, p. 14.

28 Sommers, Marc (2004) *Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities*. Paris: UNESCO, p.90. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/pubs/136154.pdf

29 INEE. (2002-2006). Training and Capacity Building: The Role of United Nations Agencies, Training and Capacity Building: The Role of National Non-governmental Organizations, Training and Capacity Building: The Role of National Government, Training and Capacity Building: The Role of International NGOs. Retrieved May 29, 2006, from http://www.ineesite.org/training/government.asp.

30 Sommers, Marc (2004). *Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities*. Paris: UNESCO, p.94-95. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from

FRAMING PAPER FOR OBJECTIVE #2:

Identifying alternative financing mechanisms that can be used to achieve Education for All goals within emergency and reconstruction contexts.

Lyndsay Bird, Janice Dolan and Susan Nicolai—*Education Advisers, Save the Children*

Prepared for the CIDA-INEE Policy Roundtable on Education in Emergencies, Fragile States and Reconstruction: Addressing Challenges and Exploring Alternatives—New York, June 2006

MISSING OUT:
FINANCING EFA IN EMERGENCIES AND CHRONIC CRISES

1 INTRODUCTION

Two high profile international meetings of 2005 – the G8 Summit and UN Summit – reinforced the world's commitment to tackling poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed in 2000. At the G8, world leaders committed to find an extra US$50 billion required to make the MDGs a reality by 2015, including those on education. Shortly thereafter, the UN Summit pledged "that children in

Conflict Affected Fragile States

To structure this paper's analysis, we have identified a group of countries as Conflict Affected Fragile States (CAFS). With a variety of situations considered an emergency and seen as chronic crisis – caused both by conflicts and natural disasters – it is difficult to define an authoritative list of affected countries. Furthermore, weak governance and large income disparities often intensify the impact of a crisis, and thus need to be factored into any aid analysis. Thus several lists have here been cross-referenced to draw together a list of countries dealing with a combination of these issues.[2] The resulting CAFS do not fit into a regular pattern, although all have some level of conflict present in society.[3]

The CAFS include Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor Leste, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe.

armed conflicts [would] receive timely and effective humanitarian assistance, including education, for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society" (UN, 2005:118).

Emergencies and chronic crises limit countries progress toward Education for All (EFA) and the MDGs. They leave national institutions – including education authorities – in disarray and with decimated capacity. Moreover, weak or lack of political will is also often an issue in such contexts. This paper attempts to analyse the aid resources available to finance education in emergencies and chronic crises by examining the track record of both development and humanitarian aid, reviewing disbursement mechanisms and laying out key challenges.[1]

2. CHANGING AID ENVIRONMENT

Many donors are reluctant to take the associated risks involved in financing education in emergencies or chronic crises. This is true among both development-oriented and humanitarian aid donors. This often is because legitimate governments are not in place to do 'business' with, and assistance is often channelled through traditional emergency agencies and NGOs. However, emergency actors have rarely seen education within their mandates. Such gaps in education and other sectors has meant that there has recently been an upsurge in interest in identifying mechanisms for funding and implementing programmes that can deliver basic services in difficult environments.

Among development actors, this has meant greater attention to countries failing to perform sufficiently well in the areas of economic management, social inclusion, structural policy and public sector management. Sometimes known as fragile states, these countries often receive less aid than poor countries that are perceived to have stronger governance. A study by Levin and Dollar found that fragile states overall received 43 percent less than their entitlement according to population, pover-

ty, policy and institutional performance levels. It also suggested that aid flows to fragile states have been twice as volatile as aid flows to low income countries (McGillavray, 2006: 12). Funding modalities for fragile states in some ways are the reverse of how states considered as 'good performers'[4] are funded; "increasingly, donors have been using selectivity criteria to target their aid towards countries where good policy conditions exist" (Greeley and Rose, 2006: 27).

Among humanitarian actors, there has been increased interest in improved delivery of services within emergency response. Traditionally, there has been a reliance on humanitarian aid not just in acute emergencies but also in protracted crises. For instance, in 2003/04, 34 percent of UK bilateral aid in fragile states was humanitarian, compared to only 11 percent for other recipients. In chronic conflict countries, humanitarian aid is often the dominant form of support over some time. From 1993/94 to 2003/04, UK aid to both Liberia and Somalia was comprised of 73 percent emergency aid and 18 percent technical cooperation (Leader and Colenso, 2005).[5]

3. AID TO EDUCATION IN CAFS [6, 7]

For this paper's analysis, the group of 30 CAFS countries are all recognised as experiencing aspects of conflict and fragility. The majority of the countries are Low Income Countries (LIC) with only four classed as Lower Middle Income Countries[8] (LMIC) according to the World Bank definition[9]. They represent 13 percent of the world's population, and are some of the countries least likely to achieve the MDGs – with only two likely to achieve the universal primary enrolment by 2015[10]. Table 1 indicates the progress of the CAFS on the education MDGs compared to other low income countries (non-CAFS)[11] and developing countries overall.

		CAFS	Other LIC (non-CAFS)	Developing Countries
	Out of school primary age children	43 million	32 million	95 million
MDG2	Net Primary Education Enrolment	67.8%	71.2%	83.2%
MDG3	Primary education female: male enrolment ratio	0.87	0.91	0.95

Education Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries has shown an upward trend, rising from US$5 billion in 1999 to US$8.5 billion in 2004. For the same period education ODA commitments to LIC (non CAFS) doubled from US$1.6 billion to US$3.3 billion and for CAFS increased from less than US$0.6 billion to US$1.4 billion. However Figure 1 below illustrates the consistently low amounts of aid to education in CAFS, compared to other low income (non CAFS). For example, in 2004, of the education aid committed for LIC in total, less than a third was allocated to CAFS.

Figure 1: Education ODA Commitments from 1999 to 2004 (2003 constant US$ billions)

Since 2002, as with education as a whole, ODA to basic education has shown a positive upward trend, as Figure 2 below illustrates. This could be attributed to the MDG commitments and the introduction of the Education For All-Fast Track Initiative (FTI). However, the proportion of education aid going to basic education is still smaller given the expected prioritisation of the sub-sector in light of the MDG commitments and the FTI. From 1999 to 2004, 32 percent of education aid to developing countries is allocated for basic education compared to almost 44 percent in CAFS and 48 percent in LIC (non-CAFS) indicating some prioritisation of basic education in these countries.

Figure 2: Basic Education ODA Commitments from 1999 to 2004 (2003 constant US$ billions)

Overall increases of education ODA are in line with general aid increases in recent years, and also reflect a higher priority amongst donors for funding the education sector. However the actual proportion of ODA committed to education for CAFS is still very low. Between 1999 and 2004 an average of 5 per cent of aid in CAFS was committed to education, compared to 10 per cent for other LIC (non CAFS). In addition, from 1999 to 2004, the average percentage share of total education ODA allocated to CAFS was only 15 percent compared to 33 percent for other LIC (non-CAFS).

Education aid per capita for CAFS is also lower than other LIC (non CAFS) – on average LIC (non-CAFS) received US$3.3 per capita between 1999 and 2003 whilst CAFS received just US$1.6 [13].

Table 2: Comparison of per capita aid to education between CAFS and other low-income countries[14]

	Per capita aid to education (US$) (Annual average 1999 – 2003)
Low-income countries excluding CAFS	3.3
Conflict Affected and Fragile States (CAFS)	1.6

It is acknowledged that generally a higher per-child basic education aid goes to countries with higher completion rates instead of a prioritisation of aid to countries with lower completion rates, and that countries with high numbers of children not in school tend to receive relatively small amounts of aid (FTI Secretariat, 2006). Figure 3 below illustrates that although CAFS are amongst those most off-track to achieve the MDGs, they receive low levels of basic education ODA compared to other countries.

☐ = Conflict Affected Fragile State

Source : ODA: OECD CRS database –Table I; PCR: Unesco Institute for Statistics, Populations: World Bank.
Note : Basic education ODA per child refers to commitments (2003-04) and includes ODA to "Level Unspecified". School age populations are based on national cycles.

Along with ensuring that aid is going to those countries with the greatest need, there should also be an increase in the overall levels of aid for education. This is especially true for CAFS. It is difficult to calculate the exact amount of additional aid needed to enable CAFS to achieve Universal Primary Education, however an estimate can be made by using the original country data from the World Bank study carried out by Bruns et al.

(2003)[15]. In this study Bruns et al estimated the external funding gap to achieve EFA in low-income countries, and 58 percent of the figure they proposed needed to be allocated to CAFS as a proportion of low-income countries. The external funding gap estimated by Bruns et al in 2003 has since been scaled up by UNESCO and DFID (DFID, 2005), to become the globally accepted financing gap figure of US$10 bil-

lion. Therefore on the basis that 58 per cent of the external funding gap should be allocated to CAFS, it is suggested the amount that the proportion of the US$10 billion that should be allocated to CAFS amounts to US$5.8 billion per year. This is therefore just over half of the additional US$10 billion per year in aid needed in order to achieve the education MDGs.

Fast Track Initiative and fragile states

Launched in 2002, the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is one of the main international mechanisms for mobilising funds for education. To receive FTI-endorsement countries must have a poverty reduction strategy plan (PRSP) or equivalent in place with a credible education sector plan. Funding can then be obtained either via in-country donors or for countries with few donors, via the Catalytic Fund which provides transitional funding until more donors come on board.[16] In addition, the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) supports technical assistance to help countries prepare and implement a sound education plan.

The FTI has galvanised support for education internationally, with the G8 and others endorsing it as the main mechanism for increasing funds for education. However, it has not always lived up to expectations:

- To date only 20 countries have been FTI-endorsed with 14 eligible for Catalytic Funding

- The Catalytic Fund has seen much lower disbursements than commitments. 91 percent of all 2003/04 funds were disbursed that year, but only 55 percent of 2005 funds were disbursed during 2005.

- The financing needs of the 20 FTI endorsed countries have not been met. For the 14 Catalytic Fund countries, the financing gap is US$1.1 billion whilst pledges total only US$0.2 billion (FTI Secretariat 2006a).

54 countries are said to have benefited from the EPDF[17] with a total of US$1.5 million of the US$ 4.9 million granted being disbursed by March 2006 (FTI Secretariat 2006d). 19 CAFS have benefited from the EPDF; however, by nature of needing a PRSP or equivalent and an education sector plan to receive an FTI endorsement, many CAFS have to date been excluded from full FTI endorsement. Despite this and the above concerns, it is expected that by the end of 2008 there could be a total of 60 FTI endorsed countries.

The November 2005 FTI Partnership meeting in Beijing supported the notion that FTI should develop its capacity to support fragile states. There is a general consensus that the EPDF may provide a mechanism to support fragile states to develop education sector programs. An FTI task team on fragile states is thus exploring: (a) the modalities by which the EPDF can assist in this regard, (b) the possible roles of UNICEF and UNESCO, as well as (c) changes that may be needed in the FTI framework to facilitate service delivery through other channels, for example, through non-state actors.

Humanitarian funding is to some extent captured within overall ODA, however, there is a separate attempt to record emergency-oriented funding through OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS).[18] With humanitarian aid being a major form of support in both acute and protracted crises, many of which are found in CAFS, it is useful to look at the extent that this funding covers education.

As a precursor, it is important to note that one of the most significant issues in relation to humanitarian aid is an overall lack of resources. For example, on average, the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) contributions only are funded to cover two-thirds of the total humanitarian appeal.[19] The question of how to prioritise funding thus becomes a daily dilemma of humanitarian donors. While all humanitarian needs are under funded, education is particularly so.

This is within the context of education already being a relatively small sector within humanitarian aid, at least in financial terms. Within reported contributions on all CAPs, education comprises just 2 percent. However, when acute crises are separated out and one looks just at protracted crisis, the education total rises slightly to 4 percent of total (Randel et al, 2004).

Over the past seven years the number of humanitarian contributions has begun to rise, thus showing some increased attention to education by humanitarian actors.

Table 3: Evolution of reported humanitarian education funding 1999-2006

EDUCATION:

Total contributions		
1999	763,467	(4 contr.)
2000	17,965,182	(71 contr.)
2001	30,948,027	(140 contr.)
2002	96,281,877	(187 contr.)
2003	125,229,063	(175 contr.)
2004	66,782,252	(160 contr.)
2005	233,881,444	(139 contr.)
2006	34,376,102	(63 contr.)

Source: *OCHA Financial Tracking Service*

This growth in education contributions falls short of education needs identified in appeals, and significantly short in comparison to coverage of other sectors. In a review of FTS archives and summary reports, education requirements versus contributions between 2001-2005 averaged at only 42 percent coverage. This is set against 66 percent coverage for all sectors.

Table 4: CAP appeals vs. contributions 2001-2006

Year	Total coverage	Education sector coverage
2001	55 percent	29 percent
2002 [20]	67 percent	53 percent
2003	76 percent	36 percent
2004	64 percent	28 percent
2005 [21]	66 percent	66 percent
2006 (to date)	31 percent	6 percent

Source: *OCHA Financial Tracking Service*

There are a range of mechanisms used at inter-agency or multilateral levels to identify and at times fund education in humanitarian situations. Although the majority of humanitarian aid is project-based, it is worth outlining several of these inter-agency frameworks for their role in donor harmonisation and potential to support scale up of education aid. These mechanisms are useful to strengthen co-ordination, and at times pool funds.

- Joint Assessment Missions (JAM), conducted by multiple donors, are often an early step after a peace agreement. Funding is then committed through donor conferences. Education is nearly always included in a JAM, for example in Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq.

- The UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) lays out a set of project requests annually by UN agencies (and more recently NGOs) for response in emergency-affected countries. Aid is then committed bilaterally. Education is included in CAPs as a standard sector, and typically coordinated through UNICEF.

- Emergency and post-conflict Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTF) can be set up to support either reconstruction or recurrent costs. Trust funds in West Bank and Gaza and East Timor each paid teachers for several years, as well as funding school

reconstruction and other education system costs.

- The World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund was established in 1998 and by 2005 had approved US$61.5 million. In Afghanistan, the fund committed US$15 million to education. Other education support has fallen under 'social services', for example in DRC and Sri Lanka.

- The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), approved by the UN General Assembly at end 2005, is meant to make rapid response funds available to both UN agencies and NGOs. As of mid-May 2005, US$261 million was pledged, with a target of US$500 million total. Guidelines specify that for protracted crises, the CERF will fund under-funded crises for life saving interventions; it is unclear if education will be considered as a response sector by this fund.

Two additional frameworks are being discussed in education circles. The first is an education cluster, which in principle would increase predictability and establish accountability for education humanitarian response, with the possibility of attached funding.[22] The second is an Education Sector Transitional Trust Fund, proposed by Greeley and Rose (2006) as a systematic way to align donor support to national strategies in emergency and fragile states.

Actual disbursements of aid to education, like commitments, have shown a sharp increase between 2002 and 2004 jumping from approximately US$1.8 billion to US$4.6 billion.[23] Disbursements to education in CAFS show a rising trend in line with that of education disbursements to developing countries, and have tripled from approximately US$0.2 billion to US$0.6 billion for the same period.

In reality, however, the behaviour of many donors has been to promise aid and make commitments but then either disburse this money late, or not in its full amount. Whilst this is true for all developing countries, the various aspects of fragility or conflict further exacerbate it. The low ratio between commitments and disbursement provides evidence of this. For example, of the bilateral education aid committed to CAFS from 2002 to 2004, only 56 percent is recorded as being disbursed compared to 65 percent for developing countries. This could be partly explained by multi-year commitments although it also may indicate some absorptive capacity problems in the education sector (FTI Secretariat 2006b). The issue of absorptive capacity is a major factor of consideration in which channels to use for disbursement.

There are several possible channels for disbursement of aid; however, the majority of these mechanisms favour disbursement in stable countries with at least minimum levels of good governance. This can complicate the support for education in emergencies and chronic crises. A brief overview of the various mechanisms is provided below.

Direct budget support provides un-earmarked money directly into a national budget. Despite a supposed move towards this approach, particularly for 'good performers', few donors provide more than 25 percent of their ODA via budget support. This type of disbursement is rarely used in emergencies or fragile states due to low public expenditure management capacity. Rwanda and Sierra Leone are rare examples of countries that run counter to this trend, having received a small level of direct budget support in early post-conflict. One review suggests that 15-25 percent of this general budget support typically benefits education, with 50 percent of that going to primary education. Thus, support to primary education can be averaged at 10 percent of all budget support (FTI Secretariat, 2006).

- With sector budget support, funding is earmarked for a specific sector such as education. Donors agree a sector development plan, and align funds and technical support behind it. Donors may use a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) to harmonise their resources (financial and technical) to a particular sector. However, sector budget support does not necessarily ensure that the funds are additional to a sector's budget. This approach was planned in the occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) following production of their 2000-2005 Education Five-Year Plan, but poorly implemented as the humanitarian crisis escalated after 2001.

- Individual projects are the most typical disbursement mechanism in general. Funds are given either to state or non-state actors to deliver a specific service or complete a task. Projects can provide opportunities for innovation not possible under direct or sector budget support. However, there is criticism that projects are over-used, may duplicate existing processes, add bureaucratic burden and rarely finance recurrent costs. There are numerous examples of education sector projects, particularly in emergency settings. One larger scale project has been in South Sudan, where in 2003 an NGO consortium was funded to support education system development, particularly teacher training and infrastructure.

- Finally, community funds (or social protection funds) are established within, or parallel to government structures with the intent of disbursing money directly to communities to determine how to use. This support is not necessarily free for communities, which may be required to provide matching support, particularly in kind (i.e. labour). The World Bank is increasingly supporting governments to implement community funds. In both post-conflict Rwanda and Timor Leste, communities used these funds to

finance the purchase of education inputs and build schools. Funds have also been used more generally

to alleviate poverty thereby increasing access to schooling.

6. CHALLENGES

The issue of inadequate funding to education in emergencies and chronic crises is clearly central. Other major challenges include continuity of funding, accountability and effectiveness, as well as scaling up and capacity building.

Increased funding

A major issue in delivery of education in emergencies, chronic crises and reconstruction contexts is that there are not enough funds. This is true of education in developing countries as a whole and, as illustrated above, is a critical issue for agencies and donors concerned with education in emergencies and chronic crises. Therefore the first and most critical issue is the sheer inadequacy of the current aid allocation. Reasons for the current situation can be associated with not enough aid in general being available, donors unwilling to take risks in difficult environments as well as the inability of the donor community to determine the most appropriate financing mechanisms that will enable the effective use of funds.

Continuity of funding

During an acute emergency, humanitarian aid is typically provided through rapid, short term funding mechanisms, many of which rely heavily on NGOs/non-state actors to deliver basic services. To ensure continuity of funding on service delivery, better transitioning of funding modalities needs to be in place between emergency and development phases. Furthermore, because CAFS can suffer from very low or weak capacity and are further from achieving the MDGs than other countries, aid flows need to be longer term than in other developing countries. They require increased capacity in order to build stronger and more sustainable institutions. As relief efforts subside, discontinuities of funding, inattentiveness to ministry financing norms and limited support for mainstreaming remain challenges.

Accountability and effectiveness

There is little real accountability in education delivery in conflict or disaster-affected communities, partly due to lack of capacity by an equally affected civil society. The most systematic attempt to introduce accountability for delivery of education services are the INEE Minimum Standards, which cover a range of education issues and in relation to financing, provide a guidance note stating:

> *Sufficient funds are required for successful and timely implementation of education programmes in emergencies. Every effort should be made to ensure transparent and coordinated approaches to financing, especially where salary payment systems for teacher compensation are inadequate or non-functional. Emergency financing arrangements should take into consideration local labour market conditions and traditions and should avoid setting precedents that cannot be sustained (INEE, 2004: 78).*

However, there is a challenge in meeting this benchmark, in that no one actor can be held to account for its delivery.

Scaling up and capacity building

A major challenge in education provision in emergencies and chronic crises is the need to scale up to reach large numbers of children. This is a challenge for governments as duty bearers, as well as for NGOs looking to bring successful innovation to scale. Given that in the long-term a stable government should be the focal point for managing the scaling-up of aid flows, it is important that parallel systems are not created if funds are temporarily channelled through NGOs and other non-state actors, but rather state capacity is strengthened at the same time as non-state actors being a temporary channel for funds. Capacity building of education authorities at all levels is critical to system renewal, to develop quality education that does not replicate weakne

1 This paper represents an early stage in on going Save the Children work on financing for education in countries in crisis. Discussion at the 22 June round-table will be used to refine methodologies and guide further analysis.

2 CAFS countries appear on at least two of the following: (1) Project Ploughshare list of states having experienced at least one armed conflict during the period 1995-2004, (2) the Failed States Index 2006 (with scores above 90) published by Foreign Policy magazine and Fund for Peace, which assesses violent internal conflicts and measures mitigating strategies, or (3) the World Bank LICUS group 2004, comprised of countries in the lowest two quintiles of the Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA). Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia and Timor-Leste are not rated, but would likely have fallen in these lower quintiles and are therefore included.

3 None of the lists used overtly looks at prevalence of natural disasters as a filter, thus the CAFS analysis uses more of a conflict lens. However, emergency education response to natural disasters is included in the discussions on humanitarian funding.

4 'Good performers' as according to the World Bank's CPIA scores, based on assessments of each country's governance as well as its economic, structural, social, and public reform policies

5 However, greater amounts of aid appear to be directed to post-conflict countries rather than those with on-going conflict. Between 1994 and 2004 chronic crisis countries received 14 percent less aid per capita than post-conflict countries (World Bank, 2004).

6 The analysis of aid to CAFS presented is based on data from the OECD DAC On-line Database on Aid Activities, which includes both DAC members' official statistical reporting to the OECD as well as that of international organisations. Data presented in this paper analyses aid commitments since 1999 and disbursements since 2002, the years from which OECD states that the database is virtually complete for each activity. We would like to acknowledge and thank Victoria Perry for her support in the analysis of the OECD DAC On-line Database.

7 Budget support is not included in any of the analysis of aid commitments and disbursements. As only a few CAFS have received budget support, calculating education contributions as 10% of budget support would have negligible impact on the analysis. For LIC (non CAFS) however contributions to education through budget support are likely to be more significant and therefore could slightly increase aid commitments and disbursements for these countries.

8 Angola, Colombia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka.

9 The World Bank classifies economies by income groups according to 2004 gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, US$825 or less; lower middle income US$ 826 – 3,255; upper middle income, US$3,256 – 10,065; and high income, US$10,066 or more.

10 The UNESCO 2006 EFA Global Monitoring Report classes 8 (Burundi, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Myanmar, Zimbabwe) out of the 30 CAFS as at low chance of achieving the goal, one (Papua New Guinea) at serious risk of not achieving the goal., and two (Cambodia and Colombia) as having a high chance of achieving the goal. For the other countries the data was not available to make projections as to whether they would achieve UPE by 2015.

11 For purposes of comparison, CAFS will be compared to the group of LIC as classified by the World Bank excluding the CAFS. There are 59 countries classed as low income, of which 26 of them are CAFS. The remaining 33 countries are Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, India, Kenya, Dem Rep. of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.

12 Data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS 2005) for CAFS and LIC (non-CAFS) and the UNESCO 2006 EFA Global Monitoring Report for Developing Countries

13 There are however variations in the amount of aid per capita countries are receiving – for CAFS 2 countries (Papua New Guinea, and Timor Leste) receiving more than US$5 whilst most countries (18) countries received less than US$1. For LIC (non-CAFS) 7 countries received more than US$5 and 12 countries received less than US$1.

14 Data from the 2006 EFA Global Monitoring Report

15 Although many studies have been carried out on the cost of achieving UPE, the Bruns et al (2003) is the only study to estimate the external financing gap as a proportion of the total additional costs needed to achieve UPE.

16 Countries with less than 4 donors in country can qualify for Catalytic Funding. These countries are often referred to as donor orphans.

17 28 country programs have received support from the EPDF since it began a year ago. An additional 26 African country programs received support from the Norwegian Education Trust Fund, which was the precursor and model for the EPDF (FTI Secretariat 2006d).

18 The FTS is a global, real-time database which records all reported international humanitarian aid (including that for NGOs and the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations). FTS features a special focus on consolidated and flash appeals, because they cover the major humanitarian crises and because their funding requirements are well defined – which allows FTS to indicate to what extent populations in crisis receive humanitarian aid in proportion to needs. http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx.

19 The Consolidated Appeals Process is the humanitarian sector's main tool for coordination, strategic planning and programming. On average, since 1992, CAPs have sought $3.1 billion per year, and received $2.1 billion per year (68%) (OCHA, 2006).

20 2002 CAPs included a large appeal for Afghanistan, where education was already a fairly well developed sector.

21 2005 numbers are skewed due to the large Tsunami Appeal and available funds, which increased percentage coverage of all appeals and drastically increased percentage coverage of education sector coverage

22 In December 2005, UNICEF brought a proposal to the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC), in which they would formally take the lead on a cluster for education in humanitarian response. The IASC decided to postpone the decision reportedly for two reasons; clusters were still at the pilot stage and UNICEF was already seen as the de-facto lead for education.

23 This is total disbursement for ODA to education on the OECD-DAC database, however only disbursements from DAC countries, the EC and UNICEF are recorded.

REFERENCES

Development Initiatives (2003). *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003.*

DfID (2005) *From Commitment to Action: Education* London: Department for International Development

DfID (2006). *Keeping our promises: delivering Education for All.* UK Department for International Development

EFA Global Monitoring Report (2005) *Education for All Literacy for Life*

FTI Secretariat (2006a). Catalytic Fund Status Report Update, March 2006. FTI Secretariat, Washington DC.

FTI Secretariat (2006b). Education For All Fast Track Initiative Analysis of Official Development Assistance: Draft. FTI Secretariat, Washington DC.

FTI Secretariat (2006c). Fast Track Initiative Technical Meeting Overview, March 13-15, 2006, Moscow. FTI Secretariat, Washington DC.

FTI Secretariat (2006d). Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) Status Report Update, March 2006, Moscow. FTI Secretariat, Washington DC.

Global Policy (2006). Aid instruments in fragile states: making the right choices.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/oda/2006/0208fragile.htm

Greeley, M. and Rose, P (2006). *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice.* Fragile States Group, OECD.

Leader, N. and Colenso, P. (2005). *Aid Instruments in Fragile States.* PRDE Working Paper 5 - March. Policy division, UK Department for International Development.

McGillivary, M. (2005). *Aid Allocation and Fragile States.* World Institute for Development Economics Research, Finland. Background Paper for the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States 13-14 January 2005, Lancaster House, London.

OCHA (2006). *The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).*
http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2005/webpage.asp?Nav=_about_en&Site=_about&Lang=en.

Randel, J., Cordeiro, M. and Mowjee, T, (2004). *Financing Countries in protracted humanitarian crisis: an overview of new instruments and existing aid flows.* In eds. Harmer, A. and Macrae, J. Beyond the Continuum: The changing role of aid policy in protracted crisis. London: ODI Humanitarian Policy Group.

Save the Children (2006). *The Role of Donors in Creating Aid Volatility and How to Reduce It.* Independent Research Undertaken for Save the Children, UK

Torres, M. and Anderson, M. (2004) *Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction* PRDE Working Paper 1, Policy division, UK Department for International Development

UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) (2005), Children Out of School: Measuring Exclusion from Primary Education, Montreal, UNESCO Institute for Statistics

UN (2005). *2005 World Summit Outcome.* UN General Assembly, A/RES/60/1, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement.

World Bank (2004). *"Making aid work in fragile states" case studies of effective aid-financed programs.*

World Bank (2005). *Engaging Civil Society Organizations in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States: Three African Country Case Studies.*

World Bank (2004). *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda*

FRAMING PAPER FOR OBJECTIVE 3:

Examine the ways in which the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction can be used by donors and other stakeholders to support their work in education.

Jackie Kirk, PhD—*The International Rescue Committee, McGill University*

Prepared for the CIDA-INEE Policy Roundtable on Education in Emergencies, Fragile States and Reconstruction: Addressing Challenges and Exploring Alternatives—New York, June 2006

This paper aims to examine the ways in which the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction can be used by donors and other stakeholders to support their work in education, and to identify the most pressing challenges that confront donors today (within the context of using the INEE Minimum Standards).

1. INTRODUCTION: THE INEE MINIMUM STANDARDS STORY SO FAR

Background

Child-oriented humanitarian agencies like CARE, the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and the Norwegian Refugee Council have included emergency education programs for children since the 1990s with support of humanitarian donors like UNHCR and UNICEF. Advocates of child protection and the right to education within these agencies recognized that there was little coordination of these efforts, limited funding and no solid foundation of accepted good practice on which to base their interventions. Ensuring quality education programs in challenging circumstances was an issue of common concern. Also important, however, was the need to link improved quality and accountability to advocacy; for many donors, education was not seen as a humanitarian response priority, and funding for it was often hard to secure.

The development of the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction initiative was prioritized by the early members of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), which was established in late 2000. The Sphere project was a model with potential to mainstream education into humanitarian response – thereby securing increased funding - and to increase the levels of quality, access and accountability within emergency education programming.

The Sphere Standards

The Sphere project was launched in 1997 as a collaborative effort of various humanitarian NGOs and the Red Crescent and Red Cross movements to strengthen the quality and accountability of humanitarian assistance in response to the failures and criticisms of the humanitarian response in Rwanda in 1994. Built upon

the Humanitarian Charter, the Sphere handbook codified a set of human rights and humanitarian assistance principles[1] articulated through a set of minimum standards and indicators for emergency assistance in four priority sectors: water & sanitation, food security, nutrition & food aid, shelter, settlement & non-food items and health. In addition, a category of minimum standards common to all sectors addresses participation, assessment, monitoring and evaluation, competencies of and support for humanitarian workers. Through global training and dissemination efforts, Sphere standards are now widely accepted and used as guidelines for humanitarian response.

INEE Minimum Standards Development

Education was not included within the Sphere framework, but INEE recognized the potential significance of standards for the sector. Therefore, in 2003 a Working Group on Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies was established by 13 INEE member organizations.[2]

Over the course of 18 months, 2250 individuals from 50 countries shaped and refined the INEE Minimum Standards in a highly consultative international process. Since the launch in December 2004, interest and demand have been high. Over 17,000 copies of the handbook have been distributed worldwide and it has been translated into seven languages, with others planned. Adoption and implementation processes are underway and during 2006, INEE is facilitating a series of nine regional Trainings of Trainers to prepare 225 INEE Minimum Standards trainers. These trainers will in turn train thousands of humanitarian and education workers over the following year, strengthening the capacity of global, regional, national and local level workers to provide the psychosocial, cognitive and physical protection that quality education in emergencies can afford to communities in crisis and the coordinated, holistic response needed to lay a solid and sound basis for post-conflict and disaster reconstruction.

Informal feedback and documentation on Minimum Standards dissemination and implementation indicate that they are particularly useful in relation to:

- Improved coordination between agencies and organizations
- Developing a common language and shared visions between different stakeholders, including members of affected communities and governments
- Project design and log frame development
- Assessment design and process
- Project monitoring and evaluation
- Training and capacity building for students, educators, agency staff as well as for ministry of education personnel
- Emphasizing a gender equality focus
- Advocacy to promote education as a priority humanitarian response

More detailed reports now document use and impact of the INEE Minimum Standards in the field in recent crises. For example, in Aceh three INEE member organizations (the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and UNICEF) distributed the INEE Minimum Standards handbook to their staff at the outset of the emergency response, and the framework acted as a guide to program development within each agency, as well as facilitating coordination between the larger group of agencies on the ground. The handbook was translated into Bahasa Indonesian and shared with the Aceh Provincial Ministry of Education. This facilitated acceptance of the Minimum Standards and their use as a common framework to promote coordination and quality programming. In-depth discussions from the outset of the response on how to best utilize this tool within the local context is described as having led to more effective emergency education responses, which at the same time were laying the foundations for long-term quality improvement in education (Anderson & Brooks, 2005). This report also points to the need for staff to be familiar with the Standards through training, especially given high turn-over rates in crisis situations, which was also found in an initial baseline study of Minimum Standards implementation in conflict-affected areas of northern Uganda. The research in northern Uganda indicates that staff from the different agencies are generally at an *awareness level* of Minimum Standards implementation; that is, they have received training or through some other sensitiza-

tion activity have learned about them, but have not yet started to fully apply the Minimum Standards in their programming. Some have, however, started to use them as an informal checklist for program implementation or monitoring (Sullivan-Owomoyela, 2006).

To date there have been only three short reports to INEE on Minimum Standards implementation from donors. A JICA representative, Nobuko Kayahima, has indicated that her agency is looking at how to use the Minimum Standards in education projects in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and DRC. Maysa Jalbout of CIDA describes in more detail how the Minimum Standards have been both a reference document and an advocacy tool, resulting in a specific focus on education in emergencies within the Government of Canada's International Policy Statement. This has since been translated into a focus on education in conflict, post-conflict and/or emergency situations as one of four strategic areas within basic education (See: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/ acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-2107401-GV3). John Hatch reported that USAID used the Standards as part of the process of developing an assessment tool regarding the role that education can play in fragile states and that they have also served an advocacy function to put education on the map as part of USAID responses to crisis situations.

Despite these positive developments within the context of the INEE Minimum Standards, the need for emergency education and protection for children and youth remains critical. Post-conflict and early reconstruction contexts pose different challenges. Peace is often fragile, and the influx of returnees, high expectations of the social and economic dividends of peace, low institutional and government capacities to (re)-establish services and manage such transitions constitute significant risks of continued instability. Under these circumstances, the transition from emergency programs to institutionalized education requires time, funding and capacity.

According to the informal feedback from INEE members, in these types of settings, the Minimum Standards are starting to provide a more consistent framework for planning, implementing and evaluating emergency education interventions, and to form a more solid basis for advocacy and action to donors and policy-makers.

In some locations this is more explicit than others. In Pakistan, for example, the Early Recovery Plan, launched jointly by the government-appointed Earthquake Reconstruction and Recovery Authority, ERRA, and the UN states that:

"All education programmes outlined will be coordinated through ERRA. Programmes in the affected areas will be implemented within the framework of the Minimum Standards of Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction, and will take place under the overall supervision and coordination of the necessary provincial/district and local authorities, including Department of Education, implementing partners and other government and rural development institutions" (ERRA & IASC Country Team, 2006, p 11).

Recent donor policy developments include: a new USAID education strategy which includes reference to supporting education in crisis settings (USAID, 2005); as part of CIDA's strategic directions for basic education, education in conflict, post-conflict and/or emergency situations is highlighted as one of the four strategic areas (2005); the Australian government's white paper on international aid also sets a new expanded framework for AusAID's work in both education and humanitarian assistance (Australian Government, 2006). The World Bank document, "Reshaping the Future: Education and Postconflict Reconstruction" is significant in that it highlights the importance of education in post-conflict reconstruction and makes the argument for early education interventions as critical to peacebuilding efforts. Norway's strategy for achieving Education for All by 2015, as outlined in the 2003 strategy paper, "Education –Job Number 1" commits

Norway to supporting efforts, "to ensure that education is provided in emergencies and from day one in post-war rehabilitation situations" (MFA, 2003, p3). The paper "Education in Conflict and Emergencies" by the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) refers to INEE and the Minimum Standards as key resources (NORAD, 2005). DfID's latest Education policy document highlights both the need for and the challenges of education in Fragile States (DfID, 2006).

Fragile States Policies

Fragile states pose a critical and timely challenge for international assistance, and policies, papers and guidelines on them have been developed by DfID, CIDA, USAID and AusAID. DfID's "Keeping our promises: Delivering Education for All" (2006) report highlights the "massive" education needs in fragile states, and asserts that "a significant push from international agencies is needed if the MDGs on education and gender equality are to be met".

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has created a Fragile States Working Group focused on the key challenges of service delivery, policy coherence and aid allocation to fragile states. Education was selected as a service delivery topic, and a sector-specific paper was developed (Rose & Greeley, 2006). The aim of this work is to provide practical and relevant guidance to both donors and affected countries on how to improve service delivery in fragile states within an overall framework of "Principles for Good International Engagement" (see http://www.oecd.org/dac). Connected through the INEE network and equipped with the collaboratively developed INEE Minimum Standards, the education sector has some useful tools for working in fragile states. With the experience of the INEE Minimum Standards development and now increasing experiences of members in applying these Standards in different locations, INEE has much to contribute to a global, multi-sectoral process of principles development. At the same time, it will be important for INEE to advocate for coherency between DAC and the INEE Minimum Standards, with a strong emphasis on key issues within the Standards, such as community participation, gender equality, child protection and well-being and the provision of psychosocial support.

Increased Attention to Measurability and Accountability

Also significant are the multiple reform efforts underway to increase measurability and accountability in humanitarian action and thereby address concerns about speed and quality of international response to crises. There is increasing pressure for governments, donors, and agencies to account for and to ensure that the money dedicated to emergency relief is used effectively. Recent reports of abuse and exploitation by aid workers, especially in refugee camps, only increase the pressure to ensure that humanitarian actions have positive impacts and mitigate the suffering of the most vulnerable.

One example is the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, established in 2003, which brought together donor countries,[3] UN agencies, NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to agree on a set of 23 principles of good practice. This is an ongoing project with reviews and action plans developed on a yearly basis (see: http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/). However, this initiative does not yet have strong links to INEE or the INEE Minimum Standards, which is an issue for future INEE advocacy.

The new IASC Cluster system for coordinating humanitarian response across UN agencies is another accountability and reform effort, which was operationalized for the first time within the Pakistan earthquake response in October 2005. The Cluster system, with the assignment of lead coordinator responsibilities in each sector to different UN agencies, aims to improve the predictability and accountability of the humanitarian response system. It was a recommendation taken up the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) commissioned by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland in late 2004 (See http://www.icva.ch/files/hrrfinal.pdf). While an education cluster on the ground in the Pakistan earthquake response has produced positive results, as of June 2006, there is no education cluster within the global IASC framework.

Whilst the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative and the Cluster system address the principles and

processes of humanitarian action and accountability, apart from the Sphere standards, there are no standardized and collectively agreed-upon measures for, for example, quantifying the coverage of humanitarian assistance for an affected population.

DfID's initiative to define new benchmarks is being further developed through the SMART initiative (Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition) supported by USAID and CIDA, with participation of UN agencies and international NGOs which aims to standardize the way in which key emergency-related data are collected.
(See http://www.smartindicators.org).[4]

Complementary to, and to some extent a part of, such initiatives, individual agencies and consortia are also making efforts to expand and improve their own monitoring and evaluation processes, data collection methods, and databases to ensure that emergency programs are designed and implemented for maximum impact, effectiveness and quality. Such initiatives also help agencies to more clearly and precisely demonstrate their accountability to beneficiaries, donors, governments and consortia or Cluster members. Within this context of increased attention to accountability and measurability at all levels, the INEE Minimum Standards provide timely guidance.

3. POTENTIAL OF THE INEE MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR DONORS

Current efforts are currently focused on initial training and dissemination, and evidence of the use and impact of the INEE Minimum Standards is just emerging. Therefore, the following section suggests programming, internal and external policy development and advocacy areas where the INEE Minimum Standards can support donors' efforts to improve education and protection for children affected by crises.

To Improve Internal Coordination

One of the difficulties identified in the early days of INEE was that education in emergencies often 'fell through the gap'. This falling through the gap happens at different levels, including within agencies. Education advisers are not usually involved with emergency response programs, and are more focused on a 'regular' program of development projects in more stable contexts. Emergency response team members generally have little awareness about education's role in humanitarian action and do not have education-related skills. As separate units or sections within agencies, there is often little discussion or collaboration between the two. There are further divisions operating within large agencies and which can be brought together around the Standards; for example, HQ/field and geographical divisions (eg country desks; regional branches). The INEE Minimum Standards handbook therefore, is a tool to promote collaboration and coordination between departments within large agencies. The

Standards recognize the importance of education sector-specific issues such as the role of communities, of parents and teachers; the importance of curriculum choices; of the certification of teachers and students; of teaching methodologies; and teacher training and support, for example. These issues are familiar to education professionals within the agencies and will be issues on which they should feel able to work. At the same time, the Standards also fully acknowledge and address the particular dimensions and dynamics of humanitarian aid and include elements familiar to humanitarian response/emergency units, such as initial assessments, coordination mechanisms, school feeding programs, as well as a specific emphasis on the psychosocial well-being of students and teachers. Furthermore, the child protection components of the INEE Minimum Standards provide an entry point for child protection specialists within agencies to see the spaces within the field of education in emergencies for their support, expertise and collaboration. Internal coordination and collaboration on specific issues facilitate internal advocacy and also, it is hoped, can lead to increased funding possibilities through existing channels, and to internal advocacy for increased allocations to education in emergencies.

One very concrete example to illustrate this point is an initial training day on the INEE Minimum Standards held at CIDA in February 2005, co-hosted by CIDA

and the Children and Armed Conflict Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC). This event brought together staff from a number of different units within CIDA: education advisers and staff from various geographical branches; the Policy Branch (including education, gender equality, child rights and child protection specialists); the Humanitarian Assistance and Food Aid Division; and the Multilateral Program Branch's Peace and Security Unit (PSEC). Country desk officers of conflict and crisis-affected countries also attended. Such a gathering was unique within the agency, and it was acknowledged that this sort of cross-agency and multi-sectoral response is necessary in order to ensure quality education for children affected by emergencies.

To Develop Policy

The INEE Minimum Standards provide a framework around which donors may develop their own education in emergencies policies, or link education and child protection foci within wider humanitarian aid policy frameworks. This helps to ensure that policy promotes international rights and treaty agreements, because the INEE Minimum Standards are built upon and thus aligned with international conventions and agreements to which donor countries are committed (such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); Education for All and Millennium Development Goals (2000); the Geneva Refugee Convention (1951); CEDAW (1979)). They are rights-based in their approach, with human and children's rights and gender equality as cross-cutting themes. Although there are differences in the extent to which donors explicitly promote rights-based programming, most adhere to a broad rights-based framework which means that adoption of the INEE Minimum Standards does not imply any major shifts in approach, and should be relatively easy to integrate into overarching policy frameworks.

As a Tool for Internal Advocacy

For donor staff working in education and/or humanitarian response, internal advocacy may be required before a stage of policy development on education in emergencies is ever reached. This advocacy should reach out to other operations and non-program / policy units of the agency, such as finance and logistics.

The INEE Minimum Standards support such internal advocacy in that they are a concrete demonstration of education's position as a humanitarian sector, and of the important role education plays in times of crisis. The INEE Minimum Standards describe the field, anchor practice to rights and policy norms, focus on the specific educational needs of children, teachers and other education personnel in times of crisis, and provide a synthesis of widely accepted good practice.

Internal advocacy and policy development should be oriented to increased funding allocations to education in humanitarian contexts. Despite improvements, this is still critical, especially in the case of chronic fragile states and arrested development contexts.[5]

To Promote Quality in Donor-funded Programs

As policies are operationalized and funding and programs come on line, donors can use the INEE Minimum Standards as guidelines for program development and quality assurance. Results-based frameworks are widely used to ensure that projects meet established targets and have the desired impacts (e.g. the previous section highlighted some of the broader initiatives aimed at improving quality in humanitarian action). The INEE Minimum Standards provide a practical framework and detailed good practice guidelines that donor agency staff at all levels can readily use to promote quality and assess performance at the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages of education program development. This is especially important where funding and programming for education in emergencies is relatively new, and there may be limited 'in house' expertise, tools or frameworks to guide and monitor programming.

The indicators in the INEE Minimum Standards are meant to be adapted to each specific context and thus provide the starting point for results matrices, for performance monitoring plans and monitoring and evaluation plans. In addition to promoting the use of the INEE Minimum Standards to implementing partners through, for example, writing INEE Minimum Standards implementation into initial calls for proposals or grant criteria, donor staff can use them as a guide for monitoring visits, reviewing reports and developing formative and summative evaluation frameworks.

To Promote Accountability

Used as suggested above, the INEE Minimum Standards and indicators also provide an accountability mechanism at all levels from the field up. Donor proposal guidelines often refer to "minimum standards such as Sphere" and this wording represents sensitivity and commitment to the 'self-regulation' and voluntary implementation principles of the Sphere standards. The INEE Minimum Standards should also serve as transparent, aspirational good practice norms for all stakeholders to know and utilize, and as a resource for constructive feedback and self-correction by implementing agencies, donor monitoring and external evaluators. As is explained in the introduction of the handbook, the process of describing the gaps between the realities and the standard, identifying the reasons for them and what can be done to address different obstacles is crucial (INEE, 2004, p. 9), and is one that should be carried out by donors and implementing agencies as well as beneficiaries, teachers and other stakeholders.

To Coordinate Internal Funding Streams

The INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction cover a broad range of crisis situations and are relevant from the onset of an emergency through the post-emergency recovery and reconstruction phases. As such they are a tool to promote the coordination of internal funding streams and mechanisms, especially in the transition phase from emergency to reconstruction. Funding often dips once the initial emergency/relief phase is over and humanitarian funding is exhausted, before a country is able to access longer term, recovery and reconstruction funding. This may be complicated by the fact that the criteria for accessing such funds may be very high for a fragile, recovering country (for example a sound PRSP). Within individual agencies, there may also be disconnects between funding streams once emergency aid has been provided, creating difficulties in ensuring continuity in funding and therefore in programming. The INEE Minimum Standards represent global consensus on good practice and necessary interventions spanning emergency to development phases – and as many have observed, provide a blueprint for quality education in all settings, not just emergencies. They provide staff in all units and sec-

tions with a holistic, longer term perspective on priority policy and program actions and can be used to collaboratively advocate for longer term and coordinated funding streams as well as to design longer term programs which transition through different phases.

To Promote Preparedness Capacity of the Agency and its Partners to Respond to and Mitigate against Emergency Situations in and through Education

The Minimum Standards can be used as a basis to develop preparedness capacity within donor agencies, and to identify ways in which the education sector can support and implement prevention and mitigation activities (for example, peace education curricula, inter-group school activities in ethnically or religiously divided states) to prioritize for funding. Education should be part of all country and regional contingency plans and early warning indicators in the education sector should also be identified through the Minimum Standards which should be built into all country program monitoring. Donors may also use the Standards to provide a framework for preparedness capacity building for governments and other partners.

To Frame and Foster Inter-Agency Policy Dialogue, Coordination, Advocacy and Action (through the Program Cycle)

The Standards category, Education Policy and Coordination, emphasizes the importance of inter-agency and multi-stakeholder coordination in education responses. For donors, a consistent, overall framework like the INEE Minimum Standards for coordinated efforts in the education sector makes it much easier to identify funding gaps and priorities, and should facilitate quick and strategic funding decisions. Key education stakeholders which could be rallied around the Minimum Standards, and who could be reached through donor advocacy include: Governments (ie donor governments and recipients governments, especially MoE, but also other ministries and departments); World Bank and other IFIs; Private donors/foundations; global networks such as Global Campaign for Education, Cooperation Sud; Regional bodies (such as ADEA); Continental and regional NGO/NGO networks (i.e. FAWE,); UN agencies; Multi donor funding mechanisms (i.e. FTI); Universities.

Future emergency responses will be increasingly coordinated through the UN-led Cluster system. Although no Education Cluster has been officially established at the global level, in the earthquake response in Pakistan an Education Cluster was set up, operating at the central level with meetings in Islamabad, while at the field level, meetings at local hubs were organized. These Cluster meetings were initiated by UNICEF, with the Ministry of Education playing a stronger role over time. The Cluster Closure report (Education Cluster, 2006) documents how the Cluster promoted and applied the INEE Minimum Standards as a guiding framework for its work, and developed guidelines for emergency education specific to the Pakistan context, including minimum standards for educational provision such as teacher salaries and honoraria, in addition to draft designs for primary school reconstruction. Throughout it worked in close coordination with the government's Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Authority. The positive experiences of this Cluster would suggest that an 'official' and institutionalized Education Cluster should be established at the global level, and that for such future Clusters, the INEE Minimum Standards could provide a common language and vision as well as guidance on very concrete process steps to take, thus making the Cluster a more effective accountability, predictability and coordination mechanism.

At higher multi-sector policy levels, the INEE Minimum Standards provide a common framework for inter-agency collaboration within working groups and mechanisms, such as the DAC, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the Good Donorship Initiative. As described above, there are collaborative efforts underway to establish principles for good practice in service delivery (including education) in fragile states. The INEE Minimum Standards were developed with a high level of sensitivity to the particular capaci-

ty, political willingness, governance and security issues pertinent in fragile states, and as such should articulate well with broader, multi-sector principles. Early discussions of the DAC principles reflect the priorities of the INEE Minimum Standards, especially the need for ongoing and systemic community participation, and for in-depth analysis of individual contexts. For agencies working within this initiative, the INEE Minimum Standards provide a complementary sector-specific tool to operationalize the emerging DAC framework.

The same is true of the commitments in the Good Donorship Initiative: within the section on 'Promoting Standards and Enhancing Implementation', Article 15 commits agencies to "fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action". In the section on 'Learning and Accountability' agencies commit to "support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action". The promotion and implementation of the INEE Minimum Standards represents a very tangible example of putting these commitments into practice.

As a Tool for Training and Capacity Building (internal and external –with key partners)

The reality is that none of the actions mentioned above can take place unless capacity is developed within agencies and partner organizations for working on education in emergencies, and particularly for implementing the Minimum Standards At the same time, the Standards themselves constitute a training tool and the key content for capacity building initiatives; creative ways of using the Standards in this way should be explored, such as distance learning modules prepared specifically for donors to include in their orientation packages for staff, to post on intranets.

Whilst the above discussion suggests that there is much to be gained from the adoption and institutionalization of the INEE Minimum Standards by donor agencies, there are clearly associated challenges to address. Not enough time has passed since the launch of the Standards for there to be much concrete evidence or experience to draw, but the donor-specific challenges highlighted below have been identified.

Contextualization is Required

The INEE Minimum Standards are a combination of qualitative and quantitative targets which are not immediately applicable in the same way as some of the more quantitative standards of the Sphere sectors. Thus the education Standards require a process of contextualization and prioritization of locally-appropriate indicators. These are important steps at the field level for building a shared vision and common goals amongst different education stakeholders. For donor agency staff with limited time who are less involved with project implementation, the broad menu of qualitative indicators itself can provide overall guidance, but it does not provide immediately useable formulas (e.g. class size and student-teacher ratios).

Aligning Internal Structures and Processes

The pervasive divisions within agencies that separate HQ from the field, policy units from country programs, emergency response from development programming, education technical experts from humanitarian aid and emergency funding channels from longer term development assistance streams constitute a significant challenge. Within such an organizational structure, a framework like the INEE Minimum Standards that attempts to integrate components across multiple sectors may pose initial problems in terms of operationalization and ownership. If there is no one unit to take the lead, or no established mechanisms for collaboration to support such processes, the INEE Minimum Standards may fall into the gaps.

Collaboration, policy and program coherence as well as multi-sectoral synergies and linkages are required in order to fully meet the INEE Minimum Standards;

they cannot be met entirely by educationalists, nor entirely through the humanitarian response section. One of the critical advocacy issues the INEE Minimum Standards target are the gaps between initial emergency program funding and longer term reconstruction and development funding. These are gaps not only in availability of potential financial resources but also gaps in terms of donors' internal funding streams and the lack of institutionalized linkages between emergency funding and follow up funding channels.

Commitments to SWAPS, budget-support and other government-driven assistance-modalities

For some donor agencies, there is an increasing tendency to provide education sector assistance through direct budget support to ministries of education, to partner with other donors in committing to SWAPs (sector-wide assistance programs) or SWAP-like agreements. This means that the donor agencies are less – if at all – engaged in project implementation within countries. Such alternative forms of assistance also represent a commitment to supporting ministries in their own priority policies and activities. Although regular meetings and discussions take place between donors and ministries, careful negotiation is required in order for donors to also promote their own priorities. This shift in roles of donors at the country level has been cited as a challenge to the widespread use by donors of the INEE Minimum Standards at the country program level. Acceptable ways need to be found of integrating the Standards into SWAP and other budgetary support programs and of presenting the Standards to recipient governments as a guiding framework to support them in their work. This should become easier in the future as more ministry staff become aware of the INEE Minimum Standards through the training plan described above, and through national advocacy and awareness-raising by the UN, international and national NGOs. In relation to working in fragile states, Rose and Greeley (2006) welcome the Standards on education policy and coordination and recommend more in-depth contextualization in implementation: "This is very welcome, though there is scope for strengthening this indicator [*Emergency education programmes are planned and implemented in a manner that provides for*

their integration into longer-term development of the education sector] and relating it explicitly to broader processes of national policy development."

Limited Awareness, Capacity and Differing Levels of Institutionalization

Globally, awareness of the INEE Minimum Standards remains relatively limited, as are capacities to effectively apply them. At different levels, donors are likely to be working with agencies and organizations which are not using them in their education or humanitarian programming. This is especially so at the field level for government officials and local education authorities, where staff may not have heard of the Standards. Efforts have been made to include government and ministry of education personnel in INEE Minimum Standards trainings and other activities, but as yet, awareness may be limited to a small number of individuals who do not necessarily have the authority and/or the capacity to institutionalize the Standards within their own departments. There also is often considerable staff turnover within government departments. Yet it is not just a question of awareness; as highlighted above, the INEE Minimum Standards require contextualization, and they presume at least a basic understanding of key concepts, such as education as a protective force for children and youth; effectively using the Standards requires relatively sophisticated understanding and skills.

Local and international NGO staff are likely to be at least somewhat aware of the INEE Minimum Standards through internal launches, trainings and global policy development, and yet donors may find that the levels of institutionalization and formal adoption of the Standards vary widely, even within different country/regional programs of the same organization. The INEE global dissemination and training initiatives, as well as other dissemination and training activities conducted by INEE members, aim to address this

lack of understanding, but especially whilst the process is ongoing (through the end of 2007) limited awareness, capacity and differing levels of institutionalization will be implementation challenges.

Skepticism around the Potential Value of Minimum Standards

Even where people are aware of the INEE Minimum Standards, skepticism about their 'added value' may exist. With no formal evaluation evidence of the impact of the Standards as yet, this is especially difficult to counter. Education is a sector over which state control is politically, culturally and socially important; governments with whom donors are engaged may therefore be reluctant to accept what may look like an outside, and westernized imposition. Ministries have their own norms and standards, rules and regulations, and may see the adoption of the INEE Minimum Standards as giving these up or letting them be overridden by another set of external standards. One dimension of this possible skepticism is the reluctance of some governments to have their situation labeled as an 'emergency' or a 'fragile state'. Such situations speak to the need to work with the full title, 'INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction Contexts' or its abbreviated form 'INEE Minimum Standards'.

Another issue which may affect donors differently depending on the geographic focus of their interventions is a perception that the INEE Minimum Standards focus primarily on complex, conflict-related emergencies and are less applicable to natural disasters and also to smaller scale localized disasters. This perception can be addressed through reference to the effective use of the Standards in a number of recent natural disasters, but may be a hurdle to overcome, especially when presenting the Standards to governments of natural-disaster affected/prone countries.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The INEE Minimum Standards provide a comprehensive tool to guide program and policy development for quality education interventions in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction contexts. This is especially so for donors who are familiar with the principles and the content of the Sphere Humanitarian Charter. The INEE Standards have potential to improve the quality of agency supported programs at the field level, to contribute to improved, coordinated internal policy and programming and to form a framework for inter-agency collaboration. They may also enhance accountability at multiple levels. However, emergencies, crises, natural and man-made disasters are by nature unpredictable, chaotic and uneven, therefore any efforts to standardize and systematize humanitarian response are inherently challenging. This is equally so in the education sector, and there are certainly challenges to be addressed in the implementation of the INEE Minimum Standards. These include the need for contextualization, internal divisions within agencies, budget support/SWAPs strategies, limited awareness, limited capacity, differing levels of institutionalization, and possible skepticism. Addressing these challenges with donors requires efforts from different stakeholders, including the INEE Secretariat, member organizations and individuals. On the other hand, challenges can become opportunities, and recommendations can be made, such as donors using the INEE Minimum Standards to bring together staff from different units to identify and address possible gaps and discontinuities, including the Standards in their proposal guidelines, and channeling training to key actors, such as relevant ministry of education staff.

ENDNOTES

1 namely that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict and secondly that those affected by disasters have a right to life with dignity, and therefore a right to assistance.

2 Funding was provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the International Save the Children Alliance, Save the Children Norway, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Bank

3 Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland

4 Another significant initiative related to accountability and measurability in humanitarian aid is the UN-OCHA managed Financial Tracking Service (FTS), a searchable global, database which records all reported international humanitarian aid, serving to analyze aid and monitor accountability among humanitarian actors (See http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/help/whatis.asp).

5 As Lexow (2006) states "Funding to education in humanitarian assistance has increased tremendously if one looks at natural disasters and conflicts combined. But it is less certain that the same increase has happened in conflict ridden areas. Figures from the country case studies show that the gap between requirements and actual contributions is huge". Cited Rose & Greeley, 2006.

REFERENCES

Anderson, A. & Brooks, D. (2005). Implementing Minimum Standards for Education in emergencies: Lessons from Aceh. Humanitarian Practice Network, Humanitarian Exchange, December 2005.

Australian Government/AusAID (2006).Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability. Canberra: Australian Government/AusAID.

Department for International Development (DfID) (2006). Keeping our Promises: Delivering Education for All. London: DfID.

Education Cluster (Pakistan Earthquake Emergency) (2006). Closure of the Education Cluster. Islamabad: Education Cluster.

ERRA & IASC Country Team (2006). Pakistan Action Plan: From Relief to Recovery. Islamabad: ERRA/ Government of Pakistan.

INEE (2004). Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction. London: INEE.

INEE (2005). Feedback on Promotion and Use of the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction: March-May 2005. From INEE website.

INEE (2006). Feedback on Promotion and Use of the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction: June-December 2005. From INEE website.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies) (ICVA). (2005). Talkback (Special Issue: Humanitarian Reforms), Volume 7-3, (3 October 2005).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Norway (2003). Education –Job Number 1. Oslo: MFA.

NORAD (2005). Education in Conflict and Emergencies. Oslo: NORAD.

Rose, P. & Greeley, M. (2006). Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice. Draft paper prepared for the DAC Fragile States Working Groups, Service Delivery Workstream, Sub-team for Education Services.

Sida (2002). Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance in the Education Sector. Oslo: Sida.

Sida (2003). Education in situations of emergency, conflict and post-conflict. Oslo: Sida.
http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=118&a=2833&searchWords=education%20in%20situations

Sullivan-Owomoyela, J. (2006). Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction: Uganda Case Study. Draft Paper. Washington DC: For Creative Associates Inc. & USAID.

USAID (2005). Education Strategy: Improving Lives through Learning. Washington DC: USAID.

USAID/ Creative Associates (2005). Education in Crisis Situations. Washington DC: USAID.

World Bank (2005). Reshaping the Future: Education and Postconflict Reconstruction. Washington DC: World Bank.

Websites consulted:

CE-DAT: http://www.cred.be/cedat/index.htm

CIDA: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/index.htm

DAC: http: www.oecd.org/dac

Danida: http://www.um.dk/en

DfID: www.dfid.gov.uk/

Dutch Foreign Ministry: http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ257571

Financial Tracking Service: http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/help/whatis.asp

Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative: http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/

INEE: www.ineesite.org

NORAD: http://www.cred.be/cedat/index.htm

SIDA: http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=121&language=en_US

SMART Initiative: http://www.smartindicators.org

Sphere: http://www.sphereproject.org/

USAID: www.usaid.gov

Program Agenda

Policy Roundtable on Education in Emergencies, Fragile States and
Reconstruction:
Addressing Challenges and Exploring Alternatives

June 22, 2006

UNICEF — New York Headquarters, 3 United Nations Plaza

TIME:	SCHEDULE:
8:30 – 9:00 am	Registration and light breakfast
9:00 – 9:15 am	Welcome and opening remarks • Sarita Bhatla (Director General, Policy Branch, CIDA) • Cream Wright (Chief of Education Section, UNICEF) • Rebecca Winthrop, Chair of INEE Steering Group and Senior Education Technical Advisor at the International Rescue Committee
9:00 – 9:15 am	Perspectives on Current Policy Environment: Achievements and Challenges • Ronald Siebes (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) • Gerald Martone (International Rescue Committee) Brief Review/Synthesis of Framing Papers • Michael Gibbons (Lecturer, American University; Consultant for Leadership<>Learning Initiative) Q&A
10:15 – 10:30 am	Tea/coffee break
10:30 – 12:15 pm	Working Group Session I: Exploring alternatives and identifying best practices • Ensuring policy coherence across sectors/areas of work (Facilitator: Michéal Montgomery) • Identifying alternative financing mechanisms (Facilitator: Gene Sperling) • Overcoming challenges with INEE's Minimum Standards (Facilitator: Rebecca Winthrop)
12:15 – 1:15 pm	Lunch
1:15 – 3:15 pm	Working Group Session II: Drafting recommendations and defining next steps • Ensuring policy coherence across sectors/areas of work (Facilitator: Michéal Montgomery) • Identifying alternative financing mechanisms (Facilitator: Gene Sperling) • Overcoming challenges with INEE's Minimum Standards (Facilitator: Rebecca Winthrop)
3:15 – 3:45 pm	Tea/coffee break
3:45 – 5:15 pm	Report back to large group (20 minutes per group: 10-minute presentation and 10-minute Q&A)
5:15 – 5:30 pm	Closing plenary (Sarita Bhatla)

Participant List

Allison Anderson, INEE

Jiovani Arias, Fundación Dos Mundos

Sarita Bhatla, CIDA

Jessica Blitt, Permanent Mission of
Canada to the UN

Rüdiger Blumör, GTZ

Görel Bogärde, International Save the
Children Alliance

Dean Brooks, Norwegian Refugee
Council

Michelle Cervantes, UNHCR

Mouni Chouban, UNICEF

Arnaud Conchon, UNICEF

Hazel de Wet, UNICEF

Darcy DeMarsico, CIDA

Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Harvard
Graduate School of Education

Amalia Eraso, Fundación Dos
Mundos

Rachel Fink, UNHCR New York
Office

Michael Gibbons, American
University/Leadership<>Learning
Initiative

Brian Gorlick, UNHCR

Jennifer Hofmann, Council on
Foreign Relations

Maysa Jalbout, CIDA

Laura Johansen, UK Mission to
the UN

Melissa Kelly, INEE

Jackie Kirk, IRC/McGill University

Gerald Martone, IRC

Mary Mendenhall, INEE

Kara Mitchell, CIDA

Michéal Montgomery, CIDA

Susan Nicolai, International Save the
Children Alliance

Jed Oppenheim, IRC

Sandra Pompey, UNICEF

Eli Rognerud, UNESCO/INEE

Kelly Shannon, INEE

Ronald Siebes, Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Natasha Smith, Australian Mission to
the United Nations

Gene Sperling, Council on Foreign
Relations

John Trew, CARE USA

Carl Triplehorn, Save the
Children – US

Ana Triponel, FTI Secretariat

Ellen van Kalmthout, UNICEF

Fon van Oosterhout, Dutch Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

Marit Vedeld, Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation

Rebecca Winthrop, IRC

Cream Wright, UNICEF

Hong-Won Yu, CIDA

INEE

Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
Reseau Inter-Agences pour l'Education d'Urgence
La Red Interagencial para Educación en Situaciones de Emergencia

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency