Education in Emergencies
Financing in the Wake of COVID-19:
Time to Reinvest to Meet Growing Needs
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Acknowledgements

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Foreword

Conflict, violence, disasters and the worsening climate crisis threaten children’s education more than ever, especially children and young people caught in crisis. While the international community is committed to ensuring the right to education for all children, we are currently far from achieving this goal. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the education crisis through prolonged school closures, and through financial knock-on effects that have yet to be fully assessed.

We all know that the provision of education is a life-saving and indispensable service for children and young people who find themselves in extremely precarious situations. Why? Because education offers them protection, hope and, above all, perspective for the future. Unfortunately, we also know that education in emergencies (EiE) remains under-prioritised and under-funded in humanitarian action and international development.

That is why the Geneva Global Hub for EiE, which includes governments, international organisations, UN agencies, NGOs, academia and foundations, commissioned this study to assess the current state of global EiE funding.

To meet this challenge, we need to identify funding gaps and assess progress. We need to be driven by evidence in order to make informed decisions, set clear targets and advocate effectively. Until now, it has been difficult to access reliable information on funding for EiE, partly because EiE operates at the intersection of humanitarian and development aid and tends to be fragmented in different reports.

That is why this study is both unique and timely. For the first time, it offers a comprehensive picture of global funding for EiE, compiled from a variety of sources. It is also the first major analysis published under the auspices of the EiE Hub on behalf of its members. It aims to create a shared understanding of the current state of EiE funding and the important actions that need to be taken to address the gaps. And it will contribute, as a baseline study and a call to action, to several key events such as the upcoming Transforming Education Summit, which is being convened by the United Nations Secretary-General in September this year, and the Education Cannot Wait High-Level Funding Conference to be held in February 2023.

Now is the time to act. For children caught in emergencies, and for their parents, education is a priority. Donors, crisis-affected governments, humanitarian agencies and development actors are called upon to see it the same way. Let us all invest in education.

On behalf of the Steering Group of the Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies,
Millions of children and youth are being denied their right to safe, inclusive, and quality education because of armed conflict, climate change and other emergencies. The global education crisis has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seriously disrupted children and youth’s schooling and exacerbated education inequalities. Education in emergencies (EiE) has received increased attention in recent years, but the international community is still failing to ensure that all children and youth living in emergency contexts have access to inclusive and equitable quality education.

A critical impediment to achieving these education goals is the chronic underfunding of EiE. This study provides a detailed assessment of the state of EiE funding, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reviews financial data from a range of EiE funding modalities, including humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. In addition to presenting the key funding trends since 2016, it pinpoints the critical factors that influence EiE funding over time, with a view to identify what actions are required to address the noted gaps.

The key findings emerging from the study are:

**EiE remains chronically underfunded against the backdrop of rapidly increasing needs**

EiE funding is comprised of both humanitarian and development assistance. Humanitarian funding for EiE has increased year-on-year over the last decade, reaching $807 million in 2021. The proportion of funding to the education sector in UN-led humanitarian appeals has grown over the same period. In the same contexts Official Development Assistance for education has also increased, reaching $5.7 billion in 2020. However, the increasing funds for EiE have not kept pace with the rapidly growing financial requirements and mounting needs, leaving a massive gap. Within UN-led humanitarian appeals the education sector has become more seriously underfunded since 2018; it received 22% of the funds requested in 2021. This is far less than other sectors, leaving millions of children and youth without much-needed education. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on EiE funding has been mixed; it has diverted funding away from EiE in some contexts, while in others it has created an opportunity to mobilise more funds.

**Stronger political commitments are needed to address the on-going underfunding of EiE**

The profile of EiE within the international aid system has risen in recent years, which has translated into more resources, but not at a rate quick enough to address the mounting needs. While EiE is considered more of a priority today than in the past, it still tends to be overlooked or deprioritized because it is not considered to be a life-saving need in the same way as other sectors. The sustainability of funding is also affected by the unpredictability of donors’ funding decisions over time and the short funding cycles. All actors need to recommit to the importance of EiE and ensure that it is properly funded. This is especially true in the post-COVID-19 recovery period, so that children and youth living in emergency contexts are able to catch up on the education they have lost, and to get back on track to achieve SDG4 by 2030.

**Humanitarian funding is insufficient to address EiE needs, which makes enhancing coherence with development cooperation doubly important**

Humanitarian funding for EiE is limited in comparison to development funding provided for often similar education activities in the same contexts. The distinction between these two funding modalities is often marginal and as crises become more protracted, improved collaboration is needed between the two. This is the most effective means of leveraging financing for EiE and delivering the best possible education outcomes for children. What remains in effect today is a siloed approach to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation for EiE. What is needed instead is a transformational change that addresses the many institutional barriers and disincentives to a more joint approach, including more strategic alignment between different funding modalities and the guidance to make this happen.
Inequities in the allocation of EiE funding requires improved coordination between relevant actors

While the education sector is underfunded in all contexts, some countries receive far less than others because of a variety of factors, including whether they are prioritised by donors and how strong the absorption capacity and operational constraints are of education partners on the ground. The needs of EiE should be properly assessed and translated into accurate funding requirements. Better coordination between all education actors is also essential to ensure that the limited resources available target the areas where they can have the greatest impact on education outcomes.

There is no comprehensive or unified tracking of EiE funding

Several different systems exist for reporting and monitoring the funding of EiE, each linked to a specific funding mechanism. All these systems lack proper reporting, which means it is impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of EiE funding. The collection and reporting of EiE funding must be improved, including multi-sector and multi-year funding, and the ability to analyse the data available. It would make sense to consolidate such disparate data into a single platform so that decisions on the allocation of scarce resources can be further improved and trends monitored more efficiently.

Based on these key findings the authors of the study make the following recommendations:

All EiE partners

- Redouble advocacy efforts calling for increased political support for the global education crisis and the funds required to address it.
- Ensure that the education sector receives an equitable share of humanitarian funding at the same proportion as other sectors and the overall UN-led humanitarian appeal.
- Develop an observatory/dashboard to consolidate existing data on EiE funding from all relevant modalities and present it in one place on a common platform that is available to all partners.
- Organise annual planning conferences to coordinate the yearly allocation of funding for EiE to reduce the inequity in where it is used and to make sure that it targets the greatest needs.
- Clarify the nexus approach to EiE financing through operational guidance that sets out the approach to establishing joint financial requirements, arrangements for assessing needs, planning common strategies, and developing joint programmes, coordination mechanisms and funding modalities.
- Ensure that 25% of funding to the education sector goes as directly as possible to local and national actors, in line with the commitments of the Grand Bargain.
Donors

- Ensure that, at a minimum, donors reach the current Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) target of 4% of humanitarian funding for education and commit to ensuring that this level is maintained over time.
- Discuss within the context of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative the revision of the GEFI target and combine it with an agreed target for the overall share of ODA that should be dedicated to education.
- Increase the proportion of predictable, multi-year funding for EiE.
- Align policies and approaches to EiE funding through, for example, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.
- Further strengthen the reporting of financial contributions in the OCHA Financial Tracking Service and the OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (DAC CRS), and ensure that disaggregated funding data is available for EiE.
- Work to diversify and expand the EiE donor base, including contributions from non-traditional donors, the private sector and philanthropic organisations.
- Further explore innovative financing models for EiE, including how greater coordination can enable different funding modalities to act in unison.
- Strengthen commitments to leverage financing for refugee education – in both emergencies and protracted contexts – at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum.

Global education funds

- Further enhance coordination to ensure a more unified approach to mobilising resources, planning, allocating funds and programming of the complementary funding mechanisms.
- Develop a strategic framework between Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) to ensure a more joined-up approach to the direction and use of education funds.
- Organise joint pledging conferences and other meetings for EiE funding to crisis countries, particularly forgotten or deprioritised emergencies, to present a common assessment of needs to donors.
- Streamline funding mechanisms and processes between the funds to harness complementarities and reduce duplication, especially at the country level.

Coordination entities for EiE responses

- Provide operational guidance and training for education partners to strengthen the reporting and tracking of EiE funding.
- With development actors, develop guidance for education partners at the country level on how to apply the nexus approach to ensure a more aligned approach to their planning, programming, coordination and allocation of funding.
- Advocate so that education requirements in Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) and Refugee Response Plans (RRPs) are accurately and consistently set, and are commensurate with assessed needs.
- Further develop the modalities and guidance for joined up programming between the education cluster and other sectors to ensure a multi-sector approach to EiE.
- Revise the Refugee Funding Tracker to provide a breakdown of requirements and funding to the education sector in RRPCs.

Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA

- Ensure that EiE remains a strategic priority for the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund and the Country-based Pooled Funds, and that previous commitments are implemented through the appropriate accountability mechanisms.
- Further improve the FTS system to track funding more accurately for education and specific sub-activities of the sector, including as part of multi-sector funding, and provide a dedicated page to the education sector on the FTS platform.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh JRP</td>
<td>Bangladesh Joint Response Plan</td>
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<td>CBPF</td>
<td>Country-Based Pooled Funds (UN)</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (OECD)</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<td>ECW</td>
<td>Education Cannot Wait</td>
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<td>EIE</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>EIE Hub</td>
<td>Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>FER</td>
<td>First Emergency Response</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service (OCHA)</td>
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<td>GEC</td>
<td>Global Education Cluster</td>
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<td>GEFI</td>
<td>Global Education First Initiative (UN)</td>
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<td>GEM</td>
<td>Global Education Monitoring Report</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>L/NAs</td>
<td>Local and National Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYRP</td>
<td>Multi-Year Resilience Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NLG</td>
<td>No Lost Generation</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMRP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
<td>Refugee Response Plan</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria 3RP</td>
<td>Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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1 Introduction

A lack of access to safe, inclusive, quality education is keeping millions of crisis-affected children out of school every day. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened this education crisis through prolonged school closures and secondary effects. The increased frequency and protracted nature of both armed conflict and climate change are also having a large impact on national education systems and the delivery of EiE. Progress made in recent years in improving learning outcomes for children has been reversed, and it is feared that many children and young people who dropped out of school during the pandemic may never return. Insufficient funding for EiE has compounded the problem, and millions of children are being deprived of educational opportunities.

This study, which was commissioned by the Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies (EiE Hub), provides an analysis of the state of financing for EiE and the impact the COVID-19 pandemic has had on the sector. It provides a sobering assessment of the underfunding of EiE, which has gotten worse in recent years as the need has increased. Although the education crisis is now more visible, global and national policy commitments are still not being met, which is creating massive funding gaps. The lack of funding is having a direct and negative impact on the educational opportunities of children and youth living in crisis settings. However, the inadequate funding for EiE is only one part of the story, as there have been some positive trends. Therefore, this study also identifies the factors that are influencing funding levels to pinpoint the kinds of interventions that can improve not only the quantity but the quality of funding for EiE.

Section 2 of the report provides the background to the current global education crisis highlighting the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and explaining the architecture of EiE financing. Section 3 outlines the scope and methodology for the study, including the limitations. Section 4 provides an overview of existing funding data on EiE and identifies key trends in funding received, as well as gaps. Section 5 then discusses the main factors that influence EiE funding before Section 6, which includes the study’s conclusions and recommendations for different EiE actors.
2. Background

2.1. THE EDUCATION CRISIS AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic there was a pre-existing education crisis. UNESCO estimated that 256 million children of primary and secondary school age were out of school in 2019.¹ Half of these children were in crisis-affected countries regularly experiencing armed conflicts, climate-induced disasters and other emergencies.² The COVID-19 pandemic has been an added blow, as school closures seriously disrupted the education of millions of children, many of whom likely will never be able to return to school. At the peak of the pandemic in 2020, UNESCO estimated that more than 16 billion students and 100 million teachers and school personnel were affected by the closure of schools and other learning institutions.³ And by the end of 2021, with 2 trillion hours of in-person learning lost, 80 per cent of countries experienced learning loss according to UNICEF, UNESCO and the World Bank.⁴ Specific efforts are needed not only to provide access for these millions of children who remain out of school, but also to help children stay in school by providing catch-up and accelerated programmes to make up for lost learning. In total, $17 trillion dollars in future earnings may be lost by the current generation of learners.⁵

The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated existing education inequalities, particularly in impoverished societies. Save the Children has estimated that at least one-third of the world’s schoolchildren were unable to access the remote learning offered during the school closures; half of the learners kept out of school did not have access to a computer or internet at home.⁷ According to UNICEF, at least 463 million schoolchildren worldwide cannot be reached by remote learning opportunities because of the digital divide; three out of four of these children live in rural areas and/or poor households.⁸ As such, the pandemic has acted as a risk multiplier, not only by creating new needs but also by amplifying the existing risks for the most vulnerable groups, particularly crisis-affected girls and children with disabilities.

Schools provide physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection, emotional security, a sense of stability, and a broad range of social services, such as health, mental health and psychosocial support, school feeding and nutrition, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities.⁹ One major negative impact of COVID-19 on children and young people, in addition to disrupting education and preventing millions of children from accessing quality education, was that these secondary benefits of schooling were lost during the pandemic-related school closures. The effect of this, which has been seen in other protracted crises, has had a detrimental impact on the safety and well-being of children and youth and caused the kind of psychological damage that results from being out of a protective and safe school setting. For example, when not in school, girls in many parts of the world face additional risk of child marriage and child pregnancy.¹⁰ UNICEF has estimated that up to 10 million more girls will be at risk of becoming child brides because of the pandemic.¹¹ Moreover, according to UNICEF and the World Food Programme, about 370 million children have missed out on free or subsidized school meals during the pandemic.¹²

With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, UN member states committed to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” by 2030. While the world was not on
track to reach SDG4 even before COVID-19, it is estimated that the pandemic has wiped out 20 years of education gains. UNESCO has estimated that, due to COVID-19, an additional $150 billion to $460 billion could now be needed to achieve SDG4 by 2030 in low- and lower-middle-income countries. Against that bleak backdrop, this study looks at the financial gap left by the COVID-19 pandemic and the steps needed to make up the lost progress.

### 2.2. THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES

Education systems in crisis settings are funded in a variety of ways, including most importantly by national governments, but also household expenditures and foreign aid – in the form of both humanitarian and development assistance – which complements domestic spending. It has been estimated that $75 billion will be needed each year at minimum to get on track for providing the world’s children with universal education by 2030. Government spending on education has increased steadily during the last decade, but the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted public finances dramatically, resulting in a significant contraction in education budgets. According to the World Bank and UNESCO, two-thirds of 17 reported low- and lower-middle-income countries cut their education budgets in 2020 after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2022, a UNICEF survey of 122 countries showed that only one third of countries had increased public resources for education while a quarter had reported a decrease in budget. The importance of foreign aid to safeguard spending on education and ensure that children’s access to education is maintained has therefore increased considerably. Approximately $14.7 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) was dedicated to education in 2020, which represents 6.5% of the total. The bulk of this comes from the development aid budget of donor governments and the remainder from humanitarian funding.

EiE financing is a subset of this education funding, although there is no agreement on the scope of what, precisely, it entails. It might be provided for a short time in a quick-onset emergency to cover the immediate needs of children and youth affected by emergency, or over the long term, over several years, to sustain education in a protracted crisis where formal education systems are unable to accommodate all children and youth. In this sense, EiE financing straddles the nexus between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, which are both important sources of funding for EiE. This support is channelled through UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and intermediaries, including dedicated global funds for education response such as Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). Aid recipients include UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and civil society organizations.

Although EiE has been a subject of international focus over the last two decades (see timeline below), there was a time when education was not prioritized during emergencies. Education is now recognized as a critical sector in humanitarian response and a key element of development cooperation in crisis settings. The Global Education Cluster (GEC), established in 2007 and co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children, is the main coordination mechanism for delivering such assistance in humanitarian crisis, with UNHCR leading the coordination of refugee responses. In 2010, the importance of EiE was affirmed by the UN General Assembly in a resolution urging “Member States to implement strategies and policies to ensure and support the realization of the right to education as an integral element of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian response.” Technical knowledge on providing education in crisis settings has evolved since then, with the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards being agreed to amongst the diverse actors involved.
In order to increase funding for providing education to children and youth in emergencies, the UN Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) agreed in 2012 to spend a minimum of 4% of humanitarian funding on education. In 2015, EiE was captured in SDG 4, which seeks to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. In 2016, EiE gained further attention with the establishment of the first dedicated UN-hosted fund, ECW. In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees reaffirmed the importance of inclusive national education systems in facilitating access to refugees and host community children. While these positive developments have raised the profile of EiE, this study examines whether or not the policy commitments have translated into more and better funding for the sector.
3. Scope and methodology

This study analyses key trends in EiE financing between 2016 and 2021. In the absence of an agreed understanding of what falls within the scope of EiE financing, it is taken to mean all aid flows from a variety of different funding sources that are used to fund activities related to the definition of EiE (see Box 1). The study has not analysed the role of national governments that fund their own education systems, nor funding received for EiE from private sources, in a comprehensive manner. It is also only concerned with the quantity of funding. Funding quality and implementation, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency in the use of available funds to improve education for children and youth, is beyond the scope of this report.

There is no comprehensive, all-encompassing data source on financing EiE, and existing databases do not allow easy comparison of data – which are often incomplete due to the voluntary nature of reporting. This study, therefore, has tried to identify trends from a range of data sets. These are primarily humanitarian financing mechanisms, although development funds that have been used to fund EiE are also included. Indeed, as crises become increasingly protracted, EiE and its financing operate at the nexus between humanitarian and development aid in many respects, including to ensure a smooth transition between the acute response and the longer term EiE response. The data analysed was collected in February and March 2022, and 2021 data was updated for some data sources in early May 2022. (For more information, see Annex 1: Methodological note on data analysis.)

In addition to the data analysis, 37 interviews were conducted with a range of different stakeholders, including actors from UN agencies, NGOs, donor organisations and research institutes. Education actors working in five crisis countries—Afghanistan, Jordan (as part of the Syria refugee response), Niger, Venezuela and Yemen—participated in focus group discussions organised to gain an understanding of the field-level dynamics affecting EiE financing. The boxes that appear throughout the report provide snapshots of these five contexts. An online survey was conducted with different stakeholders to gather their viewpoints on factors that have affected EiE financing and actions that could be taken to address funding gaps. There were 106 responses to the survey, the results of which are featured in the relevant sections of the report.

**BOX 2: DEFINITION OF EIE**

Education in Emergencies, as defined by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), refers to “the quality learning opportunities for all ages in situations of crisis, including early childhood development, primary, secondary, non-formal, technical, vocational, higher and adult education. Education in emergencies provides physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection that can sustain and save lives.”

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Education in Emergencies (EiE) Financing in the Wake of COVID-19: Time to Reinvest to Meet Growing Needs — 15
4. Key trends in EiE funding and the impact of COVID-19

Trends in EiE funding are impacted by broader trends in aid. In 2022, the UN appealed for a record $41 billion to meet the needs of the 183 million people requiring humanitarian assistance and protection, up from 174 million just a year earlier. Humanitarian needs have expanded enormously in recent years because of persistent armed conflicts and other disasters, but also because of compounding humanitarian challenges such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, the Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19 was released and subsequently revised twice, with financial requirements reaching $10.3 billion across 63 countries. The number of UN humanitarian appeals rose from 35 in 2019 to 62 in 2020. While the COVID-19 response was integrated into UN-led humanitarian appeals in 2021, the overall need has remained persistently high. So far in 2022, the Ukraine war has added $4.1 billion to the initial requirements of UN-led appeals, which means that $46.1 billion will now be required to fund humanitarian action for this year.

As the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased significantly in the last few years, donor funding has not kept pace. This has created a rapidly growing funding gap. In its 2021 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, Development Initiatives stated that international humanitarian assistance has flatlined in recent years. While contributions from some top donors have increased, despite the COVID-19 crisis, this was offset by the reduction of others. Underfunding of humanitarian assistance increased markedly in 2019. Between 2016 and 2019, UN-led humanitarian appeals were funded at around 60%. Only 50% of the required funding was received in 2020, while the figure in 2021 was 54%. This is a significant change in the trend of humanitarian financing over the last decade and a significant increase in the funding gap.

Funding for EiE has been impacted by these overall trends in humanitarian assistance while also facing its own challenges. This section looks at EiE financing from a range of data sources linked to different funding modalities, with a view to identifying the broad trends and gaps in funding and to determine the impact of COVID-19. However, the report does not aim to quantify the total amount of funding received for EiE, which, given the gaps in reporting, would be impossible to calculate. The analysis focuses mainly on humanitarian financing mechanisms, but also includes development aid used to fund EiE. Although the main funding trends are identifiable, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive picture because there is no agreed upon definition of what exactly falls within the scope of EiE funding.

4.1. FUNDING FOR THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN HUMANITARIAN APPEALS

4.1.1. Humanitarian funding reported in the OCHA Financial Tracking Service

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) is a centralized source of data on humanitarian funding flows, which donor governments, UN entities, NGOs and other humanitarian actors report to on a voluntary basis. Financial contributions can be reported for the following education activities conducted during a crisis or its aftermath: school construction, school supplies, support to teachers, teacher training, temporary learning facilities, peace/reconciliation education and food for work (e.g. for school construction or teaching). According to FTS, school feeding should be reported under food security, but this is not done consistently. For example, in 2021 13% of all funding reported in the FTS as earmarked for education was in fact received by the World Food Programme, which confirms that funding for school feeding is increasingly reported under the education sector, making education appear to be better funded than it actually is.
Figure 3: Education sector funding received: Total versus inside appeals (based on FTS data)

Most of the humanitarian funding data reported in the FTS is for UN-led humanitarian appeals, which is what the platform was specifically designed for. These appeals include Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs), flash appeals, other appeals such as COVID-19 response plans and, more recently, Regional Refugee Response Plans (RRPs) — although FTS is not the primary tool for tracking funding to refugee responses. The FTS also captures humanitarian funding falling outside these appeals. As seen in Figure 3, funding for the education sector (both inside and outside appeals) reported in FTS increased each year for a full decade, reaching a record $807 million in 2021. Within the UN-led humanitarian appeals, funding for education increased from $230 million in 2016 to $633 million in 2021; this is a 175% increase, one of the largest increases of all sectors. An analysis from the website Humanitarian Funding Forecast shows that part of the 2021 education funding was originally in the 2020 budget. This suggests that at least some of the funding intended for 2020 that couldn't be used due to COVID-19 was carried over to 2021; this partly explains why there is no noticeable ‘COVID slump’ for the education sector.

The proportion of humanitarian funding allocated to education has also risen steadily over the last decade (see Figure 4), reaching a high point in 2021. In that year, education-sector funding accounted for 3.1% of overall humanitarian funding reported for humanitarian appeals on the FTS. However, a significant amount of funding reported in the FTS is not assigned to any one sector or is recorded as multi-sector in recognition of the multiple sectors that it might fund. It is unclear what proportion of this unspecified and multi-sector funding was directed to the education sector. Excluding this from the calculation and looking only at sector-specific funding data in the FTS in 2021, the proportion reported as going to the education sector was actually 5.2%. The authors of this study considered this to be a more accurate way to calculate the proportion of humanitarian funding going to the education sector. However, it needs to be clarified whether the GEFI target of 4% is being met. Whether or not it is, some education actors such as the members of the Global Campaign for Education have been calling for donors to spend up to 10% of their humanitarian funding on education.
Despite these positive trends in the absolute level of education funding and its proportion of overall humanitarian funding, the sector remains severely underfunded relative to its stated requirements, and also compared to the funding of other sectors. These are a more important measure of whether EiE is properly funded. While 57%, on average, of the UN-led humanitarian appeals were funded between 2016 and 2021, the education sector received 34% of its requirements. As shown in Figure 5, the education sector is consistently less well funded. Moreover, while the level of funding against the UN-led humanitarian appeals took a significant drop in 2020, from 63% to 50% at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the education sector fared much worse, receiving 39% of its requirements in 2020 and 22% in 2021.
Put simply, funding requirements for the education sector have grown much faster than the increase in funding for education. The net result is that the education sector is more underfunded now than it was previously (see Figure 6). The massive increase in funding requirements for the education sector, from $1.4 billion in 2020 to $2.9 billion in 2021 (i.e., more than double), can be explained in part by the greater visibility of education funding requirements in RRPs. The inclusion of regional RRPs and the tracking of their funding by sector in the FTS is relatively new as the primary mandate for tracking the requirements for refugee responses lies with UNHCR (UNHCR maintains a separate reporting system for tracking refugee responses, the Refugee Funding Tracker). In the FTS education requirements and funding in RRPs used to be included under ‘multi-sector’, but in 2020-2021 these were recorded under the education sector, which significantly pushed up the reported requirements, reflecting more accurately the total requirements for education in UN-led humanitarian appeals. However, even when RRP requirements have been disaggregated by sector in appeals documents, funding received has not been systematically reported by sector. Without any prejudice to the reporting of funding against RRPs, this has led to a distortion in the trends in FTS funding data related to the education sector.

![Figure 6: Education funding coverage, inside response plans and appeals (based on FTS data)](image)

However, even when accounting for this distortion by removing data for regional RRPs and looking only at HRPs, the education sector remains significantly underfunded (see Figure 5). After peaking at 48% of required funding in 2018, the underfunding of education got worse over the next three years, dropping to 25% of the required amount by 2021. The education sector, which is generally underfunded in terms of humanitarian aid, is also more seriously underfunded than most other sectors (see Figure 7). Out of 13 sectors funded between 2016 and 2021, education ranked 8th in terms of funding coverage. Food security, health, nutrition and other sectors received proportionally far more funding, and the sectors that received less, such as coordination, logistics, early recovery, camp coordination and management, and emergency telecommunications, are support functions rather than direct assistance.
The immediate consequence of this underfunding is the absence of quality education assistance for millions of children and young people. In 2021, the GEC targeted 28.4 million children out of an estimated 55.6 million in need of education assistance. Because the education sector received just 25% of the funding it required, targets were not met, and eight million children were left without education assistance in 2021.21 Faced with these shortfalls, the education partners consulted as part of the research for this report spoke about the impact this underfunding had, including the suspension of programmes, overcrowded classrooms, poor maintenance of school infrastructure and, ultimately, increased dropout rates and negative coping mechanisms, including child labour and child marriage.22 The lack of funds ultimately leads to an erosion of quality programming at the expense of maintaining coverage of at least some form of education assistance to the greatest number of children.

A closer look at the years 2019 to 2021 shows an increase in the need for education funding, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of HRP countries rose from 23 in 2019 to 30 in 2021, and the number of people in need of education assistance more than doubled, from 36 million in 2019 to 76 million in 2020. The need declined again in 2021, but the 32.9 million children targeted in 2020 for education assistance represented less than 50% of estimated need in these countries. With schools reopening again, the number of people in need declined but it was still much higher than before the start of the pandemic. In addition to more traditional EiE activities, accelerated education and catch-up programmes, mental health and psychosocial support for children, caregivers and teachers, as well as hygiene kits and improved WASH facilities were needed as part of the prevention of, and response to, COVID-19.
### Table 1: Education in HRPs 2019-2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HRPs</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Funding Received</th>
<th>Funding Coverage</th>
<th>PIN</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Average cost per person targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.98 bn</td>
<td>385 million</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20 million</td>
<td>$49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.2 bn</td>
<td>403 million</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>32.9 million</td>
<td>$37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.5 bn</td>
<td>389 million</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>28.4 million</td>
<td>$55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1.2. OCHA-managed Humanitarian Funds: Central Emergency Relief Fund and Country-Based Pooled Funds

Two key sources of funding for UN-led humanitarian appeals are the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs). Each has a separate funding portal and both are reported in the FTS. The CERF was established in 2005 as a UN global emergency response fund aimed at delivering fast and effective humanitarian assistance. It has two funding mechanisms: a rapid response window to kick-start relief efforts when a new crisis emerges, and an underfunded emergencies window that helps to scale-up and sustain relief operations when no other funding is available. CERF provides grants to UN agencies that fall within its life-saving criteria, which includes EiE. However, CERF allocated 2.7% of its funding to the education sector between 2016 and 2021, a total of $88.5 million. In 2019, the emergency relief coordinator (ERC) outlined four priority areas for CERF and CBPF funding: namely, support for women and girls, including tackling gender-based violence, reproductive health and empowerment; programmes targeting people with disabilities; education in protracted crises; and other aspects of protection. These priority areas were considered underfunded, and all humanitarian coordinators were asked to give ‘due consideration’ to them during decisions about CERF and CBPF allocations.
In 2020, CERF funding for education reached $28.6 million, the highest level since its establishment in 2006 (see Figure 8). However, that amount decreased significantly in 2021, to $9.7 million or 1.8% of CERF funding, which is well below the average reported for overall humanitarian funding in the FTS. This can be partly explained by COVID-19, as the health sector received 24% of CERF funds that year, but protection-sector funding held up far better than education by receiving 15% of CERF funding, which was in line with the ERC’s priorities. In 2021, the CERF allocated large amounts to just a few emergencies, including $93 million to Afghanistan, which was 17% of its overall funding; this did not include any funding for education. Allocating such large amounts with no education component helps to explain the decreasing trend in CERF funding for the sector. While CERF funding is a small proportion of overall allocations to EiE, its funding decisions show that the sector is not prioritised, even when there is an explicit call to do so.

CBPFs, which complement the work of the CERF, operate at the country level. They enable donors to support humanitarian efforts by contributing to a single unearmarked fund and the highest-priority projects set out in the HRP. There were 21 CBPFs globally in 2021, which received $1.13 billion in donor contributions. The CBPFs have been much more consistent funders of the education sector than the CERF. From 2016 to 2021, the education sector received 5.4% of CBPF funding, for a total of $282 million. The share of CBPF funding to the education sector increased to 7.1% during those years—far more than its share of overall humanitarian funding reported in FTS—but this dropped to 3.6% in 2020, as funding was prioritised for health and WASH as part of the COVID-19 response. It recovered to 6.9% in 2021.
The CERF and CBPFs provide important lessons on how funding can and should be prioritized for education. An evaluation of the ERC’s four priority areas for funding in 2019 concluded for the CERF that the “initiative is highly relevant for delivering quality and inclusive humanitarian assistance and has successfully increased attention on these core areas in CERF allocations.” However, the prioritization was clearly ignored in 2021 with respect to CERF, and funding for education was marginalised again due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This shows that, once policy commitments are made to fund EiE, there must be ways to make those responsible for their implementation accountable.

4.1.3. EiE funding for refugee responses

Funding received for the regional RRPs is tracked through the Refugee Funding Tracker (RFT) platform that UNHCR established in 2019, with some data – as noted earlier – also reported in FTS. RRP appeal documents present requirements broken down by sector, which is estimated at 11% on average in 2021, higher than for HRPs at 6% based on FTS data. The RFT, however, does not provide a publicly available breakdown of funding received by sector, which makes it impossible to analyse what proportion of funding to the regional RRPs has been received by the education sector. As data is recorded differently in the RFT as compared to the FTS, and many donors provide unearmarked funding for refugee responses, it is not possible to know the sector breakdown of their contributions. In the absence of sector-specific data for education, the study focused on three regional RRPs; namely, the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), Bangladesh Joint Response Plan (JRP) and Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) (see Figure 10), for which education-sector-specific data is available on either the FTS or the websites of the plans.

Although not representative of all RRPs, education requirements for these three response plans represented 4-6% of total requirements in Venezuela RMRP, 6-9% in the Bangladesh JRP and 13-16% in the Syria 3RP for the period 2019-21. However, the education component of the plans was extremely underfunded except for the Syria 3RP – which was funded at 53-55% over this timeframe due in large measure to the advocacy and mobilization of funds through the ‘No Lost Generation initiative’ (see Box 3). However, the Bangladesh and Venezuela RRPs received less funds for education at just 48% on average (dropping from fully funded in 2019 to 16% funded in 2020) and 15% over the same timeframe.

Figure 10: Education funding coverage in the Syria 3RP, Venezuela RMRP and Bangladesh JRP (based on data from FTS and 3rpsyriacrisis.org)

Although not representative of all RRPs, these plans provide an indication of the extent to which the education sector is funded in refugee responses. Education requirements for these three response plans represented 4%-6% of the total requirements of the Venezuela RMRP, 6%-9% of the Bangladesh JRP and 13%-16% of the Syria 3RP for the period 2019-2021. However, the education component of the plans was extremely underfunded (see Figure 10), except for the Syria 3RP, which was funded at 53%-55% during this period due in large measure to the advocacy and mobilization of funds through the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative (see Box 2).
BOX 2: SYRIA’S NO LOST GENERATION INITIATIVE

The NLG was launched in 2013 as a multi-stakeholder initiative, co-led by UNICEF and World Vision, to ensure that children and youth affected by the Syria crisis are protected and have access to education. NLG has led important evidence-based advocacy to push for increased investments, including multi-year funding, in the education sector. Making EiE a priority theme of the annual Syria donor pledging conferences led directly to increased funding, which demonstrates how increased visibility of the problem can mobilize more funding. NLG has brought attention to the major education needs of Syrian refugees, which has resulted in increased funding in the Syria 3RP and Syria HRP. However, despite valuable donor support, NLG found that, in 2021, the overall education sector remained underfunded by 50%13.
UNHCR’s own spending, and its share to education, is also indicative of the trends in EiE financing within refugee responses (see Figure 11). Over the period from 2016 to 2021, education represented 4.1% of UNHCR’s overall spending, which increased from $154 million in 2016 to $208 million in 2021. A key commitment of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees was the inclusion of refugees and displaced children and youth in national education systems. Funding for education in refugee contexts is more difficult to estimate. However, UNHCR has worked with the World Bank to be more precise on the costing of refugee education – taking into account both emergency and protracted settings – and estimated that $4.85 billion was needed annually to provide education to all refugee students in low, lower-middle and upper-middle income host countries. The report, building on another study from Save the Children, estimates that $2.76 billion (56%) would have to be externally financed by the international community through joint humanitarian and development response. At the first Global Refugee Forum in 2019, the World Bank, GPE and ECW jointly pledged to improve coordination and financing in support of education for refugees and host communities. The three actors reaffirmed in 2020, in a joint action plan, their pledge to work together to close the education financing gap and provide tailored and timely funding responses, focusing on ten priority countries.

UNRWA, the UN agency mandated to respond to the needs of 5.6 million Palestine refugees across the Middle East, is supporting quality, equitable and inclusive basic education for more than 500,000 school-aged children. In its 2020 programme budget, UNRWA earmarked around 58% of its $806 million education budget to develop a strong EiE programme. By providing and directly managing a high-quality education system in more than 700 schools, UNRWA can adapt its approach when a crisis occurs, such as the periodic conflicts in Gaza and the ongoing war in Syria, by channelling funds from a variety of sources. It is not possible to identify what proportion of its funding is specifically allocated to emergencies, because the bulk of UNRWA’s education budget is for recurring costs. More generally, though, UNRWA has faced a funding crisis for several years as no political solution has been found to the plight of Palestine refugees. This has put the education of millions of children at risk and eroded its quality, for example due to the need to have more children in each classroom.
Since the start of the war in Syria in 2011, Jordan has hosted one of the world’s largest populations of refugees who reside in official camps and host communities; this includes 238,000 Syrian refugee children, 92,000 of whom were out of school in 2020. Jordan is one of five countries in the Syria 3RP, the regional refugee response plan for the Syria crisis that is led by UNHCR and United Nations Development Programme. The scale and protracted nature of the refugee crisis has had a significant impact on Jordan’s education system, a situation compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic. Syrian refugee children have been able to attend Jordanian schools, but donor fatigue has resulted in diminished support to sustain their education over the years. In 2020, the percentage of children going out to work rather than attending school increased to 13%, a significant increase from the pre-pandemic rate of 1% in 2019. Funding for education in the 3RP dropped from $435 million in 2019 to $372 million in 2021, which has further stretched the limited capacity of Jordan’s education system to support education in host community settings. This makes Jordan’s Accelerated Access Initiative, outside the national budget, doubly important. Due to the protracted nature of the crisis, coordination has been strengthened between humanitarian and development actors to address the changing funding flows.
4.2. DEDICATED EDUCATION GLOBAL FUNDS

4.2.1. Education Cannot Wait

ECW was established in 2016 as the first global UN-hosted fund dedicated to EiE and protracted crises. Between 2016 and 2021, ECW mobilized $107 billion. It allocated $632 million to 56 grantees in 43 countries, thereby reaching more than five million children and adolescents—half of them girls—with equitable, inclusive, quality education in areas seriously affected by conflict and crisis. The fund works through a multilateral system and mobilises resources from both development (43% of funding) and humanitarian (31% of funding) sources (see Figure 12). The fund’s top bilateral contributors are Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark and Norway. ECW channels its funding predominantly to UN agencies and NGOs through three investment modalities: the First Emergency Response (FER) window, the Multi-Year Resilience Programme (MYRP) window, and the Acceleration Facility window. ECW’s model is geared toward incentivizing humanitarian and development actors to plan, prepare and respond, jointly when possible, under the leadership of the host government, while at the same time engaging in global advocacy to further raise the profile of EiE.

Figure 12: ECW sources of funding envelopes (development vs. humanitarian)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of funding envelopes (public-sector contributions, 2016-2020)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No distinction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2020, ECW funding peaked at $184 million, followed by a decrease to $141 million in 2021. ECW raises funds on an ongoing basis, and it also organises high-level financing conferences at which its largest donors commit to multi-year funding: the next one, co-led by Germany, Norway and Switzerland, will take place in Geneva in early 2023. Its two most important funding modalities in terms of volume of funding are the FER—28% of funding from 2016 to 2021—and the MYRP—62% over the same period. The FER window supports education programmes during sudden-onset or escalating crises, whereas the MYRP window addresses longer-term needs through multi-year (usually 3 years) joint programmes in protracted crises. The intention of MYRPs is for other funding to align to the plans, with ECW acting as a catalyst for additional funding. The two main ECW grantees from 2016 to 2020 were UNICEF and Save the Children. While most of these funds are sub-granted to implementing partners, there are transactional costs for ECW to process its funding which need to be kept to a minimum to ensure that programmes are effective.
While ECW experienced a dip in income in 2020-2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the fund was able to launch 112 new FERs in 2020, 85 of them COVID-19 related. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the ECW fund’s ability to channel funding where it is most critically needed. This ability was highlighted again in early 2022 with the outbreak of war in Ukraine: ECW has announced a $5 million catalytic FER grant to Ukraine, with the aim of raising at least $20 million in funding to align with OCHA’s flash appeal.31

4.2.2. Global Partnership for Education

While ECW focuses largely on emergencies and protracted crises, the GPE is a complementary global fund. Established in 2002, GPE has a broader and longer-term focus and is dedicated to supporting strong and resilient education systems in lower-income countries. The fund’s largest contributors are the European Commission, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States. GPE provides financial support to help governments develop education-sector plans, as well as grants to support the implementation of these plans. The grants are channelled through grant agents (the World Bank and UNICEF being the largest) that oversee the use of the funds, in collaboration with the government recipients.
The GPE approved $3.34 billion in grants between 2016 and 2021. As indicated in Figure 14, GPE allocations vary significantly from year to year, given the three-year donor funding cycles. It is common to see a spike at the end of each cycle, as this is when most applications are approved, which is what occurred in 2020. The significant drop in GPE approvals in 2021 is related to GPE funding cycles, and not necessarily to the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, GPE was well placed to allocate $500 million specifically to support the COVID-19 response. While GPE might be considered primarily a development fund, it has an emergency response mechanism as well, whose dispersal is aligned with HRP plans, providing $272.4 million from 2016-21. GPE estimates that funding requests for EiE increased 21% from 2015 to 2020. Partner countries affected by fragility and conflict (PCFC) represented 62% of GPE funding from 2016 to 2021, amounting to $2.1 billion.
BOX 4: DIVERSE STRATEGIES TO MEET HUGE EDUCATION NEEDS IN YEMEN

After years of conflict, Yemen remains one the largest humanitarian crises in the world. Food insecurity is extreme and the risk of famine ever present. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing needs. This adds to an extremely challenging operational context, wherein de facto authorities and an internationally recognised government control different parts of the country. Attacks on schools by the parties to the conflict and the collapse of government services have put a severe strain on the education system. In 2021, the Yemen Education Cluster requested $257.8 million to provide education services to 5.5 million children, but it received 37% of its requirements. Education funding has increased from $5.6 million in 2016 to $95.3 million in 2021. Successful advocacy by the Yemen Education Cluster ensured that the education sector received $8.4 million from the CBPF in 2021; this represented 8% of overall funding, a marked increase from 2% in 2018 and no funding at all before that. Joint programming with other sectors has also been an important resource mobilisation strategy for the Yemen Education Cluster, which has 70 active partners. Despite the ongoing conflict, the Yemen Education Cluster has collaborated successfully with UNESCO-led working group development actors. In 2020 and 2021, the GPE provided a total of $64.8 million, some of which was from its COVID-19 response. ECW also provided more than $18.5 million from 2017 to 2021, which was not multi-year funding.
4.3. DEVELOPMENT AID FOR EDUCATION

4.3.1. OECD DAC CRS

This study has been predominantly concerned with humanitarian funding for EiE. However, as is apparent from the review of the ECW and GPE funds above, development aid is also used to fund EiE activities. The following section provides an overview of the trends in development aid to EiE and how these contrast with those of humanitarian funding. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) tracks and monitors ODA through the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The database provides comparable data on aid reported by the 30 DAC members and about 80 other providers of development co-operation (other countries, multilateral organisations and private foundations). Since 2020 (for 2019 data onwards), the DAC CRS has allowed tracking through a specific sub-purpose code for ‘education in emergencies’. However, so far, there has not been any data published against the EiE code online as it is a voluntary code and there has been minimal reporting against it.

Figure 15: ODA for education (total amounts and as % of total ODA), 2016-2020

ODA provided by official OECD and DAC members increased to $178.9 billion in 2021, up 4.4% from 2020. This amount was a new peak, though the increase was attributed almost entirely to COVID-19-related activities, including donations for vaccines. ODA to the education sector from all official donors increased by 19% in the ten years from 2010 to 2020 (in constant 2020 prices) (see Figure 15). While aid to education increased robustly throughout the 2000s, it stagnated after 2010, partly because of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. It did not pick up again until 2016 and reached its highest recorded level in 2019, $14.7 billion. The proportion of ODA allocated to education has fallen somewhat over the last decade, from 8.4% in 2010 to 6.5% in 2020.
However, within crisis countries in which there are UN-led humanitarian appeals ODA for education increased by 95% from 2016 to 2020 from $2.9 billion to $5.7 billion. While this is a greater increase than ODA for education in all recipient countries it is not as high as the increase in humanitarian funding which, as noted in section 4.1.1, has risen 140% over the same time period from $230 million in 2016 to $551 million in 2020. This suggests that, as humanitarian crises have become more protracted, there has been an increased preference for funding education through humanitarian funding, although development funding has also increased significantly in these contexts. Moreover, the scale of development funding for EiE education is still far greater than humanitarian funding – see Figures 16 and 18. With data available only up to 2020, it is not yet possible to say what precise impact the COVID-19 pandemic will have on overall ODA levels for the education sector. However, some predict that aid to education may fall by $2 billion from its peak in 2020 and not return to 2018 levels for another six years.  

Figure 16: ODA for education and humanitarian funding for education in countries with an UN-led humanitarian appeal
BOX 5: WORLD BANK EDUCATION PORTFOLIO IN COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY FRAGILITY, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

The World Bank is the largest financier of education in the developing world. In recent years it has expanded its education portfolio in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) to a record $6.2 billion in 2021, the vast majority consisting of grants. This total represents 26.5% of the bank’s overall education portfolio of $23 billion. Most of the funding is for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, with the largest recipients being Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Cameroon and Ethiopia. The World Bank has a comparative advantage in mobilising development financing, and its role in FCV contexts has evolved from a focus on post-conflict reconstruction to supporting governments and national systems in developing institutional resilience and the capacity to ensure that education services are continued during and after a crisis. It aims to work along the nexus providing a development lens for humanitarian aid and bringing a longer-term vision and sustainability perspective.\textsuperscript{62}

Figure 17: Relative share of the World Bank’s education portfolio in FCV countries

![Figure 17: Relative share of the World Bank’s education portfolio in FCV countries](image-url)
4.4. OVERALL TRENDS IN EIE FUNDING AND THE IMPACT OF COVID-19

It is clear from the analysis above that, while overall humanitarian funding for EiE has increased since 2016, along with its overall share of humanitarian funding, the sector still remains severely underfunded relative to its requirements. These have risen significantly over this period, and compared to other sectors. The trend in development funding for EiE is more difficult to identify given the absence of a tracking system and the multiple funding sources. Based on ODA funding for education in countries where there are UN-led humanitarian appeals, though, it appears that the levels of funding have increased, but it is not possible to say whether this has met needs as there are no financial requirements set for development cooperation in the same way as humanitarian assistance. Putting together both humanitarian and development funding for EiE, it is difficult to say what the overall trend is, given the data available, but what is clear that it is insufficient for meeting SDG4 which is becoming increasingly difficult to reach. Of the respondents to the survey for this study, 94% said they considered EiE to be underfunded. Some 39% thought that funding for EiE had improved since 2016, but 30% thought it has gotten worse.

The study found that EIE funding varies significantly from one country to the next and from one year to the next. This signifies the unequal access to EIE funding among aid recipients and the challenges posed by the unpredictability of funding, which is exacerbated by donors’ short funding cycles. There are few formal mechanisms to coordinate where allocations are made. Furthermore, different funding mechanisms tend to operate independently, according to their own donor requirements and planning processes. Stakeholders mentioned how funding can be either crowded in or crowded out,
given the multiple funding sources which often perform similar functions. For example, CERF, ECW and GPE all have rapid response facilities albeit operating in different ways. Figure 20 shows the top recipient countries for the main sources of funding analysed above. In the 28 countries where there was an activated education cluster in 2021, 12 countries (43%) also received funding from at least two of these three others funding sources: GPE, ECW, CBPF. As can be seen, some of the largest crises, such as Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan, have received significant funding from each of the funding sources. From 2016 to 2021, the five HRPs receiving the highest amounts of funding received 45% of their requirement as compared to 25% for the rest, which suggests that the larger crises are better funded. In 2021, only four HRPs received more than 50% of their education requirements (namely: Ethiopia, Palestine, Ukraine and Mozambique).

Figure 20: Top 10 recipients of education funding per funding source: FTS, ECW, GPE, and CBPF

2016-2021 - Top 10 recipient of Education funding per source of funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FTS</th>
<th>ECW</th>
<th>GPE</th>
<th>CBPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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FTS Response plans and appeals (excluding RRP)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>CAR</td>
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ECW

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<td>Cameroon</td>
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GPE Restricted to countries affected by conflict and fragility

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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CBPF

A range of factors influence the level of funding directed to different contexts, including donors’ national priorities, the country’s strategic importance, and whether the crisis has been neglected. Indeed, education funding tends to get skewed toward high-profile crises that either have received extensive media coverage or are geopolitically important to donors. For example, appeals for Syria and neighbouring countries in North Africa and the Middle East have fared far better than those for other crises. According to INEE, humanitarian aid for education to the Middle East and North Africa increased by 176% in nominal terms between 2010 and 2020 while aid to sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 25% in the same period.66

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic – a mixed picture

With the closing of schools and the many socioeconomic repercussions, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating effect on children’s education, including reversing positive trends in their improved learning. This study found that the pandemic has had a mixed effect on EiE funding by presenting both a threat and an opportunity, depending on the specific context. The majority (74%) of the respondents to our survey said the COVID-19 pandemic had had an impact on the levels of EiE funding. Some 75% of these respondents considered the impact to be negative or extremely negative. The UN Global HRP for COVID-19 that was launched in 2020 appealed for $10.3 billion, and by the end of that year it was 39% funded. 67 The education component received 8% of what it requested—$342 million requested, $27 million received. While this suggests that education was a lower priority in the COVID-19 response than other sectors, it is worth noting that it was challenging to track funding specifically for the COVID-19 response, which left many gaps in the data.

This study found that different donors adapted their EiE funding in different ways during the pandemic. Meanwhile, the ways the pandemic affected EiE funding at the country level varied from one context to the next. On the one hand, some donors’ aid budgets were reduced as governments tightened their purse strings to address the economic fallout of the pandemic. In this sense, there clearly was a COVID-19 slump as funding was redirected to fight the pandemic, with priority given to health and WASH efforts. The trends in CERF and CBPFs seem to confirm this trend and, as noted earlier, according to the FTS the underfunding of education significantly increased in 2020-2021. On the other hand, addressing the pandemic’s effects on education that resulted from school closures was seen as an important part of the COVID-19 response. Stakeholders consulted for this study noted that the secondary benefits of education were also greatly appreciated, including those that went beyond providing learning opportunities to supporting families and communities who were coping with the crisis. Some education donors and funding mechanisms were therefore able to mobilize additional resources to address the education part of the COVID-19 response. Both ECW and GPE were able to make funds available.

COVID-19’s long-term impact on EiE funding is still to be realised. According to some estimates, the pandemic is expected to have even greater consequences than the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which led to a slump in overall education financing for several years. 68 It could take six years for education funding to return to 2018 levels. 69 However, it will be important to continue to analyse the impact going forward, as well as the inequities it has created.

Figure 21: Survey responses for most important reasons EiE is underfunded

Most important reasons why EiE is underfunded

- Other sectors are considered more of a priority: 76.9%
- EiE is not considered life-saving: 72.5%
- The EiE needs and funding requirements are not properly set in humanitarian appeals: 46.2%
- The perceived lack of demonstrable results/impact from EiE activities: 40.7%
- EiE is not prioritised within individual humanitarian organizations: 39.6%
- The lack of capacity and presence of organizations to implement EiE programmes: 15.4%
- Other (please specify): 8.8%
5. Key factors influencing funding levels for EiE: Challenges and opportunities

If the chronic underfunding of EiE is to be addressed effectively, it is necessary not only to identify the trends in funding data presented above but also to fully understand the key factors that influence the funding levels. Only then will it be possible to adopt the interventions required to close the noted funding gaps. The study has sought to identify the main challenges education actors face when mobilising resources, but also the opportunities, and the critical strategies needed to ensure effective EiE financing.

Figure 22: Survey responses on which actions most influence the level of EiE funding

What actions influence most the level of funding for EiE?

- Policy commitments on EiE by donor governments - 58.2%
- Political support for EiE - 52.8%
- Prioritization of EiE by senior humanitarian leadership - 50.6%
- The establishment of dedicated funds (e.g. Education Cannot Wait) - 47.3%
- The adoption of funding targets on EiE - 31.9%
- Demonstrating the results of EiE programmes - 27.5%
- Other (please specify) - 5.5%
5.1. POLITICAL SUPPORT AND POLICY COMMITMENTS

Political support and policy commitments for EiE are perceived as the most critical influences on the funding of EiE. Stakeholders consulted as part of the research consistently noted that the sector will only receive more money once EiE gains more visibility in aid policy and programming. Political support and policy commitments were the actions survey respondents most often cited as influencing EiE funding levels (see Figure 22). The education crisis, in particular the staggeringly high number of children out of school, has been gaining increased attention in recent years. Adoption of SDG4 clearly established what needs to be achieved. The creation of ECW at the 2016 The World Humanitarian Summit was a watershed moment, as it brought clear recognition of the need to step up support for EiE. ECW is widely considered to have helped elevate the visibility of EiE and to have made it clear that the international community urgently needs to address the education crisis. The high-level financing conferences for ECW and the calls for the replenishment of funds for GPE are also important occasions to galvanise attention and increase funding levels for EiE. Several other initiatives have sought to secure member states’ commitment to more funding, including the Global Compact on Refugees mentioned earlier and the 2018 G7 Charlevoix Declaration, where donors pledged $3.5 billion in support to quality education for girls and women in developing countries. The Transforming Education Summit, to be held in September 2022, aims to mobilise political action and find solutions to transform education by 2030.

In addition to multilateral efforts, the policies of individual donor governments are critical to mobilising support for EiE. According to a 2019 report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo and Save the Children, between 2015 and 2018, 11 donors out of the 16 analysed listed education as a priority area in their humanitarian and development policies. Eight donors—Canada, the European Commission (EU), France, Norway, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US)—referred explicitly to ‘education in emergencies’ in their national or foreign policies, up from just four countries in 2015. More recently, the Swiss Federal Council dispatch to its parliament presented EiE as one of four priorities for the country’s direct humanitarian aid.

The extent to which there is sustained donor commitment to EiE funding is dependent on domestic politics and the changing priorities of governments. For example, the government of Norway in power between 2013 and 2021 set the target of doubling the country’s funding for education. With the change in government last year, however, education is no longer a top priority in Norway’s aid policy, although it has agreed to maintain the funding levels established by its predecessor. The current UK government reversed its previous legal commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on overseas aid, cutting that to 0.5%. This has had serious knock-on effects for humanitarian funding in general and for EiE, although education funding has stood up better than that for other sectors. Maintaining advocacy and dialogue with parliamentarians, work that is done by the International Parliamentary Network for Education, is critical to EiE remaining a priority for donor governments. This advocacy goes hand in hand with the production of solid evidence to inform policy and decision-making. Building Evidence in Education, a donor working group established in 2012, has conducted research on cost-effective approaches to improve global learning and it maintains a donor working group to present this research regularly.
BOX 6: MULTI-DIMENSIONAL HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN NIGER REQUIRES CLOSE COORDINATION OF DIFFERENT EIE FUNDING TYPES

Due to continuous population movement linked to armed conflicts on its borders with Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, as well as multiple natural disasters, Niger is experiencing a recurrent need for humanitarian assistance. In 2021, humanitarian partners targeted 252,000 people for education assistance at an estimated cost of $16.5 million. They received 46.4% of this amount, according to FTS. However, several financial contributions for EiE were made outside the humanitarian response appeal process. The Education Cluster in Niger and its partners have recently launched a quarterly tracking tool for keeping better records of projects and funding flows. Development funding has also been critical in enabling Niger to address its protracted education crisis. Niger has been a partner of GPE since 2002 and it received a grant under its COVID-19 rapid response mechanism. It also recently mobilised funding from ECW through three successive FER and MYRP grants, for which implementation began in 2021. With a large variety of funding sources and a large part of its funding received outside the HRP and other UN-led appeals, coordinating these projects has been a challenge.
5.2. PROFILE AND PRIORITIZATION OF EIE AS A HUMANITARIAN CONCERN

Despite EIE being chronically underfunded, steady progress has been made in recent years in its recognition as a key humanitarian concern. Today, humanitarian crises are more protracted than ever, with some lasting decades. Therefore, the need to provide proper access to education for children caught up in armed conflict and other disasters is increasingly viewed as a humanitarian imperative that cannot be ignored. The secondary benefits of education, such as providing a sense of safety and normalcy as well as psychosocial support, is also increasingly acknowledged. The GEC and its partners have made considerable progress in increasing EIE’s profile as a humanitarian concern, including highlighting its life-saving nature, and ECW has helped increase the visibility and need to give increased attention to EIE. Reflecting this, 68% of survey respondents said that EIE is considered more of a priority than it was five years ago. This increased attention has clearly led to higher funding levels, as outlined in the previous section, with the amount of funding increasing year-on-year and the proportion of humanitarian funding going to education also steadily increasing. These findings show what sustained attention to an issue can achieve in terms of translating policy commitments into increased funding.

However, EIE is still not considered as much of a priority as other sectors, such as food security, health and WASH, which are considered more critical life-saving interventions. As Figure 21 shows, a lack of prioritisation and the misconception that EIE is not a life-saving intervention are two of the main reasons why it remains underfunded. While the stakeholders consulted for this study acknowledged the progress that had been made in increasing the visibility of EIE as a key humanitarian concern, they kept returning to the fundamental perception that EIE is not a life-saving sector, being a key impediment to its receiving adequate funding. Indeed, the example above of the ERC’s prioritising EIE for support through the CERF and the CBPFs shows that, even when commitments are made at the highest level to allocate more funds to education, they are not always followed through. This perception lingers, even though previous research from Save the Children has shown most children, when asked, cite education as amongst their most important priorities in an emergency. A 2019 review of children’s surveys in countries affected by crisis found that, “on average 37% of the children surveyed placed education among their top three needs—significantly outstripping the next most prioritised concerns of food (19%), healthcare (19%), water (16%) and shelter (15%).”

The COVID-19 pandemic has potentially reinforced the deprioritisation of education. Of the survey respondents, 43% said EIE had been prioritised only ‘minimally’, while 36% thought it had been ‘moderately’ prioritised. Health and WASH interventions were understandably viewed as more critical to addressing the life-threatening dimension of COVID-19. However, several stakeholders felt that it was clear that the scale of school closures, which was denying children their education, was a crisis in and of itself. Many stakeholders also spoke about how the response to COVID-19 had led to greater acknowledgement of the secondary benefits of education. One strategy to address this lack of prioritisation has been for education actors to develop partnerships and joint programmes with other sectors. Child protection and education are naturally interconnected, but stakeholders also referred to increasing joint programming with WASH and food security.

It is impossible to discern from the FTS whether some education activities are facing more funding challenges than others as the system does not provide this level of detail. Figure 23 shows what survey respondents considered the most challenging EIE activities to fund. As noted earlier, in 2021, the GEC targeted 28 million people for assistance and was able to reach 20 million (71%), even though it only received 23% of its funding requirements. While the GEC was able to maintain coverage with insufficient funding, this was only possible because they prioritised certain education interventions, such as the distribution of education materials, that would reach the largest number of children but were unlikely to have the greatest impact on improving learning outcomes. In short, when there is a lack of funding, the quality of education assistance suffers.
Figure 23: Survey responses on the EiE activities most challenging to secure funding for

The EiE activities most challenging to secure funding

- Payment of teacher salaries: 53.9%
- Support, training and coaching for teachers: 37.4%
- Construction and rehabilitation of education facilities: 36.3%
- Mental health and psychosocial support in and through schools: 35.2%
- Protecting education from attack advocacy: 31.9%
- Coordination of education assistance: 31.9%
- Other (please specify): 16.5%
- Education materials supply: 6.6%
5.3. DIVERSITY OF DONORS AND PREDICTABILITY OF FUNDING DECISIONS

This study has found that the diversity of donors that fund EiE and the consistency of their funding decisions has a critical impact on the overall funding levels for the sector. Table 2 shows the eight largest donors for the education sector during the period 2016-2021. The education sector has a relatively high number of donors (73) compared to other sectors. This more diverse funding and reduced dependence on a few donors provides greater resilience to external shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Having said that, the eight largest donors in Table 2 accounted for 77% of education-sector funding from 2016 to 2021.

Table 2: Top eight donors of the education sector and proportion of their humanitarian funding for the education sector over the period 2016-2021 (based on FTS)

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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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The largest education-sector donor is the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), which made a commitment from 2019 to allocate 10% of its humanitarian funding to the education sector (see Box 7). The study has found that donors reporting in FTS tend to leave significant amounts of funding unassigned to any one sector (as much as 35% of donor funding over the period 2016-2021). Based on the data available, Table 2 shows that few of them have reached the GEFI’s global goal of dedicating 4% of humanitarian funding to education. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have become more visible EiE donors, have reached this target in some years but not consistently. These countries also tend to channel their assistance to crisis-affected states in the region, and they often provide funding outside UN-led humanitarian appeals. With the crises in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East carrying on for several years, the amount of funding they receive has tailed off. Norway and Japan have reached the 4% target, but also not on a consistent basis. Based on FTS data, although they are amongst the largest funders of EiE, the United States, United Kingdom and Germany have not yet met the overall target, and their funding varies significantly from one year to the next.

BOX 7: ECHO REACHES 10% TARGET FOR FUNDING EIE

EiE has been a priority for the EU since 2006. In 2015, however, the EU adopted a resolution on education for children in emergencies and protracted crises, which included a commitment to reach the GEFI’s global goal of dedicating 4% of its humanitarian funding to EiE. In 2018, the EU went further by developing a new policy framework, entitled Communication on Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises. This was followed by operational guidelines for ECHO field offices on EiE, which committed them to allocating 10% of their funds to the education sector. As a result of these measures, ECHO’s funding rose consistently from 2016 to 2019, when the 10% target was achieved. However, while the proportion has been maintained in the subsequent years, the total amount has fallen from €164 million in 2019 to €147 million in 2021, mainly due to a decrease in funding in the Middle East region.
5.4. INCREASING COHERENCE BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AID: THE NEXUS

The short timeframes of humanitarian funding, which often do not even exceed the length of the academic school year, are not conducive to funding education. Collaboration between humanitarian and development actors that have a longer-term perspective is, therefore, essential to ensure that education strategies and interventions are sustainable, especially in protracted crises settings. In many ways, EiE is at the nexus between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. As indicated earlier, EiE covers a broad spectrum of activities to address both short- and long-term needs. Both humanitarian and development funding are often used to fund similar education interventions, the main distinction being the different timeframes, recipients of funds, geographical targeting and risk thresholds. In protracted crises, ensuring a joint approach and coherence between humanitarian and development aid is a key priority for EiE funding.

There has been increased attention to the so-called nexus approach since the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. This approach seeks to address short-term needs while reducing vulnerability to these needs over the long term through greater collaboration between humanitarian and development aid. While the importance of the nexus approach is widely accepted, efforts to put it into practice remain fragmented and piecemeal and have yet to address the fundamental institutional barriers to a more joint approach. The multi-dimensional nature of the COVID-19 pandemic should have been the occasion to advance the application of the nexus approach, but the response unfortunately was business-as-usual, with separate plans and funding for the humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences of the crisis.

A 2019 study on financing the nexus found that funding mechanisms have not yet adjusted and have been as much a hindrance to the application of the nexus approach as the means to facilitate it. This study found similarly that there still tends to be a siloed approach to the funding of EiE, with no clear policy guidance or framework for planning and allocating humanitarian and development aid for EiE in a joint way. There is rarely a common education strategy at the field level to articulate education needs and requirements as both a humanitarian and development problem. Existing parallel coordination mechanisms rely on the personal initiative of those involved to collaborate, but without any formally agreed-to approach or mechanism. Local Education Groups, which are education coordination groups at country level (usually led by ministries of education) that discuss policy issues, have been important in advancing the nexus approach on EiE. Important coordination is occurring between ECW and GPE, but many stakeholders consulted as part of the research for this study felt that coordination between the two mechanisms could be further strengthened. GPE and ECW both provide funds for education in 22 of the same countries (albeit through different channels), which underlies the need to strengthen the coordination.

Ensuring greater collaboration and strategic coherence between humanitarian and development aid is a critical strategy for enhancing EiE funding. With 66% of survey respondents citing it as a first priority, this was the action seen as most necessary to increase funding (see Figure 24). According to a GEC analysis, 89% of 2021 HRP’s refer to plans for education clusters to strengthen dialogue and engagement with development partners. The feedback from the stakeholders consulted for this study was clear: humanitarian funding is insufficient to address needs, and increased funding is unlikely to be transformational. Therefore, greater collaboration with development is a more effective means of leveraging financing and delivering better education outcomes for children. The most effective strategy for leveraging finances for education is to channel resources through existing national education systems, if possible. The Global Compact on Refugees has reaffirmed such an approach, and the UNHCR partnership with the World Bank has leveraged funding for refugees’ inclusion in national education systems.
Figure 24: Survey responses on the priority actions to increase EiE funding

Priority actions to increase EiE funding

- Joined up approach between development aid and humanitarian funding - the nexus approach: 65.9%
- Setting a minimum % target for EiE funding by donors: 46.2%
- Diversifying the group of donors that fund EiE: 44.0%
- Improving EiE needs assessments and setting of requirements in appeals: 44.0%
- More joint funding with other sectors: 36.3%
- Improve the tracking of funding to EiE: 26.4%
- Other (please specify): 6.6%
After already suffering decades of armed conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban takeover of power in August 2021 has led to a serious deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Girls’ education has suffered immensely, including denying them the right to education. Of the 4.2 million out-of-school children in Afghanistan, 2.6 million are girls. The ban on girls’ education above grade 6 is preventing an additional 1.1 million girls from attending school. This makes education an undeniable priority within the humanitarian response. In 2021, the education sector in Afghanistan required $84.5 million to meet one million people’s need for EiE services, which, following the Taliban takeover, was revised upwards to $89.2 million as part of a flash appeal. However, by the end of the year, only 24% of the requirement was met. Education partners in Afghanistan face significant operational challenges that affect the amount of funding they receive. Donor conditionality limits their interaction with the education authorities, while bureaucratic constraints placed on partners by the authorities and the dysfunctional banking system affect the absorption capacity and programming of funds. Given the protracted nature of the crisis in Afghanistan, collaboration between humanitarian and development education partners is critical, and close coordination is taking place with the respective mechanisms. In February 2022, humanitarian and development education actors together developed an Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework, which identifies common education priorities and aligns programmatic approaches while forming the basis for funding different interventions. Afghanistan has been a large recipient of both ECW and GPE funds, but multi-year funding remains a challenge.
5.5. TRACKING AND REPORTING FUNDING DATA

This study has revealed significant gaps in EiE funding data and serious limitations of the tracking and reporting of financial contributions to fund EiE activities. Any strategy for increasing EiE funding must start by strengthening data collection on EiE funding and providing better reporting and tracking. This is necessary not only to identify trends but to understand where funds are being allocated, helping to target the limited funds available, ensure that they are used most effectively and have the greatest impact on children. Accurate, transparent and timely data is vital to sustaining EiE, informing evidence-based planning, assessing resource needs and supporting advocacy efforts.

Because reporting through OCHA FTS, OECD CRS and other such mechanisms is voluntary, it tends to be incomplete, as donors do not report what funds they have provided for EiE. Even when contributions are reported, they often are not broken down by sector, which makes it impossible to know how much is allocated to the education sector. This is particularly the case for the UNHCR Refugee Funding Tracker, which is not currently designed to track funding by sector even though financial requirements are sectoral in official RRP appeal documents. Unearmarked funding enables operational partners flexibility to use it as they think best, but it is inherently challenging in terms of tracking and knowing which sector it is being used for. Multi-sectoral funding, which has increased significantly in recent years, also presents obstacles in terms of reporting and knowing which sectors it is used for. It would be far better to track how funds are spent, rather than their allocation. As noted above, EiE includes activities not covered by the education sector, thus the funding it receives may be included under other sectors. There should be a commitment from response partners to report on expenditure more systematically at the end of each year, which would facilitate more detailed sectoral tracking.

For the reasons specified above, there are significant unknowns about the true level of EiE funding. Technical fixes can be made to the different tracking systems, especially OCHA FTS, with systematic reporting of funding for the education sector and a breakdown of multi-sector funding, and to OECD DAC by using the specific DAC CRS purpose code for EiE. Both donors and implementers also need to commit to further improving their financial reporting under the appropriate sectors, which will provide better data on the funding levels. There currently is no consolidated system for tracking all EiE funding sources. This study has used eight different data sources and tracking tools. There is no way to bring the data together from all these systems to provide a comprehensive overview of EiE funding. There could be a simple solution, such as an online platform or dashboard that brings together and consolidates the available data in one place and in a more regular and transparent format.

5.6. ABSORPTION AND PROGRAMMING OF FUNDS, INCLUDING LOCALIZATION OF AID

In addition to ensuring that sufficient funding is available for EiE, there must be a way to absorb funds when they do exist and translate them into effective education programmes. Demand must equal supply; if it does not, then funds won’t be attracted. Education partners are frequently affected by serious operational challenges in complex humanitarian crises, which influences the level of funding they receive. Given the school closures, lockdowns and other social distancing measures, the COVID-19 pandemic created additional difficulties in implementing education programmes. The majority of EiE activities are implemented through UN agencies and international NGOs, but a wide range of local actors and national governments are critical partners as well. However, in numerous humanitarian crises, such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Myanmar, education partners are constrained from working directly with national authorities, due to issues of state recognition. Given that GPE provides most of its funds to national governments, this has limited the funding it provides in many of these contexts (see Figure 20). Furthermore, certain donors place conditions on the financial support they provide, and anti-terror legislation may prevent them from working with specific political actors. These political challenges affect the use of EiE funding. Humanitarian access constraints caused by security threats and bureaucratic conditions impede the implementation of education programmes in many contexts. There also may be a lack of education partners, but in all the countries where research was conducted for this study, this was not seen as a significant barrier to receiving more funding for EiE. Indeed, 15.4% of the survey respondents considered the presence and capacity of education partners to be an important factor in influencing funding levels (see Figure 2).

Education clusters have had mixed success involving local and national actors (L/Nas) in resource mobilization strategies to ensure they receive adequate funds and are equal and valued partners. A key component of humanitarian financing reforms in recent years has been the localization of aid, with the Grand Bargain signatories committed to achieving, by 2020, an aggregated target of “at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible to improve outcomes for affected people and reduce transactional costs.” According to Development Initiatives, direct funding to local and national responders increased by 23% between 2016 and 2020, from $6.15 million to $756 million. However, this still represents 3.2% of total humanitarian funding and only a marginal increase from 2.8% in 2016, when the Grand Bargain commitment was made. According to the FTS, only 3% of education funding between 2016 and 2021 was...
allocated to L/Nas. Based on the UNICEF transparency portal, 2% of ECW funding was disbursed directly to national NGOs in 2020. CBPFs have been more effective in ensuring that a greater proportion of their funding goes to L/Nas; in 2021, 36% of its direct funding for education was implemented by such actors.

In HRP s, education needs often are not clearly assessed or financial requirements are not accurately set. This is particularly difficult in protracted crisis settings, in which the long-term structural problems that affect children’s education needs can be vast. Rarely do humanitarian and development education articulate what they consider to be the combined education needs. The GEC has over the past few years stepped up its dedicated support to field education clusters to improve their inputs in Humanitarian Needs Overviews and HRP s through capacity strengthening, tip sheets and guidance. Despite these efforts, this study found significant variation persists in how needs and requirements are set in HRP s, creating a distorted picture of the actual education needs and trends in EIE financing. This suggests more can be done by education clusters and other sectors to strengthen awareness and advocate for the alignment between assessed needs and requirements in HRP s.

Faced with chronic underfunding of the sector, education clusters adopt a variety of strategies to maximise the use of the limited funding they receive. Joint programmes are an effective strategy for maximising the use of resources. For example, the GEC and the Child Protection Area of Responsibility have developed a collaboration framework related to Child Protection/Education in Emergencies, which facilitates joint programming and the mobilisation of resources at the field level. Securing multi-year funding is also critical to ensure that education partners can implement programmes over successive school years. While it is difficult to know how much multi-year education funding there is, multi-year humanitarian aid in general fell from 50% in 2019 to 42% in 2020, despite Grand Bargain commitments to the contrary.

**BOX 8: CHALLENGES TO MAKE EDUCATION A PRIORITY IN VENEZUELA’S NEGLECTED HUMANITARIAN CRISIS**

Years of political instability and economic collapse have created significant humanitarian need in Venezuela, which tends to be a neglected crisis. One million children are out of school, with a further 15 million at risk of dropping out. In 2021, the HRP education partners requested $104.8 million to provide education assistance to 15 million people. However, it was 11% funded by the end of the year, and 20% of the target population was reached. Education has not been prioritized in the Venezuela humanitarian response, as it is considered a structural rather than a life-saving issue. Despite strong implementation capacity and a well-established civil society capable of delivering a quality education response, accessing funding is a significant challenge, including multi-year funding from donors and global funds, along with the country’s challenging political context. Creating partnerships and integrated programmes with other sectors (especially WASH and child protection), two strategies the Venezuela Education Cluster has used to mobilise what funds it has been able to secure, have been effective ways to address the scarcity of funding. The Venezuela Education Cluster has also worked successfully with coalition partners, including civil society, to improve access to CBPF funding. It received 21% of the total funding requested ($2.4 million out of $11.5 million) in 2021; 84% of those funds were implemented by national NGOs. Despite the neglected and protracted nature of the crisis, however, Venezuela has received two grants from ECW (neither of which was multi-year) and no funding from GPE.
6. Conclusion and recommendations

Education needs in crisis settings are increasing year-on-year, the key drivers being armed conflict, climate change and, most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. While EiE funding is increasing, it has not kept pace with increasing needs, leaving a massive funding gap and denying an education to millions of children and youth. Although this study has been able to present some of the most important trends in EiE financing, there are major gaps in the reporting and tracking of funding, with no consolidated system which brings together all relevant data. Moreover, there is no agreed definition of what constitutes EiE funding, which includes not only humanitarian assistance but also a significant part of development cooperation, thus acting at the nexus between the two. This study makes it clear that it no longer makes sense to speak of humanitarian funding for EiE and development cooperation for education more broadly. Most crises today are protracted and require a joint approach by humanitarian and development actors to support education, rather than one that is bifurcated into different types of education interventions and, in turn, funding streams. This requires going beyond the current siloed approaches to ensure that the planning, programming and funding mechanisms for EiE are well coordinated, if not fully integrated. If the funding gap for EiE is to be closed there must also be a political recommitment to the importance of EiE in aid policy and programming, and innovative ways to finance such activities.

In view of the above, the authors of this study make the following recommendations for consideration by members of the Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies and other organizations working on EiE.

All EiE partners

- Redouble advocacy efforts calling for increased political support for the global education crisis and the funds required to address it.
- Ensure that the education sector receives an equitable share of humanitarian funding at the same proportion as other sectors and the overall UN-led humanitarian appeal.
- Develop an observatory/dashboard to consolidate existing data on EiE funding from all relevant modalities and present it in one place on a common platform that is available to all partners.
- Organise annual planning conferences to coordinate the yearly allocation of funding for EiE to reduce the inequity in where it is used and to make sure that it targets the greatest needs.
- Clarify the nexus approach to EiE financing through operational guidance that sets out the approach to establishing joint financial requirements, arrangements for assessing needs, planning common strategies, and developing joint programmes, coordination mechanisms and funding modalities.
- Ensure that 25% of funding to the education sector goes as directly as possible to local and national actors in line with the commitments of the Grand Bargain.

Donors

- Ensure that, at a minimum, donors reach the current Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) target of 4% of humanitarian funding for education and commit to ensuring that this level is maintained over time.
- Discuss within the context of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative the revision of the GEFI target and combine it with an agreed target for the overall share of ODA that should be dedicated to education.
- Increase the proportion of predictable, multi-year funding for EiE.
- Align policies and approaches to EiE funding through, for example, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.
- Further strengthen the reporting of financial contributions in the OCHA Financial Tracking Service and the OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (DAC CRS) and ensure that disaggregated funding data is available for EiE.
• Work to diversify and expand the EiE donor base, including contributions from non-traditional donors, the private sector and philanthropic organisations.

• Further explore innovative financing models for EiE, including how greater coordination can enable different funding modalities to act in unison.

• Strengthen commitments to leverage financing for refugee education – in both emergencies and protracted contexts - at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum.

Global Education Funds

• Further enhance coordination to ensure a more unified approach to mobilising resources, planning, allocating funds and programming of the complementary funding mechanisms.

• Develop a strategic framework between Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) to ensure a more joined-up approach to the direction and use of education funds.

• Organise joint pledging conferences and other meetings for EiE funding to crisis countries, particularly forgotten or deprioritised emergencies, to present a common assessment of needs to donors.

• Streamline funding mechanisms and processes between the funds to harness complementarities and reduce duplication, especially at the country level.

Coordination entities for EiE responses

• Provide operational guidance and training for education partners to strengthen the reporting and tracking of EiE funding.

• With development actors, develop guidance for education partners at the country level on how to apply the nexus approach to ensure a more aligned approach to their planning, programming, coordination and allocation of funding.

• Advocate so that education requirements in Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) and Refugee Response Plans (RRPs) are accurately and consistently set, and are commensurate with assessed needs.

• Further develop the modalities and guidance for joined up programming between the education cluster and other sectors to ensure a multi-sector approach to EiE.

• Revise the Refugee Funding Tracker to provide a breakdown of requirements and funding to the education sector in RRP.

Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA

• Ensure that EiE remains a strategic priority for the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund and the Country-based Pooled Funds, and that previous commitments are implemented through the appropriate accountability mechanisms.

• Further improve the FTS system to track funding more accurately for education and specific sub-activities of the sector, including as part of multi-sector funding, and provide a dedicated page to the education sector on the FTS platform.
Annex 1: Methodological note on data analysis

The data used in this report was downloaded from publicly available funding tracking platforms, including UN OCHA FTS, CERF, CBPF, UNHCR and OECD DAC CRS. This was supplemented by data provided directly by these organisations and by ECW and GPE. All data analysis presented in the report has been validated by the respective institutions.

FTS is a real-time online data platform, on which the data entered is constantly changing. Data included in this study was retrieved in mid-March 2022 and updated at the end of April 2022 for 2021 figures. The analysis of FTS data refers to what has been reported under ‘Education sector’. However, a significant amount of funding reported in FTS is reported as ‘Multi-sector’, which includes projects and activities with no one dominant sector (mostly UNHCR assistance for refugees), and ‘Multiple sector (shared)’, which includes funding with multiple values of destination sectors and where no breakdown per sector is available. Furthermore, a lot of reporting in FTS is ‘Not specified’ because no information on the sector/cluster is provided in the funding report. As noted in the report, this significantly underestimates the level of education funding.

Funding coverage is calculated as funding received divided by funding required. It should be noted that, in the FTS, the annual and overall funding levels consist of all funding received, including multiple cluster/sector (shared) funding and funding not specified, put against all sector-specific requirements. At the sector level, however, multiple sector (shared) funding cannot be calculated against the sectors’ specific requirements, as no information is available on the share of funding to be attributed to each sector, which leads to general underestimates of funding levels.

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7 Emma Wagner, Build Forward Better: How the global community must act now to secure children’s learning in crises, Save the Children, September 2021.


17 Where are we on education recovery? UNICEF, UNESCO, World Bank, March 2022.

18 UN General Assembly Resolution 64/290, The Right to Education in Emergency Situations, UNGA, July 2010.

19 EIE was specifically targeted in SDG Target 4.a and Target 4.5. SDG4 Target 4.a aims to “build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all”; Target 4.5 aims to, “by 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations”; see The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development-SDG4, UN 2015.


21 Figures are for People Targeted; source: Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, OCHA December 2021.


24 The authors identified gaps in the data including an important one observed for the Syria 3RP for which the FTS shows a total of $192 million received for education in 2021 whereas the dedicated 3RP website reported $372 million for 2021- a difference of some $180 million.

25 Mike Pearson, How Much Funding Is the Education Sector Forecast to Receive in 2022? Humanitarian Funding Forecast, April 2022.
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The share of education funding is calculated as a percentage of total funding received inside response plans/appeals, following two different methods: (1) over total appeal funding for all sectors; (2) over sector-specific appeal funding; therefore, funding tagged under “multiple sector (shared)”, “multi-sector”, and “not specified” is excluded.

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The Syria 3RP has been included on the FTS since 2012, but a breakdown of data by sector is available only from 2021. Prior to that, requirements and funding received were reported under ‘multi-sector’, and in 2020, ‘COVID-19’. Data for the Syria 3RP offered by sector on 3rpsyriacrisis.org is, however, more accurate. In 2019, the Bangladesh JRP and the Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant Humanitarian Response (RMRP) were added to the FTS, followed by the addition in 2020 of four other RRPs: Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Horn of Africa and Yemen, and South Sudan. Although the requirements and funding of the RMRP received are disaggregated by sector in the FTS since 2020, requirements only became widely available by sectors in 2021, with the exception of the Regional Migrant Humanitarian Response Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen.

Such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo RRP and South Sudan RRP in 2021.

For clearer comparison, the figure excludes the following sectors: Not Specified, COVID-19, Multi-sector, Multiple sectors (shared) and Other. Protection is the sum of all protection areas of responsibility.

For more details, see the GEC website at www.educationcluster.net/


See CERF Life-Saving Criteria, OCHA, available at https://cerf.un.org/sites/default/files/resources/CERF%20Life-Saving%20Criteria%202020_2.pdf. The education activities included are: ‘Provision of school tents, education and recreation materials to establish safe spaces/learning environments/temporary learning centres for children. Emergency repair of education facilities or tents and replacement of damaged learning equipment, including the provision of adequate sanitation facilities, safe drinking water and water for personal hygiene at the learning site. Training of teachers in emergencies (Support establishment of initial teaching capacity only.) Teaching essential life-saving skills and support provision of information on GBV and other forms of violence, anti-trafficking, unexploded ordnance, diseases, nutrition, health, hygiene and psychosocial health.’


Interview with CERF officials, 10 March 2022.

Correspondence with CBPF staff, 5 April 2022.


Education requirements represented in 2021 of total requirements for the DRC RRP and the Venezuela RMRP, 9% for Bangladesh JRP, 10% for Burundi RRP, 11% for South Sudan RRP and 13% for Syria 3RP.

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The ten priority countries are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Niger, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. For more details see Ensuring More Effective, Efficient and Aligned Education Assistance in Refugee-Hosting Countries, ECW-GPE-WBG Joint Action Plan, October 2020.


50. COVID-19 affected these shares in recent years and, based on ECW financial models, FER represent 15% of ECW funding, MYRP 80%.


52. Inclusive of all GPE grant types: ESPIG, Multiplier, Additional Financing, COVID-19 and Regular Accelerated Funding. But excluding a special Multi-Country COVID Plan Development Grant to UNICEF.

53. The previous funding cycle covered 2018-2020, while the current one covers 2021-2025.

54. The fund has mechanisms for accelerated funding disbursements (within 8 weeks) for critical interventions, such as temporary shelters, classroom construction, school meals, school supplies, teacher payments and school grants.


56. Based on the authors’ calculations of data provided by GPE.

57. Under CRS Purpose Code 72012 titled Education in Emergencies.


59. Which includes the 30 DAC members, and 65 multilateral organisations, as well as non-DAC members. Private donors are excluded.


63. Data presented in this figure is from a variety of different sources (FTS, GPE, ECW, CERF, CBPF and WB) and may overlap in some places. The World Bank amount includes grants and loans reported in the following publication: Peter A. Holland et al., Safe & Learning in the Midst of Fragility, Conflict and Violence, World Bank, 2022. The figure does not include other development aid for EiE including bilateral contributions from donor government and regional banks.

64. In 2021, 13 countries received ECW FER rapid response and in 12 of these CERF funding was also received but only in 5 did the education sector receive any funding.

65. This table focuses on funding received at country level and excludes regional funding. The first recipient of CBPF funding for education is Syria Cross-border ($48m.)


67. FTS shows that 39% was funded ($3.7 billion) out of a total of $9.5 billion requested.


71. Rasha Daya and Emma Wagner, Education against the Odds: Meeting marginalised children’s demands for a quality education, Save the Children, 2019.

72. Government and inter-government donors, as shown in FTS.


74. Data was retrieved by donor, by year, and viewed by sector, with multi-sector (shared) excluded from the calculation.

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See, for example, Humanitarian-Development Coherence in Education: Working together in crisis contexts, Background Paper, INEE, 2021.

For example, the World Bank’s Global Programme on Forced Displacement—IDA18 sub-window—has made significant funds available in recent years to countries hosting refugees to tackle the challenges of protracted displacement situations. Overall, UNHCR estimates that $6.5 billion has been contributed for development in refugee-hosting countries over and above what they received in humanitarian funding.


Multisector funding reported in FTS increased tremendously over time, from $18 million in 2016 to $2.8 billion in 2021 in response plans/appeals. It is, however, not possible to estimate the share of funding to be attributed directly to the education sector from this multi-sector funding.

In its Reflections and Aspirations Paper to inform its new strategic plan for 2023-2026, ECW proposes to bring greater transparency and convene an effort to improve EiE financing data, highlighting the inefficiencies resulting from multiple, and not compatible, data standards and reporting platforms. INEE has already created a dashboard of donor funding for the Charlevoix Declaration on Quality Education.


A larger proportion of ECW funding is provided indirectly to L/NAs. For example, in 2019, 26% of ECW funding was also disbursed indirectly, through one UN agency or an international NGO to local providers. See Stronger Together in Crises: 2019 Annual Results Report, ECW, 2020.

See Tipsheet to Strengthen Quality of 2022 HNOs and HRPs, GEC, 2021.


While EiE Hub members have provided input into these recommendations they have not endorsed them yet as a group and will rather take them forward as a follow up to the study.
Title page: © UNICEF/UN0199546/Noorani. Djibouti, 7 February 2018. A young boy jumps with excitement while walking back home with his sister from a UNICEF-supported school at Markazi camp for Yemeni refugees.

p. 3 © ICRC/V-P-CD-E-01322/ Moore Phil. Congo, 2011. North Kivu province, CAJ ED Transit and Orientation Centre for children who were associated with armed forces and armed groups. A former child-soldier takes part in an art class.

p. 4 © UNICEF/UN0572462/Khachatryan. Armenia, 2021. Displaced children playing a game with their teacher during a class at their temporary education center.

p. 8 © ICRC/V-PH-E-01062/Vee Salazar. Philippines, 5 May 2019. Two years after the 2017 conflict in Marawi City City, the displaced persons continue to struggle for access to drinking water, viable livelihood opportunities and permanent shelters. Uncertainty remains as rehabilitation has yet to begin in the most damaged part of the city. The ICRC, with its partner the Philippine Red Cross, has been supporting the people of Marawi since the onset of the conflict.

p. 24 © People In Need. Syria, 2020. In several schools in northern Syria, People in Need (PIN) helped children to continue their learning even when the COVID-19 restrictions were put in place, through a distant learning methodology that PIN developed.

p. 26 © UNICEF/UN0267183/Herwig. Jordan, 2018. Safa, 10 years, does her homework with her siblings in Azraq Refugee Camp where she lives with her family and goes to school.


p. 45 © Street Child. Afghanistan, 2021. There is a need to go beyond access considerations and understand the needs within the EiE classrooms to ensure that all children are safe and learning.
Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies Members