

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES TO SUPPORT OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN AND YOUTH THROUGH ACCELERATED LEARNING PROGRAMMES

Case Study of Jordan

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Abbreviations

AAI	Accelerating Access Initiative
ACCESS	Accelerating Change for Children’s and Youths’ Education through Systems Strengthening
AEP	Accelerated education programmes
AEWG	Accelerated Education Working Group
EMIS	Education Management Information System
GDP	Gross domestic product
JOHUD	Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development
MECI	Middle East Children’s Initiative
MoE	Ministry of Education
NCHRD	National Committee for Human Resource Development
NFE	Nonformal education
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OOSCY	Out-of-school children and youth
PEA	Political economy analysis
PLM	Participatory learning methodology
TVET	Technical and vocational education and training
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
VTC	Vocational training centres

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 nearly 258 million children and youth were out of school worldwide (UNESCO Institute for Statistics [UIS], 2019). The majority live in crisis-affected contexts and find themselves out of school because of conflict- or disaster-induced displacement. The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to increase the number of out-of-school children and youth (OOSCY), with a projected additional 24 million not returning to school as they reopen (UNESCO, 2020). Global school closures have made children fall behind their age-appropriate grade more than ever before. While the duration of school closures varies greatly, as of January 2022, schools worldwide had been fully or partially closed for an average of 38 weeks—more than the equivalent of a full academic year. In some countries, including Uganda and Colombia, schools have been fully or partially closed for nearly 2 school years (UNESCO, n.d.). Due to these sweeping school closures, many children will be prevented from returning to formal education due to being overage, and many more will not return due to the need to generate income, increased household and childcare responsibilities, early marriage and childbearing, and other reasons.

Accelerated Education Programmes (AEP) are an alternative education option to help overage, OOSCY complete primary education (and in some cases junior secondary school) and transition back into formal education, into technical/vocational training or into livelihoods opportunities. AEPs provide learners with equivalent, certified competencies for basic education using effective teaching and learning approaches that match their level of cognitive maturity. AEPs reduce the number of years in a learning cycle and allow students to complete a certified, equivalent level of education in a shortened time frame (Accelerated Education Working Group [AEWG], 2017).

In 2020, the AEWG¹ conducted a review of the existing evidence base on AEPs. A key finding of the evidence review was that while there is substantial evidence on the effectiveness of AEPs to increase access to education by overage OOSCY, as well as some evidence on how AEPs improve learning outcomes, completion, and transition, AEPs are not yet fully institutionalised and supported within a wider suite of nonformal education (NFE) opportunities for OOSCY in many contexts.

¹ The AEWG is an interagency working group made up of partners funding and implementing accelerated education programmes globally. The AEWG is currently led by UNHCR with representation from UNICEF, UNESCO, USAID, DG-ECHO, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Plan, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children, Education Development Center (EDC), and War Child Holland. Its overarching goal is to strengthen the quality of AEPs through a more harmonised, standardised approach.

Under the Accelerating Change for Children’s and Youths’ Education through Systems Strengthening (ACCESS) research project—led by the University of Auckland in partnership with the AEWG and funded by Dubai Cares under E-Cubed—this report presents findings from the first phase of research in Jordan. Key questions this phase of the research sought to explore are:

1. To what extent does political commitment, capacity and will for institutionalising and integrating alternative and/or NFE interventions such as AEPs exist within the national education system at present?
2. Where are there current levers and opportunities for the AEWG to lead and/or support systematic change which would better promote increased access to AEPs for learners who need it?

In Section 2 of this report, we specify the methodology used in this first phase of the research. In Section 3, we identify the distinct groups of OOSCY in Jordan and assess the reasons they are out of school; and in Section 4, we examine the current range of learning opportunities available to these out-of-school learners—provided by state and nonstate actors and focusing on two programmes: the Catch-Up and Drop-Out Programmes. In doing so, we locate where AEPs fit into the current NFE landscape, and briefly trace their development and growth in the country to date. Further, we map out the key stakeholders involved at present in funding, operating, overseeing, and legislating these programmes—and with what effect. In Section 5, we analyse the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability of existing AEPs at present, and the underlying factors contributing to challenges in those areas. In Section 6, we discuss a key transition that is ongoing in Jordan—the Accelerating Access Initiative (AAI), and the opportunities and risks this initiative faces in better institutionalising AEPs to meet the needs of OOSCY. The last section of the report—Section 7—summarises the implications of these findings regarding opportunities and challenges for the AEWG engaging with national educational stakeholders to advance policy reform for overaged out-of-school learners.

SECTION 2

METHODOLOGY



To explore the two main questions in this first phase of the research, an applied political economy analysis (PEA) was conducted. Political economy approaches provide a way of situating educational interventions and programmes, such as AEPs, within the wider political, social, and economic systems in which they exist (Robertson & Dale, 2015). More critical applications of PEA also emphasise the power relations and competing interests of key actors, organisations and institutions in either maintaining or disrupting the status quo in relation to OOSCY and the causes and consequences of them remaining out of school (Novelli et al., 2014). A light-touch problem-driven framework to PEA (Harris, 2013) coupled with a power-based analysis (Acosta & Pettit, 2013) was used to explore and analyse over four successive and iterative waves of data collection:

- a. The various categories of OOSCY in the country, why they are out of school, and the degree to which they are accounted for, recognised, and their needs met within existing education policies and programming at present (and why/why not);

- b. The prevalence and existence of AEPs or AEP-like programmes for OOSCY, how this has evolved over time, and how such programmes are governed, regulated, funded and provisioned for within the wider national education systems (including an identification of key stakeholders and their interests within these functions);
- c. The degree to which such programmes are meeting the desired needs and ambitions of various groups of OOSCY, and why that might be.

True to the problem-driven framework, the focus on OOSCY is shaped by the premise that AEPs are one solution to addressing this chronic global concern. A problem-driven framework helps us to see the issues and challenges facing AEPs beyond technical implementation issues and helps to situate them within systems that may currently work against the programme ambitions. By foregrounding these issues, the aim is to then identify entry points to shift the institutional or regulatory frameworks governing OOSCY or the motivations and power relationships of key actors involved in thwarting change at present.

2.1 Specific Scope and Focus of Research

Within the parameters noted above, the scope and focus of the research were further refined in terms of both the specific questions/topics explored, as well as the types of programmes, geographical location, and target populations the research focused on. After initial exploration of the wide range of NFE options available to OOSCY in Jordan, this research focused on the Catch-Up Programme (CUP) and Drop-Out Programme (DOP) specifically (described in detail in Section 4). There is a range of NFE and informal education options available, but these two programmes are the focus of this research because they are accredited by the Ministry of Education (MoE), targeted at OOSCY, and offer pathways for reintegration back into formal education.

The research looks at programmes nationwide, assessing evidence and speaking to implementers who operate across the country. To the extent possible, the research looks at all OOSCY, inclusive of different nationalities, genders, geographical locations, and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Research questions look at four themes: (a) need and demand for AEPs; (b) the current provision of AEP, and specifically the CUP and DOP and challenges in achieving the programmes' stated objectives; (c) actors and policy framework involved in the regulation, funding and implementation of these programmes; and (d) political, social, and economic factors influencing the CUP and the DOP.

2.2 Approach to Data Collection and Analysis

This research includes an extensive desk review of available literature in both Arabic and English languages and key informant interviews with national stakeholders in the education landscape in Jordan. All data collection was qualitative. The research began with a desk review of policy, legislation, needs assessments, evaluations, and programme documents. The desk review resulted in further development of the scope of the research, stakeholders mapping, and interview tools. Table 1 shows the number of documents reviewed by type for this research.

Table 1

Number of Documents Reviewed by Type

Document Type	# of documents
Policies and legislation	8
Strategies and plans (e.g., education sector plans, refugee-re- sponse plans, education strategy)	12
Needs assessments	39
Programme documentation (e.g., programme evaluations, project overviews)	43
Total	102

A total of 19 key informant interviews were conducted. Questions for the interviews were tested and modified throughout based on feedback received and data saturation. Interview questions were individualised to utilise the expertise of different stakeholders. Stakeholders included education experts, the MoE NFE department, NFE regulators, implementers, and funders. Participants for interviews were purposively selected, based on their knowledge of OOSCY in Jordan or their experience in either researching, funding, regulating, or implementing the CUP or the DOP. Table 2 shows the number of participants by interviewee type.

Table 2Number of Participants by Interviewee Type²

	National actors
Education expert	7
AE researcher	1
AE funder	5
AE regulator	2
AE implementer	4
Total	19

A full list of documents reviewed and stakeholders interviewed is provided in Annexes 1 and 2. All interviews were conducted by the author of this report and were then transcribed, cleaned, and analysed. When consent was given, a digital voice recording was used, and recordings were secured to the cloud. The interviews were analysed using thematic framework analysis and allowed the inclusion of themes emerging from the data collected.

² Researchers may include those affiliated with universities, research institutes, non-governmental or governmental entities, or individuals. Funders may include representatives from multi-lateral funds or bilateral donors, or government entities involved in financing AE. Regulators may include government officials developing policy and monitoring AE, as well as coordinating bodies such as UN agencies. Implementers may include representatives of non-governmental organisations, school administration or staff responsible for provision of AE. Experts include any of the above that may not be considered a researcher, funder, regulator, or implementer.

2.3 Limitations

The research faced limitations as a result of incomplete data on OOSCY, limited data on programmes, and the fact that data collection did not include any young people. These limitations are further explored below:

1. Incomplete data

- Lack of reliable up-to-date nationwide data on numbers of enrolled and graduated participants from NFEs.
- Lack of data looking at refugee minorities who are not of Syrian origin. Most of the available research focuses on Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.
- The majority of the stakeholders interviewed for this research were not willing to share quantitative data from the CUP or DOP, although data on enrolment and completion exist.
- The CUP is supported by one funder and thus information about the programme is monopolised and was more challenging to obtain.

2. Programme evaluation

- Existing evaluations of programmes are donor funded and incomprehensive, looking at centres funded by a donor and not nationwide.
- While funders and implementers have conducted evaluations of the DOP, some of those evaluations remain unpublished.
- As the CUP was launched in 2017, there are no available evaluations published to date.


3. Scope of research did not include young people

- The scope of the research did not include data collection from young people who are out of school or attend NFE programmes.
- To date, no published research is available on the needs and desires of OOSCY in Jordan.

Some of the abovementioned limitations are due to factors and conditions which are later explored in the report (see Sections 3, 4,5, and 6).

SECTION 3

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AND OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN JORDAN



This section explores the Jordanian context and education system, as well as the characteristics of the OOSCY population and the barriers they face to being in school. This section focusses on populations of interest and relevance to AEPs—namely adolescents and youth aged 9 to 18 who either have never entered formal education or have missed significant amounts of their education and are considered too far overage to enter back into formal education.³

³ The AEWG considers AEPs relevant for over-age OOSCY aged 10 to 18. This is because, in many contexts, children 9 years and younger are not considered over-age and could reenrol in formal education, and because, given their level of cognitive development, an accelerated curriculum may not be appropriate for them. Individuals over 18 years are often included in and more appropriate for adult education. The AEWG recognises, however, that the exact age range for AEPs differs by context.

3.1 Jordanian Context and the Education System

In 2017, the World Bank changed Jordan's classification from an upper middle-income country to a lower middle-income country. The reclassification reflects data from the 2015 national census which show a slowdown in real gross domestic product (GDP) and an unprecedented influx of refugees (MoE, 2018). In the past 15 years, the population of Jordan saw an 86.4% increase from 5.9 million people in 2006 to over 11 million in 2021 (Department of Statistics, 2021a). Jordan continues to be the second-highest hosting country of refugees per capita in the world. One out of every three people residing in Jordan is a refugee. Refugees come to Jordan from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and 45 other states (UNHCR, 2020), with 47% of refugees arriving to Jordan under the age of 17 (UNHCR, 2022). The education system in Jordan was ill prepared for both the population growth and refugee influx and thus the increase to the student population (World Bank, 2017).

In Jordan, education is split into basic and secondary education, with basic education covering Grades 1–10, including both primary (Grades 1–6) and lower secondary (Grades 7–10), and upper secondary education covering Grades 11 and 12. To complete upper secondary education successfully, students must pass the Tawjihi exam. Tawjihi is the Secondary Education Certificate Examination, the final stage of school education. Both basic and secondary education are free of charge. Jordanian law mandates education to be compulsory for all learners through to the age of 16, which is equivalent to Grade 10. While basic education has been compulsory in Jordan since the early 60s, the law does not penalise noncompliance.

In the academic year 2019/2020, 1,769,600 students attended basic education and 236,900 attended secondary education (Department of Statistics, 2021b). In the same year, the MoE operated 3,893 primary, secondary, and upper secondary public schools attended by 1.44 million students. The remaining student body attended private schools or schools operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (MoE, 2020).

3.2 Out-of-School Children and Youth

Our analysis of the out-of-school population is informed by a typology—initially developed by Lewin (2007) and then taken up by UNICEF and UIS (2015)—of the five dimensions of educational exclusion:

- **Group 1:** Preprimary-aged out-of-school children
- **Group 2:** Primary-aged out-of-school children
- **Group 3:** Lower secondary aged out-of-school children
- **Group 4:** Learners at risk of dropping out of primary school
- **Group 5:** Learners at risk of dropping out of lower secondary school

AEPs typically target students in Groups 2 and 3—learners who are already out of school and are of primary or lower secondary age—with the goal of providing a pathway for those who are overage to reenter formal education. UNICEF’s framework (UNICEF & UIS, 2015) for Groups 2 and 3 further delineates those out-of-school children into three subgroups:

- a. **Visible out-of-school children:** These are out-of-school children who are typically accounted for in official figures, based on information collected from EMIS systems or other government databases. These are typically students who are school leavers rather than those who have never entered into school at all.
- b. **Semi-invisible out-of-school children:** These are either learners who attend school infrequently, or learners who may no longer be attending school but are still counted as enrolled because their drop-out status was never registered; or children who never enrolled in school but for whom information can be obtained from national birth registration records, household IDs or other civil records.
- c. **Invisible out-of-school children:** These are children not recorded in any government, administrative or school record, and are often the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children in society.

Lastly, it is important to note that UNICEF’s framework acknowledges that, in some contexts, OOSCY may in fact be participating in some form of learning which is not officially recognised or does not result in a qualification. This includes literacy programmes, life skills training, nonformal vocational training, rural-development education, religious education, and cultural/traditional education. While they should be counted as OOSCY in official figures, “participation in non-formal education is different from no exposure to school at all and should be reported separately when analysing data on out of school children” (UNICEF & UIS, 2015, p. 15).

Below, we provide a brief profile of the learners in Groups 2 and 3 above and what current provision exists for these learners to reenter or access education.

3.3 Numbers and Rates of OOSCY

Estimates of the number and rates of OOSCY vary widely by source and are unreliable, ranging from 112,016 to 527,582 (MoE & UNICEF Jordan, 2020; UIS, n.d.). A joint publication by the MoE and UNICEF in 2020, using numbers put forward in government-collected data from the EMIS and the Department of Statistics, reports that the total number of OOSCY of compulsory-school age (6–16, or primary and secondary age) not attending basic education in Jordan to be 112,016, making up 6.2% of the total school-aged children and youth of that age group in Jordan. This number only includes Grades 1 to 10, with 54,761 children out of primary education and 57,255 out of lower secondary education.

The report highlighted inequalities in accessing formal education, with out-of-school rates noticeably higher among nonnationals. As shown in Table 3, 39,800 Jordanian, 50,600 Syrians, and 21,500 children of other nationalities are reported by MoE and UNICEF (2020) to be out of school. In support

of the above figures, the Jordan National Child Labour Survey showed that 5% of all children and youth are not attending basic education (Shteiwi et al., 2016). Still, civil society actors reported that in reality the figures for OOSCY are far higher (J.1, expert; J.12, AE implementer; J.15, AE funder), and while the numbers in Table 3 show visible OOSCY, it leaves out those who are semivisible and invisible.

The MoE counts drop-outs when a student who is registered in school does not return the following school year, leaving out of the statistics all those who were never enrolled in formal school or those who register and do not attend (the semi-invisible and invisible children). The number of children and youth who are between 6 and 17 years old and have never been enrolled in formal education is estimated to be 1.6% (MoE & UNICEF Jordan, 2020).

Table 3

Primary and Lower Secondary-Age Out-of-School Children in Jordan, MoE and UNICEF Jordan (2020)

Nationality	Number of primary OOSC	Percentage of group by gender	Percentage of total primary OOSC
Group 2: Primary-age out-of-school children (age 6–11)			
Jordanian	18,932	42% male 58% female	34.6%
Syrian	24,132	51.5% male 48.5% female	44%
Other nationalities	11,697	57% male 43% female	21.4%
Total	54,761	49.4% male 50.6% female	100%
Group 3: Lower secondary-age out-of-school children (age 12–15)			
Jordanian	20,906	54.3% male 45.7% female	36.5%
Syrian	26,510	53.7% male 46.3% female	46.3%
Other nationalities	9,839	60.7% male 39.3% female	17.2%
Total	57,255	55% male 45% female	100%

A second source of data on OOSCY from the World Bank shows how the Syrian refugee crisis, which began in 2010/2011, has impacted the enrolment rate in basic and secondary education in Jordan. While the data effectively demonstrates the decrease in enrolment rates due to the crisis, the data are substantially different from the UNICEF data, reporting that 281,509 OOSCY are out of primary education.

Table 4 shows the enrolment rate in basic education decreasing from 94.6% in 2000 to 80% in 2020 and secondary-education enrolment decreasing from 82% in 2000 to 68% 2020, suggesting that 20% of children are out of compulsory basic education, and 32% are out of secondary education (World Bank, n.d.).

Table 4
World Bank Data on Basic- and Secondary-Education School Enrolment

Year	2000	2010	2020
Basic-education enrolment	94.6%	81.9%	80%
Secondary-education enrolment	82%	80%	68%

To further highlight data discrepancy, UIS (n.d.) reported the numbers of OOSCY to be much higher than that reported by other stakeholders. UNESCO data from 2020 report the number of out-of-school children aged 5–11 to be 281,509 and adolescents aged 12–17 to be 246,073, making a total of 527,582, almost five times the number reported by MoE and UNICEF (UIS, n.d.). While the MoE and UNICEF 2020 report used data from EMIS and the Department of Statistics, both the World Bank and UIS calculated the number of OOSCY by subtracting the number of primary-school-age children enrolled in primary or secondary school from the total population of school-age children, thus including visible, semivisible, and invisible OOSCY.

Both the MoE/UNICEF and World Bank data contradict data published by the MoE in its annual 2020 report, where the enrolment rate was reported at 97.9% for basic education and 77.9% for secondary education (MoE, 2021).

Despite the contradictions described above, the data consistently show that the majority of OOSCY are of non-Jordanian nationalities. In 2019, UNHCR released data stating that out of 233,000 refugee children who are at school age, 83,920 are not enrolled in any form of education, neither formal nor informal, constituting 36% of the total school-aged refugee population. Similarly, reports published by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) estimated that 41% of Syrian school-age children and youth are out of school (Carrier, 2018; Save The Children, 2016). The Vulnerability Assessment Framework Population Study published in 2019 reported that 19% of Syrian children are classified as severely or highly vulnerable to being out of school or at risk of dropping out (Brown et al., 2019), while another UN assessment published in 2015 stated that 97% of school-age Syrian children are at risk of not going to school because of financial hardship (Carrier, 2018). The inequality in access to formal education for refugees at all levels of education is acknowledged by the Government of Jordan; the MoE (2018) Education Strategic Plan 2018–2022 committed to addressing barriers that make out-of-school rates higher for children of non-Jordanian nationality.

In addition to the large number of OOSCY in Jordan, the MoE and UNICEF (2020) publication reported that 40,647 students are at risk of dropping out. Those are identified as students who are “at least two years older than the recommended age to start the grade they are attending” (p. 12).

Current regulations do not allow those who are 3 years older than their grade to enrol in formal education. According to the National Committee for Human Resource Development (NCHRD), Jordan has high levels of student absenteeism, with 40% of students reported skipping at least 1 entire day of school without authorisation every 2 weeks. The NCHRD strategy, published in 2016, concluded that the education system in Jordan is failing to meet expectations on enrolment and learning outcomes: “Whether judged by enrolment and progression rates, the results achieved in school examinations, or the employment and employability of those graduating or leaving education, the system is failing to meet expectations” (p. 16).

The COVID-19 pandemic is already proving to exacerbate the challenge of school drop-out. Stakeholders, both in government entities and NGOs, estimated that the number OOSCY has doubled since the MoE and UNICEF report was published, due to the COVID-19 pandemic (J.17, AE regulator; J.18, AE funder).


Despite challenges to the data described above, regionally and compared to countries with similar income levels, Jordan holds high enrolment rates in formal education (NCHRD, 2016). On the surface, the numbers may look hopeful, but percentages hide the size of the challenge masking substantial disparities at the subnational level or by socioeconomic status and nationality (Salamah, 2017). Available numbers raise a concern around the gap of those enrolled in Grade 1 and those enrolled in Grade 10 and show a worrying increase in numbers of OOSCY who drop out as they progress through basic education. During the 2 academic years 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 the number of those enrolled in Grade 10 was 16% less than those enrolled in Grade 1; the percentage rose to 22% in the academic year 2012–2013 and then to 35% in the 3 years that followed. In a study that traced those enrolled in Grade 5 in the academic year 2010–2011, it is reported that from the same cohort, 11,000 students, approximately 8%, did not reach Grade 10, meaning they did not complete basic education (Salamah, 2017). This raises serious concerns about the formal education system’s ability to retain its students as they progress along academic grades. A Human Rights Watch report published in 2020 reported:

Beginning at around age 12, Syrian children’s enrolment begins to drop, even though 10 years of basic education are compulsory in Jordan. ... [Syrian refugees have a] gross enrolment rate of 25 percent. A detailed survey conducted during the 2017–2018 school year of 18,000 Syrian refugee children in Jordan found that only 15 percent of Syrian 16-year-olds and 21 percent of 17-year-olds were enrolled in secondary school, as compared to more than 80 percent of Jordanian children of both ages. (Small, 2020, p. 1)

Figure 1, looking at the academic year 2015–2016, highlights the decline in enrolment as students progress through basic education.

Figure 1

Enrolment by Grade. Adapted from Salamah (2017)



3.4 Challenges with Statistical Data

Defining the precise number of OOSCY in Jordan is challenging, with different sources providing conflicting data on enrolment rates (Younes & Morrice, 2019). Both governmental entities and NGOs have highlighted this challenge. The EU Common Results Frameworks stated, “There is no scientifically acceptable evidence available for making any projections on the number of out of school Syrian pupils” (European Union, 2018, p. 38). Similarly, an evaluation of EU programming published in 2019 highlights the lack of reliable and up-to-date data on OOSCY, and, in turn, the lack of uniform understanding on why OOSCY are out of basic education.

The issue of data is compounded by an overall lack of available and reliable data. ... the majority of donors, implementing partners and organizations working in the sector interviewed ... stated that there is a problem with reliable and systematically updated data, albeit for different reasons, allowing to determine, inter alia, the numbers of out of school children ... and the reasons why they are not accessing Basic Education. (Particip Consortium, 2019, p. 27)

While there has been acknowledgement from the Government of Jordan that the education system needs to do better at enrolling and retaining students, the numbers of out-of-school children remain a controversial topic. A previous director of NFE at the MoE shared that calculating drop-out rates is a complex task involving both a number of governmental entities and NGOs (Salamah, 2017). The challenge is heightened due to relatively limited coordination between ministries; the Ministries of Labour, Social Development, and Education collect data on OOSCY. The Ministry of Labour looks at children and youth who engage in child labour; the Ministry of Social Development looks at children and youth with disabilities, those in juvenile centres, and those involved in street work; and finally, the MoE looks at children and youth who are denied entry to formal schooling, drop out, or do not return to enrol.⁴

⁴ This report will refer to the data shared in the MoE and UNICEF (2020) report on OOSCY, as it is the only source of data that offers disaggregation of OOSCY based on nationality and other socioeconomic vulnerabilities.

MoE's EMIS better enables data-driven decision making for primary and secondary education, but it does not include data from upper secondary education or NFE. Implementers of NFE have been advocating for the government to include data on OOSCY and accelerated education programmes as part of EMIS, and reported there is still resistance to doing so (J.12, AE implementer). However, in an interview for this research, a government official did confirm that including data from NFE in the EMIS is one of the MoE's future objectives (J.17, AE regulator).

Challenges related to reliability of data on OOSCY also relate to challenges in the process of reporting children as out of school. Data from formal education is added to the EMIS by schools, each school has an account on EMIS and it is the role of the school principal to report students who miss more than 7 consecutive days of schooling. The process of documenting school drop-out was described as follows:

Once a student is identified as having missed 3 consecutive days of schooling without approval, it is the role of the school counsellor to follow up on reasons behind absence, the school sends a letter informing the child's parents of his/her absence. If the student does not return to school and misses more than 7 consecutive days of schooling, it is then the school principal's role to add this data on the EMIS system and inform the MoE directorate who in turn informs the administrative governor with the objective of returning the student back to school. The administrative governor then sends law enforcement to the student's house to inquire on the reasons for absence and inform the student's caregiver that basic education is mandatory. Challenges, however, remain, as no government body has the power to force the return to education if caregivers wish to keep the student out of school. (J.17, AE regulator)

According to the same government official, a student is counted as a drop out on the system once they miss 7 or more consecutive school days with no excuse of absence; in theory, a student automatically fails the semester if they miss 21 days. The level of compliance in entering students' information on EMIS beyond enrolment is unclear. A World Bank report published in 2017 maintains that there is a critical need to further build the capacity of MoE staff on the use of EMIS. In an interview with an education expert, the lack of follow up on students' enrolment, attendance, and completion was cited as a reason for the lack of trust in OOSCY numbers reported by the government (J.10, Expert).

An additional challenge to the accuracy of data on OOSCY is that EMIS data only includes those in basic education and does not include data on students in upper secondary, vocational education, or out of both (MoE & UNICEF Jordan, 2020). For this reason, there is limited data on the number of students who complete their education past Grade 10. A survey conducted in 2018 shows that only 15% of Syrians who are 16 years old are enrolled in secondary education, compared to more than 80% of Jordanians (Small, 2020).

Furthermore, there is a lack of data on the needs of refugees in Jordan that are not of Syrian origin. The lack of data on refugees of other nationalities is reflected in this report where most data refer to Jordanian and Syrian children and youth. Around 11% of refugees and asylum seekers

registered with UNHCR are from countries other than Syria, yet almost the entirety of aid directed at refugee response is directed exclusively to Syrians and vulnerable Jordanians, leaving holders of other nationalities with limited access to services and legal rights, and the sector with little information about their vulnerabilities and needs (Johnston et al., 2019). A report titled Displaced Minorities published by Mixed Migration Platform (2017) stated:

Insufficient attention has been devoted to understanding [non-Syrians'] experiences of displacement, humanitarian and protection needs, and access to appropriate solutions. From the few studies that point out gaps and imbalances in the humanitarian response framework, we know that minority groups face unmet protection, healthcare, education, shelter, non-food items, food security and livelihoods need. (p. 1)

3.5 Profiles of Out-of-School Children and Youth

Dropping out of school is a cumulative process that reflects complex and often interlinked vulnerabilities interacting over time. Available research shows that the list of factors contributing to drop-out is long and myriad. In Jordan, the contributors to drop-out in basic education can be categorised as follows:

1. System-level challenges
2. Socioeconomic challenges
3. In-school experience

System-level challenges

System-level challenges to accessing education include availability of spaces, administrative barriers, quality of education, and public schools that are inaccessible to learners with disabilities. These issues are interrelated and tend to affect different groups of learners differently.

- **System unable to meet needs of learners with disabilities.** There are 251,499 persons with disability in Jordan, and children and youth with disabilities are considerably less likely attain any form of education (ESCWA, 2018). Data published by Humanity & Inclusion in 2021 showed that out of the 11% national disability rate, 79% of school-age children and youth are not enrolled in any form of education. Disability compounds with other identities to impact the extent to which children and youth are able to access school. Among Syrian refugees, disability rates are notably higher with around 23% of children aged 2 years and above having disabilities (Humanity & Inclusion, 2021). Among children and youth with disabilities, 78% of females and 53.7% of males in rural areas have received no schooling (ESCWA, 2018). Challenges children and youth with disabilities face in accessing formal education include negative attitudes among communities; the education system's lack of capacity; difficulty reaching schools, and using school

facilities; and violence (Humanity & Inclusion, 2021; Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Jordan, 2020; NCHRD, 2016). Formal government-run education has not adequately addressed the accessibility barriers faced by children and youth with disabilities, both physical and in relation to inclusive education practices. Only 1 of 10 public schools is able to provide learners with disabilities with accessible classrooms (Personal communication, December 21, 2021).⁵

- **Availability of schools and overcrowding.** Availability of formal schooling is one of the most common reasons stated for dropping out of basic education. For both males and females between the ages of 6 and 11, school being too far away from home was mentioned by 11% as the reason behind drop out, while 5% mentioned there were no seats available to accommodate them at the nearest schools (Carlier, 2018).
- **Administrative barriers for refugees.** For refugees, almost half of families note administrative barriers as the biggest challenge to accessing formal education. One of the most referenced administrative barriers to school enrolment is the 3-years rule, which forbids children and youth who have been out of the formal school system for 3 or more years from directly enrolling back. In 2016, the estimate of Syrian children alone who could not access formal education as a result of the 3-year rule was 77,000 (Younes & Morrice, 2019). Documentation requirements and clear regulation on what is needed pose another barrier to non-Jordanians (Mixed Migration Platform, 2017).
- **Quality of education.** The past decade has placed a strain on the quality of basic education across the kingdom. Schools are overcrowded, with many operating in two shifts. Teachers do not receive the training they need, and the curriculum and assessments in place do not sufficiently support students in achieving the outcomes they need to succeed. Over the past 10 years, Jordan has seen a decline in student learning outcomes (NCHRD, 2016). The quality of education, specifically in second shifts schools, which are primarily for refugees, is viewed to be lower (Save The Children, 2016). The deteriorating quality of education contributes to higher school dropouts, as 30% of drop outs are reported to be affected by the perception of the value of education (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Jordan, 2020). Syrian parents of OOSCY reported that their children were not learning in school, left in classrooms as teachers with no training managed classrooms of up to 50 students (Carlier, 2018). Experts interviewed as part of this research affirmed that the lack of trust, among students and their families, in the state-run educational system, its quality, and the value of certification contributes to their choice of dropping out of the formal system (J.3, expert; J.5, expert; J.10, expert). The perceived value of education is further explored in Section 6 of this report.

Socioeconomic vulnerabilities

Studies have shown that specific socioeconomic circumstances increase children and youth's vulnerability to drop out. These include children whose mother never completed basic education, children who struggle academically in school, children and youth who suffer from economic stresses in the household, children and youth who experience violence in schools, females in early marriages, and those who experience social tensions as a result of their identity (MoE & UNICEF Jordan, 2020; Save The Children, 2016).

⁵ Resources listed as personal communication were shared confidentially by key informants interviewed for this research.

- **Poverty.** The most recent governmental data on poverty (Department of Statistics of Jordan, n.d.) is over a decade old, data from 2010 show that around 14% of the population lived below the national poverty line for prolonged times and a third of the population experienced transient poverty. Poverty affects children's ability to attend and remain in education in many interrelated ways, as described below:

[Poverty] has had multiple effects on education as children from poor families may be less likely to attend pre-primary education and the burdens of indirect costs (clothing, transportation costs) increase the need to work to supplement family income and may contribute to non-enrolment, non-attendance and even drop out. (MoE, 2018, p. 1).

Inequalities in education opportunities increase as learners progress postbasic education. The more wealth a family has the more likely children are to remain and progress in school; this is particularly true for basic to secondary and secondary to higher education transitions (Hendy et al., 2022). In an interview for this research an expert confirmed that the main barrier to education is the economic status of the family. While education is free, the costs that come with it are not. School-related fees burden families, these costs can include uniforms, transport, and stationery (J.6, expert).

- **Refugee children and youth.** Refugee children are more likely to be out of school, with refugees making 64.4% of the total number of OOSCY (MoE & UNICEF Jordan, 2020). Despite commitment from the Government of Jordan to make education free for Jordanians and Syrians, and the UNRWA making education free to Palestinians, according to Mixed Migration Platform as of 2017, all other non-Jordanians had to pay 40 JOD as an annual fee to enrol in public schools. Recently, that rule was changed such that all refugees have free access to education, including free textbooks, but schools still, at times unaware of this rule, implement the old regulations.
- **Early marriage.** For girls, early marriage is a contributor to school drop-out. Economic strains that place a burden on families may lead to early marriages of female students. Reducing the number of "mouths to feed" is a motivating factor for families to seek marriage for daughters. Child marriage then becomes a barrier to education, as females are forced into adult roles and responsibilities and are expected to prioritise home care and begin childbearing (Save The Children, 2016). A report published by Global Citizen in 2018 stated that, driven by extreme poverty, child marriage of Syrian children has doubled in just 4 years, rising from 15% in 2014 to 36% in 2018 (Selby, 2018).
- **Child labour.** The 2016 National Child Labour Survey reported an estimated 75,982 children who are between 5 and 17 years old, constituting 1.9%, engaged in paid or unpaid employment. The vast majority are boys who work in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and trade, on average engaging in around 34.5 hours per week (Shteiwi et al., 2016). Cost of living and lack of employment opportunities for adults to generate household income pushes school-aged children out of formal education and into child labour (Carlier, 2018). The need for livelihoods keeps children out of school; it is easier for children to find informal work compared to their caregivers, leaving 47% of refugee families relying at least partly on children for income in the household (Save The Children, 2016).

In-school experience

Negative experiences in formal schooling contribute to the likelihood of student drop-out.

- **Violence and bullying.** Violence and bullying experienced in formal school are key contributors for children not enrolling or dropping out, particularly among boys, and the lack of sufficient psychosocial support magnifies the challenge (Save The Children, 2016). Non-Jordanians are more likely to experience bullying due to lack of social cohesion and social support. According to the Jordan National Youth Assessment “Jordanian and Syrian youth characterize school as a disengaging environment rife with violence and overcrowded classes, housed in dilapidated structures, with teachers uninterested in students’ learning” (USAID Jordan, 2015, p. 5). Violence leading to drop-out is at times experienced at the hands of teachers (Christophersen, 2015). As a result of the exacerbated vulnerability experienced by refugee students, bullying and violence experienced in formal schooling and on their way to and from school has led to 1,600 Syrian students dropping out in 2016 alone (El-Ghali et al., 2018).

3.6 Out-of-School Children and Youth and Accelerated Education

Accelerated education programmes are designed for children and youth who are out of school and unable to enrol back into formal education. According to an unpublished needs analysis conducted in 2016 by an NFE donor, only 40% of OOSCY who are eligible to directly access formal education have been out of school for less than 3 years. The remaining 60% have left school for more than 3 years and are no longer eligible to directly join formal education. Half of the 60% are children aged 8–12, and the other half are 13 or older (Personal communication, November 20, 2021). This, alongside the high rates of drop-out and risk of drop-out, especially for refugees, points to a high need for AEPs in order to enable OOSCY to acquire certified education and transition back into formal school. Sections 4 and 5 of this report zooms in on accelerated education offerings in Jordan, which are intended to meet this need.

SECTION 4

LANDSCAPE OF AEPS

IN JORDAN

In this section we briefly outline efforts made to date in Jordan to create alternative education pathways for the groups of OOSCY identified in the previous section. This section is broken into two parts. The first is an overview of how AEPs have come about as a solution to the needs of OOSCY in Jordan, and where they are situated in relation to other types of NFE or alternative education approaches in the country. The second explores in greater depth the key actors involved at present in the funding, operation, and regulation of AEPs in the country looking at the CUP and the DOP.

4.1 The Evolution of AEPs

AEPs sit within a wider landscape of nonformal and alternative pathways for learning in Jordan. At present, there are a number of opportunities for OOSCY that offer alternative education. NFE programmes first emerged in Jordan in 1952 to combat illiteracy among military men. Back then, NFE sat within the Ministry of Culture. At the time, according to a government official interviewed for this research, the illiteracy rate was 88%, posing a serious threat to the development of the nation (J.17, AE regulator). In 1968, the mandate for NFE moved to the MoE and an NFE department was established. At its establishment, the department offered programmes focused on illiteracy eradication (MoE, n.d.-a).

In 1978, the Home Studies Programme was introduced in addition to literacy programmes, allowing children and youth who are overage⁶ and have dropped out of formal schooling due to social and economic circumstances to home school, sit for examinations, and receive appropriate-grade certificates (J.17, AE regulator). This effectively expanded NFE options from only literacy programmes and added a programme focused on gaining equivalent, certified competencies in basic (primary and lower secondary) education.

Today the MoE runs six NFE programmes. The MoE strategy published in 2018 lists them as follows:

- **Adult Literacy Programme:** Targets illiterate adolescents and adults who are above the age of 15. The programme is 4-years long and graduates from one of the 165 centres obtain a certificate equivalent to Grade 6. In academic year 2016–2017, the programme reached 2,017 learners. The Grade 6-equivalency certificate does not allow reintegration

⁶ The 3-years rule does not allow students who have been out of school for 3 or more years to enrol back into formal education without completing an NFE programme.

back to formal education but rather is just an acknowledgement that the holder possesses learning outcomes equivalent to that of a 6th grader in formal education.

- **Home Studies Programme:** Targets students who have left the formal education system yet wish to continue their education through self-learning. Those who enrol can sit for the exams in public schools at the end of each semester. If a student passes the exam successfully, they are allowed to enrol in the subsequent grade in the formal schools if they are not overage. In academic year 2016–2017 the programme reached 2,717 learners.
- **Evening Studies Programme:** Targets individuals at rehabilitation centres with interrupted or no education. The programme runs from Grade 7 to Grade 12 in three juvenile centres.
- **Summer Studies Programme:** Targets students who wish to further develop their skills and academic readiness for upper secondary certification/Tawjihi during the official summer break. The voluntary programme lasts 6 weeks and is offered 5 days a week. Students can choose the subject and activities they wish to attend.
- **Drop-Out Programme:** Targets out-of-school adolescents and youth in the age groups of 12–18 years for males and 12–20 years for females. The programme can last up to 2 years. Graduates, from the 179 centres, receive a Grade 10-equivalency certificate⁷ which they can use to enrol in vocational training or Home Studies Programme. Those who complete home studies may enrol back in formal education. In 2017, the programme reached more than 4,000 students.
- **Catch-Up Programme:** Targets out-of-school children in the age group 9–12. The programme covers two academic grades per year and can last up to 3 years covering Grades 1–6. Graduates from the 58 centres can directly enrol back in formal education. In academic year 2017–2018, the programme reached 2,607 learners.

Out of the six NFE programmes, three programmes allow for pathways to return to formal education: Home Studies, DOP and CUP. Both the DOP and CUP take place in classrooms where academic grades are offered at an accelerated pace. For this reason, the following sections of this report will focus on the DOP and CUP as the two accelerated-education programmes offered for OOSCY in Jordan.⁸

4.2 Origins of the Drop-Out and Catch-Up Programmes

In 1992, Questscope⁹ began offering a programme for at-risk children and youth, pairing them with youth mentors. Many of the participants were out of school and began requesting pathways back to education. At the time, Jordanian law did not allow for any student who had been out of school for 2 or more years to return back to formal schooling¹⁰ (Younes & Morrice, 2019), and the only pathway back was the self-taught Home Studies Programme. In response, Questscope worked on a programme that responded to the needs of OOSCY and presented it to the MoE. Questscope

⁷ The Grade 10-equivalency certificate that graduates of the DOP receive is not equal to the Grade 10 certificate received by graduates of basic education and does not allow access to the same pathways. This is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.

⁸ International and local organisations offer a wide range of informal education to both in and OOSCY. Informal education is not certified by the MoE, and does not provide certified, equivalent competencies and certification or allow transition back to formal education. For that reason, informal education is not included in the scope of this research.

⁹ Questscope is an international NGO with its headquarters in Jordan.

¹⁰ At present, the law states that learners who have been out of school for 3 or more years cannot return to formal education.

wanted to design a programme that offered a certification, had clear pathways upon completion, and built on the needs of youth and children (J.12, AE implementer). In 2003, and in collaboration with the MoE, Questscope began implementing the programme in four centres. The programme, called the DOP, was designed to target males aged 13–18 and females aged 13–20. The MoE (2018) stated the objective of the programme as follows:

To provide students, who have dropped out [...] with knowledge, skills and attitudes, and to ensure their educational rights and develop their professional maturity through training and rehabilitation according to criteria that entitle them to join the vocational training institution or to complete their home studies. (p. 9)

While the DOP was designed to respond to the needs of vulnerable Jordanians, it has seen unprecedented growth as a result of the refugee influx in the past 10 years and the heightened perceived need for such a programme. When donors and humanitarian agencies began discussing the needs of OOSCY and the importance of offering an accelerated education pathway that offers them a way back to formal education, the MoE put the DOP forward as the solution (J.1, expert; J.19, expert). UNICEF and USAID began funding the programme in 2015, Plan International joined as a funder of a small number of centres in 2019. In 2017, Relief International began implementing the programme in Syrian refugee camps, Mercy Corps, Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) and Middle East Children’s Initiative (MECI) started implementation in host communities in 2019 (Personal communication, March 20, 2020).¹¹ As a result, the programme expanded from 27 centres in 2009 (MoE, 2009), ran by Questscope, to 179 centres in 2021. It is important to note that the Arabic name for the programme translates literally to “Out-of-School Culture Promotion Programme.” It is unclear how the programme got its English name, and perhaps the Arabic name more accurately reflects the initial design and intended scope of the programme, which are explored in the following sections.

While the DOP was developed prior to the Syrian refugee influx to Jordan, and was designed to respond to the needs of vulnerable Jordanians, the CUP tells a different story. In 2014, and in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) began working on an education programme in camps as a response to need among children aged 9–12 who had never enrolled in formal schooling or had had interrupted studies for 3 or more years and thus had no pathway to formal education (J.14, AE implementer; J.19, expert; NRC, 2015). At the same time, UNICEF was designing a programme in response to feedback it was receiving from Makani¹² beneficiaries and their parents. The feedback focused on two points: 1) The need to provide OOSCY with the opportunity to enrol in formal education as opposed to informal education (provided through Makani and other similar programmes), and 2) The need to provide children with accredited certificates (J.13, AE funder). The output was an accelerated education programme which was later adopted and rolled out by the MoE and UNICEF allowing return to formal education. The programme was launched as the CUP in 2017. Building on lessons learnt from the experience of the DOP about government ownership and suitability, the MoE has been the sole implementer, and UNICEF the sole donor, of the of the CUP since its launch. The CUP operated 58 centres in 2020 (J.15, AE funder).

¹¹ Mercy Corps stopped implementing the programme prior to 2020.

¹² Makani (translated to My Space) is an integrated programme run by UNICEF which offers interventions in education, child protection, and youth. Makani targets marginalised and vulnerable children and youth and their caregivers. Makani is an example of informal education. <https://www.unicef.org/jordan/reports/makani-standards-operating-procedures-sops-2019>

At present, the DOP and the CUP are included in both Jordan’s National Education Strategic Plan, the Jordan Response Plan, and the National Strategy for Human Resource Development (MoE, 2018; Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Jordan, 2020; NCHRD, 2016). Starting 2022, funding for both programmes will be directly to MoE through a multidonor initiative with MoE both implementing and regulating the programmes under the AAI. The AAI and its implications for both programmes are further discussed in Section 6 of this report. Still, understanding the current and past state of both programmes is essential to understanding the shift underway, the future of the programmes, and the potential challenges and opportunities the programmes will face in meeting the needs of OOSCY. Sections 4, 5, and 6 explore the programmes in their state prior to the AAI transition.

4.3 Pathways for Return to Formal Education

Having explored the growth and evolution of NFE in the country, we now focus on two AEPs—the DOP and the CUP—that are functioning in Jordan. The aim in this section is to explore the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders involved in running, funding, regulating, and overseeing both programmes historically and at present.

4.3.1 Current Scale and Scope of AEP Provision

The DOP and the CUP are the two options available in Jordan to meet the needs of overage OOSCY to complete basic education, obtain a qualification, and either transition back into formal education or other forms of further education. Table 5 provides an overview of the location, target population and number of learners reached, and programme objectives of these two programmes.

Table 5

Scope of the Drop-Out and Catch-Up Programmes

AEP	Dates of implementation	Location	Target population	Number of beneficiaries reached	Programme objective
Drop-Out Programme	2003 to present	All governorates and both Syrian refugee camps	OOSCY age 12 to 18 for males and 12 to 20 for females. Learners who have been out of formal school for 1 or more years are able to enrol.	Between 2003 and 2018, more than 17,000 young people enrolled (MoE, 2018; NCHRD, 2016).	An 18–24 month accredited flexible programme that uses participatory learning methods. Graduates obtain an equivalency of Grade 10 certificate. The equivalency certificate does not allow access to the same pathways open for students receiving a Grade 10 certificate from formal education.
Catch-Up Programme	2017 to present	All governorates and both Syrian refugee camps	Out-of-school children aged 9–12. Learners who have been out of formal school for 1 or more years are able to enrol.	Between 2016 and 2018, close to 5,000 children enrolled with over 1,700 integrating back into formal education (UNICEF Jordan, n.d.). Estimated by MoE official to be 7,500 with 3,000 integrating back to formal education (J.17, AE regulator).	Accelerated programme that covers two academic school grades per academic year. Programme can run up to 3 years and graduates can reintegrate into formal schools.

4.3.2 The Drop-Out Programme

As shown in the table, the DOP seeks to provide children and youth who have dropped out of school, for at least a year, with knowledge and skills in safe, supportive spaces.¹³ The programme runs in formal schools and targets males who are 12–18 and females 12–20; prior to 2021, only learners who were 13–18 and 13–20 were able to enrol. The programme consists of three cycles, each 8 months in duration. Upon enrolment, learners complete a placement test and are placed in either the first or second cycles. The cycles correspond to grades as follows:

- **Cycle 1:** Equivalent to Formal School Grades 1–4
- **Cycle 2:** Equivalent to Formal School Grades 5–7
- **Cycle 3:** Equivalent to Formal School Grades 8–10

Classes are given 5 days a week, with a duration of 2–3 hours per day. The curriculum covers maths, English, computer skills, Arabic, Islamic religion, vocational education, life skills, the human body, health, environment and civic and social development. The DOP uses the participatory learning methodology (PLM), a pedagogy that is built on dialogue between facilitators and learners. In Jordan, NFE education programming is required to take place within public school buildings and to be taught by MoE teachers (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2020). Although the programme takes place in public school buildings, where formal education takes place, unlike formal education classrooms, the classes are well equipped with stationery, a water cooler, a fridge, an LCD screen, computers, carpets, and appropriate heating/cooling among other things (J.4, AE implementer). All children enrolled in the programme receive transportation (J.13, AE funder).


Upon graduation and successful completion of the examination, graduates receive an MoE-accredited document stating they have completed the equivalent of Grade 10. It is important to highlight that the document specifies the student has completed the equivalent of Grade 10, but is not a Grade 10 certificate, meaning it does not qualify holders to move to secondary education. Graduates who decide to continue their education post the DOP can choose one of two pathways:

- **Home Studies;** with the obtained Grade 10 equivalency certificate, graduates of the DOP can sit the Grades 9 and 10 exams through the Home Studies Programme. If they pass the Grade 10 exam, then they receive the Grade 10 certificate. Those graduates who complete the DOP and the Home Studies component, while still under the 3 years age gap, can join upper secondary education (Grades 11 and 12). Graduates who are over the 3 years age gap after completing the DOP and the Home Studies component cannot rejoin formal schools but can continue Home Studies for upper secondary grades.
- **Vocational Training;** with the obtained Grade 10 equivalency certificate, graduates can enrol in a Vocational Training Centre (VTC) as Level 2 skilled workers. VTCs are operated by the Ministry of Labour.

¹³ In recent years, the criteria for enrolment were revised to allow those who have been out of school for 1 or more years to enrol; previously the criteria only included learners who had been out of school for 3 or more years.

These pathways are further illustrated in Figure 2. The programme operates in all governorates across Jordan. Enrolment in the programme is on an ongoing basis and is open and free to all eligible OOSCY of all nationalities.

Figure 2
Learner Pathways in the Drop-Out Programme



4.3.3 The Catch-Up Programme

While the DOP aims to reach older learners and helps them attain the equivalent of a Grade 10 education certificate (and for some, return to formal education), the CUP is a transitional programme for learners who are younger, with the aim of helping them recover what they have missed and transition back into the appropriate grade for their age. The CUP seeks to provide children who have either dropped out of school for 3 or more years, or have never been in formal education, a pathway back to integration in formal schools. The programme was developed in response to the needs of Syrian children (UNICEF Jordan, 2017). It targets children ages 9 to 12, whom the DOP does not cover. The rationale of the enrolment criteria starting at age 9 is due to the fact that any child who is younger than 9 is below the 3 years age gap for first grade and can enrol in formal schools without needing to catch up. In its first 2 years, the programme was exclusive to Syrian children, responding to needs assessments; in its third academic year, 2018–2019, the programme expanded enrolment to Jordanians and refugees of other nationalities (J.17, AE regulator).


The programme is implemented in governmental formal schools and is taught by MoE teachers. Classes run 6 days a week, except for camps where classes run 5 days a week. Each day constitutes 4 hours and is offered during the afternoon shift which takes place between 12:30 and 4:00 pm. The programme is composed of three levels, each level covering 2 academic years. A student is placed in a level based on the results of a placement test completed upon enrolment. The programme can last up to 3 academic years, catching up a total of six grades as follows:

- **Level 1:** Equivalent to Formal School Grades 1 and 2
- **Level 2:** Equivalent to Formal School Grades 3 and 4
- **Level 3:** Equivalent to Formal School Grades 5 and 6

The curriculum includes Arabic, science, mathematics, and English, as well as some sports, art, and music classes. Once learners complete the level appropriate to their age, they graduate the programme and are enrolled in formal schooling. Pathways for learners in the CUP are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Learner Pathways in the Catch-Up Programme



Looking at the two programmes in place, the CUP offers a straightforward pathway back to formal education for younger children, with clear entry and reintegration opportunities, and clear acceleration rates. On the other hand, the older children are, and the longer they've stayed out of school, the more limited their pathways back to formal education are. The DOP offers up to 10 years of education in 24 months, but presents fewer entry and integration opportunities back to formal education.

4.3.4 Enrolment and Completion

According to recent data shared by a key informant interview for this research, there are currently 4,806 learners enrolled in the DOP. Of the currently enrolled learners, 44% are females and 56% males. A closer look at nationality of those enrolled shows that 51% are Jordanian, 44% are Syrian, and 5% are of other nationalities. Only 2.2% of total enrolled are OOSCY with disabilities (Personal communication, December 27, 2021).

According to implementers, young males face complex barriers to their attendance in AEPs due to livelihood responsibilities and a deteriorating economy (J.4, AE implementer; J.18, AE implementer). However, the higher number of male enrolments may be attributed to the fact that USAID-funded implementers have a 70% male target. This target was set because Jordanian males are more likely than females to drop out as they progress through basic education (USAID, 2018).

The CUP was offered in 58 schools in 2020–2021 with 763 learners enrolled. Of those, 39% enrolled were females, and 61% male; 33% were Jordanians, 60% Syrians, and 7% other nationalities; and 2.5% were OOSCY with disabilities (Personal communication, December 27, 2021).

Stakeholders believed that the number of active learners who engage and attend regularly, for both programmes, is well below those reported enrolled (J.7, AE regulator). While enrolment might be relatively high, attendance is generally low (J.13, AE funder). Table 6 shows number of learners enrolled in the DOP and CUP by gender, nationality, disability, and camps/host residency.

Table 6

Number of Learners Enrolled in the Drop-Out and Catch-Up Programmes

Programme	# of learners enrolled in academic year 2020–2021	# of learners disaggregated by gender	# of learners disaggregated by nationality	# of learners with disabilities	# of learners in camps
Drop-Out	4,806	2,114 females 2,692 males	2,455 Jordanian, 2,102 Syrian, 234 of other nationalities	107	554 learners in two centres
Catch-Up	763	297 females 466 males	254 Jordanians, 458 Syrian, 51 of other nationalities	19	79 learners in nine centres

Source: Personal communication, December, 27 2021.

The DOP has a notably small number of graduates per year, as shown in Table 7.¹⁴ As shown in the table, only 759 learners graduated in 2020, and only 684 graduated in 2021. These graduation figures represent those who were in cycle three, thus were completing the programme. Since additional disaggregated data on the number of learners per cycle in 2020 and 2021 and the number starting with each cohort was not provided by the key informant, it is not possible to ascertain the exact graduation rate. However, one key informant reported that the graduation rate is approximately 25–35% (J.12, AE implementer).

Table 7
Number of Learners Who Graduated the Drop-Out Programmes in 2020 and 2021

Year	# of graduates	# of graduates disaggregated by gender	# of learners disaggregated by nationality
2020	759	309 females 450 males	476 Jordanians 255 Syrians 28 of other nationalities
2021	684	304 females 380 males	432 Jordanian 215 Syrian 37 of other nationalities

Source: Personal Communication, 27 December 2021.¹⁵

There is no information available on what pathways graduates of the DOP take, according to Human Rights Watch, “limited data is available on success rates for children who transition back to formal education” (Small, 2020, p. 4). The lack of postgraduation follow up and impact monitoring has also been highlighted in an evaluation of USAID-funded centres published in 2018 and an EU-commissioned evaluation published in 2019. The low graduation rate and lack of postgraduation data in the DOP is one challenge that is discussed at greater length in Section 5.

The CUP has been running for a short amount of time. With the programme launched in 2017, and learning disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, there are not published evaluations or learning from the programme to date.

¹⁴ Graduation data are not available for the CUP; neither the donor nor the MoE were willing to share.

¹⁵ The table does not offer the percentage of graduates as the number of enrolled learners for those cohorts was not shared as part of this research.

4.4 Funding, Implementation, and Regulation

Table 8 shows the primary funders, implementers, and regulating/certifying bodies of both the DOP and CUP from their start to present.

Table 8
Funders, Implementers, and Regulators

Name of AEP	Dates	Funder	Implementer	Regulating/certifying body
Drop-Out Programme	2003 to present	UNICEF and USAID provide funding to implementing partners with Plan International funding a smaller number of centres. USAID: 43 centres UNICEF: 131 centres Plan International: 5 centres	MECI Questscope Relief International JOHUD	MoE certifies with Questscope as technical partner
Catch-Up Programme	2017 to Present	UNICEF to MoE 58 centres in 2021	MoE	MoE certifies, with UNICEF as technical partner

Source: Personal communication, December 27, 2021.

As shown in the table, while the MoE is the governing body of all NFE, the NGO sector plays a key role in regulating, ensuring quality and implementing programmes. Within the MoE there is an NFE department that oversees all six programmes the government offers; the department consists of 4–5 full time staff, with each staff member overseeing a region. Since the development of the DOP, Questscope has remained the key technical reference, with three donors funding the DOP: UNICEF, USAID, and Plan International, and four implementing partners: Questscope, JOHUD, MECI, and Relief International.

The management of NFEs is decentralised, and there is a governing structure based on coordination between governmental actors at three levels:

1. The school principals at the centre level are responsible for supervising implementation at the centre level and submitting reports to the MoE directorate.
2. In turn, each MoE directorate has an NFE coordinator who supervises the implementation of all NFE centres in a given area and reports to the NFE department at the MoE. There are 42 directorates across Jordan.
3. The department of NFE at the MoE is responsible for overseeing and monitoring all NFE centres and compiling reports received from the directorates.

Currently all implementing organisations and current funders are phasing out of the programme; starting 2022, all management of centres and funding will go directly to the MoE. Both CUPs and DOPs will be fully funded, regulated, and implemented through the AAI. The transition is further explored in Section 6 of this report.

SECTION 5

ASSESSING THE CURRENT STATE OF THE DROP-OUT PROGRAMME AND CATCH-UP PROGRAMME



In this section, we assess the extent to which the DOP and CUP support the objective of education for all children and youth. We use Tomaševski's 4As framework (Tomaševski, 2001) which assesses the degree to which education provision is available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable to particular groups of learners. This framework helps us to understand if programmes are meeting the needs/demand of out of school children and youth.

As shown in the sections above, while estimates of the number of OOSCY in Jordan vary, the proportion of those who are enrolled in the DOP and CUP are low, regardless of which figures are used; together, around 5,560 learners are enrolled in both programmes, representing 4.9% of OOSCY nationwide. Among those enrolled, there are more Jordanians than refugees, despite higher rates of being out of school among nonnationals. Moreover, among those enrolled in the programme, the graduation rates in the DOP in particular are quite low and reported to be between 25–35% (J.12, AE implementer). There are no public numbers available on the retention of learners in the CUP and key informant interviews did not share graduation rates. These figures point to several challenges, which are related to the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability of the programmes.

5.1 Availability

One reason the enrolment rate of OOSCY in the DOP and CUP is low is that the programmes are available only to a small fraction of the OOSCY population. The limited number of centres throughout the kingdom is one factor that limits the availability of these options to OOSCY. On the one hand, the DOP is available in all 12 of the kingdom's governorates, while the CUP is available in nine of Jordan's 12 governorates; and both programmes are available in Azraq and Zatari Syrian refugee camps. Notably, however, there are only 179 operating DOP centres and 58 operating CUP centres in 2021. Since all DOP and CUP centres, except two DOP centres operated by JOHUD, are in public schools, and, currently, there are 3,845 public schools across the country, that means the programme is available in only 6.5% of all public schools.

Despite the low number of centres, the programme is designed to be available for most OOSCY. Together, the programmes cover OOSCY ages 9–18 years for males and 9–20 years for females. Programmes are available to females up to the age of 20, while males up to 18, as it is believed that older females are more likely to attend programmes as family concerns regarding safety and reputation are most acute for younger females (USAID, 2018). While the DOP previously only enrolled those who were over the 3-years age gap, in recent years the criteria for enrolment were revised to allow those who have been out of school for 1 or more years to enrol, expanding the availability of the programme to a wider target group. Despite the fact that policy allows those who have been out of school for less than 3 years to return back to formal education without enrolling in an AEP programme, the criteria were changed to offer a safe space for those who face barriers specific to protection before the education system loses them completely (J.12, AE implementer).

While the general programme guidelines cover the above specified ages and genders, some centres set specific targets for specific learner groups. For example, USAID asks implementing partners to abide to a 70% male target as mentioned in Section 4. USAID funded around a quarter of all DOP centres in 2021 (J.11, AE funder). Still, looking at the programme as a whole, the enrolment rates for both genders are similar, with young males constituting 56% and females 44% of total learners enrolled (Personal communication, December, 27 2021).

Other centres target specific geographic locations. For example, remote areas are targeted by funders, making programmes available in areas that are often neglected by other organisations, and for the DOP this includes areas that do not necessarily have a high concentration of refugees (USAID, 2018). The specific targeting of certain learner populations and geographies is intended to make the programme available for more marginalised OOSCY, who may have fewer educational opportunities otherwise, but may also further reduce availability for OOSCY outside of those priority groups/locations.

Implementing partners report facing challenges when attempting to increase programme availability and operating new centres. These challenges are twofold. First, there is reportedly a bureaucracy within the MoE in relation to obtaining approvals to operate new centres, equipping the centres, and training staff in managing centres, facilitators, and curricula. Second, there is low interest from formal schools' management in operating NFE centres as it is seen by some as an extra administrative burden with limited financial return to principals and teachers (J.4, AE implementer).

Despite these challenges, the MoE reported that they are committed to making a centre available when need exists, and that they work based on demand, opening a centre in each public school where 5–10 students request to be enrolled in the DOP or CUP (MoE, n.d.-b, 2009). One key informant reported the process as follows: for the CUP, the school reports on all children who show up to enrol in formal education and are not eligible; the MoE then moves to open a centre in that school. For the DOP, in addition to schools reporting on youth who wish to enrol in formal education but are not eligible, implementers run a rapid assessment before opening a centre in a new location where mobilisers gauge interest through community home visits (J.13, AE funder).

Nonetheless, an AEP funder interviewed for this research shared that a challenge in making programmes available is the lack of data at a district level, stating that “while overall data on OOSCY is available, we lack the needed data on locations at a district level” (J.13, AE funder). While the commitment to open centres where there is a need is there in policy, the low number of centres available throughout the kingdom, alongside the low rate of enrolment of OOSCY in the programmes and the lack of information on areas where need exists, still suggests a challenge in the ability to make programmes available to the OOSCY population.

For the majority of children who drop out, there is no way back to school; non-formal and informal education programs are reaching only a small fraction of secondary-school-age Syrian children. (Small, 2020, p. 2)

Moreover, COVID-19 related challenges have led to almost half of the children enrolled in NFE to drop out. However, programmes were still made available to learners by continuing learning activities and accessing both programmes online (United Nations Jordan, 2021). As a result, both programmes were offered online for the first time in 2020–2021 (J.7, AE regulator).

5.2 Accessibility

The programmes are designed to be accessible to those OOSCY whom the programmes target; however, accessibility of the programmes is variable depending on who is implementing and funding the centres and the profile of the OOSCY wishing to enrol. As noted in the Jordan Response Plan for 2020–2022:

Children enrolled in NFE face similar vulnerabilities to those in formal education, with the additional some has the difficulty of having been out of school for three years or more. This contributes to difficulty catching up and transitioning back to formal education. Many adolescents enrolled in NFE are engaged in labour activities or in early marriages, which adds difficulty to their ability to manage schoolwork alongside other commitments. (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Jordan, 2020, p. 39)

The programmes are designed in a way that is intended to help learners overcome the myriad administrative, financial, and sociocultural barriers (described in Section 3) OOSCY face to remaining in education in the first place, as well as the additional barriers they face due to having been out of school for a significant period.

To address administrative barriers, both programmes are made accessible to all nationalities regardless of legal status, documentation, or evidence of prior learning. Once an out-of-school child or youth expresses interest in attending one of the two programmes, the learner sits for a placement test to determine the appropriate level/cycle. Enrolment for the DOP is open on a rolling basis and learners can join at any point of the semester (J.13, AE funder).

To address financial barriers, both programmes are available free of charge to all residents of Jordan regardless of their nationality. Programmes offer stationery and learning materials at no cost in classrooms. In addition, transportation and snacks are provided by all partners in all centres. In the camps, transportation is not provided as centres are available within walking distance (J.18, AE funder). The offering of transportation and a snack removes some of the hidden costs associated with education and lessens financial burdens. While both programmes eliminate some financial stress in comparison to formal schooling, they do not fully eliminate it.

To address barriers that are connected to the pursuit of livelihoods, the flexibility of the DOP is high, allowing students to miss days and enrol on an ongoing basis. Students report that facilitators understand and accommodate the special circumstances students face in relation to attendance, such as the need to work or respond to domestic responsibilities (USAID, 2018). Highlighting flexibility, only 60% attendance rate is required to complete each cycle (J.13, AE funder). Yet, in interviews, a number of stakeholders have cited pursuit of livelihood as a contributor to low programme completion rates (J.7, AE regulator; J.17, AE regulator; J.18, AE funder).

Efforts have been made to make both programmes more accessible to OOSCY with disabilities. In 2021, all teachers, facilitators and principals were trained in inclusive education including identifying those with special needs, accommodating learners with mental and physical disabilities, and ensuring classrooms are equipped to accommodate special needs (J.17, AE regulator). However, recent data from 2020–2021 shows that out of those enrolled in the CUP and DOP, only 2.5% and 2.2% had a form of disability respectively (Personal communication, December 27, 2021). This is substantially lower than the kingdom-wide rate of disability of 11%, suggesting that learners with disabilities still face significant barriers to accessing the programmes.

Despite efforts to eliminate barriers and increase accessibility, an evaluation of the DOP shows that the challenges OOSCY face in accessing AEPs are similar to those they face in accessing formal education. These challenges to access include livelihood commitments, centres being few and far for some prospective learners, nomadic movements of families, and conservative traditions challenging female participation (USAID, 2018).

5.3 Acceptability

Acceptability in regard to quality and perception is the most complex to unpack in the case of the two programmes. Alongside the low availability of centres, and challenges with accessibility described above, the extent to which each of the programmes is seen as acceptable by OOSCY and their communities may explain low enrolment and low completion rates. Acceptability of the DOP and CUP can be thought of in relation to the extent to which the programme is contributing to learners achieving the expected outcomes, namely achieving desired learning outcomes and being able to transition back into formal education.

Integration into formal education

The CUP provides a clear pathway to formal education, but the DOP, as is, does not. The certificate which graduates of the CUP receive makes them eligible to integrate directly into formal education. Thus, according to one of the stakeholders interviewed “The Catch-Up Programme is seen as more acceptable as it has more frequent and direct reintegration opportunities back to formal education” (J.17, AE regulator). Currently, graduates of the DOP are not traced after graduation, and thus data on how the programmes help reintegrate graduates into formal systems or support them to reach their aspirations is limited. Reintegration into formal classrooms for graduates of the CUP is estimated to be higher; however, no data or evaluations have been published to date. One of the main reasons DOP graduates have a lack of postcompletion opportunities is the Grade 10-equivalency certificate. The certificate only makes them eligible to enrol in vocational training and the Home Studies Programme. An evaluation published in 2018 shows that both learners and teachers are confused by which pathways are available to holders of the certificate.

The certificate equivalence and education pathways were reported to be unclear to both students and facilitators which caused confusion among students and frustration to those who were incorrectly informed. (USAID, 2018, p. vi)

In addition, two key informants reported that some learners join the DOP believing that the Grade 10-equivalency certificate qualifies them to apply for jobs in the army, but this is untrue (J.17, AE regulator; J.10, expert).

Implementing partners report that not all who join the DOP do so with the objective of continuing their education in the formal systems. Some join to be able to engage socially with others, to gain basic literacy and numeracy, or to find a sense of purpose (J.2, AE implementer). In fact, one key informant described the DOP as a literacy and numeracy programme (J.9, expert). Still, for those who do wish to reintegrate into formal education, the DOP lacks a clear transition pathway. Among stakeholders there are two different narratives: one that sees the DOP as an AEP-like programme, and the other that views it as a protection programme that has been misbranded as an AEP (J.13, AE funder). An unpublished evaluation of the programme shares that same sentiment:

It is questioned to what extent the programme is able to realize educational outcomes in terms of further re-integration into educational learning programmes or vocational education, and whether the programme ought to be regarded simply as a protective programme. (Personal communication, March 20 ,2020)

Drop-out rates from these programmes are high, with some estimating that around 75% of learners enrolled in the DOP do not complete (J.2, AE implementer; J.10, expert), with stakeholders reporting that enrolment rates are higher than attendance rates, meaning that not all those who enrol attend (J.7, AE regulator; J.13, AE funder). The large gap between those who enrol and those who complete is seen to reflect the programme's effectiveness (J.1, expert; J.10, expert). Regulators argue that the high drop-out rates are also due to how drop-out is calculated as any student who sits for the placement tests and attends 1 day is considered enrolled. The reasons behind dropping out are reported to be the same reasons learners leave formal education (J.17, AE regulator).

A published evaluation of education in Jordan cites “severed bridges between NFE and formal education” (Particip Consortium, 2019, p. 42). Referring specifically to the DOP, key informants shared frustration at the programme leading nowhere, with no tangible pathways (J.1, expert; J.9, expert). One key informant shared that the programme should have not been branded as one that allows return to formal education (J.9, expert), while another shared that the programme lacks support postcompletion, explaining, “There is a need for pathways beyond graduation; scholarships to diploma and higher education, vocational training scholarships, and connections with the private sector for employment” (J.7, AE regulator).

Reach

In areas where the programmes are offered, the programmes are well acknowledged by stakeholders for their expansive outreach strategies, employing various outreach channels and engaging community members as outreach mobilisers. Outreach for the programmes takes place by strategically engaging OOSCY, social media, word of mouth, graduates, religious spaces, and through the work of other organisations and their activities. Some implementers of the DOP may even speak to OOSCY families and employers to negotiate and encourage enrolment (USAID, 2018).

Despite significant outreach efforts of the programmes in the areas where they are offered, generally information about the two programmes is scarce and hard to obtain, and there is no information on the MoE webpage around where the programmes are offered. As part of this research, the MoE and UNICEF hotlines were called repeatedly to inquire on the programmes, with no answer. Interviews showed that except for those who are implementing or funding the programmes, education stakeholders know very little about the programmes supporting OOSCY. To explain why there is limited knowledge and awareness about the availability of these two programmes one stakeholder cited limited funding and demand, explaining:

If an organization doesn't have the capacity and the secured fund it would not want a drastic increase in demand. With limited funders, implementers are only able to operate both programmes at a scale that reflects available funds. (J.9, expert)

On the other hand, an AEP funder attributed the lack of awareness and knowledge about the programme to a lack of political willingness.

The reason MoE is not promoting the programme is because the MoE does not believe there is a notable number of children and youth who are out of school. The MoE's mandate remains to be formal education, NFE was neglected for years, only recently has the MoE started to look at NFE as a result of advocacy from the non-governmental sector pushing for better NFE provision. (J.13, AE funder)

Further, while the programmes are known for their unique outreach strategies, despite rigorous outreach, implementing partners of the DOP report struggling to reach targets set by funders (J.4, AE implementer; J.18, AE implementer). In interviews conducted by this research, implementing organisations shared that finding OOSCY and having them enrol in the programme is a continuous challenge, and while the numbers for OOSCY are high, implementers do not know where to find them (J.10, expert; J.13, AE funder). Early marriage and child labour remain the main barriers to the DOP (J.13, AE funder).

One funder echoed this challenge, noting that implementers are often not able to reach set targets for enrolment (J.18, AE funder).

Quality and learning outcomes

When it comes to quality, the nature of curriculum, pedagogy, and physical classrooms of both programmes is reported to be favoured by learners over formal education. Classes are seen as more engaging, fun, and overall offering a better physical and learning environment than that in formal education. In fact, they are so much so, that there have been reports that students from formal education prefer the AEP programmes over formal education (Particip Consortium, 2019; USAID, 2018). Similarly, some parents have been reported to prefer AEPs due to lower indirect costs and flexibility (Particip Consortium, 2019).

Both the DOP and the CUP work with small groups of learners. The curriculum for the CUP is recent and is based on the acceleration of the national curriculum used in formal education, where each cycle in the CUP covers 2 academic years. The DOP uses a participatory learning method that is learner centric; in theory, the curricula cover 10 academic grades in 24 months; however, the curriculum currently in use was drafted prior to the programme's launch in 2003 and is reported to be outdated. A new curriculum has been developed, however, and will be used in future cohorts (J.12, AE implementer).

Despite the preferred pedagogy, stakeholders report that the DOP does not meet its intended learning outcomes and graduates are left underprepared to pursue the Home Studies pathway (J.7, AE regulator; J.11, AE funder; J.13, AE funder; J.18, AE funder). In an interview for this research, one key informant, referring to the DOP, shared, "To cover 10 academic school years in less than 24 months is an impossible task. A task that would require magicians not teachers" (J.16, AE funder). Furthermore, there are reports that in some instances, due to the few numbers of interested learners, DOP centres combine different levels into one class in order to get to the 10-learners threshold for opening a class. This practice further jeopardises the quality of learning and contributes to learner drop-out (J.18, AE funder).

Published evaluations report that students feel respected and that centres are free of violence. One study found that among those who complete the DOP, 100% would recommend it to others or have already done so (USAID, 2018). It is important to note that studies that highlight positive experiences represent those who complete and graduate the programmes, and not those who drop out. One key informant interviewed did report instances of violence and discrimination within centres (J.5, expert).

Due to the number of stakeholders involved in the DOP, the quality of the centres is often dependent on the implementing partner. Some implementing partners are known to excel with teacher training, others in the quality of classrooms, or outreach strategies (J.18, AE funder).

5.4 Adaptability

The criteria of adaptability refer to the extent to which programmes are able to be flexible to meet the needs of OOSCY from different backgrounds and experiences, as well as the extent to which they can respond to the changing needs of society. In some ways, the DOP and CUP are able to be flexible to the unique needs of learners. Specifically, the initiation of the CUP as a response to the Syrian refugee crisis demonstrates the system's ability to respond to an influx of OOSCY.

On the other hand, the flexibility of the programmes, which is perceived as being necessary to meet the needs of target learners, has been associated with low learning outcomes, so the system has not yet figured out how to be adaptable while still maintaining quality. Moreover, low enrolment rates, especially of refugees, suggests challenges in the programmes' ability to meet their specific needs in the current context.

The current transition which the system is undergoing via AAI also suggests a key adaptation. The major shift of funding and implementation by the MoE is an attempt to respond to current needs related to sustainability and localisation of education services. This shift is discussed in greater detail in Section 6.1.1.

Flexibility

As discussed above in relation to accessibility, the programmes are adaptable to accommodate to some of the vulnerabilities students may face. The DOP allows students to determine the time of sessions according to their preferences and working hours, better enabling both males and females to enrol and maintain attendance. In one evaluation, females reported choosing a time that was acceptable by their parents and working males reported choosing a time that allowed them to receive education while engaging in income-generating activities (USAID, 2018).

The DOP also addresses other factors that could discourage students from enrolling or committing to attendance. Enrolment is on an ongoing basis, allowing interested OOSCY to enrol at any time in the year. There is flexibility around attendance, with only 60% attendance required to complete each cycle. The programme also allows students who engage in seasonal work to return after the season ends and complete their cycle rather than restarting it. Enrolled learners can be absent for 3 months without being considered a drop-out (J.13, AE funder). Programmes nationwide do not necessarily run synchronously, implementers can make decisions on when the programme operates (J.13, AE funder).

However, the abovementioned flexibility measures are believed to be a key contributor to the low learning outcomes of the programme. Stakeholders are currently looking at how they can decrease flexibility and increase learners' attendance commitment. One stakeholder, referring to the DOP shared, "The programme is not very structured, the extent of flexibility offered affects learning outcomes. Currently learning outcomes are very poor, learners graduate and cannot meet basic requirements for TVET [technical and vocational education and training] or other pathways" (J.13, AE funder).

Decision making

Despite the abovementioned flexibility and adaptations, some challenges to the programmes' ability to adapt were noted in interviews for this study. Decision making around curricula, centres, and logistics all sits with the MoE. Implementers report limited adaptability and slow response to challenges. One partner reported that the MoE must even authorise the specific make of eraser, notebooks, and other stationery the implementers purchase to run the programme (J.4, AE implementer). Decision making is centralised within the NFE department at the MoE, which is understaffed, with 4–5 full-time staff overseeing all six NFE programmes across the kingdom.¹⁶ Additionally, the bureaucracy within which the MoE operates makes decisions very hard to come to (J.10, expert).

Coordination and decision making for the CUP are bilateral between the MoE and UNICEF. For the DOP, many of the decisions are made between the funder and implementing partners, noting there are three funders, and then put forward to the MoE. Interlinked with challenges related to decision making, one key informant reported that there is an ownership challenge that stifles innovation and creativity. Referring to the DOP, a stakeholder shared, “The programme witnesses an ownership crisis ... is it Questscope's, the founder of the programme? MoE's ... the regulator? the funder's? or the implementer's?” (J.10, expert).

¹⁶ The six NFE programmes are listed in Section 4.1 The Evolution of AEPs.

SECTION 6

UNDERSTANDING THE WIDER CONTEXTS INFLUENCING THE ABILITY OF AEPS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF OOSCY

The previous section explored the current state of the CUP and DOP in relation to the extent to which they are available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable to meet the needs of OOSCY. Moreover, the section discussed some of the main reasons why challenges in those areas exist, namely a historic deemphasis in terms of funding and human resources on NFE programmes by the MoE, bureaucratic challenges and disincentives to schools to open AEP centres.

In this section, we explore a major transition that is in progress in the AEP landscape in Jordan: the AAI. We discuss the potential AAI has to bring about change for the DOP and CUP and the risks the initiative faces to its success. We conclude this section by further unpacking a final challenge within the wider political and economic context, namely the perceived returns on education at present in Jordan for OOSCY, and how that may influence the potential of AAI and the CUP and DOP.

6.1 A Time of Transition— The Accelerating Access Initiative

The AAI is a multidonor development assistance fund to the Government of Jordan focused on strengthening national systems to improve the quality of education offered to refugees (Rashid, 2020). The AAI launched in 2016 and is, at present, significantly changing the landscape of NFE in Jordan.

AAI was born out of the London Compact in 2016 (Rashid, 2020). In its first phase, the initiative was established to off-set the cost of providing education to Syrian refugees that the Government of Jordan has endured. The objective of the first phase was to increase access to formal education for Syrian refugee children without lowering the quality of education for Jordanian children (Personal communication, December, 21 2021). The fund covered costs associated with tuition fees, classroom furniture, books and stationery, training of teachers, and operational costs of schools (Rashid, 2020). In its second phase, which will run from 2021 to 2023, the AAI 2.0 has expanded to shift to a vulnerability approach looking at children and youth in and out of the formal education system regardless of their nationality (Jordan Times, 2018), as explained by one stakeholder:

Where AAI [in its first phase] focused exclusively on the delivery of education for Syrian refugee children, AAI 2.0 now expands to include non-Syrian refugees and other vulnerable groups, including children with disabilities and children out of school. (Personal communication, December 21, 2021)

AAI 2.0 looks at the sustainability of education services offered by MoE, including the sustainability of AEP provision. Under AAI 2.0, all CUP and DOP centres will be transitioned from current implementers to the MoE. MoE will have full ownership of the programmes—operational, financial, and administrative. Funding of both the CUP and DOP will no longer be through USAID, UNICEF, or Plan International but rather through the AAI 2.0 off-budget accounts, which constitute a joint funding agreement by the UK, the USA, EU, Norway, Australia, Canada, and Germany (World Bank, 2020). Previously implementing organisations will continue to have a role in supporting the MoE during the transition phase. For example, the roles of the outreach and community mobilisers will continue to be recruited by former implementers. This, to a large extent, is due to the flexibility in spending that NGOs have and the MoE lacks, as currently the MoE does not have scope for such roles within its existing systems (J.17, AE regulator). Questscope will continue to support the MoE through capacity strengthening of staff and technical support throughout the transition (J.12, AE implementer).

6.1.1 AAI and AEP

Since its launch in 2003, the DOP has always been implemented by NGOs. The lessons learnt from over 14 years of implementation of the DOP resulted in the belief that for the CUP to be scalable and sustainable, it needs to be owned and implemented by the MoE (J.15, AE implementer). The same call for sustainability and government ownership of AEPs resulted in the shift towards the DOP being funded by AAI. This shift will radically change how the programme operates (J.16, AE funder).

At time of writing this report, all implementing organisations and current funders are phasing out of the both programmes. Starting in 2022, all management of centres, implementation of activities and funding will go directly to the MoE. To facilitate the transition of programmes from implementer to MoE, a 5-year plan has been adopted by current stakeholders and the MoE. During this time of transition, stakeholders will continue to support the MoE through providing technical support and capacity-strengthening opportunities (United Nations Jordan, 2021).

6.1.2 2022 Forward—The Opportunity of AAI

In key informant interviews for this report, regulators, funders, and implementers repeatedly spoke of the way forward for the DOP under the AAI. The AAI represents a major shift in the landscape of NFE, and presents a significant opportunity for strengthening the DOP and CUP to better meet their aims for OOSCY. In fact, AAI 2.0 suggests growing political interest and will (at least at present) to meet the needs of the most marginalised learners, including those who are out of school. Moreover, the shift to funding, regulation, and implementation by the MoE may alleviate some of the variability between programmes provided by different funders and implementers.

The section below highlights some of the changes the DOP is expected to see over the coming years. These changes include new curricula, expansion in a number of centres, an online platform, a database hosted by the MoE, and a fourth cycle that will presumably allow graduates of the programme to reintegrate directly back into formal education. These changes, if implemented, will effectively address some of the critiques of the programmes explored in Section 5. This section has a stronger focus on the DOP as it will experience foundational transformations to its design.

- **Curriculum.** One of the critiques of the DOP explored in Section 5.3 of this report is its outdated curriculum that has not been updated since the programme launch. Stakeholders have reported that, with the transition, a new curriculum that has already been developed and approved will be rolled out. The new curriculum reflects new learnings in pedagogy and is more closely aligned with learning outcomes associated with completion of basic education in formal schools (J.12, AE implementer). The new curriculum, developed by Questscope with USAID's support, will be key to enhancing learning outcomes and availability of pathways upon completion through the newly introduced Cycle 4 (J.7, AE regulator).
- **Cycle 4 and the Grade 10 certificate.** One of the most pressing critiques of the DOP is the limited acceptable and accessible pathways available to graduates upon completion of the programme. As explored in Sections 4 and 5 of this report, this is largely due to the fact that graduates receive a Grade 10-equivalency certificate that does not equal that received by students in formal education. The certificate does not allow learners to enrol back into upper secondary education without first completing at least 2 years of Home Studies. Under the AAI 2.0 transition, the MoE will introduce a fourth cycle, an additional 8 months, which will increase the learning outcomes of the programme. Cycle 4 will allow for a direct path back to formal education, as completers would no longer receive a Grade 10-equivalency document, but a Grade 10 certificate that equals that of the formal education system. Thus, completers will no longer have to go through home studies before enrolling back into formal education (J.12, AE implementer).
- **Postgraduation support.** Under the AAI 2.0, there are plans to support graduates of the DOP postcompletion. This planned support will offer need- and merit-based scholarships enabling graduates to pursue pathways of their choosing that are vocational or academic (Personal communication, December 21, 2021).
- **Expanded age criteria.** The DOP is expected to increase its reach in the coming years as the enrolment criteria were revised to now include 12-year-olds. Previously, only learners 13 years old and above could enrol. Similarly, the CUP is considering extending the enrolment criteria to include children aged 7–9 years old, expanding from the current 9–12 criteria (J.7, AE regulator).
- **Online platform.** Building on learnings from implementation during COVID-19, stakeholders have reported that offering the DOP online offers an opportunity to reach a larger number of OOSCY who cannot attend the programme in person. This is specifically true for males who are engaged in livelihoods, and females who are caregivers or face cultural barriers to enrolment. It is reported that the MoE is currently working to develop an online platform to respond to existing need (J.12, AE implementer; J.17, AE regulator).

- **Availability.** Both the CUP and DOP will move to be more available, expanding the capacity of the two programmes to reach and enrol an increased number of OOSCY. Under the AAI, the MoE has a target of opening 10 new centres a year (J.17, AE regulator).
- **EMIS and graduate tracking.** Under the AAI 2.0 there are plans to integrate an NFE database in Open EMIS. This database is set to monitor graduates of both the DOP and COP and include the percentage of graduates who continue into formal education, vocational training, or join the labour force postcompletion (Personal communication, December 21, 2021).

6.1.3 The Risk—Political and Economic Challenges Within the Education System

The transition plan, launched in 2022, will be the second trial after previous talks about transition failed due to lack of MoE readiness (J.12, AE implementer). An evaluation published in 2018 concluded that, at the time, the MoE lacked capacity to manage the DOP and that it would not be ready to do so in the foreseen future. The report explained:

The MoE is not currently ready to take over management of the NFE programme and will not be in the foreseen future. The mandate of the ministry is narrow and focuses only on formal education while NFE is considered a side programme of a much lesser priority. The formal education, though the only mandate of the ministry, is characterized by low quality of education and a deterrent environment. This raises a major concern about the ability of the ministry to manage a program that requires high level of innovation, flexibility and organized collaboration. (USAID, 2018, p. vii)

While one stakeholder interviewed for this research referenced the conclusions of the evaluation to emphasise the lack of capacity of MoE to manage the transition (J.12, AE implementer), another maintained that the landscape has changed since the evaluation was published in 2018, highlighting that since then MoE's capacity has been strengthened to increase readiness, and NFE and inclusion have since become priorities for the MoE (J.13, AE funder).

The MoE's primary focus and mandate continues to be formal education and it sees all other programmes as secondary (Particip Consortium, 2019). With decision makers changing every 4 years during political elections, and often before, decisions around NFE and the level of support received are largely dependent on who is in office. For instance, it has been reported that in recent years, for a short period of time, one minister suspended the implementation of the DOP as the minister did not see its importance (USAID, 2018). There is current commitment to the programmes under the AAI; however, both programmes are very costly, and while the 5-year transition plan dictates that the MoE will eventually allocate a budget for NFE (J.13, AE funder), there remains the question of whether the MoE will be able to afford running the programmes beyond the AAI (J.7, AE regulator).

Bureaucracy and a system that is resistant to adaptation poses another challenge, as discussed in Section 5.4. NGOs have flexibility in assigning costs and spending that the MoE does not have. This is already causing delays and complications in the transition of centres to MoE. For example, the MoE is unable to pay for transportation for learners as it is not part of its mandate to provide transport for education. Similarly, the key role of community mobilisers and stipends for learners are not supported by the current MoE financial system (J.12, AE implementer; J.16, AE funder). Currently, these challenges are being mitigated by the provision of block grants to the centres, but block grants do not offer a sustainable solution on the long term (J.13, AE funder).

The MoE works to ensure the quality and reach of offered AEP programmes but needs further support. The NFE department at the MoE has 4–5 employees and needs more resources (J.7, AE regulator). Unless the MoE invests in resourcing the NFE department and staff at the directorate level, the transition may not be successful, as the department, as it is, is “overworked and understaffed” (J.10, expert). The overstretched MoE runs around 80 programmes and while the MoE is willing and has adopted the transition plan, stakeholders doubt its capacity to implement it (J.9, expert; J.10, expert; J.12, AE implementer). In contrast to the current direction, the 2018 evaluation reflected on the MoE capacity and reported that a structure where MoE is not the implementing partner “has much more potential for sustainability than a complete handover to the ministry” (USAID, 2018, p. vii). However, having NGOs continue to be the implementing partners also comes with challenges, as one stakeholder shared:

The cost remains to be very high for NGOs to continue supporting the implementation of the programme. Efforts are now being directed towards strengthening national systems and building capacities for MoE direct implementation for sustainability purposes. While maintaining that technical support to MoE is still very much needed. (J.13, AE funder)

6.2 The Future of the Programmes in the Wider Political Economy—Education Return

Critiques of the DOP explored in this report include low enrolment and completion rates, lack of availability of centres, challenges to accessibility, severed pathways that lead nowhere, and lack of evidence on the positive impact of the programme (Particip Consortium, 2019). Similarly, it remains unclear if the CUP is able to retain learners, support learning outcomes, and successfully reintegrate them back into formal education (J.15, AE funder). In their design, neither programme includes following up with learners after they graduate; information on where learners go after graduation is limited (J.15, AE funder; J.18, AE funder).

While the changes to the programmes planned under AAI 2.0 offer a glimpse of a better future for AEP programmes, there are wider societal issues that still pose a challenge for the DOP and CUP to achieve their aims.

An AEP funder described changing the regulations of AEPs without addressing the wider system-level challenges that limit education return to be like “Investing in growing and pruning the tree, removing dead and broken branches, while all along the roots and soil are rotten” (J.18, AE funder). This section further expands on the perceptions of AEP (and education more broadly) and its perceived return value, as well as issues related to employment for youth, and especially for refugees.

The deteriorating quality of education contributes to higher school drop-outs where 30% of drop-outs are reported to be affected by the perception of the value of education (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Jordan, 2020). Perception around the quality of education, and particularly the low return from education, contribute to the decision by children, youth, and their families to drop out of formal education. According to MoE and UNICEF (2020):

The relationship between school attainment and potential earnings has implications for households’ decisions to invest in education. The expectation of low returns from schooling is likely to reduce the time individuals spend in school. Low returns are due either to the quality of education or the characteristics of the labour market. For Syrian refugees, the lack of return is compounded by legal barriers to labour market entry. (p. 18)

A major social constraint to the success of the DOP and CUP and the future of AAI is the perceptions of NFE and its return value. The acceptability of NFE is interlinked with the acceptability of education offered by the MoE as a whole. An evaluation looking at level of satisfaction with the government and formal education system showed that 61% of respondents reported being worried about the government’s ability to provide children with good-quality education (Boyle & Ramos-Mattoussi, 2018). Similarly, a large-scale assessment of youth need, conducted by USAID, reported that the majority of youth surveyed felt that the education system was not teaching them skills that they needed to be prepared for the workforce, with youth reporting that their options to acquire knowledge and skills relevant to school-to-work transition were limited (USAID Jordan, 2015). Both programmes are offered by the government, yet research shows that fewer than 5 in 10 young people in Jordan trust the government (OECD, 2021).

Part of the perceived poor acceptability of AEPs is related to the opportunities and pathways for further education that learners have access to postgraduation, and those too are perceived to be of low value. Only 25%–35% of learners enrolled in the DOP graduate (J.12, AE implementer). The DOP, as it has been offered between 2003 and 2021, provides graduates with a certificate of Grade 10-equivalency, allowing them to enrol in VTCs or continue with home studies. If a learner completes the Home Studies Programme and obtains a Tawjihi certificate (the secondary diploma), they are then able to enrol in higher education opportunities. The latter is a pathway that is unreachable for the vast majority (J.1, expert). Below, the pathways for TVET and upper secondary education is further explored.

Vocational training

Vocational training through government-run centres, one of the two possible destinations of DOP graduates at present, is perceived by youth to offer limited progression and employment opportunities. According to the National Strategy for Human Resource Development (NCHRD, 2016), young people and their families have negative perceptions of vocational training, with the pathway being seen as one for students who fall behind academically:

There is an engrained cultural stigma associated with the prospects and status of technical and vocational paths and qualifications, and current enrolment numbers clearly demonstrate this preference. ... The system as it currently operates reinforces this perception. Poorly performing academic students are funnelled into TVET. (p. 154)

TVET provision in Jordan lacks the necessary links with employers and labour markets, and graduates are reported to not have the rights skills for their vocation (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2019). For those who do enrol and complete the vocational training pathways, little support is offered by the government to guarantee decent work and employee rights. There are no unions for graduates of vocations from VTCs, pay is not regulated, many can only find employment as daily labourers where health care and pensions are not provided. For refugees, vocational training is costly, with the majority of vocations offered in fields refugees do not have the legal right to work in (J.8, AE researcher). In 2018, participation in TVET programmes among 15–24-year-olds stood at 1.2% nationwide (UNESCO-UNEVOC, n.d.).

Upper secondary education

In the rare cases where graduates of the DOP are able to successfully graduate secondary education and obtain their Tawjihi certificate, the value of the certificate is viewed to have low return. In 2015, only 41% of students passed the Tawjihi exam, graduating secondary education (NCHRD, 2016). Of all Syrians in Jordan, around 15% of adults who are 20 years old or older have completed secondary or postsecondary education (Particip Consortium, 2019). Whether they pass or fail Tawjihi, students leave school with no clarity on alternative pathways or support (NCHRD, 2016).

Beyond secondary, higher education is restricted to a small percentage of the population of residents of Jordan, and it, too, is perceived to have low value. Family wealth drives inequality in higher education (Hendy et al., 2022). Among Jordanian youth, 44% of “well-off” youth reach university compared to a mere 11% of “poor” youth (Shuayb et al., 2021). Refugees residing in Jordan must pay an international fee to access higher education opportunities, making access prohibitively expensive, and, while scholarships exist, they mostly target Syrian refugees (Johnston et al., 2019). Employment opportunities open for refugees are mostly unskilled labour and do not require a higher or upper secondary education (J.1, expert). Compounding the issue, unemployment rates are reported to be significantly higher for graduates of higher education than those who hold only primary or secondary education (Shuayb et al., 2021). In other words, higher education is no more likely to help young people get a job than completing only primary or secondary education.

Perceptions of the return on education are intimately tied with the labour market and opportunities for employment. Yet, youth unemployment in Jordan witnessed a stark increase as a result of COVID-19. In the first quarter of 2021, the World Bank reported youth unemployment in Jordan at 48.1%, with female labour-force participation to be one of the lowest in the world at 14% (World Bank, 2021). The labour market in Jordan has been failing to offer enough skilled jobs for educated young people. Research shows that unemployment patterns marginalise youth, females, and those with university degrees (Particip Consortium, 2019). School-to-employment transition can take up to 3 years, with many graduates of secondary, higher, and vocational education unable to find jobs even beyond the 3-year mark (J.1, expert; J.2, AE implementer).


A report focused on youth transitions to adulthood in Jordan found:

While education has raised youth aspirations for improved livelihoods and economic independence, the reality of young people's transition to adulthood has generally not met their aspirations. The jobs that young people aspire to have not been forthcoming, leading to extended and difficult school-to-work transitions and thus delays in their transition to financial independence, marriage, and starting their own families. (Assaad et al., 2021, p. 13)

Two of the stakeholders interviewed for this report stressed that actors need to view adolescents and youth who drop out of school not as passive individuals who are left behind, but as active actors with agency, making decisions based on incentives and return value. While many socioeconomic vulnerabilities can put a learner at a higher risk of dropping out, to remain in an education pathway, whether formal or nonformal, the learner needs to see its value added (J.1, expert; J.2, AE implementer). A pressing barrier is the lack of clarity and trust around trajectories beyond AE programmes, adding to the perceived low value of participation (J.9, expert).

SECTION 7

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS



In this final section, we reflect upon the key findings discussed in Sections 3 through 6 and make recommendations for the AEWG and national stakeholders working in accelerated education to address and overcome obstacles or bottlenecks in the funding, regulation, and provision of AEPs to meet the needs and demands of OOSCY. Below, we list opportunities for change and the challenge that they are addressing, as well as providing insights into the factors that may enable or constrain change in these areas. This section is not intended to list all challenges, but rather highlights those for which there is a notable opportunity given the current political and institutional will and capacity for change.

Under the AAI 2.0 and the planned revisions of the programme, Jordan AEP-provision is witnessing a moment of transition which, if managed correctly, will be able to increase the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability of the CUP and DOP. Globally, Jordan ranks among the top 20 countries with the longest school closure because of COVID-19 (Jordan Strategy Forum, 2021). AEP stakeholders anticipate that as a result of learning loss, the numbers of OOSCY will see an unprecedented rise, thus increasing demand for AEPs (J.12, AE implementer; J.17, AE regulator).

The challenge to ensuring AEPs are available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable:

To date, significant challenges with the DOP and CUP exist, ranging from low enrolment and completion rates, poor learning outcomes, and several technical challenges to the establishment of centres, curricula, and pathways. The transition under AAI is hoped to address some of these issues. However, notably, there is no structured accountability or coordination mechanism specific to AEPs under AAI, and there still remains no national NFE strategy to guide the programmes.

Furthermore, the perceived value of education, unless addressed holistically, will continue to act as a deterrent for children and youth to remain in formal education or access accelerated education services.

The opportunity for greater integration of AEPs: AAI 2.0 presents a significant opportunity to build on existing momentum amongst a range of actors to ensure the DOP and CUP can meet the needs of OOSCY, since it is looking at strengthening curriculum, certification, and accessible pathways. Some initial steps that can be taken to support AAI include establishing a coordination group or community of practice to support and monitor the transition specific to AEPs, as well as developing a national NFE strategy, neither of which currently exist. In addition, this transition offers an opportunity to better understand and shift perceptions of the value of the CUP and DOP as part of the 5-year transition plan to MoE through action research. There is an opportunity, and a need, as many stakeholders shared, to undertake an evaluation of the learning outcomes to assess to what extent children and youth are learning in both the DOP and CUP.

Factors enabling change: Jordan has a number of experienced AEP stakeholders who possess strong technical and implementation capacity. Relevant stakeholders are willing to offer support to the MoE during the transition period. A 5-year transition plan is already in place and adopted by the MoE.

Factors constraining change: There is coordination fatigue among stakeholders and limited resources within the MoE. Limitation in staffing at the MoE level may hinder effective and timely coordination. Additionally, and as explored in this report, there are competing priorities between the support of formal education and of NFE. The research also shows that there is resistance from stakeholders to share information on enrolment, completion, and learning outcomes from both programmes. The aftermath of COVID-19-related learning loss is expected to continue to be the focus of the MoE in the foreseeable future. Finally, unless perceptions of the return value of AEPs, and education as a whole, are better understood and addressed, it is unlikely that the transition under AAI 2.0 alone will address interest and enrolment rates in programmes.

SECTION 8

ANNEXES

8.1 Annex 1: List of Interviews

Interview Code	Interviewee Type	Level	Organisation Type
J.1	Expert	National level	INGO staff
J.2	AE implementer	National level	INGO staff
J.3	Expert	National level	Local NGO/CBO staff
J.4	AE implementer	National level	INGO staff
J.5	Expert	National level	INGO staff
J.6	Expert	National level	INGO staff
J.7	AE regulator	National level	UN body staff
J.8	AE researcher	National level	INGO staff
J.9	Expert	National level	INGO staff
J.10	Expert	National level	INGO staff
J.11	AE funder	National level	Bilateral donor staff
J.12	AE implementer	National level	INGO staff
J.13	AE funder	National level	INGO staff
J.14	AE implementer	National level	INGO staff
J.15	AE funder	National level	UN body staff
J.16	AE funder	National level	Bilateral donor staff
J.17	AE regulator	National level	Government official
J.18	AE funder	National level	INGO Staff
J.19	Expert	National level	INGO Staff

8.2 Annex 2: List of Documents Reviewed

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