Staying power: struggling to reconstruct education in Burundi since 1993

Anna Obura

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Much information and many insights were offered by colleagues and respondents. The book is the fruit of those many conversations and exchanges but the specific content of the book, with its particular perspective and possible errors, is my own.

Foreword to the series

UNESCO is increasingly requested to provide an educational response in emergency and reconstruction settings. The organization is in the process of developing expertise in this field in order to be able to provide prompt and relevant assistance. It will offer guidance, practical tools and specific training for education policy-makers, officials and planners.

The fifth of the eleven objectives adopted by the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children in emergencies. It stresses the importance of meeting "... the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict". The Dakar Framework for Action (World Education Forum, 2000: 9) calls for national Education for All plans to include provision for education in emergency situations. Governments, particularly education ministries, have an important role to play in an area that has often been dominated by the actions of NGOs and United Nations agencies.

Moreover, the field of educational planning in emergencies and reconstruction is still young. It has to be organized into a manageable discipline, through further documentation and analysis, before training programmes can be designed. Accumulated institutional memories and knowledge in governments, agencies and NGOs on education in emergencies, are in danger of being lost due both to the dispersion and disappearance of documents, and to high staff turnover in both national and international contexts. Most of the expertise is still in the heads of practitioners and needs to be collected, since memories fade fast. Diverse experiences of educational reconstruction must now be more thoroughly documented and analyzed before they disappear.

This task includes the publication in this series of seven country-specific analyses being conducted on the planning and management of education in emergencies and reconstruction. They concern the efforts currently being made to restore and transform education systems in countries as diverse as Burundi, Kosovo, Palestine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Timor-Leste. They have been initiated and sponsored by IIEP, in close collaboration with the Division of Educational Policies and Strategies in UNESCO Headquarters.

The objectives of the case studies are:

- to contribute to the process of developing knowledge in the discipline of education in emergencies;
- to provide focused input for future IIEP training programmes targeting government officials and others in education in emergencies;
- to identify and collect dispersed documentation on the management of education in the seven countries; and to capture some of the undocumented memories of practitioners;
- to analyze response in seven very different situations to educational provision in times of crisis;
- to increase dissemination of information and analysis on education in emergencies.

IIEP's larger programme on education in emergencies and reconstruction involves not only these case studies, but also a series of global, thematic, policy-related studies. In addition, IIEP is producing a handbook for education authority officials and the agencies assisting them, and developing training materials for a similar audience. Through this programme, IIEP will make a modest but significant contribution to the discipline of education in emergencies and reconstruction. Its hope is to enrich the quality of the planning processes applied in this crucial field.

Mark Bray
Director, IIEP

Contents

Acknowledgements		5
Foreword to the series		7
List of abbreviations		11
List of tables		14
List of figures		15
Executive summary		17
Map of Burundi		22
Chapter 1.	Introduction	23
	Objectives of the study	23
	The significance of the study	23
	The selection of Burundi	25
	Education in emergencies – revisiting the rationale	26
	The structure of the study	36
Chapter 2.	Background	39
	Introduction to Burundi	39
	Investigating social discrimination	47
	Investigating discrimination in the education sector from 1920s to 1993	60
Chapter 3.	The history of education in Burundi	67
	Education before independence	67
	Education after independence	74
Chapter 4.	The effects of war and initial reconstruction	89
	Precipitating causes of the 1993 crisis	90
	La crise, 1993	91
	Education just before 1993	93
	Destruction of the education sector	93
	Emergency and initial reconstruction stages	95
	HIV/AIDS education prevention programmes	114
	Reviewing the first initiatives	116
Chapter 5.	Achievements, challenges and potential	125
	Community junior secondary schools – les *cocos*	125
	Yaga Mukama – Burundi's unique alternative programme	137
	Burundi's accelerated learning programme	144
	Developments within the ministry	149

Chapter 6.	Experiencing schooling in Burundi today	159
	School – from the inside	161
	The wider context	175
Chapter 7.	Twa access to education	189
	An introduction to the Twa or the Batwa	189
	Education	193
	Initial action in favour of the Twa	198
	Conclusion and recommendations	200
Chapter 8.	Education for Burundian refugees in Tanzania	203
	Tanzania's experience of hosting refugees	203
	The relationship of the host country to refugees	204
	Education in the camps	210
	Overview of achievements in the education sector	218
	Peace education	233
	Documentation, data, monitoring and assessment	238
Chapter 9.	Education for repatriation	241
	Refugee perceptions of education in the camps	241
	Expectations of schooling back home	247
	Lessons learned	251
	Summary of lessons learned	253
	Girls' education	255
Chapter 10.	Conclusion	259
	The risk	259
	Risk avoidance	262
References and Bibliography		267
Appendices		
Appendix A.	Fact sheet: Primary education, Burundi, 2003	287
Appendix B.	Background statistics	289
Appendix C.	Writing the history of Burundi: Action plan 2003-2005	295
Appendix D.	Additional data on secondary schools	297
Appendix E.	Global comparison of Tanzanian camp education as at end of 2003	300
Appendix F.	Tanzania's national refugee policy on education	303
Appendix G.	Further information on Burundi school children interviewed	305
Appendix H.	Overview of one camp – Muyovosi	312

List of abbreviations

ACCT	Agence de coopération culturelle et technique
AFDDB	Alliance des femmes pour la démocratie et le développement
AFEC	Association francophone d'éducation comparée
AGEI	African Girls' Education Initiative
AIF	Agence intergouvernementale de la francophonie
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
ASB	Association des scouts du Burundi
ASBL	Association sans but lucratif
BEET	Bureau d'études des programmes de l'enseignement technique
BEPES	Bureau d'études des programmes de l'enseignement secondaire
BER	Bureau d'éducation rurale
BNEC	Bureau national de l'éducation catholique
BPE	Bureau de la planification de l'éducation
BPEP	Bureau de promotion de l'enseignement privé
BRIDGES	Basic Research and Implementation in Developing Education Systems
CAS	Centres d'animation sociale
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CED-CARITAS	Centre d'entraide et de développement-CARITAS
CFEP	Certificat de fin d'études primaires
CEPBU	Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte du Burundi
CNRS	Commission nationale de réhabilitation des sinistrés
CNDD	Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie
CNDD/FDD	CNDD-Forces de défense de la démocratie
CRPD	Centres régionaux de pédagogie et de documentation
CSE	Centres socio-éducatifs
CSFM	Centre for Studies of Forced Migration, Dar es Salaam
CURE	Crédit d'urgence pour le redressement économique
CYM	Centres Yaga Mukama [Parle, Seigneur!]
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration project
DGEB	Direction générale de l'enseignement de base
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAP/EMP	École d'apprentissage pédagogique
EDC	Education Development Centre
EEA	L'Église évangélique des amis

ELM	L'Église libre méthodiste
FAB	Forces armées burundaises
FBBR	Fonds belgo-burundais du ré-emploi
FCD	Forces du changement démocratique
FDD	Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
FNL	Forces nationales de libération
FRODEBU	Front pour la démocratie au Burundi
FS	Foyers sociaux
GLPSN	Great Lakes Peace and Security Network
GPI	Gender Parity Index
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IBE	International Bureau of Education
IEB	Interregional Examination Board
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
INADES-FORMATION	Institut africain pour le développement économique et social
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
JRR	Jeunesses révolutionnaires Rwagasore
Kcal	Kilocalories
KFW	Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau
KK PEP	Kigoma/Kagera Peace Education Programme
MASPF	Ministère de l'Action sociale et de la Promotion de la femme
MEN	Ministère de l'Éducation nationale
MEPS	Ministère de l'Éducation primare et secondaire
MESSRS	Ministère de l'Enseignement secondaire, supérieur et de la Recherche scientifique
MPDR	Ministère de la Planification du développement et de la Reconstruction
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PCRP	Peace and Conflict Resolution Programme
PEP	Peace Education Programme
PPD	Projet des plus démunis
PRP	Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple
PSU	Programme social d'urgence
PTAs	Parent Teacher Associations
RET	Refugee Education Trust
RPP	Régie des productions pédagogiques
SDN	Société des Nations
SERVOL	Service Volunteered for All

SOJEDEM	Solidarité jeunesse pour la défense des droits des minorités
TCRS	Tanzanian Christian Relief Services
TEP	Teacher Emergency Package
TOT	Training of Trainers
UCEDD	Union chrétienne pour le développement des déshérités
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNESCO-PEER	UNESCO Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIPROBA	Unissons-nous pour la promotion des Batwa
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPRONA	Union pour le progrès national
USAID OTI	United States Agency for International Development, Office of Transition Initiatives

List of tables

Table 1.1 Characteristics of conflict which impact the education sector
Table 1.2 Schema for the rationale of focusing on education in emergencies
Table 2.1 At a glance: The history of Burundi before independence
Table 2.2 Milestones in Burundi's political history since independence
Table 3.1 Overview of education development up to independence, 1898-1962
Table 3.2 Schools and enrolment 1900-1957
Table 3.3 Progress in primary subsector expansion in the 1980s
Table 3.4 GPI improvement in Burundi in the 1980s
Table 4.1 Education indicators before and after the crisis
Table 4.2 Regaining pre-conflict levels in primary education
Table 4.3 Evolution of GPI, 1982-2003
Table 4.4 Secondary education before and after the crisis
Table 4.5 Main donors supporting education
Table 4.6 Measures reducing/increasing disparities
Table 5.1 Achievements, challenges and potential, 1995
Table 5.2 Distribution of community secondary schools across communes, 1996
Table 5.3 Transition rates from primary to secondary school, 1990/1991 to 1999/2000
Table 5.4 *Yaga Mukama* and primary school enrolments, 1963-2002
Table 6.1 School children interviewed
Table 6.2 Annual school fees and other direct expenses in Bujumbura (2003) in selected schools (in Burundian francs)
Table 8.1 Four districts hosting major proportions of refugee populations (assisted by UN agencies) in western Tanzania
Table 8.2 Western Tanzania camp populations, end December 2003
Table 8.3 Educational activities in Tanzanian-Burundian refugee camps
Table 10.1 Globally relevant strategies for conflict prevention
Table 10.2 Africa-related additional education sector strategies for conflict prevention
Table 10.3 Education-related factors for conflict prevention

List of figures

Figure 3.1 GPI in selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1990 and 2000
Figure 4.1 GER response to crises, 1962-2001
Figure 4.2 GER by province before and after the crisis, 1993, 1998 and 2002
Figure 4.3 Primary GER and GPI levels by province, before the crisis, 1992/1993
Figure 4.4 Primary GER and GPI levels by province after the crisis, 1996/1997
Figure 4.5 Distribution of schools by province and population, 2002
Figure 4.6 Classroom provision by population by province, 1993 and 2002
Figure 4.7 Pre-war and post-war teacher provisions, 1993 and 2002
Figure 4.8 Teacher qualifications before and after the crisis, 1993, 1998, 2002
Figure 5.1 *Coco* dependency by population
Figure 7.1 Batwa population and GER by province, *circa* 2001

Executive summary

The present study on education sector reconstruction in Burundi differs from the others in the IIEP series on Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction since it was written while conflict was ongoing in the country under investigation. Numerous peace accords had been signed, and a major one in 2001, but it was proving difficult to draw in all the rebel movements and militia into the peace process. Burundi moves, still, at a painfully slow pace, towards reconciliation. Nothing can be taken for granted. No one dares to hope too much. The study provided an opportunity for examining coping strategies and initial recovery strategies during a period of ongoing strife. The country has moved from the explosive crisis in 1993, to a series of major upheavals in 1996-1998, including a coup d'état and a consequent international trade embargo, to a period of intermittent attacks, until recently. A transitional government was sworn in, in 2001, in an attempt to share political power between Tutsi and Hutu. Elections proposed for the end of 2003 were postponed to 2005. At the time of going to press, a few months after elections, the path to peace looks more and more attainable.

This study is an analysis of decade-long survival strategies in the education sector during a period of conflict, the attempts made to salvage and rebuild the school system, and the traps in uncontrolled and runaway development and, contrarily, in structural inertia, that awaited the unwary. The study leans heavily on a historical perspective for investigating allegedly deep-rooted social discrimination in the country which is blamed for repeatedly causing bloodshed since independence in 1962, and which explains major disparities in education provision.

Lessons from other case studies in the series, notably on Kosovo and Rwanda, indicate that education for reconstruction and for peace needs to develop a firm conceptual basis before sector planners and curriculum developers can begin to envisage their task. Hence the need for a persistent search in the present study for a clear understanding of the experience of being Hutu or Tutsi or Twa in the past, in order to fully appreciate the current directions of the sector and experiences of children at school, and to plan a different order in the future.

There are so many tangled and contradictory myths woven around Burundi and its nonidentical twin, Rwanda, that some important

assumptions needed re-examination or revisiting. It has to be stated clearly that Hutu and Tutsi are not ethnic groups. They share the same language, culture and traditional religion; they live intermingled on the hills, and intermarry; they are members of the same clans; and, contrary to popular opinion, they share many of the same physical features. They can be described as socio-identity groups. Everyone knows which group they belong to, inheriting this from their father. Moreover, at the beginning of the last century it was possible for a Hutu to become a Tutsi and vice versa. Contemporary rivalry was created by colonialist misunderstandings of the fabric of Burundian society, which has been the root cause of the current conflict. The colonial authorities neglected the Twa, as have post-independence regimes.

In order to put the experience of schooling in context, seven types of social discrimination operating in Burundi since independence were noted:

- Exclusion from leadership and local administration;
- Exclusion from political power – and the development of a policy of discrimination;
- Exclusion from/manipulation of the judiciary;
- Exclusion from the armed forces;
- Exclusion from employment;
- Expropriation of property;
- Extermination/massacres.

The alien and unfamiliar nature of the type of leadership patterns imposed on Burundi society by the colonizers was contrasted with the meritocracy, which operated in the country before the colonial period, the *ubushingantahe*, which served to govern society at a local level and provided effective democratic representation of the people at higher levels of the political system. The implication for education is that Burundi had models of good leadership which are demonstrably indigenous, and which can be exploited to shape an improved political and civic system in the future. By looking back to what once worked well for Burundi, there can be hope and inspiration for devising an appropriate and culturally rooted national model of governance for the future.

The growing literature on the potentially negative effects of schooling is at the heart of the detailed examination in this study of potential damaging characteristics of the education sector. Unanticipated at the start of the study, since Burundi is different in many ways from

Rwanda, 10 areas or types of discrimination or exclusion were identified in the education sector. They date from the 1920s and most continue up to this day:

- Structural discrimination;
- Curricular discrimination;
- Inequitable school provision, staffing, equipment and supplies;
- Limitation of Hutu enrolment in secondary schools;
- Manipulation of examination results;
- Low expectations of Hutu examination performance;
- Induced socio-economic disadvantage of Hutu school children;
- Regular disruption of the education system;
- Targetting and killing students in secondary and tertiary institutions – and even primary schools.
- Reduction of numbers of Hutu teachers.

The study demonstrates that discrimination against Hutu (and Twa) in the wider Burundi society, and in the education sector up until 1993, was no figment of the imagination. It was real. It was acute. Prior to the crisis, the major types of disparity in education provision included:

- Regional – favouring the south and the centre, particularly the province of the three longest serving presidents;
- Social – against specific social groups in Burundi society (the Hutu and Twa);
- Gender-related – leaving girls far behind socially and at school (unlike Rwanda which had achieved gender parity at primary level in the 1980s);
- Economic – widening the gap between the income levels of all social groups.

It was concluded that during the decade of continuing conflict *disparity has been widening* and the attempts at reconstruction have produced more, but more for some and not for others. Data, which has been available for some time is not only reviewed and re-analyzed, but graphically presented here. The continuing educational losses are shown to be dramatic as one follows the gradual exacerbation of negative, discriminatory trends from 1993 to 1998 to 2003. There is a sharp reaction to the massacres of 1993, an erratic response of the sector five years later as conflict explodes here and there in place and time. And, as the extent and frequency of conflict abates somewhat, in the last five years, the

education sector disparities grow, and show unnerving and erratic gains and losses. The lines on the graphs dart in all directions.

The second finding of importance is that conflict has not provided the opportunity for improvement or renewal that is often claimed for such situations. It is true that Burundi cannot yet be termed a classical case of 'post conflict'. There is still insecurity. There is still fear. There is an appalling lack of resources and of funding for the education sector. The sole positive outcome of the conflict has been to force the rural poor, who are mainly Hutu, into regarding education as the only mechanism, which will pull their children out of poverty. There is now high demand by all Tutsi and Hutu for education. This is not yet the case for the Twa.

The classical picture of donor aid flooding into a post-conflict country has not yet happened for Burundi. And the national or international observers do not expect a flood of aid. Burundi does not have the attraction of the giant Democratic Republic of Congo or the image of post-genocide Rwanda. It is small, not well known to the outside world and strategically of no interest to the great powers. The proverbial donor fatigue will baulk at assisting a second Rwanda to the same level as Rwanda has been assisted to date. Burundi will have to fight and to market itself effectively to attract a modicum of assistance in the future. This is precisely what Burundi needs: sufficient support to recover, rebuild and become a force for peace in the region. It would make no sense for the major donors to focus on Rwanda and on the Congo and to omit Burundi from a regional Great Lakes programme of assistance. There should not be one weak flank in the plan or a neglected, smouldering region. Burundi carries exactly the same potent force for regional damage, as did Rwanda. This is perhaps the best argument for attracting donor support to Burundi in the future. Burundi is indeed a twin to Rwanda and for the sake of peace and stability in the region, all need fraternal aid, the powerful and great such as the Congo, and the small but significant, that is, Rwanda and Burundi.

Given the disheartening findings, namely the increasing disparities operated by the state machinery through the education sector, the study concludes with some words of caution. It notes that Burundi continues to be one of Africa's most vulnerable failed states, not only because it has experienced numerous incidents of violence for four decades, but because there are no mechanisms yet in place to prevent recurrence of conflict.

- Recurrent crises have crippled Burundi;
- It can happen again;
- There are no signs yet that Burundi is going to turn this situation around;
- The region and the international community have failed Burundi – and may fail Burundi again in the future.

Map of Burundi

Chapter 1
Introduction

Objectives of the study

The purpose of the current study on the education sector in Burundi during the years 1993-2003, was:

- to document and make known the strategies used by Burundi in the management of education during the decade of crisis; and
- to identify lessons learned from the Burundi experience for input into global learning on education in emergencies and reconstruction.

The findings will also be offered as inputs into future education planning within Burundi itself. The study will focus on the educational planning and management functions that have been used during the period of emergency and reconstruction with regard to: providing access; ensuring quality and relevance; building planning and management capacity; securing funding; and developing external relations.

The significance of the study

There are two factors, which make this study different from five of the other studies in the IIEP Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction series, those on Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories:

- The conflict in Burundi is continuing – the present study is an analysis of decade-long survival strategies in the education sector during a period of conflict.
- The study provides an opportunity for scrutiny of current conflict-reducing and conflict-abetting sectoral mechanisms.

Since the conflict in Burundi is ongoing, despite progress in the peace process, the study does not fit into the classical 'post-conflict' mode of the series and will necessarily take a somewhat different perspective. It will describe the education system after the massacres, that is, after the critical events of 1993, which plunged the country into civil war, and *during the decade of continuing crisis*, 1993-2003, in order to highlight the survival mechanisms used by the education sector in the midst of a long period of strife.

Second, there is growing concern in education circles over the role of education in fuelling social division and conflict. This phenomenon needs to be increasingly documented and better understood (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). It is hoped that the present study will contribute more information and data on the subject, since vestiges of the pre-war features of the education sector have survived in the system throughout the years of crisis in Burundi and remain visible ten years later. It will be important to be able to identify such characteristics in education systems in other countries with significant social disparities in the future – particularly in societies at risk of conflict – so as to increase the chances of eliminating those negative characteristics from the sector in future.

It is not a new discovery that education systems reproduce their societies, and those societies' positive and negative perceptions and practices. Yet we are familiar with the perennial hope of governments and peoples that the schools will somehow manage to rise above the imperfections of the socio-political context and succeed in helping the next generation create a better world. What has been lacking in every nation is thorough analysis of teaching and malpractice and in schools from the perspective of human rights. This information gap has led to the festering of malpractice. It could euphemistically be termed an act of negligence or irresponsibility on the part of the sector, of education ministers and ministries, of central, provincial and local education officers, of school boards and managers and teachers, in the face of the challenge to ensure the integrity of the education sector, to contribute to the betterment of the nation and to educate children to become good citizens. It could be regarded as a climate of educational impunity, which is in need of transformation.

Given these concerns, the study gives some attention to the origins of discriminatory practices in Burundi. It attempts to illustrate the extent to which history continues to determine social constructs in Burundi; it unravels and reveals historical socio-cultural and group identity dynamics, which are still not well disseminated or acknowledged in the public domain, national or international; and it exposes social myths which continue to verbally brutalize the Burundian people. Much of the verbal onslaught today is unconscious, subconscious, and not deliberate. It is a habit. The study sets out to demonstrate that schools cannot, single-handedly, change it but will need to find an effective way of confronting it, alongside other partners in society.

The selection of Burundi

The present study of the Burundi education sector covers the following dimensions: the provision of education for different categories of learners: for children across a country currently in conflict, in their safe or totally insecure home areas, rural and urban; for internally displaced children, for refugees and returnees; and the ongoing attempts at reconstructing the system by a persevering Ministry of Education together with some rare and committed partners. Further, all phases of emergency and displacement, are present in the Burundi experience: the immediate response to local and sporadic emergencies; the stable phase, locality by locality; and initial reconstruction, locality by locality. The education of Burundian refugees in Tanzania is also covered. The Burundi experience has powerful lessons for future education planning on approaches to emergency educational response.

Burundi's overall response to educational sector survival has yet to be documented. IIEP notes that the roles of national governments and ministries of education in post-emergency situations need further analysis in contrast to the activities of the United Nations (UN) agencies and international Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose activities are relatively better documented (Talbot, 2002: 3-5).

The definitive study on Burundi's management of emergency education will one day be written by a Burundi national, giving sufficient attention to the many disparate local experiences across the country. Such a study needs to take into account the disequilibrium in the education sector prior to the 1960s as well as prior to 1993. History is all important in Burundi, as is the knowledge of parallel events in neighbouring Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region. To interpret education in Burundi without history and without taking into account the tragedy of Rwanda would be to fail to describe the experience of schooling in Burundi. In the meantime, the current study takes note of the historical origins of inequities rife in Burundi's present political structures, starting with the significant social disruption caused by colonial administrative structures established as early as the 1920s and 1930s. Using the instrument, which it called 'indirect rule',[1] the Belgian colonial power sidestepped and then transformed the indigenous administrative structures in Ruanda-Urundi, using new, alien administrative systems organized according to external

1. The intrusive, distorting and repressive actions of colonial regimes had a direct, negative effect on colonized peoples.

perceptions of *Tutsi/Hutu* identity. These measures were mirrored by *similar structures and inequitable practices in the education sector*. Colonial structures imposed across Africa and Asia were consistently pernicious but some territories suffered more distorting forms of sectoral education provision and/or lack of provision than others. Large numbers of children have at one time or another been excluded from school in Burundi and deprived of education *on the grounds of social group and/ or regional identity*. It is important to keep in mind that exclusion from education has been a critical factor in fuelling conflict in Burundi, as in Rwanda and in Sudan, over the last 40 years. This has major implications for the post-war education reconstruction exercise. While in post-independent Rwanda social discrimination was overt, in Burundi the mechanisms were covert. These differing situations point to the need for developing different approaches to post-conflict social reconstruction.

Education in emergencies – revisiting the rationale

The context of providing support to education in situations of emergency and post-conflict territories is changing. The rationale is being strengthened by the experience of the last five years, benefitting from the policy changes such as the Dakar Framework for Action (UNESCO, 2000). Readers following this evolving context and the developing theory of providing education in emergencies may find this section of interest. General readers and those specifically focused on Burundi may prefer to go straight to the section on *Structure of the study*.

Definitions – an update

What is an 'emergency'?

A detailed description of emergencies is provided in a previous book in this series, dealing with the Rwanda case Obura (2003: 27-28), together with an overview of stages of emergency aid. Emergencies have been characterized as "an unforeseen combination of sudden and brutal circumstances that calls for immediate relief ... or a disaster which overwhelms capacity to cope" (Hernes, 2002). In brief, emergencies fall into the following three broad categories:

- Natural disasters: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tsunamis, drought;
- Manmade disasters: war, internal conflict, or genocide;
- Preventable and predictable disasters: recurrent crop failure, famine, hunger.

Disasters are predictable in the sense that they may be cyclical or early warning systems may identify their imminence. They are preventable in the sense that once predicted, they may, with the aid of planning and technology, be prevented or minimized.

What shape do emergencies take?

In theory, emergencies are recognized as moving through three broad phases, despite the fact that each emergency is inevitably different from the next one:

- The state of crisis, the emergency and its immediate aftermath;
- Initial reconstruction;
- Development.

However, there is no agreement on definitions for these phases and, in practice, there is no clear idea of when each phase starts or finishes, particularly when a country shows no uniform sign of recovery from an emergency. It is a common experience that crises erupt in one region or another within a country as violence diminishes overall, and that progress is patchy and sporadic. Typically, humanitarian assistance first addresses urgent physical needs, providing water, food, medical assistance and shelter; and initial education services. It is now acknowledged that education provision for children has to start as soon as possible during the emergency phase. For the purpose of this study the term 'education in emergencies' will be understood to cover the provision of education during both the phases of emergency and reconstruction.

IIEP has created a multi-faceted forum for exchange and reflection on education in emergencies since 2003. This includes the present series of indepth country case studies on education and emergencies; open and easy access to the IIEP library which has increasing documentation on education in emergencies; the IIEP Summer School series starting in 2003, which has included significant inputs from the World Bank; contacts through IIEP with the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) which has been an active platform for informal exchange and participation from the field; seminar opportunities at IIEP open to or led by visiting researchers; close collaboration between IIEP and the Peace Education unit at UNHCR; access to UNHCR field and documentary resources; workshops, papers and theories developed by UNICEF; and the fruitful exchange between IIEP and International Bureau of Education (IBE) Geneva staff and associates, which has been at the forefront of analysis on curriculum change in post-conflict

countries (Tawil and Harley, 2004). For African researchers and practitioners, these opportunities have proved far more effective than the web, which continues to have limited influence in Africa, due to cost. And, since Africa is the continent most affected by conflict at the present time, in terms of the proportion of population and countries involved in conflict, IIEP platform for exchange and learning constitutes a significant contribution to conflict resolution and long-term conflict prevention.

Rationale for focus on education in emergencies

The rationale for focusing on the field of education in emergencies is developed below, beyond the arguments put forward in the study on Rwanda in this series four years ago by the same author (Obura, 2003: 28). The issues are all relevant to Africa, particularly the second set, and are summarized in *Table 1.1*.

Table 1.1 Characteristics of conflict which impact the education sector

	A. Worldwide factors
1.	Conflict is increasing.
2.	Significant increase in civilian targets.
3.	Massive refugee influxes causing new social problems in host countries
4.	Most conflicts are internal.
5.	New analyses of the relationship between conflict and education.
	B. Additional factors characteristic of Africa
6.	Porous borders facilitate conflict proliferation.
7.	Shared conflict-related, historical and politico-cultural features trigger crossborder conflict.
8.	Physical crossborder spill-over.
9.	Drought: increased frequency and intensity, affecting larger populations.
10.	Drought and HIV: Africa’s new double crisis.
11.	HIV’s dual impact on the education sector, heightened in countries in conflict.
12.	Increasing poverty and social inequity: twin engines of conflict.
	C. Education related factors worldwide/Africa
13.	Armed conflict is a major cause of global failure to achieve EFA.
14.	Schools/education targetted for destruction.
15.	Increased danger of disruption of schooling.
16.	Emergency education provision counts.

Worldwide factors, also characteristic of conflict in Africa:

(a) *Increased conflict:* the prevalence of conflict is increasing. Worldwide, in late 2002, there were 37 countries in conflict (Project Ploughshares, 2002).

(b) *Civilian targets:* a new phenomenon is that 80-90 per cent of the victims of war are civilians; and millions are children, whereas in the First World War almost a century ago, only 5 per cent of the casualties were civilians. The nature of conflict has changed.

(c) *Massive refugee movements:* large influxes of refugees create new socio-economic pressures and exacerbate competition for scarce resources, for example in Kenya and Chad. Tanzania, with a population of 30 million and one of the poorest countries in the world, had to host the largest refugee population in Africa of over one million in the 1990s; and received inadequate international funding for doing so.

(d) *The majority of conflicts are internal:* most of the conflicts in the world today are internal and this is certainly the case in Africa.[2]

(e) *Group identity manipulated for war:* the nature of internal conflict has ostensibly been changing. It is frequently claimed that ethnicity is a major cause of conflict. It is more likely, however, that ethnicity is used – just as other forms of group identity have been used, politicized and mobilized – for fuelling conflict and not vice versa (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 3), as this study aims to illustrate.

Factors particularly characteristic of Africa:

In addition to the global factors noted above, Africa has the following characteristics, which impact on and are affected by conflict:

(f) *Porous borders:* The borders of African nations are recent and benefit less than borders in other continents from distinctive and separating geographical demarcations between countries. They are lengthy and poorly policed. In this sense they are defined badly demarcated and porous, and routinely experience a high level of crossborder two-way undocumented crossings.

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2. Outside Africa, countries suffering from internal conflict include: Colombia, Haiti, Nepal, Russia/Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and the former Yugoslavia. The exceptions in Africa included, in the late 1990s, the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict; and the involvement of nine countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo, adding to the civic unrest within the country.

(g) *Shared conflict-related historical and politico-cultural cross border features:* In some cases, neighbouring countries in conflict share significant historical features and exhibit similar politico-cultural characteristics, as is the case with Rwanda and Burundi. Populations of the same cultures and communities straddle more than one country. A crisis in one country tends to culturally and politically affect neighbouring countries, such as the case of Somalia and Djibouti, or Liberia and Sierra Leone.

(h) *Physical cross border spill-over:* To be distinguished from the previous two points, conflict and population movements in one country often physically spill over into the subregion, exporting political, social, environmental or economic crises to neighbouring countries, for example Liberia to Ivory Coast, and Somalia to Ethiopia. Small arms flood the region, insecurity spreads, and an intensified scramble for resources becomes the order of the day. Previous routine cross border activity, is now exacerbated by large and uncharacteristic one-way population movements, overstretching the resources, the patience and survival mechanisms of the host populations.

(i) *Increased drought:* Drought and floods regularly and increasingly cause disasters in Africa. High population growth coupled with chronic food insecurity, and global warming, have compounded the intensity of the effects of drought in Africa and the inability of populations to depend on traditional survival mechanisms, such as in Ethiopia.

(j) *Africa's new double crisis:* When disaster hits regions already devastated by HIV/AIDS the customary social coping mechanisms are overwhelmed. The most recent examples are in drought-stricken areas of southern Africa where some countries have at times had an HIV prevalence of over 30 per cent, such as Zimbabwe. In Rwanda, increasing numbers of children are now 'separated', as many as 100,000, living on their own in child-headed families, with no parents or guardians (Guluma, 2004; Obura, 2005).

(k) *HIV's dual effects on education in countries in conflict:* Much has been written about the many ways in which HIV has affected the education sector, including the decimation of the teaching and learning population, coupled with the high rate of pupil absenteeism, particularly girls, and the weakening of sectoral structures. The sector also has a role in combating HIV through education on preventive and coping mechanisms. It is known that countries in conflict are

particularly vulnerable to HIV (Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, etc.), due to lack of health services and preventative health programmes, and are finding it difficult to marshall the education sector to combat HIV. These countries are not running quality lifeskills programmes in schools.

(l) *The twin engines of conflict – poverty and social inequity:* Poverty and inequity could be dubbed the twin engines of conflict. Analysis points to extreme internal inequity rather than poverty *per se* as the tinder box of conflict.

Education-related factors:

(m) *Conflict is a major cause of the global failure to achieve EFA:* It is now well documented that one of the major causes of global failure to achieve Education for All by the end of the last millennium was conflict across several countries. "More than half of the world's children without education live in countries in the midst of or recovering from conflict," points out Save the Children (Save the Children UK, 2005: 1). The trio poverty-conflict-schooling – or poor provision of schooling – are distressingly common, especially in Africa, for example, in Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan, amongst others.

(n) *New analyses of the relationship between education and conflict:* As a result of the growing understanding of the relationship between conflict and education, the spotlight has turned to focus on the nature of conflict, the role of education prior to, during and after conflict and, increasingly, to the potential of education to fuel or to abet conflict during each of these stages.

(o) *Schools/education targetted for destruction during conflict:* It is significant that the education system has become a prime target in many civil wars. Schools are seen as representing specific or incumbent political systems and regimes, and as symbols of peace and hope they provide a prime target for destruction so as to sow seeds of despair in the target population. Schools irritate warlords, rebels and militia whose aim is to destroy systems and terrorize people, including children. This has been the case in Somalia, Rwanda, southern Sudan, Angola and Burundi, where schools were bombed, burned and looted, school materials and equipment were stolen or destroyed, school children were killed (Rwanda);[3] children were

3. Teachers have often been the specific target of massacres.

chased away, abducted (Uganda and southern Sudan); and teachers and intellectuals specifically targetted and killed (Burundi).

(p) *Emergency education provision counts:* It is also documented, largely as a result of the current IIEP series on education in emergencies, that the maintenance of and the immediate attention to education in post-conflict reconstruction phases is a highly significant mechanism for preventing sector collapse, maintaining minimally functioning systems and, in time, for strengthening them; for increasing education enrolments and, potentially, for promoting the quality of education.

For all these reasons, education in countries in conflict needs urgent attention: ongoing analysis of practice on the ground, documenting lessons learned, followed by feedback and utilization for sound programme planning. The rationale for giving increased focus to education in emergencies and education for social reconstruction discussed above is reproduced below in schematic form, in *Table 1.2*. At the end of the study the matrix will be reviewed in order to include new insights, if any, from the Burundi case, and to give more attention to conflict prevention measures.

Table 1.2 Schema of the rationale for focusing on education in emergencies

Nature of factors	Characteristics of Conflict	Intensified strategies in education in emergencies
A. Worldwide *factors*	1. Conflict is increasing	A1. Develop increased & improved measures to rehabilitate education sector
	2. Civilian targets: schools & education materials destroyed, teachers killed	A2. Need for social reconstruction, rebuild-ing/ replacement, to provide fast return to normal (for children/ communities)
	3. Massive refugee influxes cause new social problems in host countries	A3. Need for education for refugees

	4. Most conflicts are internal	A4. Identify & reverse any anti-group content/practice in post-conflict education sector & in schools
	5. New analyses of the relationship between conflict and education	A5. Transform education sector into an engine of peace
B. Africa, *factors particularly characteristic*	1. Porous borders which routinely facilitate crossborder exchange	B1. Be aware of proliferation risk
	2. Shared conflict-related, historical and politico-cultural features can trigger cross border conflict	B2. Develop regional collaboration; counter & prevent ongoing negative cross border effects
	3. Physical cross border spill-over	B3. As above
	4. Drought: increased frequency and intensity, affecting larger populations	B4. Involve schools in food security programmes (general education, improved agricultural practices, school feeding programmes; agrarian reform)
	5. Disaster effects of drought coupled with HIV: Africa's new double crisis	B5. As above; & intensify lifeskills and HIV prevention education, targetting sector managers, teachers and pupils
	6. HIV disaster and its dual impact on the education sector, especially in countries in conflict	B6. As above, to be strengthened by peace education programmes
	7. Increasing poverty and social inequity: twin engines of conflict	B7. Develop affirmative, pro-poor sectoral policies & practices
C. Education- *related factors*	1. Conflict is a major cause of global failure to achieve EFA	C1. Support sector rehabilitation to boost efforts for achieving EFA
World/Africa	2. Schools/education sector targetted for destruction	C2. Emphasize education sector in national reconstruction exercise, as a forceful statement of rebuilding the future

	3. Increased danger of disruption of schooling	C3. Re-establish production of sector graduates to ensure national capacity growth
	4. Emergency education provision counts	C4. Use arguments from other post-conflict precedents to give high priority to education sector rehabilitation

The right hand column of the table outlines an exercise in damage control, inspired by the current IIEP country case studies. It responds with a strategy (in Col. 3) to match each of the problematic factors (Col. 2) arising from conflicts, which have repercussions on the education sector. The totality of the strategies constitute a rationale for working more intensively in the field of education in emergencies, in post-conflict situations and an attempt to pre-empt conflict in countries at risk. It makes sense to deal fast and effectively with the institutional or structural destruction of an education system to provide a quick return to normality, and to reduce recurrent costs, while ensuring a sector-wide approach, that is, with a view to the long term reconstruction of all levels and subsystems of the sector (Cells A1-2 and C1-4). Overt and hidden curriculum content, and institutional managementneeds to be oriented into positive, social reconstruction directions (Cells A4 and 5).

While adopting a cautious attitude to the role of schools in food production and management in disaster situations, due to widespread failures in the past in stable programme situations, there should be room for the exploration of new responses at the school level (Cell B4). And, despite the tragic inadequacy of most school programmes to date, this is no reason not to try again, to develop sound behaviour-oriented lifeskills programmes (Cells B5 and 6). All countries need to redouble efforts to target development to vulnerable populations in order to reduce national disparities (Cell B7).

Countries hosting refugees must shoulder their responsibilities, as the Tanzania and Kenya hosting experience indicates, map out needs and required responses; marshall adequate support from the international community; and adopt a regional approach to addressing immediate and long term problems (Cells A3 and B1-3).

To return to the first point, and to wrap up the points presented in this chapter, the present rate of increase in armed conflict in Africa is cause

for alarm. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) considers it to be the foremost obstacle to economic development and to the well-being of the continent.

> "[C]onflict ... has affected Africa particularly severely. Among the 20 countries with the highest level of refugee enrolments in education in 2002/2003, as many as 15 were on the African continent. And because income levels are so low in Africa the impact of such crises is particularly harsh" (Williams, 2005).

More and more, conflict risk is being addressed in Africa through preventive mechanisms, using peace-promoting measures and initiating participatory practices in government especially at local levels. Drought and flood disasters are increasingly being understood as preventable effects of weak governance, which need to be countered by national and regional planning, coupled with effective rural development. At the same time, while crises multiply and escalate in Africa, prudence dictates that disaster preparedness and disaster management skills should be acquired by all governments and agencies, among them the capacity for providing education in times of emergency.

As noted above, when reconstructing the education sector, it is important to identify the role that education played before the crisis and to ensure that it is used as a positive and active force for rebuilding social relations during the period of relief and reconstruction. Fortunately, the restoration of an educational system is now acknowledged to be a major strategy for social and national reconstruction in post-crisis situations. This is a recent phenomenon. It is only within the last five years that acceptance of this principle spread, following the approval of the Dakar Framework for Action in 2000, which declared the provision of education in emergencies as one of the major eleven objectives of basic education, in order to meet "the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability" (UNESCO, 2000: 9). Humanitarian departments and agencies now officially acknowledge that children should have access to education as soon as possible after a crisis and that education should be an integral part of emergency humanitarian services (Sommers, 2002: 9-11; Sinclair, 2001: 7-17; Pigozzi, 1999). At the Winnipeg Conference on War-Affected Children, in September 2000, all participants, including major donor governments, affirmed that: Education must be a priority in humanitarian assistance. Education is central to humanitarian action. The Governments of Norway and

Canada have referred to education as the 'fourth pillar' of humanitarian assistance, with food/water, health and shelter (Johannessen, 2002: 4; Government of Canada, 2000).

Policy is one thing. Funding is another. The world watches as industrialiszed nations struggle to revisit the pledges they made to development aid many years ago. In 2005 they are still far from meeting their international commitments. At the time of going to press, these nations were inching towards restructured pledges of 0.5 per aid of their gross domestic product (GDP) by 2010, and 0.7 per cent by 2015.

The structure of the study

The present chapter has noted the objectives, significance and limitations of the study, and explained the selection of Burundi as the seventh country case study in the IIEP series. The context of conflict in Africa was highlighted, particularly in relation to its impact on the education sector. The rationale for providing support to education in emergency and in post-conflict situations was revisited and developed.

Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the events, which have shaped modern schooling in Burundi. It separately investigates alleged social then education sector discrimination in the country over three time periods: pre-colonial times, the colonial era and after independence. Practices in the wider society and in the education sector are examined. The question is of some significance since it is often stated that Burundi did not suffer the same type or degree of social inequity as its neighbour, Rwanda.

In *Chapter 3*, an overview of the history of education in Burundi during colonial times describes the historical baggage inherited by schools and the steps taken by post-independent governments to make the education system more relevant to Burundi during the first three decades of independence. This is followed in *Chapter 4* by an account of the destruction of the education system in 1993 during the crisis, and of the initial efforts made to re-establish the sector in the aftermath of the crisis, continually comparing pre- and post-crisis situations, although it has to be remembered that Burundi, to this day, has not totally emerged from the period of internal conflict. *Chapter 5* looks back at what was achieved during the decade of ongoing conflict, which followed, the manner in which it was achieved and the obstacles confronting reconstruction. In *Chapter 6* Burundian children describe their world, their school and their

hopes for the future. *Chapter 7* looks at the special case of the *Batwa* people and describes their experience of educational neglect.

The provision of education for Burundian refugees in Tanzania is the subject of *Chapter 8*, contrasting with schooling experience inside Burundi and with refugee camps in neighbouring countries during that same decade. *Chapter 9* focuses on the type of education needed for repatriation and listens to the experiences and aspirations of refugee children. Concluding remarks are presented in *Chapter 10*, including lessons learned and suggestions for action in the future.

Chapter 2
Background

The chapter will give a brief general background to the geographic, economic, social and historical context of Burundi. The question of discriminatory practices has to be examined, both in society in general and in the education sector in particular, since it forms the basis of accusations and counter-accusations, which led to civil war in 1993 and the subsequent decade of strife. The relevant issues will be traced back through precolonial times, during colonial occupation and since independence, in an examination of general social trends and through documenting practices within the education sector. The chapter sets the scene for the overall review of education during the decade of conflict in the following chapters.

Introduction to Burundi

Burundi is a tiny land-locked country located east of the western rift valley in central Africa. It extends over 27,834 km^2, lying between one and two thousand metres altitude. The nearest ports are on the east African coast, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, at a distance of 1,500 and 2,000 km respectively. Kinshasa is 2,500 km away. The inland lakes of central Africa remain an important transport thoroughfare for the region. Lake Tanganyika, lying longitudinally between Burundi and Tanzania on the east and Congo on the west, is the second deepest lake in the world and continues to serve as an important communication route between the three countries (see map on page 22).

Burundi has over seven million inhabitants. It is the second most densely populated country in Africa after Rwanda, estimated at 228 inhabitants per km^2, while the average for sub-Saharan Africa is 20 per km^2.[4] It also has an atypically high rural population, currently about 90 per cent. A high percentage of Burundian families own less than

4. Total population data from: le Service d'appui aux programmes de population du Ministère de la Planification, de la Reconstruction et du Développement, *Données Statistiques* (IIEP, 2003). Population density is reported at 216 ha/km^2 (Atlapedia Online 2004; and between a range of 100-200 ha/km^2 to 300-500 ha/km^2 (Cochet, 1996: 67). Note that the population density in Rwanda is 321 ha/km^2, reported in the 2002 census summary report, (MINECOFIN, Rwanda, 2004: 4). Sub-Saharan Africa population density reported in UNICEF Burundi (1997*b*).

one hectare of farmland (Cochet, 1996: 67) and many are landless. Yet 90 per cent of the population is engaged in farming and only 9 per cent are urban dwellers, an unusually low percentage for Africa in the new millennium.

The economy

Principal cash crops are coffee (about 85 per cent of export earnings), tea and cotton, while subsistence crops include bananas, maize, cassava, sorghum and sweet potatoes. In 1990, three years before the war, 56 per cent of Burundi's GNP was derived from the agricultural sector. Pre-war macro-economic imbalances are indicated by the proportion of imports to exports, standing at 40 to 12 billion Burundi francs in 1990; and a foreign debt of US$1 billion, serviced at a rate of 31 per cent of annual export earnings. About 25 per cent of GNP was contributed by international aid in 1992, amounting to approximately US$315 million (Reyntjens, 1995: 6), indicating the pre-war dependence on aid and the fragile nature of the economy. Burundi consistently occupies one of the lowest global ranks in national wealth stakes and human development indicators. In the late 1990s, economic sanctions imposed by the international community further weakened the economy. In 1998 the GNP per capita income was US$145 (http://www.ochaburundi.org, November 2004) and Burundi was the twelfth poorest country in the world. The GNP per capita declined to US$110 by 2003 (United Nations, 2003*a*: 15). The average for sub-Saharan Africa was US$490, and Burundi became the third poorest country. The national currency, the *franc burundais*,[5] lost almost 30 per cent of its value between 2001 and 2003 (United Nations, 2003*a*: 15). In 2004, Burundi ranked 173rd out of 177 nations in the UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP, 2005). The general picture is of a chronically declining economy, with precipitous recent deterioration, and with no indication of strategies in place for recovery until peace is achieved.

The people

Four decades of intermittent strife and massacres, and eleven years of non-stop conflict, have left the people of Burundi in a desperate state. "Burundians live in some of the worst conditions in the world" (United Nations, 2003*b*). Approximately 300,000 Burundiians, mostly civilians, have been killed since the crisis in 1993. Adult illiteracy is estimated

5.. FBu1,099 equalled US$1 in October 2003.

at 52 per cent. Life expectancy has plunged from 54 years in 1992 to 41 years in 2001, aided and abetted by a high and still increasing HIV prevalence rate of 9.5 per cent in urban areas and 2.5 per cent in the rural areas, “making Burundi one of the most HIV/AIDS-affected countries in Africa” (IRIN, 12 February 2004). The people “have lost much of their capacity to care for themselves”. Some 70 per cent of the population is undernourished and 59 per cent live on less than a dollar per day. Almost 300,000 Burundians are officially displaced, living in 230 ‘sites’ all over the country. Nearly 800,000 exiles are in Tanzanian refugee camps, villages and the capital city; others are in the Congo. The most vulnerable people in Burundi today are displaced people, returnees, orphans, children, female-headed households and the Twa. The United Nations Consolidated Appeal for 2004 concludes: “few individuals are aware of their civil and human rights; serious violations abound” (United Nations, 2003*b*).

The people of Burundi speak the same language, live intermingled in all parts of the country, share the same culture, traditions and traditional religion, have intermarried over many centuries, and still belong to the same clans. In Burundi, most clans include both Tutsi and Hutu. The people of Burundi constitute one ethnic group: the *Banyarundi* or *Barundi*. They include about 85 per cent Hutu, 15 per cent Tutsi and under 1 per cent Twa. The Hutu and Tutsi are socio-identity groups, not ethnic groups, but have become increasingly distinctive groups since colonial times. In pre-colonial times – and as recently as the first half of the twentieth century – it was possible for a Hutu to become a Tutsi, through acquiring increased social privilege and property. Likewise, Tutsi could lose their economic assets and be relegated to Hutu status. The Twa were a hunter-gatherer community, formerly living in the forests. Up until 80 years ago the *Ganwa* ruled as regional governors or delegates of the monarch, as ‘an intermediate princely class’ between the people and the hereditary king or *mwami*. Many of the Ganwa were princes of royal blood. Historians have described the relations between Tutsi and Hutu in those times as generally harmonious (Gahama, 1999, and Reyntjens, 1995: 6).

The genesis of social polarization

The colonial regimes and, after them, the post-independence political elites, manipulated, politicized and polarized the groups to the point where Hutu/Tutsi identity became the factor determining socio-political roles and economic opportunity in Burundian society: “The colonizers

did not invent the categories Hutu, Tutsi ... but they recreated them as confrontational entities" (Shyaka, 2002: 127).

Since independence, the Tutsi a significantly small minority in numerical terms, have held onto power. The Hutu had constituted a minority in political terms, despite their numbers, since they had been excluded from political and economic power for 40 years and allowed only limited access to education since the 1930s. The Twa, have been neglected by all parties since colonial times. They are "the minority of minorities, marginalized socially, culturally, economically and politically, and despised by Hutu and Tutsi alike" (Reyntjens, 1995: 7).

At independence, in 1962, the Burundi monarch proved to be the sole unifying force with which both Hutu and Tutsi could identify. Reyntjens called the monarchy "the most important stabilizing element in the political system" (Reyntjens, 1995: 7). Prince Rwagasore, a nationalist, had been assassinated in 1961. He was not only the crown prince but also the nationally elected leader of the pro-independence party, UPRONA (Union pour le progrès national), which garnered a high proportion of the vote. After independence and after the loss of Rwagasore, the monarchy had to struggle to maintain its central role and authority. Repeated and increasingly violent conflict resulted in the abolition of the monarchy in 1966 and the consolidation of Tutsi republican power. In the late 1960s, "virtually all Hutu elements were eliminated from the armed forces" and Tutsi supremacy was achieved through "purges of Hutu officers and politicians". Between 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu were killed and a further 300,000 fled the country to neighbouring states.

> Chacun est atteint
> Chacun a perdu un être cher
> Des amis
> Des voisins
>
> *Entre la peur et l'espoir*
> Antoine Kaburahe 2002

Burundi before independence

Burundi was a well-defined kingdom, like its northern neighbour, Rwanda, well before the advent of the European colonizers, as *Table 2.1* illustrates.

Table 2.1 At a glance: The history of Burundi before independence

C16	**Kingship of Burundi traced to sixteenth century**
C19	Consolidation of the Kingdom of Burundi during nineteenth century
1860s	First European explorers reach Burundi
1884	Arab slavers routed by King Mwezi Gisabo
1891	Cattle disease decimates herds
1892	Smallpox epidemic
1899	**Burundi incorporated into German East Africa, as part of Ruanda-Urundi**
1899-1902	Famine
1903	King Mwezi Gisabo signs the Kiganda Treaty, after prolonged resistance, recognizing the German protectorate of Ruanda-Urundi
1904-1906	Famine
1905	Trypanosomiasis among people and herds
1909-1911	Famine
1914	First forced labour, porterage, and taxes
1916-1924	Ruanda-Urundi placed under Belgian mandate
1919	The Allies formally allocate Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium
1924-1962	Belgian trusteeship territory of Ruanda-Urundi
1920-1930s	Removal of Hutu from social/political leadership (chiefs, assistant chiefs); exclusion of Hutu from education/advancement
1930s	Forced coffee planting and grain storage; per capita (not per household) taxes imposed
1950s	Belgians give political support to Hutu
1959	Burundi witnesses upheaval in Rwanda, massacre of Tutsi and Tutsi refugee exodus
1961	Assassination of nationalist Prime Minister, UPRONA leader, Prince Rwagasore
1962	**Independence**

Burundi was incorporated into German East Africa in 1899. The Germans sent less than one dozen administrators to govern their newly acquired territory and used the system of indirect rule, basing their administration

on what they perceived to be the existing political structures. The effect was immediate. Alien rule interfered with and distorted existing political and social indigenous relations from this time onwards. Belgium occupied Ruanda-Urundi in 1916 and was given a mandate by the League of Nations to administer the country as a trust territory after the First World War. The practice of indirect rule was continued. Then followed increasingly direct, "arbitrary and disruptive interventions in Burundi's social and political system" (Reyntjens, 1995: 6) which took the following form: "the *elimination* by the colonial administration, during the decade 1920-1930, with the consent of the missionaries, *of all the Hutu chiefs and assistant chiefs* from the traditional political structures of the two kingdoms *and their replacement with Tutsi*" (emphasis added) (Shyaka, 2002: 131-3). The 1920s and 1930s consolidated Tutsi in power in both Burundi and Rwanda, giving them a headstart in education, employment and asset accumulation well before independence. Despite the change of support in the 1950s of the colonial power for Hutu in both Burundi and Rwanda, the initial historical advantage of the Tutsi was not significantly affected in either country. In Burundi, the unbroken political and economic domination of the group poses a unique challenge to post-war governance in the near future, since the roots of power go deep and have become almost invisible.

After independence

In 1962 Burundi gained independence from Belgium.

Events may be divided into decades, three presidents having ousted their predecessors from power in 1966, 1976 and 1987. Presidents Micombero, Bagaza and Buyoya, all Tutsi, all from the southern district of Bururi, set up respectively the first, second and third republics in those years. In contrast, the three Hutu presidencies lasted weeks or months, in 1993, 1994 and 1996. The first two Hutu presidents were assassinated and the third was forced to flee.

Table 2.2. Milestones in Burundi's political history since independence

1959	Burundi witnesses clash of elites vying for power in neighbouring Rwanda, *'révolution sociale'*, massacre of many Tutsi and massive Tutsi refugee exodus	
1961	Burundi national party UPRONA, led by the King's son, Prince Rwagasore, gathers mass support from Tutsi and Hutu in September elections. Prince Rwagasore is assassinated in October	
	PRESIDENCIES AND REPUBLICS IN BURUNDI	**Years marked by violence**
1962	INDEPENDENCE – monarchy Successive premierships	
1965	King flees	*1965*
1966	*President Michel Micombero, putsch – monarchy abolished*	1969
	[1st Republic]	1972
1976	*President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza ousted Micombero in coup d'État [2nd Republic]*	
1987	*President Pierre Buyoya ousted Bagaza in coup d'État*	*1988*
	[3rd Republic]	*1991*
1993	**President Melchior Ndadaye,** FRODEBU – 1st Hutu President elected in 1st multiparty elections June 1993, assassinated 21 October	*1993* *ongoing*
1994	President Cyprien Ntaryamira – 2nd Hutu President, elected 13 January by Parliament, killed 6 April	
	President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya – 3rd Hutu President, nominated 1 October, fled 23 July 1996	
1996 2000	President Pierre Buyoya took over (25 July) Arusha peace accord signed by 19 parties; CNDD-FDD signed in 2002 and FNL in 2005	
2001	November 1: **Transitional Government** for four years Consecutive presidencies: UPRONA (2001-2003), **President Pierre Buyoya** FRODEBU (2003-2005), **President Domitien Ndayizeye**	
2005	**President Pierre Nkurunziza** took office on 19 August after general elections. By June 2006, all rebel parties but one had signed peace accords with the Government.	

Source: Chrétien and Mukuri, 2002.

Since 2001 there has been a transitional government in Burundi. The intention was to share political power among Hutu and Tutsi, and share the presidency consecutively between Tutsi (2001-2002) and Hutu presidents (2003-2005) for 18 months each. Due to insecurity, elections were repeatedly deferred during the period 2003 to 2005 but eventually took place in August 2005. On 19 August, Burundi's Parliament elected as President of Burundi Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu, head of the former rebel Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and sole candidate for the post.

The current phase of the civil war started in 1993 and has continued until the present, although the peace process has been reinforced since 2000, resulting in the gradual inclusion of all parties in that process and the extension of secure areas in the country. A referendum was held on the Constitution in February 2005 and the last rebel force, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) signed the national peace agreement early 2005. The least secure areas are now concentrated around Bujumbura, the capital, although the city itself is generally calm and well protected.

Years noted for violence in Burundi are: 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993. The events of 1972 and 1993 were the worst in terms of extent and brutality of killings. The years of comparative peace and progress were the late 1980s and early 1990s and again in the last five years. In the first case progressive policies, widening the participation of the Burundian people in government led to a violent backlash in 1993. The second time around, since the year 2000, international support has resulted in a more inclusive and possibly sustainable peace process, partly driven by the commitment of the late President Nyerere of Tanzania and former President Mandela of South Africa.

The non-identical twins

In Francophone literature on Burundi and Rwanda, the two countries are known as *les faux jumeaux*, the non-identical twins. The French expression is more evocative than the English, since it translates literally as *the false twins*, which highlights the commonalities but also the danger of considering the two countries as being alike. They were joined in one dual territory under the Germans and then the Belgians, as Ruanda-Urundi, then separated once again at independence. The falsity, misperceptions and betrayal of the colonial powers are also reflected in the term. The symbolism of twin births is legion in the literature: the mother-culture and body-politic of German/Belgian oppression; the nurturing of false

identities during the colonial period in the 'womb'; what some would call the false premise of independence in 1962 symbolized by the severing of both umbilical cords with Belgium on the same date; the gasp for the first breath wracked by the decimation of national leaders in the first years of independence in Burundi and during the upheavals of 1959 in Rwanda. Then came the struggle that each country waged over the next 40 years to survive a world market constantly pushing down the prices of developing country exports, in a context of burgeoning populations and shrinking land assets, the never-ending strife in the Great Lakes Region, proximity to the giant Congo, suffering international post-cold war realignments, globalization, and the repeated betrayal by their power elites. As events unfolded in one of the *faux jumeaux*, so the events would be mirrored in the neighbouring twin country, but in a nonidentical manner.

Investigating social discrimination

A review of the education sector in Burundi during the last decade, and planning for the future, would be misconceived without some reference to the destructive social forces, which have dogged schooling in the country since the 1930s. School enrolments remained much lower in Burundi than in Rwanda after independence.

There are continuing accusations and counter-accusations with regard to exclusion from the sources of wealth and power in the nation. In a study of this nature, it has to be established whether discrimination was indeed practised in the education sector in Burundi against any social group or whether it is a figment of the imagination. The second question is whether discrimination and inequity, if they existed, whatever their form or degree, could have been one of the causes, or the principal cause of massacres or genocide in Burundi over the last 40 years.

The picture the external world has of Burundi is inevitably confused by the fact that discrimination in Rwanda has been clearly demonstrated as anti-Hutu in colonial times, then anti-Tutsi after independence, followed by an accumulation of bewildered trauma and pain on all sides since the genocide of 1994. Burundi's history has been patently different since independence in terms of type, degree and visibility of discrimination. And, due to social structures unique to each country, Hutu-Tutsi dynamics manifested some differences across the two countries even in precolonial times. Post-independence politics have been continuously Tutsi dominated in Burundi, with the exception of a few months' duration in mid-1993, before the crisis; and since 2001, under the power-sharing transitional government.

Evidence from the colonial era indicates that discrimination was practised in Burundi against the Hutu and the Twa, including discrimination within the education sector, which is the focus of the present study. The origins of discriminatory practice start about one hundred years ago, with the arrival of the German (1899) and Belgian (1916) colonizers, who developed false perceptions of Burundi society, which went uncorrected. These notions spread amongst the colonizers and thenevolved into social theories, which were appropriated by the colonial authorities and by supposedly scientific observers of Burundi society, disseminated by these authorities and then, tragically, presented to and generally assimilated by the colonized peoples themselves. This has been the pattern in most societies colonized towards the end of the second millennium of modern times, and is discernible in history well before then.

It is important to describe, in summary, the social context that the colonizers found in the territory of Burundi on their arrival, so as to appreciate the changes brought on by colonization. The brief overview below owes its content to the authoritative work of the historians Mworoha, Gahama and Chrétien. Mworoha's work covers pre-colonial times. Gahama's studies focus on the colonial period 1919-1939 and quote regularly from the informative masters theses completed at the University of Burundi during the 1970s. Chrétien deals with both past and contemporary history. The results of historical research are complemented here with citations from anecdotal documented sources, at points where they illustrate or complement the historical evidence of the academics.

Investigating discrimination before colonial times

Before the twentieth century, there is no evidence of antagonism or confrontational relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi social groups. The Kingdom of Burundi was established around the sixteenth century. It was divided into regions or provinces and ruled by the king, or *mwami*, through his delegates, the princely class known as the Ganwa, a class unique to Burundi. In addition to Ganwa governors, some areas were administered by Hutu or by Tutsi bishikira, sometimes called chiefs, who also administered the subregions or subchiefdoms (Gahama, 1999: 287). The traditional priests and diviners at the court were, in the main, Hutu and enjoyed considerable political influence. The king did not hold absolute power, enjoy a 'divine right of kings' or own all the land or the cattle of the kingdom, as the Europeans thought: "In practice, the

king's power was limited, yet his authority was all-encompassing and recognized as such through the territory".[6] He was highly respected and powerful, but kingly power had its limits. There is no definitive finding as yet, but from the historical evidence available, the *mwami* could have come from either Hutu or Tutsi stock.

It is not that life in those times was idyllic. From time to time there were rivalries and fierce competition amongst neighbours, over natural resources, such as land, or over water in the east. The important point, however, is that, according to historical records, when conflict arose, it was about land, and it was interterritorial. Rivalries did not pit Hutu against Tutsi, or against Ganwa or Twa. Ganwa rivalry could lead to conflict between intermingled Tutsi and Hutu groups living in different areas, princedoms or chiefdoms, in wars often directed by rival Ganwa who wished to extend their land (Gahama, 1999: 19, 29). The four categories of Burundis – Twa, Hutu, Tutsi and Ganwa – all shared the same language, culture, religion and traditions, and have considered themselves historically to be one people: "at the dawn of colonization, there was a culturally homogeneous and integrated population in Burundi, using one language, having the same customs and traditions. There were inequalities in society, naturally, but there were no ethnic or potentially ethnic antagonisms" (Mariro, 1998: 47).[7]

The term 'ethnic' cannot be used correctly in reference to the people of Burundi except as one sole ethnic group of Burundis or Barundi. From this point on, the term 'ethnic' will be avoided unless quoting directly from another source. The Twa, Hutu, Tutsi and Ganwa, are described in this study as social groups or, in technical terms, as 'socio-identity groups'.

The people of Burundi (and Rwanda) were agro-pastoralists, tilling the land and herding cattle, one practice complementing the other. Farmers focused on herding or agriculture depending on the region they inhabited. Some Tutsi had large herds. Hutu were able to improve their social status by becoming Tutsi, through mechanisms that will be

6. "Autant son autorité était limitée en pratique, autant donc elle était immense en principe et reconnue comme telle dans le pays" (Gahama, 1999: 21, 23). Ndikumana holds the opposite view (2004: 4).
7. A UNICEF report echoed this view: "[the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa] of the Rwandan population have been wrongly designated as 'ethnic' groups by the colonial power. It can be said without any ambiguity that the anthropological basis of this definition cannot be traced ..." (UNICEF/Government of Rwanda, 1997: 2).

explained below. Hutu and Tutsi habitations were intermingled across the hills and the people intermarried. The Twa lived in the forests. They were hunter-gatherers and potters.[8]

The points that are to be made below highlight the intermingling of the Burundian people over the geographical space of the kingdom; the emphasis on the personal qualities demanded of leaders rather than on their adherence to the groups Ganwa, Tutsi, Hutu or Twa; and the mutable quality of social group adherence in Burundi before the arrival of the colonizer.

The flexibility of social structures: earning rank

There are at least four categories of leadership,which illustrate the importance of leadership qualities in Burundi culture and the processes by which leadership-appointing bodies identified and fostered what would today be called the qualities of good governance. This resulted in a requirement for leaders at every level to earn their appointment, to demonstrate and to maintain the required qualities and attributes.

(a) *Earning kingship:* The king, the *mwami*, ruled at the behest of his subjects. He did not rule for life, but was expected to abdicate in favour of the next king, when the young man was deemed ready to take over. This indicates the traditional understanding of the people in Burundi that even kings have their time limits and that there is an appropriate time for handing over power.[9] Second, the eldest son and the sons of the king did not automatically become king. The councils of elders chose the next king from among the royal extended family, the ganwa, who could number up to 1,000 interested parties. The elders selected the prince with the personal attributes most appropriate for kingship (Gahama, 1999: 23; Kamatari, 2001: 22).

(b) *Earning the rank of ganwa:* The Ganwa class was unique to Burundi in central Africa. A Ganwa, or *umuganwa*, was a prince of the blood, or a member of the extended family of the king, appointed to administer a given territory. When they stopped administering

8. The Batwa are said to number approximately 80,000 across Burundi, Congo, Rwanda and Uganda and form less than 1 per cent of the population in both Burundi and Rwanda. They are a subgroup of the approximately one quarter of a million pygmoid peoples in central Africa, from Cameroon to Burundi (Golden and Edgerton, 2003).

9. The king not only abdicated but elected to die, to make the kingship fully available for the successor: he drank poison (Kamatari, 2001: 23-24); Chrétien (2000: 102).

territory they stopped being an *umuganwa*. After two or three generations a Ganwa family could be reclassified as Tutsi.[10] Among those who administered regions were some Tutsi and Hutu who were not Ganwa.

At times governorship or chieftainship of a territory extended to enclaves located within other chieftainships. The enclaves or pieces of land were not necessarily adjacent to each other. Another point to note is that chieftainship was not only territorial. It was also linked to specific responsibilities – the collection of taxes and tributes of property in kind, such as honey or cattle – which the *ivyibare* carried out, not only on the land belonging directly to the king, but across other geographical areas forming part of the kingdom but not owned personally by the king. Outsiders evidently did not understand the multifaceted nature of chieftainship. When the Belgians decided to define and determine the extent and limits of chieftainship in the early 1930s, they reduced the complex web of administration in the kingdom, to mere territorial administration, each area with its own chief or governor; thereby distorting the complex concepts in Burundi of governorship, leadership and responsible administration (Gahama, 1999: 29). By restricting chieftainship to the Tutsi, the colonizers created an immutable class of rulers, eliminating all other citizens from leadership, and instigating social discrimination along lines of Tutsi/Hutu identity.

(c) *Earning appointment to the ubushingantahe*:[11] The institution of *ubushingantahe* was also unique to Burundi. It comprised the leadership at community level of specific, exceptional and well-tested community notables, selected over time for their distinct qualities and integrity (Ntahombaye, 1999). This social structure will be described in more detail below, when focusing on the relevance of tradition to modern Burundi and on traditions which could be woven into modern, peace-oriented education. At this point, to further demonstrate the flexibility of Burundian social structures, it can be pointed out that, interestingly, the *umushingantahe* or senior community councillors, were not only elderly men of the community. There were rare cases of younger men appointed as *umushingantahe*, if they showed extraordinary skills and traits of

10. The historian Gahama provides an example by name (1999: 26).
11. *Ubushingantahe* is the term for the institution of community leadership; the *umushi-ngantahe* (pl.) are the people who hold the post; Gahama (1999: 300); and Laely (1992).

character. Appointment to the ranks of the *ubushingantahe* had to be earned, as in the case of kingship, by observable deeds and honourable behaviour over long years. A further important point to note is the process of community selection, ensuring that the appointees were accountable to those who had elected them. The *umushingantahe* were regarded as the voice of the people and the representatives of the people. The system was characterized by its bottom up structure.

(d) *Earning appointment as a bishikira: bishikira* or chiefs – Traditionally both Hutu and Tutsi (Rutake and Gahama, 1998: 82) – who administered territories belonging directly to the king, as opposed to the other land in the kingdom, were also appointed according to their track record: "the tradition was to give chieftainship and subchieftainship only to those who merited it" rather than according them to a person's family category or lineage.[12]

In conclusion, the aspect of earning public appointment to leadership and being accountable to the appointing institution or the people was deeply entrenched in Burundian culture. When the Belgians took over the power of appointment from the king (with regard to provincial governorship or chieftainship and *bishikira*) and from the people (with regard to *ubushingantahe),* they transformed appointment procedures into a top-down process. Second, they changed the criteria of eligibility, from that of proven integrity and loyalty to the traditional appointing body – to the king or people – to that of willingness to collaborate with the colonial authorities. The desire for individual advancement came to obliterate the former moral obligation of service and accountability of leaders to the appointing institution. Mariro (1998) describes how the new driving forces of individualism were then reinforced by the competitive ethos promoted by the modern institution of the school.

Mutable categories of classes and people

The ranks of Hutu, Tutsi and Ganwa were mutable. Rich Hutu would marry Tutsi women, and the combination of wealth and a Tutsi marriage alliance ended up by propelling Hutu into Tutsi ranks: "since they had many head of cattle, they ended up by being [reluctantly]

12. Gahama citing Siryuyumunsi, a Tutsi Hima, and Muhakwanke, a Hutu, speaking in 1957: "the traditional customs ... gave those who merited appointment the right to become chiefs and subchiefs. It was not a question of family background or lineage" (1999: 287).

accepted”. But these *nouveaux riches* had their problems, which are known all over the world, when rich upstarts try to find their feet in the superior ranks of society. Some were considered as bumbling and slightly ridiculous gatecrashers and were accused of having bought rank rather than having been born to it. Gahama notes that, at one point, the connotation of the term Tutsi changed. It came to mean a wealthy person (Gahama, 1999: 288).

‘Tutsification’ was nothing new. There was even a name for the process of dropping Hutu status: *kwihutura*.[13] Gahama cites the case of many Bashubi and Bajiji Hutu from Muramvya who managed ‘fairly successfully’ to become Tutsi; and the considerable numbers of Bairu Hutu from Nkore who, at the turn of the century, received cattle after giving distinguished service to the king, and who married Hima Tutsi women. Although in a patriarchal society children normally inherit the rank of their father, the descendents in this case became Tutsi Hima after two or three generations (Gahama, 1999: 288). What is described here is a slow mutation, accepted due to the measured pace of events and, no doubt, to the exceptional service that the Bairu had rendered their king. But for the Hutu in the 1930s-1950s, suddenly facing exclusion from the regular enjoyment of social and economic benefits, *kwihutura* became a calculating and even desperate mechanism used to save the family and oneself from social obscurity and disadvantage.

The latter-day process of *kwihutura* can be compared and contrasted with the syndrome in both Rwanda and Burundi of acquiring membership of elite political groups since the last four decades, and of the increasingly desperate measures employed by political elites to hold onto power. The gradual processes of *kwihutura* were acceptable more than 50 years ago. Today, the rapacious scramble for power has brought both countries to their knees, fuelled by the societal changes enforced by the colonizers in the first half of the twentieth century to rule a foreign people in an alien and ultimately ungovernable way. The remedy – and the challenge – is to re-institute social equity, but without turning the clock back.

Investigating discrimination during colonial times

The early twentieth century found the Europeans continuing their quest to discover every last inch of the globe and document every last human community. The scientists of the nineteenth century aimed to

13. Literally, this means losing buhutu or Hutuhood.

develop classificatory systems and taxonomies, to analyze and categorize everything they saw, from plants to cultures. They looked for hierarchies in nature and applied similar classificatory methods to their study of human society. The methods of investigation and observation were still raw and, particularly in the human sciences, the methods of analysis were embryonic, to say the least, and depended heavily on the socio-historical context of the observers, as is the case of all scientific endeavour.

However, to credit the first colonizers with the title 'scientists' would be to totally misrepresent them. They were mainly adventurers, traders, missionaries, dubious emissaries of European potentates, soldiers, mercenaries and crooks.[14] Domination of central Africa, as elsewhere in the colonized world, led to misguided and distorted perceptions of the colonized peoples. Prejudiced views produced unfounded generalizations, stereotypical images, and led, ultimately, to the dehumanization of colonized peoples. And, as Reychler, Musabyimana and Calmeyn (1999) point out, this last stage resulted in the 'deviant behaviour' that they euphemistically describe, namely the criminal treatment of fellow human beings, degradation, exploitation and, ultimately, to physical violence and murder of the people. The first genocide of the twentieth century took place in Africa against the Herrero people in Namibia and, as the century closed, the last genocide took place in Burundi's neighbour and 'twin' nation, Rwanda, in 1994.

In Burundi the colonizers misunderstood the nature of Burundian society, its spirituality, its traditions and culture; the functions of the king's court; and the dynamics of social administration. What they did not see they assumed in their ignorance to be missing. What they saw, they only partially understood. They would also 'discover' categories and features of Burundian and Rwandan society where none existed. At other times they noted the existence of social categories but failed to understand the nature of those categories. The new discipline of anthropology was an attempt to make sense of world cultures and peoples from an insider standpoint, but it was initiated from a Eurocentric point of departure.

The colonizers took over the administration of Burundi soon after the famines and cattle diseases of the early 1900s, before family herds

14. As many as one third of the Europeans in Burundi in the 1940s were missionaries.

had been restocked.[15] The herds of the agropastoralist Hutu and Tutsi had been decimated and many families, untypically, were left without any cattle at all. The foreigners imagined that livestock farming was a permanent characteristic of some, of a group they identified as Tutsi and, to simplify their understanding of the society, they deduced that crop farming was the exclusive occupation of others, whom they identified as exclusively Hutu. The myth of Tutsi pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists in Ruanda-Urundi was born (Cochet, 2002: 96).

In their eagerness to create social hierarchies, with which they were familiar and comfortable, and to which they could delegate the functioning of the colonized state, under a system they would call 'indirect rule', the colonizers selected one group of people to play the role of a superior administrative class and another for an inferior labouring class. In Burundi, as in Rwanda, the roles were allocated to people they called Tutsi and Hutu, respectively.[16] However, in Burundi, Tutsi ascendancy incorporated the class of Ganwa: "the Germans and then the Belgians strengthened the power of the Ganwa, linking Tutsi to Ganwa administration but excluding the Hutus". Under the influence of the missionaries, they abolished the significant spiritual and political role of the traditional priests and diviners at the king's court, who were mainly Hutu. In 1930, the colonial government introduced the requirement for personal identity cards to state the 'ethnic' origin of the bearer: "The division of the population on 'racial' grounds was determined once and

15. There were unprecendented outbreaks of human and cattle disease, and famine, just as the first colonizers reached the region: cattle disease in 1891 and 1905, smallpox in 1892, and famine in 1889-1892, 1904-1906 and 1909-1911. The first taxes imposed in 1914 and forced labour for porterage served to weaken economic recovery strategies even more (Cochet, 1996: 35).
16. In almost every colonized territory, the colonizers created new hierarchies of peoples. In Kenya, the Somali were classed above the other Kenyan communities, but below those of mixed Swahili-Arab descent. In Sudan, the colonizers first placed the northerners above the southerners, and called the northerners Arabs. In Nigeria, the Ibo were favoured by the colonizer above other communities. In India, the imperialists privileged the Muslims. And so it continued. The twenty-first century still lives out these imposed distortions that bit deep into the culture of colonized peoples, to the extent that many of the current conflicts reflect centuries-old foreign, cultural impositions.

for all" (Rutake and Gahama, 1998: 87).[17] The European perception of Burundi society was then fed to the colonized peoples through the authoritative power structure of the repressive colonial regime, and particularly to pupils in the first schools of the trusteeship territory.

To sum up briefly, since the topic has been fully examined by scholars of international repute, such as Mworoha, Rutake, Gahama, Cochet and Chrétien: The social organization of Ruanda-Urundi was first misunderstood and then represented erroneously and stereotypically by the colonizers. According to Rutake and Gahama (1999: 83), it was the British explorer J.H. Speke who thought up the divisive and latterly destructionist myth of ethnic categorization and hierarchy in Ruanda-Urundi. Having confused the physical characteristics of the Tutsi and the Ganwa at the court of King Rumanvuika of Karawe in north-west Tanzania, he developed the notion that they were related to the Galla of Ethiopia or were possibly descendants of Ham. The 'Hamitic myth', as it came to be known was taken up by the next adventurers that came to central Africa, the traders, missionaries and colonizers. They imagined the Tutsi (a) to be rulers; (b) to be descended from a biblical people; and (c) they thought Tutsihood and Hutuhood were markers of ethnic groups such as they had seen in other parts of Africa. Instead of developing a policy to redress a perceived social imbalance in the society, the colonizers proceeded to reinforce the apparent disadvantage of the Hutu in ways that will be noted in the section on *Investigating discrimination after independence* below.

The economy of Burundi, like those of all other African countries, underwent a process of profound change. The move from a traditional economy to a monetary and a market economy led to significant modifications in the concept of wealth (Mariro, 1998: 48). According to Mariro, the colonial entities of Africa were established on feet of clay, more particularly in the case of Ruanda-Urundi where the tissue of the society had been completely destroyed in the 1930s: "Colonial Burundi was built *on the ruins of* a former strong political, cultural and spiritual society" (emphasis added) and, by implication, it was doomed to collapse (Mariro, 1998: 54).

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17. 'Race' refers to the association the colonizers created between an erroneous identification of Burundi ethnic groups and racial origins, identifying *Tutsis* with *'Hamitic'* origins and *Hutus* with *Bantu* origins. The Tutsis and Hutus were neither ethnic groups nor, demonstrably, of different racial origin. The issue of identity card format was only debated later in 1957 (Gahama, 1999: 286) and the 'ethnic' label, which identified the card holder as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa erased from ID cards after independence (Mariro, 1998: 251).

Investigating discrimination after independence

At independence in 1962, Burundi inherited a forty-year legacy of discrimination. An overview of practices after independence points to the multiple areas of exclusion of Hutu operated by government machinery. Repression against the Hutu did not simply take the form of killing. It was the culmination of the attempt, according to an authoritative historian, "to remove the [Hutu] from access to employment, property, education, and the general chance to improve themselves" (Lemarchand, 2002: 557, quoting US Embassy cables in English, No. 1028, 25 July 1972 from Lemarchand Papers, University of Florida, American Embassy Cables.

The humiliations suffered included "sectarianism, arbitrary treatment and arrogance, which was the lot of most of the rural population who were mainly Hutu" (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 78). "The peasantry has been humiliated by the continued enforcement of most of the regulations that were in force in colonial times, on the pretext of promoting development ... They have been made second class citizens in their own land and subjected to directives from above, from the central state, without being able to participate in decision making" (Cochet, 1996: 72). "The fundamental dilemma for the Hutu lies in their exclusion from the strategic sectors of political and social life, which has its origins in colonial times" (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 79). The experience of the Hutu in Burundi has been compared to that of South Africans under apartheid. One reads repeatedly in the literature of 'the Tutsi hegemony' (Lemarchand, 2002: 563). In neighbouring Rwanda, in the 1970s, committees for the verification of what was called 'ethnic identity' were set up (Lemarchand, 2002: 562). Again and again it is emphasized that the rural population, who were mainly Hutu, lived in worsening conditions over the first three decades of independence, arbitrarily, dictatorially – and ineffectively – pushed by the state into one disastrous agricultural project after another. By 1993 they had had enough. Burundians emphasize the fact that "in Burundi the violation of human rights was not merely a consequence of civil war". On the contrary, human rights violations after independence were the principal cause of the war: "[E]ven in peace time equal opportunity for peoples of different ethnic groups and regions was just a dream as far as education, legal rights and employment, etc., were concerned" (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 74).

Some of the specific forms of discrimination that were practised in Burundi are detailed immediately below (a) to (f), summarized in the *box*.

General post-independence discriminatory practices in Burundian society

(a) Exclusion from leadership, local administration and political power – and the development of a policy of discrimination;
(b) Exclusion from/manipulation of the judiciary;
(c) Exclusion from the armed forces;
(d) Exclusion from employment;
(e) Expropriation of property;
(f) Extermination/massacres.

(a) Exclusion from leadership, local administration and political power. A policy of discrimination

The Belgians revised the structure and nature of regional and community leadership. In the 1930s, they systematically got rid of all Hutu chiefs and subchiefs, bishirika, and placed Tutsi in their place. They then reserved administration training for the sons of chiefs, automatically excluding Hutu from education programmes that would prepare them for administration. Gahama points to the overtly discriminatory policies of the 1950s which were identified with concern at that point by certain Tutsi and Hutu leaders, who described them as such. The Micombero Government systematically employed a policy of exclusion in the late 1960s (Gahama, 1999: 287; Lemarchand, 2002: 552). By 1972, after the massacres, there was no prevarication: "all the Hutu ministers were relieved of their posts ... then summarily executed" (Lemarchand, 2002: 562). The first elected Hutu president, President Ndadaye, was assassinated in 1993, the second, President Ntaryamira, was killed alongside his Rwandan counterpart in a plane crash in Kigali (1994), and the third, President Ntibantunganya, was forced out of office after a year and fled the country (1996).

(b) Exclusion from, then manipulation of the judiciary

The judiciary was not separated from the legislative or executive, and was absorbed into the political, military power structure. Then followed a practice of double standards: impunity for [Tutsi] army crimes while bringing Hutu to trial for the crimes they had committed in the 1972 massacres (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 90).

(c) Exclusion from the armed forces

In 1972, the army was completed cleansed of Hutu elements. About 700 soldiers were killed in addition to all the Hutu officers, who were

tortured, executed and their bodies thrown into a ditch. Some weeks later, 800 new Tutsi recruits were taken into the army, among them 50 at officer rank, mainly from Bururi. They were given a crash course in order to replace the Hutu (Lemarchand, 2002: 556). Ndikumana explains that in addition to the exclusion of Hutu, non-southern Tutsi were also excluded from the army, producing a tightly knit Tutsi Hima concentration (Ndikumana, 2004: 16).

(d) Exclusion from employment

The point is repeated again and again by witnesses of the late 1960s up to today, that since the civil service (including the teaching profession), the army and the Church were the main employers in the country, those who had power over these structures determined recruitment into their ranks. The first tactic used to bar Hutu was to fire them from the civil service and the armed forces; the second was to recruit Tutsi rather than Hutu; and the third, was to design a policy of recruitment on merit. This constituted a barrier for Hutu since they generally could not meet the minimum entrance requirements, having been filtered out of the school system early on. Lucrative business contracts from government went to cronies and kinsmen, making it difficult for Hutu businesses to survive in the private sector. The profitable coffee industry was also a Tutsi fiefdom. The informal sector remains relatively undeveloped in Burundi (Cochet, 1996: 68, 70 and Reychler *et al*., 1999: 74).

(e) Expropriation of property

Convicted (Hutu) killers in 1972 had their property taken over by the state. Their cars, houses, and bank savings were given to Tutsi victims, with an immediate down payment of 100 francs per family (Lemarchand, 2002: 558).

(f) Massacres

The massacres in 1965, 1969 and 1972 killed more Hutu than Tutsi, culminating in what has been called ethnic cleansing in the corridors of power (Lemarchand, 2002: 553). In 1972, the atrocities surpassed anything experienced before in the region. For the record, it is important to note that the atrocities committed against the Hutu in 1972 equalled in violence those that would be perpetrated against the Tutsi during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 (Ntibantuganya and Kiraranganiya as reported by Lemarchand, 2002: 557). Hundreds, then thousands of Tutsi were massacred in the south by insurgents and Hutu. The army then retaliated,

killing as many as 200,000 or 300,000 Hutu. Historians are the first to point out that the killers did not include all Tutsi, or all Tutsi Hima, or all Hutu in the south.[18] The significant point is that the final and most widespread killings in 1972 were perpetrated by the army turning on its own people and massacring them in their hundreds of thousands.

It has been alleged that there was a systematic plan for the extermination of the Hutu in 1972, that this was not some spontaneous uprising on the part of the Tutsi or merely a reprisal for the Hutu massacre of Tutsi in October. According to this argument, the existence of a plan would account for the high number of Hutu killed and for the search for specific individuals among the Hutu in order to diminish their leadership: The leaders and the educated, as well as potential leaders such as young children in primary school.[19] Almost all the Hutu elite was killed, including most of the students at the University of Bujumbura, the technical high schools, the top secondary schools and teacher training institutions and, as noted, even children in primary school, a total of 200-300,000 deaths (Lemarchand, 2002: 555).

Investigating discrimination in the education sector from 1920s to 1993

It is commonly said that, unlike Rwanda, there was no discrimination in the Burundi school system. The issue now arises as to whether discriminatory practices in Burundi society in general are reflected in the education sector. The answer to this question will have direct relevance for the examination in this study of the education sector during the emergency and for planning education for reconstruction in peace-time. As in the section on *Investigating social discrimination* above, the approach will be to collect a wide variety of voices on the subject.

In developing countries where there is palpable poverty, access to education becomes a highly prized resource because it opens the door to employment, wealth acquisition and power, especially in countries with relatively low school enrolments, as was the case in Burundi after independence. Mariro views the school in Burundi as the principal mechanism in the creation of national divisions (Mariro, 1998: 55). The

18. "The majority of these crimes were committed by the Tutsi Hima of Bururi Province ..." (Lemarchand 2002: 552).
19. There was "a plan to carry out the systematic extermination of the Hutu ... to kill, man for man, the educated Hutu. This caused the deaths of several tens of thousands alone" (Rossel, 1992: 39).

education sector became a battlefield where each side was struggling to obtain the spoils, that is, a place in school for their children and kin. The maldistribution – and the allegedly discriminatory nature – of education in the country has been seen, rightly or wrongly, as the source of all other inequities in the nation. The situation had persisted for some time, since the 1930s. The year 1966 marked a watershed in Tutsi domination over all the nation's institutions, including the education system. Exclusion and discrimination in the education system became more visible from that year on. After 1972 the situation worsened again considerably, and education became the focus in the scramble for social gains (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 93-94).

The fact that Hutu school children were targets of repeated massacres lends credence to the theory that some leaders may have had a plan to totally exclude Hutu from the political system by curtailing the education of Hutu youth: "the education system was the preferred mechanism for creating and perpetuating injustice and exclusion" (Mariro, 1998: 90). "[T]he education system ... [and] other instruments of social control ... have been exploited and kept for the exclusive benefit of certain Tutsi individuals in leadership positions" (Mariro, 1998: 49). To indicate the involvement of negative forces inside the education sector, a plan to target the Hutu was allegedly drawn up by a minister who had been Minister of Education at the time of the important education sector reform, which focused on the Kirundization and ruralization of the curriculum in the early 1970s (Rossel, 1992: 39).

Discrimination in the education sector involved the following elements, summarized in the box and detailed below.

Discriminatory practices in the education sector in Burundi – 1930s to 2000s

(a) Structural discrimination;
(b) Curricular discrimination;
(c) Limitation of Hutu enrolment in the education system;
(d) Inequitable school provision, staffing, equipment and supplies;
(e) Manipulation of examination results;
(f) Regular disruption of the education system;
(g) Targetting students in secondary and tertiary education institutions;
(h) Reducing the number of Hutu teachers.

(a) Structural discrimination

It was above all the secondary schools that promoted social division in Burundi, according to Mariro, since their original objective had been to train a national elite of administrative cadres to assist the colonial government. The most prestigious school in Ruanda-Urundi, Astrida Secondary School (in Butare, situated in present day Rwanda), established in 1932, had played a critical role in crystallizing the 'ethnic' rift within society. The school prioritized admission of the children of dignitaries and only sons of chiefs or Tutsi were authorized to enter the senior secondary stream specializing in administration, the section reserved for future chiefs (Mariro, 1998: 51). Chiefs' sons wore white uniforms while the other pupils wore khaki. Even in primary school, children were officially registered in the categories of: "sons of chiefs (who were Ganwa and Tutsi from Burundi), Hutu, sons of soldiers, half-castes, and Asians" (Gahama, 1999: 258-259). Indeed, schools were opened exclusively for boys, first and foremost for the sons of those at the top of the social ladder: the princes of the blood, subchiefs and other dignitaries. Girls had to wait until 1908 before they were admitted. There is no reference to schooling Twa children. Mariro also points to the important socializing and christianizing role of the primary schools, which were run by the Church, as delegated by the colonial government. Conversion to Christianity was seen as an instrument for subduing and winning over the colonized peoples to the culture of the colonial power, and for producing effective collaborators and colonial assistants.

(b) Discrimination through the curriculum

It is reported that in Ruanda-Urundi, in 1926, arithmetic and French were taught to Tutsi while Hutu children had lessons in singing; and natural sciences, taught to Tutsi, were optional for Hutu children (Mbonimana and Chrétien in Gahama, 1999: 257). "The new elite ... grew, nurtured as it was in 'Hamitic ideology' and became entrenched over time" (Rutake and Gahama, 1999: 87). According to Mariro, the colonizers made a determined effort to ensure that the ethnic myth was thoroughly assimilated in school: "[M]any textbooks were produced for Burundi schools by the missionaries and the Belgian administration which contributed to the spread of deliberately constructed prejudice and stereotypes which today are formidable barriers for the older generation to overcome", since they challenge the political and economic problems. History, geography and civics textbooks in the colonial era were saturated

with so-called ethnic issues, "with a constant attempt by the missionaries and colonizers to get the concept over and ensure that children in Ruanda-Urundi acquired an ethnic and clan oriented outlook". The churches are portrayed as collaborators in this exercise. As a result, the damage done was "specifically psychological and has been long-lasting" (Mariro, 1998: 49-51). Chrétien considers that Africa's assimilation of the colonizer's tribal perception of the continent, while not uncommon, was particularly insidious and significant in Ruanda-Urundi (Chrétien, 1985). Mariro argues that since the colonizers focused on (erroneous) ethnic issues, there was no room left for other differences, for other ideologies and for other societal markers or distinguishing features in the society to play their roles, or for new ones to emerge. He notes also that the type of education on offer led to a focus on individual aspiration instead of a collective or national one, and nurtured the desire to acquire individual wealth and personal success at the expense of traditional collective social goals.

(c) Limiting Hutu enrolment in the education system

Education in the colonial era operated through the medium of social selection, which was ordained by birth. As noted, school records bear testimony to the classifications used. Hutu were permitted to complete only the lower levels of education, in order to prepare them for agriculture work and other modest jobs, placing a ceiling at the level of primary teacher training. Tutsi were given more education so that they could become civil servants, assistants to the colonial administrators, and exercise significant responsibility. The dividing line was drawn, they say, as early as the 1930s (Reychler *et al.*, 1999: 94).

The tactic chosen for limiting Hutu presence in schools was ethnic filtering, disguised, almost invisible, but effective, up until the 1990s. Hutu students were eliminated at the end of each cycle: at entry to junior secondary school, to senior secondary school and to the university (Cochet, 1996: 75; Reychler *et al.*, 1999: 94-95). The result was severe social group imbalance in terms of qualifications and meeting the entrance requirements of higher institutions of education, as well as the minimum qualifications needed for the higher echelons of the judiciary, the army and the civil service in general (Reychler *et al.*, 1999: 79). Hutu were significantly less educated than Tutsi by the time of independence and relatively even less qualified after three decades of independence. Discrimination in Burundi mirrored that of Rwanda where the Tutsi,

who had benefited from colonial preference before independence, had to suffer under representational quotas apportioned overtly to each social group in terms of access to education, to employment and advancement in the private sector (Rossel, 2002: 30).

Another factor, which had a negative effect on Hutu children's school advancement in Burundi was socio-economic disadvantage, which has well known effects on school outcomes. Due to exclusion from wealth accumulation, as noted above, the less favoured socio-economic background of the Hutu children was translated into low school survival and achievement rates (Cochet, 1996: 75).

(d) Inequitable school provision, staffing, equipment and supplies

Regions where Tutsi were in the majority, and which were favoured by the political elite, such as Bururi, enjoyed a better supply of teachers and single shift classes in the 1980s, which meant that teaching would have been of higher quality, learning conditions significantly better and the school day longer (Cochet, 1996: 75). Hutu children studied in overcrowded classrooms in a double shift system, with significantly fewer hours available for learning or direct contact with teachers.

(e) Manipulation of examination results

There were relatively low expectations in schools as regards the numbers of Hutu children who would sit end-of-cycle examinations, which were all-important in the selection process for entering the higher levels of the educatioin system. In addition, the examination system discriminated between Hutu and Tutsi candidates. According to a Ministry of Education veteran interviewed for this study, examination papers were marked at each school with the symbols i and u, signifying to examiners the Tutsi or Hutu origin of the examinee, who was then marked up or down accordingly. Before 1989 no individual primary school examination scores were published. Students were only informed if they had gained access to a state secondary school or not, which constituted a pass or fail. "There was no way of knowing whether examinations had been fairly graded, and suspicions that there was tampering with test scores were widespread". In a context where the pass rate depended on the number of secondary places available, for approximately 10 per cent of the examination candidates, there was intense competition to gain a pass and to understand the reasons for 'failure' when it occurred. With no information on individual student scores it was difficult for primary

heads to refuse to give pupils a chance to repeat. The result was mass repetition (Schwille, 1992: 7).

(f) Regular disruptions of the education system

The regime created impossible conditions for children in school. Inciting and spreading rumours was a regular political ploy: "tension was created in schools through rumours about impending interethnic conflict, which would produce panic all round and Hutu children would flee *en masse* from school" (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 98). The power of rumour can only be appreciated by those who have lived long years in Burundi, subjected to one leaflet after another spreading fear and terror, warning of attacks and ethnic cleansing. In 1972, a large number of educated Hutu in eastern Burundi fled over the Tanzania border. Most have remained in Tanzania to this date.

(g) Targetting students in secondary and tertiary education institutions

In 1972, Hutu students in higher education institutions and senior secondary schools were attacked and many killed. The rest fled. At the University, 250 of the 350 Hutu students disappeared, about 60 were killed. The teacher-training institute of Ngara lost about 40 per cent of its 314 students. In all, one in five or six of the secondary and tertiary students disappeared, male and female students alike (Lemarchand, 2002: 555). Even the primary school children were not spared. "In the 1993 pogroms, when tens of primary and secondary Tutsi schoolchildren were killed, there seemed to be a sense of revenge for the killing of [Hutu] secondary students in 1972 and for all the peasant families who never saw a single one of their children pass the primary leaving examination and get into secondary school from that time on" (Cochet, 1996: 76). Anecdotes abound on how Hutu took their children out of school *en masse* for fear they would be targetted by future pogroms.

Another feature of the times was the resignation of Hutu families to a situation where, for one reason or another, their children would never do well in school. So they pulled them out of school. The tide seems to have turned after 1993 in the sense that the strong but necessarily hidden attachment to education has propelled Hutu once more, throughout Burundi, to send their children to school, whatever the circumstances. Everyone makes enormous efforts to see that children go to school. Eagerness for schooling is typified by the lengths people will go to get to school. Children go as far as taking their own initiatives to get to school,

employing a range of strategies, even fleeing Burundi, alone, without their family, to reach one of the refugee camps in neighbouring countries, where education is reputed to be free.

It is said that the university, the prime educator of the nation, remained silent in the face of the devastation of Burundian society and witnessed in silence the death of its own sons and daughters on campus. It was only the churches that reportedly broke their silence from time to time and raised questions (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 75). It is implied by these observers, that the Church's reaction will be judged by history as too tepid a response to the escalation of violence in the society, while the role of the university will be condemned.

(h) Reducing the number of Hutu teachers

Many Hutu teachers were killed during the 1972 massacres and others were forced out of the teaching profession (Cochet, 1996: 74).

In sum, discrimination was practised in the education sector in Burundi. It was acute; and it was no figment of the imagination. The result of these events was, reportedly, a people waiting to explode in anger but biding their time: "a muzzled population [publicly] applauding those in power ... [T]heir anger will be manifested at the first opportunity, peacefully or with violence, depending on the occasion". Such humiliations, it is reported, never leave the memory of a people (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 79). Lessons need to be learned from the experience of other post-conflict countries in turning around an inequitable education sector to the elimination of discrimination and to a more pro-active practice, namely the promotion of sectoral and societal equity, through visibly inclusive practices.

Chapter 3
The history of education in Burundi

Education before independence

Education under the churches

It was colonial policy 'from the beginning', under the Germans (1899-1916), then under the Belgians (1916-1962), to hand over the responsibility of education to the churches, with supporting subsidies from the colonial government. The missionaries were described, in this sense, as providing "the indispensable element for cementing the institution of the colonies" (Gahama, 1999: 243). The churches then translated this mandate into the organization of basic education and training for a small number of future subaltern colonial assistants, purposefully transmitting Christian and western values (Bikorindagara, 2002: 83; Gahama, 1983). At the start, there were three types of schools: chapel schools, church-run schools and secular state schools. The chapel schools provided one to two year courses, mainly religious instruction, in the mother tongue, with some rudimentary literacy and numeracy classes, principally for future catechists. These schools received no state subsidies and were not inspected (Duarte, 1995: 276-277). There were very few secular schools. Most schools were church schools. The importance of the church in the development of education in Burundi is noted as late as 1982, when an analysis of educational opportunity reported that church parish structure was determinant in the distribution of schools, rather than education needs per commune or per local government administrative unit, despite the fact that schools had been nationalized or nominally taken over by the government by the 1970s (Renoux, 1973: 10-11).

Modern schooling started in Burundi in 1900, at the first Catholic mission in Muyaga parish, two years after initial religious instruction and literacy classes had been set up. The Catholic, then Protestant missionaries reached Burundi in the wake of the explorers, traders and soldiers, who had opened up routes through Tanganyika. The local populations with the occupying power identified the missionaries and first school educators. The aim of the church was to evangelize the Burundian people and to prepare them for baptism through the schools. They addressed the chiefs first, in the hope that they would subsequently persuade their communities to become Christians.

An overview of school development during the colonial period is given in *Table 3.1* below.

Table 3.1 Overview of education development up to independence, 1898-1962

Year	Education events	Political events
1898	First Catholic mission, Muyaga, immediately started literacy classes	1897: German military base in Usumbura (Bujumbura), HQ for Ruanda-Urundi
1900-1924	First primary schools opened as each parish was established. 1908 first girls' school, Muyaga. Two secular schools: Usumbura (1909), and Gitega (1913), using Swahili medium, for chiefs' sons 1916-1924: Number of schools increased	1903: King officially recognized German occupation (Kiganda Treaty) Belgian occupation 1919: Belgian trusteeship
1925-1947	Frank Commission on education for Congo and Ruanda-Urundi 1926: State/Church Education Convention First primary education curriculum, developed by the Catholic Church 1938: State/Church Convention revised 1940: First secondary school, Gitega 1940s: Primary teacher training institutions started (*Écoles d'apprentissage pédagogique*)	1920s-1930s: Imposition of new form of chieftainship
1948-1959	Education Convention and Reform Increased number of full primary schools Secondary education develops	1950s: In Belgium, major regime politico-social change, leading to political change in Burundi and confusion re State/Church roles in education
1960	First tertiary institute in Burundi: Institut Agronomique du Ruanda-Urundi.	
1961	Education Reform	**1962 Independence**

Resistance to education

There was overt resistance at first to the colonizers and to their schools, for many reasons. Burundians mistrusted the foreign occupiers and gave them a wide berth. The last thing they wanted was to hand their children over to foreigners, in institutions where children seemed to be sitting down all day, avoiding work. The Burundi ethic was hard work and an important part of indigenous education was learning to carry out and persevere in hard work. Initially, the chiefs managed to avoid sending their own children to school, as in other African countries, by sending other boys from the community. Gahama explains that this resulted in mainly Hutu boys being pressurized by the authority of the chiefs, to reluctantly attend the first schools, "passing them off as their own sons, in order to satisfy the colonial authorities who wanted to educate chiefs' sons" (Gahama, 1983, as reported in Ruzenza, 1992: 22). The result was that, in the early years, the ruling classes managed to avoid school. After one decade, schooling was not going well in Burundi: Mugera School, the second school, established in 1901, had "made no progress"; and the Buhonga schoolboys ran off to Usumbura once they discovered that money was to be made there. Even after two decades "schools hardly had any pupils" (Ruzenza, 1992: 21). Two secular schools were opened, this time explicitly for chiefs' sons, in Usumbura (Bujumbura) and Gitega, in 1909 and 1913, respectively. Other schools were set up by the Belgians for the same purpose in the 1920s, with a total of 607 pupils by 1925 (Gahama, 1999: 246). The growth in enrolments is indicated in *Table 3.2* below.

Table 3.2 Schools and enrolment 1900-1957

Year	Schools	Enrolments	Observations
1900	1	Na	Muyaga School
1911	70	1,440	
1920	123	6,000	1925: chiefs' sons' schools: 18 classes and 607 pupils
1930		14,174 [a]	Pupils in central, rural and girls' White Fathers/ Sisters' schools [b] 1932: First secondary school opened (Astrida)
1938		10,215 [a]	Pupils in central, rural and girls' White Fathers/ Sisters' schools
1948	1,619	142,652	1941: First primary inspector appointed 1947: 75% of pupils in non-subsidized, unsupported, unmonitored missionary schools First government secondary [c] school
1952	1,855	202,414	5 secular schools (0.3%) & 1,237 pupils (0.6%) 99.4% pupils in 'denominational' schools 77% teachers uncertified
1953	2,192	Na	Second government secondary school
1956	2,700	236,962	9 primary inspectors (7 for missionary schools) 2,474 pupils at secondary level

Sources: Duarte, 1995; Gahama, 1999.

[a] Figures possibly exclude non-Catholic schools.

[b] 1930: Girls' enrolments were 5% (N=674) in eight central schools; 1,666 in 1938.

[c] Reference to 'secondary' here does not include the vocational schools, of which there were three by 1956 with 401 pupils; nor junior secondary or private secondary schools.

Lack of accountability

In the 1920s the Government of Belgium pledged to the Trusteeship Council of the League of Nations, which had accorded them the trusteeship of the territory of Ruanda-Urundi, to develop an "elementary education, primarily through government-sponsored private schools and to provide qualified students with the necessary facilities for higher education, especially in the professional fields". However, the colonial government paid little attention to its pledge. Time and time again, through the 1940s and 1950s, Belgium ignored the instructions of the Council regarding the poor development of education in Ruanda-Urundi. Haiti's representative to the Trusteeship Council noted that "Belgium's policy failed to develop a national identity or an indigenous population

capable of assuming the responsibilities of self-government after independence". The US representative pointed out that to postpone focus on education in the territory would jeopardize economic development towards self-government. It was cheaper for the colonial authorities to run subsidized missionary schools than to set up a government, secular system of education (Gahama, 1999: 244) and to use rudimentary chapel schools as the principal mechanism for low cost, mass adult education. Both these practices came in for criticism from the Trusteeship Council but Belgium repeatedly ignored advisories since the Council had no powers to enforce its recommendations (Duarte, 1995: 275-277).

The structure of education in Burundi

After World War II the colonial authority increased the number of primary schools but neglected secondary and tertiary levels. Two major education reforms, of 1948 and 1961, increased the metropolitan elements of the school system, modelled on the Belgian one. French was confirmed as 'the target medium of learning' and strengthened in the early grades of primary school alongside Kirundi (Rwantabagu, 1999: 297).

At this time, primary schools were classified into two categories: full primary 'central' schools and incomplete 'rural' or 'bush' primary schools. Incomplete schools – the term is used both in English and French these days – are schools with less than a full complement of classes. In Burundi this means schools with less than six grades. The incomplete schools were clustered around full primary schools, under the supervision of the central school headmaster, and used mother tongue as the medium of instruction. The central schools used French. This left a dichotomous and inequitable legacy at independence, with core schools or *écoles centrales* having head teachers and teaching French, while the others, the *écoles succursales*, to this day do not have a head teacher, even if many of them have six grades today. Currently, there remain a significant number of full primary schools and incomplete primary schools, without head teachers.[20] Achievement tests of the late 1980s and early 1990s were to point to the difference in performance between schools with head teachers and schools without (MEPS, 1989*a*; Schwille *et al.*, 1991 and 1992; Chabert, 1992; and Riba, 1992). This is an example of practices

20. In 2003, of the 1,794 full primary schools in Burundi, 396 (22%) had no head teacher, nor did 440 (25%) incomplete schools. Schools with heads numbered 957 (53% of the total).

dating from the early decades of the century,which have contributed to today's inequitable provision of quality in education.

The quality of education

Schooling expanded over the 1920s and 1930s, as noted in *Table 3.2*, through chapel schools, church-run subsidized schools and secular schools. However, it is misleading to classify all these institutions as primary schools. Chapel schools did not provide primary education yet constituted a high percentage of schools in Burundi. This is borne out by reports that most children "did not complete more than one or two years of studies"; and in 1952, only 47 per cent of first grade children went into the second class, 33 per cent of the pupils survived to third grade, and "fewer than 3 per cent completed the full six years of primary school studies" (Duarte, 1995: 279). In 1952 chapel schools accounted for 480,000 learners of all ages, mainly adults, rising to 650,000 in 1956.[21] The first full secondary school in Ruanda-Urundi, Astrida Secondary School, was established in Butare in 1932; a second secondary school was founded in 1953.

Nearing independence, in 1957, the primary NER was estimated to be 33 per cent, leaving two thirds of the children out of school. As few as 3,041 pupils were in government schools. Only 36 schools followed the approved, quality curriculum, and the Belgian school syllabus.

Tertiary education

In 1957-1958 university education was introduced in Congo and Ruanda but no campus existed in Urundi at that time. The *Université officielle de Bujumbura* was established in 1964, two years after independence, and the *École normale supérieure*, the first tertiary teacher training institution in Burundi, was opened for secondary teacher education one year later (1965). Burundi entered on independence with almost no tradition and no provision at all of tertiary education.

Adult education and alternative education

As in the case of the primary schools, other education centres were organized by each separate church according to their different diocese and parish criteria, rather than in response to a national educational planning

21. The chapel schools were the precursors of the *Yaga Mukama* literacy centres, described in the section on alternative education (*Yaga Mukama – Burundi's unique alternative programme*).

orientation. The Catholic Church Yaga Mukama network of centres catered for out-of-school children, mainly under 15 years, adult literacy, and catechist classes. Distribution of the 43 schools and 87 nonformal *Yaga Mukama* centres in Kirundo Province in 1980, for example, was more a function of parish organization than of the educational needs of the population. Twenty years after independence, Vumbi Commune, one of the five communes in the province, but with no parish headquarters, was allotted 7 per cent of the *Yaga Mukama* centres and a high proportion of incomplete primary schools, yet the population represented 16 per cent of the province (IIEP/MEN, 1982: 24-26). The *Yaga Mukama* system was regarded as an alternative to formal primary schools, taking children for two days a week, but seems to have been largely unsupervized by the educational authorities. Social centres, or *foyers sociaux*, were set up in 1949 for adults, offering skills training; they were also mainly run by churches. Literacy was estimated at less than 10 per cent in 1962. Duarte (1995: 6) summed the situation up: "[N]o literate population had emerged ... less than 100 [citizens] of Ruanda-Urundi had received post-secondary education".

On the eve of independence

During the last decade of colonial rule, "Belgium virtually ignored the Trusteeship Council's demands to accelerate the process of educating Ruanda-Urundi's population". Five years away from Burundi's independence, the United Nations Trusteeship Council "deplored the snail-like pace at which Belgium developed an education system for its [Ruanda-Urundi] trusteeship". "[A]fter four decades under Belgian control Ruanda-Urundi had neither a viable education system nor an educated elite prepared to govern" (Duarte, 1995: 280-281). By 1960 the whole of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi had produced one sole university graduate (Gahama, 1999: 260). By 1962 there were ten Burundi graduates (Bitagoye, 1998). The consequence was that, in terms of an education foundation, Burundi and Rwanda were singularly unprepared for independence in 1962. As independence neared, the colonial government modified its political stand, removing support from the minority Tutsi whom they had privileged from the start and who were increasingly turning to a radical and Africanist ideological stand. They now offered encouragement to the majority Hutu, whom they had previously excluded from social and political advancement, but whom they now regarded as a potentially more submissive partner in the post-independence relationship they were hastily cobbling together. The

massacres in Rwanda in 1959 had a destabilizing effect on Burundi, where political assassinations commenced in 1961, just before independence.

In summary

The principal characteristics of Burundi/Rwanda education before independence were a markedly poorer quality, unstructured, restricted and inequitable education system than pertained in other African countries before independence:

- Slow and poor quality development of the education system;
- Systemic social discrimination in schools and other educational institutions;
- Over-dependence on church-run schools and lack of state engagement in the supervision of education institutions;
- Low level of state participation in and funding for education.

Education after independence

A plethora of education providers

The new nation found itself with a complex education patchwork of education providers and different school models. As late as 1973, more than a decade after independence, there continued to be 35 education bodies, which in theory were collaborating as implementing partners with the Ministry of Education. In reality, there was no real co-operation. School provision continued to match the missionary histories and maps of the country, organized by competing parish and church secretariats of different denominations, rather than by a central state organ or ministry responding to the needs of the people. At community level, different church jurisdictions overlapped, were absent, duplicated themselves, or left many of the 'incomplete' schools further than 20 kilometers away from their administrator instead of benefitting from a headmaster from another denomination's church-sponsored school located nearby. Only seven primary inspectors supervized the totality of the schools in the country (Renoux, 1973: 10-11).

The 1960s – Stagnating/falling enrolments

While population growth was estimated to be 2.5 per cent in the late 1960s, school enrolments declined by 3 per cent between 1968 and 1971. The most alarming statistic was the 17 per cent decline in admissions to first grade during these same years, which was explained as diminished education demand when parents saw an increase in drop-out and repetition

rates. Another issue was cost. Few children entered secondary school, but at that level 84 per cent of the schools were highly subsidized boarding institutions which cost the state (and the churches) twice as much as day schools (Renoux, 1973: 23). The high cost of boarding limited the number of places available.

The 1973 Education reform – A major shift in the concept of education

While curriculum revision prior to independence, in 1961, had emphasized the classical subjects mathematics and French, the post-independence reform of 1973 constituted a major and radical departure, aiming to produce a primary education cycle of value in itself and to ensure that the vast majority of Burundi children who lived in rural areas (over 90 per cent) and who would not reach secondary school (90 per cent of them), would have access to an education useful to them and to the development of their country. It also had the role of preparing learners for secondary studies. The reform focused on nationalizing the education system, relevance and efficiency: "*nationaliser et rationaliser pour rentabiliser*" (UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 9). It chose three main strategies to do this: the Kirundization and ruralization of the curriculum, and the transformation of schools into community centres. Children were to be taught in the mother tongue, Kirundi, to ensure that they learned their national culture and remained rooted in it. Practical agricultural and livestock herding skills were to be taught in schools, and domestic science, hygiene, environmental improvement skills, and income generating skills, so that children would have the capacity for transforming the immediate community and become agents of development alongside their teachers. Contact hours would be 27 hours per week in the first two grades and 29.25 and 31.5 hours in third/fourth and fifth/sixth grades. With regard to reforms aiming at increasing the efficiency of the system, repetition was to be limited to 10 per cent of each class. Education services were to be distributed equitably among the regions, according to population (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 9).

Schools were to become 'community schools'. *L'école communautaire* was to be a centre of community development, including an adult education unit, providing resources for the entire community, and benefiting from the knowledge and skills of the most skilled members of the community. Schools were to be increasingly self-financing through projects, school co-operatives run by the school community and

production units. Parent-teacher associations were to be set up in every school (UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 9). It has to be pointed out that most other African countries at the time were going through the same review of education objectives, planning processes and ending up with very similar planned outcomes; and that the processes and planned outcomes were not unique to Burundi.

Institutional changes were made within the Burundi Ministry of Education, setting up a *Bureau d'éducation rurale* (BER) or Rural Education Centre; and a number of other new divisions. The BER was a curriculum development and teacher education centre whose role was to spearhead the content of the reform, incorporating a monitoring and evaluation unit, which produced regular reviews on the reform process (Chabert, 1992: 39). BER staff grew from eight to 154 by 1982/1983 and the centre made important inputs to the exercises monitoring learning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, noted below.

The outcome of the reform

It took until 1983 to produce the new curriculum,[22] which included Kirundi, mathematics, general studies (called 'study of the locality', or *étude du milieu*, encompassing science, social studies and ethics), practical agriculture, practical domestic science, physical education, and French from third grade as a subject, becoming the language of instruction in fifth grade in preparation for the primary leaving examination which remained in French. Most of the new textbooks reached the schools in the mid-1980s. There had been success in getting communities involved in the construction of schools and in the establishment of some school co-operatives; and school heads and inspectors had been trained in the concept of ruralization (UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 4-5).

However, it was stated at a ministry seminar in 1980 that the concept of the community school and the school as a productive unit had not been assimilated by the public or by the education system itself. With no explanation, it was reported that the key actors had not followed the new promotion/repetition regulations. They had not even implemented

22. It is reported, however, that as early as April 1973, the new curriculum was introduced to schools (UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 9). This probably means that, with or without a curriculum, syllabuses and guidelines, a significant attempt at re-orientation had taken place and that teachers were requested to improvize change. This was the type of initial change that ministries of education encouraged or even directed in many countries.

them by the end of the second decade after the reform: In 1988/1989, 19 per cent of first grade children repeated and 38 per cent of fifth graders (51 per cent in sixth grade, up from 44 per cent the previous year). It was estimated that if repetition were eliminated from sixth grade it would free up resources to provide to the rest of the schools so that there would be a single shift system for everyone (Schwille *et al*., 1991: 6, 17). The BER was said to have developed no links with agricultural or rural development services and had not produced a concrete plan during the 1970s or guidelines for integrating the school into the community (UNESCO and UNDP, 1983: 9). Decades later the Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) were not functional and had to be re-established. Also, the new divisions – the primary, secondary and technical education directorates, the BER, the inspectorate and teacher training institutions – reportedly worked in isolation from one another, reducing the impact of the reform through lack of institutional and systemic co-operation (UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 11).

Some challenges arose with the new curriculum. The Kirundi language had not been standardized nor elaborated specifically for use as a school language. However, the success of using Kirundi in school can be judged by the fact that it has continued to be used as a medium of instruction in the first four grades of primary school until the present day. The promising General Studies syllabus (*étude du milieu*) was a major step in localizing curriculum but the teaching of *étude du milieu* descended at times into a purely language class, even in Kirundi medium lessons, rather than focusing on learning through action and drawing on the daily experience and already acquired skills of the children. Teachers received a total of two days' refresher courses per subject per year. This was considered insufficient to cope with the new curriculum, while the teacher development radio programmes were also described as inadequate. In the 1970s, 30 per cent of the teachers were 'underqualified' at level D6. In 1983, due to the shortcomings in the D6 training, 69 per cent of D4 teachers were considered well trained even if at a lower level. One per cent of more highly trained D7 teachers were senior secondary school graduates with a full four years' pedagogical training (UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 4, 10).[23]

23. D4 primary teachers had a minimum of six years primary schooling plus professional training. D6 primary teachers had 10 years of schooling with simultaneous pedagogical training. D7 primary teachers had 13 years of schooling plus simultaneous training.

The 1980s – primary expansion

Having put a great deal of effort into the education reform of 1973 during the 1970s, it was nevertheless apparent to the overnment that enrolments were stagnating and not matching those of other countries. A decision was taken to introduce double shifts as a way of kick-starting expansion. In 1982/1983 double shifts took effect. This had dramatic consequences, as indicated in *Table 3.3*, on enrolments, on the quality of education, and on the implementation of the 1973 reform. One class of 100 children was to be divided into morning and afternoon shifts, 50 children per class, with the same teacher. Teachers received no extra pay for the extra hours worked and the heavy burden of two classes daily. It has to be appreciated that the 1973 Education Reform was still being implemented in the 1980s. After some years of curriculum and textbook development, the new textbooks and teachers' guides reached schools mainly during the 1980s.

Table 3.3 Progress in primary subsector expansion in the 1980s

	Children of school age	Enrolments	Gross enrolment ratio	Girls as percentage of enrolled children	Gender parity index	Teachers
1981/1982	622,519	206,627	33.2	38.4	0.61	5,570
1991/1992	900,220	631,039	70.0	44.9	0.80	10,008
Rate of increase	45%	205%	111%	6.5%	31%	80%

Source: MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 7.

Enrolments increased more than threefold, from 206,627 pupils in 1981/1982 to 631,039 in 1991/1992; GER more than doubled, from 33.2 per cent to 70 per cent; numbers of teachers almost doubled, as did classrooms; despite the increase in the population of school-age children (7-12 years), which was just under 50 per cent during the same period. With significant assistance from the Belgian government, 400 new classrooms were built per year. Girls' enrolment did not make the same progress as boys', reaching 45 per cent of the children enrolled by 1991, with a 31 per cent rise in gender parity index (GPI) from 0.61 to 0.80. It was a major leap but left girls still behind boys as the last decade of the century unfolded.

To turn for a moment to GPI, it is difficult to appreciate the value of the index since it is still a new and unfamiliar measure. Parity is indicated by the value of 1.00, where boys and girls are equally present in school. The lower the score, the lower proportion of girls to boys in school. For example, the GPI increased in Burundi between 1981/1982 and 1991/1992, from 0.61 to 0.80. A score greater than 1.0 shows there are more girls than boys in school, as has been the case in Lesotho and Namibia in southern Africa, for example, 1.22 and 1.09 in 1990. GPI can be viewed in two ways: in direct relation to GER levels and by ranking a country or region alongside others, to gain a sense of proportion. *Table 3.4* traces the historical development of GPI through the 1980s, the decade of massive enrolment expansion. The aim is to find out if girls' education increased to the same extent as boys'.

Table 3.4 GPI improvement in Burundi in the 1980s

	GER overall	GER girls/ GER boys	% of children enrolled who were girls/boys	GPI
1981/1982	33%	25%/45%	38%/62%	0.61
1991/1992	70%	62% [a]/78%	45%/55%	0.80

Source: MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 7, 42.
[a] GER by sex 1992/1993.

While girls' enrolments and the proportion of girls in schools increased, they were still far below par in 1991/1992, with a GPI of 0.80. To compare Burundi's GPI with other countries in the region, *Figure 3.1* shows Burundi's ranking across the decade 1990 to 2000, as an exercise in GPI mapping. The historical progression is of interest at this point as is Burundi's position relative to other countries in the region.

Figure 3.1 GPI in selected sub-Saharan African countries, 1990 and 2000



Source: UNESCO, 2003*a*: 334.
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

Figure 3.1 shows that three countries in the region achieved gender parity in education more than one decade ago: Tanzania, Rwanda and Madagascar. Countries with the lowest GPI in 1990, with the longest path ahead of them to attaining parity, were: Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Congo Brazzaville, Mozambique and Uganda – in addition to Eritrea, which gained independence in 1991. A newcomer in 2000 to the top ranks was Malawi with its free primary education policy introduced in 1997. Countries making the most progress over the decade appear to be Congo Brazzaville, Chad and Malawi. A decline is noted for Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Burundi ranks low in comparison with other countries, starting with a relatively low GPI in 1990 before the onset of the war, and decreasing since that time. Burundi (0.84) had just overtaken the average sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) GPI in 1990 (0.83) but fell well below (0.60) by 2000, as the SSA GPI rose to

0.88. In conclusion, Burundi has been and currently is in a weak position with regard to girls' education.

Impact of double shifts on the quality of education

In 1982/1983, teachers' work hours increased by 50 per cent, from 26 to 39 hours per week, with no extra pay. Children's learning hours decreased by 26 per cent, to accommodate the two daily shifts (Rurihose, 2001: 28; UNESCO/UNDP, 1983: 13; MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 8). The pounding of the rains on the tin roofs in the afternoons made the second shift problematic for both learners and teachers. The subjects that schools dropped first from the timetable were the practical subjects of agriculture and domestic science in order to give sufficient time for French and maths which remained the principal elements of the final primary examination. Children found it increasingly difficult to make the transition from Kirundi to French medium in fifth grade as their language learning hours decreased. It was observed in the late 1990s, with the benefit of hindsight, that double shifts had been introduced far too quickly in 1982/1983, which had produced its own unplanned shock effect on the system (AGEI/MEN, 1999; MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 6). In the early 1980s the ministry and the schools were still in the delicate process of incorporating the radical reform of the previous decade. The result of introducing double shifts was to dilute the major reform of 1973 targeting ruralization and Kirundization, since the practical subjects, which were the most relevant to rural children, were reduced or dropped from the timetable, and Kirundi received less emphasis than originally intended. What Burundi gained in the expansion of schooling it lost in terms of content and quality.

One could argue, long after the event, that ruralization and Kirundization should not have been in jeopardy as a result of double shifts. It would have been possible*, in the rural areas,* to orient school towards the immediate environment. This could have been accomplished without necessarily doing, during school hours, what children could very well practise in the extra hours they had in the fields and home. Second, it would have been important to ensure that the primary leaving examination used Kirundi rather than French, in order to maintain emphasis on Kirundi. But at no time, in the 1970s, or even before the introduction of double shifts, did the examination change to Kirundi medium, or adequately test the new 1973 curriculum content in order to consolidate, support and respond to Kirundi medium. It was left till

the late 1980s for a research exercise monitoring learning achievement, to indicate that learning was indeed more effective in the mother tongue (Schwille *et al*., 1991 and 1992; see the section on *Monitoring quality and achievement* below).

The concept of the 'community school' would have served ruralization and Kirundization well, had it been pursued. But the classical perception of school steadfastly kept the upper hand – as it did in all the African countries that attempted the same ruralization of education that Burundi was attempting in the 1970s. This was the case even if countries used different names for what they were doing: education for self-reliance in Tanzania; education for production in Benin; (pre)vocationalization of education in Kenya. It is arguable that Burundi's ruralization and Kirundization programme would have been compromised even without the double shifts, since all countries, without exception, failed to bring the school closer to the community, failed to train their teachers in technological skills, failed to give them sufficient equipment or supplies and, most important of all, failed to re-orientate the school for rural development – or for the development of whatever children they happened to have in the school, rural, urban, poor, or elite. Primary schools went on teaching literacy and numeracy and added a long list of knowledge items to be learned by heart, which children had to copy from the blackboard into more exercise books than anyone could afford. Curriculum content remained (a) knowledge-oriented in all these countries; and (b) there were insufficient exercise books and learning materials, everywhere. Examinations continued to measure literacy in the foreign language, numeracy and recall.

As for Kirundization or the promotion of mother-tongue teaching, Burundi, Somalia, Madagascar and Rwanda (and Tanzania with its national vehicular language, Swahili), succeeded more than most countries since they stuck to the use of the mother tongue for at least four grades (Somalia for eight years, Tanzania for seven years). It is not accidental that these are all countries with a sole mother tongue, which is unusual in Africa. However, the failure of Burundi (and Rwanda) to modify the language of the examination ensured that the foreign language attracted more attention than the mother tongue on the timetable and distracted learners from concentration on the mother tongue, and on 'things Burundian'. Policy-makers need to be clear over objectives and to manage a complex balancing act ensuring that gains in one language are also captured in the second language.

Burundian educational planners still lament that the brutal introduction of double shifts eliminated the gains of the 1973 reform. They say that the reform should continue to guide and inspire curriculum planning in the twenty-first century (MEN, 1998).

It should be noted, finally, that the six-day curriculum of the 1970s was retained not only through the double shift system but was compressed into a five-day week, in 1993. This produced yet another curriculum re-organization challenge for teachers and learners, the type which teachers normally find difficult to handle.

Monitoring quality and achievement

Absenteeism, repetition and drop-out rates

Performance rates were not high before 1993. When considering, first, absenteeism, repetition and drop-out rates, the situation was disquieting. There are no records on absenteeism. Drop-out was estimated to be 7 per cent in grades one to five in 1991/1992 but the repetition rate was 24 per cent over the primary cycle. One-quarter repetition rate is a considerable drain on sector resources and indicates in a particularly marked way the inefficiency and low quality of the system.

The pass rate in 1991 on the primary leaving examination (*certificat de fin d’études primaires*, CFEP) was 53 per cent and on the entrance examination to secondary school (*concours national*) it was 9 per cent. The latter measures transition rates rather than achievement. More specifically, it reflects the number of places available in state secondary schools as a proportion of the candidates sitting the entrance examination. Girls comprised 43 per cent of CFEP candidates and 41 per cent of successful passes; and 34 per cent of the secondary entrance exam passes (MEPS, 1992*b*; MEN, 1993). There is no information in the ministry today as to whether the percentage of passes by gender reflected then or reflects today the number of secondary places available for girls or whether, in some measure, it represents achievement. It may reflect some of both, but no one has disentangled one from the other.

Monitoring achievement

At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s two series of achievement tests were carried out, the Basic Research and Implementation in Developing Education Systems (BRIDGES) Project and the Franco-Burundi exercise. The BRIDGES-Burundi research team ran the first set of tests from Harvard University in collaboration with the ministry. The purpose was

to determine if sixth grade pupils demonstrated more or less effective learning through Kirundi or through French. Tests included mathematics, science and agriculture, French and Kirundi.

The most interesting finding in the view of the BRIDGES team was that repeaters scored best, which led the evaluators to conclude that the primary curriculum was too 'difficult' to master in six years – and in two languages. It is unclear if it was the level of difficulty, or the amount of content, or both, which concerned the assessors.[24] Most pupils in sixth grade were 14-16 years old. The 18-year-olds scored best on tests of school-related learning (French, for example), while younger pupils improved their scores relative to the older children on content gleaned in part from general life experience (for example, agriculture). Performance was highest in mathematics, Kirundi and French, in that order, indicating that pupils were more proficient in Kirundi than in their second, international language, and that Kirundi must have played a major part in the acquisition of mathematics over the previous four years. A second finding – arguably the most important of all – was that the attempt to introduce "vocational training for primary school [learners] has not been successful" (Schwille *et al.*, 1991: 16). Teachers and children gave low priority to agriculture. The team recommended the incorporation of agricultural theory and skills learning within science studies, that is, within the primary general studies curriculum, *étude du milieu*. A third finding of importance was that pedagogical support from head teachers to teachers was found to be highly significant (Schwille *et al.*, 1992: 8).

When the BRIDGES project started to write up their reports in 1991 and 1992 they made no mention of the Franco-Burundi testing exercise, which was running by that time; nor of the correlation or lack of correlation between the findings of the two projects. Also, the reports made no mention of the difference in significance attributed by each project to their findings.

The second set of tests, carried out by a Franco-Burundian team, took place at the end of 1989, a French and mathematics achievement test on sixth grade pupils in 47 schools. There was no test of Kirundi, nor of the practical (agricultural and other) skills learned in the 1970s and 1980s, nor civics skills, nor any assessment of the degree to which

24. BRIDGES was testing the first cohort of double-shift learners. The repeaters had gone through the single shift system, which is relevant for interpreting the significance of the scores.

Burundian pupils were prepared for the developmental role they were to play in rural areas. That is, the fundamental objectives of the reform were not monitored or evaluated by the test, which was analyzed in Paris: "the results of the evaluation were sent to Bujumbura [from Paris] in early 1990" (Chabert, 1992: 40).

In 1991 a national Burundi team of evaluators was set up. They also chose to confine tests to French and mathematics, this time testing at tenth grade, in 1992, in junior secondary school. This second Franco-Burundian assessment exercise included an additional battery of questionnaires to pupils, teachers and heads on a variety of topics (Riba, 1992: 90). The Franco-Burundian reports made no reference to the BRIDGES monitoring exercise or findings of 1986-1989; nor to the implications of varying assessment outcomes for future sector planning.

The first significant finding of the Franco-Burundian tests, supported by the BRIDGES results, was that the characteristics of the individual school at primary and junior secondary level had a determining role on learning. The crucial issues were (a) the presence or absence of a head teacher, or being designated a 'central school' in the primary subsector – half of the Burundi schools were incomplete or feeder schools, with no heads; (b) the management style of the school; (c) teacher-pupil relations in the school; and (d) the teaching style of the school at secondary level. In other words, primary schools with heads had a distinct advantage in terms of quality learning and competent headship mattered, at every level (Riba, 1991: 91). Second, the geographical location of the school was important: Learners attending schools in urban centres or well established parish centres also scored well. However, this could have been a proxy for a variable that could be called 'resource-rich schools'. Third, the more homogenous the class, in terms of learners' ages, for example, the better the scores (MEPS, 1989: 29). Neither sex nor age was found to be a determining factor; and there were as many girls as boys repeating classes.

When UNESCO/UNICEF MLA-CTLS[25] tests of the education system were conducted in 1999, no reference was made in the MLA reports to the BRIDGES or Franco-Burundian assessments of 1986-1992.

25. The UNESCO/UNICEF MLA-CTLS tests (Monitoring Learning Achievement, Conditions of Teaching and Learning in Schools). The MLA was a global and regional initiative aimed at capacity building for national teams and at the production of data on the quality of education for the Dakar 2000 EFA conference.

Clearly, there is a growing case for Burundi to collect, acknowledge, analyze and learn from its own cumulative educational experience. The 1999 exercise will be taken up in *Chapter 5*.

By the late 1980s, the nation could no longer trust the examination system. There were some scandalous leaks of papers but a more notorious practice was the identification of candidates' social group to the markers, as noted in the section on *Manipulation of examination results*. The ministry did not publish education statistics or examination results before 1992, only a list of successful secondary school applicants, to avoid having to admit to giving privileged access to certain candidates (Jackson, 2000: 28). The tragic result was that the all the work put in by individual pupils and their teachers – and the scarce financial resources provided by parents – was betrayed by the very system that was meant to encourage education. The result was that public examinations did not distinguish between high and low performers and was manipulated for other ends.

Endnote

The rationale for detailing these events is to demonstrate that Burundi's experience in the 1970s and 1980s was not unique in Africa, in terms of curriculum objectives and the attempt to make school learning more meaningful for learners; and that the same obstacles to success were operating in all African countries at the time. It was not only the double shifts, which robbed Burundi of education reform success. More powerful forces were at play. It is argued above that failure to define education within a broad socio-political context was responsible for flawed analysis of 'learning' and of sector outcomes in the 1990s. Further, the new millennium needs a more insightful analysis of the milestones in Burundi's post-independence education history if it is to succeed in future education reform.

Second, specific characteristics of Burundi's education development experience have been highlighted, namely the obstacles to curriculum reform in the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid and massive enrolment expansion of the 1980s which resulted in other problems, and the almost unique-in-the-region continued commitment to the use of mother tongue as a learning medium – which was never reflected in the examination system. These experiences have lessons for post-conflict development in the education sector. Sometimes the lessons have been lost or ignored,

and history has repeated itself, or events have continued without change; and sometimes lessons were taken on board and used to advantage.

Third, given the continent's experimentation with prevocational education at primary level in the 1970s, cost-sharing in the 1980s, almost total emphasis on formal primary schooling in the 1990s, fee-free schooling since 2000, and so on, it is important to be aware of the prodding of international opinion, which persuasively argues for one solution for the whole region, per decade, to Africa's education needs and to redirect funding accordingly, whatever the national priorities. All countries are urged to sing to that same tune, whatever the stage and history of their education development. This is not to say that African voices have not put forward African solutions, but the uncanny persuasive power of international partners generally takes over, and moulds the continent's education systems, decade by decade.

Fourth, the above discussion has pointed to the difficulty and complexity of carrying out educational reform, at any time, and the new challenges thrown up by change. And, it has laid the foundation for the unfolding events of the 1990s in the education sector, wracked as it was in Burundi by tragic internal armed conflict. This is the subject of *Chapters 4* and *5*.

Chapter 4
The effects of war and initial reconstruction

An argument has been put forward in international development circles, which states that the period of post-conflict reconstruction generally serves to increase educational opportunity, particularly enrolment expansion (Pigozzi, 1999; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Boak, 2005). However, the argument uses data mainly from outside Africa. While reviewing the crisis management efforts of the Ministry of Education in Burundi, the present study will discuss whether the decade of conflict, 1993-2003, served to bring about positive change. Five years after the critical event of 1993, it was the view of the Ministry of Education that there were fundamental dysfunctionalities in the education sector. The situation continues to this day. The Ministry of Education acknowledged in 1997 that the education system was catastrophic. How could it be otherwise since the country had suffered from the atrocities of 1993, had experienced presidential assassinations, take-over of government in 1996, an international embargo, devaluation and continuing insecurity?

> The continuing crisis in Burundi, which started in 1993, has disrupted the entire education sector and has exacerbated the dysfunctional aspects of all the subsectors of education.
>
> Bazikamwe (1998: 22).

The second introductory point to be made here concerns data. It is the case with all emergencies, by definition, that reliable data are hard to come by since the situation keeps changing, insecurity makes it difficult to go out collecting data and demographic data are generally out of date (Bethke and Braunschweig, 2004: 3-5). In the case of Burundi, the last census was in 1990; and statistics for 1993/1994 and 1994/1995, the years of the crisis, do not exist (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 42) – although some documents quote partial data for those years. To the credit of the ministry, attempts were made to collect data once more in 1995/1996. Looking back over the decade of crisis, two statistical problems remain: data are inconsistent within the same document,[26] and across documents.[27] The latter is understandable given that statistical revisions are carried out

26. Among them Ndimira *et al.* (2001): primary enrolment (p. 8, 10).
27. MEPS (1992*b*: 18) and Ndimira *et al.* (2001: 8) on enrolments.

in subsequent years, particularly when new demographic data become available. Although the figures may differ across documents, it is good to note that the variation in data is generally small and consistent, and that the trends are similar. Ministry publications and UN agency data have been quoted in the present study, in preference to the available wide range of data reports and authors. In all cases, for reference purposes, the data sources are cited. The reader is asked to focus on degrees of magnitude and trends rather than specific figures in this chapter, since more than one data set is used and figures necessarily vary a little.

Precipitating causes of the 1993 crisis

In the early chapters of this study, the recurrent nature of the political crises in Burundi and Rwanda was noted. The watershed dates in Burundi's recent history have been 1959, 1972 and 1993. In 1959, Burundi observed its neighbour's turmoil and the resulting massacre and exodus of Tutsi from Rwanda, leading in part, to the political assassinations inside Burundi of the early 1960s and to fragile and unstable political regimes in the first years of Burundi independence. The 1972 atrocities by Hutu against Tutsi in Burundi were followed by state organized reprisals carried out by the army. This became the established pattern of violence in Burundi, with the state response far outweighing each rebellious uprising. Some have called the 1972 and 1993 acts on both sides 'selective genocide'.

Since independence, the government has made two genuine attempts at political and social reform, the years 1988-1991 and the current process of widening political participation through setting up a transitional government, in 2001. The first efforts put what turned out to be intolerable stress on the system and demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the political entity that was Burundi. There has been some research on 'failed' states but there is need for more analysis of vulnerable states and the signs which could indicate to benevolent regional and world organizations the point at which states in crisis need support to prevent stress turning into internal armed conflict.

The Burundi crisis of 1993 was precipitated by destabilizing events both within and outside the country. Major political reforms were being planned in 1988-1993 internally and with the support of regionally backed discussions in Arusha, which caused anxiety at both extremes of the political spectrum. On the one hand, there was a groundswell of Hutu opposition to the slow pace of reform, demanding faster, more effective

and permanent inclusion into the political and economic mainstream. On the other hand, the more conservative Tutsi leaders were increasingly concerned about sharing resources with the Hutu majority. The general election of July 1993 ushered in a Hutu President, Ndadaye, for the first time. His assassination, only 100 days into his term, brought the country to a standstill. By October 1993 the country was in turmoil once again.

Major economic reforms were introduced in 1991, recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; to diversify agricultural exports, attract foreign investment in industry, and modernize government budgetary practices. They were launched simultaneously with the political developments described above and, consequently; put a great strain on the political fabric of the country. Burundi's economy still depended on coffee for about 80 per cent of its exports; coffee was always at risk from factors beyond national control, namely the vagaries of the climate and the international market. In Rwanda, extremists in the Hutu government were trying to block political reform and wider participation in the political process, mirroring a similar type of occurrence in Burundi, but waged by different groups. They were losing ground in the armed conflict in the north of the country, where Tutsi refugees returning from Uganda after more than thirty years exile, were succeeding in putting pressure on the government for political reform and were inching their way towards the capital. The forces that were to produce Rwanda's genocide were building up in both countries. The crisis broke first in Burundi. The devastation of 1993 resulted in the destruction of much of the public infrastructure, the collapse of key institutions, and a serious decline in the delivery of most basic social services (UNICEF Burundi,1997: 7).

La crise, 1993

In Burundi, the year 1993 is referred to as '*la crise*'. The term denotes the specific events of 1993, the sudden shock of events during that year, in distinction to the continuing violence and instability over the next twelve years. The expression also signifies that the crisis of 1993 was the immediate cause of unfolding, decade-long events and violence, continuing up to today. The sequels to 1993 are called the period of 'instability' or 'the ongoing conflict' which was particularly acute until 1996-1997.

It was estimated that by the end of 1993, 150,000 people had been killed (Sommers, 1998: 3). More were to die over the next decade. Tens

of thousands of Tutsi were murdered by the *Front pour la démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU) after the assassination of the Hutu President Ndadaye. The army retaliated, and killed at least as many Hutu. In Burundi for a second time, in 1993 as in 1972, and anticipating the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, it was the state which planned mass murder, which instigated and directed the extermination ... all in the name of national sovereignty ... In the three cases, the monster-state ... turned on itself, put itself at risk of self-destruction, and massacred its 'faithful servants' without any hesitation (Lemarchand, 2000: 562).

The social fabric of the country was torn apart. An estimated 790,000 people or 160,000 households escaped from their homes, fleeing from the pogroms, while up to 800,000 people fled as refugees. "Since 1993 more than one million of the country's 6.2 million people have either been killed or uprooted as refugees, internally displaced, dispersed" or, more recently, 'regrouped', that is, people forced out of their homes into settlements according to a military strategy for the stated aim of protection; and new refugees totalled 300,000 in Tanzania and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In the next few years 800,000 villagers were to flee to settlements for protection. The most desperate people were those still "hiding in marshes and forests with their families", up to 1997. "As security improves ... a recent startling phenomenon is the emergence of groups of starving people ... mainly women and children ... emerging from hiding in the marshes and forests", UNICEF reported (UNICEF Burundi, 1997: 2-4; Cochet, 1996).

Most of Burundi's 20,000 unaccompanied children had been placed in host families by 1997, but UNICEF admitted that without proper monitoring mechanisms, "some suffer abuse or lack of affection" in those families. Some 400,000 children were displaced, without proper access to health services or schooling. "[M]any children had witnessed brutality toward family and/or neighbours or have themselves been the target of conflict". "Shockingly", the report continued, "the majority of victims of indiscriminate violent attacks are children". The populations most in need were communities located in the areas of high insecurity (UNICEF Burundi, 1997: 2). Depending in great part on local capacity, and on the Government of Burundi, UNHCR, UNICEF and other partners set up networks of rapid intervention teams to assess survival and other needs, and to plan an adequate response.

Education just before 1993

Senior planners in the Ministry of Education acknowledged, at the round table meeting on education in 1998, that the education sector had suffered from 'profound structural distortions' even before the crisis, due to lack of sector planning and absence of clear objectives. They noted that there was already a problem with urban/rural disparity, the excess number of teachers in towns, which even as early as 1989 was reported as problematic (Ziarati, 1999: 77). They reminded the meeting that the 1973 reforms had never been evaluated and that piecemeal adjustments in the 1980s and 1990s had not only failed to strengthen the system but that major policy changes, such as the introduction of double shifts, had severely eroded the anticipated gains of the 1973 reform (MEN, 1998: 6-7). Primary enrolment expansion in the 1980s was, arguably, the only area of significant sector improvement since independence. In short, significant problems existed in the sector before the crisis.

Enrolments were at their highest levels in Burundi at the end of the 1980s and an average of 400 new classrooms were being built every year. But, as tension grew in the early 1990s, some fluctuation in enrolments became apparent in 1991/92. The GER declined from 72 to 70 per cent the previous year, no longer matching population growth rates, which have always been high in Burundi (MEN, 2002: 10). Even the absolute number of children in school decreased, by an almost imperceptible 2,616, mirroring growing apprehension in the countryside and the worsening economic situation at household level (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 16; MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 7; and MEN, 2000*a*: 38, 41 and 45). The number of teachers and classrooms continued to increase, but at a slower pace than before.

Destruction of the education sector

Armed conflict, killings, atrocities, terror, flight and displacement brought the country to a standstill. There was destruction, loss and looting of schools. Schoolchildren and teachers were killed. In general, education sector disparities noted in pre-war days were exacerbated: the difference between urban and rural access to resources, the advantage of the centre and the disadvantage of the periphery, the regional gap, the social group gap, the gender gap. Those who suffered most after the war were in the rural areas, the politically peripheral zones of the country, the historically disadvantages regions; they were the socially marginalized groups, girls, AIDS orphans and affected families, the war wounded,

the forcibly conscripted and abducted (which included girls and boys), refugees, internally displaced, landless and impoverished people (MEN/ UNICEF, 1999: 45).

The major effects of the crisis were:

- enrolments plummeted – by at least one third;[28]
- physical destruction and looting of schools, classrooms, furniture equipment;
- textbooks and supplies destroyed and looted;
- teachers were killed and fled;
- the functioning of the total system was threatened by the instability in the country;
- external assistance cut back/withdrawn;
- unco-ordinated entry of many new relief NGOs, international and national;
- funds for education declined.

Table 4.1 Education indicators before and after the crisis

Indicators	Before the crisis, 1992/1993	Destruction/loss/dysfunction
Pupils	651,086	35% (N=225,551) decline
GER	67 %	37% decline, to 42% GER
NER	50 %	44% decline, to 28% NER
Teachers	10,165	14% (N=1,400) decline [a]
Schools	985	29% (N=282) shut/destroyed
Classrooms	9,211	29% (N=2,740) non-functioning/destroyed

Sources: MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 45; MEN/ADEA, 2002: 16; MEN, 2000*a*: 38, 45; Rurihose, 2001; MEN, 2000*b*.

[a] Data for 1993/1994 from MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 45. Other reports put the figure of teacher loss much higher.

Table 4.1 gives an impression of the magnitude of the destruction and loss in the education sector.

Violence did not end with the crisis of 1993. It was recurrent, sporadic and exploded in one region after another, causing widespread fear and panic up until the time of the field visit at the end of 2003,

28. Other sources state that "half the children" were attending school (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 45).

on which this book is based. This meant first, that it was not easy to restart schooling and that some of the initial efforts at reconstruction were suffering from subsequent destruction and stoppages.

Emergency and initial reconstruction stages

A more detailed description of the destruction of the sector is given below, with some indication of how the ministry and the partners set about tackling the rehabilitation exercise. The priorities for the government were to re-open schools and keep them open, to rapidly rehabilitate a minimum number of classrooms, put teachers into classrooms, pay them salaries, get children into the schools, and provide essential teaching/learning materials such as textbooks and writing materials.

The ministry spearheaded a back-to-school campaign in early 1994. It recruited 3,000 new teachers and managed to pay teachers; it started to train the new unqualified teachers; and successfully re-opened schools in the secure zones in February 1994, only four months after the crisis. Annual school examinations were organized even during 1994 and 1995, although under very difficult conditions. According to observers at the time, the quality of the examinations could not be guaranteed but the fact that they were held at all was reassuring for everyone. The government succeeded in keeping things turning over despite heavy losses in its own professional personnel and significantly reduced technical assistance at the time (MEN, 2002: 4). One achievement is amazing, given the trouble of the times: the ministry published the annual education statistical report for 1992/1993 in December 1993, just two months after the explosion of the crisis.

Table 4.2 shows the situation in 1995/1996 and, in the right hand column, the number of years that it took to regain pre-crisis levels. The population continued to grow at this time so the burden of enrolling more and more children increased.

Table 4.2 Regaining pre-conflict levels in primary education

Indicators	Before the crisis, 1992/1993	1995/1996	Regained pre-war level
Pupils	651,086	426,535	6 years later (1999)
GER	67%	42%	8 years later (2002)
NER	50%	28%	13 years later (1990 level of 53% regained in 2003)
Teachers	10,165	8,700[a]	4 years later (1997)
Schools	985	421	5 years later (1998/1999) all functioning in 12 provinces
Classrooms	9,211	6,548	3 years later (1996)

Sources: MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 45; MEN/ADEA, 2002: 16; MEN, 2000*a*: 38, 45; Rurihose, 2001: 31; MEN, 2000*b*.
[a] Data for 1993/1994, MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 45.

To regain the same absolute numbers of enrolments took six years; the former gross enrolment rates were reached after eight years; but net enrolment rates took 13 years to recover, from the start of tension in 1990, at the point where NER had started to decline. Burundi concentrated on classroom rehabilitation and teacher recruitment, probably using the strategies that had been used in the 1980s to prepare for renewed enrolments. The components, which proved difficult to provide were qualified teachers and sufficient learning resourses, particularly textbooks.

Enrolments

To lose one third of the children from school, overnight, was a traumatic experience for the education system. Unfortunately, this was not the first time, as *Figure 4.1* below illustrates. The diagram is explicit in pointing to the massively destructive effects of conflict on an education system, over four decades, and is a graphic lesson for Burundi on the importance of building sustainable peace in the country.

Figure 4.1 GER response to crisis, 1962-2001



Year	GER
1962	20
1970	47
1972	47
1975	**25**
1977	26
1980	29
1984	47
1990	70
1992	72
1995	**47**
1997	43
2000	68
2001	73

Source: MEN/ADEA, 2002: 18.

After the crisis, six of the 16 provinces dropped to a GER of under 30 per cent. Three years later, reflecting the state of insecurity province by province, Bubanza Province had as few as 9 per cent of their children in school and 91 per cent out of school; Karusi had 17 per cent in school. The GER in these provinces had fallen from 58 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively. Net enrolment rates were even more devastating: only 37 per cent of children aged 7-12 years were in school in 1998/1999 or, to put it more clearly, almost two thirds of Burundi's children were out of school (MEN, 2000*a*: 46). NER was 52% in 1991/1993 and 37 per cent in 1998/1999. In 1998, the displaced population of 800,000 included 77,000 to 125,000 school age children between 10 and 16 per cent of the population (Jackson, 2000: 8). Households found it increasingly difficult

to pay the direct and indirect costs of schooling. Children abandoned the formal primary schools and flocked to literacy classes at the *Yaga Mukama* non-formal education centres, which were free and only required twice weekly attendance.[29] This gave children the time to help their parents on other days of the week at home and in the fields, helping to increase family food production or income, or freeing up parents for income generation by doing the domestic chores and providing childcare for younger siblings. In 1999-2000, when the country was settling into a less intense phase of violence, school fees were raised more than threefold, from FBu300 to 1,000, which countered the policy of increasing enrolments.

Figure 4.2 indicates how enrolments were still low and erratic by 1998, with Bubanza still far from recovery. By 2002, although GER has risen it is more uneven by province, jumping up and down the imaginary trend line, with a widening gap between the highest and lowest enrolled provinces, Kirundo with 49 per cent GER, and Bujumbura and Bururi Provinces with 108-106 per cent GER.

Figure 4.2 GER by province before and after the crisis: 1993, 1998 and 2002



Sources: MEN/ADEA, 1999: 18; Ndayisaba, 2003; MEN, 2003*a*.

Enrolments by gender

After 1993 girls' enrolments were erratic. Boys' and girls' enrolments fell, then started to rise around 1997. However, boys made steadier

29. See also the section on *Yaga Mukama – Burundi's unique NFE programme* in *Chapter 5*.

progress. Initially, as *Table 4.3* indicates, as the schools re-opened and the first data were collected for 1995/6 and 1996/7, it seemed as if girls were in the same or a slightly better relative position than in the early 1990s.[30] The gender gap widened in 1997/1998 and again in 2001/2002.

Table 4.3 Evolution of GPI, 1982-2003

Year	GPI	GER
1981/1982	0.79	34
1984/1985	0.72	52
1989/1990	0.80	71
1992/1993	0.80	70
1995/1996	0.83	42
1996/1997	0.83	43
1997/1998	0.79	52
1998/1999[a]	0.80	62
1999/2000[b]	0.80	65
2000/2001[c]	na	69
2001/2002[c]	0.75	73
2002/2003[c]	0.83	77

Sources: [a] MEN/UNICEF, 2002: 42; [b] IIEP, 2003; [c] MEN, 2003*a* and MEN, 2004.
Note: Data for 1993/1994 and 1994/1995 not available; MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 42.

GER decreased to 42 per cent overall, 46 per cent for boys and 38 per cent for girls. The GPI vacillated betweeen 0.75 and 0.83 over the next ten years, until 2003. And, it rose and fell regularly during that period, as it did in the 1980s, which had been a time of rapid enrolment expansion. In other words, when enrolments rise rapidly, there is a danger in Burundi, that girls' enrolments become unstable and do not maintain their improved level. It is concluded that girls' primary school enrolment, as a proportion of total enrolment, has not regained stability

30. The post-crisis national gender parity index is reported as 0.81 and as 0.83 in different documents, as compared with 0.80 before the war. The problems of data collection were enormous at this point, and there was little reliable information on population levels. It has to be concluded, given the slight difference between 0.80 and 0.83, which could both have been erroneous, that there was no apparent change, but that there were erratic shifts up and down.

on a national level and is not showing steady improvement since the crisis. While girls' education in Burundi is unstable, the last decade has seen significant improvement in eastern Africa, in the Sahel, and in Africa as a whole. The *EFA Global Monitoring Report* of 2004 identifies Benin, the Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania and Morocco as particularly noteworthy. Sadly, Burundi has missed out on this regional progress in girls' education. It is all the more important that the African/UN Girls' Education Initiative programme makes headway on this issue.

In Burundi, GPI broken down by provinces is shown in *Figure 4.3* and *Figure 4.4* below, before and after 1993.[31]

Figure 4.3 Primary GER and GPI levels by province, before the crisis, 1992/1993



Source: MEN/ADEA, 2002: 18.

At provincial level, three negative features are noticeable. First, there was a significant decline in the lowest GPI provinces (from 0.64 to 0.53). Second, the GPI range grew wider across the country after the crisis (from 0.64 - 0.95 to 0.53 - 0.97), indicating a general, increasing gender gap. Further, four of the six provinces with the better GPIs are the same provinces, which receive the bulk of central government support.[32] In conclusion, the gender gap is widening across the country and the lower rates are occurring in the provinces, which receive the least education services.

31. Bubanza Province is not included in *Figures 4.2-4.3* since the measurement of GPI is not comparable with other provinces at such a low level of enrolment.
32. Jackson (2000: 25) identified the provinces attracting the bulk of education services from central government. He noted that one third of the provinces receive about two thirds of government support.

Figure 4.4 Primary GER and GPI levels by province, after the crisis, 1996/1997



Source: MEN, 2000*a*: 46.

Repetition and drop-outs

The dropout rate rose imperceptibly, from 7 per cent to 8 per cent after 1993. Repetition soared from the already disturbing level of 24 per cent in 1992 to 28 per cent in grade four, 37 per cent in grade five and 44 per cent in grade six after the crisis (MEN, 2000*a*: 54). No doubt it is the transition to French medium in fifth grade that is responsible for the escalating failure rate at this level and the lack of either curriculum or teaching competency adapted for the purpose of transition. The age of pupils was no longer relevant to the curriculum or school cycle they attended, as attested by the age of the pupils in upper primary in 2000. The oldest pupils in primary school should have been in secondary school or in university, while many secondary pupils were adults, rendering both methodology and textbooks inappropriate, when the latter were available. Education centres for older adolescents and adults (18 years and over) with extensive, intensive and accelerated education programmes are sorely lacking in Burundi, and nothing has been extracted of benefit from Burundi's instructive experiments in this field.[33]

33. See *Chapter 5* on ALP and *Yaga Mukama* potential in Burundi.

Physical facilities

In 1995/1996, 29 per cent of the 985 schools remained closed,[34] and 29 per cent of the 9,211 pre-war classrooms were unusable. Displaced people flocked to schools for shelter; school desks and chairs were often used as firewood for cooking. Five years after the onset of the war, 124 of the total 1,467 schools were operating under trees; 379 had no drinking water; and 155 schools had no latrines. The national average ratio of latrines to schoolchildren was 1:60, some provinces with 1:110. Over 70,000 desks were needed, 5,000 chairs and 1,200 blackboards. Provinces most affected by the destruction of buildings were Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, Muramvya, Gitega, and Makamba (MEN/UNICEF, 1999).

In the past, the state had not built primary schools. Before independence, the Belgian Government handed over the responsibility of school building and maintenance to the churches. Few primary schools were built between 1960 and 1976. But, during the Second Republic, 1976-1987, communities assisted in the construction of schools, through organized, mandatory communal work in each locality, to implement the government's policy of school expansion. These efforts were supplemented by the reportedly more solid and higher cost constructions of the missionaries, the International Development Association (IDA) and *Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaubau*, and *le Fonds belgo-burundais de réemploi*. The number of classrooms in the country doubled, at a rate of 400 new classrooms a year. After the crisis, communities must have been psychologically and physically incapacitated by the tragic events and totally unable to repeat the 1980s exercise. In the late 1990s, the agencies which assisted in rehabilitating schools included IDA, the European Union, UNICEF,[35] UNHCR, *l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique* (ACCT) and Belgian bilateral aid (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 19, 21, 37). We received the assistance from the ministry gratefully but recognized it as "a drop in the ocean", given the immense needs of the education system in those years. Further, the international embargo imposed on the country in 1996 had the effect of drastically reducing aid. Burundi reeled from one crisis to the next. It is a wonder that the people had the resilience to try, once again, to rebuild their nation once the embargo was lifted in 1998.

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34. Accounts of the destruction vary considerably. Another document states that in January 1997 the Ministry of Education estimated that only one third of the country's nearly 1,500 primary schools were functional (UNICEF Burundi, 1997: 3).
35. UNICEF contributed over US$5 million between 1993 and 1999.

One notable and welcome break with the past was the identification of priorities according to need rather than by favour, followed by action targeted to those same areas. The provinces most affected by the crisis, were to receive the most aid for reconstruction (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 18, 21). This policy would have constituted a first step in the removal of regional imbalance in resources if it had included an affirmative component to target provinces with chronic low classroom provision. However, the total funding was too low to make much difference in overall school provision, to supply enough solidly built schools, and it did not change the pattern of disparity, as *Figure 4.5* and *Figure 4.6* on schools and classrooms indicate.

Figure 4.5 Distribution of schools by province and population, 2002



Note: Population and schools are ranked from 16 to 1, the former representing the province with the highest population; and, separately, the province with the highest number of schools.
Sources: MEN, 2002: Annexe; MEN, 2004) Burundi, International Institute for Education Planning.
Note: School age population data for 2001; schools data for 2002.

School construction did not match population by province by 2002. *Figure 4.5*, ordered from left to right by ranked provincial population, shows that the highly populated province of Kirundo had relatively few schools by 2002, while Bururi, Cibitoke, Makamba and Ruyigi, had more than other regions relative to their population.[36] The provinces at the top and at the bottom of the scale of provision are always the same ones in

36. Muramwya Province had been split into two provinces in 2000, Muramwya and Mwaro.

terms of access to education services, with the exception of Cibitoke, where schools were built and rehabilitated immediately after 1993. The population has had to regularly flee this area of high insecurity.

Figure 4.6 Classroom provision by population by province, 1993 and 2002



Sources: Rurihose, 2001: 22, 31; MEN, 2004.

Figure 4.6 indicates that there is no difference in relative classroom provision in the years before the crisis and nine years later, in 2002, after the decade of rebuilding and rehabilitation, with the exception of Bujumbura City, which had fewer classrooms in 2002 than before. It is as if the planners deliberately set out to provide an equal percentage of new classrooms according to the pre-crisis allocation, with the result that Bururi, with an untypically good classroom provision before the crisis received the benefit of an untypically high number of new classrooms after 1993, as did Makamba.

Burundi resorted to classrooms under plastic sheeting for many of its immediate needs in the decade. Mainly UNICEF provided the rapid response. During the author's mission to Burundi in 2003, requests for plastic sheeting classrooms were still being received. In terms of school furniture, three to five children were still sitting at desks designed for two children. Many schools had to use planks instead of desks or children simply sat on the floor.

Textbooks and supplies

Textbooks

Reports on textbook availability are unreliable for the early years after the crisis. Visitors to classrooms generally found no textbooks in the children's hands, and few for teachers. A survey carried out in early 2003 in primary and secondary schools, 10 years after the crisis, produced the finding that even in Bujumbura mathematics textbooks were undersupplied by 85 per cent, and there was not one single general studies textbook in the whole city. The report described the situation across the country as 'shocking', even in the provinces with the best education resources, and concluded that there was a 'colossal deficit' in textbook provision. It noted that new secondary schools, particularly the *cocos*, were in a particularly bad position, with no stocks of old books to use at all (Nibizi, 2003: 3, 5). The ministry printer (RPP) started reprinting. School fees paid by parents continued to provide significant funding, although reduced after the crisis. This was supplemented by RPP's commercial production and funds from external agencies, particularly IDA and the European Union (EU). When the embargo was lifted the World Bank funds for textbooks became available under the CURE project (*Crédit d'urgence de redressement économique*/Emergency Fund for Economic Reconstruction). The ministry set up a secondary textbook fund to which parents annually contributed FBu2,000 per child, as a supplementary levy to regular school fees. However, the printer no longer received guidance or instructions from the BER/ministry, which led to unplanned and unsequenced textbook revision and reprinting. Also, due to growing dependence on commercial work, RPP could no longer give priority to schoolbooks. This resulted in sporadic and low print-runs for schools. Textbook distribution became chaotic, with the rural schools receiving no or few books while urban schools succeeded in obtaining books on a 'first come first served' basis, widening the already serious urban/rural gap in access to education resources (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 51). Schools could no longer count on having a regular supply of textbooks, or any textbooks at all – and this situation persisted until 2003.

After 2000, the government planned to withdraw tax relief on printing supplies, leading to a rise in textbook prices for consumers, that is, for the ministry itself. This policy directly contradicted the campaign to enrol more children in school, and seemed to indicate a certain level of confusion in ministry policies at the time. The practice had been for

pupils to use textbooks free of charge (free once school fees had been paid), planned at one book for two pupils, reported as one for four to six pupils by 1999. Observation in schools showed that pupils generally had no textbooks at all.

Burundi had an interesting advantage after the crisis: the textbooks designed in the 1970s and printed in the 1980s had nothing objectionable in them. On the contrary, they spoke of national unity, the brotherhood of man, the unifying, and the rich cultural heritage of all Burundians. They sent all the right messages. One could wonder what prevented such messages from being assimilated before the war. Whatever the case, the textbooks were in what one could call an appropriate cultural shape, sending all the right messages before and after the war. The ministry did not have to revise or change them, as other post-war countries have had to do.

It is quite another issue as to whether the messages were credible before or after the war to the Burundi people. The books cannot however, be faulted for being divisive as regards their overt or covert content, as Rwandan textbooks had been. Contemporary issues and major social questions had been avoided in the Burundian teachers' guides and textbooks. Some would say they had been passed over in an unnatural silence, and that this very denial or selective silence has led to the sort of social tension that produced the crisis of 1993. Those who take this view, the progressive human rights NGOs, for example, would also say that the silence needs to be now broken.

Supplies

Before the war, school fees had provided exercise books, paper, and were used for recurrent classroom and school office expenses, such as chalk, typewriters and stationery. Children bought their own pens and pencils directly. After the crisis, many agencies distributed supplies, including NGOs, UNICEF, UNESCO and the *Agence intergouvernamentale de la francophonie* (AIF). The agencies also funded teacher capacity-building, focusing on training the newly recruited teachers taken on after the crisis. When the policy was introduced, to provide fee waivers for the poor, local authorities must have appreciated that schools simply could not run at all if the number of exemptions was to match need. Almost everyone could be classified as needy. Whatever the level of need on the ground, the central ministry did not make up the shortfall in school budgets resulting from fee waivers. The consequence could be anticipated:

very few children were accorded fee waivers; most children stayed out of school, and schools stumbled along on minimal funds and without essential learning materials and equipment. The lesson should have been learned by now across many education systems that fee waivers need to be backed up by compensatory funding for schools either from local or central authorities, or with the assistance of external partners. While it seems that the lesson has been listened to in stable countries, which are setting up capitation grants for schools under decentralization processes, the practice is not common in situations of emergency. Schools must have annual budgets for recurrent expenses. It is recommended that external partners give attention to such assistance in the future.

Teachers

Teacher provision

At least 500 teachers were killed during the violence of 1993. Thousands fled, among them most of the Zairean and Rwandan teachers, estimated at 1,800, who had formed 22 per cent of the teaching force in 1992 (Bazikamwe, 1998: 5). Data is inconsistent on the number and proportion of teachers who did not return to schools after the crisis, between 30 per cent and 14 per cent, but described as a "catastrophic loss" by all accounts (UNICEF, 1997: 4; MEN and UNICEF, 1999: 45; Jackson, 2000: 8). Part of the explanation for varying data could be that many teachers were internally displaced; others requested transfers to towns. Over 3,000 unqualified teachers were recruited to make up the shortfall. It could be the case that the state simply bowed to public demand for employment at a time of terror and deprivation. The *Lycées pédagogiques* were producing 1,000 D6 primary teachers per year; and just over 80 D7 primary teachers. Only 50 per cent of the D6 teachers chose to enter the teaching profession each year, after having received highly subsidized training. One new major problem faced by teachers was lack of mobility. Due to low salaries, teachers could only feed themselves adequately if they lived on their own land and grew their own crops. Further, they only felt safe if working in their home locality, within their displaced community or in the provincial towns. This situation resulted in the major urban areas attracting a massive surplus of teachers, since those who had completed teacher training programmes tended to come from middle income, urban families. Towns overflowed with teachers, sometimes three to a class, particularly in Bujumbura, whereas some rural areas had almost no teachers at all (Rurihose, 2001: 34-38).

Observing classes in the late 1990s, the author saw that the surplus one or two teachers per class did not team-teach: They sat in desks at the back of the class, with no books or papers in front of them, watching.

Figure 4.7 Pre-war and post-war teacher provision, 1993 and 2002



Sources: Rurihose, 2001: 22, 31; MEN, 2000: 41, 45, 48, 53, 93.

In *Figure 4.7*, the order of provinces, indicated by the descending line, from left to right, reflects provincial school age population, that is, from 110,000 children to 30,000 children in a province. First, the ministry succeeded in recruiting more teachers for the sector. Ironically, there was a 19 per cent excess of teachers by 1998/1999, which also goes to explain the apparently contradictory data for 1994, above (MEN and UNICEF, 1999: 16). The second point that *Figure 4.7* makes is that teacher provision does not match population by province. Third, as in the case of classroom provision, teacher allocation in 2002 clearly matched pre-war deployment, instead of reversing policy and practice and aiming at equitable distribution. In Bururi, a significantly higher allocation was made by 2002, also in Mwaro and Muramvya. Many teachers had taken refuge in Bujumbura for security reasons and due to the fact that essential services had collapsed in the rural areas, such as health clinics, water, electricity, transport and markets (MEN and UNICEF, 1999: 16). This produced a further dimension to disparity and brought untold hardship to the provinces and rural areas with an increasingly low proportion of teachers, such as Muyinga with the fourth highest post-war school age population but one of the lowest teacher allocations. Karusi was also

allocated few teachers. Makamba's population was increasing rapidly and was, justifiably, given a higher proportion of teachers than before. In short, there was varying success with teacher allocation over the decade in terms of equity, but mainly a pattern of exacerbated disparity.

Another indicator of quality is the teacher/pupil ratio, which was 1:39 in primary schools in 1991 and rose to 1:54 in 2001, with the pattern of regional disparity that is common to other indicators in the education sector (Ndimira, nimpagaritse, Sandayizeruka and Suguri, 2001: 12, 25).

Teacher qualifications

In 1998, 30 per cent of the primary teachers were unqualified (reduced to 20 per cent by 2001 (Rurihose, 2001: 37)); and 64 per cent in the community junior secondary schools. In state secondary schools 29 per cent were unqualified and 34 per cent in technical secondary schools (Bitagoye, 1998: 15). The *Politique Sectorielle* stated in 2002 that many unqualified and underqualified teachers remained, mainly the new teachers recruited since 1994 (MEN, 2002: 9).

Figure 4.8 Teacher qualifications before and after the crisis, 1993, 1998, 2002



Sources: Rurihose, 2001: 22, 31; MEN, 2000: 41, 45, 48, 53, 93.

Figure 4.8 indicates that teacher qualifications were higher and more uniform across provinces in pre-war days than at any time after the crisis, ranging from 79 to 92 per cent of qualified teachers before 1993.

After the crisis, sharp disparities were evident as all rural provinces experienced a sharp drop in qualified teachers to a level lower than 1993, except Bujumbura Town and Muramvya. The gap in access to qualified teachers widened from 13 percentage points to 28 percentage points, with the capital city gaining more and more qualified teachers (92 per cent) and Bururi, Muramvya and Makamba at over 80 per cent, while Karusi had only 67 per cent qualified teachers. By the tenth year after the crisis, in 2002, the situation had improved but had not righted itself: (a) there were still too few qualified teachers available. Only five provinces had recovered and had a better supply of teachers than before the war, and (b) the allocation by province was still distinctly disparate, with a continuing gap of 28 percentage points between the proportion of well endowed and poorly endowed provinces. Bubanza had a particularly high proportion of unqualified teachers (33 per cent). This was an opportunity for external partners to plan with the ministry to reward qualified teachers ready to teach in difficult zones and in historically disadvantaged areas. But there was no assistance in this area at all. Disparity therefore increased due to patchy security and to the chronic pattern of inequitable resource distribution.

Teacher development and support

A 2001 overview of teacher education noted the continuing lack of clarity in the sector and the urgent need of rationalization, reform and funding. It recommended the crash course model of the accelerated learning programme (the type of teacher training organized for the Accelerated Learning Programme/Teacher Emergency Package experiment run by Norwegian Refugee Council) to the ministry and pointed to recurrent dissatisfaction with the quality of some of the teacher education programmes, for example, the D6 course (Kanyugu, 2001: 11, 14). There is documentation on teacher education, which details the plethora of training institutions, stop-start reforms in the sector and general confusion and lack of direction over the last 20 years (MEN/UNICEF, 1999; Jackson, 2000; Rurihose, 2001; Kanyugu, 2001). It cannot be overemphasized to external agencies that the area which needs most attention and funding in the future, in Burundi and in all post-conflict situations, is teacher development and support.

Teachers remained unpaid and underpaid from time to time during the decade, depending on the availability of Government funds. The injection of 4 million euros by the Belgian Government in 2002/2003 for

salary back-payments of teachers boosted morale at that time. Salaries continue to be low; classes are overcrowded, particularly at secondary level, where an average class seems to be 60 students; working hours are long for the 70 per cent of primary teachers who work double shifts; 59 per cent of primary teachers have never benefited from upgrading or refresher courses; and 45 per cent of primary teachers have never received professional advice despite the big increase of inspectorate staff at cantonal level. What the teachers requested specifically from government was a separate employment status since they constitute 64 per cent of the civil service and feel that their needs have never been met – not since 1960 when they made their first applications to government – by the central ministry of Public Service. Most qualified teachers (D4 level) received FBu25,000 the few D7 teachers got 32,000 and untrained teachers earned 16,000. At secondary level trained teachers earned FBu47,000 and graduates FBu48,000 (Ntakimazi, 2001). Evidently, one of the first steps for government to take in peace-time will be to review the status, salaries and working conditions of teachers.

The lesson learned is that the international community has still not found a mechanism for giving immediate financial support to teachers in times of crisis, for providing a much more extensive and better quality component of training than is done in most post-conflict situations, and for teachers' support materials. Teachers are the major prop of education.

The figures in this chapter graphically demonstrate the two-track education system that Jackson describes. The same five or six provinces, the same one third of the population, repeatedly receive two thirds of the nation's education resources, while the remaining dozen provinces are repeatedly allocated one third of the resources (Jackson, 2000: 25). The seriousness of the situation by now, more than a decade after the 1993 crisis, is that the pattern of chronic inequity and discrimination is continuing and has worsened. These data support Rurihose's argument that future provision of education services must include an affirmative approach otherwise chronic disparity will be perpetuated (Rurihose *et al*., 2001). This means that, by definition, social tensions will again rise and there will be yet another catastrophe in Burundi, unless there is a complete turnaround in education sector planning, in social service provision, in political participation and direction.

Few partners in the international community have come forward to assist Burundi during the decade, due to continuing conflict and insecurity

in much of the country, which has made it difficult to reach many areas, or to plan sustainable programmes. The work and commitment of the donors and agencies that have been present during this difficult period has been gratefully accepted by Burundi. However, one question looms large: the international community has been present, but it has consciously or unconsciously been a partner in the unequal distribution of assistance noted above. The dilemma is plain and the questions are many: is it right to bring humanitarian assistance blindly to a country in distress in the hope – rather than in the certainty – that it will help the needy or some of the needy? Is it right to give assistance when it may serve to exacerbate inequity? Is it right to continue working in such a situation without knowing the results of one's intervention? Is it, was it, possible during the decade, to analyze the situation better and to work differently? Does this mean that donors should devise other mechanisms for working in such situations in order to increase the likelihood of their aid reaching the neediest rather than the always-advantaged sections of the population? Do such mechanisms exist? Who is using them?

Neither big donors nor small NGOs are exempt from such questions. NGOs may argue that they work in small communities, and by definition reach the poor. They may reach the relatively poor, but NGOs may be clustering in the relatively well-endowed provinces or districts of provinces. The point is that well-being is relative. The aim of reaching the relatively poor and the poorest of the poor is the right approach for righting wrongs and creating a level playing field. The issue lies in identifying those two social categories, the relatively poor and the poorest of the poor, and in assisting them commensurate with their need.

In response to some of the above questions, one could say that there is no justification in going into a situation blindly. Information always exists on which (pre-war) locations are historically disadvantaged, which locations have been most affected by war and what types of people in post-conflict situations are needy. Second, it is not enough to focus aid to the disadvantaged provinces – as some of the major agencies may claim they have done – since, palpably, the assistance given has been insufficient and the bigger partner, the government, has not changed its favoured attention and allocations to the advantaged provinces. Donor assistance is, anywhere, simply not as big as government assistance. The other strategy for external partners to use is influence on policy, with the aim of changing practice; or to work on systems. In Burundi, systems

have not been transformed during the decade, despite some steps in the right direction.

Post-primary education

Secondary education

The most significant change after the crisis took place at secondary level. Church, government and private secondary schools had places available for only about 10 per cent of the school leavers before the war. Communities were permitted to establish junior secondary schools and changed the face of secondary education, as the section on *Community junior secondary schools – les cocos* describes in some detail. The *collèges communaux* or *cocos* multiplied rapidly, even during the worst years of the crisis in the mid-1990s, and have continued to mushroom (Ndimira *et al*., 2001: 23).

Table 4.4 Secondary education before and after the crisis

Year	Cocos	Other secondary schools	Total	% Cocos
1991/1992	18	75	93	19%
2001/2002	273	99	372	73%

Source: MEN, 2002: Annexe O.

Between 1992 and 2002, 255 junior secondary community schools were established (*Table 4.4*). The government has concentrated on supporting the *cocos* rather than expanding the state secondary system but the location of *cocos* has been uneven and, like all community initiatives, they have benefited the communes which were already most advantaged. Worse, the poorest provinces are now the ones that depend most heavily on *cocos* that is, on their own meagre resources, and least of all on the state, as indicated in *Figure 5.1*.

Higher education

During the post-crisis years tertiary institutions have increased in number. In addition to the one state university in the capital, the National University of Burundi, which was established in 1964, there are the private universities of Ngozi, the *Université des Grands Lacs*, the University College of Bujumbura, the *École normale supérieure* (formerly an independent institution), the *Institut supérieur de contrôle et de gestio*n (ISGE), the Institute of Management, the Higher Technological Institute

(*Institut supérieur de technologie*), and others. There was a total of 7,554 students in the state university in 2003, and 239 lecturers (MEN, 2004: 112-113). Before the crisis a total of 3,787 students were in tertiary institutions, less than one third of them women (MEPS, 1992*b*: 111). The state university had been the preserve of one social group, discriminating against others, and it was mainly as a result of frustration that the first private university opened in the north, costly for parents, but serving a need. Based on experience of other countries in the region it can be expected that more and more private universities and tertiary institutions will open. There is a need to regulate them and to ensure a minimum quality but also to facilitate their establishment in order to provide competition for the sole state university and to widen access (MEN, 2002; Ndimira *et al*., 2001: 23). The irony of the situation is that while the private returns to university education have been proven to be high, students have full bursaries, or pay only nominal university fees, whether they come from high or low-income families. And the university students are from the higher rather than lower income brackets. This is another time warp in Burundi, one that prevailed in eastern Africa in the 1970s but which has been transformed in other countries during the 1980s and 1990s into a system of student loans, in an attempt to increase individual and household contributions according to income levels.

HIV/AIDS education prevention programmes

As in other countries of eastern and central Africa, the tale of HIV/AIDS is a tragic one in Burundi, turning more children into orphans than the conflict has done and likely to increase in the immediate future. The topic has been extensively documented in other countries: the extent of the pandemic, the effects on development, the implications for recovery from conflict, the impact on the lives of children, on schooling and most particularly on the lives of girls and women. Burundi is no different (MPDR/UNDP, 2002: 69). In a sense, the situation in Burundi is worse, since people are distracted from HIV by ongoing insecurity, which tends to fuel resignation to everything else, and there is no effective national women's empowerment movement. Gender relations, as illustrated by school enrolment and performance rates, formal and informal employment patterns, gender distribution of labour, and access to economic resources and political power, are strikingly unequal in Burundi, more so than in neighbouring countries, and are a serious impediment in curbing HIV and AIDS. There is no point in attempting

to introduce HIV/AIDS prevention programmes in schools, which are not gender responsive in their institutional and pedagogical practice. This issue has not been addressed in many school programmes across the region with the result that impact of HIV programmes in schools must, no doubt, be considerably reduced.

Almost every family in Burundi is affected by HIV/AIDS in one way or another. In 2002, 3.6 per cent of people over 15 years of age were HIV positive, 9.5 per cent of the country's urban population and 2.5 per cent in the rural areas. Antiretrovirals were almost totally inaccessible before 2004, due to lack of funding and low incomes. Treatment has been made available through a US$12 million grant in 2004. However the public health services may not have the capacity to handle the programme for some time (IRIN, Bujumbura, 12 February 2004). With regard to children, a UNESCO study indicated that 23 per cent of primary children, 33 per cent of secondary students and 59 per cent of university students are sexually active; and 43 per cent are reported to practise safe sex (Nkinyangi, 2003). The latter is likely to be an overestimation since it is also reported that before the crisis, in 1992, the contraceptive prevalence rate was 1.6 per cent (UNICEF Burundi, 1997: iii). There were reportedly 240,000 HIV orphans in Burundi during the years 2000-2004 (UNESCO, 2004).

As in other parts of eastern and southern Africa, HIV and AIDS are not common topics of conversation. In Burundi, people face daily challenges in the struggle for survival and the search for food. Reports on attitudes towards HIV indicate that few people understand or believe that through an individual decision they can protect themselves from HIV. In the context of ongoing political tension, it is unlikely that school programmes on HIV will be any more successful than in Rwanda or DRC, or indeed than most school programmes in stable countries in Africa which have, in the main, resisted – or been unable to – take on teaching/learning methodologies promoting behaviour change. Time and again, it has to be stated that despite the billions of dollars now reaching Africa for HIV education/treatment, unless the education programmes espouse these methodologies they remain merely information exercises, which, according to extensive research, do not change behaviour and

therefore may be a waste of funding[37]. HIV/AIDS preventive education programmes started late in Burundi, towards the end of the 1990s. The UNESCO Regional Office has supported the development of HIV prevention education for sixth and seventh grades, Stop-AIDS clubs in secondary schools, with plans to extend to primary schools, information materials for secondary schools, and school radio programmes. Peer education and counselling is carried on outside schools. UNICEF and NGOs have also been active. In Burundi, HIV preventive education is still mainly driven by outside agencies. Given the experience of Uganda, it is NGOs working outside schools and as welcome visitors inside schools, which are most likely to run adolescent-oriented and behaviour change oriented programmes effectively. At present, there is no indication so far of the coverage of these programmes, inside or outside schools.

Reviewing the first initiatives

The ministry and partners

In 1993, the ministry had requested external partners to assist with classroom rehabilitation and provision, and the reprinting of textbooks. This was done through rapid rebuilding and repair of classrooms, notably with the assistance of UNHCR and the Belgian Government, and by providing temporary classrooms almost immediately under plastic sheeting, particularly through UNICEF. In 2003, due to continuing population movements, and improved security in new areas, temporary classrooms were still being constructed. In time, external partners contributed to teacher inservicing and to some textbook development, especially in the domain of adult education, through UNESCO PEER. The government had to provide teachers' salaries, which absorbed almost the total sector budget, particularly at primary level.

In the 1990s there was less involvement of external partners than today in teacher training. The government had to provide all 1994/1995 teachers' with salaries and start to orientate the new teachers. No

37. Due to the conditionalities of some donors, HIV funds have resulted in the closure of sexual reproductive health programmes and, more tragically still, of family planning programmes, and many sexually transmitted disease clinics and general health programmes in Africa. Analogous to the observation that HIV programmes will not have much chance of success in an unresponsive environment (in gender-insensitive schools), effective HIV health programmes need a solid general health programme as a context. At the very least, they should not be the cause of terminating other excellent, proven health programmes.

government funds remained for reprinting textbooks; for typewriters or photocopiers; for regular teacher inservicing; for curriculum development; and almost no funds for other learning materials.

Entry of the NGOs

Although local and international NGOs had worked in Burundi before the crisis, their activities changed after 1993. They generally dealt with provincial rather than central ministry officers, working in the field directly where action was needed. In the 1990s, there was no NGO co-ordinating unit in the government or among the NGOs themselves, and no central monitoring or documenting of NGO activities. This led to the government's perception that international organizations, at every level, had a tendency to act outside the ambit of government plans and objectives and to work without consultation. It made the ministry feel uneasy, as if things were spiralling out of control as regards education delivery. Ministries have a tendency to perceive the situation in this way in post-conflict situations, while documentation, if kept, normally provides evidence of regular consultation. This is a combination of the nature of relationships and hard times. It has to be remembered that it had taken the ministry about two decades to solve a big problem it had inherited from colonial times, namely dealing with the churches in the education sector. Now a supportive but rather elusive and new element had entered the equation: the world of the NGOs.

The embargo 1996-1999

As Burundi lurched from one year to the next, getting the schools functioning once more, and beginning to draw breath, a further setback occurred. What might be termed the unkindest cut of all was the international embargo on trade and aid imposed on Burundi for two and a half years, July 1996/January 1999, in response to the *coup d'État* of early July 1996. Aid "disappeared into thin air ... shrivelled up into nothing" as one government report put it (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 38), just at a time when the stricken nation was trying to pull itself up on its crutches. The World Bank, the European Union and the bilaterals withheld assistance and loans to Burundi during that critical time. International NGOs continued to support and fund the reconstruction of the country, alongside multilaterals such as UN agencies. Aid declined to one quarter of what it had been in 1992. Government health and education budgets were cut by 64 per cent. Technical education had depended on external resources for 89 per cent of its budget (Sinzinkayo, 2004: 10). Inflation

rose to 40 per cent. "The effects of economic decline on women and children, particularly in rural areas, have been devastating", due to the dwindling supply of fuel and vital relief goods. "As scarce public services and traditional sources of income decline, more Burundians are equating ethnic survival with denying the other group access to scarce national resources. Increasingly radicalized, polarized and armed groups within society are attempting to resolve differences through armed conflict". And, what was more significant, "[p]rolonged and extensive conflict ... have resulted in an erosion of faith and hope" (UNICEF Burundi, 1997: 1-2). "The education sector, a cornerstone for the future, [was] particularly hard hit" by the embargo since education materials, which mainly had to be imported during the crisis, were not granted sanctions-exempt status (UNICEF Burundi, 1997: 6). It is difficult to comprehend, 10 years later, how the region could have chosen a non-selective embargo as a method of disciplining political leaders and could have stood by watching as life-sustaining assistance and hope evaporated.

The national education budget

The effort that Burundi was putting into the education sector can be measured by the fact that internal resources contributing to the education budget in the years 1997-2000 rose by 44 per cent in local currency. However, in real terms it decreased by 10 per cent (MEN, 2002: 5). In 2000, primary teachers' salaries amounted to 97 per cent of the recurrent education budget, and salaries absorbed respectively 60 and 50 per cent at secondary and tertiary levels. Boarding expenses accounted for 27 per cent at secondary level. The contribution of parents, communes, and NGOs is referred to in *Chapter 5*.

External assistance

During the embargo the assistance of the following donors and others was much appreciated:

- **Twitezimbere/IDA** contributed almost FBu800 million over two years, 1996 and 1997, for primary education (mainly construction).
- **UNICEF** provided over FBu200 million for 1997 and 1998, for temporary classrooms, reprinting. textbooks, classroom supplies, support to peace education.
- The **Belgian Government**, FBu150 million, through the *Fonds de ré-emploi.*

- **Churches**, FBu37 million in 1997.
- **UNHCR**, almost FBu700m in 1997 and over US$1.5 million in the following year (Rurihose, 2001: 32, 34).

By 2000 the major donors active in support of education were:

Table 4.5 Main donors supporting education

Donors and agencies	Action
UNICEF and UNHCR	Rehabilitation of primary schools; provision of temporary schools (under plastic sheeting)
Belgian aid Sweden through CEPBU (Pentecostal Churches)	Construction of primary schools and community junior secondary schools
IDA through Twitezimbere, UNESCO, and some local NGOs	Assistance to primary schools and community junior secondary schools

Source: MEN, 2002: 5.

- After 2000:
  - The European Union pledged support.
  - In 2000, after the embargo was lifted, the World Bank returned to Burundi with the CURE project, which included an allocation for education of FBu5,620 million, of which FBu2,500 million was budgeted for primary school reconstruction and equipment, and FBu700 million for textbook production (Rurihose, 2001: 32, 34).

Into the new Millennium

Many plans were drawn up both at the inter-agency level and nationally, to reconstruct the sector, starting with classrooms, schools, school furniture and equipment, and teaching/learning materials. The 2002 Sectoral Policy document superseded all other plans and detailed projects up until 2010.

To its credit, at a continuing time of stress in 2002, the Transitional Government succeeded in producing an education sector policy, for short-term, medium-term and long-term planning, and for improved management of the sector. The document noted the continuing lack of infrastructure and teaching/learning materials, but also the "almost chronic lack of teachers and poor teacher support services" (MEN, 2002: 1-2, 6).

Despite acute hardships in these years, the State, the parents and communities, made extraordinary efforts to continue to fund education and even to raise their contributions to schools. Some rare donors assisted them. The state paid teachers' salaries and communities, parents and external assistance met all other school costs. However, despite the overall rise in enrolments, fundamental problems remained nine years after the crisis. They were summarized by the sector policy document as: lack of teachers, buildings, irrelevant curriculum, geographic and social disparities in the system, the lack of development of technical education, poor school support services and monitoring systems, and inadequate supervision and control of private schools. The principal four obstacles noted by the government were: restricted access to schools, equity, finance and the unstable socio-political context. GER was quoted in the report as 66 per cent at primary, 10 per cent at secondary and 1 per cent at tertiary levels (MEN, 2002).

The ministry's plan was to develop a decentralized, more equitable sectoral management system, which would increasingly involve communities and parents in the running and financial management of schools, and have the capacity for regular self-assessment. Children were to acquire knowledge and skills to become active and innovative agents in the development of their communities, employable, proud of their national culture, open to and tolerant of the wider international community, and appreciate fundamental human rights. These aims echoed the reform of 1973, which had not been fully implemented. The role of the Ministry of Education was spelled out, including a commitment to equity, to providing peace education, education for democracy, respect for the law and individual freedom. ministry structure was determined, very similar to the existing one. The most significant lack of name change must have been the *Bureau d'éducation rurale*, which continued to lead curriculum development (MEN, 2002).

Contradictory tactics and occurrences

Although disparities increased during the decade, the government and other partners made attempts to eliminate them. The left column below notes some of these efforts. The right column lists some of the steps taken, which served to increase disparity. Four parameters of discrimination structure the lists: regional, socio-economic, gender and social group disparity. Strengthened information collection and analysis by the ministry constituted a major strategy for countering inequity.

Table 4.6 Measures reducing/increasing disparities

Measures to reduce disparities	**Measures which increased disparities**
Regional disparities: Policy to give priority to school rehabilitation in areas suffering from destruction of school facilities (did not substantially change unequal school provision) National campaign in 2000 to increase enrolments	*Regional disparities*: Inequitable classroom provision, ongoing Inequitable teacher provision Inequitable deployment of qualified teachers Textbook distribution mainly to urban areas, ignoring rural schools Rapid *coco* expansion in advantaged areas
Income disparities: Some few fee waivers brought some poor children into school *Coco* day schools cheaper than boarding secondard schools	*Income disparities:* Mandatory school fees More than threefold rise in school fees, putting school costs beyond poor households Increased price of textbooks
Gender disparities: AGEI, girls' education programme	*Gender disparities:* Gender gap widened across provinces and between rural/urban populations
Social group disparities: End to exam mark manipulation Peace education programming	*Social group disparities:* Balkanization of secondary schools (Tutsi pupils choosing some schools and *Hutu* choosing others)
Disparity in general Data collection (annual), analyses carried out to identify disparity and other problems, e.g. vast Comprehensive Analysis of Education (1997), MEN 2000*a*, sectoral policy development Increased education budgets	

The schema above seems to indicate a ministry giving with one hand and taking away with the other. The situation is explained by the times, and by the lack of a general plan.

There are three main characteristics of the decade 1993-2003 in the education sector in Burundi:

- Widespread destruction and fundamental disruption of the system.

- Valiant efforts to reconstruct and maintain the system; no significant improvement achieved.
- Take-over of market/demand forces in the sector.

One could say that Burundi managed to patch up the cracks and to physically reconstruct many of the elements of the education sector that existed before the crisis. But it is taking more than 10 years. There has been no success with quality reform or system strengthening. Burundi was left at the end of the decade of ongoing war, in 2003, with a skewed and anarchic system, that is, expansion running out of control at secondary level with the spontaneous and unplanned establishment of *cocos*; and an educational process and content that had not moved ahead in the last thirty years. Primary, secondary, technical and tertiary education, out-of-school options and adult education, all needed major overhaul, renewal and new life breathed into them. This is not to deny the efforts of the Ministry of Education in Burundi and its partners in extremely difficult circumstances. On the contrary, there have been heroic efforts and there have been some achievements. It is these achievements and the potential in the sector that *Chapter 5* sets out to document and explore.

Regaining pre-crisis levels

The chapter ends where it began: on the issue of conflict and opportunity. Unlike countries which may have found that armed struggle produced an opportunity for education sector reform and renewal, this is not the case in Burundi, which has had to struggle long years just to keep afloat, as *Figure 4.1* and *Table 4.2* indicate with regard to the timetable for regaining past achievements, and which has yet to fully implement the peace accords it has signed. To recap:

- *Absolute numbers of children in school:* Despite the conflict and the exodus of refugees, the population of children of primary school age, 7-12 years, increased but primary enrolments were not equalled until six years after the crisis. After that point, they continued to rise, but more slowly than would have been the case without conflict.
- *GER:* It took eight years to regain the GER level, with population growth compounding the problem of increasing poverty. GER in 1990 had been 70 per cent, which was only reached once more in 2002.
- *NER: NET* was regained after 13 years, from a level of 53 per cent in 1989/1990.

- *Classrooms*: The need was for 777 new classrooms per year, to reach universal primary education by 2010. But it proved difficult to match even the achievements of the 1980s, which succeeded in constructing 400 per year. From 1998/1999 to 1999/2000 only 110 classrooms were built (Rurihose, 2001: 33).
- *Quality*: Indications are that quality decreased, with rising pupil/teacher ratios, high repetition rates and declining performance rates.
- *The state of the Ministry of Education:* The decade was marked by a dwindling and demoralized staff, political appointments, serious lack of funds and little means of implementing policies or reaching out to remote or insecure areas.

Conflict has to be the major force for holding back and reversing progress in the sector, and for destroying education systems in Africa.

Chapter 5
Achievements, challenges and potential

Over the decade of ongoing crisis and insecurity, some particular events and achievements in the education sector in Burundi can be remarked. Some of these will be described here, to give an insight into the challenges faced during this time and the manner in which the Ministry of Education tackled them. The areas to be discussed in this chapter are: the community-driven junior secondary schools (or *cocos*); the *Yaga Mukama* extensive alternative education programme; the Teachers' Emergency Package, an accelerated alternative learning programme for out-of-school children[38] and progress achieved in the structure and activities of the Ministry of Education.

Community junior secondary schools – les *cocos*

The creation of community junior secondary schools, the *collèges communaux* or *cocos*, as they are commonly called,[39] is a sudden success story in Burundi, demonstrating that the Burundi people are firmly education-oriented and that they can drive the sector if, for any reason, the ministry shows signs of lagging behind. As the 1990s opened, the ministry was not leading change at secondary level – possibly exhausted by the expansion at primary level. It took the determination of the public to make things happen.[40] The change occurred at a time when the country and the government were at their weakest, crippled by the crisis of violence during the middle years of the 1990s, and unable to direct the unfolding events in the education sector. The momentum of opening community secondary schools ran away with itself, expanding in all directions, skewing the sector to such a degree that by the end of 1995 two thirds of secondary schools were *cocos* (*Table 5.1* below), schools which had not

38. In Burundi's case the accelerated learning programme was a new Teachers' Emergency Package (TEP), as it was called, inspired by the Angolan TEP.
39. The primary cycle is six years; the junior secondary cycle is four years and the secondary cycle is generally three years: a 6+4+3 (+3) system (three more years for a university degree).
40. One day there should be a debate on the position, during the 1980s and 1990s, of the World Bank and the donors, who not only focused their own funds on basic education but put pressure on African governments to reduce secondary and tertiary spending.

even existed six years before. The experience revealed that there were untapped resources within regions, communities and households which could be utilized for education. It also shows that a distorted, runaway subsector can become a big problem at a later date for a ministry that did not plan it, has no funds to support it or the means of controlling it. Yet, that was exactly the challenge that was facing the ministry in 2003, as it squared up to its responsibility for shaping secondary education for the future, bringing some order to it, facilitating it and, most importantly, ensuring that it would provide equitable access and an education of quality at secondary level. The experience also shows that when the state partners a popular movement, it can benefit from new life breathed into it. Some may say that that is exactly what the ministry needed in those difficult years.

From the five *cocos* set up in 1990/1991,[41] the movement mushroomed into 155 *cocos* by the end of 1995 (*Table 5.1*), despite the state of the economy in the early 1990s when annual per capita income was as low as US$180, despite the crisis of 1993, and despite the continuing violence after that date. This was a time when the people firmly led secondary school development and transformed the face of the sector in six short years, as they continue to do today.

To highlight the positive aspects of the *coco* phenomenon is not to downplay the challenges that the community schools movement has thrown up. Among the first results were dangerous and increasing regional and social disparities in the subsector, due to lack of ministry control over the location of new community schools, and failure to regulate the secondary sector or put state funds into the enterprise at the start, in order to cushion poorer communities. Consequently, advantaged communes set up more and more *cocos* while resource-poor communes remained without a single one. However, since 2000 there has been a serious attempt by the ministry to take stock of the *cocos*, to control and supervize them, to invest state funding in the schools and, in this way, to reduce and finally eliminate the earlier regional and social disparities.

41. Additional data on secondary schools is in *Appendix D*.

Table 5.1 Achievements, challenges and potential, 1995

Provinces	Lycées	Other secondary schools	Community secondary schools	Total
Bubanza	1	4	5	10
Bujumbura Town	4	9	11	24
Bujumbura Rural	3	1	13	17
Bururi	7	4	19	30
Cankuzo	1	2	5	8
Cibitoke	2	0	7	9
Gitega	5	9	13	27
Karuzi	0	3	6	9
Kayanza	3	0	10	13
Kirundo	1	1	7	9
Makamba	1	2	14	17
Muramvya	5	4	16	25
Muyinga	2	1	6	9
Ngozi	5	2	9	16
Rutana	1	0	6	7
Ruyigi	4	1	8	13
Total	45	45	155	245
	(18.4%)	(18.4%)	(63.3%)	(100%)

Source: Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 26, 29, 38.
Notes: Lycées are the full secondary schools or high schools with lower and upper secondary cycles.
"Other secondary schools" may include state and private junior secondary schools (*les collèges*), technical schools and private high schools and seminaries.

The nature of the need

Public demand for community schools arose from a number of needs in the early 1990s:

- Demand far outstripped secondary school places;
- Secondary school selection procedures were suspect;
- Insecurity, which depressed demand for boarding schools;
- Impoverishment, leading to new survival strategies.

Entry to secondary school had always been restricted by the very few places available. For decades, less than 10 per cent of primary completers reached secondary school while the population was growing at nearly 3 per cent per year and primary enrolment increased threefold in the 1980s. Burundi had one of the lowest secondary enrolment rates in the world (Rurihose, 2001: 14-15). By 1993, the secondary GER was as low as 7.3 per cent, and the transition rate to state secondary state schools was 7 per cent. This was a very sensitive issue since entry to secondary education meant opening the door to opportunities in higher education and employment in the formal sector. Some communities felt that there had been discrimination in the past over entry to secondary schools and that, for one reason or another, they had been severely underrepresented in secondary education. While these opinions were being voiced, the capacity of the secondary school sector was contracting instead of expanding, thereby fuelling frustration. Moreover, since entry into government employment and recruitment into the army had long been suspect, secondary selection procedures also came under suspicion. All these factors had bred resentment. The community's involvement in *cocos* gave leverage for demanding improved and transparent admission procedures to secondary school.

Further, rising insecurity drove communities inwards. To keep their children safe, and in a familiar community close to home, parents preferred their children to attend nearby day schools rather than let them travel to faraway boarding secondary schools, in unfamiliar and possibly unsafe locations. Day schools were cheaper for fee-paying students. Impoverishment led households to search for creative survival strategies for the family. Many now turned to educating their children as a last resort, in terms of a final, long-term family survival strategy. In short, the *cocos* were an answer, and an appropriate answer at the time, to the desperate need for more secondary schools.

The community school of the 1990s

The notion of the 'community school' was not new to Burundi. The idea dated from the 1973 education reform and had been applied to primary schools, as noted. However, the 'community school' as a focal point for community development had not succeeded. The 1990 version, now applied to junior secondary schools, signified community establishment and initiation of a school. However, to the chagrin of education planners, it did not necessarily mean continued support once the school was up and running (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996).

The community junior secondary schools are built or established and maintained by the commune, which is permitted to raise levies for the purpose. The construction funds are administered jointly by heads and the commune's chief administrator (*administrateur de la commune*). Each school determines its fee level in consultation with the commune and the parents, and is required to present the school accounts annually to the commune and the Ministry of Education. Writing materials, uniform and fees are purchased or paid for by parents. The state pays the community school teachers, heads and administrative staff salaries and, in theory, provides inspection and technical advisory services, in addition to in-service training for teachers and administrators. The state will, in the future, provide textbooks to both state and community schools when it has sufficient funds. Few are provided at present. A ministry statement of 1992 noted that in theory the state could subsidize the *cocos* but not in the foreseeable future. The state is now doing far more than it envisaged ten or even five years ago and the *cocos* have in fact become government or state day junior secondary schools, managed by the decentralized provincial education offices which also determine staff allocations to the *cocos* (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 75-76; Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 63, 69).

By 1995, as indicated in *Table 5.1*, the community secondary schools represented almost two thirds of all secondary schools.[42] Schools offering the final or senior secondary cycle made up less than one fifth of the total number of secondary schools. Imbalance in *coco* provision was now apparent. The chronic syndrome of disparity had re-appeared: a minority of communes had a disproportionately high number of secondary community schools, while others had none.

In 1995, one commune had opened as many as four schools and six communes had three schools each, while one quarter of the provinces (4) remained without a single community secondary school. It was estimated that if all 121 communes in Burundi were to have two community schools by the year 2005, it would mean constructing 97 new ones. Two of the schools had already developed into full secondary schools or *lycées* by 1995, offering the complete secondary programme cycle of seven years study. This was the second unplanned step of the *coco* movement, the evolution of *cocos* into full secondary schools. The blossoming of this

42. In 1998, technical schools comprised 6.3 per cent of the total number of secondary students and 3 per cent of students attended private schools (Rurihose, 2001).

new secondary community sector was running far ahead of ministry registration, let alone planning.

Table 5.2 Distribution of community secondary schools across communes, 1996

	Commune/s	N *Cocos*
	1	4
	6	3
	22	2
	88	1
	4	0
Total	21	154

Source: Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 38.

Success breeds success

The achievements of the *cocos* created a snowballing spiral of demand for more; and led to the establishment of yet more *cocos* (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 62). By 1994/1995 the first cohort of pupils in the *cocos* had completed tenth grade and, to the surprise of many, they gained entry to senior secondary education state classes at the same rate as their peers from state schools: "performance on the national exam in tenth grade was as good in *cocos* as in state schools" (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 39). Observers at the time reported "*cocos* are focal points for education in the countryside, transforming attitudes in the rural areas and responding to their immediate environment. They organize cultural and sports activities involving the local community. They are responsible for increasing demand for education both at primary and secondary levels ... And, at this time of crisis in our society, the *cocos* are responsible for raising the morale of education in general" (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 57). One could have added that the *cocos* raised the morale of society in general, not just the education sector, since they became a beacon of light and hope during those dark days of the mid 1990s and visible evidence that something of value could be resurrected from tragedy.

Teaching and learning conditions in the cocos

The quality of *coco* education differed sharply across the country (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 82-83). Most of them had to make do with temporary

classroom arrangements, borrowing primary school classrooms, church buildings (including some of the *Yaga Mukama* classrooms), and vocational training centre (*centres d'enseignements des métiers*) rooms. *Coco* school boards wondered then – and are still worrying now – how they will manage if the generous but temporary sponsors take back their buildings at short notice (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 38). They appealed for assistance with construction to the government and other partners, and they continue to do so.

Pupils entering seventh grade in *cocos* generally have lower marks than those entering the more prestigious, well established state secondary boarding schools, which are the first choice of primary leavers due to bursaries available and the more direct route to career success. State secondary schools take entrants at a cut-off point of 30 per cent in the primary leaving examination, while *cocos* accept those with as low as 25 per cent. Dropouts from the state secondary schools transfer regularly to the community schools during the junior secondary cycle, which is a second contributory factor to the lower level of the *coco* pupils. There is a higher repetition and drop-out rate in *cocos* as compared with the state schools (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 43). Community school classes were, however, smaller than in the state schools, which had an average of 70 pupils per class. Given these factors, it is surprising that the first cohort of *coco* leavers performed as well as they did in 1994, not long after the peak of the crisis, in October 1993.

Initial positive outcomes

The *coco* teachers were described in 1996 as very devoted to their work, explicitly aiming to outdo the record of the state schools. For the first time at secondary level in Burundi, the teachers and pupils came from the same locality; and they wanted their district to shine. The motivation of *coco* teachers, pupils and the school community in general, may well have compensated initially for any lack of qualifications on the part of the teachers, more than half of whom (53.5 per cent) were untrained. Rivalry between state and community schools was a healthy one at the start of the movement and led to positive competition between them (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 40). *Coco* teachers reported that they were giving special individual attention to their pupils and regularly assessed progress. Nevertheless, teaching remained classical rather than innovative in approach. Informal assessment of the schools at the time attributed this to lack of equipment, supplies and science laboratories

in the *cocos*, rather than to lack of creative teaching (Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 56).

The different procedures for secondary state, community and private school admission had become increasingly cumbersome. From 1999 onwards, the ministry started to use the primary leaving examination, the *concours national*, as the sole selection mechanism. This restored some order with regard to secondary school entry procedures and made the whole process more transparent, which led to widespread public satisfaction. It could be regarded as another constructive contribution of *cocos* to the sector.

Status of cocos today

There was no respite. The *coco* sector kept on expanding. There were 273 *cocos* by the end of 2002, making up 73 per cent of all secondary schools (N=372) (MEN, 2002: Annex 1-12). The ministry reviewed the situation and took some policy decisions: the number of boarding places in state schools would be decreased – as had also been decided in the 1980s – in order to lower costs and to spread public resources more equitably. It proved difficult to implement the policy. In 2003, state schools were still filled with boarders (98 per cent of places). The proportion of boarders nationally was shrinking, representing a little over a quarter (28 per cent) or 25,000 of the 90,000 secondary students, but this was due to the day school *coco* expansion and not to any success on the part of the ministry in reducing boarding or subsidies to boarding. Since a greater number of relatively higher income children benefited from state subsidized boarding, this anomaly was becoming an increasingly inequitable allocation of public resources in times of scarcity.

In 2003, less than 10 per cent of the *coco* teachers were trained, as compared with the 46.5 per cent of 1996. Anxiety is growing over the quality of teaching and learning in *cocos*. Teacher motivation is lower than in the past. Teachers' salaries – and indeed the salaries of all civil servants – continue to decrease in terms of purchasing power. Provincial governors and local authorities have become increasingly involved in *cocos*, to maintain the momentum and to expand them. Some provinces have taken the initiative of giving supplementary motivational packages to *coco* teachers, as much as FBu10,000 per month, in order to entice school leavers in teacher-surplus regions to cross the country to work in areas of low teacher supply. In some cases, communities have built staff housing at *cocos*, which is a major attraction, especially since it is free.

These efforts point to the continuing community support for *cocos* but, at the same time, to the growing funding burden at community/provincial level.

The problem of the growing regional gap in school provision, exacerbated by uncontrolled *coco* expansion, had not passed unnoticed. The *Comprehensive Education Analysis* of 1997 noted it, the International Alert Report of 2000 repeated the warning, yet still, in 2003, the south and central provinces of Bururi, Gitega, Muramvya, Mwaro and Makamba continued to forge ahead establishing new *cocos* (MEN/UNICEF *et al*., 1997; Jackson, 2000).

There must be studies and reports somewhere in Burundi's education history on the amount of teacher/pupil hours per day, per week, per year and per school life, wasted on copying in the classroom. Such reports were not available during the author's mission but a fleeting observation of the copying syndrome in *cocos* in 2003 and primary schools in the late 1990s, pointed to the drain on teaching/learning time and the consequences for learning quality. Copying time probably increased after the crisis in 1993, to make up for the lack of textbooks, and is at a critical level in the *cocos*. But it seems that Burundi has always been singularly short of textbooks, for one reason or another: "Even before the 1993 crisis, textbooks and school materials in general were scarce during times of bilateral assistance" (Rurihose, 2001: 43; Bazubwaho and Sinzinkayo, 1996: 56). Sadly, teachers appear to be resigned to this situation. They have not really known better times and this is why one generally fails to hear complaints. Burundi's schools are simply used to having children copy huge chunks of the teacher's guide or the teacher's notes into their exercise books. Hence the need for many exercise books: some for copying notes, others for classwork, for homework or tests. The notion of digital divide does not even begin to apply to this situation.

Some of the statements in the 1996 evaluation of *cocos* now ring a little hollow as the value of teachers' salaries plummet and textbooks are not only lacking in the hands of pupils, but many teachers in community schools have neither syllabus, nor teacher's guide, nor textbook, as tools of work, let alone reference material, maps or charts. What has to be acknowledged as a positive development is the commitment of the government to paying a significant proportion of *coco* teachers (now two schools per commune) and abiding by their commitment to support *cocos*, despite the amazing growth of the sector.

Costs to households

Students are wearing uniform, which costs between FBu6,000 and 8,000 per set, and which probably represents the price of four textbooks. But, no one knows the price of textbooks since they are not available anywhere for purchase. Textbooks have never been on sale in Burundi, except for one sole outlet, at the Government Printing Press (RPP) in Bujumbura, the distant capital city, which Burundi's 90 per cent rural inhabitants do not visit at the best of times. Now the roads to Bujumbura are too unsafe for travel. Some subjects on the secondary curriculum, such as history, have never had textbooks, even after the 1973 reform of education. What passes for a teacher's guide for a syllabus is, in some cases, only a partial reference book. In other words, it is difficult for parents to contribute to learning-related inputs to their children's education and they are left paying for the only purchasable items available, such as uniform, school supplies, furniture, and construction. The *coco* classroom therefore either has the physical essentials in better-resourced areas, or it does not even have these items. But it hardly has any books.

***Advantages of the* cocos**

- More adolescent children are studying near home;
- Pupils say they are generally happier near home;
- Secondary teachers are also content to be working in their home areas;
- The movement is driven by the people and local authorities that feel as though they own it.

***Continuing challenges of the* cocos**

A summary of continuing needs translated into recommendations follows:

- Increase central subsidies to community schools according to community need, including bursaries for needy children, to reduce national disparity in provision;
- Boost the flagging commitment of communities to the *coco* once it is built and functioning;
- Provide incentives, such as teachers' houses, to entice unemployed and underemployed trained teachers in urban areas to rural areas;
- Increase security in the countryside, to attract urban trained teachers to rural schools; and to provide safe passage for teachers to circulate, collect textbooks from the capital city and borrow them from neighbouring schools;

- Mitigate the isolation of rural teachers by setting up secondary school teacher networks to include *coco* teachers;
- Expand all secondary teacher-upgrading programmes;
- Provide textbooks and teachers' guides, other essential teaching/ learning materials and library books;[43]
- Desegregate the school community as soon as security permits, as in other secondary schools, to encourage mixing across social groups.

Regional disparities should be eliminated by focusing additional central funding and support on historically disadvantaged communes: Observers felt that the state should correct imbalances and provide education according to need by equalizing educational opportunity in the communes according to need and to population at commune level, which varied from 35,000 to 70,000 inhabitants across communes in 1999, rather than an equal provision of two *cocos* per commune, as the ministry had planned (Rurihose, 2001: 43). When the dependency level of provinces on community schools versus state funded schools is measured (*Figure5.1*), it indicates areas needing priority support.

Figure 5.1 *Coco* Dependency by population



Source: Rurihose, 2001; MEN, 2002.

Provinces are ordered from left to right in *Figure 5.1* by population levels, Gitega with the highest population and Cankuzo with the lowest.

43. Library books can be organized by class until libraries are built at a later date.

Gitega, as one would expect, has one of the highest numbers of secondary schools in the country (only Bururi has more) and the capital city has many. Ngozi and Kirundo, which also have high populations, have relatively few secondary schools. It is noticeable from *Figure 5.1* that some provinces with few secondary schools relative to their population compensate by putting considerable funding into community school development, as is the case with Rutana, Kayanza, Kirundo and Bujumbura Rural, ranging from 93 to 85 per cent, in that order. These provinces have what could be termed a *high dependency rate on community schools* for their secondary education provision. That is, households in these areas are contributing far more than others across the country to secondary education, due to lack of state provision. It is particularly these provinces, which need priority support from central funding, and, additionally, the provinces, which have low secondary, provision overall, such as the seven provinces listed on the right, not including Bujumbura Town.

By 2001 it was reported that the World Bank CURE programme had allocated FBu1,000 million for secondary textbooks and FBu238 million for laboratory supplies (Rurihose, 2001: 44). This was going to make a significant input to secondary education and produce some of the essential learning materials required in the system. Funds from the European Union were also in the pipeline for an interim supply of imported textbooks.

The great achievement of the *coco* movement was the resulting change in transition rates to secondary school, including entrants into all types of secondary school, state, private, community and technical schools, as indicated in *Table 5.3*.

Table 5.3 Transition rates from primary to secondary school, 1990/1991 to 1999/2000

1990/1991	10.8
1991/1992	14.7
1992/1993	7. 2
1997/1998	20.3
1998/1999	27.8
1999/2000	28.5

Source: Rurihose, 2001: 15.

Yaga Mukama – Burundi's unique alternative programme

The *Yaga Mukama* programme (*Yaga Mukama* literally means: Speak, Lord!) is included in this section, which lists some of the major achievements of Burundi's education landscape, in the full knowledge that *Yaga Mukama* (YM) does not enjoy a high status in the country. It is a much-maligned provider of education. Yet it has a proven track record as regards its contribution to social development and holds great potential for the future in terms of an existing and solid educational structure, appreciated especially by the rural poor. The salient features of Burundi's *Yaga Mukama* programme are its uniquely wide coverage, reaching up to nearly half a million learners at one time, approximately 220,000 in 1999 (MEN, 2000*a*: 61); the fact that it is a home-grown programme, run by a Burundi church; the long duration of the programme, for over 40 years, which is a second unique feature for a programme of this type; and its constancy, to be compared with that of the Qur'anic schools in Somalia, which have also weathered civil war, providing a safe and trusted haven for learning during the worst years of conflict, when the formal system of education was collapsing.

Currently, the *Yaga Mukama* (YM) centres offer a six-year extensive basic education programme, twice a week, to children 10 years and above who are out-of-school or dropouts, equivalent to three years of primary school. The Catholic Church founded YM schools in 1963/1964, one year after independence. Prior to independence, the church centres taught literacy and the catechism, and trained future catechists.[44] However, the YM centres taught a wider range of subjects, while still training catechists. The aim was to supplement the provision of primary schools and to provide adult education. The Conference of Catholic Bishops of Burundi, which was the organization running the centres, handed the YM system over to the National Catholic Secretariat for Education in 1999, which contracted CED-CARITAS to implement the programme.

The most impressive *Yaga Mukama* centres are located within the old parish complexes of church buildings. Standing tall above all else,

44. *Yaga Mukama* (2003) and *Vyumvohore* (1998) statements do not agree on the founding date of YM proper. It could be that YM evolved out of previous church education centres or that the name *Yaga Mukama* was used before independence in some way. The centres seem to have been separate from the chapel schools of the 1940s and 1950s and separate from the home/social centres or *foyers/centres sociaux* which included only women and girls prior to independence.

on the highest hill in the area, the great solid brick churches are typically the first landmark one sees in the countryside, sheltering a cluster of parish buildings: the church hall and rooms, offices, the presbytery, possibly a health clinic, and among these low brick buildings will be the *Yaga Mukama* centre. The setting is one, therefore, of a community centre rather than an isolated education centre. Far from the central parishes, and set in communities out of reach of schools, there is another type of *Yaga Mukama* centre. They perch precariously on the hillsides, simple mud and wattle structures, similar to the homesteads around them on the *collines*. They are generally made up of three or four classrooms. The children bring their field hoes and leave them at the door, to pick up at the end of the class and go back to the fields. *Yaga Mukama* is plainly an integral part of rural life and fits very naturally into the context of the *collines*.

Yaga Mukama *since 1963*

The pattern of enrolments in the Yaga Mukama centres since independence has been as follows:

Table 5.4 *Yaga Mukama* and primary school enrolments, 1963-2002

	Yaga Mukama	Primary schools
1963-1983	Higher enrolments than	in primary schools
1984	Lower enrolments than	in primary schools
1992/1993	184,603	644,565
1998	400,000	554,981
2002	222,000	806,214

Source: Niyongabo, Hanf and Vierdag, 1996; MEN, 2000*a*; and Johannessen, 2002 for 2002 data.

From 1963-1983 enrolments were higher in *Yaga Mukama* centres than in primary schools, simply due to the high demand for education and the low provision of formal schools. With the expansion of the primary sector in the 1980s there was a reversal, and a higher number of learners in primary schools from 1984 onwards, as compared with YM. There had been a massive government school enrolment campaign in that decade, the introduction of double shifts in schools and the construction of 400 new classrooms per year. In 1992/1993, just before the crisis, YM pupils totalled 184,603 as compared with 644,565 in primary schools (*Yaga Mukama*,

2003: 1).[45] Immediately after the crisis YM enrolments mushroomed, reaching 941 YM centres, with 2,409 full-time teacher-catechists (1996) and 400,000 learners (1997/1998), as compared with the 554,981 pupils in primary schools. By 2002 primary enrolments were again increasing. The proportion of YM pupils consequently decreased, but represented 80 per cent of learners in alternative education (Johannessen, 2002: 6). Currently, YM centres are concentrated in areas of low school enrolment. The majority of YM pupils are female (60 per cent in Ngozi Province), reflecting a global syndrome whereby when the state system registers significantly more boys, then girls have to find a second chance, lower cost solution, such as YM.

YM has well understood its role, realizing that fluctuating YM enrolments reflect the accessibility of state primary schooling. When school provision is lacking, as was the case prior to the 1980s, or too costly, in times of instability after 1993, pupils turn to the YM system. YM constitutes an alternative and a very important back-up system for the delivery of education in Burundi. It has done this consistently and over time, for 40 years. Moreover, it has a network of solid, brick-built classrooms, which have weathered decades and have even been lent out by the church to the immediate community for a variety of purposes, notably at present to house some *coco* classes. Rough mud and wattle structures are also used. YM programmes are free, almost entirely internally funded by the Church. They run twice a week for a number of concurrent classes. There are adults among the learners, who finish the course in four years instead of six years, but the proportion is not known.

The programme, teachers, learning materials

The YM six-year course is considered to be equivalent to three years of primary schooling but there is no achievement or leaving certificate and graduates are not channelled into primary schools. There has been no link with the formal school system. Subjects and topics on the curriculum included literacy, numeracy and general studies or *étude du milieu*, hygiene, geography and farming. YM courses did not include livelihoods skills acquisition before the launching of a pilot programme in 2000. YM graduates needed skills training on completion of the course to enter the world of work. The programme is extensive, deliberately

45. This document has provided most of the information for the section on *Yaga Mukama – Burundi's unique alternative programme*.

covering ground more slowly than the primary system, over two days per week, as noted above, in order to respond to learners' need for time to work at home and in the fields. There is no advanced programme for those who might wish to go further with their education or to ensure skills retention.

In 1993, 87 per cent of the YM teachers had six years primary school level of education and were considered unqualified for their task (Niyongabo *et al*., 1996: 90); 13 per cent were trained as catechists in a three year post-primary programme. YM teachers do not benefit from ministry inservice courses or any form of ministry advice, inspection or support to teachers. With regard to learning materials, 41 per cent of learners had Kirundi readers in 1996 – which was probably a much higher level than in state schools – but only 1 per cent had mathematics books. Centres lacked teachers' guides in all subjects and the existing guides were not well designed. There has never been strong central control or supervision in the YM system, either under the Bishops or under BNEC/ CED-CARITAS. Each diocese tends to run things in its own way.

Assessment 1996

An assessment of YM centres was carried out in 1996, on two poorly enrolled provinces, Ngozi and Muyinga, supported by UNICEF (Niyongabo *et al*., 1996: 90). The report concluded that there was need to increase the relevance of YM curriculum and to modernize its approach and teaching methodology. YM was seriously under-funded, which limited its capacity to respond to learners' needs, to modernize the programme and upgrade its services. Among the findings were:

- continued need for YM due to general under-provision of schools;
- importance of free YM access versus the high cost of schools;
- significance of the weekly YM schedule, permitting children's work at home, unlike the school schedule (even the double shift schedule);
- security in YM as compared with the insecurity in and fear of schools (due to past massacres in schools).

Respondents were in two minds. On the one hand, they recommended that the YM centres should be converted into classical formal primary schools. On the other, they wanted income generating skills training for their children, such as "brick-making, masonry, carpentry, restaurant work, cookery, embroidery, basket-making, mechanics, sewing, modern

agricultural/livestock herding methods, soldering, business studies, plumbing, typing, etc." and French, which is considered to be important in the world of work. This debate was still continuing in late 2003.

New objectives

The vision of the YM centres in the new millennium is:

> To train young people for life –
> to work effectively in their
> immediate socio-economic environment.

The YM centres would become 'a veritable school for life'. Learners should acquire a solid Christian foundation for their lives, and be able to operate better in the work context. YM programmes needed to evolve alternative courses to formal institutions, to become more directly relevant to the locality, to respond in very specific ways to learners' needs, and to ensure they learned practical skills to live and work in rural areas. Advanced learning courses and post-programme activities would become more important in YM centres, the establishment of co-operatives, for example, in order to promote the advancement of the individual learner and of the community in general.

The pilot programme

Guided by the recommendations of the 1996 YM assessment report, 29 YM centres in Ngozi Province were involved in a pilot programme in 2000/2001. The new features of the pilot programme are:

- basic education components form a foundation on which to build practical skills;
- foundation first year YM curriculum conforms to BER content and approach;
- the values and attitudes of Burundi culture: *ubushingantahe, ubuntu, umutima* and honesty, moral courage, and truth are reflected;
- a more utilitarian approach to YM curriculum, including problem solving, and livelihoods skills training;
- subjects taught: literacy, numeracy, general studies; domestic science; agriculture, French and livelihoods skills – responding to the learning needs of each locality;
- young people will learn how to run their own business or work in a co-operative or group;

- 11 supervisors benefited from an administration course and 29 teachers were upgraded on the new YM curriculum and methodology in Ngozi Province (2000-2003).

YM set itself a very narrow, detailed and time-consuming task in producing textbooks for each of the YM first four years (which are equivalent in total to primary second grade). YM chose this option instead of (a) shortening the four years, since the learners would be well over primary age by the YM second year, a minimum of 12-14 years (but probably over 16 years), and (b) merely taking on the existing second grade books and teaching them in six months, in the shortened/extensive YM course. It is no surprise therefore that an assessment of the Ngozi pilot found that the YM first year students (of over 10 years) had gone much further than primary school second grade pupils, yet they were only expected to complete half the primary school first grade curriculum in the YM time allotted. Although the report makes no reference to skills training during the first two years, the assessment found some modern agricultural methods being used on the children's *shambas* or *icabare* (agricultural plots near the YM centres). The children's self-esteem had increased due to learning "much more than before, and French". Teachers felt that they did not have the academic background to teach the new programme. Nevertheless they managed the new course to the satisfaction of both assessors and learners. It has been recommended recently, probably as a result of monitoring the pilot programme, that YM (a) selects children two weeks after the opening of state schools, in order to ensure that the greatest number possible of children go to formal schools and that YM does not compete with the formal system on admissions, and (b) takes children from 12 years upwards only, as a clear encouragement to younger children to go to primary school.

There is no mention, in the latest report of 2003, of any recommendation to accelerate the YM course proper, that is, to incorporate the major lesson learned in the pilot, which clearly demonstrated that older learners learn much faster than primary age children, conforming to current theory on learning. The pilot learners had demonstrated that they could learn much more than before, faster, with a properly constructed syllabus and with trained teachers. It is hoped that YM scrapped the pilot textbooks and went back to the drawing board to produce accelerated learning material, collaborating with NRC, which was doing something similar, enriching both the YM and NRC programmes.

Observations

It is interesting that the 1996 report made reference to the inferiority complex of the learners. It has been apparent that there is not only an inferiority complex dogging the YM system but that government education officials hold out no hope whatsoever that YM can be reformed, upgraded or turned into a modern and efficient organization. The discussion continuing in the late 1990s and early years of the new century was centred on whether the state should take over the YM from the Church and convert the centres into primary schools. Fortunately for YM, the state did not have the funds to do this at the time. There was no halfway solution envisioned by either party to the discussion, such as the Church continuing to manage the centres with the state supporting and monitoring, or converting half the classrooms into formal primary classes while retaining the other half in an alternative education programme. In a sense, circumstances have started to overtake the discussion: some classrooms have been lent to *cocos*, since they are permanent buildings in relatively good condition, and not as intensively used as *coco* classes. YM is in danger of losing its valuable alternative education system, by default, not only to the formal (primary) system but to the secondary system. It will be important to avoid letting *Yaga Mukama* accidentally disappear since it is so well established and has great potential. The country has to decide what it wants, carefully, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of the current YM system and what it will take to incorporate YM into a mechanism for strengthening basic education in Burundi in the future. What is needed is a decision on the vision and role of YM as an integral, albeit private, component of national provision of basic education in Burundi, with appropriate funding and support from the government and partners.

Given the lack of documentation available on YM (an evaluation was reportedly carried out in 1980 (Niyongabo *et al*., 1996: 90)), a few personal observations will be added here, since the author had visited YM in 1996 in Bujumbura Rural, and YM Rutana in 1998. Reports available on YM do not represent the observable quality of YM teaching. The teaching of children in YM classrooms is extremely poor, even as literacy classes go. Learners cannot possibly learn efficiently from the type of classes observed in 1996-1998. It is unlikely that the type of teachers currently employed can upgrade to modern alternative education facilitators since they tend to be elderly. Young, new personnel needs to be recruited and trained in crash courses – and the Ngozi report, which

was not available to me, may have some clues as to the measures taken for converting inefficient teachers into much better ones. It could have been the training, coupled with a new curriculum and the availability of textbooks. YM adult education, however, can be different. The civics and other classes related to peace education and community reconciliation that I saw in those years had alert and lively, mature teachers, using modern methods of participatory discussion. It may be that YM should retain and upgrade its adult education teachers but seriously review the recruitment of YM teachers for children. I have seen no evaluation of the quality of YM adult literacy teaching and cannot comment on this aspect of YM adult education.

On reflection, these are no solitary observations. Peace education facilitators of various nationalities, observed in refugee camps in Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya in 2002, were more proficient in adult education sessions than in school classrooms (Obura, 2002). It was concluded that adult learners vote with their feet and stay away if teaching is inefficient, which provides an important stimulus for adult facilitators to perform much better than the teachers of children, who are a relatively more captive audience – and whose views matter little to programme organizers/headmasters if they report that teachers are incompetent. There is, however, a strong link between the quality of education and school retention rates in the literature. It is only that dropout occurs more slowly from schools than from adult education classes.

Conclusion

In conclusion it is recommended that YM continue to play its role as the major alternative education provider in Burundi and be strengthened in order to achieve this goal. The ministry has to take the initiative to approach the YM and demonstrate its willingness to support and develop a sound, collaborative relationship with YM, whatever the past history of state-church relations. YM needs to collaborate with the ministry to ensure equitable access to education of quality, and benefit from the type and extent of resources that only a government can make available. This will entail readiness on the part of YM and the Church to work as equal partners with the ministry.

Burundi’s accelerated learning programme

Few people have heard about Burundi’s accelerated learning programme (ALP), which was developed by the Norwegian Refugee

Council (NRC) for displaced and returnee children, previous refugees, and other needy children affected by war. This was a response to a government request for support for increasing school enrolments. The accelerated learning programme aimed to put more children into school. It ran in three provinces, starting in 1999, under the supervision of provincial education officers. The programme was inspired by the Angola Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) accelerated programme that the Norwegian Refugee Council had also worked on.

The aim in Burundi was, specifically, to provide a mechanism for increasing school enrolments, for getting non-schooled children or dropouts, 9-14 years old, into the formal primary schools at the end of the ten-month intensive ALP course, into third grade if possible. It was a bridging strategy, to help children who would otherwise not manage it, into school or back into school. True to the mandate of the NRC, it was intended to be an emergency programme, to open up, shut down, move on fast, and to respond to emergencies. This was affected in Kirundo where the programme opened in 1999 and shut by 2002. The programme was to shut down in Muyinga by around 2003. The issue of short-term aims will be discussed below.

The ALP Burundi curriculum focused on the core subjects of Kirundi and mathematics, and also offered physical education, health education, nutrition, environmental education, culture, civics and ethics. French was introduced towards the end of the one-year course. Learners were expected to complete two years learning within the 10 months. ALP materials provided free in the centres included a kit or box of teaching/ learning materials for one year: a teacher's guide, one exercise book per child, a cloth alphabet and a figures chart, and some small wooden cubes. Language textbooks were available, in the mother tongue, at a rate of just under one book for two children. ALP centres included two classrooms and two teachers; a total of 120 pupils organized into two shifts per day, that is, four daily classes of 30 pupils each, taught by the two teachers. The ALP schools functioned under plastic sheeting like the 'temporary' primary schools or in permanent brick structures, although some started under trees.

ALP was to recruit educated but untrained teachers with a minimum level of 9-10 years of schooling, who would undergo a six-week crash course. The trainers were ministry BER instructors, oriented to innovative teaching methodologies over a one- to two-week training

of trainers (TOT) course. However, since unemployed teachers were available in the country, trained teachers (of 10 years or more education background) were recruited in Muyinga and Makamba, and in serviced in the participatory methodology, which was new to them, in six weeks. The initial course was supplemented by a follow-up workshop focusing on active learning methods in 2002 (Johannessen, 2002: 4, 17; Demers, September 2003, personal communication). Teachers were supervised in the field by (a) a mobile team of four provincial advisors per province co-ordinated by a provincial co-ordinator, and a programme co-ordinator in the capital city; and by (b) the regular ministry provincial inspectors. The provincial mobile advisory teams were trained over five days and participated in the teacher training courses. The regular school inspectors were not oriented in participatory learning approaches. It is debatable whether the BER was justified in sparing their specialized TOT staff for training such a small number of (ALP) teachers, for as long as six weeks per year, given that the ministry then made no attempt to retain or mainstream the programme.

Teachers earned US$47 per month, which is a considerably higher salary than government primary teacher salaries (Demers, 2003, attached to Johannessen, 2002: Annex 1-4) and were employed on a temporary basis. There have been cases where the ALP teachers took over one of the centre classrooms as living quarters, leaving four classes with only one classroom. This indicates the shortage of housing available in the countryside. Provincial supervisors were paid about US$130 per month, and were responsible for 6-11 schools.

There were no fees at ALP centres. Essential learning materials were provided, such as some textbooks and one exercise book per child. Parents had to buy other exercise books (at least one, at FBU100 or US$10 cents), a pen or pencil, paper for tests and a contribution for the wage of a night guard. It is reported that half the parents could not afford to buy even one exercise book; and in one class 75 per cent of the children were observed without a single exercise book. ALP centres did not require uniform but some children stayed away from the centres because they did not have suitable clothes to wear. Many ALP officers felt that everyone could afford one or two exercise books but they noted that a certain amount of dependency had crept into the programme resulting in parents passively waiting for the sponsor to provide everything (Johannessen, 2002: 24, 41, 46). Funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) and the Swedish International

Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) supported the programme. The total annual budget for 2003 was likely to be just over US$400,000 (Demers, 2003, attached to Johannessen, 2002: Annex 1-2).

Accurate data were difficult to obtain on the programme, on profiles of learners, including their sex, age, absenteeism, drop-out, and so on. The programme was intended to give increased educational opportunities to girls but the evaluation report estimated that there could have been 60 per cent boys at the centres. By the end of 2002 there were 73 centres functioning: 26 in Kirundo, 37 in Muyinga and 10 in Makamba; 8,499 children; and 148 teachers (31 per cent women teachers).

Achievements by early 2003 included:

- 16,039 children had attended/were attending TEP by January 2003 of whom 7,279 were still in the programme;
- 83 new schools had been constructed: 36 permanent brick structures and 47 temporary (plastic sheeting);
- approximately 67 per cent of children integrated into primary schools: 75 per cent of them to third grade, 25 per cent to second grade;
- 67 per cent pass rate at the completion of the course;
- anecdotal evidence for a good and sometimes better performance of ALP leavers as compared with primary pupils;
- absenteeism rate during 2002 assessment mission: 17 per cent;
- completion/retention rate around 70 per cent; drop-out rate about 30 per cent;
- 181 teachers had been trained – they regularly planned lessons and had good relations with the children;
- close co-operation with provincial education authorities on recruitment/admissions of ALP pupils, inspection of ALP centres and integration of ALP pupils into primary schools.

It is understandable that an international organization such as the Norwegian Refugee Council has its own mandate, in this case targeting refugees, returnees, displaced, and war affected children. For this reason the NRC runs emergency education programmes, the Teachers' Emergency Package in Burundi, an alternative accelerated education programme. The term 'alternative' is used here to indicate that the programme operates outside the formal school system, although close to it. 'Accelerated' means that the ALP-TEP covers in a short time, with older children, what schools normally take longer to accomplish: In one

school year, or 10 months, the course primary schools normally cover in two years.

The limited and short term aims of an education programme such as the ALP-TEP may not be in consonance with the long-term interests of a nation in the sense that the programme shuts down after two to three years in each location. As the ALP evaluation report rightly pointed out: the government and the community "want it to be permanent and extended to other areas" (Johannessen, 2002: 28). The ALP can completely disappear, as has happened in other countries, once the international partner pulls out. While it is rated a success for NRC when an ALP closes down and moves on, as a mission accomplished,[46] it is rated as disastrous by the host country, as in the case of the Kirundo programme which was shut down by NRC at the end of 2001/2002, and Muyinga a year later. The author's mission confirmed this, on visiting a sad, dilapidated house in Kirundo town, serving as a temporary accommodation for about 10 little boys, a place which had been part of the former thriving Kirundo project. Not only had the ALP gone, but also so had the notion of accelerated learning and alternative education opportunities for out-of-school children. It had come to a complete stop in Kirundo, which still harboured scores of out-of-school children.

Yet, a government or local authority could capitalize on the introduction of such temporary or emergency programmes, if they wished to, and if they could be assured of collaboration on the part of the initiating organization. In short, it would be in the interests of a government to carefully study the aims and activities of organizations such as NRC and to get fully involved in an ALP programme. It would be possible to plan and set up mechanisms with NRC to sustain the programmes after the departure of the organization. In this case, while the international partner is present and training teachers, it would be necessary to find a way of continuing to use the external technical assistance for master training or to build capacity nationally before the end of the assisted programme; to work as a counterpart with the national co-ordinator and with the NGO country field office on programme planning, administration and monitoring; and to work on strategies for future mainstreaming of the programme, either with the support of the government, an NGO or another partner.

46. Johannessen (2002: 30) clearly points to the tension between the aims of the country and of the organization.

Shortcomings of the programme

According to the 2002 evaluation, there were problems in: finding national trainers skilled in participatory methods, consequently teachers had difficulty with the active learning methods intended by the programme; the continuation of corporal punishment in schools; the minimal participation of parents in the programme; and the failure of the government to employ the ALP teachers who worked on and were trained by the programme.

With hindsight, the major disappointment has been the lack of planning on all sides to ensure that this interesting innovation could be incorporated into Burundi's education system at the departure of the external partner. It was a significant opportunity missed. However, an almost identical programme continues in neighbouring Eastern Congo and could be repatriated to Burundi, while a ministry-led three-year ALP has been running in Rwanda since 2001 and has interesting lessons to be learned for a Burundi national ALP.

Developments within the ministry

Policy development

Even in 2002 the government still talked of "ongoing insecurity ... disruption of schooling and destruction of school buildings and equipment", which points to the extremely difficult circumstances in which the ministry continued to work. Nevertheless, the ministry went through a policy development and projections exercise in 2002 and produced a sectoral policy. This was based on the Comprehensive Education Analysis carried out with support from UNICEF, UNESCO and the World Bank in 1997, which, at an extraordinarily difficult time for the country, produced volumes of detailed information on the education system at the time (MEN, 2002). The sectoral policy covered formal education at three levels, primary, secondary and tertiary, and formal technical education, but made no mention of alternative education for the most disadvantaged members of society, assuming perhaps that the policy of universal primary education would result in reaching every child through the formal sector. The document did not explain how social equity was to be achieved in the secondary and tertiary subsectors, which necessarily select entrants and which could use selection for increasing equity. It might have reviewed, for example, policy on selection on merit, on ability to pay fees or on prior advantage in the education system; and

the desirability of affirmative programmes such as upgrading or bridging programmes for disadvantaged social groups, such as students with disabilities, the Twa, girls, and so on. There was no reference to adult education in the document.

The sector policy did not indicate the nature of planning, the type of procedures to be used, or the methods of monitoring, to improve access to education. An education policy needs to be derived from a vision and should be based on an explicit philosophy of social development. Since 1993 no five-year development plan had been formulated (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 65). A sectoral policy has to be comprehensive and general, omitting detail, particularly if it is not accompanied by a costing exercise. For short-term and medium-term purposes, it needs to prioritize action and provide focus. However, the document was more of a list of activities to be carried out than a vision, a framework or a set of guidelines, which could later be used to map out specific desirable and achievable goals according to possible changes and circumstances. Sinzinkayo, reviewing the development of technical formal education, echoes this view. Planning had been top-down and directive in the past, and was not founded on an understanding or appreciation of the evolution of Burundi's education system over time. The result was, even up to the publication of the *Politique sectorielle* in 2002, a set of contradictory and unachievable plans. This was the legacy of the war. Also, it was difficult to modify the culture of chronic poor planning, as noted in the 2002 study on the financing of education (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 66; Sinzinkayo, 2004: 12).

In addition to the structural problems and general acute lack of funding, the challenges facing the ministry were reported as including:

At primary level:

- unqualified teachers made up 18 per cent of the teaching corps;
- lack of control of and support for private schools, which lacked teachers and had a high proportion of unqualified teachers;
- the central Inspectorate needed offices. The inspectorate had not been fully separated from administrative work at provincial level. at cantonal level there was lack of transport, equipment, and the new inspectors required training.

At secondary level:

- difficulty in reducing boarding places in favour of day ones;

- continuing attrition of teachers, due to low pay

  Technical education:

- lack of funding for the sector and, particularly for equipment, due to withdrawal of aid

  Adult education:

- under-funding and declining enrolments; need to respond to new objectives of adult learners

  At tertiary level:

- lack of funding and brain drain of lecturers to other countries

There was no plan for decentralizing or regionalizing campuses of the existing university or for encouraging the establishment of private universities.

The aims and objectives of the sectoral policy were multiple, expansive and all urgent. There was no prioritization or boundary set to the development envisaged. For instance, no limitation was set on secondary school or university places. The aim was to pay teachers a 'reasonable salary' yet there was no explanation as to where the funds would come from (MEN, 2002: 30). Projections for 2010 were probably based on the pace of enrolment increase to date, and on the resulting facilities and resources needed that is, on demand rather than on strategic planning. Whereas basic education is a right and all governments have committed to EFA, the expansion of secondary and tertiary education could be expected to be planned by the state, taking into consideration the public and private resources likely to be available together with national development needs.

The primary sector plans in the *Politique sectorielle* had all the ingredients that could be anticipated for strengthening a sector: School building, provision of equipment, textbooks, trained teachers; a functioning inspectorate, printing press; training for all ministry staff, from curriculum developers, education planners, and heads, to inspectors and teachers, through multiple modes such as pre- and inservice training, refresher courses, and distance learning by radio. The ministry was to work with various partners to achieve its goals: the churches, NGOs, the private sector, parents and communities, and external aid providers.

Salient and/or new points in the policy

In the primary school:

Language: Kirundi was to remain the language of instruction and extended to sixth grade. French was to be taught as a subject all through primary school, and English too.[47]

Values education: The values of peace, human rights tolerance, and social and gender equity were to be taught, and HIV prevention programmes. Burundi's 1994 peace programme was to be continued and prioritized in the most insecure provinces, and centred on sports tournaments and competitions.[48]

Girls' education: The national girls' education programme, AGEI, was to be strengthened and girls' progress monitored.

Special education: Burundi was to mainstream children with disabilities.

Batwa: Batwa children's learning was to be closely monitored.

Dropouts: Children who had dropped out of school were to be re-integrated, alongside returnees and children who had been displaced during the war.[49]

Free education: Fee-free education was to be planned for poor and disadvantaged children but not on a national level.

Teacher housing: Repeated reference to the need for housing loans to teachers.

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47. Given experience in the region of overload of language on the curriculum at the expense of science and humanities, for example, Burundi could have incorporated the lessons learned. Also, if the government was still committed to the philosophy of the 1973 reform, as the 1998 *Table ronde* had suggested, then it would have delayed the start of French until second or third grade, to allow full concentration on literacy in the mother tongue, and would have limited English to secondary level.
48. There was no reference to the innovative 2000s approach used by UNESCO, UNICEF and UNHCR in the INEE peace education programme in the region. There was no reference to inclusive, team-building, peace-building and fitness-oriented programmes in preference to competitive sports (MEN, 2002: 38).
49. There was no reference to Burundi's exciting accelerated learning TEP programme, operating in three provinces, which could have inspired other re-integrative programmes and been mainstreamed by the ministry.

Corruption: Efforts to eliminate corruption in the school system, focusing on examinations and recruitment procedures.

At secondary level:

The same aims as above, including girls' education, a special textbook fund, and:

Day schools: Continued efforts (no explicit reference to the nature of the efforts) to increase day schools (in spite of the difficulties so far); to transform dormitories and dining rooms into classrooms.

Cocos: It was planned that the government would increase funds to *cocos*, to extend them into full secondary schools. All would be provided with water and electricity.

Private schools: Government would facilitate the acquisition of land by private schools and planned to exempt schools from taxes on all school materials, including building materials, and on teachers' salaries; include private teachers in MOE teacher refresher and upgrading opportunities; inspect and monitor private education.

Teacher development: Review of teacher training institutions to date, expansion and improvement.

Examinations: Reform the two public examinations at secondary school level, and provide certificates to graduates.

Technical education: Encourage the private sector to invest in technical education and implement measures planned previously for the sector.

Sector administration

The ministry started to decentralize towards the end of the 1990s and by 2002 was still developing the initiative. This was a bold and courageous step in a country still wracked by turmoil, determined, as the ministry was to continue to improve education services across the nation. The policy of decentralization in Burundi was described more explicitly as 'deconcentration', delegating implementation and some decision making to lower levels of the institution, but ensuring that the central ministry was the monitor and final arbiter of action. Given the rapid expansion of primary and secondary schooling by the late 1990s – particularly secondary schools, which had increased fourfold in 10 years – the ministry established provincial offices of education in

2000, to administer and monitor schools through more efficient provincial units, closer to schools, rather than from the central ministry (MEN, 2002: 19). It increased cantonal inspectors from 46 to 110 by 1999. In August 2000 a full scale primary enrolment campaign was successfully launched (Rurihose, 2001: 33).

In 2002 progress was already noted, resulting from the new role played by the provincial education offices, in such areas as:

- an intensified UPE campaign;
- increased sensitization of local partners in supporting education;
- more efficient (faster) teacher deployment at provincial level;
- improved utilization of school fees for direct learning purposes;
- the establishment of a Provincial Community Education Fund;
- allocation by provinces of funds for teachers' travel in country (MEN, 2002: 19).

The Directorate of Education Planning had received loans and assistance from the World Bank and from UNDP before the crisis. After 1993, aid was withdrawn. The section lost experienced and qualified staff, which jeopardized routine operations. Annual data collection was not easy at all in areas of insecurity but it was done and eventually computerized in time. Projections for the future were calculated (2002) and studies on the formal system were carried out (1997), on the state of the cost and financing of education, and on education sector expenditure (1999), as several studies and reports cited in this present study demonstrate. Two new strategies have been adopted since 2000. The planning function of the ministry is being decentralized: 17 provincial units, strengthened by an expanded central unit within the ministry. However, before the development of the 2002 sectoral policy, within-sector budgets were not determined by policy objectives (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 65).

It has been noted above that technical education is acutely under funded in Burundi but, more importantly, expenditure in the sector cannot be properly evaluated until the objectives of the formal technical training are clearly defined or revised, in order to take the realities of the employment market into consideration. Since only 1 per cent of the graduates from technical education went into the small and medium enterprise sector in 1998, while three quarters of the others were employed in the formal sector, it could be that the type of training being given and the level of financing being sought is inappropriate for training skilled

workers for the SME sector, which will inevitably employ most workers in the future (Mivuba, 1998, reported in MEN/ADEA, 2002: 43-44).

The Directorate of Scientific and Technological Research had been set up in the ministry in 1983 but had never done more than establish regional focal points which, after the crisis, had become totally dysfunctional, due to the "context of instability, and a climate in which scientific research was not appreciated". The result was that no research was carried out (MEN, 2002: 24-26). It is not clear what the rationale for regional units had been in the first place, distinct from the education planning division in the central ministry and from research in the University. The 2002 policy did not give a rationale for the location of this research institution in a Ministry of Education rather than in a Ministry of Development planning or in the university (MEN, 2002: 20, 24, 59-60). It stated that the ministry directorate would produce a national policy for scientific and technological research and set up a National Council for Scientific and Technological Research. The decision to maintain such an institution in a ministry rather than as a collaborative institution of a university or a sub-unit of the directorate of planning – and despite its track record of inaction – indicates the lack of prioritization and decisiveness at the time.

In the 1970s the Ministry of Education (BER) had been criticized for not working in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries when attempting to give schools a rural orientation. Similar criticism was voiced again in 2004, when reviewing the 2002 BEET (*Bureau d'études des programmes de l'enseignement technique*, Directorate of Technical Education) plans for technical education in the *Politique sectorielle* of 2002, which bore no evidence of consultation with industry, agriculture, commerce, and the many other ministries and institutions involved in the employment sector. Ten years after the crisis, technical education was accused of being conducted without reference to the employment market (Sinkinkayo, 2004: 13). On a visit to BEET in late 2003, the author found a new director and an office bare of historical documentation on the sector, epitomizing the extent to which disruption of an education system wipes out history, institutional memory, experience, data and the very conceptual foundation of a sector.

In the case of Burundi there had been no destruction of the ministry, no looting of documents. But the ministry archives had not been preciously guarded. In the years of stagnation of inertia, in fear of dismissal from employment, and in the mayhem of change, parts of history had simply

disappeared. And some of the former senior civil servants with the history of the ministry in their heads were outside the institution, unemployed. Ministries need to rebuild their documentation archives, with help from documentation centres around the world, so that they can plan for the future.

A separate ministry exists for adult education and informal sector promotion and development: *le ministère de l'Artisanat, de l'Enseignement des métiers et de l'Alphabétization des adultes* (MAEMAA), separate from the Ministry of Labour and from the Ministry of Education. Naturally, this situation leads to duplication and confusion. The result is that in 2004, 47 per cent of the MAEMAA training centres remained closed.

Funding crisis

Burundi relied on external funding for a significant proportion of the education sector before the crisis, as *Table 5.4* indicates, particularly post-primary education. It was mainly bilateral aid from Belgium and France.

Table 5.4 Financing sources of education by subsector, 1992/1993

	State	External aid	Parents	Communes	Total %
Primary	44	19	62	80	38
Secondary	31	39	20	20	34
Tertiary	25	42	-	-	28

Source: Ndimira *et al.,* 2001: 7.

The state focused mainly on primary education, as did households and communes. The higher the education level the more dependence there was on external input.

External multilateral aid had totalled over US$350 million in 1994 and just under US$50 million in 1997. Bilateral aid declined from approximately US$200 to US$30 million in the same years (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 7). After the crisis, in 1997, the proportion of primary school financing provided by external grants/loans was 22 per cent, the remaining 78 per cent representing state and parental contributions. The state managed to increase the recurrent education budget from a level of about FBu40,000 million in 1994/1995 to nearly FBu60,000 million in 1997/1998 (Ndimira *et al.*, 2001: 7). Funds were so scarce that even

a proportion of the primary school fees paid by parents went to funding the inspectorate and the Directorates of Primary Education and Planning (Ndayisaba, 2003: 57). In addition there were NGO contributions, which have not been estimated, and local materials and labour provided for school construction by parents. Annual uniform, exercise books and other state school costs rose to FBu6-10,000 per child. It was noted by the government that three types of interventions go uncounted and unevaluated, making it difficult to make a full appraisal of the totality of inputs into the education sector: parental levies such as PTA payments for school night watchmen, local and international NGO activities in general, and also the activities of some international agencies/organizations operating at a national level (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 36, 38-39).

During the years 1993 to 1998, salaries swallowed up between 97.4 and 99.6 per cent of the ministry's recurrent expenses for primary education. Sector expenditure was governed by ad hoc need and not by objectives or by an overall plan. Projections of expected – rather than planned – enrolment expansion in all education subsectors were annexed to the policy document of 2002 but no costing was carried out. Evaluation of sectoral disbursement impact was never carried out, only account auditing (MEN/UNICEF, 1999: 36; MEN/ADEA, 2002: 66). Expenditure in the nonformal sector was never analyzed by the state, whether delivered by government or non-goverment sources; nor was the cost of private education.

In conclusion, the financial resources of the education sector are extremely restricted but Burundi has shown creativity in harnessing household, community, commune and provincial inputs. There is need now to ensure the financing of quality inputs into education. This links with the human resources available. All those involved in the sector, from parents to senior ministry personnel, need regular capacity building in both technical and managerial aspects or education. Such an investment will make savings in the sector in the long run. When Burundi is satisfied that it has a clear statement of its education mission together with general and specific objectives, when the policy options have been costed, decisions can be made and a prioritized plan of action can be formulated. An integral part of policy-making will be decisions involving cost. The technical education sector is a case in point. It is extremely costly and needs to be planned with current realities and future national employment needs in mind, together with the potential of the SME sector in generating its own training institutions and mechanisms, with facilitation from the

state. Alternative education opportunities have not begun to be studied. The *Yaga Mukama* structure exists and can be swiftly used for national rather than ad hoc purposes. A large proportion of children currently in school are over age and could be educated outside rather than inside school, in tandem with employment skills training. The possibilities need urgent attention and new approaches need to be incorporated into future education sector planning. Finally, state allocations are the ultimate statement of the nation's policy, which is repeatedly said to be the reduction of disparity. The present study has identified disparity as being primarily regional economic, gender and social group in nature.

Chapter 6
Experiencing schooling in Burundi today

Over the last 10 years children in Burundi have tried to cope with terrible tragedies and fear. But, in addition to this, they have struggled to get into school and to stay there, trying to forge their way up a very demanding education system. While this has caused them additional trauma, it has also been a saving grace for them. In their eyes, school is a beacon of light and a symbol of hope for the future. When reading through these testimonies, one has to be continually aware of the fact that the cost to the government, and to the individual education officers and teachers, has been enormous and the heroism of those same individuals and of the sector leaders is not in question. They have kept schooling alive when everything around them was crumbling. Burundian children attest to the heroism and kindness of these individuals. And, in analyzing these terrible years, observers credit the Ministry of Education with having recognized the vital task of fuelling hope and struggling on, almost leaderless.

The chapter gives a voice to children and young adults, and is followed by observations and conclusions on the experience of schooling in Burundi today.

Twelve schools of different types were selected in the province of Kirundo and in Bujumbura to give some breadth to the data, ranging from primary schools (six students), through junior secondary schools (four students, including one at a community junior secondary school), to high schools (six students), the latter including schools initiated by the government, by the Church, and by parents or communities. Due to insecurity on the roads at the time of interviewing, it was not possible to go further into rural areas than schools near provincial centres. Many of the provincial schools are characteristic of rural areas.

Eight female and eight male school students were interviewed, between the ages of 13 and 31 years, all current school students. There was an attempt to seek out children of differing socio-economic backgrounds, with experience of exile and relocation within Burundi; orphans and children with living parents; from sixth to thirteenth grade. Of the 16 children and young adults, ten may have been Hutu and six may have been Tutsi. The interviewer did not ask for the socio-identity of the children and therefore there is no certainty regarding their group identity.

The aim was to include a preponderance of Hutu children, and a smaller number of Tutsi children, to match the demographic composition of Burundi. Details on the sample are given overleaf and in *Appendix G*.

Table 6.1 School children and students interviewed

Pupil ID (1)	Fictitious name (2)	Sex (3)	Age (4)	Grade (5)	Pupil's cycle (6)	School type (7)	Urban/rural (8)	School ID (9)
A	PAULINE	F	16	6	Primary	G	Provincial city	1
B	EVARISTE	M	19	6	Primary	G	Capital city	2
C	EMMANUELLE	F	14	6	Primary	G	Capital city 1956	3
D	FABIEN	M	14	6	Primary	G	Capital city 1956	3
E	MARIE-CHRISTINE	F	15	6	Primary	G	Capital city 1994	4
F	PEGGY	F	13	6	Primary	G	Capital city 1969	5
G	MARTIN	M	17	8	Junior secondary	CC	Provincial city 1990s	6
H	LUCIE	F	19	10	Junior secondary	G	Provincial city 1960s	7
I	JOSEPHINE	F	19	10	Junior secondary	G	Capital city 1995	8
J	IRÈNE	F	18	10	Junior secondary	G Ca	Capital city 1996	9
K	INNOCENT	M	21	11 LP1	Junior secondary	G	Capital city 1961	10
L	DIEUDONNÉ	M	31	11 Sc	Senior secondary	G	Provincial city 1960s	7
M	FÉLICITÉ	F	20	12 LP2	Senior secondary	G	Capital city 1961	10
N	RÉVÉRIN	M	22	13 LM	Senior secondary	G Ca	Capital city 1996	9
O	DANIEL	M	22	13 LM	Senior secondary	G	Capital city 1955	11
P	JEAN-CLAUDE	M	21	13 Sc	Senior secondary	G com	Capital city 1995	12

Cols. 1, 2 and 3 Pupil identity, fictitious name and sex.

Cols. 5 and 6 Grade (Sept 2003) and cycle: primary (1st-6th grades), junior secondary (7th-10th grades) or senior secondary 11th-13th grades). LP1 and LP2 refer to the Burundi names for these grades 11 and 12: *Lycée pédagogique* 1, first year of teacher training; LP2, second year.

Col.7 *G* = government or state schools; *CC* = community college or community junior secondary school (*coco*); *G com* = state school started by and still supported by the (urban) community, now under the municipality of Bujumbura; *G Ca* = state assisted school run by the Catholic Church.

Col. 8 *Urban/rural i.e. capital city versus provincial* – Pupils in the sample attended typical urban schools in the capital city, Bujumbura, or provincial or rural schools. Due to insecurity it was not possible to go far into rural areas, only to a small provincial town. Date established.

Col. 9 School identification number.

Note: At least seven of the schools attended by the interviewees were established recently, in the 1990s. The older schools are generally better resourced than the more recent ones.

School – from the inside

Fear, insecurity and trauma

While children try to concentrate on their studies their daily lives are wrecked by fear. It is not only war itself and militia attacks that cause terror and death. It is also the total breakdown of law and order. “My older brother used to pay my school fees but one night in May 2003 robbers came to our house in Bujumbura and they killed him. The rest of us just escaped death ... I don’t know how I am going to get school fees now, without him. I need FBu5,000 for this first term [US$5], and the deadline is October 3”. This was Irène’s first term in secondary school. It is hard to gauge how many other children in her class were still wondering where to get school fees and whether they would still be in school one month from then. It must have been difficult to concentrate on studies in such conditions.

In addition to the major attacks there are also regular threats of attack. As Irène put it: “At night, in the dark, I hear gunfire sometimes. I am really scared. And I am not able to study properly”. Jean-Claude says that there is sporadic gunfire in the mountains beyond his neighbourhood in Bujumbura, “and sometimes they even fire shots in our neighbourhood!”

During the author’s visit a UN national education officer came trembling to the office after some days’ absence. A grenade had been thrown over the walls into the courtyard of her Bujumbura house. It had not exploded but it had caused terror in the household, and among her children.

Disruption of schooling

Three of the children interviewed had returned from refugee camps in Congo or Tanzania; and two from short spells of refuge in Rwanda. The overall impression in late 2003 was that there were not, on a national scale, significant returns of refugees from the major, large and well organized UNHCR refugee camps of the neighbouring countries.[50]

The effect of temporary exile on schooling: Those who fled to Rwanda found no schools in the hurriedly established camps. Whether they stayed one month or six months in Rwanda, the brief flight interrupted their

50. It is known that some refugees had returned, but to specific locations in the border provinces.

schooling in Burundi for at least one year and they had to repeat the class when they re-entered school the next year. This example provides an indication of how schooling is needed even in short stay refugee camps and how the home countries should make every effort, even in the midst of an emergency, to re-integrate pupils back into the school system as soon as they return. It argues for the establishment of a less rigid school system in Burundi, for allowing re-entry to school throughout the year, for widespread provision of catch-up and bridging programmes, and re-integration measures, so that the nation does not lose the momentum of schooling children. Such strategies would reduce the cost of schooling to parents who, in too many cases, have to bear the financial load of avoidable school repetition, and to the education system, which has too many unnecessary repeaters, pushing up the costs of the entire sector and slowing it down.

Internal displacement – and schooling: It might be supposed that children who remained in Burundi, whether staying in their home areas or relocating within the country to other communes, managed to continue their schooling with less disruption than the exiles. But this does not seem to have been the case. Some IDP camps were without schools; in other cases, temporary schools under plastic sheeting were set up only after one year. Sometimes children fled to relatives in other parts of the country where there were no schools. If there were schools, they would not admit the relocating children once the school year had started. Other relocating children had suddenly to work full time, cultivating the land, to provide food for the family, rather than look for schooling opportunities. Flight and relocation, even to the home of relatives, has been a major stumbling block to family survival. Some parents are so traumatized they cannot work, or even hire out their labour to farms, as in the case of Innocent's father, whose wife and three sons were killed. He remains on the grandfather's land, not working, while the remaining three children manage to survive, cultivating and schooling as they can. By all accounts, the IDP children had the worst experience in terms of disrupted schooling during the decade.

Displacement to and within Bujumbura: It should not be assumed, either, that children who stayed in Bujumbura throughout the crisis had peaceful or uninterrupted schooling. On the contrary, Jean-Claude found that when the family fled from Gitega to Bujumbura in 1993, there were continual upheavals and attacks, assassinations and strikes in the city. When his parents tried to find a place for him in fifth grade they were told

that the schools were already overcrowded and would not take any more pupils. He had to spend one year out of school waiting for the next year's intake. Irène's family, from Gihosha in the capital, fled Bujumbura to an IDP camp in the interior of the country and stayed there for seven years. On returning home they had to flee again after two years, in 2002, due to renewed attacks in the neighbourhood. This time they went to live with a friend in the Kinama area of the city. Félicité, who is 21 years old, was displaced three times in the last 10 years. She fled with her family from Citibitoke to a Bujumbura IDP camp. The authorities reallocated the family to two subsequent camps. Félicité now spends the whole year in her Bujumbura secondary school and never goes back to the family, just a few kilometres away, who are still in the third IDP camp, a 'military' camp, which Félicité thinks is too dangerous to return to, due to the constant attacks and threats of attack on the camp.[51]

Schools as havens of security – and centres of survival: At least three others among the 16 students interviewed also live in their schools throughout the year. "I have nowhere else to go to", explains one of the male students simply. They are provided with free rice and beans during holidays – and the diet remains just that, beans and rice. Salt and oil are rare commodities. But it is free living for the whole year and many Burundi children would long to have this free beans-and-rice opportunity to live in a secondary school for seven years.

The most advantaged children: In war as in peace, the most advantaged children in terms of schooling, even if orphaned, are those from high-income families or now living in high-income families, as was the case with Joséphine and her four siblings. Her uncle, who was working with the UN, took them in. There was no interruption of her schooling career at all, even during the height of the war. Once schools had re-opened in Bujumbura, after the worst of the crisis, Joséphine was found a place in a city school to continue her fourth grade studies, with no problems at all, in a city neighbourhood where her social group predominated. To hear her talk confidently one would think that the move from one home to another, from one neighbourhood to another and from one school to another, had caused no disruption at all in her life. Her physical well-being and her school career have been assured. However, from the way she talks, in a cold, adult and arrogant fashion – as if to

51. The camp houses both internally displaced people and, in a separate unit, army personnel.

keep going at all costs and manage her memories the way she knows best – her emotional confidence may be less well founded. Joséphine's school career was less affected than all the others by the war, and it seems due to the economic status of her guardian.

Unequal disadvantage: Only one of the 16 students interviewed had managed to acquire a poverty certificate, entitling him to a fee waiver for secondary school. This was a case of Innocent, a male student aged 21 years, whose father was alive, but not working due to the loss of his land and relocation to his own father's house. Among the interviewees, paternal orphans in far more desperate situations, who had lost the main family breadwinner, could not manage to get poverty certificates, even if they had had to relocate and if they were returnees, even if they had to rent a place to stay in as a result of displacement, even if they could only afford one meal a day, and even if their family had to choose which siblings to send to school and which to leave out of school.

Avoidable loss of school years – waiting for re-entry and repetition: Clearly, from the children's experiences, once they relocate, whether to a new school or to an IDP school or back, or to exile and back, they inevitably have to repeat one or even as many as four classes. When these years are added to the ones they spend totally out of school, looking for a school, waiting for the next school year to start, or accumulating school fees, the disruption and time loss is enormous. Comparing the experiences of long-term refugees in Tanzania and Congo, as recounted in *Chapters 8* and *9*, officially recognized IDPs who are settled in internal camps, and children spontaneously relocating to other areas without any assistance, it seems that the refugees benefited from better provision of education services than the children who stayed in Burundi. Most children who stayed in Burundi either had to repeat classes, spend some years out of school, or missed out altogether on school. If they managed to get into school, they suffered from uneven allocation of education resources across the country, as noted.

Lessons learned

Burundi needs:

- facilitate and encourage fast return to school in all circumstances, rather than to erect barriers to schooling;
- develop a less rigid school system, allowing re-entry of returnees and relocating children throughout the year;
- institutionalize the transformation of schools – to create welcoming, safe and happy environments for learning.;
- rapidly develop new teacher orientation and development programmes, and to implement them;
- provide catch-up, bridging, remedial and accelerated education programmes; and late entry programmes. These could be delivered through an entirely transformed *Yaga Mukama* structure. To provide alternatives to traditional schooling such as the above and an educational extension programme that could be accessed by irregular students (short courses, extended courses, distance courses, etc.);
- significantly reduce the cost of schooling, to families and to the state, through a reduction of repetition, and stimulation of better quality learning – and use the savings made on alternative programmes;
- facilitate access and provide better quality learning: Provision of teacher development programmes to improve on teaching skills and institutional transformation in order to create more conducive conditions for learning for more learners. This is how quality can be improved, rather than setting up myriad barriers to re-entering school.

Positive aspects of schooling in Burundi perceived by the children

Children name the following attributes as characteristics of safe, good schools in Burundi today:

- A school location free from attack, in a place where ‘I can study in peace’.
- Schools with a good examination track record, that is, quality schools.
- Schools with welcoming teachers and pupils.
- Schools with a good atmosphere; and without ethnic divisions and tension, which do not practice any form of discrimination.
- Schools which are well managed and which insist on discipline.

- Schools with good relations between staff and pupils and school and community – and which work with the community to design school development strategies appropriate for all parties.
- Schools (secondary) near to the home, making it possible to study at lower cost, as a day scholar, and to meet up with friends in the neighbourhood in the evening to help each other with studying.
- Schools which find solutions for staffing shortages; and which never stop classes (e.g. fundraising among parents to pay extra teachers – Jean-Claude's school pays five extra teachers US$60 per month, funded by a US$30 cent (FBu300) contribution from 200 pupils per month).
- Schools which are flexible on fee payments.

The children appreciate teachers who have the following characteristics:

- Teach regular classes.
- Regularly turn up for their classes.
- Arrive on time and use class time well (do not waste class time chatting among themselves).
- Competent and effective, just and hardworking – to the extent of coming an hour before the other teachers to help children prepare for the exam, or who tutor for free on Saturdays or on Sundays. They note that some privately paid teachers even work before they receive a salary and the students marvel at their commitment.
- Work as a team.
- Do not continually hand out punishments for minor infringements of the rules, such as lack of punctuality.
- Give them advice on their school work and on social matters, and moral support in general, praising them for hard work and for work well done; take an interest in the individual needs of each learner, identifying those that need extra assistance;
- Assisting individual pupils by buying them exercise books.

They also appreciate when schools give at least partial fee waivers. One girl stated that there is no ethnic division amongst pupils in her school – only among some teachers, and: "If there is any ethnic animosity it is among adults in this society who are still killing each other".

Lesson learned

The Ministry of Education needs to document good practices in schools, to acknowledge good teachers and to join with the children in lauding all the good that is done in schools at present. The good practices could then be institutionalized and encouraged as 'national good practice', and included in new teacher development programmes.

Negative aspects of schooling in Burundi perceived by the children

Children talked of their problems and characterized the challenges of schooling in their country in the following terms.

Physical danger:

- Schooling in areas under continual attack, such as Bubanza, which results in not having the peace of mind to be able to concentrate on studies.
- And they feel desperately alone: "I feel bad when there's no one to look after me at boarding school when I fall sick."

The infrastructural shortcomings of schools:

- Schools too far from home for completing one's homework, or without electricity: "I go to a nearby primary school to do my homework" explains Jean-Claude in senior secondary school, "because we don't have electricity in our school or at our house [in Bujumbura]. But sometimes the school is locked in the evening and the night watchman cannot be found. On such days I have to get up early the next morning to finish my homework."
- Secondary schools without enough classrooms and without lab supplies; insufficient books in the library; schools without playing fields.
- Dormitories without lights and sanitation blocks with non-functional plumbing; schools where, even at age 20 years and more, students have to sleep two to a bed.
- Unfenced schools opening onto major roads in the city, which are noisy and distracting for learners.
- Lack of school equipment which they know to be common in peacetime, such as schools without a single radio or TV.
- Frustration generated by a new expectation for IT learning: "almost no access to computers", added a senior secondary student.

The agony of poverty and the effects on school children:

- Fears of not being able to sustain fee payments, buy uniform or writing materials: "lack of school fees could have me sent away from school at any moment. This is a constant worry of mine". Irène says: "I don't think we, five children, will be able to remain in school. We just don't have the money". Some children have been known to work for as long as five years in order to save enough money to go back to school, for grades three to six, as Evariste did.
- Schools which stop students with fee arrears from borrowing books from the library.
- All children, even in war time, are acutely affected by their appearance because they hate to be different from or more poorly dressed than their peers: "I feel bad when I don't have uniform ... and school writing materials," and "the essential things that girls need [sanitary towels]". Girls are left on their own to manage menstruation issues every month. This particular type of stress with no sanitary protection, poor water supply in schools, lack of soap, and lack of privacy at the latrines and bathing areas, are a well documented source of distraction and anxiety for girls, more significantly so in wartime conditions. They impact on girls' self-esteem, concentration, performance and regular attendance at school.

Poorly managed schools:

- Schools with poor staff relations and poor teacher-pupil relations, which do not cope with discipline problems within the school, calling in parents for minor infringements of school rules, even at secondary level.
- Schools that do not organize cultural activities.
- Schools that force pupils to work in the school gardens, without explaining where the harvest goes.

Selection for specialist courses: A quarter of the interviewees explained that they were in senior secondary courses they had not selected: one was in a science stream yet he had opted for a teacher development course; three others found themselves in a general academic secondary school but had applied for a technical or paramedical training institution: "you know, when you are allocated a short course such as the teacher training programme in the general academic secondary schools, there

is really no sound future [in terms of employment] in sight for you", said one girl. Most students are from poor families and they are keen to join the active workforce and to earn a salary as soon as possible, so as to put their younger siblings through school before it is too late. The rationale for the complaint of the first student is that the science stream leads to university and he did not have university fees. He had selected an employment-oriented technical or paramedical training course so that he could earn an income and help his family.

Teachers: There are problems with absentees and poorly-trained/untrained teachers.

- Long-term absent teachers – absent for as long as two weeks with no explanation to pupils.
- Teachers who do not listen to students' explanations for late arrival in school, missing homework assignments, etc.
- Harsh teachers: Teachers who regularly punish students are seen as tormentors. Lack of punctuality is generally severely punished along with other offences which students perceive to be trivial.
- Teachers who are too familiar with students and who end up losing the respect of the learners.
- Mercenary, exploitative, harassing, abusive or rapist teachers: who demand payment or sexual favours in return for giving children high marks.

Confusion between academics and discipline: There is a tendency for teachers/schools to confuse academic issues with discipline, that is, to change students' academic record as a result of trivial disciplinary infringements, such as lack of punctuality. Male students deeply resent this, especially the ones over 20 years, who mention it regularly. Corporal punishment is rife, as in other countries of eastern Africa. The children mention a head who has been known to cane even a twelfth grade student. In Burundi, most twelfth grade students are over 20 years old.

Most children are given homework tasks, which they cannot manage to finish during daylight hours, and in the majority of families with not only no electricity but no paraffin for their hurricane lamps, the issue of homework becomes a daily worry. Children get up early to start studying at 5.30 am: "I have to do my work outside the house so that I get enough light". Daybreak is indeed at around 5.30 am and sunset at about 6.30 pm, which leaves school children very little time for individual study.

Issues affecting re-entry to school

School fees: Not only are school fees required in Burundi, and at least some exercise books, but uniform has to be purchased in most schools, particularly in the capital. Additional regular and irregular levies can be required by the school, such as an extra FBu1,000 admission fee, or a levy for examination paper. Bribes can be demanded, especially for late entries, once the regular New Year entry period is over. Primary fees more than trebled in 1999/2000 to FBu1,000 and secondary fees were also increased. Children repeatedly express acute anxiety over the difficulty they face in finding school fees and other requirements, which are detailed below, in the section on *State assistance*. Pauline had to find primary school fees when she returned home after four years in a Rwandan refugee camp, a double orphan and a member of a child-headed family. In the end, a cousin paid for her: “They asked us for fees just like anyone else”. Two years later she defaulted on fees, was sent away from school and had to wait a whole year before re-entry. The final hurdle was having to repeat the class, which she had almost completed when she was sent away.

Poverty certification: Although returnees and indigent families are meant to receive poverty certificates, attesting to their low income or no income status and allowing them fee waivers or free education services, the attestation is not easy to acquire. Irène, having just entered secondary school for the first time, from a low-income family of seven children, explained: “I just can’t even go to request a poverty certificate from them because it’s just too difficult. The *inshingwamiryango* (the committee which identifies poor families) only gives them to their cronies. They all are from Kamenge and they hardly give any certificates to families from other neighbourhoods. We are from Gihosha. They didn’t even allow me to go and ask for help from *Buyengero* [an Italian missionary who often helps the poor in the city].”

In another case a family with two plots of land, but both in the war zones, with an able but non-working father, managed to get a poverty certificate, school fees paid by the mayor’s office and exercise books from NGOs for his two remaining sons, while the two boys benefit from free rice and beans at school during the holidays. The daughter remained out of school. These anecdotes, and others like them, lend credence to the claim made by several people that the poverty certificates are

significantly fewer than the number of indigent children in Burundi and are not handed out on the basis of need.

Repetition required, and regression: Unlike Rwanda's post-genocide returnees, almost all Burundi children returning to school after displacement, exile or simple absence, or children from the provinces coming to Bujumbura, have been required to repeat their previous class, whether they passed the end of year examination or not. This is a requirement that needs reconsidering, given the extra burden it places on the system and on individual learners.

Treatment of provincial children in city schools

When we reached Bujumbura, they went to request a fourth grade place for me in school. But it didn't work at all. The school told me to wait one year. So that is why I stayed at home for that year. When I went back to the school a year later, they put me into third grade! I think it's because I came from the provinces and they thought I would not be as good as the Bujumbura children – at least I just suppose so.

Fabien, 14 years, pupil from upcountry

Schools take decisions unilaterally: Schools seem to take unilateral decisions on which class the returning child will be placed in, without consulting the child or the parents, without taking the previous school certificates fully into account and without testing the children. The attitude of school authorities could be considered out of tune with the educational context of the times.

Frequent school transfer can lead to low performance and frequent repetition, a four time repetition is not unusual when children change schools four times, change country, and so on.

State assistance

Children in primary schools receive no assistance at all from the state. Yet, as has been noted above, it is only primary school that most children in Burundi can hope to access, given the few places available in secondary school and the cost. It would make sense to provide free-schooling to the most vulnerable children, to the lowest two quintiles of the population, and to share the high cost bursaries now going to secondary students with some primary pupils.

The Ministry of Reintegration (*ministère de la Réinsertion*) has assisted most of the senior secondary pupils interviewed here. This takes the form of providing irregular work during the holidays, in return for a gift of exercise books, or sometimes cash. In one case a young man was able to earn FBu50,000 (US$50) to spend on exercise books. Rebels have been given 5-10 days work with an NGO distributing roofing materials in neighbourhoods attacked others in Bujumbura. Second, the ministry provides students staying at school with free meals. It seems that accommodation and board is also free at the school during holiday time. This assistance was given to a 21-year-old student who also worked from time to time on construction sites, and who saved his money for buying school materials and clothes. Most secondary schools encourage students who live throughout the year at the school to cultivate crops during the holidays, which are then bought from them. The money they earn goes towards buying uniform and sometimes helping younger siblings with school materials. The Ministry of Education for primary and secondary schools, through external assistance, provides some exercise books but they often arrive very late in the year, several months after the school year has started.

Noted above, but not generally recognized as state assistance, is the extra tuition that some teachers give free to pupils before their examinations, often providing weekend classes to supplement regular ones.

Table 6.2 gives selected information on the fees of the children interviewed.

Children interviewed paid from FBu2,000 in lower primary school up to FBu13,000 for secondary school per year, and boarders paid FBu26,000. This should be added to the cost of uniform and minimal writing materials. Uniform at primary school costs between FBu4,500 and 5,000; and secondary uniform between FBu7,500 and 9,000. The total cost per year could therefore range between FBu8,000 for primary, up to FBu25,000 for day secondary school, and FBu40,000 (or US$40) for boarding school, when taking fees, other direct expenses, uniform and writing materials into account. These expenses have to be considered in the light of annual per capita income in Burundi which is estimated at FBu100,000 (US$100);[52] and Burundi families typically have over six

52. US$ GNP per capita income, PPP US$680, data from *Global Monitoring Report 2005* (UNESCO, 2004).

children per family; and many families support the extended family or other orphans.

Table 6.2 Annual school fees and other direct expenses in Bujumbura (2003) in selected schools (in Burundian francs)

Schools	Fees	Other recurrent expenses	Textbooks, laboratory supplies	Tests fee	Boarding fee	Total p.a.
(School 3) Primary govt. Bujumbura	1,500	500		1,800 for 5-6th grades		2,000 or 3,800
(School 4) Primary govt. Bujumbura	1,500	500		700		2,000 or 2,700
(School 5) Primary govt. Bujumbura	1,500	1,500 per family		1,500 for 6th grade		2,000-4,000
(School 9) Junior/high Bujumbura	6,000	1,000	2,000			9,000
(School 8) High school Bujumbura	6,000	5,000 per family: T supplement	2,000			13,000
(School 11) High school Bujumbura	6,000		2,000		18,000	8,000 day pupils or 26,000 boarders
(School 12) High school Bujumbura	6,000	School admission 1,000 5 extra Ts: 2,700	2,000			11,700

Col.1: School identification number, see *Table 5.1* above
ORE = Other recurrent expenses, such as the night watchman
T = teachers

The case of Lucie

While the boys struggled in the fields, saving money to put aside for fees – and in the case of Evariste it took him five long years to accumulate the sum he needed – and older boys found a way of getting a poverty certificate, a 17-year-old adolescent girl thought up another

The girl who was determined to stay in school

Lucie had been a refugee in Rwanda. When she found herself in danger of missing out on school for the second time, she made a plan.

"In 2001, I took the road once more, to Tanzania. This time I was alone."

"It was clear to me that my father was poor, a simple farmer with six children to look after, and that, with his drinking, there would be no money left over for school fees. I knew it would be difficult for me to stay in school if I remained in Burundi. And that is when I thought of going to Tanzania, to the refugee camps, because they let unaccompanied children go to school free in the camps."

Lucie left home again in 2001, on her own this time, and did her eighth and ninth grades in the Burundi refugee camp in Tanzania. Her father wrote to her all the time, pleading with her to return, and promising to pay her school fees in Burundi. Lucie gave in after two years and came back home. She is in school, poised to finish tenth grade. But for how long?

plan to survive in school. When her mother died after the family had spent four years in the Rwanda refugee camps, Lucie was left with an alcoholic father and five younger siblings. Once back in Burundi, she realized that her fate would surely be to remain out of school, looking after her younger brothers and sisters while her father drank his way to oblivion. So she took fate into her own hands and decided to brave the roads alone, in search of schooling in a totally new country, in Tanzania, a country she had never been to before. Lucie's determination has attracted the admiration of some of Burundi's hardened and most experienced education officials.

Lucie found help once she reached the camps, not only with her schooling, but for shelter: "In the camp I found a former neighbour of ours, and the family took me in and helped me so much, despite the fact that they had seven children of their own there in the camp". But things are not yet sorted out for Lucie. She is back in Burundi, with her seemingly reformed father and five younger siblings: "We eke out a living, somehow", she mused. "I have sneaked back into secondary school, and they haven't noticed yet that I'm here and that I haven't paid the fees ... they could send me home any day ... I keep worrying

about things. I just pray to God to help me so that I can continue with my studies".

There is an amazing resilience about the young generation in Burundi. To say that demand for education is high is to understate the determination and perseverance of Dieudonné, Evariste and Lucie. School entry and re-entry procedures in Burundi are among the most difficult in Africa. Burundi would benefit from a total overhaul of budgetary allocations and entry procedures, along with the creation of a viable alternative education programmes to cater for overage, re-entering students and the education needs of young adults who should not be in school, but in learning centres geared to facilitating rapid progress.

The wider context

Solidarity among friends and family

Family: "Urahabura wihe, uguhabura kuraguma",[53] said 31-year-old Dieudonné of his extended family. But friends and neighbours help each other all the time in Burundi and in the refugee camps, despite the hesitancy voiced by Dieudonné. Perhaps it is a case of reluctance to accept or expect more help than he has had already from his kind brother, rather than a negative comment on the extended family in general. Dieudonnné's brother had paid his secondary school fees for four years in the refugee camp. Claudine's cousin financed her primary schooling – she is the youngest in a child-headed household. Innocent's decimated family fled for refuge to the old grandfather's home, and he gave them shelter. Félicité's parents, IDPs living unemployed and dependent on relief food in an IDP camp, have taken four more children into their precarious shelter, the nephews and nieces of their dead relatives, and have doubled the family size. They have no money to pay school fees but they provide the children with an intact family home and parental guidance.

Friends and neighbours: Together with his little brother and widowed mother, Evariste lives on a plot belonging to strangers in Bujumbura who have given them permission to stay on the land. This gives them at least somewhere to lay their heads: "we have nowhere else to go", he explains, after the initial family friends they stayed with in the capital turned them out: "The man of the house started to treat us

> **"We have nowhere else to go"**
> *Evariste, who fled from the provinces to Bujumbura*

53. "It's better to rely on yourself than to expect help from [the family]".

badly".[54] Evariste is evidently very grateful to this second hosting family, who has been generous enough to give them a couple of rooms to live in. "The owner is not even charging us rent!" Evariste marvels at this, "and they are not related to us at all!" This means that the two boys can continue with their schooling in the capital, in relative safety, even if their living conditions remain extremely precarious and they have little to eat. Evariste admits that he and his brothers are fearful when their mother is away: "but we have no alternative", he says again.

Daniel, an orphan whose entire close family and extended family was killed, says he owes the continuation of his schooling to the local community administrator – in an area to which he had fled for protection (to his maternal uncle who was subsequently assassinated). The education official ensured that Daniel was given a poverty certificate, got to school and stayed there right through secondary, even providing the boy with the clothing, bedding, school materials and provisions that Daniel needed for boarding at school from his own pocket.

> "**I owe my entire schooling to this man, the commune administrator [district officer]".**
>
> *Daniel, 22 years old, whose whole family was annihilated*

Pauline's widowed father fled to his three children to Rwanda after the massacres of 1988. He was killed en route. Neighbours, who were with them, took them under their wing and looked after the children for four years in a refugee camp.

Amongst school friends: Children hand down their school uniforms, when they are done with them, to smaller children who are their friends in school (Fabien's experience). Daniel, 22 years old, an orphan since he was 12, and still at secondary school, confirms this, and says the secondary school leavers often donate their uniforms to the school, to help poor students. He says that his school-mates are generally understanding and good to him, and give him the odd exercise book and even money at times, since he is without any parental assistance. He feels very comfortable at school and accepted by both his teachers and school-mates, despite his desperate economic situation. Some of the secondary students talked about mutual help among school-mates to do homework and tackle lesson problems.

54. The boys cook for themselves while their mother is away. She has to leave them for six weeks at a time to go back to the dangers of constant attack in Bubanza Province in the northwest, to look for food to bring back for the three of them.

How do people live?

Evariste's family in Bujumbura, that is, his widowed mother, his brother and himself, depend 'for something to eat' on the frequent journeys his mother makes back to the very dangerous north western province of Bubanza, bordering the Congo, where they own land. "Yes, it's really difficult in Bubanza, since the war is continuing in that area", worries Evariste. "We can't afford to buy or lease land for cultivation in Bujumbura." Evariste is 19 years old and has only reached sixth grade, the last class of primary school.[55] Children all over Burundi recount this type of experience. While they may have been taken to a place of safety and to a location where they have a chance of schooling, the parent – and it is usually the one remaining parent, the mother – has to brave the very real risks of returning to the dangerous home zone, again and again, in order to supervize the farm labourers she has left tilling the land. She then brings food back to the new location for her children or sells it on the market in exchange for other food that the children need. Since this is the family's sole source of income the mothers have to face this danger, month in month out.

When the two parents of a family are alive they have a double source of income. The most moneyed family of all the interviewees was one where the father was not only a church minister but he also ran an HIV NGO, while the mother was a businesswoman. This produced a very positive result, even with nine children. They had one son in university, one child in Europe, and all the others in school. Interestingly this seemed to give their daughter, Marie-Christine, the time and leisure to worry about the past and about 'ethnic' divisions in the society, which almost none of the other students mentioned.

In less educated families, even with two parents, there is a struggle to feed all the mouths in the family. "We have to live off the meagre harvests that my parents produce on allotments in the city suburbs. We are a big family, with seven children, and it's difficult to get enough for everyone to eat. It's really hard for me to get the writing materials I need for school," explained Irène. "We eat one meal most days, in the evening usually," said Révérin, in twelfth grade. Like Evariste, Révérin's family has land in the provinces. They now find themselves almost indigent in Bujumbura, and have been there for the last 10 years.

55. Evariste had spent five years out of school working on farms and saving money to go back to school.

Fabien's family of seven siblings and two parents are scattered all over Bujumbura lodged by various friends. This has been the case for the last eight years. Fabien's father is a mechanic but helps his farming wife when he cannot find regular work. His mother is one of those who regularly go back to the rural area to work the family land alongside tenant farmers to whom they have hired out the land. The parents manage to pay their way with the various friends who shelter their seven children, renting here and paying for food there. And, they manage to send six of the children to school. The seventh child dropped out of school "due to poor performance".

Jean-Claude's father was laid off from employment at the plastics factory in Bujumbura and has done no work since then. In this previously middle class family, where the mother and children lived contentedly in the provinces, the mother has had to resort to petty trade in Bujumbura: "My mother sells tomatoes, fruit and some other small items". The family has all five of the school age children in school, with the help of official fee waivers for some of them.

Orphans with an official poverty certificate get no assistance with school uniforms. "We just have to find uniforms somehow", explained Daniel in senior secondary school. It is understandable that the government cannot do everything and that the needs are overwhelming. Seen from the standpoint of the school child, it is, however, an enormous challenge to find all the essential items that they must purchase in order for a school to accept them.

Félicité is an IDP. She has her two parents and four siblings, now joined by four cousins from her dead uncle and aunt. Of the eight children, two have received poverty declarations and benefit from fee waivers. The other six children who are all in school are being assisted by NGOs. It is not clear why the remaining six children do not have poverty certificates. However, given that the eight children are all in school, in a totally unemployed, IDP family, five in secondary and three in primary, assisted by the state and the wider community, this is a success story in terms of national assistance to and solidarity with indigent families. However, it is also a story of failure to make people self-reliant, and over long, long years.

Lesson learned

Assistance appears to be uneven across needs and within families. The state should rationalize assistance to poor families, giving all children in the same family the same poverty certificates and working collaboratively with NGOs to ensure that all the children are assisted through the same channel instead of limiting official assistance to two children while requiring the others to seek assistance from other organizations. This procedure is not aimed at giving additional assistance to a family but aims at clarifying and co-ordinating current assistance, possibly resulting in a more equitable distribution of support once information on commune needs and assistance programmes are gathered in one office.

In IDP camps or when families relocate to a new place, they have no land to farm. Yet agriculture is the major occupation and income earner of Burundis. They become totally dependent on food relief. Félicité's parents were to join with others, to be trained by NGOs in new employment and production skills. However, Félicité explains, "these projects never saw the light of day", and the parents remain unskilled in their new location and helpless with eight children to provide for. The result of their lack of earning skills and opportunities is that as many as eight children are totally dependent on the state for their schooling, with no parental or community input at all into the financing of their education. This is, naturally, an extremely heavy burden for the state, yet it is an avoidable one. It demonstrates lack of co-ordination of assisting agencies, state and private – and lack of policy.

The urgent needs with regard to income generation and achieving self-reliance for displaced people remain:

- access to land for farming;
- access to training on new productive skills;
- access to microfinance, to put into practice both the above.

What work do children do?

Home labour: Girls provide domestic labour. In families without daughters, the boys cook and do other domestic chores. One boy fetches water from a borehole for the family. Middle class girls do not to manual work but they often do a considerable amount of domestic chores.

Agriculture-related work: Evariste works during the holidays, watering tomatoes for a farmer, 6-9 am and 3-4 pm every day and gets

FBu15,000 per month. "I buy food with this and put aside a little for school fees and buying exercise books." He says he and his brother are very happy indeed to be able to get some work since they know their mother does not have enough income to pay school fees.

Some of the children declared officially as indigent and with permission to live at school throughout the year, are given permission to grow vegetables on school land during the holidays. The vegetables are added to their minimal relief diet of beans and rice, and some are sold in the market. One secondary school student earned FBu3,000 this way, enough to keep him 'in soap', as they say.[56]

Unskilled construction labour: "I work whenever I can," said Révérin, "during the holidays. I generally help my parents in the fields. The first time I got a paid job I earned FBu8,000 per month and the second time I got 14,000, which I put towards food and buying exercise books". Daniel reported having found work on a construction site through his school friends: "I earned FBu15,000 for 10 days' work".

Bar attendant: Jean-Claude, a 21-year-old secondary student, earns FBu20,000 per month during the holidays, to add to the income from his mother's petty trading. His father does not work.

Relief work: The Ministry of Reintegration sometimes provides work opportunities for senior secondary school students during the holidays, distributing roofing in a nearby IDP camp or neighbourhood, for example. Students reportedly worked between 5 and 10 days, earning about FBu50,000 (approx. US$50). One said: "I worked last holidays, in July-August, for the ministry, distributing *mabati* roofing in a neighbourhood near my school to victims of recent attacks, and earned FBu50,000 for five days. I bought school writing materials and uniform for myself and my little brothers". It is indeed excellent that the work ethic is encouraged through relief programmes, co-ordinated by the state itself, involving school children in social relief assistance and giving them the opportunity to work for cash to support their own schooling. It is evident that this gives the young people immense pride. They only lament that the opportunities are short and irregular, and one cannot depend on them.

56. In Burundi this expression means that one earns so little that it can only buy soap, one of the essential needs after food.

Some children worked for years before they were able to go back to school: For five years, between the ages of 10 and 14, Evariste did casual agricultural work, mainly planting rice, in order to save the money he needed to finish his studies.

Children's state of mind

Marie-Christine, approximately 18 years old, in her last year of primary school, from a middle class family, says simply: "I was very affected by all the killings of 1993. I lost many of my friends." She would have been around seven or eight years old at the time, but the memories are clear. Jean-Claude, now 21, and almost finishing secondary school, recalls the time he returned from Bujumbura to his home, the first time after he had fled from there in 1993: "Those people killed my uncle in Gitega and they completely destroyed our home. You can't even see today that there had been any buildings on our land at all". He is shocked by the totality of the destruction and the complete disappearance of what had been the environment of his childhood.

"I was the youngest in a family of four siblings. Everyone has been killed, even my paternal uncles and my maternal uncle who was a doctor. I just stay at school during the holidays. I have nowhere else to go." Daniel is 22 years old but, understandably, he talks like a boy and has powerful emotions and grief that he has not yet dealt with. Despite all this he has only one more year to go before completing his secondary studies. He expresses his deep gratitude to the local government official who made sure he stayed in school during all these difficult years, as noted before. Daniel is a picture of confusion and emotional mix-up, having had to make the transition to adulthood while his childhood fears are still with him.

Innocent, a young man of 21 years in twelfth grade, who came from a comfortably off rural family, says that he felt totally and suddenly bereft when he realized that he was now poor, with no immediate economic resources, after the events of the mid 1990s. He says his family used to have many cattle and that since the killings and plunder of 1996 they have lost them all. He remembers with nostalgia that as a child: "I could drink milk whenever I wanted to". And he is constantly aware of the loss of his mother, killed the same year. Innocent has reached adulthood but, when he has a kindly listener, the emotions of childhood destroyed tumble out. He is an example of how those who formerly had property and status in the community have a double problem to face after the war,

"My mother has to go back all the time to Bubanza, in spite of the noise of canon and gunshot whistling by ... so that my brother and I can eat in Bujumbura". While she is away Evariste worries but mechanically goes on cooking for his younger brother. "Yes, it is difficult ..."

Evariste, paternal orphan, who fled with his widowed mother and little brother to Bujumbura after the rest of the family was killed

bereaved of family and reduced to destitution, to a life they have no experience of.

Jean-Claude's family had owned land and 'houses' in the second town of Burundi, in Gitega. His father had an additional house in Bujumbura and worked there at the plastics factory until he was laid off in 1996 as a result of the international sanctions against Burundi, which prevented raw materials reaching the country. Despite his middle-class background, Jean-Claude is now officially classed as poor and has acquired the precious poverty certificate. He has a school fee waiver for secondary school and receives free exercise books.

Students are also concerned by the state of their parents. Innocent continues his story: "My father had land and so many cattle, but they were all stolen. He had to flee from home, as we did, and he is now in another place. Since he has no land in Mugamba he is doing nothing at all. He has lost everything and his land is far away in one of the war zones, in Makamba. And when he managed to buy a small piece of land in another area, he had to flee from that place too, because of the war". Students whose families have lost their land or cattle, or whose land is in

Facing the uncertain future alone

Some young people, belatedly finishing off their secondary school studies beyond the age of 20, have already had to deal with the problems of inheritance, depossession and repossession: "My whole family was killed around 1993-1994. Once, I tried to go home, to Marinzi, Mutambu Commune. Rebels were firing on us throughout the journey there. But I managed to get home. I found that our land was being farmed by the very same people who killed my family. I filed an official complaint. The land was restored to me but I can't go back and work the land because I am really scared."

Daniel, 22 years old, in the last year of secondary school

the current war zones feel a strong sense of loss and bewilderment. And, the older they are, the more they feel this. The urgency to get home and to look after their land and their property is evident but these students are prevented from going home, due to danger in the area. In the midst of these raging fears, they are struggling to hold on to their hopes and they are trying to study.

When asked what the government does for students like himself, 22-year-old Daniel retorted: “Nothing at all. It’s really shocking!” yet he went on to explain that his school was a most supportive one, that his fees were paid by the local authorities, that he received free exercise books, (late), every year, that he is provided with free accommodation at his secondary school throughout the year, since he has no parents. He reports, too, that the Ministry of Reintegration provided him and other officially indigent children (poor or orphans) with work during the last holidays so that they could earn FBu50,000 (US$50). It is possible that Daniel understood the question to refer solely to central government services and did not see the local government authorities as ‘central government’. Nevertheless, Daniel’s understanding and attitudes are indicative of the future problems, of a possible dependency syndrome and of simmering anger at the world in general, despite the fact that he will be one of the lucky few in Burundi, a secondary school graduate, in just a year and a half. He appreciates his school friends, however, his supportive teachers and the quality of the school in general, who are all close to him but he bears a strong feeling of resentment against ‘the government’ which he does not translate into the school services and other benefits that he receives. It will be important for schools to ensure that all students, particularly senior secondary students, understand the types of assistance already provided to them, the sources of that assistance, the costs involved, the rationale for these forms of assistance, their limitations, and the need for recognizing government efforts, whether central or local, so as to orient requests for assistance in the future to realistic ones. It is also important for youth to understand the issues of equity involved in the selection of individuals and groups to be supported by the government in a context of extreme and widespread need.

It is interesting to note, in passing, that US$50 is an extraordinarily high rate to pay anyone for 5-10 days casual work (distributing roofing) in any African country, especially for a very young person. By over-paying students, relief organizations (in this case the government) could be paving the way for skewed expectations and frustration in the future. It

begins to explain the dissatisfaction of Daniel who was lucky to benefit from this scheme but who did not appreciate it, as explained above. And, Daniel is already of voting age. He is evidently sorely in need of thorough civics education.

School: Students in good schools where teachers are supportive feel secure and comfortable to some degree, in spite of the fearful context in which they live. Daniel has experienced both good and bad schools. In the lower junior secondary section of a provincial high school pupils were “tormented by unnecessary, continual punishments”. In his current senior secondary school in Bujumbura, there are no such teachers and no such punishment. On the contrary, teachers are mindful of the individual needs of students, are kind, professional and competent.

“There is nothing negative about my school at all. It’s a really good school. The only problem for me is that I feel bad that I can’t go home in the holidays, since I have no home to go to. But I’ve got used to this”. Jean-Claude, who keenly feels the loss of their land, houses, and his father’s work, is comfortable in what he regards is a good school. He does not allow himself to worry too much: “I have no problems at school. I am comfortable there. I am a Christian and I trust in God for everything”. Religion helps some of the students to face the days as they come.

Aspirations and hopes

The children and young adults interviewed listed their hopes:

- *Que la guerre cesse!* “Stop the war!”;
- “To have peace, since everything depends on peace – studies and everything else”;
- “To enjoy peace”;
- “I keep on hoping that my older brother, the only member left of my entire family, is alive and will turn up one day”:

They longed to return to family life, in their original homes, mainly in the provinces:

- to leave precarious living in the capital and return to the home province once peace is achieved (children from Bubanza and Muzinda);
- to stop having to waste money on renting and to live in their homes once again;

- to get the remaining family back together again – a family of three remaining children, of the original six, and their widowed father;
- "to go back to our land," said a 22-year-old young man, whose parents had both died, "to grow crops and to live again with dignity".

Other hopes were more immediate and modest: we just want "to get exercise books on time, the free exercise books that the ministry sends annually to schools". Two of the students explained that they had to struggle to earn enough money to buy soap. This signifies that they were on the very edge of pauperization. One of them expressed his longing to find once more a life 'of dignity' which is surely lacking at this level of existence and which is severely threatened in a psychological sense when one is in danger of not having soap, of going through the day unwashed. Yet, while living through these tribulations, the students are coping with senior secondary school programmes, which is no mean task by any standards. The resilience and determination of the young people is admirable and points to the energy levels and hope that the peace time government will be able to build on in this new generation.

Further issues

Some other issues were raised by the children's observations, although not noted by them explicitly.

Inequitable distribution of school facilities: Even in Bujumbura there is poor distribution and use of school facilities. In one case it was reported that there were less than 10 pupils in the last three grades of a secondary school, one class with only three pupils. This explains to a large extent the lack of resources going to peri-urban and rural areas. The reason given for the small classes was the poor management of the school, bad staff-pupil relations and continuous harsh punishments, which had caused many pupils to leave school or transfer. It was in this school, among others, that marks were regularly deducted for breaches of discipline, for example, arriving late to school.

Lesson learned for equitable system development

To compensate for neglect of school facilities in dangerous zones, and skewed distribution of resources over the last decade, affirmative action programmes will be needed in peace time to upgrade access to resources in the most disadvantaged areas of the country, implementing an equitable school development policy.

High repetition rate: Even a clever student like Félicité, who seems to have avoided repeating classes, is now 20 years old and still in secondary school, starting twelfth grade of the thirteen that she must complete. She entered school at eight years old, but fled her home when the area came under attack. She was moved with her family, eight children and two parents, to three different IDP camps over the last 10 years. It is unusual that she has not repeated any classes, but with two years out of school due to displacement (one year) and lack of school fees (a second year), she will only finish school at the advanced age of 22 years. This is too late. She outgrew school four years ago.

Lesson learned for the reduction of repetition rates

The culture of repetition needs to be replaced by a more efficient class promotion mechanism, for example, the one devised but never implemented in the 1970s; and re-entering, returnee or transfer students should be given every support to move into the next class.

Changing teacher behaviour: The complaints against teachers in Burundi contrast sharply with at least one post-war experience of education in the eastern Africa region, where good management practices in schools led to a feeling of security, to happiness, to the rising confidence of students and to open praise of heads and teachers. In the latter case it was interesting that it had occurred spontaneously, without management training but with strong political leadership from the top, demanding team-work, sacrifice and adherence to a clear, positive and national vision of progress. Heads would continually keep students informed about management problems such as lack of supplies, of water, or finance, and consult with them on ways of managing crises of the kind. Students appreciated this and were jubilant to be back in their home country, despite the shortfalls experienced in the schools.[57]

57. The case was Rwanda in the first decade after the genocide (Obura, 2003).

One interpretation of these contrasting phenomena in Burundi, and elsewhere, would be that a society still in the grip of war could not be expected to create favourable learning conditions in school, or to fire their heads and teachers with enthusiasm, sacrifice and commitment to the vocation of teaching. Nevertheless, the establishment of peace provides a context for positive management attributes to thrive, if only spontaneously rather than in a structured manner. The recommendation to the post-war country had been, in this case, to spontaneously occurring positive institutional changes, to formalize them and incorporate them into teacher development programmes and monitoring practices, so as to preserve them for the long-term in the education system. The lesson learned for Burundi is that, first, many negative practices exist in schools in the current conflict-ridden society, but that teacher orientation and development can be planned as of now to change school management practices radically and rapidly in a peacetime context. The tendency in many countries is to organize head teacher capacity building programmes around financial management, but there is something far more fundamental to be addressed, namely institutional transformation, starting with head-teacher relationships. And, if possible, an excellent way to start in a post-conflict situation is to give teachers a meaningful salary rise. In other words, a gesture indicating that the government values teachers is recommended, to raise the morale of the teaching force at such a critical moment of history.

Lesson learned for teacher development

Heads and teachers will need re-orientation and skills development in peace-time Burundi, building on good practices noted both within Burundi and elsewhere; and a salary raise.

System diversification: Children, adolescents and young adults spend far too many years in school in Burundi. They are generally late school starters. Several in the sample started school at eight or nine years old, even before the war. This is just too late for primary schooling, and jeopardizes the relevance of the official curriculum. Late starters need a different curriculum, *appropriate for their age level*, and *accelerated syllabuses* designed to get them through and out of the education system as quickly as possible. Second, there are too many repeaters in the system, which delays movement through school. Adolescents in Burundi are needed to contribute to family income and provision needs to be

made to couple education programmes with skills training and/or earning opportunities for children in their early teens.

Lesson learned for system reform

- Lower primary school entry age to six years
- Reduce repetition rates
- Abolish school fees

Lessons learned for education for adolescents

The need to provide:

- provide alternative education programmes, appropriate for the age level of late starters, and accelerated programmes;
- link education programmes with skills training and/or earning opportunities for children in their early teens.

Chapter 7
Twa access to education

The Burundian community with the least access to education has been the Twa people or *Batwa*. Sindayigama states “discrimination practised against the Batwa was certainly the greatest shame of Rwanda and Burundi”.[58] The point has been made many times that the Belgians brought their cultural baggage to Burundi, with the metropolitan Wallon versus Flemish feuds still fresh in mind, and possible contamination of racism from its Nazi neighbour in the 1920s-1930s, as Sindayigaya observes. “The Twa [became] the most excluded of all excluded people in Burundi.” They “had no access to schools” and “the rare Twa children who managed to get into school had problems all the time with the other children”. This put an end to their attempts at integration. Burundians often quote the story of the sole Twa, Stanislas Mashini, who advanced to the level of headmaster, in Makebuko-Gitega. He was among those accused of massacres following the assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993 and was executed on 31 July 1997. Significantly, his wife was included among the new parliamentary appointments of 1998 (Reychler *et al*., 1999: 59). In order to understand Twa exclusion from school, a brief overview is given, an analysis of the change in the lives of the Twa during the last century and an account of their current access to education.

An introduction to the Twa or the Batwa

The Twa people are part of the quarter million pygmy peoples stretching across central Africa from Burundi to Cameroon. They have always been estimated as less than 1 per cent of the total population in Burundi and Rwanda – which would put their number in Burundi at approximately 70,000. Recent estimates speak of as many as 2 per cent (about 150,000) or as few as 70-87,000 across Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda and CAR. A 2003 UNICEF document reports a figure of 52,000 in Burundi, which will be used in this study (Mwebembezi, 2004: 1; Golden and Edgerton, 2003: 2; Nditije’s report for UNICEF, 2003: 11).

58. Sindayigaya (1998: 32-34) also notes that the Kirundi and Kinyarwanda languages classify the noun for the Twa as belonging to an object-class of nouns rather than the human-class.

Whatever their numbers, Twa participation in the social mainstream, and in political and national decision-making, is low in all these countries. In Burundi, there was only one Twa in the 2002 national Parliament. By early 2005 there were three members of the community in the national Senate, including one Twa woman.

The social context of the Twa

Burundi clans have always included the Twa, as have the Rwanda clans. In this sense, the Twa have never been a people apart. In the past, the semi-nomadic Twa regularly exchanged their pottery and forest products for the agricultural and livestock products of the Hutu and Tutsi herders and farmers, in similar fashion to the exchanges between the Ogiek honey-gathering forest dwellers and the settled Kikuyu farmers in Kenya. There seems to have been interaction at weddings and at the investiture of *abashingantahe* (community elders). However, it is also reported that, in the main, the Twa lived separately: "no one ever went to visit a Twa family at a time of bereavement; no one went to congratulate a Twa family on the birth of a child"; "inter-marriage was forbidden"; there was "no exchange of visits"; and "people don't share what they have with the Twa" (Nditije, 2003: 1, 27 and 33; Mwebembezi, 2004: 1). One explanation for the infrequent interaction may simply be that the Twa lived in the forest, at a distance from non-Twa, were content to stay there and that the non-Twa simply did not know about the births and deaths among the Twa, and vice versa. The physical distance between the habitation of the Twa and their nearest neighbours could explain a psychological or social distance, according to Nditije, but not necessarily a negative separateness. The relative prosperity of some Twa in Bururi, Makamba and Mwaro and the fact that they had acquired some livestock and begun to adopt the lifestyle of the area, might explain the increasing exchange of invitations to family occasions.[59] The practice of eating and drinking apart at functions, imposed by the non-Twa, is declining, a practice which most humiliated the Twa (Nditije, 2003: 30).

As hunter-gatherers, the preferred habitat of the Twa was the forest, where they were healthy, content and almost entirely self-sufficient. But, various forces have pulled them out of the forest during the last century. In Burundi there is little forest cover left and warring factions have, in

59. In the same provinces, for example, Mwaro, there is little/no social interaction between low-income earners among the Twa and the other groups, and a continuing strong sense of discrimination (Nditije, 2003: 35).

the last decade, intruded into those last remaining forests. Currently, the Twa live intermingled with the other peoples of Burundi, mainly in the northern provinces of Cibitoke and Kirundo, also in Karusi and Gitega, and even in urban areas (Nditije, 2003: 30, 11). The Twa have not lost their identity or their culture. However, since colonial times they have been stigmatized, placed by the Belgian authorities on the lowest rung of the social hierarchy they created, and excluded from education. "[M]isrepresentations of the Pygmies have had devastating effects upon their populations" over the last century (Golden and Edgerton, 2003: 1). Nditije, author of a recent comprehensive report on the Burundi Twa, noted that: "We all have very deeply rooted prejudices against the Twa", implying that it was an issue he had to continually be aware of in 2003 when supervizing research assistants in the field. He refers in his study to continuing discriminatory practices directed at the Twa (Nditije, 2003: 8, 30). Moreover, during the recent conflict in the region, the Twa seem to have been the most exploited community, suffering the recurrent massacres as "both killers and victims", defending to the death their non-Twa landowners and employers, of whatever political persuasion, and accused of sympathizing with one side or another. This has led to increased social distance between the Twa and non-Twa in Karusi Province, for example (Golden and Edgerton, 2003: 3; Nditije, 2003: 29). In sum, "without the availability of traditional or state resources, the Batwa became the most vulnerable and the most easily exploited population during the conflicts of the 1990s" (Golden and Edgerton, 2003: 3).

Health

The transition from the forest to living in mixed settlements has made the Twa more vulnerable to disease, which is compounded by poverty. Yaws, for example, is a highly contagious bacterium, which seriously threatens the health of Twa in the Great Lakes Region. In one area "nearly half of the 6,000 person Twa population was infected". The disease is easily prevented by access to clean water and soap, and treatable with antibiotics but due to extreme poverty, the Twa do not have access to such resources. The average number of children per household is over six, higher than the national average. Maternal and child mortality rates are high and HIV has made significant inroads into the community (Golden, 2004: 1).

Livelihoods

> **"For us, owning a little plot of land means that you are a full citizen of Burundi."**
>
> Mwebembezi (2004: 3)

Forests have been dwindling in Burundi and Rwanda in the last century and, to add to this problem, in the wake of poorly conceived conservation programmes in the 1970s and 1980s, governments in the region forced the Twa out of their remaining forests. State compensation promised was not forthcoming and the community had to resort to settling on "tiny plots of land" allocated to them by landowners at the forest edge. In return, they were to provide "anywhere from four to five days weekly of unpaid labour" per family (Golden, 2004: 1). About 30 per cent of the Twa today are reported as engaged in agriculture, growing mainly beans and cassava, with some maize, bananas and sweet potatoes, but it is not clear whether this is paid in cash, in kind or unpaid labour. If they have land, Twa farmers own 10 to 50 *ares*, which is one tenth and one half of a hectare, respectively, insufficient for producing enough food for a family (Nditije, 2003: 14-19). Successful farming in Burundi has always depended on mixed agro-pastoral activity, producing fertilizer for crops. Very few Twa have livestock, which partly explains their low crop yields. Less than 20 per cent of Twa now work in pottery making. It is an increasingly precarious economic activity due to problems with

> **Just a house!**
>
> **Twa families are so poor, they not only have no land on which to build a home, they can't even afford the simplest building materials. Once families have a house, they can become more self-sufficient in every aspect of their lives. Action Batwa helps families own their own land, start small farms and animal husbandry, send their children to school; and interact with local communities and officials that have not traditionally acknowledged them. Christine, the eight year old daughter of Mbogo who is a new farmer in the Action Batwa programme, used to spend nights hunkered down, outside, on a shop verandah, sheltering from the driving rain, before running to the family's wet, makeshift shelter in the mornings. For her, the effect of having a decent place to live in is very straightforward: "Now I am happy. I can sleep at night like other people. How good it is to have a house!"**
>
> Adapted from Action Batwa/CRS (2004)

obtaining the raw material and with markets: "I can't get clay here, and even if I could, customers are becoming rare", explained a woman potter (Monique Sinzobakwira reporting to *Africa News*, cited by Golden, 2004: 1). The economic implications for women are particularly serious since up to 70 per cent of them are potters and earnings from pottery continue to decline. Twa now work as day labourers, domestics, or in other unskilled menial jobs. Half of the respondents in the 2003 study report having no source of income at all (Nditije, 2003: 14). Eighty per cent have resorted to begging for survival.

In sum, the Twa are mostly landless, lack marketable skills for urban living, and have little access to public services and community assistance. Their self-esteem is reported to be low which creates a vicious circle of anticipated and repeated failure. "Fewer than 2 per cent of the Batwa population are landowners" in the Great Lakes region (Golden and Edgerton, 2003: 6). This means they are among the poorest of the poor. The fundamental issue of landlessness is underlined by both the Hon. Nicayenzi, the Twa Member of Parliament, and by Action Batwa in their analysis of community needs. These days, there are significant numbers of Twa who refuse the discriminatory treatment meted out to them. They are asking for respect and are claiming their rightful access to national resources (Nicayenzi, 2005; Mwebembezi, 2004: 1; and Nditije, 2003: 37).

Education

In the past

The Twa hardly figured in the development of education in Ruanda-Urundi: "the missionaries systematically neglected to school and evangelize the Twa" (Nditije, 2003: 1). "At the state level little has been done to improve access to education for Batwa children" (Golden, 2004: 1). As late as 1989-90 in Rwanda, there were 0.3 per cent Twa children in first grade and 0.2 per cent in sixth grade, that is, less than one quarter of the Twa children who should have been in school at the time (Obura, 2003: 44).

Twa in Burundi have felt neglected by the state during the civil war and the conflicts of the last decade: "There is no campaign to get our children to school. No one knows where we are living. We are totally ignored ... In the eyes of the local authorities, we don't even exist. The missionaries work with us [in some areas], but not the state." But overall, they feel neglected by everyone, by the state, by churches and by the NGOs.

> **Braving School**
>
> **The Mutwa child, already traumatized by extreme poverty, has nothing to fall back on to help him in the difficult task of coping with school. He has nothing to eat, no clothes, nothing to write with. He is riddled with inferiority complexes. When he thinks of school, he sees himself surrounded by other children pointing fingers at him, with scornful attitudes, full of stereotypical notions about him. He would rather miss out on school than endure such a harsh experience.**
>
> Mwebembezi (2004: 2)

In the present

There is no official policy of discrimination against the Twa in the education system. At the same time, there is no evidence that the national fee waiver policy, in force until the abolition of fees in late 2005, gave any specific priority to Twa families, despite the fact that the Twa are among the poorest of the poor in Burundi, or that Twa children benefit in any particular way from the scheme. There is no national policy on Twa education or programme. A total of six Twa have reached tertiary level in the whole community and 167 have accessed secondary school. The rate of illiteracy is estimated at about 80 per cent among the Twa as compared with the national rate of 63 per cent (Nditije, 2003).

Until the abolition of fees, Twa families could not afford Burundi's fee-paying schools but, contrary to popular belief, there is growing demand for education in the community. The Twa are aware of the need for literacy, qualifications and marketable skills so as to enter the mainstream of Burundi society. This is borne out by the experience of the UNICEF research team in 2003, who found some Twa unwilling to respond to survey questions, saying they wanted action from the authorities, "free and total schooling of their children", rather than yet another analytical report (Nditije, 2003: 8).

Enrolments

Tentative estimates put the number of Twa children aged 5-17 years, at just under 20,000.[60] Children of primary age among the Twa, if calculated on the basis of the regular percentage of any population likely to be of that age, and taking the total Twa population to be approximately 52,000, could number about 10,000. There is a motley set of statements

60. This represents 37 per cent of the Twa population, as reported by Nditije (2003: 13) and is lower than the national figure of 45 per cent.

on Batwa enrolment rates. The conclusion of this study is that we still do not know the total number in school or the enrolment ratio.[61] *Figure 7.1* below indicates Twa population figures by province. Pending a more thorough statistical compilation, the "GER data" should be considered as indications of comparative magnitude by province rather than reliable figures.

Figure 7.1 Batwa population and GER by province, *circa* 2001



Source: Nditije, 2003.

Figure 7.1 indicates Twa population concentrations by province against the Twa GER (gross enrolment ratio). The provinces most populated by the Twa (Cibitoke, Karusi, Kirundo and Gitega, in that order) show the lowest enrolment levels. Twa GER is highest in Makamba, followed by Ruyigi and Bururi, and very low in Gitega. Comparing overall provincial GER with Twa GER by province, Makamba, the best-enrolled province for Twa, ranks fourth on general GER. The Ruyigi Twa are well enrolled but the province has a low GER in general (Nditije, 2003: 40, 41, 44). Nditije explains these erratic findings by noting that Twa school enrolment is largely dependent on the presence of development projects specifically targeting the Twa people and is an indication of the lack of support to the Twa from public authorities. His point is that, without NGO programmes, hardly any Twa would be in school at all.

61. Nditije estimates that in 2003 (a) almost all Twa children were out of school; (b) then produces a figure of 6,563 Batwa in primary school, 167 in secondary and six in tertiary courses; (c) translating the first into a 12.5 per cent GER (Nditije, 2003: 3, 39, 40). All these statements need revision. See *Appendix D*.

Girls' education

Significantly, no data have been collected on girls' education among the Twa. Nditije estimates that, despite protestations across the country that no one discriminates against Twa girls, there must be few Twa girls in school given (a) the general national gender disparity in enrolments and (b) the labour distribution patterns by sex in the community and the reported unemployment levels. More females work as potters than males, 70 as compared with 17 per cent, respectively, and in agriculture, 47 per cent compared with 24 per cent. This leaves boys with more time for school than girls (Nditije, 2003: 54).

Continuing obstacles to schooling

Despite the growing demand for schooling, even when the family can afford it, Twa children are reluctant to go to school, fearing the treatment they will get from non-Twa pupils and teachers, as a Twa girl in Rwanda recently reported.[62] In Burundi, the Twa anticipate trouble from their peers first and foremost. Incidents of Twa children being harassed and bullied at school include: name-calling and refusal to sit next to Twa in the classroom; and some children go as far as tearing up their exercise books (Nditije, 2003: 46, 54). One major issue is clothing; and another is lack of money for soap. Twa children feel that their poor clothes mark them out from the other children at school: "They treat us as different because of what we are wearing ... We can't go to their houses if they invite us, dressed in these rags ... How can I wash the only clothes I have? And what will I wear if I wash these ones? They say we are dirty and they don't want to come near us" (Nditije, 2003: 21). The Twa and other poor children often arrive at school having had no breakfast and they wait till evening to eat the sole meal of the day. The Norwegian Refugee Council set up a school feeding programme in one area, but this is far from meeting needs across the nation.

In addition to acute poverty, which results in:

- hunger, leading to lack of concentration in school;
- lack of clothing;
- lack of writing materials for school;
- low self-esteem relative to the other children.

62. "People of that area do not like my people. At school I was often beaten for nothing at all by the teachers, and insulted", Juliette said of her school experience in a community near her home in Rwanda (Obura, 2005: 44).

External obstacles to schooling for the Twa include:

- distance from school;[63]
- low parental expectations on performance and retention in school.

Twa parents routinely watch their children drop out of school in the first three grades, particularly after grade one, and have no expectation that the children will reach the sixth grade or pass the primary leaving examination. Of course, they know about the difficult social context in schools. This in turn affects the children's expectations and performance at school.

In-school factors acting against the interests of the Twa children are listed below in the box. In addition, there is a disturbing curricular issue. Like Hutu and Tutsi, the Twa have internalized myths about the origins of the Burundi people, which are now shown to have no basis in fact, but which have led to divisiveness and recriminations in the society. Indignant at the treatment meted out to them, Twa have said: "We know we are the first inhabitants of Burundi. We lived here long before the Hutu and the Tutsi. But we are considered as nobodies. They have taken our land and now we have nothing. It is as if we are not considered as Burundi citizens.

"They will have to give us back our land". Such sentiments indicate that, like everyone else, the Twa have accepted the simplistic, conflictual and probably erroneous accounts of Burundi's origins. It will be important to spread the findings of recent national and international historical research which indicate that there is no way of telling which peoples first arrived in Burundi at the dawn of time. This is a fortunate finding, since it binds all Burundi peoples together if it is acknowledged that there is no 'indigenous' people, nor any invading usurper. Attention could then be focused on the restitution of land to the Twa after recent forceful eviction from the forests (Nditije, 2003: 37).

In conclusion, those working simultaneously on the political, social and economic development of the Twa, in conjunction with education, have chosen a sound approach.

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63. Nditije (2003: 8, 41) notes that some children have to walk 5 kms to school and that the more remote Twa communities could not be reached during the 2003 survey. The problem of distance from school was recognized by the Burundi PPD project (*Projet des plus démunis*, Project for the Poorest of the Poor), which deliberately located new schools near Twa settlements.

Obstacles within the school

- Head teachers do not expect Twa children to continue schooling beyond third grade.
- Twa children have poor clothing.
- Many have no writing materials.
- Twa children are quiet and timid in class (passive).
- Teachers say Twa children who join in playground games are often aggressive and pick fights, so the other children prefer not to play with them.
- Twa children speak with an accent: teachers say they do not speak clearly and have a poor grasp of vocabulary. The other children laugh at them when they first come to school and tease them for speaking Kitwa (the Twa language, which does not exist) but Hutu and Tutsi are never accused of speaking Kihutu or Kitutsi.
- Teachers say they know Twa children less than the other children.
- Teachers appear to be 'indifferent' to the Twa.
- Teachers say they give no particular attention to Twa children.
- Teachers report giving more input to clever children, who they say do not include the Twa.
- Twa children have low achievement rates.

In conclusion, the school environment in Burundi does not provide the minimum conditions for learning for Twa children. School adds to their feeling of social rejection, of inferiority, incompetence and vulnerability. The Twa child then reacts with aggression or withdraws from society.

Nditije (2003: 56)

Initial action in favour of the Twa

Over the last decade, NGOs have been set up specifically to work with the Twa, such as *Première Fondation de la Nation* in Rwanda. In Burundi, there is the *Projet des plus démunis* (PPD) in one or two villages, supported by Sweden and run under the Pentecostal Church; a school feeding project by the Norwegian Refugee Council; Action Aid, with UCEDD (*Union chrétienne pour le développement des déshérités*) in Gitega and with a church diocese in Ruyigi (Nditije, 2003: 50, 52, 64); and Action Batwa in Gitega Province in collaboration with the White Fathers (Mwebembezi, 2004: 2). UNIPROBA (*Unissons-nous pour la promotion des Batwa*) was founded by the Twa, as a focal point of Twa aspirations. It includes the Twa political leaders, graduates and

tertiary students. Action Batwa has a strong advocacy programme for the restitution of land to the Twa. They and others have been acquiring land for the Twa; improving housing; working in agricultural and livestock development; employment; education, including school construction near the new Twa homesteads, peace education, human rights education, values education and civic education; health, HIV prevention; and promoting active Twa participation in the political life of the country. Action Batwa has also assisted other acutely poor non-Twa families in the vicinity, in an attempt to strengthen social integration. Appreciation of Twa culture, such as dancing, arts and crafts, is spreading in the country, and in the region. Further, according to national NGO informants, the recent move by Uganda to train Twa as guides in national parks has given a modern, positive image to the traditional Twa forest skills and has gained new respect for the Twa.

Action Batwa's support to 476 school children in 2000 grew to 1,760 in 2003, providing school fees, uniform, writing materials, soap and sometimes eye-glasses. Action Batwa also makes a point of sensitizing teachers in schools attended by Twa to provide a welcoming atmosphere for the Batwa children and the teachers have, in their turn, started to influence the non-Twa pupils. The impact is positive. Twa children are now feeling more comfortable in school, attend regularly, and their relationships with other children are improving. The local authorities and churches are beginning to understand the need for supporting the Twa community and are moving into action. Action Batwa includes other poor families in their programmes.

Support to Batwa secondary education

Action Batwa has opened a hostel for fifth and sixth grade Twa pupils in Gitega, providing free food, light for studying at night, extra tuition and help with homework so that the children will have a better chance of passing their secondary admission examination.

Mwebembezi (2004: 6)

When Twa children go to school, are baptized, go to church like other Burundians, and live nearer non-Twa neighbours, it leads to more social interaction. This, together with the visible improvement in Twa access to housing and other essential materials for modern living, is contributing to increased social acceptance. Intermarriage now occurs, particularly in Makamba and Kirundo Provinces where there are signs of improved

income levels among the Twa. The ability of a Twa bridegroom to gather sufficient dowry for a non-Twa bride seems to be the determining factor (Nditije, 2003: 33). These experiences indicate that social integration will depend on improvements in the economic status of the Twa.

Conclusion and recommendations

Action Batwa makes a strong plea for support to the education of Twa, which they see as a necessary prerequisite for the community to demand their rights and ensure attention to their problems. The organization reasons that education will promote the societal aspirations of the Twa and will provide creative solutions to the new problems they face, helping the community to help itself and to regain self-determination. In short, education programmes for the advancement of the Twa need a two-pronged approach: first, targeting the Twa directly, giving them the confidence and tools to succeed as agents of their own development; and, second, addressing the wider society, to get positive support and co-operation for the integration and development of the Twa.

Those who have worked with the Twa agree that they first need land, and then housing and income generating projects to enable them to acquire the bare material essentials of life, before they can face the challenge of putting their children in school. And the children agree (Mwebembezi, 2004, and Nditije, 2003: 50-51).

The Twa people have been forced out of their forests, through no choice of their own, to turn to agriculture and urban living. The agents of change have included direct state intervention, modernization and conflict in the region. It is now the obligation of the state to step in more actively to give the Twa access to essential resources and help them acquire the skills of twenty-first century citizens. While the assistance of NGOs can be helpful, it is up to governments to draw up policies, provide direct support and monitor the progress of the Twa peoples, taking the lead role.

The conclusion of this study is that the Twa community suffered from discrimination during colonial times and under post-independence regimes but that the aftermath of the 1993 crisis has brought new attention to the needs of the community. The Twa have borne a treble burden: (a) social discrimination during colonial and present times, (b) forced landlessness; and (c) the experience of being caught in the crossfire of the recent conflict. The result has been that Twa children were excluded from schools in the past and are almost totally absent from schools today,

except in a few areas with programmes specifically targetting the Twa. It will be one of Burundi's peace challenges to reverse the many types of discrimination directed at the Twa for almost a century; to restore land to them and access to education; and to ensure that they become, once again, valued and strong members of the nation.

Recommendations:

- The state has the prime obligation to develop and lead policy and programmes to improve the well being of the Twa community and to promote partnership to do this. It is also the agent to lead sensitization campaigns on the issue, addressing the non-Twa.
- The next national census should identify and count the Twa, if the community agrees, in order to provide a tool for planning and monitoring development assistance to the community.
- Integrate Twa education programmes, specifically targeting the Twa community, into overall development projects, which provide them with land and aim to raise income levels, in order to address the myriad poverty-related problems which affect the schooling of Twa children.
- Increase the number of projects specifically targeting the Twa community.
- Provide free primary and secondary education to the Twa and cost-sharing secondary education in time, as the income levels of individual families improve.
- While developing a nation-wide Twa education programme, start with the most highly populated Twa provinces (Cibitoke, Karusi, Kirundo and Gitega).
- School environments should be transformed to provide a supportive social environment for Twa children; sensitization programmes for heads, teachers and non-Twa school children, with the support of Burundi school radio, Nderagakura.
- The curriculum and textbooks need radical change, to depict the Twa in a positive light and as stakeholders in the future of the nation, and to incorporate recent findings and analyses of Burundi history, which promote national cohesion. The 1994 Burundi Peace Education Programme needs revision (Obura, 1996).
- Teacher education needs to promote participatory learning for all, supporting special attention for all social groups and individual learners who need it (such as girls, Twa, displaced children, returnees, the very poor, orphans and other vulnerable children).

Chapter 8
Education for Burundian refugees in Tanzania

This chapter gives an overview of the education programmes offered to Burundian refugees in Tanzania up to 2003. It tells the story from the refugee perspective and notes the exiles' expectations of schooling once they repatriate to Burundi, after more than a decade in the camps.

Tanzania's experience of hosting refugees

There may be as many as one million refugees in total in Tanzania today, of whom almost half a million were UNHCR assisted refugees in the western Tanzania camps in late 2003 (UNHCR, 2003*d*: 1). Others, from previous refugee movements in the late 1950s and in the early 1970s, live in the Tabora and Rukwa areas in resettlement camps and amongst Tanzanian villagers: in 2003 "Government figures indicated that there are 170,000 Burundi refugees living in settlements and 300,000 in Tanzanian villages" (UNHCR, 2003*b*: 7). The latter figure is sometimes disputed but commonly quoted. Still other refugees are legally and illegally resident in Dar es Salaam. In the camps, Burundians represented 68 per cent of the refugee camp population at the end of 2003 or over 300,000 (*Table 8.2*). One third were Congolese; only 24 Rwandan refugees remained; less than 0.1 per cent of the total refugee population were Somalis, in camps in eastern Tanzania (UNHCR, 2003*b*: 2). This gives a total of approximately 800,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania at the end of the study period (2003). They include assisted refugees in camps and unassisted and sometimes settled refugees outside camps.

The Tanzanian camps described in this chapter are not necessarily typical of the experience of the Burundian refugees in the Congo, Uganda, Kenya or elsewhere. These camps provide an example of a successful refugee education programme, a wide-ranging programme for up to half a million refugees and, for these reasons, it is the one documented here.

When discussing refugee education in the Tanzanian camps, it is important to take note of the geopolitical and the historical context of refugee presence in the country, and to appreciate the perspective of the host government and the local host populations where the refugee camps

are located. These factors have an indirect bearing on educational service provision for Burundians in the camps.

The latest significant wave of Burundian refugees arrived in Tanzania after the killings of October 1993. First, the fleeing population made for DRC, a Francophone neighbour but, in 1996, due to rising conflict and war in the eastern DRC, they fled a second time, to the Kigoma and Kagera Regions of northwestern Tanzania. This area saw the greatest and most rapid movement of refugees ever in Africa. First came the Rwandans in 1994 to Ngara in the Kagera Region, fleeing genocide and the aftermath of genocide. Then came the Burundians in 1996. Tanzania bore the brunt of this second wave in as short a time span as two years. At that point there were over one million refugees in Tanzania. The country is still reeling today from the massive influxes of 1994-1996.

The 1990s Burundi refugee population added to the earlier influx of Burundian refugees of 1972 who settled among Tanzanians, in villages near Rukwa and in the Tabora region, and who then spread across the country looking for employment opportunities, particularly in Dar es Salaam (Sommers, 2001).

Tanzania is not only one of the poorest countries in the world, numbered among the least developed countries (LDCs), but it is also among the most heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). A second astounding fact is that there were estimated to be as many as two million orphaned children in Tanzania in 2002, "and still rising" (UNICEF Tanzania, 2002*b*: 4), while HIV prevalence rates were not declining. Yet Tanzania has had to bear Africa's largest refugee population of the continent, over a million, in a host population of approximately 30 million, and continues to host about half a million assisted refugees today. This is accounted the largest number of refugees being hosted in any country in Africa. The refugee camp of Ngara was once the second largest city in Tanzania, with over half a million refugees. Tanzania is one of the exceptionally peaceable countries of Africa, though underdeveloped. The reward for stable government has been the unplanned, massive influx of refugees searching for a safe haven, which has taken its toll on the hosting capacity of the country.

The relationship of the host country to refugees

At one time, during the first three decades of independence, Tanzania had had an open door policy for refugees and asylum seekers, particularly from southern Africa and the frontline states, and observers were quick

to emphasize the traditional and magnanimous hospitality of Tanzania. It was President Nyerere's expressed policy to aid asylum seekers from apartheid regimes and to contribute to the downfall of oppressive and colonial regimes in southern Africa. Refugees from South Africa and from Mozambique even had their own educational institutions in the country supported by Tanzania. However, the profile of refugees coming into Tanzania changed by the mid-1990s and patience started to wear thin in Tanzanian political circles as one massive refugee influx was followed in quick succession by another. Tanzania was pained by the experience of 1993 when refugees who had apparently integrated with the local population and accepted Tanzanian nationality as far back as the 1970s, suddenly upped, burned down facilities built for them by the Tanzanian Government, and returned home to Rwanda, revoking their Tanzanian nationality. Tanzanian foreign policy underwent a change in the post-Nyerere era, in 1996, the new aim being to sustain good relations with all neighbours, whatever the regime, in order to enhance Tanzanian security and to boost national economic development. The unconditional welcome and the open door policy of integration for refugees were replaced by one of temporary asylum, to be followed when feasible by repatriation. To firm up the new perspective, the Refugee Act of 1998 was reviewed and a modified Refugee Policy produced in 2003.

Table 8.1 indicates the significantly high refugee populations per district in western Tanzania in recent years.

Table 8.1 Four districts hosting major proportions of refugee populations (assisted by UN agencies) in western Tanzania

Districts hosting refugees	Host population	Refugee population	% refugee population
Kibondo	255,000	134,500	35
Ngara	223,000	83,600	27
Kasulu	472,000	159,800	25
Kigoma Rural	406,000	90,300	18
Total	1,356,000	468,200	26

Source: UNICEF Annual Reports, Tanzania 2000-2002; UNHCR Country Reports, Tanzania, 2000-2003; CSFM, 2000 and 2003).

Refugees formed 18 to 35 per cent of the district population in the four northwestern districts of Ngara, Kibondo, Kasulu and Kigoma.

Kibondo hosted the largest proportion, with 35 per cent. In early 2004 there were 12 refugee camps spread through northwestern Tanzania, listed in *Table 8.2*.

Table 8.2 Western Tanzania camp populations, end December 2003

	Nationality of refugees	Camps	Total population	%
Kasulu Area			***252,237***	
1	Burundi	Mtabila I	17,843	4
2	Burundi	Mtabila II	44,462	9
3	Burundi	Muyovosi	39,835	8
4	Congolese	Lugufu I	57,689	12
5	Congolese	Lugufu II	33,954	7
6	Congolese	Nyarugusu	58,454	12
Kibondo Area			***129,219***	
7	Burundi	Mtendeli	41,098	9
8	Burundi	Kanembwa	19,135	4
9	Burundi	Karago	24,119	5
10	Mixed population	Mkugwa	2,047	0.4
11	Burundi	Nduta	42,820	9
Kagera Area			***94,651***	
12	Burundi	Lukole A	57,153	12
13	Burundi	Lukole B	37,498	8
14	Burundi	Kitali	0	0
TOTAL			**479,437**	
Transit Centres			133 (46 Burundi)	
GRAND TOTAL			**479,570**	

Source: UNICEF Annual Reports, Tanzania 2000-2002; UNHCR Country Reports, Tanzania, 2000-2003.
Note: Kitali Camp is closed and Mtabila Camps I and II are often counted as one camp.

By 2002 there was little sign of real progress in the Burundi peace talks but there were mounting accusations by the Burundi Government that Tanzania was assisting Burundian rebels, and a steady stream of refugees from Burundi and Congo still coming over the borders. High ranking Tanzanian politicians started to complain of the continued refugee presence, of the "severe economic and social burden on the country, which threatened to reverse the gains so far made by [Tanzania]" and of "increased insecurity and depletion of resources of an already impoverished country", as the Tanzanian President put it in January 2002. Refugees were accounted "responsible for the slow pace of development in the [western] region" forcing the Tanzanian Government to spend more on security than on development and "diverting its meagre resources" to security and away from development (CSFM, Dar es Salaam, 2003: 4-5). Refugee presence was described as a negative experience for Tanzania, on five counts, regarding:

- threats to external and internal peace and security;
- environmental degradation;
- destruction of the physical and social infrastructure;
- hampering socio-economic development;
- an excessive administrative burden at local level.

It is significant that it was nationals, Tanzanian scholars, who investigated the accusations. They found that the presence of a large number of refugees had not been an unmitigated negative experience for the western regions. These areas were described as suffering from "chronic under-development ... attributed to the remoteness of these districts and a historical lack of investment in physical and social infrastructure ... having among the worst socio-economic indicators" in the country during the first three decades of independence.[64] The investigators refuted the claim that refugees had caused long-term damage in Tanzania. They explained that it was not the refugee presence in the Kigoma-Kagera regions, which increased insecurity and caused the forced displacement of some local communities but the proximity of the area to Burundi and the DRC, to the areas of conflict (CSFM, 2003: 55). Crime statistics for the region showed that armed robbery and murder were committed proportionately by host populations and refugees, and in some cases refugee populations accounted for less crime than the host population

64. United Nations (2003*b*: 15, 32-34) uses data published in 2002 echoing negative perceptions of refugee impact in the region, while the Tanzanian report quotes more recent data.

(e.g. 3 per cent of murders in Kagera in 2000) (CSFM, 2003: 15). Environmental degradation of the mid 1990s had been successfully reversed by well-focused environmental protection and conservation programmes, and poaching decreased. However, biodiversity suffered in the area and it is likely that some indigenous species have been lost (CSFM, 2003: 17-22). Roads, airstrips, bridges and other communication infrastructure, which were initially destroyed by sudden overuse, were improved. "Overall, the infrastructure has been improved", the local community said, although local residents would have preferred more focus on rural roads rather than on airstrips for ferrying refugee supplies (CSFM, 2003: 26-27). Initially overburdened health services reportedly increased and the health indicators, for example, in Ngara in 2000, were "well above national average", for Tanzania.[65] Household access to safe water increased significantly (CSFM, 2003: 40).

Primary school examination pass rates improved threefold among Tanzanian school children in the area, indicating increased quality of educational opportunity and, between 1998 and 2002, secondary school enrolments almost doubled in Ngara District.[66] The district moved from 112th of 117 districts ranked nationally on educational performance, to ninth, and from the lowest ranked region to the second, due to increased support from the government and partner agencies. These included, for example, a Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) investment of approximately US$40,000, US$115,000 grant by UNHCR to a secondary school in Ngara, and the extension of UNICEF support to basic education in western Tanzania, including teacher development, the improvement of sanitary facilities, community mobilization for education, and the introduction of the alternative education programme, COBET, for older children out of school. Primary enrolments increased to 97 per cent in Kibondo District in 2003, with a completion rate of 85 per cent (CSFM, 2003: 32-34). A vast array of partners became involved in support to education in these northwestern regions, "in accordance with longterm plans [and] district and national goals", since development analysis pointed to the need for special attention for refugee hosting areas. It was largely due to the

65. Maternal mortality rate is 114/100,000 live births in Ngara, to 200-400 nationally; ratio of doctors per person 1:32,000 in Ngara, 1:23,000 nationally (CSFM, 2003: 30).
66. While Ngara and Kasulu had very low school enrolment rates in 1998, of 29 and 40 per cent, respectively, the interventions of external agencies and NGOs in these districts had significant impact by 2003 (UNICEF Annual Report, 1998, and CSFM, 2003).

publicity resulting from the refugee presence, which put Kigoma-Kagera onto the national and the international development map as never before (CSFM, 2003: 36). As a consequence, many development donors and agencies working in Tanzania were encouraged to support populations hosting refugees in the area.

The arrival of the refugees in the region had a negative impact, however, on the local administration, police, judiciary and the prisons, despite support and inputs from partners. A great deal of time had to be devoted to refugee related matters, even though the institutions benefitted, in terms of increased vehicle fleet, construction, equipment and supplies from development partners (CSFM, 2003: 38). The expansion of business and marketing opportunities led to more economic activity in the region. The influx of Tanzanians from other parts of the country seeking new business opportunities and employment was seen as a mixed blessing in the area but the augmented local and central government earnings were an undisputed benefit, as was the availability of cheap refugee labour (CSFM, 2003: 51).

In conclusion, while the unplanned intrusion of refugees in the mid 1990s initially caused social and environmental damage in the districts of north western Tanzania, the road infrastructure, the general environment and the social indicators are now much improved and these districts are now more developed than some other districts in the country. In addition to this success story, Tanzania is one of the few countries with a refugee policy in Africa, updated in 2003, which includes guidelines for sector support to refugee education.

Lesson learned

The hosting of refugees can be beneficial to host populations if specially focused national and international development programmes accompanying refugee programmes are targeted at the area, with the long-term, sustainable well-being of the host areas in mind.

Education in the camps

Refugee initiatives

At first the Government of Tanzania did not permit formal education of any kind in the refugee camps, due to fears that refugees would never repatriate if a viable schooling system was established for them in the camps. Children gathered in groups under trees in what was initially and euphemistically called *children's activity centres*. They even acquired an acronym in camp parlance, namely CACs. Despite the well-nigh impossible conditions for organizing activities for thousands of children in the open air, in a region of heavy and frequent rainfall, where the red earth first turns into heavy, deep slushy mud then billowing rusty dust, refugee leaders realized that the gatherings and *centres* could become embryonic schools, with or without the permission of the host government. Accordingly they set about transforming the so-called play activities into structured centres. They put out an appeal for trained teachers amongst themselves to come forward. They then counted and

> My first glimpse of the land at Kigoma port was green. The road wound up into the lush fertile hills and thinly populated areas of Kasulu and Kibondo, punctuated here and there by small maize plots, cassava, beans, and all manner of fruit trees. The overwhelming impression was that the area had expanses of underutilized rich, fertile land. Before the refugee influx, the area was known to be remote, neglected by development schemes and isolated due to poor roads from the more dynamic eastern areas of Tanzania. Into this land came the Burundi refugees around 1996, after the massive wave of Rwandans into Ngara, Kagera, further north, in 1994. The refugee camps lay hidden, camouflaged by the greenery, a few kilometres off the main north-south all-weather road from the Ugandan border to Kigoma Town by the lakeside. Before the refugee camps were set up, the road had been impassable during the rains. The land was well forested, especially around Mtendeli Camp, with tall trees shading and hiding the refugee houses below. In some of the camps, refugees had a little land around their houses for cultivation but in the newer camps land per family had been reduced. Although it can get proverbially dry and dusty in the area, the author saw the camps in rainy, fresh, healthy weather. Refugee houses were brick and thatch; some were brick and *mabati* (corrugated iron roofing); each surrounded by its maize patch, not crowded together as in most refugee camps around the world.
>
> *Source*: The author

deployed them on a voluntary basis to start teaching the home country primary curriculum, still 'under the trees'.

The Burundian (and Congolese) refugees in Tanzania were relatively well educated compared with refugee populations in other countries in eastern Africa. Among them were significant numbers of trained primary and secondary teachers, seasoned education planners, and private sector managers who came forward to assist in structuring and organizing an education system for the camps. From 1997 when schools began to take shape – at first without the permission of the host government – both primary and secondary schools started to operate; and pre-schools were also organized. An effort was made to initiate some vocational education and skills programmes for small numbers of adolescents and young adults; and adult literacy classes began.

The significant points about the Burundi refugee camps are, first, that initiatives were started immediately by the refugee population themselves and, second, that a structured system was set up from the start, due to the existence of a managerial cadre in the camps with planning experience. A third characteristic is the manner in which secondary schools have been running in the camps from the beginning with little or no outside support. By 2000 the situation changed perceptibly, but the self-reliance of the refugees in the domain of education has stood them in good stead for sustaining efforts over nearly a decade, and in a situation where hopes for outside funding for secondary and tertiary levels have frequently been dashed. They know where to turn in times of hardship: they turn to themselves, to their new interest in education – as explained below – to their determination, and to the (extremely meagre) financial resources they have within their deprived refugee community. Even when food rations dipped below 40 per cent in 2002 and declined to precarious levels again in 2003, schools remained open. The only factor that has closed schools in the life of these camps was a meningitis outbreak, which closed schools for four months in 2002.

The Hutu and education

Observers explain the palpable resilience and perseverance of the Burundian refugees in their quest for schooling in the camps in the following terms. They note that, prior to independence, the Tutsi benefitted most from education in both Burundi and Rwanda. Then, contrasting Rwanda's post-independence history with Burundi's, the Hutu in Rwanda ensured that their children got proper access to schools for the

first time once they gained political power in the 1960s after decades of exclusion from schools in the colonial era, as noted in *Chapter 2*. In Burundi, the Hutu never held the reigns of power and discriminatory practices continued against them. They never accessed education in the same way as Tutsi under post-independence regimes or as the Rwandan Hutu. Since 1993, Burundian refugees, who are almost all Hutu, have looked for education in a way that is entirely new in Burundi Hutu experience. Access to education became the rallying cry in post-genocide Rwanda, for all peoples in the country. The new government realized that it was a political imperative to open schools *to all children of the nation*, regardless of their socio-cultural origins.[67] During the same last decade, the decade of conflict in Burundi, Burundians inside and outside the country have all come to appreciate the importance of education and have all been clamouring for education for their children.

Inside Burundi this is demonstrated by the upsurge of community junior secondary schools racing ahead of government planning. In the refugee camps it has provided the impetus for almost universal schooling at primary level and for a determined effort to establish and maintain quality secondary education in each camp, against all the odds. It is also the result of belated efforts by the UN agencies and NGOs in the camps and the growing realization that the provision of good secondary education in the camps boosts primary schooling.[68] All Burundians understand that to improve their lives, to have a guaranteed stake in the political future of their country, and participate in the power-brokering processes of national development, they must have schooling. The Burundian refugee experience has been an important stage in the process of lobbying agencies and donors on the necessity of supporting secondary school development in the future in refugee camps and backs up the point made elsewhere that conflict survivors have a lesson to teach international supporters: that it

67. The Rwandan education policy is a determinedly open door policy to right the wrongs of the past. However, it seems that, due to extreme poverty, and high opportunity costs, as many as 25 per cent of Rwandan children still could not access school by 2002. Social group discrimination had been replaced by income level discrimination, a feature common to most countries in the region. In 2003 Rwanda introduced fee-free education and reached a NER of 93 per cent.

68. One of the outcomes of this new recognition was the establishment, in 2000, under the patronage of the outgoing High Commissioner for Refugees, of the global Refugee Education Trust (RET), which aims to support post-primary education in refugee situations. RET injected a great deal of enthusiasm into the secondary schools in the refugee camps of Tanzania.

is vital to build up sector-wide educational activities in all post-conflict situations in contrast to the narrower perspective espoused by donors, who prefer to limit their support to formal primary education.[69]

UN support to education in the camps

UNHCR, benefiting from close collaboration with UNICEF – an atypical role for UNICEF which generally works with in-country nationals rather than directly with refugees – has been a champion for education in the camps.[70] The United Nations agencies made continual representations to the Government of Tanzania on the need for education services in the camps and finally succeeded in gaining permission for formal primary schooling.

Schools progressed from gathering children under the trees, to mud-and-pole thatched constructions, to *mabati* roofs, to unburnt bricks, and finally to burnt-brick walled *mabati*-roofed classrooms. To keep construction costs down and increase the rate of school expansion, UNICEF used earth flooring in the schools – the total cost was as low as US$23,000 for a school of 16 classrooms, a twelve-latrine block, a staff room, a head's office and a store (concrete floors in the three latter rooms) (Penina Sangiwa, personal communication, 9 February 2004). Schools are justifiably proud of this evolution from shade trees and flimsy structures to permanent buildings. One Education Development Centre in the camps made models of the progression of classroom construction, to commemorate it. As a secondary headmaster put it, emptying out his pockets as a graphic demonstration: "We started off under the trees, sitting on branches, without even a blackboard, and our school office was carried around in the pockets of the rags we school heads wore, which we called trousers at the time".

An assessment report of 1999 painted a very different picture: an "alarming scarcity of teaching/learning materials ... serious shortages of pupils' and teachers' books in Burundi camp schools". "Schools in all camps are on temporary structures. Most classrooms have no doors and windows and are just open ... The facilities such as desks and chairs are scarce making pupils learn in a very pathetic environment. Many

69. In conflict situations nationals think sector-wide while external partners have a tendency to concentrate on primary education. See Obura (2003) on Rwanda's education sector recovery.
70. The UNESCO PEER programme has also been active in environmental education in the Tanzanian camps.

classrooms have their walls made of mud or poles and roofs made of plastics". "[S]chools lack stores, staffrooms, library, desks, tables and chairs, good sanitation, piped water, enough space" and an environment conducive to learning (Sichizya, 1999: 11-12). It has to be stressed that materials inside classrooms in the refugee camps were generally more available than in Burundi due to good management practices, including regular monitoring. There seems to have been real progress by 2004 regarding school construction, furniture, and textbooks and writing material provision.

The totality of current educational activities is best presented in a matrix, *Table 8.3* below. It should be noted that the generic, standardized terms 'formal schooling', etc., are used below rather than the terminology used in the western Tanzania UN reports.

Table 8.3 Educational activities in Tanzanian-Burundi refugee camps

Education-related activities	Observations
Formal schooling:	GER recorded as 91% in 2002, 62% in 2004, using different measuring instruments.
• Primary schooling	Attendance rates 95-98%.
• Secondary schooling	At least one secondary school per camp
[Scholarships for tertiary programmes, including university courses]	Tertiary scholarships to universities and colleges outside camps, in Tanzania/ elsewhere
• Pre-schooling	Significant fall in enrolment and attendance since inception
• Adult literacy	Caters more for women than for men.
Non-formal vocational programmes • Vocational and income generating skills training programmes	Plans to incorporate some of the vocational programmes into the formal VETA Tanzania programme, providing recognized certification

Programmes (sometimes included in formal education in schools):	
Curricular programmes:	
• Peace education	Peace education one-period per week, supported by teacher training programme and teacher guide
• Environmental education	2003 Africa region assessment of environmental education
Intended inputs into the school system:	
• HIV/AIDS prevention education	HIV peer facilitators, trained in youth centres, some apparently operating in schools Starting in health centres[71]
• Girls' education programme & SVGB activities	Girls' education programme not clearly linked to SVGB camp activity
Other educational activities:	
• Sports activities (Right to Play/ Olympic Aid)	Active community sports programme, unclear on its involvement in schools.
• Cultural activities such as dance and drama	The drama and cultural activities mentioned in passing in UNHCR documents; not brought to the notice of the present mission while in the field

To a greater or lesser degree, the Kigoma/Kibondo Camps include the same type of educational activities that are going on in other refugee camps in Africa. The same talk of peace education, gender issues in schools, HIV/AIDS prevention programmes, is heard in Kasulu/ Kibondo as one hears in Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya, for example. The innovations and educational activities of interest will be detailed below.

71. A UNICEF report (probably 2000) entitled School Based HIV/AIDS Intervention in Western Tanzania notes plans for the introduction of an HIV/AIDS programme into schools in 2000. However, in early 2004, at the time of the author's visit, field officers made no reference to the programme or to any behaviour change oriented programme in schools, apart from peace education (see below).

To the credit of UNHCR/UNICEF, the Burundians, Congolese and formerly the Rwandan refugees were all offered their national curriculum, in accordance with best practice in UNHCR, to prepare refugee children for repatriation, so that they would have no problem re-integrating into national schools on their return home. The Burundi curriculum was, like the others, overloaded in the view of a UNICEF assessment report, in this case with 13 subjects: “Kirundi, French, mathematics, general knowledge (history, geography, environment), Kiswahili, English, music, games (football, gymnastics and volleyball), art, religion, agriculture, home economics and peace education” (Sichizya, 1999: 22). During the author’s mission there did not seem to be any English or Kiswahili being taught, nor the proliferation of “additional knowledge and skills” listed as taught in some schools by the Sichizya report in 1999 (sewing, embroidery, agriculture, animal husbandry, mechanics, carpentry, masonry, nursing, business studies, art or drawing). There seems to have been no official effort to reduce the curriculum by 2004, but officials passively watched as the practical subjects were either unofficially dropped or were reduced to meaningless theory, as the author observed.

In such cases it is always better to acknowledge the limitations of what can be effectively taught, to make provision for out-of-school participation in the creative and performing arts, for example, and to call on youth and community organizations to fill the inevitable gaps. In other words, it is recommended that schools aim officially to teach the achievable, and to teach well, and call on other actors in the community to assist in the holistic exercise of educating children. Still in 1999, parents and children expressed satisfaction with the numerous subjects taught in the refugee schools. However, this is where specialist planners are needed, to point out that overloading curriculum will lead to ineffective learning right across the board and that it is in the interest of learners to deliver a doable curriculum. In sum, proper and realistic curriculum planning requires not only taking the voice of the consumers into account, but it also needs professional shaping.

Examinations

Unlike West Africa where Anglophones sit a regional secondary examination, the rest of Africa has no regional examination board. Each country has its own national examination board; and a few Anglophone countries opt to sit UK examinations. The crossborder missions orchestrated by the UN and the NGOs have achieved one very

important outcome, namely, the availability of national *and regional* examinations for the refugees. The Congolese sit their primary leaving examination and receive a fully authenticated national certificate. The Burundian children sit their examination and receive results but these are not authenticated by the national board of examinations. For this reason, many Burundian children choose to sit the Congolese examinations in addition to their own, in order to get an official certificate. To ease matters, a regional examination board was set up, which produces a further set of examinations and offers certification. Despite the apparent good quality of these examinations and accompanying certificates, it is doubtful that, in the future, the regional board certificates will be as credible as a national certificate.

However, this achievement should not be minimized in any way. It has provided a number of useful outcomes: it has given continuity of experience for national (refugee) examination administrators and on-the-job training for refugee newcomers in the field. Further, it has demonstrated that refugees can totally staff this type of crossborder and regional activity; that it is worthwhile for UNHCR and partners to promote such an exercise; and that UNHCR should support a speedier setting-up of such an exercise in new sites, if needed in the future. For the sake of representativity and monitoring, a UN official occupies the position of chair of the board but the entire workings of the examination board are in the hands of experienced, (refugee) national examination personnel. It is recommended that this exercise be documented before it disappears, as it will, as soon as the levels of refugees decrease in the region.

It is difficult to appreciate the reference to "vocational and income generating skills training programmes above". On the one hand a UN CAP report refers to "34,934 adolescents participated in training in development activities, which included carpentry, home gardening, sports and reproductive health" (United Nations, 2003*b*: 60), while another assessment states that the numbers of "skill-related centres ... are insignificant in the camps" and goes on to explain that children in the camps were often required by parents to repeat Grade 6 in order to keep them in an educational institution, due to the lack of secondary school places and of vocational training opportunities in the camp (Sichizya, 1999: 15).

Lessons learned

Curriculum: In difficult conditions, such as refugee camps, there is compelling reason to reduce the curriculum to a realistic and doable load; while linking with outside-school organizations and the community to help fill remaining education-related gaps.

Certification: One of the most important goals of refugee education is access to internationally recognized certification. This activity should be initiated simultaneously to the provision of curriculum for repatriation, and it is one of the major elements of the more holistic aim of education for repatriation as a package. While such an aim can be achieved where refugees include experienced system administrators (in central Africa), it has proved too difficult so far in situations where refugees are less qualified and less experienced in system management (the Horn of Africa). However, this does not mean that the next time a crisis erupts the provision of credible certification should not be targeted for action. It means that it has to be tried again.

Crossborder certification: In Africa, national public examinations are unavailable across borders, due to examination security concerns, with the exception of the highly laudable and recent case of the Congolese examinations being sat, marked and certified across the Tanzanian-Congolese border, negotiated for the benefit of refugees (in addition to the long-established West African Examinations Council, serving five countries).

Regional examinations board: After the next crisis, attention needs to be given to the possibility of speedily setting up a new regional examinations board when national and regional examinations are unavailable.

Overview of achievements in the education sector

Some extraordinary achievements were seen in the education programme in the western Tanzania refugee camps as noted above, with regard to coverage at primary level and the existence of some good secondary schools mainly run by the refugees themselves. Refugee initiative in education was very apparent in Tanzania. Other positive features included good interagency relations, joint work, and conscious learning of lessons from the mayhem of the Rwandan exodus to western Tanzania a few years earlier. However, multi-level administration may have weakened the system by diverting scarce resources into unjustifiable

administrative salaries. It also produced some invisible gaps in terms of tasks left undone. The author pointed out to the camp authorities, and to UNHCR in Geneva, that the opportunity existed in the Tanzania refugee camps for collecting viable data as never before, to demonstrate confidently across Africa and beyond, that 100 per cent education enrolment level for refugees can and should be achieved.

The achievements of the programme are listed, with the issues arising, followed by comment on lost opportunities and challenges for the future.

Summary of achievements in the education sector:

- **Parents and children happy with education achievements** in the camps, feel ready for and confident about education in the home country.
- **Very high primary school enrolment rates**.
- **Quality of teaching and learning relatively good:** performance rates perceived by refugees to be equal to or to surpass those in Burundi **– but could have achieved higher standards**.
- **Relatively good textbook supply** as compared with the home country – and writing materials.
- **Good quality secondary schools available; good performance**.
- **Increasing access to national examinations, including secondary examinations**.
- **Interim regional examination board established and functioning well**.
- **Innovative strategies devised by the refugee community** for various purposes, including the financing of secondary schools, for example.

General issues for agency attention (impacting on the education sector):

Positive

- **Lessons were learned** from the Rwanda refugee experience and **incorporated** into the Burundi refugee (education) programme.
- **Good functional relations and co-operation between UN agencies**, particularly UNHCR and UNICEF.
- **Sensible reduction of IP education providers/agencies,** to facilitate co-ordination.

Remaining challenges

- **Heavy administrative sector structure** – numerous personnel in UN-IP-refugee structure
- **Multi-tiered hierarchy** of education administration in IP/UN agencies
- **Uneven take-up/optimization of small, innovative, valuable NGO initiatives** by UN agencies/hierarchy

Lost opportunities and challenges for the future:

- **Peace education programme no longer functioning**.
- **Vocational training minimal**.
- **Youth programmes not co-ordinated with schools**.
- **High proportion of out-of-school adolescents**.
- **Pre-school/ECD programme no longer functioning:** objectives unclear; untrained carers; unclear recruitment policy; wasted supplies, inappropriate supplies; etc.

The points noted above are discussed in some detail below.

Achievements

- **Parents and children well satisfied with education achievements in the camps:** Burundian refugees are aware that enrolments in the camps well outstrip home country enrolment rates. Consequently, the refugees feel good about the quality of the education system. The camps benefit from the presence of some very senior national education planners among the refugee education administrators. The children feel ready for and confident about education in the home country. They anticipate that they will get into primary and secondary schools with no problem on their return home. Second, there is general consensus among teachers that children in the camps pass their examinations better than children at home, at both primary and secondary levels; and that the few refugee students who reach university do very well compared with host nationals.
- **Very high primary school enrolment rates:** Enrolments reached 95 per cent GER in the primary subsector in some camps, as compared with home country rates of GER 73 per cent and NER 51 per cent, in 2001/2. No net enrolments rates are available since the age of school children has not been recorded.

Given the current enrolment rates, it is likely that children remaining out of primary school are children with disabilities since most

schools report having no children with disabilities. There are no special needs schools or programmes within the camps (Sichizya, 1999: 19). It would seem important for UNHCR, UNICEF and the NGOs to develop capacity in this area and to make simultaneous provision of such programmes when schools are set up in future crisis contexts.

- **Quality of teaching and learning relatively good:** Performance rates are perceived by refugees to be equal to or surpass those in Burundi.[72] School heads regularly refer to the high performance of their pupils. This represents an improvement on the situation noted in 1999 where an external assessment repeatedly noted the poor quality of learning and stated that pass rates on regular internal school tests in the camps were low. Of the five camps surveyed: "Over 50 per cent of the pupils failed the subjects French Grammar [and Reading] and Mathematics" and in the primary leaving examination, "Nduta Camp had 40 per cent passes in 1998 while Mtendeli had 0 per cent" (Sichizya, 1999: 2). It is difficult to assess learning levels in the camps after having observed a few very classical chalk-and-talk lessons there of uninspiring and largely out of date content. However, there is little difference between lessons taught in Burundi and those in the camps. While a refugee parent may justifiably be optimistic about his children's achievement compared with school performance in Burundi, there may still be grave cause for concern over the quality of curriculum and learning in the camps in absolute terms. Other issues needing attention include education for repatriation and national reconstruction; and opportunities for making a significant difference to the quality of teaching skills.
- **Teacher development:** The 1999 assessment repeatedly stressed the need for total overhaul of teacher development structures and personnel and an end to ad hoc and fragmented low quality teacher training. In 2004 it was not evident that the recommendation had been implemented despite the fact that the number of teachers who had passed through some kind of training had risen.
- **Relatively good textbook supply as compared with the home country, and writing materials:** UNICEF has been the principal supplier of funding for textbook reprinting and distribution at primary level, in addition to providing writing materials (exercise books,

72. The claim needs to be independently verified.

pens, pencils, and chalk). The agency has also provided writing materials for junior secondary schools.[73] UNESCO PEER supported the development of an environmental education programme across the Africa region and distributed resource materials for teachers.

- Given research findings over the last few decades, which indicate a correlation between access to textbooks and performance, this assistance has undoubtedly led to effective learning. Teachers have textbooks and access to teachers' guides within their school. Classes have mother tongue textbooks and in some cases, a French course book. There are no mathematics or general studies books in the children's hands, and sometimes the French textbook is missing. However, the existence of texts in the early grades in the language of instruction, the mother tongue, is a major boost for learning. The situation demonstrates clearly the importance of essential over non-essential textbook provision. However, it has to be said that the lack of general studies textbooks must hamper the children's reading skills. Moreover, there are no general reading materials or library books in camp primary schools in either Kirundi or in French, as is the case in Burundi itself. There seemed to be no expert input in terms of guiding decisions on the choice of teacher guides and textbooks or on the most appropriate quantities of each book, given the needs of the education system in the camps. This is an area where global guidelines across UNHCR/UNICEF refugee education in emergencies for prioritizing textbook orders would be useful, together with advice on the usefulness of readers once core textbooks have been purchased.

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73. It was not possible to find complete information on textbook printing and distribution. Documents available in the field, such as the list of 'textbooks required for Burundese [primary] Children for Year 2002', for Mtabila and Muyovozi Camps, indicated emphasis on language books – those available in class and those ordered – Kirundi in first grade, Kirundi and French from the second grade onwards; with no indication of mathematics textbooks, or any others; and, which was gravest, no mathematics teacher guides in the first four grades; no '*Étude du milieu*/General Studies teachers' guides in the first three years, when children are introduced to scientific principles; and no French language teachers' guides for the initial years of French, grades one and two. However, a supply requisition sheet of 27 November 2002 recorded the purchase of 500 Physical Education and 500 Art guidebooks for teachers. UNICEF field staff indicated that these were the initial order lists and that until then there had been almost no textbooks at all in primary schools.

At secondary level, schools have made a tremendous effort to acquire books, any secondary textbook, to stock their bookstores and libraries. Old textbooks have been sent from a variety of sources in Europe, mainly France, for science, mathematics, French language learning, history and geography. One school has hundreds of readers in English (and four in French, the language of instruction at secondary level). There is no easy way to directly acquire textbooks in the refugee secondary schools and no way of ordering the books they most need. None of the camps have direct access to donor country second-hand book supplies. All books are donated, sporadically. Teachers use these motley materials as the sole resource available for their teaching since the national set of secondary level textbooks in Burundi is incomplete and they find it difficult to procure the existing national teaching guides for each subject and grade. Lesson preparation must take time and hard work, and the teachers are commended for their efforts. Some pupils' textbooks are available and visible in the classrooms.

- **Good quality secondary schools available; good performance:** The commitment, enthusiasm and good management of secondary schools was palpable right from the start of my mission. The heads either had considerable experience in secondary school leadership or they were men brought into these roles from management in the private sector. One, for example, had been a factory manager. Documents were arranged, archived and available for perusal; the school libraries and bookstores were clean, very tidy and the books labelled on shelves by subject and listed in registers. Students were visibly well dressed and hardworking. One eighth grade class visited was forthright and confident in questioning visitors in French. Individual students interviewed were articulate and comfortable using French. They were ambitious and evidently aware of their increased life chances after leaving the camps. Many of the students were girls.
- **National examinations made available to some extent, including secondary examinations; interim regional examination board established and functioning well.** Details on examinations were given in the section on *Education in the camp*.
- **Innovative strategies devised by the refugee community** including, for example, the financing of secondary schools. The most regular lament voiced in the education sector was lack of funding for the secondary subsector. In the early days, there was no external support

at all for secondary schools: "the secondary schools ... are running under difficult conditions [since] their teachers are supported only by the community and individual refugees" (Sichizya, 1999: 15). Secondary education was reportedly established in the Kigoma Camps in 1997 for children who wished to pursue the Burundi curriculum, run "alongside the SAEU Programme".[74] Refugees rallied around, identified trained and untrained but educated people whom they appointed as secondary teachers, and managed to set up secondary institutions under trees. It was soon recognized that the relatively small population of secondary students and families could not possibly finance a secondary system. A practice was then borrowed from the model of financing secondary education by the Congolese in eastern DRC where public financing has ceased to exist, that is, getting the larger community of primary school parents to fund the secondary system through levies paid in the primary schools. In the Tanzanian camps, each Burundi primary pupil contributes 20 Tanzanian shillings per month (currently under two US cents), to pay incentives to secondary teachers.

Secondary teachers give each other a great deal of support in the camps and provide on-the-job training for new teachers. Since teaching methods are classical in Burundi, with emphasis on teacher talk, these teacher induction strategies work well. There are, in addition, some irregular workshops or training sessions for new secondary teachers.

Refugees have long seen the vital role played by the secondary subsector in creating a sound base for education in refugee circumstances, as have leaders in countries newly emerging from conflict such as Rwanda. But they have not been listened to. The fault has been on the side of external agencies and refugee camp authorities to fail to understand this pivotal role and, concentrating on basic education and Education for All, which was the mantra of the day, those holding the purse strings have not listened to 'the beneficiaries' and have left them almost entirely alone in their struggles not only to rebuild a total education sector, but to resurrect secondary education in particular. It is to the credit of the Refugee Education Trust (RET), and the commitment of the UNHCR's

74. The report (UNHCR, 1998: 6) may be referring to clandestine and determined refugee efforts to run secondary courses without official recognition at this time.

former High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, who established RET, that the needs of the secondary subsector for refugees are beginning to be addressed by external agencies, as they canvass globally for support and implement collaborative programmes for refugees in 12 countries.

External recognition of the importance of secondary schools, and support for them, started as late as 2000. There is growing realization, spurred on by persevering refugee lobbying, that secondary schools play an important role in the entire refugee education sector. They provide visible hope to children in primary schools, demonstrating that primary education can lead to something else. They provide a link to tertiary education through the students who have left the camps on scholarships to universities in Tanzania and beyond. The refugee tertiary students are reputed to be of good quality, outdoing their peers at times. This is a topic of regular conversation and is a source of great encouragement and pride to the teachers and pupils in the camps.

Lessons learned

Addressing the education needs of children with disabilities in an emergency situation: Organizations operating in emergency contexts need to develop their capacity for setting up programmes, preferably within mainstream schools, for children with disabilities. Global learning inputs should be made available to UNHCR before the next crisis occurs.

Global guidelines needed on teachers' guides and textbook provision: Global guidelines are required for UN, NGOs and refugee education officers in the field regarding priority issues to consider when making choices over which teacher guides and textbooks to order first, and the most appropriate quantities of each book, given the needs of the education system in emergencies in general and in the case of their context in particular, taking into account also the varying needs according to educational level. The purchase of readers should also be guided.

General issues for agency attention

In the camps and fields offices there appears to be good functional relations between the UN agencies, and the UN and implementing partners (IPs), which are generally NGOs. In the Tanzania camps a number of national NGOs play this role, contrasting, for example, with the refugee camps in Kenya, which are dominated by INGOs such as CARE and

the Lutheran World Federation. A third positive feature concerning the administration of the Tanzanian refugee camps and, in turn, the education sector, is the fact that the number of IPs has been reduced to a manageable few, streamlining and facilitating co-ordination. Each agency has a well-defined role, and each agency is clear about its place in the hierarchy of the structure of humanitarian aid to the refugees, with the refugee administration as the base and plainly at the lowest rung of the ladder of power in the camps. Small NGO newcomers find it difficult to break into the hierarchy of committees and aid allocations, with the result that their activities may not be fully acknowledged by the higher echelons of the hierarchy, such as at the UN level, and opportunities may be lost for mainstreaming their work into schools. This could be the case with Right to Play (RTP), a small but very active and innovative NGO, which could have far more impact on the school system if the UN hierarchy recognized its mainstreaming potential and the impact it could have on training teachers for repatriation purposes.

The two negative aspects of administrative structure in the camps are the number of layers of command, and the resulting numbers of non-teaching administrators in the education section, which adds to the cost of operations. A better distribution of roles, avoiding duplication, between the UN agencies, IPs and refugee administrators could be worked out to reduce the number of sector monitors while offering regular capacity building for the monitor-advisors and getting some of the best and most senior refugee educators back into the classroom, to serve as role models and practitioner-trainers. The several tiers of command, from UNHCR, through UNICEF (which is the UN agency in charge of education in these camps), to the IPs and finally to the refugee education administration structure, tend not only to encourage duplication of roles but to hide task or programme gaps. Gaps include quality inspection and advisory services; sound teacher development programmes; and extended data collection. Less clutter in terms of multiple, duplicating hierarchical structures and more horizontal administration development is needed to provide better support to capacity building, monitoring and feedback in the sector.

Recommendations for global refugee education structures derived from lessons learned in the Tanzanian Burundi refugee camps include the following:

Recommendations to agencies:

Replication of positive features of the Burundi camps in Tanzania:

- Maintenance/replication of good functional UN inter-agency relations.
- Replication of downsizing the number of IPs per host country/per camp.
- Replication of the experience of learning from previous/other experiences.

Further measures proposed:

- Increased and expanded data collection relevant for improved sector planning.
- Reduction of the number/proportion of education administrators per camp; get more of the best educators back into schools and classrooms.
- Reduction of the negative effects of multi-tiered sector hierarchies;
- Planning the range of sector tasks to carry out before assigning implementers/administrators.
- Development of flexible mechanisms for mainstreaming initially new, small-scale NGO action.

Lost opportunities and challenges for the future:

Early childhood education

It was difficult to find a functioning pre-school on the morning set aside for the author's visit to Muyovosi. One centre was locked and abandoned. A second class, attached to a primary school, was without a teacher or children. A third, with about 350 children registered and two teachers, was open with one teacher and 22 children. The second teacher had not been seen for at least a week.

The context – and learning/play materials

The little three to five-year-olds were sitting at bare desks, with nothing in front of them, playing with nothing, doing nothing – although some exercise books had been used the previous week. A blackboard leaned against the wall. It was covered with letters of the alphabet. The untrained teacher explained that the play materials were stored in the primary head's office some 200 metres away across the primary school playing field. When we located the materials, locked in the head's office and unavailable in the absence of the head, they looked clean and unused.

Some packages of toys remained unopened. The supplies and toys were UNICEF mid-1990s standard items sent to emergency education programmes, roundly criticized during those years at regional level for containing imported, relatively costly, irrelevant, inappropriate, flimsy, too-small, breakable items and for creating erroneous expectations in resource-scarce areas of the world about essential – or even useful – nursery programme supplies. The external assessment of UNICEF programmes in the Tanzanian camps in 1999 noted: "UNICEF should have their kits analyzed and content rectified for relevance. Some materials in the kit are useless and irrelevant and should not have been included" (Sichizya, 1999: 22). But the assessment had had no impact on the refugee programme in Muyovosi. When the primary teachers were asked in 2004 if the six clean and unused dolls in the locked-up box in the primary head's office were European or African dolls, they smiled and said they were European dolls, as if the answer to the question was obvious – although it was plain to the visitor that the pale beige skins of the dolls with their mildly curly black hair had been intended by UNICEF Copenhagen to represent African dolls. In brief, imported nursery school supplies are poorly used or not used at all, due to the lack of training of the teachers, in addition to the inherent unsuitability of the materials. Importation of such materials should be stopped.[75] Teaching methods could be improved, if imported supplies to pre-schools were cancelled and teacher training made available, while any budgetary savings could be diverted to primary or secondary schools.

75. It is difficult to understand the rationalization for importing useless items in a situation where people are not having enough food: "[The] current food ration is 1,857 kcal per person per day, while the international standard [for refugees] is 2,100 kcal per person per day. The lower ration is based on earlier, optimistic estimates of opportunities for self-reliance", which means that UNHCR expected refugees to grow some of their own food. The report notes that refugee movement was restricted to within 4 kms of the camp (United Nations, 2003*b*: 16). Yet when I was there, in early 2004, refugees were no longer permitted to go outside the camp, to farm outside the camp or to be involved in marketing beyond the camp. The report recommended, "reviewing the ration size and adjusting it accordingly as necessary" (United Nations, 2003*b*: 16). It is not clear if the ration was adjusted up, or whether the 1,857 kcal continued. What is known is that due to funding constraints, UNHCR has to reduce food rations from time to time in most of its camps.

The teachers

Pre-primary teachers are unpaid in the camps but they receive 1 kg of rice and 1 kg of sugar per month from the community as as compensation. It is strange that as many as 70 per cent of the teachers in pre-schools in Muyovosi are men. Two explanations were given for this phenomenon. First, some said that when the women nursery teachers realized they would not be paid, they left the centres, needing to spend the time generating income to feed their children. Second, when employment and training opportunities are almost zero it is men who rush to avail themselves of any training whatsoever, successfully edging out women, since even unpaid employment is more attractive to them than doing nothing at all, when it has potential in terms of improving their CVs and thereby their careers.

In refugee camps men normally experience little competition between providing an unpaid service and time use. They avoid most work related to domestic needs such as food, water and fuel collection, and consequently have little to occupy their time. In the African cultural context, and even in refugee camps and with enormous added technological challenges to face in the domestic domain, women still have the primary responsibility for finding enough food for the family, in addition to the other numerous household tasks. In refugee camps women have serious problems over time use. They are the sole providers of food for the family, through (a) waiting in food distribution queues;[76] (b) agricultural activity; and (c) direct purchase of food. Yet women would welcome the chance to upgrade their own education, benefit from training courses, learn new skills and get job experience, even unpaid job experience, onto their CVs. A measure of the handicaps refugee women face is the fact that very few of them in the refugee camps of Tanzania and Kenya have benefited from learning English while living in an Anglophone country for over a decade. To conclude, few refugee women have benefited from experience, prestige or training in nursery school teaching in the camps, yet early childhood care is traditionally assigned as a task to women in African society.

76. Women constituted 50-70 per cent of all those participating in food handling and collection in all camp locations (WFP, 2003: 4). Kakuma Camp adults questioned on time spent on water collection in the previous week included only the rare man.

It was recommended that a SERVOL-type, programme[77] should replace the current misguided attempt in the Tanzanian camps at preparing three year old children for reading and writing in primary schools, and that a world-renowned Tanzanian resource for early childhood be used to at least get facilitators (and idle adolescents) making no-cost play materials from resources in the environment. Since the early 1990s, Zanzibar has hosted one of the world's best early childhood programmes, assisted by the Aga Khan Foundation. It would also be useful to find out if the movement Right To Play in the camp stretches from the sports fields and team games they are currently involved in, to play in general, or to enhancing early childhood play. In any case, there is great potential for involving adolescent sports enthusiasts in an early childhood care programme, using SERVOL-inspired inputs where adolescents are oriented and given the opportunity of interacting with small children, to occupy them and to develop parenting skills.

Unfortunately, the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) nursery programme was not operating in the camps visited. It is reputed to be well managed and enthusiastically attended. Entrance is free and some free meals are provided. It is no doubt a spark of light and hope in the lives of the children. A well-funded programme such as this one will inevitably be popular. The question remains, however, as to whether the inventive and creative skills noted elsewhere in this chapter are being acquired by the JRS teachers, whether the schools focus on play, and whether the model is a relevant precursor for extending early childhood care beyond well funded, isolated urban programmes in post-war Burundi.

In conclusion: Review the pre-school/early childhood development-programme revamp or disband it. Ensure a functioning and appropriate programme for young children, using play-oriented methods – using materials available in the immediate environment or simple materials brought to the camps typical of the home environment – and providing a childcare programme, to free up mothers for income-generating activities, for at least five hours per day. Learn from SERVOL, in Trinidad and Tobago, to involve adolescents, from Right To Play, and from the Zanzibar Aga Khan Early Childhood Programme.

77. SERVOL (Service Volunteered for All) is an NGO in Trinidad and Tobago, which gives adolescents a role in looking after small children in play centres, and provides them with training for early childhood care.

Peace education

Peace education is disappearing from the camps due to rapid turnover of trained peace educators and lack of competent master trainers in the camps. Current practices may be worse than useless. In a context of continuing tension between social groups in some areas of Burundi, ongoing child soldier recruitment in the camps, and increasing need for education-for-repatriation, it is dangerous to state that a peace education programme is being carried out when it is (almost) not occurring at all or being taught with any degree of effectiveness.[78]

Lessons learned

(a) Disband the programme or use trained teachers only, whatever the circumstances. The exercise is far too important to go unmonitored.

(b) Re-cast the programme into an education-for-repatriation mould, targeting behavioural change, emphasizing the importance of group interaction and collaboration in post-war Burundi, and local, daily and practical implementation of the principles of equity and inclusion. Use INEE Peace Education Programme inputs.

Girls' education

The two girls' education programmes in the camps have had mixed results over the last decade and there are insufficient data for proving otherwise; no certainty of sustainable results. In the short term there was an increase of enrolments (insufficiently monitored or analyzed by the myriad educational administrators), but no firm measures in place to ensure retention, nor improved performance of girls, nor empowerment. Meanwhile, one major concern is the strongly voiced and growing male backlash among boys and men across all the camps visited, who disapprove of girls' education programmes. This is the most extreme negative attitude the author has heard anywhere and needs addressing. The experience of the 1996 girls' education programme was apparently not being used for planning in 2004.

78. The fact that the author was invited to the lesson of an untrained peace educator was a measure of how low the standards of peace education had fallen in the camps. The lesson included a prime example of the mishandling and misteaching of the concept of equity, and no activity, task- or behaviour-oriented approach. See also the sections on *Peace education* and *Negative expectations about Burundi schools*.

Lesson learned

Plan/handle change and innovation in education practices and systems more carefully, to achieve the desired results and in a sustainable manner, and with the support of the community.

Other opportunities lost

- **Opportunity lost for capacity building on textbook management**: In terms of producing viable national education textbook planners in the future. There is laudable injection of textbooks, but not monitored by the many educational administrators in the hierarchy of managers (see above), nor planned in such as way as to ensure that guides/textbooks are distributed first to educational planners, trainers and inspectors.

Lesson learned

Use the opportunity of the ongoing exercise for organizing capacity building in textbook planning, production, distribution, school level management and monitoring.

- **Opportunity lost to learn skills in slate use:** In a resource-scarce environment such as refugee camps, slates cut costs on exercise books, and constitute a valuable teaching method to bring back to Burundi in the future. Note that while Burundi used slates in the past they were not familiar with the more effective and wide-ranging methodologies used in (Francophone) West Africa, and not with chalk use, which is cheaper than the previous Burundian slate pencil. In Francophone West Africa slates are used alongside minimal numbers of exercise books and up to grade six.

Lesson learned

Train in slate use in first to sixth grades (UNICEF video).

- **Opportunity lost for gaining skills in collection and utilization of local resources:** The mission observed the questionable role of ICT artists/personnel – who are minimally familiar with making classroom charts, and who unnecessarily inflate the number of nonteaching staff in the sector without producing any impact. Teachers need training in creative use of available resources and

inventive practices in the classroom, rather than full time artists who hand-draw manilla-paper charts and pictures for them.

Lessons learned

(a) Disband the ICT artists/personnel to provide more classroom teachers.
(b) Provide all teachers with upgrading courses in creative methods in class including inventive use of local resources.
(c) Exploit the Tanzania-based, world-recognized national experts in this domain from the Dar and Zanzibar Aga Khan Foundation.[79]

- **Opportunity lost for running accelerated learning programmes for older children** (11 years and above): the programme observed in Mtendeli was not functioning well yet vitally important for older children in the camps.

Lesson learned

Set up accelerated classes along the NCR (Burundi) pattern or the COBET (Tanzania) pattern and train planners, managers and teachers in the camps, for the extension of the programme on repatriation, possibly through the *Yaga Mukama* programme.

Vocational education

Sichizya (1999: 15) reported "the skill-related centres ... are insignificant [in coverage] in the camps". Despite claims by UNHCR to have wide coverage there was no evidence of this in the data, in past or present reports or in the centres themselves, which enrolled few students, mainly due to lack of funds, trained teachers and funds for paying teachers.

Peace education

Peace education first came to the Tanzania refugee camps through UNICEF and UNHCR's work with Rwandan refugees in Ngara in 1996. However, the Rwandans repatriated before the programme was fully developed. Notions of the programme reached the Burundi refugee camps

79. The total package or expertise of Aga Khan Foundation would be too enriched and time-consuming for schools in refugee camps and should be tailored to fit the essential needs of the camp programme and materials available.

in the following year, carried spontaneously by individual UN education officers who were in touch with UNICEF regional think tanks on peace education at the time.[80] A workshop on Peace and Conflict Resolution Programme (PCRP) took place in August 1997 in western Tanzania. "Some of the camps followed up [by developing] programmes on peace education" (UNHCR, 1998: 6). Apart from one-year of staff support from UNICEF the programme was left to be developed, and the materials written, solely by the refugees. It is not surprising that the date of the first printing was 2001, four years after the initiation of the programme. Unlike the co-ordinated UNHCR peace education programmes in neighbouring country refugee camps, the Tanzanian camps went their own way and developed their own programme amongst themselves, leaning largely on refugee input since UNHCR/UNICEF did not provide sustained or fulltime specialist support for the process. Peace education is officially included on the formal curriculum in camp primary schools, one period per week, and it was claimed in 2002, for example, that: the "PCRP has a school based component [aiming at] long-term behaviour change for school age children ... which has been integrated into all grades of refugee primary schools ... [It] is one way of reducing ... ethnic based violence ... and preparing for an eventual and peaceful return home" (UNICEF Tanzania, 2002*b*: 63). However, it is not clear who is monitoring peace education at school, Education Development Centre (EDC) level or implementing partner/UN agency level. It could be that peace education, as the camps originally knew it in the late 1990s has disappeared. It could be that it is continuing, unmonitored, in patches. Communication later in 2004 from a field observer confirmed, however, the discontinuation of the programme (Lyndsay Bird, personal communication, May 2004).

In early 2004 it was difficult to find a peace education lesson in the camps. In the end, a school kindly put on an unscheduled lesson for the consultant. The 1,000 pupil school could only find a teacher untrained in peace education on that day. The fact that both the head and the education co-ordinator of the camp did not at first see any problem with the author's observing an untrained teacher speaks volumes. It meant that there was no appreciation of the difference between a trained and competent peace education teacher and one who dabbles in the classroom, unmonitored, with the enormous responsibility of transferring peace building skills to the soon-repatriating children. In a worst case scenario this could be

80. The author is indebted to Lyndsay Bird for an account of initial peace education development in the western Tanzania refugee camps, 1995-2000.

dangerous in that teachers could be, even unknowingly, perpetuating prejudice against some home country social groups. In any case, it is not at all satisfactory, in a situation as delicate as the current peace process in Burundi that the camps, schools and parents could be under the impression that peace-building skills are being taught, while they are not. Claims could be being made and complacency could be increasing over the psychological preparation of the refugee children for repatriation when in fact it is not being carried out. An interview carried out with a girl in sixth grade revealed that she is longing to go home to Burundi but that she feels very insecure about the mixed teacher profiles she will encounter. The Hutu girl fears that "Tutsi teachers might mistreat me ... they might beat me". Trained peace teachers in the camp should know about such fears, and allow them to be voiced during peace lessons. They should then know how to dispel such fears and give children confidence in the teachers they will work with back home.

The reasons behind the seeming disappearance of peace education in the camps are evident. First, as reported by both the refugee co-ordinators, IPs and UN agencies, the high turnover of teachers means that there is a constant, never-ending race to replace departing trained teachers. Like other teachers, peace teachers repatriate, they are snapped up by NGOs, and they seek greener pastures. Camp education administrators cannot be blamed for this – but they can and must monitor the number of peace education teachers remaining, they must replace departing teachers through ongoing trainings, and they must ensure that no untrained person takes a peace education lesson. The second explanation for the weakening of the peace education programme (PEP) is that neither UNHCR nor UNICEF has supported the programme with the necessary enthusiasm or resources since the initial start of the programme. Yet UNHCR is a pioneer of peace education, and their regional programme, now promoted by INEE, and adopted officially by UNICEF and UNESCO, was clearly an inspiration for the Kigoma/Kagera PEP (which is referred to here as KK-PEP). UNHCR needs to fully support this programme and, as a joint partner in the exercise, UNICEF needs to fund it properly, fundraising specifically for KK-PEP if necessary.

Future action should include the following recommended steps: identify and count the number of trained peace education teachers currently in schools, monitor their current level of competence and train more teachers; designate clearly the focal point per camp responsible for the quality control of KK-PEP, and the officer at IP level; require

biannual reporting on KK-PEP to UNICEF and UNHCR. Fortunately the training is not lengthy, but it needs to be upgraded at regular intervals. A total of about three weeks per year for initial trainees is required, in three separate sessions.

A last observation is in order. KK-PEP was developed simultaneously yet separately from the UNHCR regional peace education programme, and separately from the conceptual approach being developed in UNICEF across the region at the time – although individuals were in contact and attended common meetings. It seems difficult to justify the separate programme development in western Tanzania (supported solely by UNICEF at the time) while the potential for joint programme peace education development was there, with UNHCR and UNICEF inputs. It could be argued that KK-PEP was to be developed in French while the UNHCR regional programme was in English (translated into French unofficially only in 2003). This is a conundrum of costs and local programmatic outcome efficiency. However, there is a more fundamental point at issue. KK-PEP did not succeed in the way that the UNHCR programme succeeded in ensuring emphasis on skill building in learners. The KK-PEP programme is heavy on concepts, teacher talk and explanation, with pupils listening. The manual lacks practical tips and instructions for teachers on how to carry out some of the tasks it recommends to teachers:

> *Quotations from the Teacher's Guide:*[81]
>
> "The teacher encourages his students to tolerate their classmates as well as any other person with different conceptions ... inviting them to the practice of virtues."
> "He helps his students to discover that lack of respect for values might provoke conflicts as much as disputes over resources."
> "He shows ... that ethnic and tribal ideologies are also values."

There are no teachers' notes to indicate how the teacher will "help to discover", will "show" or "encourage" pupils to treat others with

81. "[Le maître] ***encourage*** ses élèves à tolérer leurs camarades et toute autre personne ayant des conceptions différentes ... ***[les] invitant à*** la pratique des vertus" (emphasis added) (KK-PEP, 2001: 118).
"il ***fait découvrir*** par ses élèves que le manque de respect des valeurs peut provoquer des conflits autant que les ressources" (KK- PEP, 2001: 233)
"il ***montre*** ... que l'idéologie ethnique, tribale, sont aussi des valeurs" (KK-PEP, 2001: 233).

tolerance. And one suspects that teachers will resort to more and more teacher-talk, and explanation, as observed in the lesson monitored.

Observations on specific examples:

The teacher is required to say to his pupils: “Ayons un langage qui ne blesse personne” but there is no identification exercise of language which hurts and which does not hurt, no practice of injurious and non-injurious language and no practice transforming injurious language into peace building language during the lesson (KK-PEP, 2001: 238).

Fortunately there is a first and sole practical ***homework*** task given to the pupils, asking them to listen to injurious language at home and to note it. This is a listening and identification/analytical exercise, which could be followed up by the teacher during the following lesson. There are however no lesson notes in the guidebook on follow up (KK-PEP, 2001: 227).

Despite the emphasis on conceptual aspects, the manual fails to distinguish between dealing with disagreements in a non-violent manner as compared with using physical violence. There are other confusions, such as the plea to accept differences. The Batwa, states the manual, are short people (yet says they are not all short) and Twa girls do not ride bicycles, as if physical stature (unchangeable physiology of the Twa) and customary behaviour (changeable behaviour of males/females such as bicycle riding) were the same type of thing. It is not clear at all whether pupils learn peace building skills through the programme despite the stated aim of the course which is “[le] changement de comportement de l’élève” (changing pupils’ behaviour) and “[la] contribution modeste, certes, mais originale ... pour bâtir un monde, un tantinet plus viable, où tout un chacun peut espérer goûter aux délices avec son prochain” (a modest but unique contribution towards building a better world where everyone can lead a contented life alongside his/her neighbour) (KK-PEP, 2001: Introduction).

Lesson learned

The vulnerability of new educational programmes would best be offset by solid links to similar programmes in other refugee camps or to host country education programmes; and inclusion in mainstream or regional UNHCR education programmes, so as to benefit from ongoing training, supplies, funding and monitoring.

Documentation, data, monitoring and assessment

Typically in education in emergency programmes, whether in a country hosting refugees or a country in transition, documentation is not kept beyond two years in UN country/branch or field offices. It is not archived and is unavailable for reviewers or evaluators even three years later unless, by chance an individual officer has kept some significant documents. Resource centres are not set up in every office.[82]

Documents available are often undated. Generally, authorship is not noted – in terms of individual authors or sector author – nor is the addressee or target audience recorded; nor the purpose for which the report was written.

To illustrate the problem, the documents available for this study of Burundi refugee education in Tanzania included:

UNHCR field:	2000 Community Services and Education 2000 Education Report.
UNHCR Dar es Salaam:	Country (annual) Reports 2000-2002, (with about three pages on education activities).
	Nothing prior to 2000.
	Some dated education statistical reports 2002, but camps not identified so the data could not be used.
	Population statistics by camp 2003; children 5-18 only, no data relating to primary or secondary school aged children; nor school-based data on ages of children.
	The Refugee Act 1998 and Refugee Policy 2003.
UNICEF:	Annual country reports 2000-2003 (with some pages on education). No field reports to country office.
	Some past sheets on peace education.
	Evaluation 1999 of refugee camp education.
	CAP 2003

82. The stores or archives that UN agencies state they have in many countries are inaccessible for evaluators, researchers and visitors. The so-called stores are in reality holding locations for documents that cannot be legally disposed of in less than the stipulated time period – four years for some UN agencies. However, since the stores are dusty and disorganized and physically impenetrable – and constitute an embarrassment for the agency faced with an enquiring consultant or outsider – no one is authorized to enter them except for the purpose of burning the documents when the stipulated holding time expires.

Africare:	One report specially written, presented on the last day of the mission. No regular reports of any type available.
Refuge Co-ordination:	Two of the three camps presented their annual report, but late in the mission. Some 1999-2002 monthly reports from two camps. None from the third.
Other partners:	No documents from RET,[83] Ahadi Institute Tanzania, Global Catalyst Foundation (computer centre); two-page activity report from RPT.[84] No project documents or assessments/reports.

From the documents reviewed, it is evident that UN, IP and refugee reports mainly list activities conducted, with few descriptions or details of the activities, and with no analysis or assessment of implementation effectiveness in terms of process, outcomes or impact. This leads to repetition of the same activities, good or bad, such as the girls' education programme rerun of 1996 in 2002-2003 supplying equipment and materials to girls, as orally reported in the field, and the continued provision of inappropriate supplies to nursery centres. If there is modification of process or aim during programme implementation, it is not recorded and is lost for future generations, who cannot learn lessons from the field that the field officers may have acquired and may have been communicating verbally amongst themselves.

Lessons learned

(a) Field reporting requirements need review, to focus on the essential elements, guided by the need for quality monitoring and evaluation of programmes.

(b) Document archiving needs review, to make sense of the achievements of programmes over time, for feedback into future programme design.

83. RET HQ in Geneva sent full documentation some months later. It was unavailable in the field.
84. RPT sent some documentation some months later but without programme aims included.

Chapter 9
Education for repatriation

Education is the right of all children, everywhere, even in exile. Education in refugee camps has often been seen as a mechanism for encouraging repatriation. The aim is to provide continuity in the schooling of displaced populations, even outside their home country, in the hope of providing uninterrupted education services for exiled children so that they are in a position to be re-absorbed immediately into national schools on their return and participate actively, from strength, in the reconstruction of their home country. For this reason, since successful repatriation is the ultimate goal of refugee care, the home national curriculum is provided if possible in refugee schools, and teaching in the learners' home language. The extent and the quality of education provided in refugee camps is therefore of interest for evaluating preparations for repatriation. Below, the perceptions of the Burundi refugee children and parents whom the author interviewed for this study are given.

Refugee perceptions of education in the camps

There are two contrasting and contradictory experiences of Burundi refugee experience in Tanzania. Many refugees voiced the positive aspects. "They welcomed us like family", a refugee woman said spontaneously describing how her family had been received by the Tanzanian authorities and the camp agencies. And, across the plots and the zones of the camps, the refugees quietly helped each other settle in. Experiences of extreme deprivation and abuse were tempered by human kindness, in the schools and beyond.

Some refugees gained more in the camps in a material sense than they had benefited from in Burundi: "In Burundi I was poorer than I am here". "At home farmers have a very hard life". The refugees noted that they had been provided with food that water sources were very near to their houses that some free clothing was distributed and that fuelwood was also nearby.[85] The land in western Tanzania is green and fertile

85. Although the CAP (United Nations, 2003*b*: 16) notes the danger for women looking for firewood outside the camps, the issue is insecurity rather than distance from the camps in this case, and pales in comparison with dangers to women in other refugee camps in Africa.

and can support a larger population than the current host population. Trees planted in the area a decade before had taken root quickly and towered high above the roofs of the Mtendeli refugee shacks, providing welcome shade from the fierce equatorial sun. Western Tanzania could be described as a good location for refugee camps, unlike camps in arid areas of Africa, or in severely limited spaces, which result in houses crowded together and constant pressure from the proximity of strangers, narrow dusty 'streets', unrelenting scorching sun, and difficult access to farming land, pasture and fuelwood.

However, despite the pleasant location of the camps, the desperation of refugee life was as present in these camps as in the Horn of Africa. What the Burundi refugees hardly talked about, fatigued after ten long years in the camps, was their daily struggle with survival, with finding fuelwood, water, clothing, patching up their shelters, the constant battle to maintain human dignity; and their attempts to advance in life and to hope, despite camp conditions and the uncertain date of repatriation. They must have suspected that their listeners were well aware of the terrible ordeals of refugees everywhere, and knew that the conversation with the author was to be restricted to educational matters only. They did not speak of the desperate and unrelenting search for food or the fact that the food ration had been decreased to 1,857 kcal/person per day, down from the international standard of 2,100 kcal, due to "earlier, optimistic estimates of opportunities for self-reliance" which the UN had anticipated half a million refugees would supply from their agricultural activities in a radius of 4 kms around the camps (United Nations, 2003*b*: 16). But by mid-2003 refugee movement outside the camps had been stopped by the Tanzanian authorities. UNHCR remained underfunded and could not provide for the shortfall in food rations. For the Hutu in the Tanzanian camps – and all the refugees were Hutu – homecoming would inevitably be mixed with apprehension, fear of renewed insecurity, fear of an unknown future and fear of their ability to cope.

Positive perceptions of the camp schools

Both the children and parents very much appreciated the benefits of schooling in the Burundi camps of western Tanzania, in the 1990s and still in 2004 (Sichizya, 1999: 24). They said it was an opportunity and sometimes an unexpected new opportunity for children to go to school, to get onto the first rung of the ladder of success, especially for children of the poor. It has been said again and again that a significant proportion

of Hutu farmers did not send their children to school in Burundi. Some could not afford it, others did not consider it important, while yet others, as described above, were pushed out of school. Several children and adults in the camps blamed alcoholism in the family for lack of school fees back in Burundi. In the camps, for the first time, school was accessible to everyone. It was 'almost free' we are told. In some cases refugees felt that those who stayed at home in Burundi had missed out on the advantages that the refugees enjoyed, "War has been very damaging for the schoolchildren who stayed at home", said one. Refugees crossed from one country to another in search of education while in exile, from the DRC to Tanzania, for example, while in rare cases, they went to the extreme of pulling their nephews and nieces out of Burundi and into the refugee camps in order to give them the benefit of camp schooling: "I brought my nieces here to the camps so that I could help them through school, because schooling is very costly in Burundi at present". In *Chapter 6* of this study the story is recounted of the secondary schoolgirl who ran away from home, away from an alcoholic father who refused to pay her school fees in Burundi, and who made her way, alone, to the refugee camps of Tanzania where she had heard that schooling was free. At the time of writing she was preparing to return home since her father had pledged to start paying school fees again.

Despite the cases cited here, humanitarian aid planners should appreciate that only in extremely rare cases are people drawn into refugee camps due to the education services provided. The Burundi refugee Tanzanian camps did not seem to harbour many of these cases. On the contrary, what the camps achieved – and did atypically well – was to establish a firm foundation for education in the post-conflict repatriation stage. The camps provided continuity for the children who had been in school in the home country; they achieved much higher enrolments, using to advantage the high density habitation patterns in the camps; and they gave initial training to many new teachers. The Burundi refugee camps in Tanzania are an exceptionally good example of refugee education provision, as noted in *Chapter 8*, and are used in this study to argue the case for continuing and improving educational services for refugees, everywhere.

> "I am just delighted that my two children are able to go to school here in the camps", said one woman, "we are lucky to have schools here". "It has been a golden opportunity. The camp schools have helped my children take an important step in life". "We have to

> take advantage of the camp schools here before we return home", said a 15-year-old girl, anticipating problems on her return home to Burundi. "Children who came here knowing very little will go home knowing so many things and we shall expect a lot of them", said one adult. "My children would not be what they are today without the camp schools", said another, simply. A 12-year-old boy explained: "I have come to understand how important it is to go to school, so that you get a qualification and then employment, which means you can help your family". "If you are well educated, you have a good life", said another. "A school diploma never loses its value", stated another informant. "Here, we are preparing for life", said a girl who nearly dropped out of school when she had a baby two years before, but who managed to continue her schooling career in the camps.

A girl of 16 years was looking after her little sister aged 12. The mother had repatriated but the daughters stayed in the camp "to continue with schooling despite the difficult conditions we have to endure. Sometimes we go to sleep at night without having eaten ...". "I'll stay with my adoptive family here in the camp and continue with schooling rather than go back to my aunt in Burundi who is poor. This family is so good to me. They have taken in two other unaccompanied children in addition to myself", said a young girl.

It seems that education demand has risen in the camps and is perceived to be more widespread than in the home country: "Fewer parents here than in Burundi are not interested in school for their children", said an education official. Even when refugee shelters are precarious in the extreme, somehow the children go to school: "Even though we were living in a church in the camps and before a plot had been assigned to us, I went to register myself in a school".

The refugees felt that if everyone goes to school, from all social groups, "there will be real hope for peace in the future in our land" and there will be no more voiceless people or people excluded from decision-making in society. It was considered shameful to be limited to working in the fields, or taking in laundry, for example. The refugee children expressed their belief that in Burundi today only schooled people can speak, be listened to, have pride in themselves and participate in civic decision-making.

Again and again, children spoke of their intention to help their families once they started earning. With evident conviction some also

spoke of their debt to the community: “After finishing one’s education it is important to work for the welfare of the community”, said a young aspiring engineer.

Specific advantages of schooling in the refugee camps

As the refugees were preparing to leave the camps over the next two years, once peace has returned to Burundi, they looked back at the specific advantages they had enjoyed with regard to camp schools. Schools were near their houses, whereas in Burundi, people live dispersed on the hills, and sometimes several kilometres away from school. In the camps, schools were “quiet, free of gunfire, of war and danger”, in comparison with the schools they had fled from, open to attack from any quarter in the isolation of the hills. Also, camp schools were free of hostilities among the children or between teachers and children. There was “no racial segregation” between Tutsi and Hutu since teacher and pupil populations in the camp were all Hutu. The camps had committed teachers. One child said: “Teachers make sacrifices to teach us, *agasabune gatoya*”, meaning that they work for meagre pay, only enough to buy soap. Teachers did more than teach in schools: “I can read and write a little since a teacher who lived with us on the same plot in the camp used to kindly give me lessons”. Above all schools were ‘almost free’ in the camps, according to the refugees and, in any case, cheaper than in Burundi. In sum, the camp teachers, who are the backbone of any education system, were committed, hardworking, looked on their work as a vocation, put up with meagre pay, and generally helped in the community. One could add that in some cases they were highly qualified and experienced. The co-ordinator of refugee education in one camp was an IIEP-trained educational planner.

Negative perceptions of the camp schools

Deprivation and abuse in school were played down. The refugees were grateful for having had the opportunity to put all their children through school. However, there were negative traits associated with schools in the camps. Children often went to school hungry. And, despite what was said above, schooling was not completely free. Children were sent home from school if they did not have the required fees or levies.

The few complaints about the schools themselves included the following:

Unqualified, unprofessional teachers: “Many teachers are unqualified”, observed some parents. “Male teachers harass the girls

and try to entice them by promising them high marks in school – even married teachers". "They reduce girls' marks to punish them". "Teachers collude in the staffroom to do this, by general agreement". "It all happens from grade 5 onwards", observed one informant. One rare complaint was favouritism: "Head teachers' children have privileges – those children don't do manual work like the rest of us, and mock those who do".

Corporal punishment: Children dropped out when they performed poorly in class and certain teachers continually beat some, to a point where they felt under attack.

Failure: Schools in the camps adhered to the rigid pyramidal structure of schools in Burundi and insisted on children passing tests before moving up to the next class, despite the special conditions of the camp. There were no accelerated or remedial classes.[86] Some pupils were crushed by the weight of failure and having to repeat classes more than once: "How many times was I going to repeat!!!" exclaimed a boy in frustration after having done two years in second grade. "I left school since I was doing badly all the time", said a girl dropout. "When they asked me to stay in sixth grade for a third year, it was just too much for me! I had tried so hard because I wanted to succeed, but I didn't make it." This girl was one of the rare Burundi girls who might have reached secondary school and, with some special attention and guidance in sixth grade, the last class of primary school she might have made it to the end. Now she does not even have a primary school certificate.

Drop-out: The two children above left school and did not return. Another case was a boy of 16 years who stayed out of class to look after sick family members. He was stunned when the school did not believe his story and he said his parents were not pro-active enough in insisting to the school authorities that he should return to school.

Negative peer pressure in schools: Even in refugee camps schooling can be an agent of negative change, as some parents saw it. One could argue that schools either failed to educate well, or failed to counter negative influences in the society and in the camps. Whatever the case, parents were known to complain: "Schools teach children to behave badly, to *kuriyambiza*, to change from black skin to white skin". "Children often play truant from school. Parents don't realize this is happening and then one day, they find their children completely changed

86. The accelerated classes had not taken off or were running in very poor conditions.

'in their skin, in their character'". People would say: "it's development, times have changed ...". Several parents were at a loss to know what to do with their children.

General

There was fierce competition for the rare employment opportunities that camp life provided and school leavers found they had to take up any type of work on offer, without relevance to their level of education. School graduates complained that they found there was "little respect for workers" in the camps. Over time, these negative experiences could have dampened the demand for education in the camps. In the camps, people had no money. When a computer centre was set up in the camp, charging nominal user fees, the organizers had to revise down the fees again and again.

Expectations of schooling back home

The rationale for reporting in some detail the refugees' expectations of their return is the complex of perceptions they had about educational provision in Burundi. To contribute to peace building efforts in Burundi, the Ministry of Education may wish to take account of the many expectations. Knowledge of refugees' positive or negative, realistic or unrealistic expectations can help educational planners in the camps and in the home country make plans for the return. Education for repatriation takes on a new twist in light of the reality on the ground as compared with hopes and expectations of the returnees. It means also that the Ministry of Education and the authorities in charge of repatriation can take on board these expectations, adapting their programmes where they can and, most importantly, preparing and facilitating the host populations for the influx. It could mean running specific programmes in the schools, that is, orientation programmes for host teachers and children, and recommending programmes of welcome and re-orientation for teacher and pupil returnees.

Positive expectations about schooling in Burundi in the future

Despite the terrible events in Burundi, which caused them to flee many exiles have positive expectations about their return home. Some say that things in general will be good, that the government will assist them, and their children will be placed in schools. The below box gives some excerpts of what children say:

> "Well, in a nutshell, I think that everything will be fine when we get back to Burundi, really fine. In fact things will be perfect once the war is over!"
>
> "Compared with here [in the refugee camps], being in Burundi will definitely be better because we will be in our own country. We'll have enough to eat and studying won't be a problem any more. We'll have everything we need!"
>
> "Whatever we went without, here in exile, we shall have it in our schools at home. There will be enough classrooms and teachers; the teachers will get paid; and our parents will have enough money for school fees."
>
> "For us, who are returning from the refugee camps, there will be special assistance. We'll have advantages over the others, especially during the first days after our return. We'll get more assistance from the government and from NGOs than those who stayed in Burundi."

One girl dreamt of being in a boarding school when she got home: "There are boarding schools back there and there will be plenty of time for studying". The children thought it would be easy to get into schools in Burundi and had faith that the government would automatically place returning exiles in schools: "The government has a plan for us", said one child. "I won't have any problem in getting into school", echoed another.

Parents expected state assistance for school fees, as is implied in the box below.

> "I know the government will help me send my children to school, because even before we came here there was some state assistance. And I can tell you that it will be compulsory for all children to go to school once we get back."
>
> "The government won't forget us. They know that we have been in exile and that we have no money."
>
> "Here a child can go to school hungry, but when we get back to Burundi that will never happen!"

Some had strong faith in their future earning ability: "When we get home, we won't have to go running to wellwishers for school fees and writing materials. We shall be able to afford all this for our children". They expected that money would be circulating in Burundi. Even unschooled refugees looked forward to being able to hire out their

labour: “I’ll work on the land of educated people and earn money”, said an illiterate refugee, accepting his lot as an illiterate casual labourer but looking forward to earning enough money to live on.

Negative expectations about Burundi schools

There were also fears, worries and concerns about the unknown. Some remembered problems in the past and did not expect things to have changed: “When I was looking for a place in primary school, in 1995, it was only through my cousin that a school was found for me in Bujumbura – and I was only looking for a primary school!” The child anticipated that it would be far more difficult to find a secondary school place after the war.

Cost was expected to be the main obstacle to schooling once the refugees returned home: “We are in danger of dropping out of school”, said a 12-year-old, “since we will not have school fees when we return.”

A girl in upper primary said: “I am so much looking forward to going home! I am a little worried, however, that I will have new teachers”. When she was pressed to explain her fear of ‘new’ teachers she explained: “I have never been taught by Tutsi teachers. Perhaps, when I go to a school at home, these teachers might mistreat me, or even beat me ...”.

Listening to this girl made one aware of the potential of the embryonic peace education programme that Burundi had had, and how sorely it was needed at that time, to explain to pupils how they would be welcomed by Tutsi and Hutu teachers and pupils in their home schools, and how the return of the refugees was being prepared. The girl needed reassurance. They all needed reassurance. And there was no structured official response to these fears. Repatriation needs preparation at all levels, not least in the domain of Hutu-Tutsi relations. Most of the children in the camps had never met a Tutsi and, to judge by the monsters described by other refugees (Sommers, 2001), they had to ready themselves to go back to the land of ogres ... But in the vestigial peace education lesson observed by the writer, the two words unmentioned and seemingly taboo in that lesson were ‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’. The Twa were named by name – as a disadvantaged group in Burundi – but no other disadvantaged group was named. No other group was named at all, as if it were too dangerous to mention them. Yet, Hutu-Tutsi tension and discord is the main, explicit

cause of conflict in Burundi, in addition to tension between the haves and have-nots, and the power elites amongst themselves.[87]

Parents had been carefully weighing up the advantages of the refugee camps against the difficulties they might find once they returned home. Worry about their children's schooling generally revolved around the question of cost: "Here schooling is almost free but in Burundi we shall have to pay school fees and buy writing materials [and uniforms]". Despite external assistance for the education sector in Burundi, some perceived that "aid is embezzled in Burundi" and did not reach the recipients or the schools, as it did in the camps. The refugees explained that they could not expect help from the extended family at home, "People don't love one another any more". But it may be a case of generalized poverty, where one poor peasant family simply cannot stretch to assisting another poor family. It is a breakdown of traditional coping mechanisms in society. Burundians are not uncaring. The many stories in previous chapters of mutual help across the extended family and even to strangers have illustrated this. They have demonstrated exceptional mutual assistance, courage and caring. However, the refugees in Tanzania were realistically taking into account the fact that their relatives and friends at home would hardly be in a position to assist them materially, and they were planning accordingly.

One parent, summing things up for many others, simply placed her trust in God rather than in the authorities: "I won't be too pessimistic about our return – even if I fear that our children will drop out of school as soon as we return – because God will continue to help us".

Repatriation – expectations and reality

There is a possible mismatch between the expectations of the children and the reality of schooling in Burundi today. It may not be as easy as the refugees anticipate finding school places in the home country. Primary schooling may be available in theory, although it is not free, but there may simply be a lack of schools in some areas, and some children may have to walk long distances to school. A third scenario is the case where refugees may return home so poor that all members of the family may be needed to engage in full-time income-generating, in full-time family labour in the fields or at home, in order to help the family unit survive. At secondary level, there may be lack of places and the fees may

87. See in *Chapter 8* the section on *Peace education*.

be prohibitive for most returnees, especially those with no or little land. While some scholarship allocation may be anticipated for returnees, they will have to compete in terms of need, alongside poor children in the home population.

Once they get into school they will find there are fewer textbooks in the classrooms than in the refugee camps and the isolation of teachers from one school to another may take its toll on teachers' morale. However, experience in Rwanda, for example, shows that despite shortcomings repatriated children can be so happy at returning home, being free nationals once more, in their own land, that they learn to appreciate the difficulties of education providers, to put up with their lot and find the energy to work hard and succeed. At school level, in the case of post-conflict Rwanda, it was found that the readiness of head teachers to explain problems of school administration to their secondary students and the reasons behind the shortfalls in provisions and in teacher supply elicited the sympathy and collaboration of the students. This had been a spontaneous gesture on the part of the heads and was subsequently recommended for routine teacher-pupil relations in the future (Obura, 2003).

Lessons learned

Three types of lessons learned are summarized below regarding:

- education for repatriation in the camps – peace/life skills;
- education for youth;
- the integration of returnees into Burundi schools.

On reflection, children who have passed through peace education or life skills programmes are better prepared to meet the challenges of going home, to new schools and a new life. Not only was the peace education programme abandoned in the Tanzania camps but there are no master trainers remaining in the camps to resuscitate it. As noted above, this was a programme initiated in the camps themselves with support from UNICEF but not linked to any other peace education programme. The discontinuation of the programme – and indeed the fact that the programme was never solidly rooted in the camps or in the camp education system – constitutes a major opportunity lost for the returnee children, and in terms of skills that could have been acquired by the returnee teachers and by the refugee education system administrators. As it is, neither the returnees nor the home children are ready as regards

the skills and confidence needed for the new challenge of repatriation. Nor are the teachers. Burundi now starts off on post-conflict education in-country without the benefit of master trainers, teachers or a core of skilled learners. Yet, the existence of the Tanzania camps, so near to the Kenya camps which pioneered the first peace education programme in Africa to have received sound acclaim,[88] could have been exploited for Burundians to acquire these skills and promote the programme on their return home.

Second, as in other refugee camps in the experience of the writer, youth programmes were insufficient in the Tanzania camps in terms of coverage and content. The result was a high and growing proportion of frustrated, uneducated and unskilled youth, male and female. Characteristics of this population were: the idleness of male youth with concomitant constant re-recruitment into militia; overworked and abused female youth leading to early marriage and unwanted pregnancies, spread of HIV and no skills acquired to resist it among the still disempowered girls and young married women.[89] Youth remained generally unprepared for the challenges of income generation and survival in Burundi.

It is admittedly difficult to run programmes, which will reach all youth in a camp: to keep all male youth busy all the time; to ensure time off work for female youth so that they can participate regularly in such programmes; and, at the same time, to add a significant element of education to the programmes. It is also typical of camps to find youth programmes floundering a decade after the establishment of a camp, with youth 'leaders' waiting for renewed external assistance and ideas; programmes catering for few female youth, with a preponderance of male leaders; programme activities responding exclusively to funding levels instead of to (youth) community initiative and energy. Arguably these are negative lessons learned in the refugee camps: that action or programmes are dependent on funding, particularly external funding. One way to minimize the need for costly specialist staff in this area is to start with a relatively high concentration of trained specialists in youth leadership,

88. The UNHCR programme, now promoted by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), extended to more than eight countries by 2004 and has been taken up by at least one national system, demonstrating that it is indeed a generalized peace education programme rather than a refugee-focused one.
89. Belatedly, HIV prevention education programmes were set up in the new youth health centres and, by late 2003, were reported to be attracting the youth.

reducing fairly quickly as the first programmes are implemented, but retaining specialist presence in the camp, however minimal. It is also typical of camps that small external initiatives are unco-ordinated and run aground very fast, which leads again to negative lessons learned. The initiatives need to be co-ordinated by camp authorities – external agencies together with refugee authorities – with long-term capacity building and sustainability in mind.

While there is still time, new and more extensive youth programmes need to be set up in refugee camps, and preparations should be started for high-coverage youth programmes within Burundi.

Further, given the concentration of population, and the literally captive population in the camps, there is an opportunity in the camps to run youth counselling and parenting skills programmes. As the parents pointed out, they often find themselves at a loss to know how to handle their adolescent children. It is recommended to UNHCR to encourage inputs in the future from NGOs specialized in these areas, co-ordinating, as above, with the camp authorities. Both these programmes could be linked to early childhood care, as recommended in *Chapter 8*.

Summary of lessons learned

Lessons learned – for education for repatriation in the camps

- **Education programmes for dropouts** in the camps, **accelerated learning programmes** to bring learners up to designated levels with the aim of (a) integrating the children into formal schools on their return to Burundi; or (b) to giving a certificate of achievement (grade two, grade four and primary certificate levels) which could be used for entry to vocational training or other education programmes outside the school system.
- **Education programmes for overage children** in the camps, **accelerated learning programmes**, with the same aims (a) and (b) as above.
- **Children** currently in school and **at risk of dropping out** should be identified for special support, in order to keep them in the school system.
- **Peace education** in the refugee camps should, just prior to repatriation, **focus** more particularly on **concrete repatriation issues**, to facilitate refugees' re-integration into their community and into the schools, as noted below.

- **Returnee pupils need to be given confidence in the welcome that awaits them** in their new schools, with new teachers and new classmates, Tutsi and Hutu, even if they are on their own in their school or class, as a returnee.
- **Returnee teachers also need confidence in their welcome** into new staffrooms and interpersonal skills for navigating new relationships in the school and the community.
- **Returnees should be coached on practical strategies for registering with education services** on their return, and advised of their rights to education, so that they do not fall through the net of education provision in the future.

Lessons learned – for education in general in refugee camps

- **It is a mistake to neglect or abandon peace education in refugee camps** since the returnees will be less ready than peace education learners for return to the home country.
- The opportunity presented by the concentration of population in a refugee camp should be optimized by running **youth activities** (a) **more intensively and in a structured way**, (b) **for all youth** in the camp, in order to prevent negative social influences in the camp, and very specifically, with a view to preventing youth disenchantment on return to the home country, not to mention the very real danger of re-recruitment into militia and armed gangs.
- **Capacity building for youth leaders** should be recognized as a **priority** in camps, to reduce the need for camp staff in the sector as soon as possible, and to give youth the experience of organization, initiation of projects and sustaining them.
- **Youth counselling** and **parenting skills programmes** should be piloted in future refugee camps with a view to providing more focus and giving more attention to adolescent needs.

Lessons learned – for the integration of returnees into Burundian schools

- **Peace education** in Burundi schools should, just prior to repatriation, **focus** more particularly on **concrete re-integration issues**, to facilitate the reception of returnees back into the community and into the schools, giving confidence to home residents that the influx of returnees will enrich the community and the nation rather than cause problems.

- **Prepare welcome activities for the returnees**, teachers with their classes, children amongst themselves, and heads with the school and community.
- **Orient teachers** to care for the returnees, to identify returnee needs, and to allay returnee fears of the unknown (for example, returning Hutu children fearing Tutsi teachers), while avoiding giving the returnees more care and attention than the home children, in order to prevent feelings of envy. Extra, free tutorials may be needed to help some of the children with learning problems, returnees and home children combined. Tutsi teachers need to be aware that returning Hutu children may be apprehensive about them, and the total staffroom needs to take this into account, giving mutual assistance for providing a welcoming and secure environment in the school for all (teachers and) learners.
- **Assist the home children to prepare to integrate their new classmates over time**, to pursue inclusive activities over the years and to avoid fast one-off extravagant welcome activities that have no follow-up. Child-hosts could each volunteer over a one-year period to look after one returnee child, or groups of child-hosts could do this. Depending on the strengths and weaknesses of the children after six months, the groups could be reconstituted and devise new roles *vis-à-vis* one another.
- **Envisage new peace building approaches**, such as:
  - the *abolition of corporal punishment* in schools, to demonstrate new ways of doing things in Burundian schools.
  - or *increased time for sports* in schools focusing as much on the *girls* as the *boys*, to use up surplus energy in the boys and to enhance fitness and confidence building for girls.
  - Sports could be linked to learning *lifeskills*, to *co-operation* and *teamwork*, and to the promotion of *risk-free behaviour*.

Girls' education

Unlike neighbouring Tanzania and Rwanda, which had, eliminated a gender gap in enrolments in the 1980s, Burundi had a noticeable enrolment gender gap before the crisis. The gap persists. In the camps, the agencies have run two girls' education programmes: first in the late 1990s, and again since 2002.

In 2004 there was a strong, unsettling backlash on the part of boys and men regarding the programme. They were eager to approach a visitor

to the schools, both in parents' meetings and in discussion sessions in class, to express their disapproval of material distribution to girls only. One boy had developed a revenge tactic since he felt that he personally was in danger of dropping out of school due to lack of school fees: "I'm not going to be the only one to drop out of school. I'm going to go after girls and once I catch them [have sex with them], they'll be sent away from school like me. So if I can catch ten girls there will be so few girls left at school the [programme] budget will cover both boys and girls!"

Women, too, expressed negative views: "Boys have been completely forgotten", declared a 30-year-old woman who may have had sons to put through school. A grandmother said that the programme should have focused on all poor children in addition to girls. Some teachers felt that boys should be included in the programme before things got out of hand: "*amazi arenga inkombe,* the situation is getting worse", they said.

Causes of girls dropping out of school and early marriage can be directly related to the refugee situation, in addition to the many factors operating against girls in general in rural areas in Africa. A young married woman explained that she had married in the camp when she was 16 years old since she felt insecure: "I had to find someone to protect me. My parents were far away and I was alone". It has been well documented that in refugee camps girls have less access to materials needed during menstruation and consequently they cannot go out of the house or to school at these times. One of the girls interviewed brought up this dilemma and explained how it affected her school attendance and performance. Absenteeism, failure and repetition are known causes of dropout.

"Girls are sexually harassed by primary and secondary teachers and by the boys in secondary schools" explained a young married woman. She and others repeated stories of teachers pressuring girls for sex with the promise of high marks in school tests and the threat of low marks for refusing sex. Teachers were accused of colluding in the staffroom to allow this fixing of marks.

Even in a refugee setting with its multiple problems, the stigmatism of unmarried mothers is prevalent. This example demonstrates how unchanging traditional obstacles add to the trauma of the female refugee who has to cope with so many new challenges. And, it is clear from the scenarios depicted above, that girls are in daily peril of sexual harassment and rape, especially at school. One girl left her refugee 'home' where

she found things increasingly difficult due to her diminished status in the family. She tried to find a husband after she got pregnant since life in the family became unbearable: "I became like a maid at home. My brothers and sisters did not help me with the household chores. Noone. They waited around for me to cook for them and serve them as if they were my masters. But they did help me with the baby", she said wistfully, "especially the younger ones".

It was evident that the rationale of a girls' education programme had not been discussed fully in the camps, and that the principle of group disadvantage requiring affirmative action focused on that same group had not been understood or accepted by the community. In such circumstances, when principles are not shared and the programme activities are poorly chosen, it is difficult for such a programme to work effectively and to achieve the desired results.

There are no data available on the outcomes of the first programme other than overall enrolment statistics by gender from one camp, no data on the vulnerable fifth and sixth grades, no performance data no information on any qualitative gains that may have occurred or activities that may have focused on qualitative targets. Girls' enrolments peaked that year then declined the following year. The second programme made the same type of distribution, again.

Discussion and reporting on girls' education always seems to lack hard data as evidence of need, programme provision and outcomes or they produce data which indicate a contrary situation or they fail to interpret the data convincingly. Such a case is the Sichizya report, which states that girls perform less well than boys, with no evidence to support the statement, nor an explanation of what the gender gap is and whether it is significant. The report then gives partial evidence to support a contrary position, that is, performance data indicating that girls do not lag behind in mathematics compared with boys but, unexpectedly, there is a far wider performance gap in mother tongue (Kirundi) results. However, the data produced are far too small to draw conclusions (Sichizya, 1999: 14-15). The year 1999 would have been a good vantage point from which to evaluate the outcome of the girls' education programme of 1996, but there is no information on it.

Chapter 10
Conclusion

The risk

It has to be recognized that Burundi is one of Africa's most vulnerable failed states, not only because it has experienced numerous incidents of violence for four decades, but because:

- It can happen again.
- There were no signs by the end of 2004 that Burundi was going to turn this situation around.
- Recurrent crises have crippled Burundi.
- The region and the international community have failed Burundi – and may fail Burundi again in the future.

It can happen again: The causes of Burundi's strife can and could be self-perpetuating. Quality of governance is the crucial determinant of the well-being of a state in the developing world. In forty long years Burundi has never allowed the Hutu or Twa to participate fully in government. Each attempt to widen political participation has resulted in violence and, ultimately, in massacres. While the education sector has fuelled hate between communities in the past, it could be incapable at this point in time of becoming a force for good and for peace. It could lack the capacity or the foresight or even the will. This factor needs to be recognized. The failure of Rwanda, despite the amazing and constructive progress on so many other fronts in the education sector, to put peace education onto its curriculum or into its formal institutional practice or to teach Rwandan history a decade after the genocide, is a wake up call for Burundi. In other words, in Burundi, the Ministry of Education is in no position to become a stronger force for peace than firm and enlightened governance from the top will allow.

No signs of turnaround: The present study has documented increasing disparities – not some disparity, or lingering disparity, or continuing disparity, but **increasing disparity** – in the education sector during 1993-2003, despite some steps to eliminate discriminatory practices; for example, the manipulation of examination marks. Disparity concerns regional, social group and gender gaps. The fact that regional disparity is not only continuing but increasing, and that this

salient point seems not to have perturbed the government since 1994, means that there is a very serious situation. The disparity in question is not some technical, trivial issue. It is the very issue, the very core of the problem, which caused strife between Tutsi and Hutu in the first place: it concerns a forty-year lack of Hutu/Twa access to the state's education resources. And the situation of 1993-2003 was deteriorating.

There are at least five possible explanations for this: Either the highest echelons of the Ministry of Education and the government in general, were unaware of the seriousness of the current situation; or they were not aware that the situation was deteriorating (as opposed to merely continuing, as several national reports have stated, since 1998); or they wanted it to continue; or they would have opted for change but were unable to effect it; or they opted for change, took some steps, and concluded, erroneously, that this had made a difference, remaining unaware of the deteriorating situation, and were not attempting to make further change since they imagined their actions had borne fruit or that they would bear fruit. The fact, that none of the latter five positions was being clearly stated or discussed makes it all the more difficult for anyone to effect change. Burundi was caught in the warp of inertia or of taking small, piecemeal action which did not relate to the wider context of disparity. Since inertia, in this case, bred increasing disparity, and in time would produce more tension, the state needed to be prompted into action.

Crises have crippled and weakened Burundi and drawn the country back behind other countries in the region, more than once, as *Figure 4.1* dramatically illustrated. Burundi experienced the crisis of 1993 as a country already handicapped by the previous massacres of 1972, with a long history of discrimination in the education sector, and lower sector indicators than other countries in the sub-region. The events of 1993 were to deal yet another blow to a poorly functioning sector. Data in *Chapter 4* traced the number of years it took Burundi to regain lost ground in enrolments, school structures, numbers of teachers and teacher qualifications. On balance, while it took between 4 and 13 years to make up quantitative ground, the quality of education has deteriorated since 1993. And, achieving the MDGs has become a more distant objective.

According to the experience of other post-conflict nations, ministries of education in such situations have been considerably weakened. After a war, they do not have the strength or the capacity to pull themselves up or to make an effective and prioritized reconstruction and development

plan. Making such a plan is the linchpin for the future. First and foremost, ministries hampered by long years of war have not been exposed to global and regional developments relevant to their country's planning exercise. Senior ministry personnel are new, young, inexperienced and less qualified than their peers in stable countries, or experienced but less qualified and little exposed (MEN/ADEA, 2002: 67). They have been deprived of the type of travel, study tours and high profile training opportunities from which ministry staff in other countries have regularly benefitted. Ministries lack resource centres, national documentation on the history of their own sector, and global reference documents.

Planning needs to be informed by understanding and planning needs to be implemented. This is not a simple task. It needs to be implemented earlier rather than later. Sector reconstruction lessons from Mozambique, Eritrea, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola and Uganda, are all pertinent to the Burundi experience and are, by definition, not yet available to Burundi. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that some countries failed to prioritize. Some plans were unworkable. Some developments took longer than planned; and this always seems to be the case with curriculum reform, for example, which therefore needs attention earlier rather than later, and should be tight and focused rather than diffuse and overloaded. Other plans are easier to roll out, such as school manager and PTA training. Teacher development and support have never been addressed early enough or fast enough but their core role in sector reconstruction is now recognized. The Ministry of Education in Burundi, or in any like country, is inevitably weak at such a period of time since the country and the sector have suffered from decade-long destruction and all manner of setbacks. A critical mass of senior ministry planners and managers needs to be developed to lead the sector in the future.

The findings of this study constitute a strong case for emphasizing teacher development in post-conflict situations, in order to focus on the quality of education from the start. Ministries generally consider that teacher development depends on prior school curriculum change but having watched countries wait for curriculum change over as long as 10 years before embarking on teacher development, the lesson learned is simply: Don't. Do not wait. After all, the specific curriculum that teachers will teach is less important than their approach to teaching and their teaching skills, both of which are generic and can be operated on any curriculum. One of the most important skills for teachers to learn

is creativity and the skill of manipulating any curriculum in accordance with their and their ministry's philosophical approach to teaching.

The region and the international community have failed Burundi – and may fail Burundi again. In post-conflict situations, the education sector needs help from outside. In 2003 the international community was not sending messages, which would guarantee sufficient support in the future to Burundi. Some of the rhetoric is there. However, on probing the concrete intentions of some potential donors, it seems that while they speak of the importance of assisting the Great Lakes region to stabilize and develop, while they speak of DRC, Rwanda and Burundi in the same phrase, they are not intending to extend significant aid to Burundi, which is continually overshadowed by the might and wealth of the DRC and the starkness of the genocide of Rwanda.

The education sector in Burundi needs help from neighbours, from the region and from the international community in general. First, the Africa region, together with the international community, needs to identify the best role for Africa to play in supporting Burundi, knowing the funding and capacity constraints of the African Union but acknowledging the neighbourly and therefore more welcome assistance it can give in some specific respects. Second, the industrialized nations need to deal with the Great Lakes region as a whole, not omitting one part of it, such as Burundi, which could prove to be a destabilizing influence in the region if it does not solve its political, economic and social problems. Burundi is simply too close to Rwanda to be neglected. One affects the other. Both countries will require sustained support for some time; and they need to develop a strength for survival and to develop a complementary role in relation to their far bigger and richer immediate neighbours.

Risk avoidance

The Government of Burundi has valiantly struggled to keep schools going during the years 1993-2003, through the worst decade of Burundi's forty-year history. The courage of many of individuals within the state and civil organizations in these last 10 years, now needs to be matched by a new political vision. The vicious circle of violence can be broken through changed societal goals and strict adherence to a plan for eliminating discrimination and inequitable resource allocation in all sectors.

- **It does not need to happen again:** The remedy lies, for the education sector, in being directed and supported by the highest authorities to root out and eliminate disparity.
- **Turnaround:** Clear policy formulation is needed on disparity elimination, on resource sharing, on using interim affirmative measures, in order to create a level playing field; and on implementing change policies in regional allocation of resources, the access of all social groups to education and gender equity; and an innovative peace education programme.
- **Strengthening the Ministry of Education:** Senior ministry planners will need exposure to other experiences of sector reconstruction, through capacity building exercises, access to documentation and travel. The planning culture needs to be developed at all levels, including school level. Teachers need special support in the form of capacity building and enhanced advisory services, and access to information.
- **Garnering regional and international support for Burundi:** Significant funding and sustained support from regional and international sources are an essential strategy for future sector development.

At this point, it is useful to turn back to the schema presented at the start of the study, *Table 1.2*, emphasizing the importance of support to the education sector as one of the prime strategies for societal reconstruction.

Now, at the conclusion of the study, revisiting this rationale, we should look forward to the future, to preventing the re-occurrence of violence in a global context and in a specifically African context. *Tables 10.1-10.3* indicate the strategies that schools can use in big ways and small ways, to practise conflict prevention.

Table 10.1 Globally relevant strategies for conflict prevention

Characteristics of conflict	Future-oriented preventive strategies
1. Conflict is increasing	Educate for conflict prevention: Offer skills-oriented peace education in schools; teach history for conflict prevention
2. Civilian targets	Lobby and educate all sides in at-risk situations to keep schools as havens of peace, to prevent the abduction and conscription of schoolchildren and the destruction of school property; give special support to teachers in at-risk situations
3. Massive refugee influxes cause new social problems in host countries.	Increase assistance to refugee hosting areas from the start, to keep social indicators level in both communities; strengthen local infrastructure; and provide programmes to increase understanding between refugees and host populations
4. Most conflicts are internal.	Identify and reverse any anti-group content/practice in the education sector and in schools; offer skills-oriented peace education in schools
5. New analyses of the relationship between conflict and education	Periodic analyses needed in at-risk countries, to identify and measure the introduction, rise or decline of negative effects of education. Transform education sector into an engine of peace

Table 10.2 Africa-related additional education sector strategies for conflict prevention

Consequences of conflict	Prevention measures
1. Conflict is a major cause of global failure to achieve EFA.	Harness education to the cause of peace and conflict prevention, particularly for social inclusion and equity, in order to achieve EFA. Use data to illustrate the relationship between peace and enhanced national education achievement.
2. Schools/education sector increasingly targeted for destruction	Strengthen the education system; preserve data and materials in times of risk; respect continuity; emphasize the role of the education sector as a significant agent of national peace
3. Increased danger of disruption of schooling in many countries	Keep sector-wide education institutions going, to ensure national capacity growth

Table 10.3 Education-related factors for conflict prevention

Characteristics of conflict	Prevention measures for the future
1. Porous borders can trigger conflict proliferation.	Be aware of proliferation dangers; develop regional collaboration; strengthen local administration, law enforcement and community structures; demand support from central authorities; counter any ongoing negative cross border effects; highlight local benefits of shared borders. Organize school exchanges
2. Shared conflict-related, historical and politico-cultural features can trigger cross border conflict.	
3. Physical cross border spill-over	
4. Drought: Increased frequency and intensity, affecting larger populations	Practise drought prevention measures: Marshall schools in food security measures (general education, improved agricultural practices, involvement in agrarian reform) to avoid need for school feeding programmes; educate on gender roles in agricultural production and the importance of increasing women's access to agricultural resources
5. Disaster effects of drought coupled with HIV: Africa's new double crisis	As above; also, ensure ongoing, skills-oriented, effective HIV prevention education, targeting sector managers, teachers, pupils and the wider school community; promote the safety and empowerment of girls in school; educate male teachers and boys on behaviour change
6. HIV disaster and its dual impact on the education sector, especially in countries in conflict	Develop behavioural change oriented lifeskills programmes including specific HIV prevention and peace skills; emphasize empowerment of women/girls
7. Increasing poverty and social inequity: Twin engines of conflict	Develop long-term, equitable education system with interim, pro-poor affirmative programmes (fee waivers for the poor, family stipends, etc.); develop understanding and support for such programmes in the community/ nation. Implement the plan

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Textbooks and teachers' guides available in Bujumbura, end 2003

All primary textbooks, teachers' guides and official teaching/learning reference books were requested; and history, ethics and civic books for secondary level. The following documents were available in the Ministry of Education.

- *Etude du milieu* – general studies

BER. 1997-1998. *Etude du milieu : fichier du maître 4e année*. Bujumbura: Ministère de l'Enseignement primaire et secondaire et de l'Alphabétisation des adultes. Bureau d'éducation rurale.

- *French* – taught as a subject from Grade 1, as medium of instruction in Grade 5.

MEPS. 1989. *Pour apprendre le français. Langage 1re année*. Livre du Maître. Bujumbura: BER; Paris: EDICEF. Et édition de 1990.

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MEPS. 1992. *Pour apprendre le français. Langage – Lecture/écriture 3e année*. Livre du Maître. Bujumbura: BER; Paris: EDICEF.

MEPS. 1992. *Pour apprendre le français. Langage 3e année*. Livre de l'élève. Bujumbura: BER; Paris: EDICEF.

BER. 1996. *Pour apprendre le français. Langage 6e année.* Fichier du maître *I, II, III*. Bujumbura: Ministère de l'Enseignement primaire et secondaire et de l'Alphabétisation des adultes. Bureau d'éducation rurale.

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BER. (circa 1997). *Pour apprendre le français. Langage 5e année* [Livre I]. Livre de l'élève. Bujumbura: Ministère de l'Enseignement primaire et secondaire et de l'Alphabétisation des adultes. Bureau d'éducation rurale.

Parlons du Burundi – Pour apprendre le français. Langage 5e année II. circa 1997. Livre de l'élève.

Parlons du Burundi - Pour apprendre le français. Langage 5e année III. circa 1997. Livre de l'élève.

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BER. (circa 1997). *Pour apprendre le français. Langage 5e année I.* Fichier du maître IV. Bujumbura: Ministère de l'Enseignement primaire et secondaire et de l'Alphabétisation des adultes.

BER. (circa 1997). *Pour apprendre le français. Langage 5e année IV*. Fichier du maître IV. Bujumbura: Ministère de l'Enseignement primaire et secondaire et de l'Alphabétisation des adultes. Bureau d'éducation rurale.

- *Mathematics* references, teachers' guides and textbooks were not requested.

- *Secondary history:*

BER. 1998. *Histoire du Burundi 7e année*. Fichier du Maître. 2e édition. Bujumbura: Ministère de l'Éducation nationale. Bureau d'éducation rurale.

A photocopied extract of a junior/senior secondary history teachers' reference book (not a teaching guide) was lent to the mission in a *coco*. It was about 30 pages and gave a more detailed information on the occupations of people in Burundi and the migrations into Burundi than in the 4th grade Etude du Milieu teachers' guide.

The Grades 1-4 textbooks and teachers' guides for language, mathematics and general studies, which were available were in Kirundi. The mission, which included a national, looked through the materials in Kirundi searching for any discriminatory messages. None were found.

Notes:
MEPS (Ministère de l'Enseignement primaire et secondaire)
MEN (Ministère de l'Éducation nationale)
BER (Bureau d'éducation rurale)

Appendix A
Fact sheet: Primary education, Burundi, 2003

Indicators	Totals	Breakdowns	Observations
School-age population (7-12 years)	1,140,739	girls 587,068 (51.5%) boys 553,671 (48.5%)	
Enrolments	894,859		
State	880,252	girls 44.5% (391,952)	
Private	14,607 (16%)	girls 49.0% (7,159)	
Out-of-school children	490,000		
Gross enrolment rate	77.2%	girls 66.8%	Range: Ngozi 52.7%; Mwaro 112.5%
		boys 81.0%	Range girls: Ngozi 44%; Mwaro 107.6%
Net enrolment rate (7-12 years)	56.2% 641,006	girls (50.0%) 293,523[a] boys (62.8%) 347,474	Range: Ngozi 36.9%; Bururi 82.1% Girls: Ngozi 31.7%; Bururi 76.4%
% of girls of all primary age children enrolled % of boys	45.8% 54.2%		in state schools
NAR	29.6%	girls 29.1%	Range: 13.6% Ruyigi, 66% Bujumbura Town
Schools State Private	1,853 1,793 60	959 with/834 without heads all have heads	54% écoles centrales (959 with heads) 46% écoles succursales (834) * Yet 396 state schools with 6e, without heads; and 438 without heads or 6[e]

Classrooms	11,876	State: 11,816 Private: 60	Single shift: 22%; double 56% (6,617)
Pupil/class ratio	74:1		
Classes of children (State)	18,455	single shift: 22% double 78% (14,395)	
Promotion rate	66%		
Repetition	29.1%	girls 30.0/boys 28.4	
Drop-out	4.9%	girls 4.4% / boys 5.3%	
TEACHERS – Pupil/teacher ratio	51:1		
Total Number	17,931	women 54%	Qualified: 85%; Women teachers qualified: 90%
State	17,297	women 54%	Qualified: 93%; Women teachers qualified: 93%
Private	634	women 62%	Qualified: 93%; Women teachers qualified: 93%
Heads	957		959 écoles centrales
Pre-primary	8,304	gender parity	3,287 state (40%); 5,017 private (60%)

Sources: Ministry of Education, annual statistics up to 2003. Background information from: Rurihose (2001); Ndimira (2001); Bitagoye 1999).

Appendix B
Background statistics

Different documents on education in Burundi, including those emanating from Bujumbura, publish varying data sets. The position taken by the present study is to quote the sources of data given here and to check over two or more documents that the trends are similar even if the data is inconsistent in detail.

To give more detail on population by province, *Table B1* shows the proportion of primary school age children per province (Col. E) and provides provincial gross enrolment ratio (GER) data.

Table B1. Provincial population, primary school age population and relative proportions, 1997/8

Province (a)	Population 1997/8 (b)	% (c)	School age population (7-12 yrs) (d)	(d) as % of (b) (e)	Enrolment (f)	Rank-ing (g)	GER (h)
Gitega	617,790	10	118,244	19	87,973	1	92
Ngozi	583,176	10	99,453	17	52,480	4	74
Kirundo	486,762	8	84,169	17	31,245	11	53
Muramvya	474,487	8	97,497	21	82,518	2	73
Kayanza	472,050	8	92,220	20	43,768	6	81
Muyinga	468,588	7	80,094	17	34,246	9	61
Bururi	429,229	7	86,238	20	69,066	3	58
Bujumbura Rural	426,693	7	79,055	19	49,376	5	75
Cibitoke	369,950	6	60,410	16	38,944	7	83
Karusi	345,703	5	59,138	17	22,114	14	65
Makamba	338,454	5	48,818	16	33,795	10	69
Ruyigi	294,607	5	49,386	18	25,656	12	69
Bubanza	279,154	4	45,972	20	8,872	16	59

Rutana	237,488	4	39,858	19	24,635	13	58
Cankuzo	167,841	3	29,499	16	17,806	15	86
Bujumbura Town	**308,558**	**5**	**42,154**	**14**	**35,890**	**8**	**86**
BURUNDI	**6,312,530**	**100**	**1,112,205**	**19**	**670,882**		**71**

Sources: Provincial populations: UNDP (1999: 31, 119).
Population of primary school age children: Rurihose (2001: 20).
Enrolment: MEN *(2000a*: 40).
GER: MEN (2000*a*: 41).

As expected, the two sets of data, on total population and on primary school age children, shown in *Table B1*, indicate that the ranking and percentage of school age children per province are almost the same. The most highly populated provinces (Gitega with over 0.6 million inhabitants, Ngozi with nearly 0.6 million), both with 10 per cent of the nation's population, and Kirundo, Muramvya, Kayanza, Muyinga, Bururi and Burumbura Rural, with over 0.4 million (7-8 per cent of the total population), are also the provinces with the highest number of primary school age children who should be in school: over 118,000 in Gitega, over 90,000 in Ngozi, Muramvya and Kayanza, over 80,000 in Bururi, Kirundo and Muyinga – and just under that figure in Bujumbura Rural. The least populated provinces in terms of total population are Cankuzo with under 0.2 million, Rutana, Bubanza and Ruyigi, with over 0.2 million. These latter provinces have lower numbers of primary school age children: Cankuzi with under 30,000 and the others, including Makamba, with 40-50,000.

However, Col. G shows that primary school enrolments do not match population levels, province by province. The Bujumbura enrolment figures do not include children in the 31 private schools in the town, which would bring the town to the rank of fourth among the provinces.

Table B2. Primary school age population, 5-12 years, 2001

Provinces	Sch age pop 2001 '000	Rank	Change since 1998 '000
Gitega	106	1	12 less (10%)
Ngozi	100	2	
Kirundo	86	3	
Muyinga	84	4	
Bururi	79	5	
Kayanza	78	6	14 less (15%)
Bujumbura Rural	74	7	5 less (9%)
Cibitoke	67	8	5 more (9%)
Makamba	65	9	16 more (33%)
Karusi	59	10	
Ruyigi	52	11	
Bubanza	49	12	
Muramvya	44	13	13 less (13%)
Rutana	41	14	
Bujumbura Town	41	14	
Mwaro	40	16	
Cankuzo	29	17	
Burundi	**1,098**		

Source: MEN, Données statistiques Burundi 2000-2003, IIEP; MEN, 1999*a*.

Table B2 gives the most recent data available on school age children by province. There has been some change since 1998, either due to more accurate data collection, revising the population data, or due to population movement. The national total is down by 14,000 but, as noted, this could be due to statistical revision rather than decline in real terms.

Eight of the 17 provinces have more children than before, which is expected, given the overall estimated population growth rates. Two seem similar; and seven have decreased.

The major changes by province are:

Increase: Provinces with more school age children than in 1998 are Makamba, with 33 per cent more and Cibitoke with an increase of 9 per cent.

Decrease: The most populous province, Gitega, has 10 per cent less; Kayanza 15 per cent less; the Muramvya set 13 per cent less (now split into two provinces, Muramvya and Mwaro, since 2000); Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke 9 per cent less.

Table B3 gives the data for *Figure 4.6*:

Table B3. Classroom provision by population, 1993 and 2002

Province	Total population	Classrooms 1993	Classrooms 2002
Bubanza	279,154	309	349
Bujumbura Rural	426,693	554	820
Bujumbura Town	308,558	438	105
Bururi	429,229	1,108	1,491
Cankuzo	167,841	318	401
Cibitoke	369,950	430	681
Gitega	617,790	967	1,130
Karusi	345,703	435	444
Kayanza	472,050	662	792
Kirundo	486,762	539	633
Muramvya and Mwaro	474,487	856	1,060
Makamba	338,454	450	668
Muyinga	468,588	603	581
Ngozi	583,176	707	837
Rutana	237,488	345	411
Ruyigi	294,607	490	521
BURUNDI	**6,300,530**	**9,211**	**10,924**

Schools and classrooms: MEN (2002, Annexe: 2).

Table B4. GER before and after the 1993 crisis by province (Data for *Figures. 4.2* and *4.3*)

Province	1992/3	1997/8	2001/2
Bururi	99	82	106
Muramvya and Mwaro	87	83	100
Bujumbura Rural	81	70	83
Bujumbura Town	81	86	108
Makamba	80	81	66
Gitega	77	75	90
Cankuzo	69	61	65
Ruyigi	66	55	56
Rutana	62	68	83
Bubanza	58	30	60
Kayanza	57	52	65
Cibitoke	55	63	77
Ngozi	54	50	48
Karusi	49	41	58
Kirundo	45	42	49
Muyinga	43	42	57
BURUNDI	**70**	**61**	**73**

Sources: MEN/ADEA (1999: 18); Ndayisaba (2003); MEN (2003*a*).

The table indicates the effects of war on school enrolment, a general decline. Bubanza shows the most negative effects, from 58 per cent down to 30 per cent. The capital city has a marked increase of enroloments, due to the massive influx of children into the town but also to increasing demand for education from all sectors of the population.

Table B5. Schools distribution by provincial population of school age children, 2002 (Data for *Figure 4.5*)

Province	(7-12 yrs) ‘000	Rank	Number of schools	Rank
Bubanza	49	13	58	3
Bujumbura Town	74	8	105	9
Bujumbura Rural	41	14	51	1
Bururi	79	6	225	16
Cankuzo	29	16	55	2
Cibitoke	67	9	120	12
Gitega	106	1	148	14
Karusi	59	11	71	4
Kayanza	78	7	115	11
Kirundo	86	3	104	8
Muramvya and Mwaro	84	4	150	15
Makamba	65	10	112	10
Muyinga	84	4	104	7
Ngozi	100	2	124	13
Rutana	41	14	71	4
Ruyigi	52	12	93	6
BURUNDI	**1,098,417**		**1,706**	

Sources: MEN (2002: Annexe) ; MEN, Données statistiques 2000-3, IIEP.
Notes: School age population data for 2001; schools data for 2002.

Mwaro and Muramvya are coupled together, for comparison with the original province of Muramvya (before 2000).

Appendix C
Writing the history of Burundi: Action plan 2003-2005

- The establishment of a *Project Support Unit* (costed at US$250,000 for three years), with one programme officer, which, among many administrative tasks, would collect and classify all documents pertaining to the programme (République du Burundi/UNESCO, 2003: 17-19).
- *Initial Training Seminar*[90] for history Secondary Teachers on Textbook Writing, planned for *July 2003* and *July 2004.* The objectives included the first mention of exposing teachers to historical methods of research as an exercise prior to history textbook writing, and of upgrading teaching skills (Gouvernement du Burundi/UNESCO, 2003: 20). Participants would include inspectors and advisors at regional and provincial levels, and ten secondary history teachers per province. The method of the seminar was to be thematic in preference to a workshop, hands-on approach to producing learning materials. The role of textbooks was stated to be: '*la transmission du savoir, du savoir-faire et du savoir être*' (emphasis added) (République du Burundi/UNESCO, 2003: 21)
- *The programme activities were to include:*
- *Document collection/study* – month-long travel to documentation centres in Europe and North America and the Great Lakes/Central Africa region (République du Burundi/UNESCO, 2003: 22).
- *Technical Committee Co-ordination Activities)* over three years.
- *Technical Committee Meeting in Paris, Dec 2003*.
- *Document collection/study 2004.*
- *Study of primary and secondary school history learners* – to document the level of information acquired by learners on Burundi history; and their perceptions on national history; using questionnaires rather than interview techniques. Analysis will take account of gender.
- *Technical Committee Meeting in Rome, June 2004.*
- *Co-ordination: Technical Committee Meeting in Paris, Sept 2004.*

90. Sole training session, that is, one session per teacher, for less than 40 per cent of history teachers.

- *Technical Committee and Writers' Meeting in Bujumbura, Dec 2004.*
- *Publication costs*
- *Writers' and Cartographers Meeting.*
- *Publication of two school textbooks* – 300,000 copies of the first book and 50,000 copies of the senior secondary textbook for 200,000 upper primary learners, 100,000 middle school learners and 50,000 senior secondary students.
- *Translation of the major study into English and* Kirundi.
- *Dissemination activities, Sept-Dec 2005* – using a variety of media, including: radio and TV; A5 booklets with resumés in Kirundi; brochures; seminars and information sessions in a variety of centres, including literacy centres; distribution of the study to reading and cultural centres; textbooks to schools.
  (République du Burundi/UNESCO, 2003: 17-35).

Appendix D
Additional data on secondary schools

PRELIMINARY NOTE: Demographic statistics are difficult to access. Estimates for 1998 and 2001 are similar by province, due to revisions over time. Only Kirundo and Muyinga Provinces may currently have higher populations relative to their reported 1998 status, that is, at 3rd and 4th rank rather than 6th and 7th.

Primary expansion is reaching out into more and more disadvantaged communities as enrolments increase. Secondary education is still the domain of the relatively higher income families. It is an efficient barometer of equitable provision across the country, as regards regions, communities, gender and income groups. For this reason additional information is given below on the status of secondary schools in 1991/1992 and, overleaf, on 2002.

Table D1. Secondary institutions 1991/1992

Province	Cocos	Clgs pb	Lycées	LP	Tech	Total
Bujumbura Rural + Town	1	6	7	2	3	19
Gitega	2	1	6	2	4	15
Bururi	1	1	7	1	0	10
Muramvya	2	0	3	3	2	10
Cankuzo	2	2	0	1	0	5
Ngozi	1	1	2	1	0	5
Kayanza	1	1	1	1	0	4
Makamba	1	1	0	1	1	4
Muyinga	1	0	3	0	0	4
Bubanza	1	1	0	0	1	3
Cibitoke	2	0	1	0	0	3
Karusi	1	0	0	1	1	3
Kirundo	1	0	0	2	0	3
Ruyigi	0	1	2	0	0	3
Rutana	1	0	1	0	0	2
Totals	**18**	**15**	**33**	**15**	**12**	**93**

Cocos = community junior secondary schools. Clgs pb = state junior secondary schools.
Lycées = full high schools. LP = pedagogical high schools.
Tech = technical high schools.
Sources: MEN (2003*a*, 2003*b*, 2002).

The data do not explicitly refer to private schools. They include technical schools. A total of 93 schools are listed: community junior secondary schools, state junior secondary schools, state full high schools and pedagogical or teacher training high schools, and technical high schools. Excluding the technical schools, the total is 81 schools: 18 (29 per cent) community schools and 63 state schools.

Table D2 provides baseline data for *Figure 5.1* in *Chapter 5*.

Table D2. Cocos – Community junior secondary schools, 2002

Province	% Pop	Total secondary schools	Rank	Cocos	% Cocos
Rutana	4	14	15	13	93
Kayanza	8	32	3	28	88
Kirundo	8	21	7	18	86
Bujumbura Rural	7	26	6	22	85
Makamba	5	17	9	14	82
Cibitoke	6	16	13	13	81
Karusi	5	15	14	12	80
Muyinga	7	19	8	15	79
Bururi	7	44	1	33	75
Muramvya	8	16	12	12	75
Mwaro	8	17	11	12	71
Ngozi	10	26	5	18	69
Cankuzo	3	9	17	6	67
Ruyigi	5	17	10	11	65
Bubanza	5	13	16	8	62
Gitega	10	39	2	22	56
Bujumbura Town	5	31	4	16	52
BURUNDI	**100**	**372**		**273**	**73**

Sources: MEN (2003*a*, 2003*b*, 2002).

Col. 6, the right hand column, determines the order of the table. Provinces are listed on the left. Col.2 shows the percentage of total population of the country per province. Col.3 lists the total number of secondary schools per province in 2002, followed by their ranking order in Col.4. The *cocos* or junior community secondary schools are listed in Col. 5. Col.6 shows the proportion of *cocos* in the secondary subsector of each province. For example, in Rutana, which has 4 per cent of the nation's population, there are a total of 14 secondary schools. The province ranks 15th out of 17th in terms of provision, which is to be expected, given its low population. There are 13 *cocos* in the province (Col. 5), which

represent 93 per cent of the total secondary schools in the province. Since the national average is 73 per cent one would have expected fewer *cocos* and more state secondary schools in Rutana. Rutana is underserved by state schools (only 7 per cent are state or private secondary schools) and depends heavily on community and local government sources for its secondary school provision, as compared with Gitega where 56 per cent of the schools are *cocos* and the province benefits from 44 per cent support from the state (or from state and private schools).

The table does not give information on private provision of secondary schools, nor on technical high schools.

Appendix E

Global comparison of Tanzanian camp education as at end 2003

Data has been published by UNHCR for those 22 countries (66 camps) with reliable data out of a total of 'more than 250 refugee camps worldwide'. UNHCR points out that the data are therefore neither comprehensive, nor necessarily representative at country level (UNHCR, 2002*b*: 1). The status of education in the Tanzanian refugee camps is indicated below.

Table E1. Education in Tanzanian refugee camps compared with camps in other countries

Students enrolled	GER 5-17 yrs[a]	N pupils	Pri % girls	Grades 9-12 % girls	% women teachers	UTs	PTR	Teachers still needed	Temporary classrooms	PCR
Tanzania	91%	171,822	46%	16%	22%	44%	132	2,992	14%	170
21 Other Countries	21-209%	none over 100,000	31-52%	3-35%[b]	11-72%	0-100%	13-80	0-608	0% [c]	27-590

GER = Gross enrolment ratio; TS = Teachers; UTs = Untrained teachers; PTR = Pupil/teacher ratio; PCR = Pupil/classroom ratio.

[a] GER by camp rather than by totality of camps in one country.

[b] All 22 countries except Thailand, where rates are 86-115% girls.

[c] Only camps with enrolments of more than 1,000 school children are noted here.

Source: UNHCR, 2002*b*: Annex 1.

Enrolments: School enrolments are exceptionally large in the Tanzania camps, with 171,822 children, due to the high refugee population in the area and to the high enrolment ratios of children in school (91 per cent). Uganda, the second country featuring in the UNHCR data, has around 65,000 refugee children in school, about one third of the Tanzanian number. Girls make up a good proportion of the children at primary level relative to varying rates of enrolments in several other countries such as Ethiopia, Pakistan, Uganda and Kenya. As in other countries girls begin to drop out at upper primary grades and are noticeably absent from secondary enrolments.

Teachers: It is the three East African refugee-hosting countries which are most in need of teachers: Tanzania needs 2,992, Kenya 608

and Uganda 311; Ethiopia has a shortfall of 120 teachers; while other countries are fully staffed or need up to 50 teachers. In terms of qualified teachers two Eritrean camps, two Ethiopian, and one Bangladeshi are totally without trained teachers. In Tanzania and Uganda about half the teachers are untrained, while in Kenya they are all trained. Tanzania presents a case of chronic shortage of teachers per se and of qualified teachers.

Classrooms: Tanzanian camps have one of the highest proportions of unsatisfactory classrooms, with 14 per cent classified as temporary structures, and one of the highest pupil/classroom ratios, which makes for very difficult learning conditions. A double shift system is used everywhere for the first four classes of primary and sometimes at higher levels. In Africa, only Ugandan camps are worse off, with 32-62 per cent temporary structures – and Ghana records a pupil/classroom ratio of 1:590. Camps in Nepal and Thailand almost all use temporary structures, the former with about 50 pupils in one classroom. Only one camp in Uganda, two in Ethiopia and one in Ghana have higher classroom/pupil ratios than in Tanzania as a whole.

Pupil performance: Surprisingly, despite the relatively poor conditions of learning as compared with other camps, the refugee children do comparatively well in national examinations. The teachers, the community and the children are satisfied that pupils are performing better than in the home country. In the case of Burundi refugees in Tanzania, it is known that refugee teachers and children have better access to textbooks than in the home country.

Table E2. Refugee education in selected host countries, 2002

Host countries	[b] School enrolments (approx.)	% girls enrolled in pre/primary school	PTR [c]
Tanzania	170,000	46%	132
Uganda	65,000	40-50%	23-68
Kenya	50,000	33-40%	70-80
Thailand	40-49,000	48-52%	n/a
Algeria		41%	42
Nepal		32-39%	34-42
Guinea	30-39,000	43-49%	25-75
Ethiopia	25,000	33-50%	43-65
Pakistan	24,000*	31-40%	27-42
Ghana	10-19,000	53%	56
Sudan		36-55%	39-71
Rwanda		46-51%	42-58
DRC	600-9,000	35-45%	42
Iraq		49-50%	34-37
Namibia		47%	37
Bangladesh		46%	73
DRC		49%	33
Yemen		46%	30
Saudi Arabia		50%	13
Burundi		41%	51
Botswana		49%	-

[a] 22 country data presented by UNHCR.
[b] Col. 2 cells with one figure relate to all countries in Col. 1. Figures have been rounded up.
[c] Only those camps with enrolments of more than 1,000 school children are noted here.

Appendix F
Tanzania's national refugee policy on education

Strategy on education (Revised in 2003)

30. The Government of Tanzania will continue to encourage UNHCR and other responsible agencies to secure curricula and teaching materials from the respective countries of origin. It is emphasized that the nature of education given should focus on repatriation and reintegration in their countries of origin.
    Special efforts will be made to secure examinations from their countries of origin and corresponding certification.
31. On post-primary education, emphasis shall be put on vocational training in order to facilitate self-employment upon their return to their countries of origin.
    (The National Refugee Policy, Ministry of Home Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania, 2003: 17)

The Refugee Act of 1998 of Tanzania

"Part V, Miscellaneous – referring to Act 25 of 1978 –
31. Education for refugees

1. Every refugee child shall be entitled to primary education in accordance with the National Education Act 1978 and every refugee adult who desires to participate in adult education shall be entitled to do so in accordance with the Adult Education Act."
2. Every refugee shall be entitled to post-primary education in accordance with the rules made by the Minister [of Home Affairs] in accordance with subsection (3) of this section.
3. The minister, in consultation with the minister responsible for education as regards secondary and in consultation with the minister responsible higher education other than secondary education, shall make rules prescribing:
   (a) fees;
   (b) categories of schools, colleges or universities a refugee student can be enrolled in; and

(c) prescribing any matter that may need to be regulated for purposes of better and effective implementation of this section;

The Refugees Act 1998, United Republic ofTanzania,

Education for Refugees (31), Part V, Miscellaneous, referring to Act 25 of 1978 (pp. 31-32).

Appendix G

Further information on Burundi school children interviewed

Table G1. Focus on disruption of schooling, years out of school and repetition

P (1)	Name and family status (2)	Age (3)	Gr 2003 (4)	Relocation/ destination (5)	School type after flight (6)	Repetition (7)	OOS years (8)	OOS cause (9)	Remarks (10)
A	PAULINE Double orphan	16	6	Fled from Kirundo to Rwanda 4 years	Too young	Once, 3rd grade	3 months	Expelled from school: no fees	Child-headed household Cousin pays plot rent in Kirundo. Lost
B	EVARISTE, Paternal orphan	19	6	Fled from Bubanza to Bujumbura 1993-	No school fees for 5 years	Once, 3rd grade	6 years	Displaced Repetition	
C	EMMANUELLE Ruyigi Paternal orphan mother + 1 sister	14	6	Fled to Bujumbura 1999	Was IDPd to Bujumbura	Once, 3rd grade	2 years	Displaced (wait) Repetition	
D	FABIEN 2 parents, 7 children father mechanic/ farmer, mother farmer	14	6	Fled from province to Bujumbura IDP camp	IDP school	Once, 1st grade	2 years or more	+ unable to find school in Bujumbura for 1 year	
E	MARIE-CHRISTINE, 2 parents, 9 children, father pastor, runs an NGO HIV, mother businesswoman	15	6	Congo 2 years	2 years in Congo schools	Twice, 1st & 2nd grades	4 years	Exile Moved school a lot	
F	PEGGY 2 parents, 5 children all in school; father TV technician, mother primary Teacher at her school	13	6	None	NA	0	0	NA	Middle class but problems to pay fees, borrow. Has not yet attended school.
G	MARTIN Paternal orphan	17	8	IDP for 1 month	No school in IDP camp	Once, 1st grade	1 year	Flight. 1 month IDP lost 1 year	

Table G1. Continued

H	LUCIE Maternal orphan	19	10	Rwanda 6 months Tanzania 2 years	Rwanda camp: no school Tanzania: camp school	Once, 3rd grade	1 year	Rwanda camp: no school Repetition	Amazing initiative to go back to Tanzania, for school, alone, at 17 years. Lost 2 years
I	JOSEPHINE Double orphan. Parents were ill 5 siblings UN uncle now guardian	19	10	Relocated twice within Bujumbura	Schools always in Bujumbura	Twice, 6th & 10th grades			School fees guaranteed by uncle Repetition 2 years

Table G1 Focus on disruption of schooling, years out of school and repetition

P	Name and family status	Age/Grade	Country of exile	School type	Repetition	OOS cause	OOS cause	Remarks
J	IRENE 2 parents, 7 children, farmers (+ father casual mason)	18-10	IDP	Temporary schools started after 1 year	6th grade + +	7 years	2 flights, IDP camp without school + unknown	
K	INNOCENT Maternal orphan father: nothing mother killed 96+brother+2 stolen cattle	21-11 LP1	Relocated in Burundi, 96	New community college	0	1 year	Flight, new school would not admit him mid-year	
L	DIEUDONNÉ 2 old parents	31-11 Secondary	Fled from Bujumbura Kamenge to Tanzania, 10 years	Camp secondary school	7th & 10th grades	10 years	No secondary school at first in camp, then no fees	Still at school at 31 years! Parents were uninterested in schooling their children, had to work for fees. Will send nephews to school.
M	FÉLICITÉ 2 parents IDP 8 children, all in school, 5 in secondary, 3 in primary, 2 with poverty decl., 6 funded by NGOs in school	20-12 LP2	IDP Relocated three times in Burundi	Primary school Must have been IDP	0	2 years	1 year: fled 1 year no fees	All family in IDP camp, helpless. Family taken in 4. Children of relatives killed
N	RÉVÉRIN 2 old parents, Farmers	22-13 LM	Relocated twice in Burundi	Found schools by chance	1st , 3rd & 6th	7 years	6 years unaccounted for	1st &3rd repeated pre-1993; lost 7 years in all
O	DANIEL Double orphan Lost whole extended family, killed+land	22-13 LM	Relocated once, fled several times	In uncle's area	3 times 6th grade & 2 years in secondary	1 year	repeated flights	The most alone of all those interviewed

Table G1 Continued

P	JEAN-CLAUDE 2 parents, 6 children 5 in school (6th young). father sacked (embargo) mother farms	21-13 Secondary	2	School in Bujumbura	Once 5th Grade	1 year	After flight to Bujumbura	

Col.1: P = pupil;
Col.2: Age;
Col.3: Grade;
Col.4: Country of exile, or displaced to an IDP camp, or relocated within Burundi without assistance;
Col.7: Repetition of grades;
Col.8: number of years spent out of school/disruption;
Col.9: OOS =out-of-school: number of years out of school,
LP1: Pedagogical High School 1st year
LP2: Pedagogical high school 2nd year

Table G2. The work children do

P	Name & Family Status	Age	Grade	Work
A	PAULINE CHH – age 16 years, 6th grade Double orphan			Helps siblings farm
B	EVARISTE, Bubanza Paternal orphan	19	6	
C	EMMANUELLE, Ruyigi Paternal orphan, mother + 1 sister	14	6	
D	FABIEN 2 parents, 7 children Father mechanic, mother farmer	14	6	
E	MARIE-CHRISTINE, 2 parents, 9 children Father pastor + NGO HIV, mother business	15	6	
F	PEGGY 2 parents, 5 children all in school Father RTV technician, mother primary teacher in her school	13	6	Has never worked. BUT washes little brother's clothes, reducing homework time Visits friends/family during holidays, no work. Easy life
G	MARTIN Paternal orphan	17	8	Building site casual, once, for some weeks
H	LUCIE Maternal orphan	19	10	Helps father farm
I	JOSEPHINE	19	10	Never. Visits grandmother during holidays
J	IRENE 2 parents, 7 children farmers (+ mother mason)	18	10	She and her siblings in the work camps to earn exercise books
K	INNOCENT Maternal orphan, mother killed 96 + brother + 2 Father does not work, cattle stolen	21	11 LP1	Ministery of Reintegration work
L	DIEUDONNÉ young man at school Parents uninterested in schooling him	31	11 Secondary	Farmed for 5 years to collect school fees Medical assistant in refugee camps for 2 years, 18,000 T.Shs.
M	FÉLICITÉ 2 parents IDP camp, helpless, 8 children (4 of dead uncle/aunt) all in school. 5 secondary, 3 primary., 2 got poverty declarations, NGOs help 6 in school	20	12 LP2	Distributing mabati to nearby Bujumbura camp, earned 50,000 in **5** days; bought school writing materials & uniform for herself + siblings

N	RÉVÉRIN 2 old parents, farmers	22	13 LM	Helps parents cultivate. Has twice worked as assistant mason, for 8,000 and 14,000
O	DANIEL Lost whole family + land – orphan, all family killed – the most alone	22	13 LM	Ministry of Reintegration programme distributing *mabati* to nearby Bujumbura camp, earned 50,000 in 10 days. Grows vegetables at school during holidays, earning 30,000/10 (i.e. 3,000) – buys soap. Once did casual work at a construction site and earned 15,000 in 10 days (info provided from school friends).
P	JEAN-CLAUDE 2 parents, 6 children 5 in school (6th too young). Father sacked (embargo), mother farms	21	13 Secondary	Bar work sometimes, 20,000 per month. Buys school materials & uniform for himself + for siblings if possible

Pupils: 15 (8 male, 8 female). Ages: 13-31 years. Classes: Sixth to 13th grade.

Appendix H
Overview of one camp – Muyovosi

As noted elsewhere, sound data on the camps were difficult to get hold of. In an attempt to give a picture of the education situation in the Tanzanian camps, a cameo of one of those camps, Muyovosi, will be described here, in the hope of capturing some of the reality on the ground. The Muyovosi statistics were the best preserved and available for visitors, covering the walls of the Education Development Centre.

The total refugee population was recorded as 39,835 in Muyovosi at the end of 2003 (*UNHCR Monthly Statistics*, December 2004). In the same year children aged 7-13 years numbered 10,535[91] and children enrolled in primary schools were 9,705. Although the official age for primary children is 7-12 years in the Burundi school system, these data for Muyovosi produce the best estimate, so far, of the gross enrolment ratio in the camps, that is, 92 per cent GER for Muyovosi, since in all the other camps only data for children 5-18 years are available. If the age band data were reduced to 7-12 years, the GER would be higher. The figure of 92 per cent is close to the official GER reported by UNHCR over the 12 Tanzania camps for 2002, but both 91 and 92 per cent are underestimations.

Table H1. Schools in Muyovosi camp, Kasulu, 2003/4

Schools	N	Enrolments	Observations
Pre-primary centres	8	1,747	7 located in churches
Primary	7	9,705	51% girls
Secondary	1	669	28% girls
Nursing school	1	120	75 men/45 women (38%) Entrants have mininum 10 years schooling.

91. Community services social workers from UNHCR carried out a survey on the education sector in 2003. Only these data were available to the author. The camp authorities, that is, the refugee education authorities and Africare (the new implementing partner for education in the camp) do not know if such surveys will be repeated every year.

Table H2 gives an overview of trends in education in the camp since 1996.

Table H2. School enrolment trends in Muyovosi 1996/1997-2003

Year	Pre-school	Primary	Secondary
1996/1997	?	5,368	0
1997	?	6,295	434
1998	3,200	7,659	?
1999	2,500	8,496	?
2000	2,000	9,970	?
2001	2,000	10,492	650 +
2002	?	?	?
2003	1,747	9,705 Boys: 4,731 Girls: 4,974 (51%)	669 Boys: 482 Girls: 197 (28%)

The explanation for the decline in pre-school enrolments in the years following the start of nursery schooling was that parents expected agency support for pre-schools. Only sporadic deliveries of inappropriate materials are received from UNICEF. When parents realized that the teachers would not be paid and that households would be required to contribute for teacher incentives and other expenses, enrolments fell. At the November 2003 Muyovosi meeting on pre-schools, mothers said they still wanted pre-school provision to free them up for agricultural work in their own fields or to work as casual labourers on other farms. In other words, they are looking for a childcare service. At present seven of the eight Muyovosi pre-school centres are located in churches since they do not have their own premises.

Primary enrolments have decreased recently due to repatriation. In 1997 there were more girls in school than boys, 3,610 girls compared with 2,685 boys, due to the campaign for girls' education carried out early in the calendar year. One wonders what the Grade I intake was. It must have been highly skewed, even misguidedly skewed in favour of girls. The 1998 intake dropped considerably for girls. While all enrolments went up, those for boys increased to such an extent that there were several hundred more boys in school than girls in September 1998. This is a

vivid example of a short-term and a poorly designed girls' education programme, which had to be restarted after 2000.

There is an ongoing campaign aimed at improving the enrolment of girls, by (a) increasing the intake of girls into the first grade class and (b) retaining them throughout primary school and into secondary school. It is already running into problems and has produced a male backlash discernible across all the camps visited during the author's mission in 2004. Men and boys are quick to point out that they feel the programme is discriminatory against boys. It has not been explained to them in a manner that can convince them that the disadvantages of girls and women are chronic and real, and that affirmative programmes are needed. It can be expected that as soon as the minimal (and poorly focused) incentives given to girls are removed, it may again be boys who seize the more significant opportunities for self-advancement.

Secondary school enrolment started on a high note but it has not increased at the rate one might have anticipated over the years, from 434 students in 1997/8 to the current 669, an increase of 235 students (54%) in seven years. In Muyovosi secondary school one quarter of the pupils are girls. At first, the low secondary enrolments would seem to be the result of the high cost to parents of secondary schooling – and to the heavy cost to the community of the schools themselves. The community is desperate about the plight of their secondary school. The head is extraordinarily committed and tries many avenues in seeking extra resources. It is a lamentable situation with few listeners and sympathizers outside the camps. The Refugee Education Trust (RET) is the main supporter of secondary education in the camps, alongside UNICEF, which provides some writing materials, and others. On the ground, RET is blamed for not doing much, for not doing more. It is clear that RET cannot yet deliver what it would like to deliver or what the schools need. But this is a new organization and, with the establishment of a co-ordinating regional office in Nairobi, it is expected to draw up explicit, modest and achievable programme goals in partnership with the refugee community, and to assist the subsector develop broader support for secondary education.

It is interesting that on questioning the secondary school authorities more closely about the need to increase the number of secondary places, they are adamant that it would be difficult to increase the number of places due to the quality of entrants. They insist that the arbitrarily high

entrance qualification the camps have chosen, higher than is required in Burundi, must stay and that they will not compromise the quality of secondary schooling in the camp. It is evident that they are sticking to pre-conflict home country values. Burundi has moved on fast from this position, without the blessing of the national authorities, as parents have created new community junior secondary schools in all corners of the home country. The position of the refugee education authorities may, however, be one way of stating that they can only work within severe limits and that one way of managing problems and of maintaining quality is to keep the secondary schools reasonably small. They could be right. However, in the absence of significant opportunities for further learning for adolescents in the camps, it is plain that the secondary subsector and alternative education planners need to get together to develop education for youth.

Teachers

Data on the numbers and proportion of trained/untrained teachers in Muyovosi camp are not readily available. Understandably circumstances change from month to month, but it would be useful to have trimestrial figures or at least annual ones. Primary teachers are paid T.Shs.8,000 per month (approximately US$18) and secondary teachers received around T.Shs.20,000. *Askaris* (school night guards) receive T.Shs.10,000.

Table H3 Teachers in Muyovosi camp

Year	Pre-school	M	F	Primary	M	F	Secondary	M	F
1996/7				116	92	24	25*		
(per cent)					(79)	(21)			
2002				125	90	35			
(per cent)					(72)	(28)			
2003	33	23	10				49*	42	7
(per cent)		(70)	(30)					(86)	(14)

* Some (an unknown number) are full-time, some are part-time.

Female primary teachers were few at the start of the programme in 1996, around one fifth, and took many years to reach the present proportion of just over one quarter of the teachers. Evidently no one was really monitoring the proportion of female teachers, or doing anything

significant about it. This represents an opportunity lost in the camps. One seventh of the teachers at secondary level are women.

Performance

The cut-off point for selection into secondary school is 42 per cent in the primary leaving examination in Muyovosi. It was 40 per cent in some other camps. The pass mark was set at 50 per cent in the Interregional Examination Board (IEB) A-level. The official A-level in DRC (called the 'examen d'État') provides a certificate/diploma for the candidates and is therefore particularly valuable. It is easier to pass than the IEB examination. Over the years, as many as 70 to 82 per cent of the Muyovosi candidates have passed the IEB A-level. The proportion of passes at O-level has been 60-70 per cent in Muyovosi.

The refugees explain that since 2000 there have been problems in Myovosi camp, incidents in Burundi affecting the security of the camp, and they have had to spend nights in the bush rather than in their houses. This has had a significant effect on the pass rate, which declined during recent years. Since September 2003 the camp has recovered and they are now hoping for better school results.

There seem to be far too many tests, (a) weekly and monthly across the camp schools, in addition to (b) the inter-camp mock for the examination classes and (c) the public examinations proper:

- Burundi and Congolese, and IEB primary leaving examinations for 6^{e} (sixth grade in primary);
- Burundi and Congolese, and IEB exams for 10^{e} (4th year of secondary);
- Burundi and Congolese, and IEB exams for the bac (A-level), the senior secondary leaving examination, after 7th year of secondary.

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